People v. Marti search and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the Serrano vs.
much less an illegal one. Thus, the Serrano vs. NLRC / ISETANN - GR No. 117040 Case
G.R. No. 81561; 18 January 1991
FACTS:
On 14 August 1987, appellant Andre Marti and his
common-law wife went to the booth of the Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a fiend
in Zurich, Switzerland. When asked if the packages could
be examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that
they were simply gifts of books cigars, and gloves. The
packages were then placed in a box and was sealed with
masking tape for shipment.
As a standard operating procedure before delivering
packages to the Bureau of Customs and/or Burueau of
Posts, the proprietor of the forwarding agency opened the
box for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted therefrom
and he found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to
NBI, and informed them that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Agents of the NBI went to his office and
found the shipment containing bricks of dried marijuana
leaves, some of which were packed inside the gloves and
neatly stocked underneath tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an
information was filed against the appellant in violation of
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found
guilty. Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the
evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and further,
that the court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally
searched and seized packages.
ISSUE:
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant’s constitutional rights be invoked against the
State?
HELD:
No. As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State in the absence of governmental interference. This
constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether
citizen or alien, from interference by government; and the
search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon private individuals. In
the present case, it was the proprietor of the forwarding
agency who made search/inspection of the packages and
the contraband came into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against
unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI agents made no
alleged act of the private individual in violation of a
constitutional right cannot be invoked against the State.
NB:
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Reference:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Digest
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department
Store as the head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-
cutting measure, Isetann phased out its entire security
section and engaged the services of an independent security
agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann
failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section
to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private
respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that
private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in
selecting employees whose employment would be
terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered
petitioner to be given separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security
agency by the private respondent to replace its current
security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the
employees classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy
program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of
the services of an independent contractor to replace the
services of the terminated employees to promote economy
and efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a
malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere
with the exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any of the cause
provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be
reinstated and paid backwages. To contend that even if the
termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned
should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to
amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering
dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of
the causes mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with
that article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid
backwages from the time his employment was terminated
until it is determined that the termination of employment is
for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is
dismissed renders the termination without legal effect.

BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, et. al., G.R. No.
149454. May 28, 2004
Full Text
Facts: Plaintiff CASA Montessori International opened a
current account with BPI. In 1991, plaintiff discovered that
nine (9) of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny
D. Santos since 1990 in the total amount of P782,000.00. It
turned out that Sonny D. Santos with account at BPIs
Greenbelt Branch was a fictitious name used by third party
defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as external
auditor of CASA. A Third party defendant voluntarily
admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and
encashed the checks.
On March 4, 1991, plaintiff filed the herein Complaint for
Collection with Damages against defendant bank praying
that the latter be ordered to reinstate the amount
of P782,500.00 in the current and savings accounts of the
plaintiff with interest at 6% per annum.
RTC rendered decision in favor of CASA. CA modified
decision holding CASA as contributory negligent hence
ordered Yabut to reimburse BPI half the total amount
claimed and CASA, the other half. It also disallowed
attorney’s fees and moral and exemplary damages.
Issues: WON there was forgery under the Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL)?
Ruling:
The Court first discussed that forgery is a defense.
“Section 23 of the NIL Section 23. Forged signature; effect
of. — When a signature is forged or made without the
authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it
is wholly inoperative, and no right x x x to enforce payment
thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through
or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is
sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up
the forgery or want of authority. “
Under this provision, a forged signature is a real or
absolute defense, and a person whose signature on a
negotiable instrument is forged is deemed to have never
become a party thereto and to have never consented to
the contract that allegedly gave rise to it. The
counterfeiting of any writing, consisting in the signing
of anothers name with intent to defraud, is forgery. In
the present case, we hold that there was forgery of the
drawers signature on the check.
Negligence is attributable to BPI alone. A banking business
is impressed with public interest, of paramount importance
thereto is the trust and confidence of the public in
general. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is
expected, and high standards of integrity and performance
are even required, of it. BPI, despite claims of following its
signature verification procedure, still failed to detect the
eight instances of forgery. Its negligence consisted in the
omission of that degree of diligence required of a bank. It
cannot now feign ignorance, for very early on we have
already ruled that a bank is bound to know the signatures of
its customers. and if it pays a forged check, it must be
considered as making the payment out of its own funds,
and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the
account of the depositor whose name was forged.
