Specpro 1 - PDF

1. Silverio Sr. v. Silverio Jr.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are concerned, and Resolution 2 dated July 4, 2013
denying petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CA nullified the preliminary injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City ("intestate court"), Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. No.
M-2629 and reversed said court's Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the sales and derivative
titles over two properties subject of intestate proceedings as null and void.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: The
late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal
heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio
(son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio
(daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-2629) for the settlement of her
estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging several
orders ofthe intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court. To better understand the
myriad of factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant consolidated case, this court will
resolve the petitions in seriatim.
The Petitions
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner,
RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order ofthe intestate court dated 16 June
2011 reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the estate of the late
Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by
virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO,
the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court and
in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange
of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR. and
SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of administrator is summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was removed as administrator and in his stead,
SILVERIO, JR. was designated as the new administrator. A motion for reconsideration was
separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May 2005,
the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming among others, the Order of 3 January 2005.
Inthe same Order, the intestate court also granted the motion of SILVERIO JR. to take his oath as
administrator effective upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report filed by SILVERIO
SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the motion filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled the
Order granting letters of administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated SILVERIO SR. as
administrator. Then again, the intestate court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the
Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR. issued an Omnibus Order dated 31 October
2006 upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR. and removed SILVERIO SR.,
ad administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules
of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above Order whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the other
hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
On 28 August 2008, the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision reinstating
SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of the Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of
letters of administration to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well
as the removal of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are declared
NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard to
the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to
the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No.
185619 challenging the 28 Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11 February 2009, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible
error inthe assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of discretionary appellate
jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO JR.’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court on 11 February
2011, denied the motion with finality. An entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011.
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as
administrator of the estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued the now challenged Order
dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent portion of the Order reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN MILLION PESOS, the same to be
approved by this Court, Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as the Administrator
to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and to immediately take his oath as such, and exercise his
duties and functions as are incumbent under the law upon the said position. xxx."
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian
moved for the disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the following
grounds: (1) Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE GUANLAO, JR.
to continue hearing the case considering that he appeared once as counsel in the intestate
proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in favor of SILVERIO SR. by
allowing the latter to pursue several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the rules against
forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA’s Petition for Support and Release of Funds for Medical Support
has not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be
presided and decided by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the Motion for Disqualification
and/or Inhibition. The movants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order
dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the instant petition.
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the sale of
certain properties belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is pertinent to the present
petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to grant
the following:
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park,
Makati City, covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2) No.
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Makati City; and (3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by TCT
No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City to partially settle the intestate
estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing the Administrator to undertake the proper
procedure or transferring the titles involved to the name of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3 above to the payment of taxes,
interests, penalties and other charges, if any, and todistribute the residue among the heirs
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by Legal
Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. SilverioDee in
accordance with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of Absolute
Salein favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06 September 2010 as
evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on
September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23
December 2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was issued toMonica P. Ocampo. The latter
subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was
issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a petition for certioraribefore the Court
of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with prayer for injunctive relief. As prayed for, the
Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February 2007. On 4 July 2007,
the Court issueda Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon the posting of the bond in the
amount of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-DEE posted the required bond on
February 5, 2007 but in an order dated 3 January 2008, the Court ruled that the bond posted by
SILVERIO-DEE failed to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court, however, did not reverse the
ruling granting the injunction but instead ordered SILVERIO-DEE to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-
SC. The Court also increased the bond from two million to ten million. On 29 February 2008, the
Court issued a Resolution approving the ten million bond and issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) issued a decision
reinstating SILVERIO SR. as administrator and declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction permanent
in regard to the appointment of administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued restraining
and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect the titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and
Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the
name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining SILVERIO JR., their agent or anybody acting in their behalf from committing any act that
would affect the titles to the properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever
deeds, instruments or any other documents involving voluntary or involuntary dealings which may
have the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating, or disposing in
favor of any individual or any entity of the subject properties. Subpoena ad testificandumand duces
tecumwas also issued by the intestate court requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO and
ALEXANDRA GARCIA of CITRINE to testify and bring with them any books and documents under
their control to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the transaction involving the properties in
question.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 14
February 2011. On 18 August 2011, the intestate court rendered the now assailed Order the decretal
portion of the Order is quoted hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as VOID:
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050 in the name of defendant MONICA
OCAMPO or any of her successors-in-interestincluding all derivative titles, as NULL AND
VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-2011000190 in the name of ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC. or any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative titles, as NULL
AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
2011000050, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000190 and all of its derivative titles;
and 5. Reinstating the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of RICARDO C.
SILVERIO, SR. AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS
TO THE INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds ofMakati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 006-
2010000063, in the name of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and all of its derivative titles;
and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223612 in the name of

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ
SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
x x x x3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.")
before the CA questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 –
Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 – (1)
Order dated March 23,2011 granting Silverio, Sr.’s application for preliminary injunction enjoining
Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
subject properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting,
approving, registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or
any other documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March 23, 2011
which denied Silverio, Jr.’s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3)
Order dated June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order
(granting application for preliminary injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 – Order dated August
18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and
Intsiaproperties as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloof which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court hereby disposes and orders the
following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172is DENIEDfor lack of merit. Accordingly, the 16 June
2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 reinstating MR. RICARDO C.
SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly DENIEDfor lack of merit insofar as it
questions the 23 March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR’s Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition is partly
GRANTEDin that the Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57 is herebydeclared NULL and VOID for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011
Order declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles
over the Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.4
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 5 "insofar as its ruling in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122024" praying that the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court be affirmed.
By Resolution dated July 4, 2013, the CA denied his motion for partial reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the
Intsia and Cambridgeproperties upon the ground that the intestate court cannotannul the sales as it
has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not includeresolving issues of ownership. It is asserted
that the CA should nothave stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which
formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate court annulling the sales of the
Cambridge and Intsia properties. In the alternative, should the said sales be upheld, petitioner prays
that this Court (1) declare the sales to be valid only to the extent of 50% net remainder share of the
late Beatriz less the corresponding shares therefrom of petitioner and the other legal compulsory
heirs, and (2) order respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of sales for distribution of the
residue among the legal/compulsory heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that
the intestate court should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties to third
parties after it itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlementof the estate, especially so when
separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said third parties were already instituted by
petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent of petitioner to the aforesaid sales as the surviving
spouses with a 50% conjugal share in the subject properties, respondents point out that such is
belied by the October 31, 2006 Order of the intestate court, which clearly showed that counsels of all
the heirs were present at the hearing of June 16, 2006 and no objection was made by them to the
sale of the properties and the partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio, together with the
transfer of titles of these properties in the name of the Estate as prayed for in petitioner’s
Manifestation and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner had not challenged or appealed the said
order authorizing the sale of the subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the day for petitioner to raise
this factual issue before this Court, not to mention that it cannot be ventilated in the present appeal by
certiorari as thisCourt is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment contending that the intestate court
improperly nullified the titles despite the fact that the present registered owners, who are
indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Indeed, a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked and
may be cancelled only in a direct proceeding brought for the purpose. Respondent points out that
petitioner himself recognized thata direct action is required to annul a Torrens title ashe initially
instituted two civil complaints before the RTC of Makati City seeking to annul, among others, the
TCT’s issued to respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge property. After failing to secure restraining
orders in these two civil cases, petitioner filed in the intestate court his Urgent OmnibusMotion dated
February 14, 2011 to annul the said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case, respondent maintains
that it is a buyer of good faith and for value, of which the intestate court never made a determination
nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Omnibus Motion dated March 4,
2011 contain allegations indicating that respondent ZEE2 was not a buyer in good faith and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioner’s act of filing a separate complaint with application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in another court
(Civil Case Nos. 11-084 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes willful and deliberate
forum shopping asthe former also prayedsimilar primary reliefs and setting up the alleged nullity of
the subject deeds of absolute sale as those raised in the Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement to
the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under
administration has the authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul
an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 856:
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is
well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s
estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of
the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: x x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it
can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
Asearly as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by
an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and
void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without
authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the
sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as
long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the
probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining to
the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that
(1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be
annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently,
however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that
said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded
that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only
with respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell
mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction were in effect.
The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the properties
in question granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still
good and valid. The fallo of the decision reads:
NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is made permanent in regard to the
said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the
Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the saleof the
three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and
void.It is axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights upon the
parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or
obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate
court when it ordered the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID
citing as justification the decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No. 97196.
To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh
Division) was declared to be limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of
letters of administrationby SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and
nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court in its Order dated 23 March 2011 and
challenged by SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it was issued with grave abuse
of discretion as it was directed against acts which were already [fait]accompli. The preliminary
injunction sought to: 1) restrain SILVERIO JR., their agents, or anybody acting in their behalf or any
person from committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any giving due course to whatever
have the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating or disposing in
favor of any individual or any entity the above-enumerated properties belonging to the Intestate
Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the records show that when the preliminary injunction
was issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed properties were already issued to CITRINE
HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court acting
upon pending motions filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son, respectively,
who are the central figures in the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of the late
Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as administrator of the estate
petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming more evident to the intestate
court as the proceedings suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed by Edmundo
Silverio to sell the subject properties and partially settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity
came when the heirs represented by their respective counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August 28,
2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), weagree
with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in its
fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of
letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as
otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order
allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on
February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for
reconsideration of the February 11, 2009 Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No.
185619).1âwphi1
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court annulling
the sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of
Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with
prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained
valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July
4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2. SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are concerned, and Resolution 2 dated July 4, 2013
denying petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The CA nullified the preliminary injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City ("intestate court"), Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. No.
M-2629 and reversed said court's Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the sales and derivative
titles over two properties subject of intestate proceedings as null and void.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: The
late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal
heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio
(son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio
(daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-2629) for the settlement of her
estate was filed by SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal challenging several
orders ofthe intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court. To better understand the
myriad of factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant consolidated case, this court will
resolve the petitions in seriatim.
The Petitions
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner,
RICARDO S. SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order ofthe intestate court dated 16 June
2011 reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the estate of the late
Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by
virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO,
the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court and
in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange
of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR. and
SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of administrator is summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was removed as administrator and in his stead,
SILVERIO, JR. was designated as the new administrator. A motion for reconsideration was
separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May 2005,
the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming among others, the Order of 3 January 2005.
Inthe same Order, the intestate court also granted the motion of SILVERIO JR. to take his oath as
administrator effective upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report filed by SILVERIO
SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the motion filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled the
Order granting letters of administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated SILVERIO SR. as
administrator. Then again, the intestate court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the
Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR. issued an Omnibus Order dated 31 October
2006 upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR. and removed SILVERIO SR.,
ad administrator for gross violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules
of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above Order whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the other
hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
On 28 August 2008, the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision reinstating
SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of the Order reads:
NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard to
the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to
the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No.
185619 challenging the 28 Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11 February 2009, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible
error inthe assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of discretionary appellate
jurisdiction. Acting on SILVERIO JR.’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court on 11 February
2011, denied the motion with finality. An entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011.
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as
administrator of the estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued the now challenged Order
dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent portion of the Order reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN MILLION PESOS, the same to be
approved by this Court, Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as the Administrator
to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and to immediately take his oath as such, and exercise his
duties and functions as are incumbent under the law upon the said position. xxx."
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian
moved for the disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. based on the following
grounds: (1) Absence of the written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE GUANLAO, JR.
to continue hearing the case considering that he appeared once as counsel in the intestate
proceedings; (2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in favor of SILVERIO SR. by
allowing the latter to pursue several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the rules against
forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA’s Petition for Support and Release of Funds for Medical Support
has not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of all the heirs that the proceedings be
presided and decided by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order denying the Motion for Disqualification
and/or Inhibition. The movants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in an order
dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the instant petition.
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the sale of
certain properties belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is pertinent to the present
petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to grant
the following:
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park,
Makati City, covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2) No.
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Makati City; and (3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by TCT
No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City to partially settle the intestate
estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing the Administrator to undertake the proper
procedure or transferring the titles involved to the name of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3 above to the payment of taxes,
interests, penalties and other charges, if any, and todistribute the residue among the heirs
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by Legal
Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S. SilverioDee in
accordance with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of Absolute
Salein favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06 September 2010 as
evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on
September 16, 2010) for the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City. On 23
December 2010, TCT No. 006-2011000050 was issued toMonica P. Ocampo. The latter
subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc. (ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was
issued on 11 February 2011 under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE filed a petition for certioraribefore the Court
of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with prayer for injunctive relief. As prayed for, the
Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February 2007. On 4 July 2007,
the Court issueda Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon the posting of the bond in the
amount of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-DEE posted the required bond on
February 5, 2007 but in an order dated 3 January 2008, the Court ruled that the bond posted by
SILVERIO-DEE failed to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court, however, did not reverse the
ruling granting the injunction but instead ordered SILVERIO-DEE to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-
SC. The Court also increased the bond from two million to ten million. On 29 February 2008, the
Court issued a Resolution approving the ten million bond and issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) issued a decision
reinstating SILVERIO SR. as administrator and declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction permanent
in regard to the appointment of administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued restraining
and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act that would affect the titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and
Void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the
name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order granting a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining SILVERIO JR., their agent or anybody acting in their behalf from committing any act that
would affect the titles to the properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever
have the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating, or disposing in
favor of any individual or any entity of the subject properties. Subpoena ad testificandumand duces
tecumwas also issued by the intestate court requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA OCAMPO and
ALEXANDRA GARCIA of CITRINE to testify and bring with them any books and documents under
their control to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the transaction involving the properties in
question.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 14
February 2011. On 18 August 2011, the intestate court rendered the now assailed Order the decretal
portion of the Order is quoted hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as VOID:
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050 in the name of defendant MONICA
OCAMPO or any of her successors-in-interestincluding all derivative titles, as NULL AND
VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-2011000190 in the name of ZEE2
RESOURCES, INC. or any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative titles, as NULL
AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
2011000050, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000190 and all of its derivative titles;
and 5. Reinstating the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the name of RICARDO C.
SILVERIO, SR. AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS
TO THE INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds ofMakati City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 006-
2010000063, in the name of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and all of its derivative titles;
and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223612 in the name of

