RULE 43 AS MODE OF APPEAL (DARAB)

1. G.R. No. 147257 July 31, 2013

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 147257 July 31, 2013

SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NELLY SIAPNOSANCHEZ and INOCENCIO
BERMA,1 Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questions, for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion, the Resolution2 dated June 2, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the appeal of petitioner-spouses Jesus and Joela Dycoco in CA-G.R. SP No. 58504, and
the Resolution3 dated January 10, 2001 denying reconsideration.

On November 23, 1994, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of

certificates of land transfer, damages and injunction against private respondents Nelly Siapno-
Sanchez and Inocencio Berma in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Albay. Eusebio Siapno, Rogelio Siapno, Felix
Sepato, Sr., Leonora Talagtag and Pablo Bonde, Sr. were also named respondents in the
complaint.4

In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they are the absolute and registered owners of Lot
No. 216, a 38,157 sq.m.-parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. VH-5187 of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According to them, the
respondents named in the complaint took advantage of the liberality of petitioner-spouses, entered
the subject property, successfully registered themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes,
and occupied and cultivated the property to the prejudice of petitioner-spouses. Said respondents
deprived petitioner-spouses of the enjoyment and possession of the property without paying
petitioner-spouses or the Land Bank the rentals due thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian
reform laws, said respondents subleased their respective landholdings to other persons.5

Petitioner-spouses reiterated these matters in their position paper.6

All seven respondents named in the complaint were summoned but only Bonde and Rogelio
submitted their answer and position paper.7 Bonde and Rogelio showed that they already own their
portions of the property through Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Pursuant to the said law, petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer in their favor which resulted
in the issuance to them of emancipation patents and, subsequently, OCT No. E-2333 and OCT No.
E-2334, respectively.8

Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision dated June 27, 1995 finding private
respondents "not worthy to become beneficiaries" under Presidential Decree No. 27.9 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding for the complainants, respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Leonora Talagtag
and Inocencio Berma are hereby adjudged not worthy to become beneficiaries under PD 27; hence,
judgment is hereby issued:

1. Ordering the ejectment of Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Leonora Talagtag, and Inocencio Berma
from their respective tillage;

2. Ordering Rogelio Siapno and Pablo Bonde, Sr. to comply with their obligation under the
Deeds of Transfer in their favor;

3. Ordering the dismissal of the case against Eusebio Siapno, for lack of evidence; and

4. Ordering the respondents under paragraph 1 to pay complainants jointly and severally
nominal damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
₱10,000.00.10

On motion of petitioner-spouses, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a writ of execution dated

November 22, 1995 ordering, among others, the ejectment of private respondents from their
respective tillage.11 Subsequently, petitioner-spouses filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of
Execution and to Cite Respondents in Contempt, claiming that private respondents returned to the
subject property although they have already been ordered ejected.12 Private respondents filed a
Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution. They explained that they are
already the owners of their respective portions of the property in question by virtue of the Operation
Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27. According to private respondents, petitioner-
spouses executed deeds of transfer in their favor which resulted to the issuance to them of
emancipation patents and, afterwards, OCT No. E-2332 in the name of private respondent Siapno-
Sanchez and OCT Nos. E-2335 and E-2336 in the name of private respondent Berma. Private
respondents further asserted that the decision ordering their ejectment from their tillage is not yet
executory as they have filed a notice of appeal on August 29, 1996.13

Petitioner-spouses submitted their Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend

Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September
16, 1996 and Supplemental Comments [on]/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated October 3,
1996 where they countered private respondents’ motion by arguing that both the motion to quash
and the notice of appeal were filed beyond the prescribed period.14