III. Fundamental Powers of the State
Similarities and Differences
Planters products inc. vs. Fertiphil
FACTS:
Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private
corporations incorporated under Philippinelaws, both
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agriculturalchemicals.Marcos issued Letter
of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery
component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. The levy was
to continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI
financiallyviable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted
thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to
FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution,
FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy.
Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the amount it
remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was
unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful
imposition that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI
argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because itdoes not have a
“personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” It asserts that
Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition
because“incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer
or the farmers themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer
company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.What is the power of
taxation?
RULING:
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury;
doctrine of standing is a mereprocedural technicality which
may be waived.The imposition of the levy was an exercise
of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that
thepower to tax can be used as an implement of police
power, the primary purpose of the levy was
revenuegeneration. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if
revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantialpurposes,
then the exaction is properly called a tax.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers
of the State. These powers are distinct andhave different
tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to
enact legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare, while the
power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for
public purpose. The main purpose of police power isthe
regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation
is revenue generation. The “lawful subjects” and“lawful
means” tests are used to determine the validity of a law
enacted under the police power. Thepower of taxation,
on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and
constitutional limitations.
ROMEO P. GEROCHI v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
GR NO. 159796, 2007-07-17
Facts:
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB),
and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN)
(petitioners), come before this Court in this original action
praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136,
otherwise known as the
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA),
imposing the Universal Charge,[1] and Rule 18 of the
Rules and Regulations (IRR)[2] which seeks to implement
the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners also pray... that the Universal Charge imposed
upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued directing the respondents to refrain from
implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its
IRR which sought to implement the same are
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34
of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented
under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law
is a tax which is to be collected from all electric
end-users and self-generating entities. The
power to tax is strictly a... legislative function
and as such, the delegation of said power to any
executive or administrative agency like the ERC
is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
authority. The assailed provision clearly
provides that the Universal Charge is to be
determined, fixed and... approved by the ERC,
hence leaving to the latter complete
discretionary legislative authority.
2. The ERC is also empowered to approve and
determine where the funds collected should be
used.
3. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all
end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and
amounts to taxation without representation as
the consumers were not given a chance to be
heard and represented.[18]
Issues:
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed
under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of
legislative power to tax on the part of the
ERC.[26]
Ruling:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of
the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the
doctrine of separation of powers is the... principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim
potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been
delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical
principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be... performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through
the intervening mind of another. [47]
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life,
delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle.[48] Given the volume and variety of interactions
in today's society, it is... doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond
promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need
to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies
tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the
authority... to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All
that is required for the valid exercise of this power of
subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation
be... not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are
denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to... determine
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.[49]
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that
"within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by
the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users," and
therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid... as
Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain
by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself.
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners' contention, the ERC
does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of the Universal Charge.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid
delegation of legislative power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted
as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and
order;"[51] "adequate and efficient instruction;"[52] "public
interest;"[53] "justice and... equity;"[54] "public
convenience and welfare;"[55] "simplicity, economy and
efficiency;"[56] "standardization and regulation of medical
education;"[57] and "fair and equitable employment...
practices."[58] Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among
others, "to ensure the total electrification of the country and
the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the
supply of electric power"[59] and "watershed...
rehabilitation and management"[60] meet the requirements
for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the
ERC's power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the
contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the
Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived
or abandoned per
Resolution[64] of August 3, 2004.[65] Moreover, the
determination of whether or not a tax is excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially
involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded
from... reviewing the same.[66]
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.[68]
Indubitably,... petitioners failed to overcome this
presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear
violation of the Constitution which would warrant a
pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of
its IRR are unconstitutional and void.
 or more constructions, that construction should be adopted ISSUE: whether or not the ordinance upon which said
which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of complaint was based is constitutional.
