FULL TITLE: DARIO NACAR VS.GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR FELIPE BORDEY, JR.

STATEMENT OF FACTS Petitioner Dario Nacar filed a complaint before the NLRC for constructive
dismissal against respondents Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr. In 1998, the Labor Arbiter ruled
in favor of Nacar and ordered the respondents to pay backwages and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement in the amount of P158,919.92. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
was affirmed. Respondents thereafter filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA which
dismissed the petition. When the case was brought before the Supreme Court, the same was denied and
the decision became final and executory.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE In 2002, Nacar filed a motion for Correct Computation praying that the
award of backwages be computed from January 24, 1997, when he was illegally dismissed, until the
finality of the judgment of the Supreme Court in May 27, 2002. The NLRC came up with the amount of
P471,320.31 but when a writ of execution was ISSUEd, the respondents filed a Motion to Quash arguing
that since the Labor Arbiter awarded separation pay and backwages, and its decision has already attained
finality, it can no longer be amended or altered. The records of the case were again forwarded to the
Computation and Examination Unit for recomputation, where the judgment award of petitioner was
reassessed to be in the total amount of only P147,560.19. On January 14, 2003, the Labor Arbiter ISSUEd
an Alias Writ of Execution to satisfy the judgment award that was due to petitioner in the amount of
P147,560.19. Petitioner then filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the re-computation of the
monetary award to include the appropriate interests. On May 10, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ISSUEd an
Ordergranting the motion, but only up to the amount of P11,459.73. The Labor Arbiter reasoned that it is
the October 15, 1998 decision that should be enforced considering that it was the one that became final
and executory. Petitioner then appealed before the NLRC,which appeal was denied in its Resolutiondated
September 27, 2006. Aggrieved, petitioner then sought recourse before the CA but to no avail. It ruled
that since petitioner no longer appealed the October 15, 1998 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, which
already became final and executory, a belated correction thereof is no longer allowed. Petitioner appealed
the decision before the Supreme Court arguing that the computation of the backwages must be reckoned
from May 27, 2002, when the resolution of the Court was entered into the Book of Entries, not when the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was promulgated. Petitioner further claims that respondents should pay
interest from the finality of the decision until full payment is made.

ISSUE/s Whether or not respondents are liable to pay interest.

RULING Yes. The respondents did not immediately pay or comply with the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and instead continued with the litigation until the decision attained finality at the CA level. As a
consequence, re-computation became necessary in accordance with the Article 279 of the Labor Code, by
the very nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until finality of the decision.
With regard to the payment of interest, this shall now be governed by Circular No. 799, effective July 1,
2013, which provides that in the absence of stipulation of the parties regarding the rate of interest for
loans or forbearance of money, goods, and credits the rate allowed shall now be 6% per annum – as
opposed to the 12% per annum which was provided for in previous circular ISSUEd by the BSP. The
following guidelines shall govern: “I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The
provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages. “II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: “When
the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the
interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. “When an
obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time
the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. “When the
judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit. “And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1,
2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed
therein.”

DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 23, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98591, and the Resolution dated October 9, 2009 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are Ordered to Pay petitioner: (1) backwages computed from
the time petitioner was illegally dismissed on January 24, 1997 up to May 27, 2002, when the Resolution
of this Court in G.R. No. 151332 became final and executory; (2) separation pay computed from August
1990 up to May 27, 2002 at the rate of one month pay per year of service; and (3) interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards, computed from May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013
and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction. The Labor Arbiter is hereby
ORDERED to make another recomputation of the total monetary benefits awarded and due to petitioner
in accordance with this Decision.

Advocates for Truth in Lending vs BSP

Facts: Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation
organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It was
incorporated on July 9, 2010,2 and a month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder and president,
Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen. - R.A. No. 265, created the Central Bank on June
15, 1948, it empowers the CB-MB to set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all
types of loans and other credit operations. - The Usury Law was amended by P.D.1684, it gave the CB-
MB authority to prescribe different maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or
renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected
gradually and announced in advance. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655 now reads: - In its Resolution No. 2224
dated December 3, 1982, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, effective on January 1,
1983. It removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits V.
Statement of case Petitioner skipped the hierarchy of courts in claim of transcendental importance ·
Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB
was authorized only to prescribe or set the maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal thereof or for
the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to change such rates whenever warranted by
prevailing economic and social conditions, the changes to be effected gradually and on scheduled dates;
that nothing in P.D. No. 1684 authorized the CB-MB to lift or suspend the limits of interest on all credit
transactions, when it issued CB Circular No. 905. They further insist that under Section 109 of R.A. No.
265, the authority of the CB-MB was clearly only to fix the banks’ maximum rates of interest, but always
within the limits prescribed by the Usury Law. · CB Circular No. 905, which was promulgated without
the benefit of any prior public hearing, is void because it violated NCC 5 which provides that "Acts
executed against the prov