In an order dated October 16, 1996, the Provincial Adjudicator found that the copy of the decision
dated June 27, 1995 was sent by registered mail to and, on July 10, 1995, received by Crispina
Berma Penaranda, daughter of private respondent Berma, who resided in a different barangay. Still,
the Provincial Adjudicator ruled that private respondent Berma was bound by his daughter’s receipt
and the decision is already final and executory as against him. Thus, with respect to him, the notice
of appeal was filed out of time. On the other hand, there was no showing that private respondent
Siapno-Sanchez has been served a copy of the decision before she procured a copy of it from the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator on August 26, 1996. Hence, as regards her, the notice of appeal
was filed on time. Therefore, the Provincial Adjudicator denied the Motion to Quash or Suspend
Implementation of the Writ of Execution with respect to private respondent Berma, and approved
and granted the same motion with respect to private respondent Siapno-Sanchez.15

Private respondent Berma moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied.16 Nevertheless, he
joined the appeal memorandum filed by private respondent Siapno-Sanchez in the DARAB.17 On the
other hand, petitioner-spouses filed a Counter-Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated
February 9, 1997, reiterating that private respondents’ appeal was filed out of time.18

In a decision dated March 20, 2000,19 the DARAB found that both private respondents were
beneficiaries of Presidential Decree No. 27 and that they are no longer tenants but owners of their
respective portions of the property as evidenced by OCT No. E-2332 in the name of private
respondent Siapno-Sanchez and OCT Nos. E-2335 and E-2336 in the name of private respondent
Berma. Ejectment would therefore not lie as against them as landholdings covered by the Operation
Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not revert to the original owner. Thus, the
DARAB reversed and set aside the decision dated June 27, 1995 in so far as private respondents
were concerned. The immediate reinstatement of private respondents to their respective
landholdings was ordered, as well as their restoration to their original status as owner-beneficiaries
of the landholdings awarded to them pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.20

Petitioner-spouses received a copy of the DARAB decision on April 3, 2000 and had until April 18,
2000 to file an appeal. They filed a motion in the Court of Appeals praying for an extension of 30
days within which to file their intended petition.21 The Court of Appeals granted them an extension of
15 days, with warning that no further extension will be given.22 Thus, petitioner-spouses had until
May 3, 2000 to file their petition.

Petitioner-spouses filed the petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was denied due
course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated June 2, 2000. In its entirety, the
said resolution reads:

The petition (for review), filed under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED DUE
COURSE and, as a consequence, DISMISSED, for late filing, as the petition was filed beyond the
extended period of fifteen (15) days granted under Resolution dated May 5, 2000, which resolution
was issued pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43, as follows:

xxxx

"Sec. 4. Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration
duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days" x x x.23

Petitioner-spouses moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated January 10,
2001.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner-spouses invoke the rule of liberality in the construction of the provisions of the Rules of
Court. The petition was filed after the period granted by the Court of Appeals because, on April 10,
2000, they secured the services of a new counsel who still had to study the voluminous records.
They claim that the petition they filed with the Court of Appeals is supported by compelling reasons.
According to petitioner-spouses, they were deprived of their property without just compensation
either from the tenant-beneficiaries or from the government. They were also deprived of due process
when the DARAB took cognizance of private respondents’ appeal although it was filed more than
one year after the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator had become final and executory. In view of
the said reasons, the Court of Appeals should have given their petition due course although it was
filed five days after the lapse of the extended period.

Petitioner-spouses are wrong.

Firstly, petitioner-spouses are before this Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which is a wrong remedy.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.24 Contrary to the claim of petitioner-spouses in the opening paragraph of their petition
that there was no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law other than this petition, the right recourse was to appeal to this Court in the form of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.

The Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 of the Court of Appeals were final and
appealable judgments. In particular, the Resolution dated June 2, 2000 denied due course to the
petition and dismissed it, while the Resolution dated January 1, 2001 denied the motion for
reconsideration of the former Resolution. The said Resolutions disposed of the appeal of petitioner-
spouses in a manner that left nothing more to be done by the Court of Appeals in respect to the said
appeal. Thus, petitioner-spouses should have filed an appeal by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court.