Police Power the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute
was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
HELD: Yes
US v. Toribio would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute
Facts: and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act  The right or power conferred upon the
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the
human consumption the carabao described in the prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any police power of the state and the state was fully
information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer authorized and justified in conferring the same
of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation place without the permit provided for in section 30.
upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands
of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an and that, therefore, the provisions of said Act are
Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of constitutional and not in violation nor in
large cattle. derogation of the rights of the persons affected
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of thereby
Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no G.R. No. L-10255 August 6, 1915
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant
 Police power has been
contends that under such circumstances the provisions of THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. defined as the power of the
Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of SILVESTRE POMPEYA, defendant-appellee government, inherent in every
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
sovereign, and cannot be
limited. The power vested in
Issue: FACTS:
the legislature to make such
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of
laws as they shall judge to be
these provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section  A Municipal Ordinance was enacted by the
for the good of the state and
30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases: Province of Iloilo pursuant to the provisions of
its subjects. The power to
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is
govern men and things,
municipal slaughter house without a permit duly secured to require each able-bodied male resident of the
extending to the protection of
from the municipal treasurer, and municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as
the lives, limbs, health,
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal well as each householder when so required by
comfort, and quiet of all
slaughter-house without a permit duly secured from the the president, to assist in the maintenance of
persons, and the protection of
municipal treasurer. peace and good order in the community, by
all property within the state.
apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving
The authority to establish
Held: information of the existence of such persons in
such rules and regulations for
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the the locality. The amendment contains a
the conduct of all persons as
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, punishment for those who may be called upon
may be conducive to the
without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, for such service, and who refuse to render the
public interest.
and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of same.
large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such
 Blackstone, in his valuable
permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies  A complaint was filed by the prosecuting
commentaries on the common
generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human attorney of the Province of Iloilo against laws, defines police power as
consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured Pompeya with violation of the said ordinance "the defenses, regulations,
from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing
for failing to render service on patrol duty and domestic order of the
for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
required under the same country, whereby the
without such permit.
inhabitants of a state, like
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for
 defendant argued that the municipal ordinance members of a well-governed
human consumption or killing for food at a municipal
alleged to be violated is unconstitutional family, are bound to conform
slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by
because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the their general behaviour to the
the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the
Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the rules of propriety, good
keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office
citizens neighborhood, and good
of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
manners, and to be decent,
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two
 industrious, and inoffensive in
their respective stations."
 The police power of the state may be
said to embrace the whole system of
internal regulation, by which the state
seeks not only to preserve public order
and to prevent offenses against the
state, but also to establish, for the
intercourse of citizen with citizen,
those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood, which are calculated to
prevent a conflict of rights, and to
insure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own, so far as is
reasonably consistent, with a like
enjoyment of the rights of others. The
police power of the state includes not
only the public health and safety, but
also the public welfare, protection
against impositions, and generally the
public's best best interest. It so
extensive and all pervading, that the
courts refuse to lay down a general
rule defining it, but decide each
specific case on its merits
 It will also be noted that the law authorizing the
president of the municipality to call upon persons,
imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1)
The person called upon to render such services
must be an able-bodied male resident of the
municipality; (2) he must be between the ages of
18 and 55 [50], and (3) certain conditions must
exist requiring the services of such persons
 It will not contended that a
nonresident of the municipality would
be liable for his refusal to obey the
call of the president; neither can it be
logically contended that one under the
age of 18 or over the age of 55 [50]
would incur the penalty of the law by
his refusal to obey the command of
the president. Moreover, the persons
liable for the service mentioned in the
law cannot be called upon at the mere
whim or caprice of the president.