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE BEATRIZ
SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
x x x x3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.")
before the CA questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 –
Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 – (1)
Order dated March 23,2011 granting Silverio, Sr.’s application for preliminary injunction enjoining
Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
subject properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting,
approving, registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever deeds, instruments or
any other documents involving the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March 23, 2011
which denied Silverio, Jr.’s motion or disqualification and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3)
Order dated June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the March 23, 2011 Order
(granting application for preliminary injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 – Order dated August
18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and
Intsiaproperties as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloof which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court hereby disposes and orders the
following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172is DENIEDfor lack of merit. Accordingly, the 16 June
2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 reinstating MR. RICARDO C.
SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly DENIEDfor lack of merit insofar as it
questions the 23 March 2011 Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR’s Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The petition is partly
GRANTEDin that the Preliminary Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 57 is herebydeclared NULL and VOID for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011
Order declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles
over the Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.4
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 5 "insofar as its ruling in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122024" praying that the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court be affirmed.
By Resolution dated July 4, 2013, the CA denied his motion for partial reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the
Intsia and Cambridgeproperties upon the ground that the intestate court cannotannul the sales as it
has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not includeresolving issues of ownership. It is asserted
that the CA should nothave stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which
formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate court annulling the sales of the
Cambridge and Intsia properties. In the alternative, should the said sales be upheld, petitioner prays
that this Court (1) declare the sales to be valid only to the extent of 50% net remainder share of the
late Beatriz less the corresponding shares therefrom of petitioner and the other legal compulsory
heirs, and (2) order respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of sales for distribution of the
residue among the legal/compulsory heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that
the intestate court should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties to third
parties after it itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlementof the estate, especially so when
separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said third parties were already instituted by
petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent of petitioner to the aforesaid sales as the surviving
spouses with a 50% conjugal share in the subject properties, respondents point out that such is
belied by the October 31, 2006 Order of the intestate court, which clearly showed that counsels of all
the heirs were present at the hearing of June 16, 2006 and no objection was made by them to the
sale of the properties and the partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio, together with the
transfer of titles of these properties in the name of the Estate as prayed for in petitioner’s
Manifestation and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner had not challenged or appealed the said
order authorizing the sale of the subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the day for petitioner to raise
this factual issue before this Court, not to mention that it cannot be ventilated in the present appeal by
certiorari as thisCourt is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment contending that the intestate court
improperly nullified the titles despite the fact that the present registered owners, who are
indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Indeed, a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked and
may be cancelled only in a direct proceeding brought for the purpose. Respondent points out that
petitioner himself recognized thata direct action is required to annul a Torrens title ashe initially
instituted two civil complaints before the RTC of Makati City seeking to annul, among others, the
TCT’s issued to respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge property. After failing to secure restraining
orders in these two civil cases, petitioner filed in the intestate court his Urgent OmnibusMotion dated
February 14, 2011 to annul the said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case, respondent maintains
that it is a buyer of good faith and for value, of which the intestate court never made a determination
nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Omnibus Motion dated March 4,
2011 contain allegations indicating that respondent ZEE2 was not a buyer in good faith and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioner’s act of filing a separate complaint with application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction on January 31, 2011 in another court
(Civil Case Nos. 11-084 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes willful and deliberate
forum shopping asthe former also prayedsimilar primary reliefs and setting up the alleged nullity of
the subject deeds of absolute sale as those raised in the Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplement to
the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under
administration has the authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance, but also to annul
an unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 856:
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is
well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s
estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of
the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: x x x x
can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
Asearly as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by
an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and
long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that the
the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics ours) Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that
(1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be
annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior
approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently,
however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that
said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded
that the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only
with respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell
mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction were in effect.
The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is: Whether the authority to sell the properties
in question granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still
good and valid. The fallo of the decision reads:
NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is made permanent in regard to the
said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the
Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the saleof the
three properties in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and
void.It is axiomatic that it is the dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights upon the
parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or
obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate
court when it ordered the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID
citing as justification the decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No. 97196.
To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh
Division) was declared to be limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of
letters of administrationby SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and
nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court in its Order dated 23 March 2011 and
challenged by SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it was issued with grave abuse
of discretion as it was directed against acts which were already [fait]accompli. The preliminary
injunction sought to: 1) restrain SILVERIO JR., their agents, or anybody acting in their behalf or any
person from committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati City from
accepting, admitting, approving, registering, annotating or in any giving due course to whatever
have the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving, alienating or disposing in
favor of any individual or any entity the above-enumerated properties belonging to the Intestate
Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the records show that when the preliminary injunction
was issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed properties were already issued to CITRINE
HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order was issued by the intestate court acting
upon pending motions filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., father and son, respectively,
who are the central figures in the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of the late
Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as administrator of the estate
petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming more evident to the intestate
court as the proceedings suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed by Edmundo
Silverio to sell the subject properties and partially settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity
came when the heirs represented by their respective counsels interposed no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the August 28,
2008 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia Silverio-Dee), weagree
with the CA that the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated in its
fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of
letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as
otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order
allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision attained finality only on
February 11, 2011 when this Court denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.’s motion for
reconsideration of the February 11, 2009 Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No.
185619).1âwphi1
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order of the intestate court annulling
the sale of the subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.
Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of
Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with
prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained
valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July
4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
3. AGTARAP V. AGTARAP
SECOND DIVISION
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, G.R. No. 177099

Petitioner,
- versus -
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,

TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS,
and ABELARDO DAGORO,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP,
Petitioner, G.R. No. 177192
Present:
- versus - CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH MENDOZA, JJ.
AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER
DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 8, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap
(Sebastian)[1] and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo),[2] assailing the Decision dated November 21,
2006[3] and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
73916.
The antecedent facts and proceedings
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City,
a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap
(Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia),[5] and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three
children, namely, Gloria,[6] Joseph, and Teresa[7]). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9,
1926.They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a
grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating
for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the
appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming
and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the
estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in
accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession
those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and
directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the
petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition.They alleged that the two subject lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924,
they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was
built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built
with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the appointment of
Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so;
(2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed
that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular
administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquins estate.Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention, alleging that
Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also
averred that there is a need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo
is not the person best qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective
proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition,[8] with the
following disposition
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of
partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and
there being no claim in Court against the estate of the deceased, the estate of
JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently ripe for distribution among the heirs minus
the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.
Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the
existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255)
which showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact
oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other than their negative allegations, the
greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder.
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of his
administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending December 31, 1996
per Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by the
Court. The accounting report included the income earned and received for the period
and the expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the
widow. In accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly
approved by this Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 the deceased JOAQUIN
AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the following:
I LAND:
Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap
St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL VALUE AMOUNT

38254 745-B-1 1,335 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,675,000.00
38255 745-B-2 1,331 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,655,000.00
TOTAL-------------------------------------------------------------P13,330,000.00
II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ------------------------------P350,000.00

BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) -----------------------------320,000.00
Building Improvements --------------------------------------97,500.00
Restaurant ------------------------------------------------------80,000.00
TOTAL ---------------------------------------------------------P847,500.00
TOTAL NET WORTH ----------------------------------------- P14,177,500.00
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total
value of P14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits and all
other incomes or increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of December
31, 1996, after deducting therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other
expenses allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows:
TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00

CARIDAD AGTARAP of the estate as her conjugal shareP7,088,750.00, the other half
of P7,088,750.00 to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:
1) JOSE (deceased) - P1,181,548.30

2) MILAGROS (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
4) SEBASTIAN - P1,181,548.30
5) EDUARDO - P1,181,548.30
6) CARIDAD - P1,181,548.30
The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of P1,181,548.30 and
who died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and
half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.
TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66

JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66
WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P236,291.66
EDUARDO AGTARAP - P236,291.66
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:
COMPULSORY HEIRS:
1) GLORIA (deceased) represented by Walter de Santos
- P295,364.57
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P295,364.57
3) TERESA AGTARAP - P295,364.57
4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - P295,364.57
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57.
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage stand
to receive the total amount of:
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
2) TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

3) WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999

P7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share
P1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
Total of P8,270,208.30
b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir

P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir

d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
P1,181,458.38
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:
SEBASTIAN P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia

P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P5,522,854.06
EDUARDO P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia

P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P5,522,854.06
SO ORDERED.[9]
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution[10]denying the motions for reconsideration of
Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the real estate
properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However, before
the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for

lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and
pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No.
745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby
partitioned as follows:
The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by TCT No.
38254 and TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the following:
Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But since she is deceased, her share shall be
inherited by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in
equal shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of the other half of the property which
pertains to Lucia Mendiettas share.
Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he is already deceased

(and died without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn,
be acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since she died in 1996 without
issue, 5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by
Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos
and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and
Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros brother
Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo
Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian Eduardo,
all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he died in 1967, his
inheritance shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and
children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter
de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
Agtarap and Teresa in equal shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties
and its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share shall be
inherited by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap
(represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and
Eduardo Agtarap in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8
of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos and
her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa
Agtarap, (in representation of Milagros brother Jose
Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes
(represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and
her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and Eduardo, all
surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall
be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de Santos and
her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa
Agtarap in equal shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her inheritance
shall be acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro
and her daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these petitions
ascribing to the appellate court the following errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned important

[12]
facts which alter its Decision;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the
issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
3. The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and in not applying
the doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.[13]
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE

JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN
DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS
OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER
COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254
AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY
BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED
TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION
UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE
NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO
DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE
SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED
WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER
INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.[14]
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and
Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of their father
Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No.
8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion Garcia, while they
claim that their mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and
Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of Joses marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were
not authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also asseverates that he actually
questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as
heirs, and in his reply to their opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of
Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them as heirs had the effect
of admitting the allegations therein. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a
hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of real
estate properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are not subject to
collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise
argues that estoppel applies against the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered
any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the
estate must have already been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by
Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros name and of
TCT No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as
the court order directing the deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of Caridad,
in the TCTs had long become final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA
erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in
one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the
will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquins
estate. He states that this violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely erred when it
affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to
Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate
court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of
ownership, which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
The Courts Ruling
As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the ownership of the subject real properties, we
hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special
and limited jurisdiction.[16] As held in several cases,[17] a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included
in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there
poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the
final determination of ownership in a separate action. [18] Second, if the interested parties are all heirs
to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then
the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.[19]Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.[20]
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties
are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is
but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement of
Joaquins estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the
TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad,
contracted a first marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were
able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother
title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y
JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia
Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES yJOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia
Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta).[21] When TCT No. 5239 was divided
between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting
of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)[22]issued on April 23,
1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently,
on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184)
contained an annotation, which reads
Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece,

tanchando las palabras con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a y poniendo en su lugar, entre
lineas y en tinta encarnada, las palabras en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia, en
complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No.
23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con el
No. 4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.[23]
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en
segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridads name in TCT No. 32184,
Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No.
32184. Lucias share in the property covered by the said TCT was carried over to the properties
covered by the certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And
as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs Joaquin, Jesus,
Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,
and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are
conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In
fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the
same should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucias
spouse.[24] Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of
Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the owners of the
properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant consideration. This cannot
be said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is
not necessarily conclusive of a holders true ownership of property. [25] A certificate of title under
the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of
ownership.[26] Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses
coverture.[27] The phrase married to Caridad Garcia in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil
status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their
conjugal properties.[28]
Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have already been settled in 1965 after the
payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the
estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid,
the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in
the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each
is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above

mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give
a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the
estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The
records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say
that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that
Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion to
exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of
Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and
the latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August
21, 1995 hearing.[29] Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006
Decision.[30]
Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate of
Joaquin cannot be sustained.Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria
Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her
husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de
Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for
leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the
father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the motion,
thereby admitting his answer on October 18, 1995.[31] The CA also noted that, during the hearing of
the motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any objection
when the intervention was submitted to the RTC for resolution. [32]
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that
both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully
participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent
evidence to refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and thus
rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo
Dagoro.Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo
Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs,
Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.[33]
This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together with
Joaquins estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the
November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of the properties related only
to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as
cited above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of
Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate, as
enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the
distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate,
they being his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquins estate pertinent
to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was
instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch
108, Pasay City.[34] While there has been no showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all
of her share from Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved,
prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros share in Joaquins estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of
Death.[35] He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B.
Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the March 27,
2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall
not yet be distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her purported will, and that
Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R.
No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the
Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be
distributed until the final determination of the probate of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G.
Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita B.
Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for further
proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. SUNTAY III V. COJUANCO-SUNTAY

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION
G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,

vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter
Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent

Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters
of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all
other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses
Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II,
lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and
Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic
relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was
eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among
others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I
and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial Hospital.
Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of
the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened
with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that
even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of
right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years
after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at the time
of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of
plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very
complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff
really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). 4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for
visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court.
The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour
a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped,
because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her
siblings stress and anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2)
as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded
preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before
the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated
to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the
petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the
hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that
Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of
the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay v.
Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a
voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code,
were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his
behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an
Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage
the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio
III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-Intervention

is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of the
estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or
dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the
court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor. 6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters
of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject
estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch
78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the
intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos. 7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight
to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as
forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of
his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole
administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks
to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of
preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the
Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests
and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of
the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest
in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since his
appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity
and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no
basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is
better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering
merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context of
this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person
as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an
administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. 8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is
the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator
for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer
the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate,
but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a
decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or
community property forming part of the decedent’s estate. 11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community
property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator

of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an
exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states
that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In
addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x
when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the
benefit of the estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power
of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 15 (2) where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the
best interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office. 18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-administrators
during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof,
we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir and executrix
designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held
that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the
decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be
represented in the management of the decedent’s estate. 19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as petitioner-wife
owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be
unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura 21 where we allowed
the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators.
However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the
category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while
the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin"
has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s
property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is
more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin,
the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,
as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children
of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana
Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the appointment of
an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the
legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the
decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating
Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator
may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over the
estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as
special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent
and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the probate court
pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early part of
his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit,
we clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals,
and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do
not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases
constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or
more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such
prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound
discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances other
than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias
this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as
the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest"
deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in
Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave
abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the
selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,

considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in
her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from
the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not per
se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into
account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the
appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-
administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half
of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of
any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her
proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would have
more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she
possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent
but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate
may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator
of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very
strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based
upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not
necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule on the
order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of
letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that
directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a "next

of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to
the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine
and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon
this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the
claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the estate
should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is
large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate
and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and
circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the
foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso
facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the
heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section
6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator
of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of
the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case. 33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which
can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel
who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as
co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying
settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate, has not
looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate
makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to
be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s
appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the
following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in
the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of
land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal
properties, contrary to Section 1,36paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of the
decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to
said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent
did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate. 37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the following
imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or persons;
several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the
functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her
pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office,
arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments
authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous objections to
Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the
Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and one of
the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it cannot
constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu
propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of an
inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of
the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that
Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew
existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his
failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact when he
actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of
Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list
of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully
discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if
any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become
even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his
interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the
inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each
other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as
co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of
Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were
estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards
Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator
(Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein
respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to facilitate
the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to
protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals, 39 we mapped out as
among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the
estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to
complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before
it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the
estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for
the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or
provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon
death, resignation, or removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and
settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly
provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to
discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When
an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator
may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is
no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the
question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code
or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the
estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina
and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently
shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and
the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after
the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. 45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment 46 of Emilio III
questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III
asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void"
as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010 on the
petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from the
Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the
Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division
acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila. 47
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different division
created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of Justice
Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions

and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. – Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and
incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of
the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself
or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced
through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division who
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who concurred therein. If only
one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution has
retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from
acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a
replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed
as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace
the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other
Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed Resolution
are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the
motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of the Division to
which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration
or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the
other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or
incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the Supreme
Court's summer session held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No.
183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of
a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to
settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
5. LEE V. RTC
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004]
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate Secretary,
respectively, of Philippines Internationl Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN
ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA,
all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming
to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R. 59736, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao (in their
capacities as president and secretary, respectively, of Philippine International Life Insurance
Company) and Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
The antecedent facts follow.
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on
July 6, 1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of
the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio
(herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel
and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).[2]
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains pending
at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition
for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court
appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael
and Jose Ortaez joint special administrators of their fathers estate. Hearings continued for the
appointment of a regular administrator (up to now no regular administrator has been appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an
inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,029 [3] shares of stock
in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing 50.725% of
the companys outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming that she owned
1,014[4] Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to
repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its
president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed to repurchase the shares of stock
within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his personal capacity and
claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011[5] Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share in
the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG
consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortaez failed to
repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings
at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and her two children, Special
Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4,
1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate
(including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number of
shares separately sold by Juliana Ortaez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on
October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina OrtaezEnderes and her siblings
(hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special
administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose
Ortaez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et
al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of
stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to
declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate. These motions were
opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of
sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares
of stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose
Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of the estate without
an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in question
were entered into by Juliana S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez in their personal capacity without prior
approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock
and release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as Special Administratrix is hereby denied.[6]
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special
Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or
extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, 1997 DENYING the approval of the sale
of Philinterlife shares of stocks and release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as Special Administratrix,
the Urgent Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement dated December 19, 1995. . .
is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife
shares of stock are concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of the Memorandum of
Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982
executed by Juliana S. Ortaez, Rafael S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez as partially void ab initio insofar
as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stocks are concerned.[7]
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortaez filed, on December 22,
1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition, however,
ruling that there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by
Jose Ortaez, his brother Rafael Ortaez and mother Juliana Ortaez during the pendency of the
settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it
was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently,
the sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock they
invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void. [8]
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision but it was denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review under
Rule 45 which the Supreme Court dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13, 1999. On February 23, 1999, the resolution of
the Supreme Court dismissing the petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortaez became final and
was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the rest of the FLAG-controlled
board of directors, increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the
50.725% controlling interest of the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, in the insurance company. [9] This
became the subject of a separate action at the Securities and Exchange Commission filed by private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes against petitioner Jose Lee and other members of the
FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife on November 7, 1994. Thereafter, various cases were filed by
Jose Lee as president of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortaez and her sons against private respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil courts.[10] Somehow, all these cases were
connected to the core dispute on the legality of the sale of decedent Dr. Ortaezs Philinterlife shares of
stock to petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose Lee who later became
the president of Philinterlife after the controversial sale.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a
motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997
because the orders of the intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court) had long became final. Respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes served a copy of
the motion to petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary, respectively, of
Philinterlife,[11] but petitioners ignored the same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares in the name of the
Estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in
the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in
the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the owner thereof without
prejudice to other claims for violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said
2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock
certificates of Philinterlife for 2,029 shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio
P. Ortaez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for violations of
pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares and,
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes, has the
power to exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said shares, including the right to
vote and to receive dividends.
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or
otherwise, to acknowledge and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all
the aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any action
which may tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise
thereof under pain of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any
other person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to
comply with this order within three (3) days from receipt hereof under pain of
contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement
the writ of execution with dispatch to forestall any and/or further damage to the
Estate.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the office of petitioners to execute the writ of
execution, he was barred by the security guard upon petitioners instructions. Thus, private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) in contempt.[13]
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736. Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely
abused its discretion in (1) declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock
was null and void; (2) ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity and (3) depriving the
petitioners of their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright:
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the light of the following
considerations:
1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent judge had long become
final and executory;
2. The certification on non-forum shopping is signed by only one (1) of the three (3)
petitioners in violation of the Rules; and
3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of execution, deed of sale with right to
repurchase, deed of sale of shares of stocks and omnibus motion, the petition is not
accompanied by such pleadings, documents and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations therein in violation of the second paragraph,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao of the above decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals on October 30, 2000:
This resolves the urgent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of our resolution of July 26,
2000 dismissing outrightly the above-entitled petition for the reason, among others, that the assailed
Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent Judge had long become final and executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for
review under Rule 45 but on December 13, 2000, we denied the petition because there was no
showing that the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any reversible error to
warrant the exercise by the Supreme Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. [16]
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao, the Supreme
Court granted the motion and reinstated their petition on September 5, 2001. The parties were then
required to submit their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes, on July 19, 2000, filed a motion to
direct the branch clerk of court in lieu of herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate the name of
Dr. Ortaez in the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the corresponding stock certificate
pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides that the court may direct the act
to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the
act when so done shall have the effect as if done by the party. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao opposed
the motion on the ground that the intestate court should refrain from acting on the motion because the
issues raised therein were directly related to the issues raised by them in their petition for certiorari at
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, the intestate court
granted the motion, ruling that there was no prohibition for the intestate court to execute its orders
inasmuch as the appellate court did not issue any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62461, questioning this time the October 30, 2000 order of the
intestate court directing the branch clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They also questioned
in the Court of Appeals the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale made in their favor by
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez. On November 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied their petition
and upheld the power of the intestate court to execute its order. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao then
filed motion for reconsideration which at present is still pending resolution by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife)
and FLAG now raise the following errors for our consideration:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR:
A. IN FAILING TO RECONSIDER ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTION DENYING THE

PETITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE APPELLATE COURTS MISTAKE IN
APPREHENDING THE FACTS HAD BECOME PATENT AND EVIDENT FROM THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE COMMENT OF RESPONDENT
ENDERES WHICH HAD ADMITTED THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF
PETITIONERS IN THE PETITION AS WELL AS IN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. MOREOVER, THE RESOLUTION OF THE APPELLATE
COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS CONTAINED IN
ONLY ONE PAGE WITHOUT EVEN TOUCHING ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS
OF THE EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND SUPPORTING LAW IN THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS;
B. IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE VOID ORDERS OF THE INTESTATE COURT ON

THE ERRONEOUS GROUND THAT THE ORDERS WERE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY WITH REGARD TO PETITIONERS EVEN AS THE LATTER WERE
NEVER NOTIFIED OF THE PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER CANCELING ITS
OWNERSHIP;
C. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INTESTATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION (1) WHEN IT ISSUED
THE OMNIBUS ORDER NULLIFYING THE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER FLAG
OVER SHARES OF STOCK WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO BE PART OF THE
ESTATE AND (2) WHEN IT ISSUED A VOID WRIT OF EXECUTION AGAINST
PETITIONER FLAG AS PRESENT OWNER TO IMPLEMENT MERELY
PROVISIONAL ORDERS, THEREBY VIOLATING FLAGS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
D. IN FAILING TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE ORDERS OF THE INTESTATE

COURT WHICH NULLIFIED THE SALE OF SHARES OF STOCK BETWEEN THE
LEGITIMATE HEIR JOSE S. ORTAEZ AND PETITIONER FLAG BECAUSE OF
SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, I.E., THAT AN HEIR HAS THE RIGHT TO
DISPOSE OF THE DECEDENTS PROPERTY EVEN IF THE SAME IS UNDER
ADMINISTRATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL CODE PROVISION THAT POSSESSION
OF HEREDITARY PROPERTY IS TRANSMITTED TO THE HEIR THE MOMENT OF
DEATH OF THE DECEDENT (ACEDEBO VS. ABESAMIS, 217 SCRA 194);
E. IN DISREGARDING THE FINAL DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO.

128525 DATED DECEMBER 17, 1999 INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME
PARTIES, TO WIT, PETITIONERS JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO WERE
RESPONDENTS IN THAT CASE WHILE RESPONDENT MA. DIVINA ENDERES
WAS THE PETITIONER THEREIN. THAT DECISION, WHICH CAN BE
CONSIDERED LAW OF THE CASE, RULED THAT PETITIONERS CANNOT BE
ENJOINED BY RESPONDENT ENDERES FROM EXERCISING THEIR POWER AS
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF PHILINTERLIFE AND THAT THE INTESTATE
COURT IN CHARGE OF THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ADJUDICATE
TITLE TO PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE PART OF THE ESTATE AND WHICH
ARE EQUALLY CLAIMED BY PETITIONER FLAG.[17]
The petition has no merit.

Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail before us not
only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the
validity of the August 11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife
shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez, in their personal capacities and without
court approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of
stock in their favor because this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its
decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in
our resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition for review on a
technicality and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on the ground
that there was no compelling reason to reconsider said denial.[18] Our decision became final on
February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments. For all intents and
purposes therefore, the nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez
and Jose Ortaez in favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said issue would set
a bad precedent, opening the door wide open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable
decisions no end. This is completely inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of justice.
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 affirming the nullity of the
sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez of the Philinterlife shares of stock read:
Petitioners asseverations relative to said [memorandum] agreement were scuttled during the hearing
before this Court thus:
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Counsel for petitioner, when the Memorandum of Agreement was executed, did the
children of Juliana Salgado know already that there was a claim for share in the
inheritance of the children of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it is already known to them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for extrajudicial settlement of a property subject
of intestate proceedings when there is an adverse claim of another set of heirs, alleged
heirs? What would be the legal justification for extra-judicially settling a property under
administration without the approval of the intestate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-judicial settlement there is an approval of the
honorable court as to the propertys partition x x x. There were as mentioned by the
respondents counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No
JUSTICE AQUINO:
The point is, there can be no adjudication of a property under intestate proceedings
without the approval of the court. That is basic unless you can present justification on
that. In fact, there are two steps: first, you ask leave and then execute the document and
then ask for approval of the document executed. Now, is there any legal justification to
exclude this particular transaction from those steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
None, Your Honor.
ATTY BUYCO:
With that admission that there is no legal justification, Your Honor, we rest the case
for the private respondent. How can the lower court be accused of abusing its discretion?
(pages 33-35, TSN of January 29, 1998).
Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private respondent:
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without securing court
approval have appropriated as their own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the
exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without
court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose
the same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate Court. As
admitted by petitioners counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification for this action by the heirs.
There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent [the
intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortaez in
favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 (see
Annex 7 of the Comment). . . are not the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez. The records of this case. . . clearly show that as early as March 3, 1981 an
Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of Administration was filed by the acknowledged
natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez with Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim by the acknowledged
natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez is admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum of
Agreement before they executed the same. This much was admitted by petitioners counsel during the
oral argument. xxx
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, public respondent can never be faulted
for not approving. . . the subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortaez] and his mother [Juliana
Ortaez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez. (pages 3-4 of
Private Respondents Memorandum; pages 243-244 of the Rollo)
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of
jurisdiction committed by respondent judge.[19]
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and
Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially
partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other
heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since
the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and
Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG),
without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art.
533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to
the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. [20]However, an heir can only
alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the
probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the
devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. [21] This means that an heir may only sell
his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case,
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of
stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the
other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is
well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate.
In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano,[22] we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the
estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,[23] we ruled that:
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties (fishpond) were included in the inventory of
properties of the estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on November 14,
1974. Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3, 1976 in lieu of
Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was
executed between petitioner and private respondent without notice and approval of the probate court.
Even after the sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three fishponds as among the real
properties of the estate in her inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated by the Court
of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the fishponds in question, knew that the same were
part of the estate under administration.
xxxxxxxxx
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate court which according to our
settled jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under
administration. . . More emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (123
SCRA 767) where We stated that when the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without
prior approval of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 174), We held that the sale of
an immovable property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a special proceedings, needs court
approval. . . This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs.
Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate
court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. x x x
can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As
early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and
long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioners contention that the
the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator
or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid
sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts power to annul unauthorized or
fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale was affirmed by the
appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and
subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the
decision of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of judgments on February 23, 1999.
Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed by the
appellate courts, it was correct for private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to thereafter
move for a writ of execution and for the intestate court to grant it.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however, contend that the probate court could
not issue a writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale because said order was merely
provisional:
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to determine provisionally whether said
shares are included or excluded in the inventory In ordering the execution of the orders, respondent
judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that
the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether a property is included or excluded in the
inventory of the estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of execution.[24] (emphasis
ours)
Petitioners argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on the facts of this case, that the
Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez from the very start as in fact
these shares were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael Ortaez
after he and his brother, Jose Ortaez, were appointed special administrators by the intestate court.[25]
The controversy here actually started when, during the pendency of the settlement of the estate
of Dr. Ortaez, his wife Juliana Ortaez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in favor petitioner
FLAG without the approval of the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortaez later sold the remaining 1,011
Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the approval of the intestate court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory of
the estate because there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock were
owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of the
sale made by the decedents heirs, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez, without the required
approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of
the intestate court was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate
proceeding is incorrect.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that the writ of execution should not be
executed against them because they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the proceedings
nullifying the sale of the shares of stock.
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein petitioner FLAG can be struck down
by the intestate court after a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the logical
consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in several subsequent cases.[26] The sale of any property
of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate or intestate
court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon. Melencio
Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court to cancel the transfer
certificate of title issued to the vendees at the instance of the administrator after finding that the sale
of real property under probate proceedings was made without the prior approval of the court. The
dispositive portion of our decision read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed Order dated February 18, 1981 of
the respondent Judge approving the questioned Amicable Settlement is declared NULL and VOID
and hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and by the latter to
William Go is likewise declared NULL and VOID. The Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the latter
is hereby ordered cancelled.
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock, approved on the
vote of petitioners non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult for Dr.
Ortaezs estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due process.
We do not think so.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to them, did not appeal the decision of
the intestate court nullifying the sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the vendor, Jose Ortaez,
appealed the case. A careful review of the records shows that petitioners had actual knowledge of the
estate settlement proceedings and that they knew private respondent Enderes was questioning
therein the sale to them of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
It must be noted that private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes filed before the intestate
court (RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85) a Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Deeds of Sale of
Philinterlife Shares of Stock on March 22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners already knew of the
pending settlement proceedings and that the shares they bought were under the administration by the
intestate court because private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her mother Ligaya
Novicio had filed a case against them at the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7,
1994, docketed as SEC No. 11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer of shares of stock, annulment of
sale of corporate properties, annulment of subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting,
inspection of corporate books and records and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.[27] In said case, Enderes and her mother questioned the
sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in his resolution
dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the intestate court to rule on the validity of the
sale of shares of stock sold to petitioners by Jose Ortaez and Juliana Ortaez:
Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez who died, in 1980, are
part of his estate which is presently the subject matter of an intestate proceeding of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 85. Although, private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] presented the documents of
partition whereby the foregoing share of stocks were allegedly partitioned and conveyed to Jose S.
Ortaez who allegedly assigned the same to the other private respondents, approval of the Court was
not presented. Thus, the assignments to the private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] of the subject
shares of stocks are void.
xxxxxxxxx
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stock owned by the late Dr. Juvencio
Ortaez, we rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular court where the
intestate proceedings are currently pending.[28]
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as early as March 24, 1995 recognizing the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to determine the validity of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Dr. Ortaez and the subsequent sale by the heirs of the decedent of the Philinterlife shares of stock to
petitioners, how can petitioners claim that they were not aware of the intestate proceedings?
Futhermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing officer reached the Supreme Court in 1996
(docketed as G.R. 128525), herein petitioners who were respondents therein filed their answer which
contained statements showing that they knew of the pending intestate proceedings:
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the SEC but with the Regional
Trial Court; Ligaya Novicio and children represented themselves to be the common law wife and
illegitimate children of the late Ortaez; that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse Juliana Ortaez, on
her behalf and for her minor son Antonio, executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons
Rafael and Jose, both surnamed Ortaez, dividing the estate of the deceased composed of his one-
half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties; that in the said Memorandum of Agreement, Jose S.
Ortaez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329 shares of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4,
1982, Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares of stock in Philinterlife to Jose; that
contrary to the contentions of petitioners, private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee
and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortaez, the
principal stockholder at that time, executed a deed of sale of his shares of stock to private
respondents; and that the right of petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement and the
acquisition of shares of stock of private respondent is barred by prescription. [29]
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes offered additional proof of actual