The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal.
This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in
the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability
of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter
remedy is the unavailability of appeal.25

The failure of petitioner-spouses to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
cannot be remedied by the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In Balayan v. Acorda26 the Court ruled:

It bears emphasis that the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy
of last recourse. The Court has often reminded members of the bench and bar that this extraordinary
action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available
but was lost through fault or negligence. In this case, petitioner-spouses received the Resolution
dated January 1, 2001 on January 19, 200127 and, under the rules,28 had until February 5, 2001 to
file an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari in this Court. Petitioner-spouses allowed
this period to lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on March 16,
2001.29

Secondly, petitioner-spouses claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing their appeal on the ground of late filing. This is also wrong.

The Court of Appeals granted petitioner-spouses a 15-day extension, within which to file their
intended petition. The action of the Court of Appeals was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Thus, as the original deadline of petitioner-spouses was April 18, 2000, they had
until May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Petitioner-spouses, however, filed the petition on May
8, 2000. Petitioner-spouses even admit that their petition in the Court of Appeals was filed five days
after the extended period.30 It is therefore clear that the Court of Appeals simply applied the rules,
while petitioner-spouses concededly failed to observe the very same rules. As such, the Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of the petition of petitioner-spouses was discretion duly exercised, not misused or
abused.

Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion,
the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.31 This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous
concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose. In this connection, Yu v. Judge
Reyes-Carpio32 is instructive:

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition
for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of
discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. (Citations
omitted.)

In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner-spouses show that the issuance of the Resolutions
dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 was patent and gross that would warrant striking them
down through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner-spouses simply
framed the issue in this case as follows:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY PETITIONERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY
DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.33

They did not, however, address the issue. It is noteworthy that aside from a cursory claim in the
opening paragraph and paragraph 25 of the petition that the Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and
January 1, 2001 of the Court of Appeals were "unjust and arbitrary" and "issued in grave abuse of
judicial discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,"34 petitioner-spouses failed to establish
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. They have not advanced any
argument to show that the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and hostility. Thus, they failed in their duty to
demonstrate with definiteness the grave abuse of discretion that would justify the proper availment of
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Thirdly, petitioner-spouses make it appear that there are compelling reasons to support their petition
-- deprivation of property without just compensation and denial of due process. The petitioner-
spouses, however, belatedly raised these issues and failed to substantiate the same.

There is no question that petitioner-spouses are entitled under the law to receive just compensation
for the property taken from them and transferred to private respondents by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27.35 Due process guarantees that taking of private property by the State for public use
should be with payment of just compensation.36 Unfortunately, petitioner-spouses themselves did not
consider the issue of just compensation as compelling enough because they did not raise it in the
complaint or in the position paper which they filed in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator.37 They
only claimed just compensation for the first time on appeal, that is, when they filed their petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. The settled rule that issues not raised in the proceedings below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal bursts the bubble that is the alleged compelling nature
of petitioner-spouses’ claim. Petitioner-spouses ask for due process, but fairness and due process
dictate that evidence and issues not presented below cannot be taken up for the first time on
appeal.38

On jurisdictional grounds, petitioner-spouses could not validly present for the first time the issue of
nonpayment of just compensation in the Court of Appeals. Under the law, the DARAB has primary,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving payments for lands awarded under
Presidential Decree No. 27.39

In any event, the right of petitioner-spouses to payment of just compensation does not include
reacquisition of ownership and possession of the property transferred to private respondents
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Lands acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not
revert to the landowner.40

The due process claim of petitioner-spouses has no leg to stand on.They have had ample
opportunity to defend their interests in due course.41 Stripped to its basic concept, due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to
explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.42 Petitioner-spouses were given the chance to sufficiently state their case concerning the
timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by private respondents. In particular, they submitted to the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator their Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September
16, 1996 and Supplemental Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated October 3,
1996 where they argued that both the motion to quash and the notice of appeal of private
respondents were filed beyond the prescribed period.43 In the DARAB level, petitioner-spouses filed
a Counter-Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated February 9, 1997 where they again
pointed out that the appeal of private respondents was filed out of time.44 Thus, petitioner-spouses
cannot correctly claim that they were not heard on the matter. 1âwphi1