There must be some just and
reasonable ground, at least sufficient
in the mind of a reasonable man,
before the president can call upon the
the persons for the service mentioned
in the law. The law does not apply to
all persons. The law does not apply to
every condition. The law applies to
special persons and special conditions
 A complaint based upon such a law, in
order to be free from objection under a
demurrer, must show that the person
charged belongs to the class of
persons to which the law is applicable
 Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in
the present case, the court would be unable to
impose the punishment provided for by law,
because it does not show (a) that the defendant
was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he
was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not
under 18 years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d)
that conditions existed which justified the
president of the municipality in calling upon him
for the services mentioned in the law
Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995 , 101 Phil. 115
May 31, 1957
 [Petitioner: Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf
and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected
by RA 1180
Respondents: Jamie Hernandez, Secretary of
Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City
Treasurer of Manila]
 Facts:
Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that Republic Act
1180 is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1)
it denies to alien residents the equal protection
of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines. In answer, the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that the Act was passed in the
valid exercise of the police power of the State,
which exercise is authorized in the Constitution
in the interest of national economic survival.
 Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the
equal protection of laws.
 Held/Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid
exercise of police power. It was also then
provided that police power cannot be bargained
away through the medium of a treaty or a
contract. The enactment clearly falls within the
scope of the police power of the State. The law
does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in
the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege. The petition is hereby denied, with
costs against petitioner.
LUTZ VS. ARANETA [98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22
Dec 1955]
Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the
Intestate Estateof Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to
recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal
Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as taxes,
pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of
said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or persons in
control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar
cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made
under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar
industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not
a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for
that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of
First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar
Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is
unconstitutional.
Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is
constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation
and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since
sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation,
its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore
redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said
objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore
constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may
determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for
its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives
and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is
seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for
their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made
with the implement of the state’s police power. In addition,
it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that
will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under
the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v.
City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967]
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v.
City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the
municipal board of the City of Manila and approved by
Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting
Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a
hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining
or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up
the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given
name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and
the number of companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with
data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and
affixed his signature in the presence of such owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound
together; (3) provides that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police,
or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also
classified motels into two classes and required the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or
restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are
required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels,
motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. It provided
a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association
(EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go
Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of
the City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a
plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void
and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain
from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July
1963. After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that
the City of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and
rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore
null and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction
issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and
hotels (increasing license fees, partially restricting the
freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of
individuals) is valid and/or constitutional.
Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is
observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to
the existence of motels, which provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and
thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill
seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments
by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open
to public view at all times, and by introducing several other
amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests. The
increase in the license fees was intended to discourage
establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal and to increase the income of the city
government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to
contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a
proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged,
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command
of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could
be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen
may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of
the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper
scope of the police power. State in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state.
Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195
Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the
constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle
owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to
be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it
stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation
Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the
compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and
subsequent administrative order are unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due
process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation
of police power.
Issue
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the
subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition.
The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional.
These were definitely in the exercise of police power as
such was established to promote public welfare and public
safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise
and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic
safety by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in
consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to
stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY
COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.,respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at
least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery
shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon
City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino
Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta,
declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and
void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s
property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power
and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended
for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that
the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in
the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.”
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
contended that the taking or confiscation of property was
obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently
restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used
for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of
the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of
the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision
which states that ‘no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill,
Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand,
there are three inherent powers of government by which the
state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to
exist independently of the Constitution as necessary
attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act
No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify
the ordinance in question except the provision granting
police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified
under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the City.
The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial
park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in
order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property
of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for injury sustained
in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are
known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its
police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety,
health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of
the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. A property in the state is held
subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the
common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like
all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent
them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints
and regulations, established by law, as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them
by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The
state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary
power to deal with all matters relating to the general health,
morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner
as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent
positive wrong and oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law
or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its
own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the
law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from
laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments.
The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay
by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold
to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.
Lozano v. Martinez
G.R .No. L-63419; December 18, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the
Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a person “who
makes or draws and issues any check on account for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is
aimed at putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks that
are worthless which causes injury to the public interest.
Contentions on the law are that: 1) it offends constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs
freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection
clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive
powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim
Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the
Third Reading
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)
HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check, not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance
of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large since putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation can pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise
of police power and is not in conflict with the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP
22 impairs freedom of contract since contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does
not deny the equal protection clause since it only penalizes
the drawer of the check and not the payee. Additonally, BP
22 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
powers. Contrary to the contention, the power to define the
offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the
payee. On the last contention, the Interim Batasan
investigated the matter and reported that the clause in
question was an authorized amendment of the bill. With all
the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of BP 22 is
upheld.
