You are on page 1of 10

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION v.

COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX


APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. No. 119122. August 8,
2000
FACTS:

The PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) for
the payment of deficiency amusement tax.

The PBA contested the assessment by filing a protest with the CIR who denied the same. The
PBA then filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), in which they held
against the PBA.

The PBA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.

ISSUES:

Whether the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games is a national tax.

Whether the cession of advertising and streamer spaces to Vintage Enterprises, Inc. subject
to amusement tax.

RULING:

YES. The Local Tax Code does not provide for professional basketball games but rather in PD
1959. It is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of professional basketball games" is
required to pay an amusement tax of 15% of their gross receipts to the BIR, which payment is
a national tax.

YES. The definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising
and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or
operator of the amusement place. The law being clear, there is no need for an extended
interpretation.
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K.
LOY, Petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183137, 10 April 2013.

LEONEN, J.:

Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which has
facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls.

In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59, the
tax ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."

Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition
before the Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretary’s failure to decide on the appeal within
sixty days, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC.

Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of
local government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local Government Code, which provides
that the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges
or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided.

The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section
140 (a) of the LGC encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and
tourist spots since Article 131 (b) of the LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion
and entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."

RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Injunction for lack of merit. Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper
remedy. However, it gave credence to the Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase
‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 of the LGC.

ISSUE: W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement
places" under the LGC.

RULING: NO.

Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from levying
amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. The levying of
percentage taxes is prohibited "except as otherwise provided" by the LGC. Section 140
provides such exception.

Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on "the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia,
and other places of amusement."
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among
those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement
taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to
these places hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the
former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to
persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned."

Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of
something, typically an impressive one"; while ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or
presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment." As such, the ordinary definitions
of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or
viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that
actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.

Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and
tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be
venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors
or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.
EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012

FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto
Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with
the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the
Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest,
Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision.
The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years.
In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died.
Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding
the removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a
case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in
favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an
easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099
wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the
HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open
space.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as
defined in P. D. 1216.

RULING:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.”

The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine
whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no
specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.

Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration
refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase
“other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a
doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity,
without which, survival in the community would be impossible.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals

G.R. No. L-33471 January 31, 1972

FACTS:
Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and
the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k)
of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited
importation cannot be released under bond.

ISSUE:
W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not as
stated by Respondent Court, among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec.
102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under
bond as provided in Sec. 2301 of the same code.

HELD:
Yes. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. 102
(k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.

LATIN MAXIM: Ejesdem generis.


Of the same kind or specie.
3.4.6
GR No. L-2783
FACTS:
A case for bigamy was filed against Nello Y. Roa. Former Judge Roman Cruz was placed on
the witness stand by the defendant to prove that his wife Elena has already secured a
decree of divorce against him in July 1944. The prosecution objected to this move of the
defendant, but the objection was overruled, and so the prosecution filed a petition for a
writ of prohibition praying that the respondent judge be enjoined from allowing the
defendant to prove the alleged decree of divorce by oral evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject matter of the petition is among those that can be determined by way
of declaratory relief under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
CONCLUSION:
Under this rule, the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter
not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expression unius
est exclussio alterius.
The subject matter does not refer to any written instrument, statute or ordinance. It
merely refers to the sufficiency or probative value of an oral evidence concerning a decree
of divorce by a former judge, which the court trying the bigamy case has ample power and
authority to pass upon.
GR No. 79974
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the
Department of Budget from disbursing payments for Mison’s
salaries and emoluments on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the
constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is
apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom
the president shall appoint:
1. Whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
2. Officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
ISSUE: The use of the word “also” implies that the President shall “in like manner” appoint
the officers mentioned in said second sentence as he appoints officers mentioned in the
first sentence.
CONCLUSION: The word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" which
meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means
that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint
(without such consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
ISSUE: That since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such law, lower-ranked officers have to
be appointed by the President subject to confirmations by the CA and that it will also be
applicable to that high-ranked officials.
CONCLUSION: There was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may
be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec.
16, Article VII.

GR NOS. 165510-33

FACTS:
Criminal cases were filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for his alleged failure
to file the SAL from 1962 to 1985. He filed through counsel a Motion to Recall Warrants of
Arrest alleging that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. Due to his non-compliance
with these terms, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to recall the warrant of
arrest. The Court declared invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG for
lack of jurisdiction. However, it held that the invalidity or absence of a preliminary
investigation did not affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or impair the validity of
the informations. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was ordered to suspend the proceedings pending
the holding of a proper preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:

GR No. 149110
FACTS:
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under
Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended. For many years now, petitioner sells electric
power to the residents of Cabanatuan City, posting a gross income of P107,814,187.96 in
1992.7 Pursuant to section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92, the respondent assessed the
petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of the latter’s
gross receipts for the preceding year.
Petitioner refused to pay the tax assessment arguing that the respondent has no authority
to impose tax on government entities. Petitioner also contended that as a non-profit
organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees
in accordance with sec. 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended.

The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC, demanding that petitioner pay the
assessed tax due, plus surcharge. Respondent alleged that petitioner’s exemption from
local taxes has been repealed by section 193 of the LGC, which reads as follows:

“Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless otherwise provided in this


Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government owned or controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock
and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.”
RTC upheld NPC’s tax exemption. On appeal the CA reversed the trial court’s Order on the
ground that section 193, in relation to sections 137 and 151 of the LGC, expressly withdrew
the exemptions granted to the petitioner.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent city government has the authority to issue Ordinance No.
165-92 and impose an annual tax on “businesses enjoying a franchise
CONCLUSION: It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Not being a local water district, a cooperative
registered under R.A. No. 6938, or a non-stock and non-profit hospital or educational
institution, petitioner clearly does not belong to the exception. It is therefore incumbent
upon the petitioner to point to some provisions of the LGC that expressly grant it
exemption from local taxes.
But this would be an exercise in futility. Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs
can impose franchise tax "notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other
special law." This particular provision of the LGC does not admit any exception.
AC NO. 5738
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon
located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for
them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to
conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent
ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that
respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
CONCLUSION:

Sec. 90 of RA 7160 is the applicable law. While, as already discussed, certain local elective
officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of
the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession.
And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time.
GR No. L-32441
ISSUE: Whether the prescription by a physician of opium for a patient whose physical
condition did not require the use of such drug constitutes “unprofessional conduct” as to
justify revocation of physician’s license to practice
HELD: Still liable. Rule of expressio unius not applicable.
Court said, It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified,
there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed ‘unprofessional.’  Nor can it be
convincingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe out all other forms of
‘unprofessional’ conduct therefore deemed grounds for revocation of licenses
4.       Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of
its provision to particular persons or things enumerating them, but no reason exists why
other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included and manifest
injustice will follow by not including them.
5.       If it will result in incongruities or a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
6.       If adherence thereto would cause inconvenience, hardship and injury to the public
interest.