More importantly, it has already been found that the notice of appeal was filed on time, particularly
with respect to private respondent Siapno-Sanchez.45 To question such finding is to raise a question
of fact. However, it is settled that questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for
certiorari.46 Only established or admitted facts can be considered.47 In this connection, it has been
established that the copy of the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision dated June 27, 1995 was sent by
registered mail to and received by private respondent Berma’s daughter who lived in another
barangay.48 Such receipt by Berma’s daughter cannot be validly considered as service of the
Provincial Adjudicator’s decision on Berma. Sections 4 and 9, Rule V of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure, which became effective on June 22, 1994, provides:

SECTION 4. Service of Pleadings, Notices and Resolutions. – a) The party filing the pleading shall
serve the opposing party with a copy thereof in the manner provided for in these Rules and proof of
such service shall be filed with the records of the case; and

b) Summons, notices and copies of resolutions, orders or decisions shall be served personally as far
as practicable, or by registered mail upon the party himself, his counsel, or his duly authorized
representative. However, notice to the counsel is notice to the party himself whether he be a
complainant or petitioner, or a defendant or respondent.

xxxx

SECTION 9. Proof of Completeness of Service. – The return is a prima facie proof of the facts
indicated therein. Service by registered mail is completed upon receipt by the addressee, his
counsel, or by the duly authorized representative or agent. (Emphases supplied.)

At that time, private respondent Berma had neither counsel nor duly authorized representative.
Therefore, the copy of the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision should have been served on Berma
personally or by registered mail. As it was sent by registered mail to private respondent Berma as
the addressee, service thereof could only have been completed upon receipt by Berma. As it was
not received by private respondent Berma but by his daughter who resided in another barangay,
there was no proper and completed service of the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision on Berma. Thus,
with respect to him, the notice of appeal was also filed on time.

Petitioner-spouses primarily anchor this petition on an invocation of the rule on liberality in the
construction of procedural rules. However, the "liberal construction rule" is not a license to disregard
procedural requirements. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for
the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.49 Petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament when they decided to change horses
in midstream and engaged the services of their present counsel on April 10, 2000 or just a week
before the expiration of the period to appeal in the Court of Appeals, discharging the services of their
former counsel who handled the case from the level of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB.
They cannot escape the consequences of a belated appeal caused by the need of their new counsel
for more time to study voluminous records and familiarize himself with the case. Moreover, as shown
above, petitioner-spouses not only failed to show any persuasive reason why they should be
exempted from strictly abiding by the rules when they filed their petition for review in the Court of
Appeals beyond the prescribed period. They again disregarded the rules in various ways absent any
compelling reason when they filed this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Petitioner-spouses named seven private respondents in their petition, namely, Eusebio

Siapno, Rogelio Siapno, Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Felix Sepato, Sr., Leonora Talagtag, Pablo
Bonde, Sr. and Inocencio Berma. A reading of the petition, however, shows that the petition
is against Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Benna. In particular, only Nelly Siapno-
Sanchez and Inocencio Benna were the appellants in DARAB Case No. 5573, which is the
subject of the Court of Appeals case involved in this petition. Also, petitioner-spouses state
that Eusebio Siapno has fully paid his obligation on June 27, 1996 (Exhibit "S" of petition,
rollo, p. 104). On the other hand, in a Manifestation dated September 23, 2004 (rollo. pp.
256-257), petitioner-spouses have dropped Felix Sepato, Sr. and Leonora Talagtag as
respondents in this case.

2Rollo, pp. 27-28; penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regina with Associate Justices
Conchita Carpio-Morales (subsequently, a member of this Court, now Ombudsman) and
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.

3 Id. at 30-31.
4 Id. at 53-55.

5 Id. at 153.

6 Id. at 72-74.

7 Id.

8Id. at 68-71; Answer, Annex "C" of Petition; id. at 75-84, Position Paper, Annex "E" of
Petition.