YNOT v. IAC
FACTS
Here, the constitutionality of former President
Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said
order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial
transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed
to charitableinstitutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission
(NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of
carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the
Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit.
Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated
by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for
recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the
lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and
as they can no longer be produced, directed
the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the
constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of
want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main,
petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar
as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty
suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE
Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative
of the due process clause.
HELD
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the
following must be present: (a) that the interests of the
public, generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO
626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the
carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct
relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos
except those seven years old if male and eleven if female workers, male and female of overseas employment. It in thechallenged Department Order No. 1.
upon issuance of a permit adequately works for
the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while
EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the
the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an
absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has
their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear.
The reasonable connection between the means employed Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such been valid classification, the Filipino
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed
measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial
order is a discrimination against males and females. The female domestics working abroad were in a class by
transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to themselves, because of the special risk to which their class
retaining them in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies
make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there
was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid only to female contract workers but it does not thereby
the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation,
denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes make an undue discriminationbetween sexes. It is well
Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker settled hat equality before the law under
and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly,
there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be participation in policy and decision-making processes theconstitution does not import a perfect identity of rights
validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a
public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by among all men and women. It admits of classification,
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However,
these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE provided that:
sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it.
In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner submitting to the validity of thechallenged guidelines
by which the disposition of the confiscated property also
presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers involving the police power of the State and informed the 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the
NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited
court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines
that said officers must observe in making the distribution
are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the 3. They are not confined to existing conditions
they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone
to partiality and abuse, and even corruption. Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN
1988] Filipino workers. In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on

substantial distinctions.

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters,

Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel.

The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to
travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is
subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public
safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of
female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is
there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the
labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
Association Of Small Landowners Vs Secretary Of
Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal
questions including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D
No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia
of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that
the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled
for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They
contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which such payment is not
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228
and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said executive orders violate the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process
or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot
eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform
has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said
rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid
exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain,
though there are traditional distinction between the police
power and the power of eminent domain, property
condemned under police power is noxious or intended for
noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such
property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking
of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of
expropriation which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.
DECS VS SAN DIEGO (1989)
FACTS:
Private respondent, San Diego, is a graduate of the
University of the East with a degree of B.S. in Zoology.
The petitioner claims that he took the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked it as
many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis of the NMAT rule:
H) A STUDENT SHALL BE ALLOWED
ONLY THREE (3) CHANCES TO TAKE
THE NMAT.AFTER THREE (3)
SUCCESSIVE FAILURES, A STUDENT
SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE
THE NMAT FOR THE FOURTH TIME.
He then went to RTC Valenzuela to compel his admission
to the test. In his petition, he squarely challenged the
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds
raised were due process and equal protection.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent was deprived of his right to a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
HELD:
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method
of protecting the health and safety of the public. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations is a valid exercises of
governmental power.
The Court agreed that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of
achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of
applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the
quality of medical education in the country.”
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within
the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The
three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG ET. AL V. DSWD G.R.
No. 166494 June 29, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD,
DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically tasked to
monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law;
promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and
revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
No. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003.”
Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be
entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent
(20%) discount from all establishments relative to the
utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property. Compelling drugstore owners and
establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of
profit and capital because according to them drugstores
impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded
medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an
exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to
the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital,
the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory
effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the
grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to
their business, because petitioners have not taken time to
calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so
that they have not been able to show properly whether or
not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their
disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist
that they will incur losses. However,petitioner’s
computation is clearly flawed.