knowledge of the settlement proceedings by petitioners which petitioners never denied: (1) that
petitioners were represented by Atty. Ricardo Calimag previously hired by the mother of private
respondent Enderes to initiate cases against petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggaboa for the
nullification of the sale of the shares of stock but said counsel made a conflicting turn-around and
appeared instead as counsel of petitioners, and (2) that the deeds of sale executed between
petitioners and the heirs of the decedent (vendors Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez) were
acknowledged before Atty. Ramon Carpio who, during the pendency of the settlement proceedings,
filed a motion for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock to the Knights of Columbus
Fraternal Association, Inc. (which motion was, however, later abandoned).[30] All this sufficiently
proves that petitioners, through their counsels, knew of the pending settlement proceedings.
Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as libel (Criminal Case No. 97-7179-81),
grave coercion (Criminal Case No. 84624) and robbery (Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919) against
private respondents mother Ligaya Novicio who was a director of Philinterlife, [31] all of which criminal
cases were related to the questionable sale to petitioners of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept petitioners claim of denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where the opportunity to be
heard has been accorded, there is no denial of due process. [32] In this case, petitioners knew of the
pending instestate proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Juvencio Ortaezs estate but for reasons they
alone knew, they never intervened. When the court declared the nullity of the sale, they did not bother
to appeal. And when they were notified of the motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate
court, they ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners alone should bear the blame.
Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling in G.R. No. 128525 entitled Ma. Divina
Ortaez-Enderes vs. Court of Appeals,dated December 17, 1999, where we allegedly ruled that the
intestate court may not pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining
whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be
constituted by the parties.
We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No. 128525. The issue therein was whether the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the resolution of the SEC that Enderes et al. were not entitled to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the resolution of the SEC denying the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because
injunction is not designed to protect contingent rights. Said case did not rule on the issue of the
validity of the sale of shares of stock belonging to the decedents estate without court approval nor of
the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court. G.R. No. 128525 clearly involved a
different issue and it does not therefore apply to the present case.
Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby warned not to further delay the
execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and affirming the July
6, 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the execution of its (trial courts) August 11 and 29, 1997
orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
6. HEIRS OF HILARIO RUIZ V. EDMUND RUIZ
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE;
ALLOWANCE FOR SUPPORT; SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO MINOR OR
INCAPACITATED CHILD-REN. - It is settled that allowances for support under
Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force
at the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age,
civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of
the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially
the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT EXTEND TO DECEASEDS GRANDCHILDREN. - The
law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the
deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE PROPERTIES CAN BE
MADE. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties
can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the
court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX; AN OBLIGATION THAT MUST BE PAID
BEFORE THE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE. The estate tax is one of those
obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said
tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF PROBATE. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will,
the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR OVER PROPERTIES
OF THE DECEASED. - The right of an executor or administrator to the possession
and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Hemedino M. Brondial for petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for private respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-
MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA
ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision
dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will
naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with
the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take
any action for the probate of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria
Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition
for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground
that the will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate - the house and lot at No. 2
Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4 - was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch
Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the
one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance,
on January 25, 1993, Edmondturned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the
balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on
the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate
taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of
P7,722.006
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and
ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23,
1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-
Parte Motion for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for Issuance
of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the release of the said rent
payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution
of the testators properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue
Ridgeapartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds
but granted respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of opposition. It thus
ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedents three granddaughters. It further
ordered the delivery of the titleds to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the
three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to
respondent Montes motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed
to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was
withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over
Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year.7
Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered
the release of the funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover
the espenses of administration and allowanceas for support of the testators three
granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.The
court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the
three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of firast publication of the
notice to creditors.8The Court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties, the court resolves to allow
Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk
of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the
expenses of administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation and deductible from the share in the
inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-
named heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6)
months from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the

expenses necessary for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn
Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be
withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate
courts order in a decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING
AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL
AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT
ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE
ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN
BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate
but before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to
order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties
of the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of
the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during
the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the testators three granddaughters
do not qualify for an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer
minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision
expressly states children of the deceased which excludes the latters grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be
limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 13 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testators death,
provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate
spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are
entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact
that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond
the age of majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and
does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity.16It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his
estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication
of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an
advance distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or

appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected
by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to
the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is
made to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order
speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly
left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much
less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond
or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six
months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due
execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the question of whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.23
The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was controverted by petitioner before
the probate court in his Reply to Montes Opposition to his motion for release of funds24 and
his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25Therein,
petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his
fathers will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an
intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are
the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate
court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his
right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of
an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal
properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration,27 Section 3 of
Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. - An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he
had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and
maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate
taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same
reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit
an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further
money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a
portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not
deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he render an
accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father
is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As
executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in his hands
are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and
the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses
of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those
portions of the order granting an allowance to the testators grandchildren and ordering the
release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and
set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.
7. UNIONBANK V. SANTIBANEZ
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and

FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 30,
2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in
Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibaez entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount
was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to
May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,[4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of
the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor,
with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC.
Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement[5] for
the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6] Subsequently in
March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the
heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During
the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors;
that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the
FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank
of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to
pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against
both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States
and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S.
Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer[13] and alleged
that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering
that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the
joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently
rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as
the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial
court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and
Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent.
However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the
probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been
probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now
defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets
and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola
that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement
executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of
action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of
Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD
BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG
THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER
RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed
to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped respondent Florence S.
Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement
had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to
present the same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the
agreement was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the
deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S.
Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the
claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of
the petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the
petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the
agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has
been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered
the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as
all other properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in
the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT

AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID

PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE
WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH

THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-
APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED
THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs
as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court
to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the
deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from
asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic
will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the
complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and
resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the
petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the
probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement
to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be equivalent
to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts
failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund
executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the
late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation.
Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980
executed by the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent
Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The
petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty
agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must
be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the
petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses
that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as
heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the
petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus
the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of
the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of
which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which
might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the
said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the
agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore,
she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that
the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or
claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing
guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that
she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez,
left a holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing

provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the
said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the
time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over
all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in
any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction
which the Court cannot allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be
a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.[27] Thus, in executing any
joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the
case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is
no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent.
When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the
latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a
premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a
valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint
agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which
is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of liability was conditioned
upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of
their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that
they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot
be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim
with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing
guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his
son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most,
it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes
and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against
the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we
find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown
that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.[33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by
virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines[34] However, the
documentary evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with
the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners
participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial
evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is
now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its
decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting.
Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON V. BELEN

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las
Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is
the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove
her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration
her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order
to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
6
Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent
Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of
the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 11 dated 7 August
2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON

WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-
QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. 14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his
estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time
of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in
1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That Eliseo
went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court. 21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced
by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death
of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, 26 has a cause
of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the
probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in
the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled
to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29 Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
9. PILAPIL V. HEIRS OF BRIONES
THIRD DIVISION
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF G.R. No. 150175

DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely:
ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO
SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA,
ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES,
ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA
SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and
PACITA MENDOZA,
Present:
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- versus-
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES,

namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES,
PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO
CABAHUG, JR., ANITA
TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA,
CRESENCIA BRIONES,
FUGURACION MEDALLE and
MERCEDES LAGBAS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
February 5, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision[1]in the above-entitled case, ruling in
favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion[2] reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the Cebu City
RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby
DISMISSED.
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration[3] of the foregoing Decision was filed by
Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs
of Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners ErlindaPilapil and the other co-heirs
of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration,[4] to which the respondents filed a Rejoinder[5]on 23 May 2006. Thereafter, Atty.
Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his appearance as collaborating
counsel for the respondents.[6] Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June 2006,
respectively, a Reply[7]and Supplemental Reply[8] to the petitioners Opposition to respondents Motion
for Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder[9] to the respondents Reply and
Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006.
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision,[10] are as follows