9 Id. at 85-87; Decision of Provincial Adjudicator Isabel Florin, Annex "F" of Petition.

10 Id. 87.

11 Id. at 90-91, Annex "I" of Petition.

12 Id. at 98; Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and to Cite Respondents in
Contempt, Annex "O" of Petition.

Id. at 106-107; Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution,

13

Annex "U" of Petition.

14Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of

Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents and Supplemental Comments
on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and
Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents, Annexes "W" and "Y" of Petition, id. at 110-111 and
114-116, respectively.

Id. at 124-126; Provincial Adjudicator’s Order dated October 16, 1996, Annex "AA" of
15

Petition.

Id. at 130-131; Provincial Adjudicator’s Order dated November 6, 1996, Annex "CC" of
16

Petition.

17Id. at 132-147; Appeal Memorandum for Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Berma
dated November 13, 1996, Annex "DD" of Petition.

18 Id. at 148-149.

19 Id. at 152-159.

20 Id.

Id. at 160-164; Notice of Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition,
21

Annex "GG" of Petition.

22 Id. at 33-34.

23 Id. at 27-28.
24 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 1.

25 Bugarin v. Palisoc, 513 Phil. 59, 66 (2005).

26 523 Phil. 305, 309 (2006).

27 Rollo, pp. 3-4.

28 Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 2 provides:

Section 2. Time for filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an
extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.

The 15th day after petitioner’s receipt of the Decision dated January 1, 2001 was
February 3, 2001, a Saturday. Under Section 1, Rule 22, if the last day of the period
"falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day." Hence, petitioner had until February
5, 2001, a Monday, to file the petition for review in this ourt.

29 Rollo, p. 3.

30 Id. at 15. Petition, p. 13.

31 Abedes v. Court of Appeals, 562 Phil. 262, 276 (2007)

32 G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.

Rollo, p. 334. This is how the issue, as framed by petitioner-spouses, is worded in their
33

Memorandum. In their petition, the issue reads:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE COURSE THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED
BY PETITION FOR REVIEW AND SUBSEQUENTLY DENYING PETIONERS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. (Id. at 15.)

34 Id. at 4.

35See Dr. Zurbano v. Hon. Estrella, 221 Phil. 696, 702-703 (1985), where it was explained
that Presidential Decree No. 27 itself requires that just compensation be paid to the
landowner whose property was placed under the operation of that law.

36 Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law x x x." Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution further provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
37What petitioner-spouses alleged in their complaint and position paper was nonpayment of
rentals due from private respondents as tenants. Rollo, pp. 53-55 (Complaint) and 72-74
(Position Paper).

38 Tan v. Commission on Elections, 537 Phil. 510, 533 (2006).

39Paragraph (h), Section 1, Rule II, 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure. This was also the rule
under Paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure, the
prevailing rule at the time petitioner-spouses filed their complaint on November 23, 1994.
The DARAB rules of procedure have been issued pursuant to Section 49 and 50 of Republic
Act No. 6657 as amended, and Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-A in relation to
Section 13 thereof.

Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso v. Perez, G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013; De la Cruz v.
40

Quiazon, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 681, 693.

41
As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was
not denied due process (Cayago v. Lina, 489 Phil. 735, 751 [2005]).

42 Samalio v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 456, 466 (2005).

43Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of

Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents and Supplemental Comments
on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and
Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents, Annexes "W" and "Y" of Petition, rollo, pp. 110-111
and 114-116, respectively.

44 Rollo, pp. 148-149.

Id. at 124-126; Provincial Adjudicator’s Order dated October 16, 1996, Annex "AA" of
45

Petition.

46 Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, 566 Phil. 1, 35 (2008).

47 Ramcar, Inc. v. Hi-Power Marketing, 527 Phil. 699, 708 (2006).

48Provincial Adjudicator’s Order dated September 25, 1996, rollo, pp. 112-113; Provincial
Adjudicator’s Order dated October 16, 1996, id. at 124-126; DARAB Decision dated March
20, 2000, id. at 152-159.

49 Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 529 Phil. 876, 885-886 (2006).