For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost
of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the
amount of income derived from all sources before
deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net
income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per
transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income
statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales,
expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could
have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their
income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot
substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss
should they give the discount. In addition, the computation
was erroneously based on the assumption that their
customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the
32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the
amount of the discount.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners
must accept the realities of business and the State, in the
exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of
a business which may result in an impairment of property
rights in the process.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO,
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM
FACTS:
In 1992, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the
Ordinance No. 7744 that prohibits hotels, motels, inns,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments
from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
“wash up” rates or other similarly concocted terms, in the
City of Manila.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC) et. al. filed a
petition on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and
motels in Manila. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA
reversed the decision and asserted that the Ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 7744 is unconstitutional.
HELD: Facts: - NO, It is Constitutional, and a valid exercise of
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the police power.
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its 1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section
people. Individual rights may be adversely affected only to 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432,3 as amended Ratio:
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate by RA 9257,4 and the implementing rules and
demands of public interest or public welfare.
regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF
- Petitioners’ Arguments
insofar as these allow business establishments to  Petitioners emphasize that
However, the right to privacy independently identified with claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens they are not questioning
liberty, in itself, fully deserve a constitutional protection. as a tax deduction. the 20% discount granted
Governmental powers should stop short of certain to senior citizens but are
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. 2. On February 26, 2004, RA 92578 amended only assailing the
certain provisions of RA 7432, to wit: constitutionality of the
tax deduction scheme
Whether or not the depiction of the vice is accurate, it prescribed under RA
cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. 9257 and the
willing married or consenting single adults which is – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the implementing rules and
constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well. The following: regulations issued by the
Court also recognize that there are very legitimate uses for DSWD and the DOF.
a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a (a) the grant of twenty percent  Petitioners assert that
day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a (20%) discount from all Section 4(a) of the law is
motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their establishments relative to the unconstitutional because
homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest utilization of services in hotels it constitutes deprivation
between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated and similar lodging of private property.
stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of establishments, restaurants and Compelling drugstore
persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of recreation centers, and owners and
a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using purchase of medicines in all establishments to grant
illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or establishments for the the discount will result in
hotel as a convenient alternative. exclusive use or enjoyment of a loss of profit and capital
senior citizens, including because 1) drugstores
funeral and burial services for impose a mark-up of only
Petition is granted. Ordinance No. 7744 is unconstitutional. the death of senior citizens; 5% to 10% on branded
medicines; and 2) the law
failed to provide a
3. The establishment may claim the discounts scheme whereby
granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax drugstores will be justly
deduction based on the net cost of the goods compensated for the
sold or services rendered: Provided, That the discount.
cost of the discount shall be allowed as  Petitioners argue that we
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA deduction from gross income for the same
FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC., Petitioners, have previously ruled in
taxable year that the discount is granted. Central Luzon Drug
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL Corporation37 that the
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE Issue: 20% discount is an
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF exercise of the power of
FINANCE, Respondents. eminent domain, thus,
- Whether the Senior Citizen’s Discount that can requiring the payment of
be claimed as Tax Deductions by establishments just compensation.
Doctrine: When a party challeges the constitutionality of a is invalid and unconstitutional
law, the burden of proof rests upon him.
Held:
- Respondents’ Arguments
 Respondents, on the other
hand, question the filing
of the instant Petition
directly with the Supreme
Court as this disregards
the hierarchy of courts.
 likewise assert that there
is no justiciable
controversy as petitioners
failed to prove that the
tax deduction treatment is
not a "fair and full
equivalent of the loss
sustained" by them.
 As to the constitutionality
of RA 9257 and its
implementing rules and
regulations, respondents
contend that petitioners
failed to overturn its
presumption of
constitutionality
- Court Ruling
o The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object.
 Accordingly, it has been
described as "the most
essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all
the great public needs." It
is "[t]he power vested in
the legislature by the
constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of
the subjects of the same."
 The petitioners cannot
claim that they will be at
a loss due to small mark
ups and only a 32%
recovery of the 20%
discount. But they have
not substantiated this
claim with income
statements of their
business.
 While the Constitution
protects property rights,
petitioners must accept
the realities of business
and the State, in the
exercise of police power,
can intervene in the
operations of a business
which may result in an
impairment of property
rights in the process.