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of
her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-
Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews
and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also passed
away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the
late Maximino Briones(Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings
of Maximino.
xxxx
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings
to settle her husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI),
14th Judicial District, designated as Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the
CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as
the administratrix of Maximinos estate. She submitted an Inventory
of Maximinos properties, which included, among other things, the following parcels of
land x x x.
xxxx
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding
ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata. On 27 June
1960, Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said
properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces, instituted with
the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlindaand
her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators
of Donatas intestate estate. Controversy arose among Donatas heirs
when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, covered
by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation, both
dated 15 September 1977, allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The
other heirs of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This Court, however, was no longer
informed of the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the estate
of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata,
including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a

Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino,
which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5
December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinosproperties. But then,
Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985,
claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wifes administration as
part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against
the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794.They later filed an Amended Complaint,
on 11 December 1992. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate
of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
xxxx
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in
favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.
xxxx
x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to of the real
properties covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It
also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to
render an accounting of the fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31 August
2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.
xxxx
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs
of Donata filed the present Petition, x x x.
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition meritorious and, reversing
the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint
for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in
Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its findings,[11] thus
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to
the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name.In the absence of fraud, no
implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her
name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952,
issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be
fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino,
including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in
Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court raising still the
arguments that Donata committed fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2
October 1952, which declared her as the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino and
authorized her to have Maximinosproperties registered exclusively in her name; that respondents
right to succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or vested from the moment
of Maximinos death and which they could no longer be deprived of; that Donata merely possessed
and held the properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this Courts ruling
in Quion v. Claridad[12] and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los Angeles,[13] respondents action to recover title to
and possession of their shares in Maximinos estate, held in trust for their benefit by Donata, and
eventually, by petitioners as the latters successors-in-interest, is imprescriptible. Respondents also
advance a fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation of Donatathat she was Maximinos sole heir, was a void order, which produced no
legal effect. Lastly, respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural presumptions in its
Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court has sacrificed their substantive right to succession, thus,
making justice subservient to the dictates of mere procedural fiats. [14]
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its previous Decision in
this case, it does not find any new evidence or argument that would adequately justify a change in its
previous position.
On the finding of fraud
As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations between petitioners and
respondents shall be examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that,
[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.Hence, the foremost question to be answered is still whether an implied trust under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the present case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient evidence to establish
that Donata committed fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of
title to the disputed properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (the
proceedings she instituted to settle Maximinos intestate estate), which declared her
as Maximinos sole heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to Special
Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and validity. Reproduced below are the
relevant portions[15] of the Decision
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure

the TCTs covering the real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a
CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by
the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the
intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable to present a
copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising considering that it was issued 35 years
prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794
on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be denied. It
was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960,
at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on the TCTscovering the real
properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of
the heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never
questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI
Order, but to the manner or procedure by which it was issued in favor
of Donata. Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration
by the RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to
the presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of Donata if produced. x x x.
xxxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the
said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy
the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in

the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence
of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a
judgment valid in every respect; and it could not give credence to the following
statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.
xxxx
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. First of all, the
Petition filed by Donatafor Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R
before the CFI was not even referred to nor presented during the course of the trial of
Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals make a
finding that Donata willfully excluded from the said Petition the names, ages, and
residences of the other heirs of Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence
showing that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to
the heirs of Maximino or that it did not require presentation of proof of service of such
notices. It should be remembered that there stands a presumption that the CFI Judge
had regularly performed his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included
sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such notices;
and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk such
presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of Special Proceedings
No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There was no testimony or document presented in which
the heirs of Maximino categorically denied receipt of notice from the CFI of
the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.The only evidence on record in
reference to the absence of notice of such proceedings was the testimony of
Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of Maximino, x x x.
xxxx
Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not testifying on
matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase I dont think is a clear indication that
she is merely voicing out her opinion on how she believed her uncles and aunts would
have acted had they received notice of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was proceeding from an
evaluation of the evidence on record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only submitted a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006,
annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners opposition to their motion for reconsideration of
this Courts Decision. Respondents did not offer any explanation as to why they belatedly produced a
copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to have been fortunate enough to obtain a copy thereof
from the Register of Deeds of Cebu.[16]
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late into the proceedings
of this case. Parties should present all their available evidence at the courts below so as to give the
opposing party the opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such evidence during the course of the
trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R was never
in issue and was, in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that the copy submitted is a certified true copy of
the said Order; and that the said Order may provide new information vital to a just resolution of the
present case, this Court is compelled to consider the same as part of the evidence on record.
The CFI Order[17] in question reads in full as
ORDER
This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960,
that she be declared the sole heir of her deceased husband, Maximino Suico Briones,
the latter having died without any legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor any
legitimate brother or sister, nephews or nieces.
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the motion, and
based on the uncontradictedtestimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest
surviving relative of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the time of the latters
death, and pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code of the Philippines,
the Court hereby declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and
exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby
entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after paying all the obligations thereof,
which properties are those contained in the Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.
Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order
was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated in the Decision. It
was the inventory of properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix of Maximinos intestate estate,
which was dated 2 October 1952.[18] Other than such observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI
Order which could change its original position in the Decision under consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings
and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem,[19] and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of
the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole
world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition,
regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate proceedings
instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner
by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and
encompassed in such presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate
proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also
failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require
proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as
to why Maximinos siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of
their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of
jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as
counsel for respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to their share in the
inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the establishment of rules of
procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De Dios v. Court of Appeals[20]
Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious

administration of justice by providing for a practical system by which the parties to a
litigation may be accorded a full and fair opportunity to present their respective positions
and refute each other's submissions under the prescribed requirements, conditions and
limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is a
symbiotic relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of Court, the
bench and the bar are better able to discuss, analyze and understand substantive rights
and duties and consequently to more effectively protect and enforce them. The other
alternative is judicial anarchy.
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and abandonment thereof should only
be done in the most exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this Court in the
instant case are disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by
evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents failed to overcome the given
presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that shewas her husbands sole heir, it was
not established that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to
conclude that she indeed committed fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the delay by which
respondents filed the present case, when the principal actors involved,
particularly, Donata and Maximinos siblings, have already passed away and their lips forever sealed
as to what truly transpired between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took
place when all these principal actors were still alive and each would have been capable to act to
protect his or her own right to Maximinos estate.Letters of Administration of Maximinos estate were
issued in favor of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question was issued only
on 15 January 1960. The intestate proceedings for the settlement of Maximinos estate were thus
pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden of the respondents to establish that their parents
or grandparents, Maximinos surviving siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings
all these years. As established in Ramos v. Ramos,[21] the degree of proof to establish fraud in a
case where the principal actors to the transaction have already passed away is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it
thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the
original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence,
and against imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a great length of
time, to require exact proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to
expect a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may
be encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are
living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be
given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest
in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at
probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living;
for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are not here to
answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb
their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be
clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir does constitute fraud, it
is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, [ 2 2 ] considering the
nature of intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular
performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned
Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donatasmisrepresentation constitutes fraud that
would impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still
cannot sustain respondents contention that their right to recover their shares in Maximinos estate
is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an express
trust, is subject to prescription and laches.
The case of Ramos v. Ramos[23] already provides an elucidating discourse on the matter, to wit
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention
of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art.
1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein
may be proven by oral evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid;
Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag,
96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546).
"Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular
intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and
constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the
act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised
by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties,
the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not
expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of
resulting trusts are found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs. Court
of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law,

or arising by operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the construction
of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement or
intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains legal title to
property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party." A constructive trust is not a trust in
the technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456,
Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of
property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to compel
a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of
the cestui qui trust does not prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs.
Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action
to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another (Sevilla vs.
De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust can be recovered by the
beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil.
64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126; Juan vs. Zuiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA
1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil.
31, 37).
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by
prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law
of prescription does not apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz
vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil.
566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12
SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may
possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust
(Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grao, 42 Phil.
35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive

trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare
with Cuison vs. Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasionvs. De Pasion,
112 Phil. 403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee
in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust;
(b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust and
(c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas
vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-owners found in the last
paragraph of Article 494, Civil Code; Casaas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De
Guzman, L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different.

The prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust is
now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona
vs. De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-
19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason &
Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may
supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May
31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be

barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz
vs. Gorricho and Aguado, supra; Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277).
[Emphases supplied.]
A present reading of the Quion[24] and Sevilla[25] cases, invoked by respondents, must be made
in conjunction with and guided accordingly by the principles established in the afore-quoted
case. Thus, while respondents right to inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at the time
of Maximinos death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be barred by the
prescription of the action.
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on implied trust is
governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Article 1456 of the
New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of
their shares in Maximinos properties. The next question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive
period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action for reconveyanceof real property based
on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance of the title to the
property,[26] not only because registration under the Torrens system is a constructive notice of
title,[27] but also because by registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had
already unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-
R, Donata was able to register and secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in her name
on 27 June 1960. The respondents filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794, only
on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in the name
of Donata. Therefore, respondents action for recovery of possession of the disputed properties had
clearly prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794
also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce their right to
the said properties imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action for partition among co-owners
does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as provided for
in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to emphasize that Donata had never recognized
respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly.[28] Her assertion before the CFI in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximinos sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of
some other co-owner or co-heir to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription
of action for partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.
On laches as bar to recovery
Other than prescription of action, respondents right to recover possession of the disputed
properties, based on implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a
question of inequity in permitting a claim to be enforced, applies independently of prescription, which
is a question of time.Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.[29]
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to
assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.[30]
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for barring respondents
action for recovery of the disputed properties because of laches. This Court pointed out therein[31] that
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs

of Maximino even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as some of the
siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the CFI Order, dated [15
January 1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her name of
new TCTs covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This
Court, however, appreciates such information differently. It actually works against the
heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby, Maximinos siblings had ample
opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their deceased
brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were
also located within the same area as their residences in Cebu City,
and Maximinos siblings could have regularly observed the actions and behavior
of Donata with regard to the said real properties. It is uncontested that from the time
of Maximinos death on 1 May 1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She
managed the real properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until her
own death on 1 November 1977. After Donatas death, Erlinda took possession of the
real properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees
thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of
ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already
put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his
wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years
from Maximinos death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning
that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case
No. CEB-5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property
belonging to the estate of Maximino. x x x
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents

conduct before this Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of new
issues, respondents are consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any proffered
reason or justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who
sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he
must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.[32]
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the petitioners
Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order, dated 15 January
1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal
effect. Consequently, the registration of the disputed properties in the name of Donata pursuant to
such Order was likewise void.
This Court is unconvinced.
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,[33] an order or judgment is considered void

when rendered by the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty,
circumstances which are not present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable one, thus
"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to be
made void when a person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the proper
steps to have its invalidity declared. It always contains some defect which may become
fatal. It carries within it the means of its own overthrow. But unless and until it is duly
annulled, it is attended with all the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment. The
party against whom it is given may escape its effect as a bar or an obligation, but only
by a proper application to have it vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it will be
efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or a source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken
against it, it will continue throughout its life to all intents a valid sentence. If emanating
from a court of general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary presumptions of
regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral action. * * *"
But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment is in legal effect
no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds
nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser
at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress."
(Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45;
Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3
Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345;
Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9 Smedes &
M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson
and Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414;
Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)
It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment
and a voidableone, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
essential to the validity of a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void
and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine,
55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and
McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453;
Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs.
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs.
Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seelyvs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)[34]
The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No.
928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely, the
intestate estate of Maximino. Donatas fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI
Order, dated 15 January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said Order, which
already became final and executory, can only be set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its
enforcement.[35] It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack as is being done in this case. Note that
respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of the disputed properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was
not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of title over the properties
issued in Donatas name. So until and unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI
Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment
therein, the assailed Order remains valid and binding.
Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or judgment based on
fraud must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. [36] If it is conceded that the
respondents came to know of Donatas fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the RTC
proceedings which they instituted for the settlement of Maximinos estate, then their right to file an
action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier
instituted by Donata for the settlement of Maximinos estate), has likewise prescribed by present time.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
10. SABIDONG V. SOLAS