 FIRST DIVISION

SUSAN G. PO and LILIA G. G.R. No. 173329

MUTIA,
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

OMERO DAMPAL,* Promulgated:

Respondent. December 21, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon
which were covered by OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147, with an approximate
area of 2.5773 and 2.0651 hectares, respectively, were mortgaged for P33,000.00
by the spouses Florencio and Ester Causin, through their attorney-in-fact Manuel
Causin, to the now-defunct Rural Bank of Tagoloan, Inc.

For failure to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold
the lots at public auction on July 8, 1992 to petitioner Susan G. Po (Susan) who
was the highest bidder. OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147 were subsequently
cancelled and TCT No. T-39280 and TCT No. 39281 were, in their stead, issued in
Susans favor, following the spouses Causins failure to redeem the property.

On September 13, 1993, Susan sold the lot covered by TCT No. 39281 to
her herein co-petitioner Lilia G. Mutia (Lilia) who was issued TCT No. T-40193.
 On September 29, 1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-herein
respondent Omero Dampal (Dampal) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manolo Fortich a complaint against the bank for Annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-280 (the civil case).

While the civil case was pending or on June 16, 1997, Dampal filed a
complaint against Susan and Lilia before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region X, for Legal Redemption with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, docketed as DARAB Case No. X-05-361.

By Decision[1] of September 16, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator of DARAB

Region X disallowed the redemption prayed for on the ground of prescription,
albeit he declared that Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a tenant; and that
although Dampal was not given notice in writing of the public auction sale, he was
deemed to have knowledge thereof because of the civil case for annulment, hence,
there was substantial compliance with the rules.

Dampals motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order[2] dated

October 28, 1997, he appealed to the DARAB Central Office where it was
docketed as DARAB Case No. 7315.

By Decision[3] of October 19, 2004, the DARAB Central Office reversed the
Adjudicators ruling. It held that Dampal, as a tenant, had the right to redeem the
mortgage in the amount of P40,000.00 plus interest; and that the right had not
prescribed, owing to the lack of written notice to him and to the DAR of the sale. It
accordingly ordered the cancellation of the title issued in favor of Susan and that of
Lilia and the issuance of new ones in Dampals favor, upon his payment of the
redemption amount. Susan and Lilias motion for reconsideration of the said
Decision was denied by Resolution[4] of July 7, 2005, hence, they appealed via
certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
 By Resolution[5] of October 19, 2005, the appellate court, holding that
petitioners should have appealed the DARAB Decision via Rule 43, instead of
Rule 65, dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari.

Petitioners thereupon filed before the appellate court a Motion for Leave to
Amend Petition and for Admission of Amended Petition, which motion was denied
by Resolution[6] of March 28, 2006. In denying the motion, the appellate court held
that dismissal due to error in the mode of appeal cannot be reconsidered by the
mere expediency of filing an amended petition. Moreover, it noted that it was filed
out of time.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts March 28, 2006
Resolution, alleging that their error in the choice of remedy was excusable as they
relied on Sec. 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, reading:

Sec. 1. Appeal to the Board. An appeal may be taken to the Board from a
resolution, decision or final order of the Adjudicator that completely disposes of
the case by either or both of the parties within a period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution/decision/final order appealed from or of the denial of the
movants motion for reconsideration in accordance with section 12, Rule X by:

1.1 filing a Notice of Appeal with the Adjudicator who rendered

the decision or final order appealed from;
1.2 furnishing copies of said Notice of Appeal to all parties and the
Board; and
1.3 paying an appeal fee of Seven Hundred Pesos (Php700.00) to
the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated or
through postal money order, payable to the DAR Cashier
where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated, at the option of
the appellant.

A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the

appeal fee.

Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to

the Board and payment of appeal fee shall be filed, within the
reglementary period, with the Adjudicator a quo and shall form
part of the records of the case.
 Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be a ground for dismissal
of the appeal. (underscoring supplied)

By Resolution[7] of May 22, 2006, the appellate court denied the motion for
reconsideration, holding that nothing in the above-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV states
that the remedy of an aggrieved party from an adverse decision of the DARAB is
by certiorari, and that the applicable rule is Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure.