 We, thus, found that the
20% discount as well as
the tax deduction scheme
is a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.
o It is not an exercise by the state of
the power of Eminent Domain
 The 20% discount is
intended to improve the
welfare of senior citizens
who, at their age, are less
likely to be gainfully
employed, more prone to
illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in
need of subsidy in
purchasing basic
commodities. It may not
be amiss to mention also
that the discount serves to
honor senior citizens who
presumably spent the
productive years of their
lives on contributing to
the development and
progress of the nation.
 The obiter in Central
Luzon Drug
Corporation,78 however,
describes the 20%
discount as an exercise of
the power of eminent
domain and the tax credit,
under the previous law,
equivalent to the amount
of discount given as the
just compensation
therefor. The flaw in this
reasoning is in its
premise. It presupposes
that the subject
regulation, which impacts
the pricing and, hence,
the profitability of a
private establishment,
automatically amounts to
a deprivation of property
without due process of
law. If this were so, then
all price and rate of return
on investment control
laws would have to be
invalidated.
 The impact or effect of a
regulation, such as the
one under consideration,
must, thus, be determined
on a case-to-case basis.
Whether that line
between permissible
regulation under police
power and "taking" under
eminent domain has been
crossed must, under the
specific circumstances of
this case, be subject to
proof and the one
assailing the
constitutionality of the
regulation carries the
heavy burden of proving
that the measure is
unreasonable, oppressive
or confiscatory.
 We adopted a similar line
of reasoning in Carlos
Superdrug
Corporation85 when we
ruled that petitioners
therein failed to prove
that the 20% discount is
 arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory. We noted
that no evidence, such as
a financial report, to
establish the impact of the
20% discount on the
overall profitability of
petitioners was presented
in order to show that they
would be operating at a
loss due to the subject
regulation or that the
continued implementation
of the law would be
unconscionably
detrimental to the
business operations of
petitioners.
 On its face, we find that
there are at least two
conceivable bases to
sustain the subject
regulation’s validity
absent clear and
convincing proof that it is
unreasonable, oppressive
or confiscatory. Congress
may have legitimately
concluded that business
establishments have the
capacity to absorb a
decrease in profits or
income/gross sales due to
the 20% discount without
substantially affecting the
reasonable rate of return
on their investments
 (1) not all
customers of a
business
establishment
are senior
citizens
 (2) the level of
its profit
margins on
goods and
services
offered to the
general public.
 Hence, the present
recourse must, likewise,
fail. Because all laws
enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality, courts
will uphold a law’s
validity if any set of facts
may be conceived to
sustain it.
- In the case at bar, evidence is indispensable
before a determination of a constitutional
violation can be made because of the following
reasons. First, the assailed law, by imposing the
senior citizen discount, does not take any of the
properties used by a business establishment like,
say, the land on which a manufacturing plant is
constructed or the equipment being used to
produce goods or services. Second, rather than
taking specific properties of a business
establishment, the senior citizen discount law
merely regulates the prices of the goods or
services being sold to senior citizens by
mandating a 20% discount.
- Note that the law does not impose at what
specific price the product shall be sold, only that
a 20% discount shall be given to senior citizens
based on the price set by the business
establishment. A business establishment is, thus,
free to adjust the prices of the goods or services
it provides to the general public.
- WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
AQUINO VS MUNICIPALITY OF
MALAY, AKLAN (2014)
GR No. 211356; September 29, 2014] Law on Natural
Resources| LGU| DENR| Police Power| Constitutional
Law
FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc.
applied for a building permit covering the construction of a
three-storey hotel in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a
Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes
(FLAgT) issued by the DENR. The Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground
that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the
Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by
the respondent mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, ordering the closure and demolition of
Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a
nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of
capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a
court order before proceeding with the demolition.
Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court
order because the municipal mayor has the express power
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the
removal of illegally constructed buildings
The CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted
before the LGU can order the closure and demolition of the
property in question.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be
classified as a nuisance per se which can therefore be
summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that
rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been
constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could
have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such,
even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a
nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular
thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per
accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly
order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Moreover, the Local Government Code
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through
their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. The
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the
closing and demolition of establishments.