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P)
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant,

vs.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn letter-complaint1 dated May 29, 1999 filed
before this Court by Rodolfo C. Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent Nicolasito S. Solas,
Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with grave and serious
misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and abuse of authority.
The Facts
Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land,
designated as Lot 11 (Lot 1280-D-4-11 of consolidation-subdivision plan [LRC] Pcs-483) originally
registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City. 2 The
Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the
other half-portion was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed
by the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4 ("Rosita
R. Natividad in her capacity as Administratrix of C.N. Hodges Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila Saplagio,
defendant"). On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to
immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s
fees, expenses and costs.3 At the time, respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3,
Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and
12. In a letter dated January 7, 1986, the Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s
offer in view of an application to purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with
the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers".
While the check for initial down payment tendered by respondent was returned to him, he was
nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a
sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so
that the property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to
them."4
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an
area of 234 square meters for the amount of ₱35,100. Under the Order dated November 18, 1986
issued by the probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No.
1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"),
respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon the court’s observation that the occupants
of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they are occupying up to this
date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x offerors
are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January 21, 1987, the probate court issued another Order
granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession
over Lot 11 was eventually issued on June 27, 1989.5
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed between
respondent and the Hodges Estate represented by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth R. Diocares. Lot 11
was thereby conveyed to respondent on installment for the total purchase price of ₱50,000.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name of respondent was issued on
December 5, 1994. Lot 11 was later subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which the
corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468), also in the name of respondent, were
issued on February 28, 1997.6
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the Hodges Estate, a writ of demolition was issued
on March 3, 1998 by the probate court in favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of
Lot 11.7
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court employee
respondent cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit
deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority. Complainant specifically alleged the
following:
3. Complainant and his siblings, are possessors and occupants of a parcel of land situated at
Brgy. San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City, then identified as Lot No. 1280-D-4-11, later consolidated
and subdivided and became known as Lot 11, then registered and titled in the name of Charles
Newton Hodges. The Sabidong family started occupying this lot in 1948 and paid their monthly
rentals until sometime in 1979 when the Estate of Hodges stopped accepting rentals. x x x
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987 that the property over which their house is standing, was
being offered for sale by the Estate, the mother of complainant, TRINIDAD CLAVERIO
SABIDONG (now deceased), took interest in buying said property, Lot 11;
5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then an ordinary housekeeper and a
laundrywoman, who never received any formal education, and did not even know how to read
and write. When Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, together with her children and the complainant in
this case, tried to negotiate with the Estate for the sale of the subject property, they were
informed that all papers for transaction must pass through the respondent in this case,
Nicolasito Solas. This is unusual, so they made inquiries and they learned that, Nicolasito
Solas was then the Clerk of Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City and
presently, the City Sheriff of Iloilo City;
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of Court III, MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge,
by reason of his position that in 1983 Hodges Estate was ejecting occupants of its land. x x x
Taking advantage of this inside information that the land subject of an ejectment case in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, whom respondent is a Clerk of Court III, the
respondent surreptitiously offered to buy the said lot in litigation. x x x
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did not know that as early as 1984, the
respondent had offered to purchase the subject lot from the estate x x x. After receiving the
notice of denial of his offer to purchase, dated January 7, 1986, respondent made a second
offer to purchase the subject property the following day, January 8, 1986, knowing fully well
that the subject property was being occupied. x x x
8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the family of the complainant and negotiated for
the sale of the property and transfer of the title in favor of the latter. Respondent made the
complainant and his family believed that he is the representative of the estate and that he
needed a downpayment right away. All the while, the Sabidong family (who were carpenters,
laundrywomen, a janitor, persons who belong to the underprivileged) relied on the
representations of the respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with more
reason that respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff;
9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the complainant who was fortunate to have worked
abroad, sent the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos to complainant’s mother, to be
given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. x x x After receiving the money, respondent assured the
Sabidong family that they will not be ejected from the lot, he being the City Sheriff will take
care of everything, and taking advantage of the illiteracy of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, he did
not issue any receipt;
10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it took the respondent some time to see them
again and demanded additional payment. In the meanwhile, the complainant waited for the
papers of the supposed sale and transfer of title, which respondent had promised after
receiving the downpayment of ₱10,000.00;
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again received from the mother of complainant
the amount of Two Thousand (₱2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for the expenses of the
documentation of sale and transfer of title, and again respondent promised that the Sabidong
family will not be ejected;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant and his family, respondent was able to
secure an order for the approval of his offer to purchase x x x in Special Proceedings No. 1672
x x x;
13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession in his favor, which the
probate court acted favorably x x x. A writ of possession was issued on June 27, 1989 x x x;
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and confidence which the Sabidong family has
shown, considering that respondent was an officer of the court and a City Sheriff at that. The
complainant and his family thought that respondent, being a City Sheriff, could help them in the
transfer of the title in their favor. Never had they ever imagined that while respondent had been
receiving from them hard-earned monies purportedly for the sale of the subject property,
respondent was also exercising acts of ownership adverse to the interest of the complainant
and his family;
15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be an embodiment of fairness and justice,
respondent acted with malice, with grave abuse of confidence and deceit when he represented
that he can facilitate the sale and titling of the subject property in favor of the complainant and
his family;
16. That when several thousands of pesos were given to the respondent as payment for the
same and incidental expenses relative thereto, he was able to cause the transfer of the title in
his favor. x x x;
17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x x x the respondent received from the
complainant the amount of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos x x x When a receipt was
demanded, respondent refused to issue one, and instead promised and assured the
complainant that they will not be ejected;
xxxx
19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law, Socorro Sabidong, delivered and gave to
the respondent the amount of Three Thousand (₱3,000.00) Pesos as expenses for the
subdivision of the subject lot. The respondent facilitated the subdivision and after the same
was approved, the complainant did not know that two (2) titles were issued in the name of the
respondent. x x x;
20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to Sell, for the complainant and his neighbor
Norberto Saplagio to affix their signatures, pursuant to their previous agreement for the buyers
to avail of a housing loan with the Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG). Complainant
attended the seminar of the HDMF for seven (7) times, in his desire to consummate the sale.
However, when the complainant affixed his signature in the contract, he was surprised that the
owner of the subject property was the respondent. When complainant raised a question about
this, respondent assured complainant that everything was alright and that sooner complainant
will be the owner of the property. Complainant and his family, all these years, had believed and
continued to believe that the owner was the estate of Hodges and that respondent was only
the representative of the estate;
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been notarized on June 3, 1996, however, no copy
thereof was given to the complainant by the respondent. Respondent then, took the papers
and documents required by the HDMF to be completed, from the complainant allegedly for the
purpose of personally filing the same with the HDMF. Complainant freely and voluntarily
delivered all pertinent documents to the respondent, thinking that respondent was helping in
the fast and easy release of the loan. While the said documents were in the possession of the
respondent, he never made any transaction with the HDMF, worse, when complainant tried to
secure a copy of the Contract to Sell, the copy given was not signed by the Notary Public, x x
x;
22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that respondent had canceled the sale and that
respondent refused to return the documents required by the HDMF. Respondent claimed that
as Sheriff, he can cause the demolition of the house of the complainant and of his family.
Respondent threatened the complainant and he is capable of pursuing a demolition order and
serve the same with the assistance of the military. x x x;
23. After learning of the demolition order, complainant attempted to settle the matter with the
respondent, however, the same proved futile as respondent boasted that the property would
now cost at Four Thousand Five Hundred (₱4,500.00) Pesos;
24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly, complainant and his family were duped by
the respondent and are helpless victims of an officer of the court who took advantage of their
good faith and trust. Complainant later was informed that the subject property was awarded to
the respondent as his Sheriff’s Fees, considering that respondent executed the decisions in
ejectment cases filed by the Hodges estate against the adverse occupants of its vast
properties;
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the respondent over the subject property is
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 37 and a criminal complaint for Estafa
is also pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City,
known as I.S. No. 1559-99, both filed [by] the complainant against the respondent. 8
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a 1st Indorsement 9 dated
July 8, 1999, requiring respondent to file his comment on the Complaint dated May 29, 1999. On
October 21, 1999, respondent submitted his Comment.10
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor Constantino C. Tubilleja dismissed the
Estafa charge against respondent for insufficiency of evidence.
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation and