On petitioners attribution of the faux pas to their counsel, the appellate court
held that they are bound thereby. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assert that the appellate court, in dismissing their petition due to
technicality, denied them the opportunity to establish the merits of their case. They
maintain that Dampals right of redemption has prescribed, he having admitted
Susans acquisition of title to the property as early as 1993 but that it was only in
1997 that he filed the action for redemption before the DARAB. They thus
conclude that the need for sending him notice in writing could be dispensed with;
and that Dampals inaction estopped him from asserting his right as a tenant.
The petition is bereft of merit.

The earlier-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of

Procedure dwells on how appeals to the DARAB Board from the decisions,
resolutions or final orders of the Adjudicator are to be taken. How petitioners
could have been misled to file their appeal from the DARABs Decision to the
Court of Appeals via certiorari escapes comprehension.

Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB
should be filed with the Court of Appeals by verified petition for review. Thus,
Sec. 1 of Rule 43 provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of
the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
 functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President,
Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board,
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural
Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board
of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators
authorized by law.
SECTION 2. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
SECTION 3. How appeal taken. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for
review x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure provides:

Section 1. Appeal to the Court of Appeals. - Any decision, order, resolution, award or
ruling of the Board on any agrarian dispute or any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement, interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought on appeal within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Rules
of Court. (underscoring supplied)

While a petition for certiorari, when availed of as a wrong remedy, is

dismissible, there are exceptions thereto, viz: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so
requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[8] None of these
circumstances is present in the case at bar, however.

The denial[9] by the appellate court of petitioners MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO AMEND PETITION AND FOR ADMISSION OF AMENDED PETITION
filed on October 28, 2005 is thus in order. For the records show that petitioners
filed the petition for certiorari on the last day of the 15-day period to appeal or on
October 5, 2005.
 The belated filing of the Amended Petition is inexcusable.

Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble
purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal
construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules
are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be
ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures
the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly
and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to
hamper litigants or complicate litigation; they help provide a
vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following
judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and
our system of justice are well served by a conscientious
observance by the parties of the procedural rules.[10] (emphasis
supplied)

Technicality aside, on the merits, petitioners failed to establish that in

deciding the case, the DARAB committed grave abuse of discretion.

In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of written notice to the
tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR, is indispensable, particularly in view of
Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, which
mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the notice in writing upon
registration of the sale.

Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of
1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, otherwise known as the Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, provides:

Sec. 12. Lessees right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are
two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to
the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this
Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing
which shall
be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian
Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other
 right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land
at the time of the sale. (emphasis supplied)

The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled the
running of the prescriptive period. Petitioners contention that Dampal must be
considered to have had constructive knowledge thereof fails in light of
the express requirement for notice to be in writing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*
The Court of Appeals was omitted following Section 4 of Rule 45 which provides that lower courts or judges
should not be impleaded either as petitioner or respondent.
[1]
DARAB records, pp. 72-75. Penned by Regional Adjudicator Jimmy V. Tapangan.
[2]
Id. at 83-84. Penned by Regional Adjudicator Jimmy V. Tapangan.
[3]
Id. at 99-105. Penned by Asst. Secretary Rustico T. de Belen and concurred in by Vice Chairman Lorenzo R.
Reyes and Members Augusto P. Quijano, Edgar A. Igano and Rolando G. Mangulabnan.
[4]
Id. at 125-127. Penned by Asst. Secretary Edgar A. Igano and concurred in by Vice-Chairman Lorenzo R. Reyes
and Members Augusto P. Quijano and Delfin B. Samson.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 104. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
[6]
Id. at 207.
[7]
Id. at 212-217. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita Dy-
Liacco Flores and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
[8]
Vide Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, 10 April 2006, 487
SCRA 78, 100.
[9]
CA rollo, p. 00271.
[10]
Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 378, 385.