Recommendation12 finding respondent guilty of violating Article 1491 13 of the Civil Code. Said rule
prohibits the purchase by certain court officers of property and rights in litigation within their
jurisdiction. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended that:
1. this administrative complaint be treated as an administrative matter;
2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, OCC, MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED
for six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the same offense in the future will be dealt
with more severely;
3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the delivery of substantial amounts which
complainant alleged and which defendant denied, this issue should be investigated and the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City should be designated to hear the
evidence and to make a report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt. 14
In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted the recommendation of the Court
Administrator to treat the present administrative action as a regular administrative matter and to
designate the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City to hear the evidence of the parties.
The Court, however, noted without action the Court Administrator’s recommendation to suspend
respondent for six months.
On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño forwarded the records of this
case to Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated July 18, 2001,
the Court referred this case to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City for investigation, report
and recommendation within 60 days from notice. By Order18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive Judge
Gustilo set the case for reception of evidence.
On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed the case for annulment of title, damages
and injunction against respondent for lack of merit.19
In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to reassign the instant administrative case
to Executive Judge Rene S. Hortillo for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from
notice. In a Letter21 dated September 15, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo informed the Court that per
the records, the parties have presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before retired
Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo.
On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required the parties to file their respective
memoranda within 60 days from notice, upon submission of which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.22
In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his purchase of the subject land is not covered by
the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A
a decade after the MTCC of Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila Saplagio and
Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He insisted that public trust was observed when complainant
was accorded his right of first refusal in the purchase of Lot 11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said
right. Asserting that he is a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent cited the dismissal of the
cases for Estafa and annulment of title and damages which complainant filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service. Prior to this, he wrote then
Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, requesting for the release of his retirement
benefits pending resolution of the administrative cases against him. 24 In a Memorandum25 dated
September 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño made the following
recommendations:
a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk of Court, MTCC, Iloilo City for partial
release of his retirement benefits be GRANTED; and
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator be DIRECTED to (1) WITHHOLD the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) from the retirement benefits of Nicolasito S. Solas to answer for any
administrative liability that the Court may find against him in A.M. No. P-01-1448 (Formerly
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA IPI No. 99-659-P; OCA IPI No. 99-670-P;
and OCA IPI No. 99-753-P; and (2) RELEASE the balance of his retirement benefits.26
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio, the new Executive Judge of the Iloilo
City RTC for investigation, report and recommendation.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and Recommendation 27 finding
respondent liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel. Based on the evidence presented, Judge Patricio concluded that
respondent misappropriated the money which he received for the filing of complainant’s loan
application. Such money could not have been used for the partition of Lot No. 1280-D-4-11 since the
same was already subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B when respondent presented the Contract to
Sell to complainant. And despite respondent’s promise to keep complainant and his family in peaceful
possession of the subject property, respondent caused the issuance of a writ of demolition against
them. Thus, Judge Patricio recommended the forfeiture of respondent’s salary for six months to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
In a Resolution28 dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted Judge Patricio’s Investigation Report
and referred the same to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found
respondent liable for serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty and recommended the forfeiture
of respondent’s salary for six months, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of extinguishing the contract to sell and
forfeiting the amounts he received from complainant and Saplagio without due notice, respondent
failed to act with justice and equity. He found respondent’s denial to be anchored merely on the fact
that he had not issued receipts which was belied by his admission that he had asked money for the
expenses of partitioning Lot 11 from complainant and Saplagio. Since their PAG-IBIG loan
applications did not materialize, complainant should have returned the amounts given to him by
complainant and Saplagio.
On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution 30 requiring the parties to manifest whether they
are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings and records already filed with
the Court. However, the copy of the Resolution dated February 11, 2009 which was sent to
complainant was returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in
a Compliance31 dated August 24, 2009, respondent expressed his willingness to submit the case for
decision and prayed for an early resolution of the case.
Our Ruling
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from
acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision
reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control
exercised by these persons.32"In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely,
tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done." 33
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property.34 Where the property is acquired after the termination
of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. 35
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil
Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it
can not be said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of
the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. 36 A property forming part
of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court
issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as
the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC
of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed
of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to
the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another
court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service,
the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must
also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the
duties of the office.39
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness."40
In this case, respondent deceived complainant’s family who were led to believe that he is the legal
representative of the Hodges Estate, or at least possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying
occupants of the estate’s properties like complainant. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City
Sheriff at that, complainant’s family completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be
ejected from the premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying was for sale and that they
had to negotiate for it through respondent, complainant’s family readily gave the amounts he
demanded and, along with Saplagio, complied with the requirements for a loan application with PAG-
IBIG. All the while and unknown to complainant’s family, respondent was actually working to acquire
Lot 11 for himself.
Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges Estate for the sale of the property to him, he
collected as down payment ₱5,000 from complainant’s family in July 1986. Four months later, on
November 18, 1986, the probate court approved respondent’s offer to purchase Lot 11. The latter
received further down payment from complainant in the amount of ₱10,000 between 1992 and 1993,
or before the Deed of Sale with Mortgage41 dated November 21, 1994 could be executed in
respondent’s favor.
Thereafter, respondent demanded ₱3,000 from complainant supposedly for the subdivision of Lot 11
between the latter and the Saplagios. Yet, it was not until respondent obtained title over said lot that
the same was subdivided into Lots 11-A and 11-B. The records42 of the case show that the
Subdivision Plan dated April 25, 1996, duly approved by the Land Management Services (DENR)
subdividing Lot 11 into sublots 11-A and 11-B, was inscribed on February 28, 1997 – two years after
TCT No. T-107519 covering Lot 11 was issued in respondent’s name on December 5, 1994.
Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of ₱2,000 to defray the expenses for documentation
and transfer of title in complainant’s name. In the latter instance, while it may be argued that
respondent already had the capacity to sell the subject property, the sum of all the circumstances
belie an honest intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to complainant. We note the inscription in
TCT No. T-1183643 in the name of C.N. Hodges that respondent executed a Request dated February
19, 1997 "for the issuance of separate titles in the name of the registered owner."44 Soon after, TCT
No. T-11646745 covering Lot 11-A and TCT No. T-11646846 covering Lot 11-B were issued in the
name of respondent on February 28, 1997 – only eight months after he executed the Contract to
Sell47 in favor of complainant on June 3, 1996.
Respondent’s bare denials were correctly disregarded by the Court Administrator in the light of his
own admission that he indeed asked money from both complainant and Saplagio. The evidence on
record clearly established that by misrepresenting himself as the estate’s representative and as a
court officer having the power to protect complainant’s family from eviction, respondent was able to
collect sums totaling ₱20,000 from complainant’s family. Even after the latter realized they were
duped since respondent was already the owner of Lot 11, they still offered to buy the property from
him. Respondent, however, changed his mind and no longer wanted to sell the property after nothing
happened to the loan applications of complainant and Saplagio. This subsequent unilateral
cancellation by respondent of the contract to sell with complainant may have been an afterthought,
and plainly unjustified, based merely on his own assumption that complainant could not make full
payment. But it did not negate the deception and fraudulent acts perpetrated against complainant’s
family who were forced into submission by the constant threat of eviction. Such acts constitute grave
misconduct for which respondent should be held answerable.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III,
RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya,48 the Court stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must
comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case,
we said that court employees are expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not
only in their official conduct but also in their personal dealings, including business and commercial
transactions to avoid becoming the court’s albatross of infamy.49
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.1âwphi1 They shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
Under Section 52,51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
dishonesty and grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of
dismissal for the first offense. Section 58(a) states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service.
Section 53 further provides that mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense
should be considered in the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the erring government
employee. However, no such mitigating circumstance had been shown. On the contrary, respondent
had been previously held administratively liable for irregularities in the performance of his duties as
Clerk of Court. In A.M. No. P-01-1484,52 this Court imposed on respondent a fine of ₱5,000 for acting
imprudently in notarizing documents and administering oath on matters alien to his official duties. And
in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-670-P) and P-08-2568 (formerly OCA IPI No. 99-
753-P),53 respondent was found liable for simple misconduct and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to
his three (3) months salary to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on September 10, 2007, for this additional
administrative case he should be fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for six months which
shall likewise be deducted from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, retired Clerk of Court IV, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY.
Respondent is FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6) months to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
11. ARANAS V. MERCADO

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,

CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination
shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V.
Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M.
Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in
Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu
Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to
Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094–
CEB).1The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992
for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all,
consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at
P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of
Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The
RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her
inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock;4the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties
with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with
total par value of P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00. 6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the
inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or
comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the
inventory.7cralawred
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what
properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on
that issue.8cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order
finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be
included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby denies the
administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to
re–do the inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio
S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding
paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this
order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate
of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must render such accounting
within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of
the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered
by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the name of
Mervir Realty.10Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent
reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the
issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them
from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the
inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to
Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse
orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION

(sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL
PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME
TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION

(sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL
PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE
NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF
WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows: 13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The

assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar
as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of
53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the
various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and
January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned
and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of
the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of
the Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold “shall be transferred to the vendee”
upon its “actual and constructive delivery,” and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the
sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the
sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because
the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land
to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with
the difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of
land were included”; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been
“even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of
Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through shares of
stock”; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment dated January 10,
1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory “considering that there is nothing
wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme”; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also
had no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name
of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the
presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed
the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be
included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from
questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its
jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be
submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not
questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they are not estopped,
since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and in
possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the
law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor
of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the
applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court
was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed
to adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate
fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing
must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be presumed. 14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding
that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir
Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Was certiorari the proper recourse

to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action
for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co–respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed
orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila–Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more
to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order
or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The
reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during
the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits
of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions
raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted
to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and
the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership
as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to
the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was
interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order “in the sense
that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The Court observed
there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448–9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L–42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA
262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a “probate
court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally,” and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the “patent reason is the
probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.”
Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the
assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules
of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments,
final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in
due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it
deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered) is expressly made non–appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that
material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1,
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be
resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate
to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any
claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the
party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances
in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for
including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by
Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of
Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored
the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person
dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes
duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate,
and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory
within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after
his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of
the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which
has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to
the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or
the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.”23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be
included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in
order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from
the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a
positive abuse of discretion.”25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited.
The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to
belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said
in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special
and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included
in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there
poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily,
its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold
emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of
the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs
of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of
properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306–R which are supposed to be divided
among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the counsel for the
petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio
Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio
Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties
required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that
she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her
name and which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her
husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being
conjugal in character, one–half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of
the estate of her husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she
had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive.
Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one–half
thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls–
657–D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is
still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case
No. CEB–12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio
Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the
said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when
he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S.
Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a
transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A
transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not
long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the
inventory to be approved in this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado
which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually
appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his
death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991
(Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant
to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations
indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and
valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included
in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by
Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in
August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. 29 For purposes of the
settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal
partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime
did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must
prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. 30 In the
absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and
Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that
pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the
RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB–12692, a dispute that had
involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in
the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in
the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB–12692. Such lack of interest
in Civil Case No. CEB–12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect
that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the
trial court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words,
Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a
notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties
involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution,
but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and
what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of
regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an
instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract.(Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real
properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of
assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his
guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick
of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the
exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be
established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could
not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of
titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system
is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except
claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991,
such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the
assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted the determination of the
rights to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court
from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the
RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to
have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.” 37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important
purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of
the Civil Coderequired every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to
“bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the
decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the
RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by
authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any
compulsory heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was
best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator
to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part
of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means
either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39
In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in
Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
12. BUTLONG V. PLAZO 765 SCRA 227

Specpro 1 - PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Specpro 1 - PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1. Silverio Sr. v. Silverio Jr.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

CA-G.R. SP No. 121172

CA-G.R. SP No. 121173

CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024

"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as VOID:

2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223612 in the name of

The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:

We affirm the CA.

With costs against the petitioner.

2. SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

CA-G.R. SP No. 121172

CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024

"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010 as VOID:

2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223612 in the name of

The CA’s ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:

We affirm the CA.

With costs against the petitioner.

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, G.R. No. 177099

SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,

- versus - CARPIO, J.,

The antecedent facts and proceedings

TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL VALUE AMOUNT

II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:

BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) ------------------------------P350,000.00

TOTAL NET WORTH ----------------------------------------- P14,177,500.00

TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00

1) JOSE (deceased) - P1,181,548.30

TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66

Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:

Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57.

HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:

1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

2) TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

3) WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:

a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999

b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir

c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir

REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:

In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:

SEBASTIAN P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia

EDUARDO P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for

Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he is already deceased

Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.

Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.

G.R. No. 177192

1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned important

G.R. No. 177099

THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE

The Courts Ruling

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece,