Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
VI.B
• FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA, 61 PHIL. 752 DY
SYLLABUS
1. PARENT AND CHILD; SUPPORT OF CHILD WHILE HIS CIVIL
STATUS IS IN LITIGATION. — In the present case the action
for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad
litem, who alleges that he is the son of the petitioner;
therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as
such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is
evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point
in issue.
2. ID.; ID. — There is no law or reason which authorizes the
granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the
same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof
that he is such son. In the latter case legal evidence raises a
presumption of law, while in the former there is no
presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in
issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with
an established right recognized by a final judgment.
3. ID.; ID. — The civil status of sonship being denied and this
civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being
in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a
claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to
the existence of the cause. It is also evident that there is a
substantial difference between the capacity of a person after
the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is
declared to be in possession of the status of a son and his
capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other that his
suit or claim to be declared in possession of such a status.
4. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION. — The Civil Code grants the right
of support to a son. This status not appearing by a final
judgment, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to
order the petitioner, as defendant in case No. 47238, to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any other amount, as monthly
support, pendente lite.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENT OF PARTIES. — In view of the lack
of jurisdiction of the respondent judge to grant the plaintiff
support, pendente lite, it is evident that the attorney of the
defendant is case No. 47238 could not by his alleged consent
to the granting of such support give the trial judge jurisdiction
to adjudicate such a claim against his client. It is a universal
rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as
such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of
the land.
Facts:
Petitioner, Luis Francisco, sought to annul the ruling of
respondent judge granting private respondent, Eugenio
Leopold Francisco, a support pendent lite at the amount of
Php 30/month.
The respondent, through his guardian ad litem Rosario (his
mother), filed a complaint of support. It was alleged that he
is an acknowledged son of herein petitioner thus entitling him
for support. Petitioner, as defendant in that case, answered
by a general denial of each and every material allegation
contained in the complaint and as a special defense alleged
that he never acknowledged and could not have
acknowledged the plaintiff as his son; that he was not present
at the baptism of the plaintiff and that he was married at the
time it is alleged that the plaintiff was born.
Notwithstanding the denial, the judge granted the order and
Francisco moved for a reconsideration on the ground that it
was issued in excess of jurisdiction in view of the fact that the
civil status of the plaintiff was placed in issue by the
pleadings; that the plaintiff has no right to monthly support
from the defendant until his status as a child of the latter is
finally determined in his favor and that as the guardian ad
litem of the plaintiff admits his lack of means to defray even
the ordinary expenses of existence it would be impossible for
the defendant to recover whatever amount he may have
advanced to plaintiff as support pendente lite, should it finally
be decided that he is not the father of the plaintiff.
Issue:
WON Eugenio Leopold Francisco is entitled to the support
without establishing his status as the son of Luis Francisco?
Ruling:
NO.
The SC held in the previous case of Yangco vs. Rohde that
the fact of a civil status must be proved before a right of
support can be derived, to wit,”In the present case the action
for the support or alimony is brought by a woman who alleges
that she is a wife; therefore it is necessary for her to prove
possession of the civil status of a spouse — that is, a
marriage, without which one has no right to the title of
husband or wife, . . .. "This evidence being lacking, and the
civil status of marriage being in litigation, it is evident that
nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue.
There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of
alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the same
manner as to a person who conclusively establishes by legal
proof that he or she is such a spouse, and sues for divorce or
separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a
presumption of law; in the former there is no presumption,
there is nothing but a mere allegation — a fact in issue - and
a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an
established right recognized by a final judgment or based
upon a legal presumption. The civil status of marriage being
denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support
is derived, being in issue, it is difficult to see how any effect
can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration
has been made as to the existence of the cause. It is evident
that there is of necessity a substantial difference between the
capacity of a person is declared to be in possession of the
status of marriage and his capacity prior to such time when
nothing exists other that his suit or claim to be declared in
possession of such status of marriage . . .."
In the present case the action for support is brought by a
minor, through his guardian ad litem, who alleges that he is
the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to
prove his civil status as such son. His alleged civil status being
in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted
upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which
authorizes the granting of support to a person who
establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter
case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law.
The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status,
from which the right to support is derived, being in issue, it
is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until
an authoritative declaration has been made as to the
existence of the cause.
Short digest:
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EL Francisco sought for the support of Luis Francisco, his
alleged father, through the institution of the action by his
mother Rosario. The herein respondent alleged that he was
an acknowledged son of the petitioner. However, petitioner
denied the allegations—he never acknowledged the child, he
was married at the time of the birth of the child, physical
absence during the baptism.
The trial court ruled in favor of the child and ordered Luis
Francisco to pay Php 30/month as support.
Issue:
WON Eugenio Leopold Francisco is entitled to the support
without establishing his status as the son of Luis Francisco?
Ruling:
No.
It held that “(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the
granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the
same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof
that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises
a presumption of law, while in the former there is no
presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in
issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with
an established right recognized by a final judgment.”
Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to
order for the monthly support in light of herein private
respondent’s absence of aforementioned status.
• YANGCO V. RHODE, 1 PHIL. 404 FERNANDEZ
PRINCIPLES:
1. Marriage and Divorce--- Where the answer to a
complaint alleging marriage and praying for a divorce
denies the fact of marriage, the court exceeds its
jurisdiction in granting alimony, and the enforcement
of an order granting it will be restrained by the writ
of prohibition.
2. -The right of a wife to support depends upon her
status as such, and where the existence of the status
is put in issue by the pleading it cannot be presumed
to exist for the purpose of granting alimony. (the
fact of the civil status must be proven first
before a right of support can be derived)
3. -The CFI have jurisdiction over suits for divorce, and
the granting of alimony pendent lite is incidental to
this jurisdiction; consequently, an order granting
alimony, even if erroneous, is not an excess of
jurisdiction, and its enforcement cannot be
restrained by prohibition.
DIGEST:
FACTS:
Yangco, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, alleging that
Judge Rohde, of the CFI Manila, acted in excess of jurisdiction
when a complaint had been filed by Victorina against the
petitioner praying that she be declared the lawful wife of the
said Yangco, and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance
for alimony, and attorney's fees during the pendency of the
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
suit; that the demurrer filed by the petitioner was overruled
by the said judge.
A part of the ruling as follows: (just for you to know the
judgment of Rohde)
"I am of the opinion that the marriage alleged in the
complaint is valid under the laws in force, although the
question is not clear nor without doubt. The facts alleged in
the complaint compel me to resolve the doubt in favor of the
plaintiff;" and that the petitioner, in answer to the complaint,
denied the principal allegation of fact therein, to wit, the
mutual agreement to be husband and wife alleged by the
plaintiff to have been entered into before witnesses; that
while the case was in this condition the plaintiff filed a motion
for a monthly allowance as alimony, costs, and attorney's
fees; that on the 22nd of July last the said judge ordered the
petitioner to pay the plaintiff, in advance, a monthly
allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and after the 11th of
March last past, and to pay on the 1st day of August following
all accrued allowances, in addition to the allowance for the
said month, amounting to the sum of 1,500 pesos; that the
plaintiff in the said action owns no property, and the judge
not having required from her any security, it is certain that
the petitioner, defendant in the said action below, should
judgment be rendered in his favor, would be unable to
recover such sums as the judge might compel him to
disburse; that against the ruling of the court he had no right
of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy;
Y prayed to the court to render judgment declare Rohde, that
he acted in excess of his jurisdiction in attempting to oblige
petitioner to pay to the said Victorina said allowance, and to
direct that a writ of prohibition issue to said Rohde prohibiting
him from attempting to compel petitioner to pay the said
amount.
Rohde, filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss upon the
following grounds: (1) That this court is without jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the action; (2) that the petition
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Victorina acquired a right all conjugal rights, and in particular
to the allowance of alimony pendente lite." And upon this
supposition he cited articles of the Civil Code as to rights
enjoyed by a married woman by virtue of the marriage, and
those which she may further exercise by reason of divorce
pending litigation and those granted to her finally in case of
a favorable judgment.
The respondents judge had jurisdiction to try the divorce case
and its incidents, among others that of alimony; in an
interlocutory ruling he held that the alleged matrimony
existed, although it appeared to him to be a matter not clear
or free from doubt; in another interlocutory order,
notwithstanding the fact that the existence of the marriage is
not clear or free from doubt, he directed the allowance of
alimony pendente lite in favor of the plaintiff; against this
interlocutory order no appeal lies on behalf of the alleged
husband who is to pay this allowance; this alleged husband
must pay it without any guaranty of recovery in the event
that the proof should established a contrary condition of
affairs to that assumed to be correct, notwithstanding the fact
that the question is not clear or free from doubt; and as the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  2

judge is not devoid of jurisdiction, and as no appeal lies
against an interlocutory order, that such an opinion, such an
interlocutory order so rendered, although erroneous and
causing irreparable damage, can not be reviewed by any
other court during the course of the trial.
Under article 1591 of the old Code any person believing
himself entitled to that provisional alimony or support was
required to file with the complaint documents proving
conclusively the title by virtue of which the same was sued
for. If the title was based upon a right created by law, it was
necessary to present the documents establishing the bond of
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant or the
circumstances which gave a right to the alimony, such
evidence to be completed by the testimony of witnesses if
necessary. The judge, under article 1592, could not admit the
complaint unless the documents referred to in the preceding
article were submitted. It is evident from this that under the
provisions of the law then in force a suit for alimony could not
prosper upon the mere opinion of the judge expressed, not in
a final judgment causing status, but in an interlocutory order
which has no other purpose than to facilitate the continuance
of the trial.
The necessity of founding the action for support or alimony
on a title, and a title supported by documentary evidence, is
a consequence of the precepts of article 143 of the Civil Code
cited by the respondent judge himself. In this article the right
to support is granted (1) to spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate
descendants and ascendants inter se; (3) to parents and
certain legitimated and acknowledged natural children; (4) to
other illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and sisters. In
all these cases in is a civil status or a juridical relation which
is the basis of the action for support — the civil status of
marriage or that of relationship.
In the present case the action for the support or alimony is
brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore
it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status
of a spouse — that is, a marriage, without which one has no
right to the title to husband or wife. Marriages celebrated
before the adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the
means established by the former laws. This evidence being
lacking, and the civil status of marriage being in litigation, it
is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the
point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the
granting of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in
the same manner as to a person who conclusively establishes
by legal proof that he or she is such spouse, and sues for
divorce or separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a
presumption of law; in the former there is no presumption,
there is nothing but a mere allegation — a fact in issue — and
a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an
established right recognized by a final judgment or based
upon a legal presumption.
On the issue of the remedy of prohibition, this remedy must
be based upon a lack of jurisdiction or an excess in the
exercise of jurisdiction in order that the judge may be
prohibited from continuing the proceedings.
The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but
he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right
to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only grants the rights
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
to alimony to a wife. This status not appearing by a final
judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order
in the matter. Therefore mandamus is the proper remedy
upon the facts related.
It is not necessary to decide at this time if an exception could
be made with respect to a case in which the fact of the
marriage is admitted of record by the defendant. In the case
before us this fact was denied. The motion and demurrer are
overruled and the defendant is authorized to answer the
complaint within twenty days from this date.
QUICK DIGEST:
Victorina (V) filed a complaint against Yangco (Y) praying that
she be declared the lawful wife of said Yangco, and that she
be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and
attorney's fees during the pendency of the suit. In Y’s answer
to the complaint, he denied the fact of marriage between him
and V. Support was granted by Judge Rohde (R).(Note: the
judge granted the allowance for alimony even if there is
DOUBT as to the existence of marriage)
Issue:
Whether the R is correct.
SC Ruling:
No. (V is not entitled for support)
Under the old Code any person believing himself entitled to
that provisional alimony or support was required to file with
the complaint documents proving conclusively the title by
virtue of which the same was sued for. If the title was based
upon a right created by law, it was necessary to present the
documents establishing the bond of relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant or the circumstances which gave a
right to the alimony, such evidence to be completed by the
testimony of witnesses if necessary.
The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as
such, and where the existence of the status is put in issue by
the pleading it cannot be presumed to exist for the purpose
of granting alimony. The fact of the civil status must be
proven first before a right of support can be derived.
In the present case the action for the support or alimony is
brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore
it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status
of a spouse — that is, a marriage, without which one has no
right to the title to husband or wife. Marriages celebrated
before the adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the
means established by the former laws. This evidence being
lacking, and the civil status of marriage being in litigation, it
is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the
point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the
granting of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in
the same manner as to a person who conclusively establishes
by legal proof that he or she is such spouse, and sues for
divorce or separation
• COQUIA V. BALTAZAR, G.R. NO. L-2942, DECEMBER
29, 1949 ECNEROL
Facts:
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Respondents Gaspara, Francisca, Dionisio, Alfredo, and
Salvador Coquia, assisted by their mother and guardian ad
litem Maria Dalori, filed an action in the Court of the First
Instance of Leyte against the spouses Silvestra Coquia and
Luis Carandang to recover the possession as owner of four
parcels of land. They alleged that they are acknowledged
natural children and the sole heirs of the latter. The
petitioners (Silvestra and Luis) in their answer denied that
the respondents are acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Alfredo Coquia.
Pending the trial of the case said respondents (plaintiff's
below) filed a petition for alimony pendente lite which Judge
Edmundo S. Piccio granted in the sum of P200 a month
(subsequently reduced to P100 a month).
The respondent judge, Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, a denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. He held that the order
of Judge Piccio for alimony pendente lite was well founded.
On February 26, 1949, ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution against the herein petitioners to collect the sum of
P400 corresponding to four months of unpaid alimony.
Petitioner’s filed the present petition for certiorari to annul the
above mentioned orders.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting the
petition for alimony pendent lite, writ of execution, and order
of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
YES. Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes the
granting of alimony pendente lite" at the commencement of
the proper action, or at any time afterwards but prior to the
final judgment," is not applicable to this case. The action
commenced before the respondent judge was not for support
but for the recovery of the ownership and possession of real
property. Manifestly such an action is not "the proper action"
contemplated by said rule The mere fact that the plaintiffs
have legal and equitable rights in the property they seek to
recover (Q. E. D. ) does not authorize the court to compel the
defendants to support the plaintiffs pending the
determination of the suit. Moreover, the petitioners, who are
sister and brother-in law, respectively, of the deceased
Alfredo Coquia, are not bound to support the alleged natural
children of the latter. Under the article 143 of the Civil Code
only the following are bound to support each other: (1)
husband and wife: (2) legitimate ascendants and
descendants: and (3) parents and acknowledged natural
children, and the legitimate descendants of the latter.
Even in an action for divorce and alimony, it has been held
that the court has no jurisdiction to grant alimony pendente
lite where the answer to the complaint alleging marriage and
praying for divorce denies the fact of marriage, because the
right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such,
and where the existence of such status is put in issue by the
pleading, it cannot be presumed to exist for the purpose of
granting alimony.
PETITION IS GRANTED. ORDERS complained of are SET
ASIDE.
QUICK DIGEST:
Facts:
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
Respondents Gaspara, Francisca, Dionisio, Alfredo, and
Salvador Coquia, assisted by their mother and guardian ad
litem Maria Dalori, filed an action in the Court of the First
Instance of Leyte against the spouses Silvestra Coquia and
Luis Carandang to recover the possession as owner of four
parcels of land. They alleged that they are acknowledged
natural children and the sole heirs of the latter. The
petitioners (Silvestra and Luis) in their answer denied that
the respondents are acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Alfredo Coquia. Pending the trial of the case said
respondents (plaintiff's below) filed a petition for alimony
pendente lite which Judge Edmundo S. Piccio granted in the
sum of P200 a month (subsequently reduced to P100 a
month).
The respondent judge, Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, a denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. He held that the order
of Judge Piccio for alimony pendente lite was well founded.
On February 26, 1949, ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution against the herein petitioners to collect the sum of
P400 corresponding to four months of unpaid alimony.
Petitioner’s filed the present petition for certiorari to annul the
above mentioned orders.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting the
petition for alimony pendent lite, writ of execution, and order
of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
YES. Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes the
granting of alimony pendente lite" at the commencement of
the proper action, or at any time afterwards but prior to the
final judgment," is not applicable to this case. The action
commenced before the respondent judge was not for support
but for the recovery of the ownership and possession of real
property. Manifestly such an action is not "the proper action"
contemplated by said rule The mere fact that the plaintiffs
have legal and equitable rights in the property they seek to
recover (Q. E. D. ) does not authorize the court to compel the
defendants to support the plaintiffs pending the
determination of the suit. Moreover, the petitioners, who are
sister and brother-in law, respectively, of the deceased
Alfredo Coquia, are not bound to support the alleged natural
children of the latter. Under the article 143 of the Civil Code
only the following are bound to support each other: (1)
husband and wife: (2) legitimate ascendants and
descendants: and (3) parents and acknowledged natural
children, and the legitimate descendants of the latter.
VERSION 2: (DOCTRINE)
The action in the present case was not for support but for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of real property.
Manifestly such an action is not the proper action
contemplated by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The mere fact
that the plaintiffs have legal and equitable rights in the
property they seeks to recover (Q .E. D.) does not authorize
the court to compel the defendants to support the plaintiffs
pending the determination of the suit.
• Villanueva v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92
AURELIA DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RAFAEL VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  4

An action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila by Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva against her
husband, Rafael Villanueva, for the purpose of obtaining
separate maintenance and custody of the two younger
minor children, Guillermo and Sergio Villanueva, as well as a
proper allowance for professional legal services rendered by
the plaintiff's attorneys in this action, as well as costs. Upon
hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant
from the complaint and abrogated a prior order of the court
for maintenance pendente lite, with costs against the
plaintiff. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
The grounds on which separate maintenance is sought
infidelity and cruelty. With respect to the first of these
charges the proof shows that during the period of about ten
years prior to the institution of the action, the defendant
was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four different
women, and even after the action was begun, he is shown
to have had illicit relations with still another, an incident
which is incorporated in the case by means of the amended
complaint. Thought at all times protesting against these
irregularities in her husband's conduct, the plaintiff appears
to have exhibited forbearance; and she long continued in
marital relations with him with a view to keeping the family
intact as well as with hope of retrieving him from his erring
course. In the end, however, the incorrigible nature of the
defendant in his relations with other women, coupled with a
lack of consideration and even brutality towards the
plaintiff, caused her to withdraw from the domestic hearth
and to establish a separate abode for herself and two
younger children. This final separation occurred on April 20,
1927, about one month before the present action was
begun.
The proof with respect to the charge of cruelty shows that
the defendant has not infrequently treated the plaintiff
roughly and that he has at times directed abusive words to
her and challenged her to carry her troubles into court. The
proof in support of this charge does not in our opinion
establish a case for separate maintenance, without relation
to the graver charge of conjugal infidelity; and if the case
depended, for its solution, upon cruelty alone, the case
could doubtless be affirmed, in conformity with the doctrine
stated in
Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo (42 Phil. 54), where the
charges of cruelty were found to be unproved or insufficient.
In that case, however, we were able to record the fact that
neither of the spouses had at any time been guilty of
conjugal infidelity, and that neither had, so far as the proof
showed, even given just cause to the other to suspect illicit
relations with any person. In the case before us repeated
acts of conjugal infidelity on the part of the husband are
proved, and he appears to be a recurrent, if not an incurable
offender against the sanctity of the marriage tie. This give
the wife an undeniable right to relief.
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in
marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity
towards other women makes common habitation with him
unbearable. Deeply rooted instincts of human nature
sanction the separation in such case, and the law is not so
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the part of
the injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature. In
order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to
require separate maintenance from her husband it is not
necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into
the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with
women outside of the marital establishment are enough. As
was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia vs. Campos Rueda
(35 Phil., 252, 262), a husband cannot, by his own wrongful
acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife
imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal,
and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile
fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to
abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and
repudiate his duties thereunder.
In her complaint the plaintiff asks for an allowance of P750
per month, but we are of the opinion that the sum of P500
per month will suffice, this being in addition to the use
which she makes for living quarters of a modest property
belonging to the conjugal estate. During their marital life
the spouses have acquired real estate which, at the time of
the trial, was assessed at more than P85,000, and which at
the same time was reasonably valued at more than
P125,000. In addition to this the defendant appears to be
now earning a substantial salary in commercial activities.
The plaintiff is also entitled to an allowance for attorney's
fees which we fix at P1,000 for services rendered in the trial
court and the same amount for services rendered in this
court. It appears that the two younger children are now
living with the plaintiff, and her right to their custody will
not be disturbed. While this litigation was pending in the
lower court the defendant was required to pay the amount
of P500 per month for maintenance of the plaintiff, under an
interlocutory order of June 15, 1927. But these payments
ceased when the appealed decision was promulgated on or
about the end of March, 1928. The plaintiff in this case is
therefore entitled to judgment at the rate of P500 per
month beginning April 1, 1928, until judgment shall be
promulgated in this case, and from that date the defendant
will be required to pay P500 per month for maintenance as
already suggested. The plaintiff will also be awarded the
sum of P720 in satisfaction of the amount paid out for the
transcript necessary to this appeal.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and it is ordered that
the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant the sum of
P2,000 for attorney's fees, the sum of P720 for expenses of
procuring transcript, and the sum of P500 per month,
beginning April 1, 1928, until the promulgation of this
decision, after which the date the defendant is ordered to
pay to the plaintiff by way of maintenance, on or before the
10th day of each month, the sum of P500. So ordered, with
costs against appellee.
• MAGOMA V. MACADAEG, G.R. NO. L-5153,
DECEMBER 10, 1951 FAITH RAVENS
PRINCIPLE: Before action is taken on the matter [of support
pendente lite], an opportunity should be given him to be
heard, considering the serious nature of his special defense.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  5

LONG DIGEST:
Facts:
Respondent Candelaria Bautista filed an action against
petitioner seeking the separation of the property of the
spouses and the consequent dissolution and liquidation of
their conjugal partnership. Months thereafter, prior to the
trial on the merits, respondent prayed the court that pending
the determination of the case, she and her daughter Leticia
be given support pendente lite in the amount of P1,000 a
month and that petitioner be ordered to act accordingly. Her
motion is based on the following ground: On August 30, 1945,
while their marriage was still subsisting, petitioner contracted
another marriage with one Luceria Bernardo; in January,
1946, petitioner abandoned respondent and two minor
daughters and went to live with his second wife; while the
bigamy case against petitioner was under investigation by the
City Fiscal of Manila, petitioner refused to give any support to
respondent and her children for their maintenance; petitioner
and respondent, through their joint effort and industry,
acquired considerable property which, added to the earnings
of petitioner from his various kinds of business, yields a net
income of at least P5,000 a month; petitioner owes them in
arrears by way of support a total of P6,000 from January 17,
1951.
Petitioner objected to the motion pendente lite on the
following grounds: Respondent abandoned the conjugal home
to live with an American soldier from January to August 1946;
later in 1947, respondent also lived with one Celestino
Fernandez up to October 1949; having committed adultery,
respondent, therefore, is not entitled to support; due to
repeated civil and criminal cases filed against him by
respondent, petitioner had to close his titles factory. at
present petitioner is heavily indebted to several banks and
because of the lis pendens annotated on his certificate of title
upon respondent's request, he is placed in a position where
he could not pay his obligation due to his inability to negotiate
with said properties. Wherefore, petitioner prayed that the
motion for support pendente lite be denied.
Before petitioner has had a chance to present his evidence on
his special defenses, respondent judge issued on September
28, 1951, an order granting the motion and ordering
petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife and
daughter Leticia.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the Court of First Instance should
be declared null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case of Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 110: Court
of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his
evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is
sufficient prima facie to overcome the application.
The facts of this case show that petitioner has not also been
given an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of the
defense he has set up against the motion for support
pendente lite. It is true several trials were held before the
deputy clerk of court, but there is nothing to show that
petitioner has resorted to dilatory tactics as to justify that
action on the motion be taken without receiving his evidence.
Therefore, before action is taken on the matter, an
opportunity should be given him to be heard, considering the
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
serious nature of his special defense. In line with the ruling
of this Court in the Sanchez case, supra, there is no other
alternative than to remand this case to the lower court in
order that immediate steps may be taken relative to the
reception of the evidence of petitioner in support of his
opposition.
SHORT DIGEST:
Facts:
Respondent Candelaria Bautista filed an action against
petitioner seeking the separation of the property of the
spouses and the consequent dissolution and liquidation of
their conjugal partnership. Months thereafter, prior to the
trial on the merits, respondent prayed the court that pending
the determination of the case, she and her daughter Leticia
be given support pendente lite.
Petitioner objected to the motion pendente lite on the
following grounds: Respondent abandoned the conjugal home
to live with an American soldier from January to August 1946;
later in 1947, respondent also lived with one Celestino
Fernandez up to October 1949; having committed adultery,
respondent, therefore, is not entitled to support.
Before petitioner has had a chance to present his evidence on
his special defenses, respondent judge issued on September
28, 1951, an order granting the motion and ordering
petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife and
daughter Leticia.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the Court of First Instance should
be declared null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case of Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 110: Court
of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his
evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is
sufficient prima facie to overcome the application.
Therefore, before action is taken on the matter, an
opportunity should be given him to be heard, considering the
serious nature of his special defense.
• RAMOS V. CA, L-31897, JUNE 30, 1972 EDOMBINGO
Principle:
The Rules of Court clearly authorizes the granting of
support pendente lite, even prior to the rendition of judgment
by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals can grant support pendent lite
pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, even with the lower
court did not grant such.
The refusal of the trial court to grant said alimony
pendente lite did not and cannot deprive the appellate court
of said authority, or even dent the wisdom of the action taken
by the latter, considering that the former did not give any
plausible reason for its aforementioned refusal and that the
same may have, in fact, been due to the appeal taken by the
defendant, whose record on appeal had already been
approved.
Long digest:
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  6

FACTS:
Assisted by their mother, Felisa and Lorraine Lagos,
both minors, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, a complaint against petitioner Luis T. Ramos, for
support and damages, alleging that she bore said children,
born on August 27, 1963 and June 21, 1965, respectively, in
consequence of illicit relations with said Ramos, who had
failed and refused to support said minors, notwithstanding
repeated demands, and despite the fact that he has, as a
municipal mayor, the means therefor, which she does not
have. Ramos having denied the main allegations of the
complaint set up a counterclaim for damages.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs,
sentencing Ramos to pay each of said minors the sum of
P75.00 monthly, in addition to the aggregate sum of
"P2,075.00 representing the support in arrears for the elder
child, that is, from July 17, 1964, when defendant stopped
giving him the support, up to the filing of the complaint on
September 3, 1965," and "the support in arrears in the
amount of P180.00 for the younger child, or from June 21,
1965, when she was born, up to September 3, 1965, when
the complaint for support was filed," apart from "the sum of
P500.00 representing attorney's fees and costs of suit
suffered by the plaintiffs."
Ramos then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs-appellees moved therein for support pendente lite.
In a reasoned and signed resolution dated November 21,
1969, Ramos was ordered by the Court of Appeals to deposit
with its Clerk the sum of P4, 727.50 — representing one-half
of the amount due under the appealed decision to the foresaid
plaintiffs — "within 15 days from notice, otherwise he will be
cited for contempt. Once the amount is deposited, the Clerk
of this Court is directed to deliver the same to plaintiff-
appellee Felisa Lagos." Subsequent reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA abused its discretion in issuing
the aforementioned resolution "there having been neither a
recognition of paternity by the petitioner nor its
establishment by final judgment"
RULING:
The Supreme Court opined that the Court of Appeals
erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence
for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima
facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the
wife is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana
vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is
also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations,
for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant
and, hence would not be entitled to support as such. But as
this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it
would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not
of course necessary to go fully into merits of the case, it being
sufficient that the court ascertain the kind of amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly
resolve the application, one way or take other, in view of the
merely provisional character of take resolution to be entered.
In the case at bar not only had evidence on the
alleged relation between the minors and Ramos been
introduced. Judgment had, moreover, been rendered finding
that said relation had been duly established, although an
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
appeal from said judgment was and is still pending in the
Court of Appeals.
Indeed, the Rules of Court clearly authorizes the
granting of support pendente lite, even prior to the rendition
of judgment by the trial court. Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 61
provide:
SEC. 1. Application. — The plaintiff, at the
commencement of the proper action, or at any time
afterwards but prior to final judgment, may file an application
for support pendente lite, stating the grounds for the claim
and the financial conditions of both parties, and shall be
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic
documents in support thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 5. Order. — The court shall determine
provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render
such order as equity and justice may require, having due
regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of the
adverse party, the probable outcome of the case, and such
other circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of
the question involved. If the application is granted, the court
shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid, and
the terms of payment. ... .
It goes without saying that if, before the rendition of
judgment, the trial court may "provisionally" grant alimony
pendente lite, with more reason may an appellate court
exercise a similar authority, after a full dress trial and a
decision of the trial court on the merits finding that the claim
of filiation and support has been adequately proven
— in the case at bar, beyond doubt — even if such
decision were still pending appeal taken by the party
adjudged to be bound to give such support.
Needless to say, the refusal of the trial court to grant,
said alimony pendente lite did not and cannot deprive the
appellate court of said authority, or even dent the wisdom of
the action taken by the latter, considering that the former did
not give any plausible reason for its aforementioned refusal
and that the same may have, in fact, been due to the appeal
taken by the defendant, whose record on appeal had already
been approved.
Neither did the failure of the Court of Appeals to hear
petitioner herein on oral argument before denying his motion
for reconsideration or to grant him "a 10-day abeyance in the
implementation" of said resolution constitute a grave abuse
of discretion, for petitioner is not entitled as a matter of right
to said oral argument, which was discretionary for said
appellate court, as was its authority to grant or deny the
aforementioned period of ten (10) days. Furthermore,
petitioner has not shown that he could have adduced
substantial reasons to warrant a reversal of the contested
resolution had this period been granted or said oral argument
taken place.
Again, the grant to the minors — who had merely
asked "a monthly support of P75.00 for each child," or
P150.00 a month for both, and, through their mother, had
offered to file a bond — of the aggregate sum of P4, 727.50,
without requiring a bond therefor, did not constitute a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in the
light of the circumstances surrounding the case. Paraphrasing
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, the circumstances obtaining in the
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  7

present case suggest that this is an instance where, in view
of the poverty of herein private respondents, "it would be a
travesty of justice" to refuse them support until the decision
of the trial judge "is sustained on appeal."
PETITION DISMISSED.
Short digest:
FACTS:
Assisted by their mother, Felisa and Lorraine Lagos,
both minors, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, a complaint against petitioner Luis T.
Ramos, for support and damages, who had failed and refused
to support said minors, notwithstanding repeated demands,
and despite the fact that he has, as a municipal mayor, the
means to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA abused its discretion in issuing
the aforementioned resolution "there having been neither a
recognition of paternity by the petitioner nor its
establishment by final judgment"
RULING:
The Rules of Court clearly authorizes the granting of
support pendente lite, even prior to the rendition of judgment
by the trial court. Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 61 provide:
SEC. 1. Application. — The plaintiff, at the
commencement of the proper action, or at any time
afterwards but prior to final judgment, may file an application
for support pendente lite, stating the grounds for the claim
and the financial conditions of both parties, and shall be
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic
documents in support thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 5. Order. — The court shall determine
provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render
such order as equity and justice may require, having due
regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of the
adverse party, the probable outcome of the case, and such
other circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of
the question involved. If the application is granted, the court
shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid, and
the terms of payment. ... .
It goes without saying that if, before the rendition of
judgment, the trial court may "provisionally" grant alimony
pendente lite, with more reason may an appellate court
exercise a similar authority, after a full dress trial and a
decision of the trial court on the merits finding that the claim
of filiation and support has been adequately proven— in the
case at bar, beyond doubt — even if such decision were still
pending appeal taken by the party adjudged to be bound to
give such support.
Needless to say, the refusal of the trial court to grant,
said alimony pendente lite did not and cannot deprive the
appellate court of said authority, or even dent the wisdom of
the action taken by the latter, considering that the former did
not give any plausible reason for its aforementioned refusal
and that the same may have, in fact, been due to the appeal
taken by the defendant, whose record on appeal had already
been approved.
• SPOUSES LIM V. LIM, G.R. NO. 163209, 30
OCTOBER 2009 HIYAS
PRINCIPLE:
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
 Support pendente lite by virtue of Title IX Civil
Code obliges the ascendants to provide legal
support not only upon default of the parents but also
for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
 The ascendant’s liability only extends to the
descdents (grandchildren and other legitimate
descendants).
 Notwithstanding at the time of application for
support pendente lite the applicant has
exercised parental authority over the children,
if found that they are unable to support or
support is insufficient still the ascendants are
obliged to support.
FACTS:
Respondent Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim. She
bore Edward three children, they resided at the house of
herein petitioners (Edward’s parents) in Forbes Park, Makati
City together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak
and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary
of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income.
Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence,
bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-
house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described
a very compromising situation.
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners,
Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for support.
RTC RULING:
Ordered Edward and petitioners to jointly
provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with
Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance
of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is
insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing
that legal support should be in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
Philippines).
CA RULING:
affirmed the trial court invoking Article 195
of the Family Code as well as Article 200 paragraph
(3) of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to
provide support to respondents.
RULING:
YES., with modification by limiting petitioners liability to the
amount of monthly support needed by respondents.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren
Petitioners rely heavily in Title IX of the Civil Code,
as amended, on Parental Authority, they theorize that their
liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  8

conceivably either by its termination or
[12]
suspension[13] during the childrens minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their
children,[14] petitioners submit that the obligation to support
the latters offspring ends with them.
while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative
parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants
only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to
provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the latters inability to
provide sufficient support.
Professor Pineda is of the view that
grandchildren cannot demand support
directly from their grandparents if they have
parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow
the order of support under Art. 199.
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to
discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support
to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed
that the amount of support Edward is able to give to
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and
Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion
of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree,
both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal[19]lines,
following the ordering in Article 199. Petitioners partial
concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants. Hence, Cheryls right to receive
support from the Lim family extends only to her
husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
Petitioners Precluded from Availing
of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation either
by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family
dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting
petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will
also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her,
is the scene of her husbands infidelity.
Petition denied.
QUICK DIGEST:
C(Cheryl Lim) and E (Edward Lim) are married with three
children. They resided with X and Y (who are Edward’s
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
grandparents). C and E’s marriage end when E has an illicit
relationship with other woman.
Hence, C initiate an action for support against E, X and Y.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering E, X and Y to be
jointly liable for support pendente lite. This was opposed by
X and Y alleging that in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended,
on Parental Authority, they theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably
either by its termination[12] or suspension[13] during the
childrens minority and since C when appliying for support
pendente lite still E and C exercised parental authority
over their children HENCE the obligation to support the
latters offspring ends with them.
CA affirmed Trial court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether X and Y are are concurrently liable with Edward to
provide support to respondents (C and children).
RULING:
Yes. But only to the children.
while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative
parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants
only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to
provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the latters inability to
provide sufficient support.
Here, there is no question that C is unable to discharge her
obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children,
then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount
of support E is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month,
is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends
only to their descendants as this word is commonly
understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents. C’s
right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to
her husband E’s, arising from their marital bond.
• GOTARDO V. BULING, G.R. NO. 165166, 15 AUGUST
2012CLAROS
Principle:
WHAT CONSISTS SUPPORT - Since filiation is beyond
question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent
is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT VARIABLE - Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on
the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.
FACTS:
Buling sued Gotardo for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite claiming that the petitioner is the father of her
child Gliffze.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  9

RTC - During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the
respondent’s motion,24 granted a P2,000.00 monthly child
support, retroactive from March 1995
RTC Final Decision - the RTC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation (Buling was
inconsistent as to when they first had sex). RTC ordered the
respondent to return the amount of support pendente
lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P 10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees
CA Decision - set aside the RTC decision noting that the
petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even
before August 1994; that the respondent had only one
boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994;
and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained
unsubstantiated and ordered the petitioner to recognize
his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order
granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
ISSUE: whether the CA committed a reversible error when it
set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to
recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
HELD:
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a
matter of obligation (The court found the inconsistencies
negligible - We find that the contradictions are for the most
part more apparent than real, having resulted from the failure
of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this
misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily
explained.)
A parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount
of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of
the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly child
support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion
in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears,
considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the
pendency of this case.
• BAYOT V. CA, G.R. NO. 155635, 7 NOVEMBER
2008CABUENAS
PRINCIPLES:
a. Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, a
husband could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to his spouse.
b. The issue of right and entitlement to support
pendente litehinges on the tenability of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
c. The property of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership be answerable for the support
of the spouses and their children during the
proceedings for:Legal separation, Annulment of
marriage or Declaration of nullity of marriage
After final judgment granting the petition, the
obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases .
LONG DIGEST
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an
American, were married in Muntinlupa. The Marriage
Certificate identified Rebecca, to be an American citizen born
in Agaña, Guam, USAThey had a child name Alix, born in
November 27, 1982 in California.From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the
latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the
Dominican Republic.
In February 22, 1996, the Dominican court ordered the
dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to
remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving
them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. The same
court settled the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement. Said agreement specifically stated that the
"conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements
and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Meanwhile, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American
citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente
However, on2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time
before the Muntinlupa City RTCon the ground of Vicente's
alleged psychological incapacity. She also sought the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alixin the amount of P 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is
barred by the prior judgment of divorce.Rebecca interposed
an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted
another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed
adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca,
on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss, instead granted
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite and ordered
to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner
as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the
instant Petition. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the
trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  10

Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.
CA dismissed and set aside RTC's incidental orders.
According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's
motion to dismiss because Rebecca had no cause of action
against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage., since
the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when
the divorce decree was granted and Rebecca was an
American citizen when she applied for the decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in
Dominican Republic is valid and whether or not the
application for support pendente lite is still tenable?
HELD:
Yes, the divorce decree is valid and the application for support
pendent lite is no longer
tenable.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine
national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she
applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the
principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American
passport.
The validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the
same shall be given a res judicata effect in Philippine
jurisdiction. Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and
wife to each other. The marriage between them is dissolved
leaving them free to remarry. Consequent to the dissolution
of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to Rebecca.As regards their property
relations, the Agreement provided that the ex-couple's
conjugal property consisted only their family homebind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
The Court does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente
and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. Alix,
having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before
her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. The
issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly
shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil
action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for
the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning
capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca.
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
The Court no longer delve into the issue of Rebecca's right to
support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind
of support hinges on the tenability of her petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of petition by
the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
SHORT DIGEST
FACTS:
X, Filipino and Y, foreigner were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child named Z. Their marital relationship seemed to
have soured Y, initiated divorce proceedings in the foreign
country. The foreign court ordered the dissolution of the
couple's marriage. However, after several years, Y filed
another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTCon
the ground of X 's alleged psychological incapacity. Y also
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
with application for support pendente lite for her and her child
Z. Y also prayed that X be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree is valid and support
pendente lite is tenable?
HELD:
Yes, the divorce decree is valid and the application for support
pendent lite is no longer tenable.
The validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Y, the same
shall be given a res judicata effect in Philippine jurisdiction. X
and Y are no longer husband and wife to each
other.Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, X could
no longer be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to Y. The Court no longer delve into the
issue of support pendente lite. The entitlement to that kind of
support hinges on the tenability of the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of petition veritably
removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the
claim for support pendente lite.
• NEPOMUCENO V. LOPEZ, G.R. NO. 181258, 18
MARCH 2010 DAPANAS
Principle: “A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father is
considered acceptable evidence. The notarial
agreement must be accompanied by the putative
father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable
evidence of filiation.”
BAR Alike Question:
X represented by her mother Y filed a case of
Recognition and Support in Court against Z based on the
latter handwritten note obligating himself to give financial
support to X. The said note contained the amount of support
in bi-monthly terms signed by Z. Is the handwritten note is
enough evidence to established filiation and thus X will be
entitled to be recognized as a child and for the support
pendente lite?
Case: BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, vs. ARHBENCEL ANN
LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI
LOPEZ, G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  11

Facts:
This is a case of recognition and support against
petitioner from his alleged daughter Arhbencel represented
by her mother Araceli. Born out of an extramarital affair; that
petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of
Birth; and that, by a handwritten note, petitioner obligated
himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500
on the 15th and 30th days of each month. The handwritten
note reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give
and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00
every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total
of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel
Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli
Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to
adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my
income.
Defendant’s prayer: Since her filiation was
established by the handwritten note, that petitioner be
ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support
pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and
(3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she
reaches the age of majority. Petitioner countered that
Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel -
- absent explicit statement, recognition or acknowledgment
& was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account
of NPA threats.
1ST RTC Ruling: Favorable to Arhbencel-
Defendant, BUT on the basis of petitioner’s handwritten
note which it treated as "contractual support" since the issue
of filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing on the
merits, granted prayer for support pendente lite in the
amount of P3,000 a month.
2nd RTC Ruling: Favorable to Nepomuceno-
Petitioner, he filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial
court granted by Order thus the case was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. It held that: Certificate of Birth
was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it
did not bear his signature; that handwritten undertaking to
provide support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment; and that there was no showing that he
performed any overt act of acknowledgment.
CA Ruling: Favorable to Arhbencel-
Defendant, reversed the trial court’s decision, declared
Arhbencel to be his illegitimate daughter and ordered him to
give her financial support in the increased amount of P4,000
every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total
of P8,000 a month. CA found that from petitioner’s
payment hospital bills and subsequent commitment to
provide monthly financial support, the only logical conclusion:
he is the father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in
omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten & P8,000
a month was reasonable and not burdensome.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA ruling based on defendant’s
contention (see 1st paragraph, Arhbencel prayer) clearly
established evidence of filiation as provided by law.
Held:
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
No. As held by the SC [in the case of Herrera v.
Alba] it summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Family Code relevant provisions: ART. 175. Illegitimate
children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, SC
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative
father:
1. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the
claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself
and the writing must be the writing of the putative father.
2. A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence.
3. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father
to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the
child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation.
BUT NOT: A student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where
the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
And the relevant provisions of the Family Code that
treat of the right to support are Articles 194, 195 & 196, thus:
Particularly Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the
succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each
other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
xxxx 4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
IN THE PRESENT CASE, Arhbencel’s demand for
support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as
his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such,
her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on
the determination of her filiation.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  12

The handwritten note does not contain any
statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to
petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article
172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits
as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight
as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in
Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs
that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the
putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable
evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner
not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He
has consistently denied it. The only other documentary
evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of
Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
Thefore, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order
dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC
dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is
REINSTATED
VI.E
• MANGONON V. CA, G.R. NO. 125041, JUNE 30, 2006
DUYONGCO
PRINCIPLE:
A court may temporarily grant support pendente lite
prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of
its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into
the merits of the case before it can settle an application for
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the
kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it
to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.
Facts:
Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy
and Support, with application for support pendente lite. In
said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975,
petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly
married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo. At that
time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent
Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the
New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975.
Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, private respondents had totally abandoned them.
At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina
were about to enter college in the (USA) where petitioner,
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved
to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University
of Massachusetts, while Rina was accepted by the Long Island
University and Western New England College. Despite their
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however,
financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.
Petitioner likewise averred that demands were made upon
Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, for general support
and for the payment of the required college education of Rica
and Rina.
Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate
daughters by respondent Federico since the twin sisters were
born within seven months from the date of the annulment of
her marriage to respondent Federico.
Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek
support pendente lite from private respondents - who are
millionaires with extensive assets both here and abroad - in
view of the imminent opening of classes, the possibility of a
protracted litigation, and Rica and Rina’s lack of financial
means to pursue their college education in the USA.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
respondents are hereby directed to provide a monthly support
(pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each.
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for
Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the
trial court.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied
ISSUE: whether or not Francisco is liable for support for her
granddaughter’s education?
YES.
SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally the
pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as justice and
equity may require, having due regard to the probable
outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may
aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the
application is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money
to be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as
should be provided, taking into account the necessities of the
applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party,
and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support.
If the application is denied, the principal case shall be tried
and decided as early as possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support
pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to
delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is
determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice
to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that
the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary
evidence appearing in the record.
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the
evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to
establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  13

daughters to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement
to support pendente lite. In the words of the trial court –
By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico
cannot be denied. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco
admitted having wrote several letters to Rica and Rina. In the
said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof, respondent
Francisco wrote the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He
therefore was very well aware that they bear the surname
Delgado.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take
our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the
amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable
for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica
and Rina as support pendente lite.Considering, however, that
the twin sisters may have already been done with their
education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we
deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to
be computed from the time they entered college until they
had finished their respective studies.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
• ROXAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 139337, 15
AUGUST 2001 BELLEZA
Principle:
The proceedings and orders issued by trial court judge
in the application for support pendente lite in the re-
filed case, were not rendered null and void by the
omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum
shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal
without prejudice.
Facts:
Carminia Roxas (Carminia) filed before RTC-Parañaque a
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological in capacity with an application for support
pendente lite for their four (4) minor children against her
husband Jose Antonio Roxas (Jose). Said case was raffled to
RTC257 (Judge How). However, prior to service to
respondent and before the latter could file a responsive
pleading, Carminia filed a notice of dismissal without
prejudice pursuant Sec. 1, Rule 17. She later on re-filed the
case and was raffled to RTC260 (Judge Ricafort). Judge
Ricafort rendered an order granting the application for
support. Jose was ordered to pay P42,292.50 per month as
support and 50% of his children’s tuition fee. However,
respondent Jose failed to comply with the order thus Carminia
asks the court to cite Jose in contempt. Thus, Jose petitioned
for certiorari before the CA. CA rendered a decision granting
Jose’s petition and declared the trial court’s orders NULL and
VOID for the reason that the certificate of non-forum
shopping of the petitioner (Carminia) did not mention the
prior filing of Civil Case No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge
How and the dismissal thereof without prejudice.
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
Issue:
WON the proceedings and orders of the trial court are null
and void.
Ruling:
It is our considered view and we hold that the
proceedings and orders issued by Judge Bautista-
Ricafort in the application for support pendente
lite (and the main complaint for annulment of
marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No.
97-0608 were not rendered null and void by the
omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum
shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal
without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which
involves the same parties and issues.
Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. The language of the
Supreme Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5,
Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) distinctly suggests that
it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an
incipient application of a party asserting a claim for
relief.10 The most important factor in determining the
existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the
courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different
courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs."
Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase
his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, it has
been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to
improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered
against him in any of the cases he has brought before the
courts. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. For the principle
of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a
decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions
involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-0523 which was the first case
filed and raffled to the sala (Branch 257) of Judge How. The
dismissal without prejudice of the complaint in Civil Case No.
97-0523 at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
considering that it was done before service of answer or any
responsive pleading. The dismissal does not amount to litis
pendencia nor to res judicata. There is no litis
pendencia since the first case before Judge How was
dismissed or withdrawn by the plaintiff (herein petitioner),
without prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. To use the wording of that rule, Judge How’s order
is one merely "confirming the dismissal" of the complaint by
the plaintiff (herein petitioner). Neither is there res
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  14

judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was not a
decision on the merits but a dismissal "without prejudice".
The petition for certiorari in the case at bar on the ground of
alleged forum shopping in the trial court is premature for the
reason that there is an adequate and speedy remedy
available in the ordinary course of law to private
respondent, i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion for
reconsideration on the ground of either litis pendencia or res
judicata before the trial court. But private respondent did not
file such a motion based on either of said grounds. And where
the ground is short of res judicata or litis pendencia, as in the
case at bar, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it granted
the petition for certiorari filed by herein private respondent.
The trial court should have been given an opportunity to rule
on the matter of alleged forum shopping in consonance with
the hierarchy of courts.
BAR QUESTION:
W filed a declaration of nullity of Marriage against H with
prayer for support pendent lite of their 4 minor children. It
was raffled to RTC 257 but W filed a Notice of Dismissal
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 17. W re-filed the case and the same
was raffled to RTC 260. Judge R granted W’s prayer and
ordered H to pay 50% of their children’s tuition fees and P
42, 292.50. H failed to comply with the court order thus he
was cited in contempt. He petitioned to CA and the latter
granted his petition and rendered orders of trial court NULL
and VOID for the reason that W did not state in her Certificate
of Non-forum Shopping that the case was previously
dismissed.
• CALDERON V. ROXAS, G.R. NO. 185595, 9 JANUARY
2013 LIM
Principle:
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of
support pendentelite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any
time prior to the judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003,
this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders which
shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the
pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These
include orders for spousal support, child support, child
custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and
administration of common property.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the Decision dated September 9, 2008 and
Resolution dated December 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85384.
Petitioner Calderon and Respondent Roxas were married.
Subsequently they filed an amended complaint for declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Ordergranting
petitioner’s application for support pendente lite.
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court issued an
Order directing private respondent to give support in the
amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999
pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order.
Private respondent then filed a Motion to Reduce Support
.After hearing, the trial court issued an Orderdated March 7,
2005 granting the motion to reduce support and denying
petitioner’s motion for spousal support, increase of the
children’s monthly support pendente lite and support-in-
arrears. Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration of the
March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005.
On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision in Civil
Case No. 97-0608 decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (sic):
1. Declaring null and void the marriage between plaintiff
[Ma.] Carmina C. Roxas and defendant Jose Antonio
Roxasxxx
2. Awarding the custody of the parties’ minor xxx to their
mother, herein petitioner xxx
3. Ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide
support to the children in the amount of P30,000.00 a month
xxx
xxx
Petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the
Orders dated March 7, 2005.
The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that granting the
appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which
had long become final and executory. The CA further noted
that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question
an interlocutory order.
Issue:
Whether the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders on the
matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
Ruling:
Interlocutory. This Court has laid down the distinction
between interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect
thereto.
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case,
and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory”. Unlike a
“final” judgment or order, which is appealable, as above
pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned
on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the
case.1
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support
pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests,
were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore
interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did
they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other
incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  15

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of
support pendentelite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any
time prior to the judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003,
this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orderswhich
shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the
pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These
include orders for spousal support, child support, child
custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and
administration of common property.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during
the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests
therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate
effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional
because they constitute temporary measures availed of
during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary
because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon
the result of the main action.The subject orders on the matter
of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
• LUA V. LUA, G.R. NOS. 175279-80, 5 JUNE 2013
DESCALLAR
PRINCIPLE:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which
those related by marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
In determining the amount of provisional support,
the court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the
financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent
and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health
of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3)
the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4)
the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make
toward the care and well-being of the child.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is
required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for
the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he
cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of
payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a
court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the
mother, when that can be done without injustice to her.
FACTS:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two
children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses
here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that
she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from
their children and respondent has continued to support the
family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with
family’s social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00
granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite,
as well as theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent
found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the
law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the
March 31, 2004 Order had become final and executory since
respondent’s motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere
scrap of paper for violation of the three day notice period
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of
the period to appeal.
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING (1ST)
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding
merit in respondent’s contention that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly
support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual
income. The said court thus decreed:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite
of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and every
month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00
a month multiplied by the number of months starting from
September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as
her and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a
Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a
copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90
payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed
in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support
in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the
CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June
and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given
by him to his children and petitioner in the sum of
P2,482,348.16.
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of the
expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part
of the monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13
granting petitioner’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution
as it rejected respondent’s interpretation of the CA decision.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  16

subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge
Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order14 denying both motions.
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in
arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 01154. Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP
No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. The two cases were consolidated.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING (2ND)
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court.
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars,
payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which
certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children,
but their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s
act of deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid
and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the
issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in
view of the different interpretation by the trial court of the
appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also
noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint
obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent
may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to
petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated
April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
RULING:
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred
to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond
the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in
going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related
by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.18 Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the
proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated
custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior
to the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into
the merits of the case before it can settle an application for
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the
kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it
to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for
petitioner and her two children was determined after due
hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was
reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended
primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children,
e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and
other household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also
mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond
doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence,
education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his children, as well as those of
petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time
housewife. Despite this, respondent’s counsel manifested
during the same hearing that respondent was willing to grant
the amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente
lite both for the children and petitioner as spousal support.
Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court
unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his
children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a
different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for
P500,000.00 monthly support and finding the P75,000.00
monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the
trial court fixed the monthly support pendente lite at
P250,000.00. However, since the supposed income in millions
of respondent was based merely on the allegations of
petitioner in her complaint and registration documents of
various corporations which respondent insisted are owned not
by him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the
amount of support pendente lite toP115,000.00, which ruling
was no longer questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when
respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision indicated
that he deducted from the total amount in arrears
(P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the
value of the two cars for the children, their cost of
maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his
children. Respondent explained that the deductions were
made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite in
arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner
as her and their two children’s monthly support.
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further
asserting amounts with supporting receipts be considered as
additional advances given to petitioner and the children.
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing
expenses already incurred by the respondent should, in
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  17

equity, be considered advances which may be properly
deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner
and the two children. Said court also noted the absence of
petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of support for
their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of
legal separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions
of the Rule on Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the
spouses, the court may be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such
amount and for such period of time as the court may deem
just and reasonable based on their standard of living during
the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1)
whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child
whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not
to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to
acquire sufficient education and training to enable the spouse
seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that
spouse’s future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the
marriage; (4) the comparative financial resources of the
spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the
labor market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse;
(6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including
services rendered in home-making, child care, education, and
career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of
the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional conditions of the
spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give
support, taking into account that spouse’s earning capacity,
earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living;
and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and
equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses
shall be supported from the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or
both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the
support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be
in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court
may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial
resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those
of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child
and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard
of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-
monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the
care and well-being of the child.
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional
support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed
by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in
settling the support in arrears.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required
by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the
support of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he
cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of
payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a
court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the
mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. The
courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules
as to when such credits may be allowed.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses
incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued
support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly
support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended
primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of
drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis
therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars
bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance
cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases
through credit card of items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear
no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent
to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as
her and their two (2) children monthly support," the
deductions should be limited to those basic needs and
expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The
assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the
accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while
correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the
respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the
executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important,
it completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner
whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by
the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the March
31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to petitioner
and her children, when the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving
some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children via
their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the
same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support to
the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for
nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon
the defendant, considering the physical and financial
condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of
defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740
reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial
court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a
monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of
petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount
respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  18

only cover those incurred for sustenance and household
expenses.
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been
admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses
of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2)
children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses
for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs
of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount
of more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each
of them and considering that as testified by the private
respondent that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00
for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses and considering further that
petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and
to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable
to him through the credit cards he provided them in the
amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private
respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount of
P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care
of the household and other needs. This monthly support
pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of
P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance
expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of
both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such
operation. Likewise, this monthly support of P115,000.00 is
without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the
trial court may grant private respondent as the circumstances
may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the
parties during the proceedings for the main action for
support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being
a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.30
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of
monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court,
which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the
CA that respondent’s act was not contumacious considering
that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the
needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent
continued shouldering the full cost of their education and
even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the
family’s social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good
faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable
grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts
he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much
capacitated to generate income on her own because she
presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in
Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of
lending money. He also claims that the two children have
finished their education and are now employed in the family
business earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of
support should be submitted to the trial court in which the
action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this
Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be
reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
the resources or means of the person obliged to support.34
As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to
support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as
subject to final determination.36
QUICK DIGEST:
Susan Lim-Lua, petitioner v. Danilo Y. Lua, respondent
G.R. No. 175279-80, June 5, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua. In her
prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two
children, petitioner sought the amount ofP500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses
here and abroad.
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order granting support pendente lite, forthe amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be
sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This
amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00)
Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by
plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which is
demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The
amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that
she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from
their children and respondent has continued to support the
family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with
family’s social and financial standing. CA rendered its
Decision, finding merit in respondent’s contention that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting
P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence
to prove his actual income.
Issue:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent
may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to
petitioner and her children?
Ruling:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related
by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  19

marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the
proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated
custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior
to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into
the merits of the case before it can settle an application for
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the
kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it
to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for
petitioner and her two children was determined after due
hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was
reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended
primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children,
e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and
other household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also
mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond
doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence,
education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional
support from the salary of the parent.Since the amount of
monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not
appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its
sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the
deductions made by respondent in settling the support in
arrears. The amounts already extended to the two (2)
children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at
his disposal.
VI.H SAAVEDRA V. YBAÑEZ ESTRADA, 56 PHIL. 33
REALINO
Principle:
Abrogation of order where main suit is dismissed- An
order for support pendente lite is intended to be operative
exclusively during the pendency of the litigation. Hence, the
voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff has the
necessary effect of abrogating the order. An order pendente
lite is in its very nature contingent, and the dismissal of the
action had the effect of abrogating the order.
Long Digest:
FACTS:
The parties in this case are husband and wife, who were
married in January, 1904, in Dumaguete, Oriental Negros. As
a result of their marriage nine children have been born, three
of whom are dead and six living. The married life of the
spouses appears not to have been happy, owing to the loose
morals and violent disposition of the defendant and his
frequent and persistent mistreatment of his wife. In order to
escape from his abuse, the plaintiff was compelled in to take
refuge with all her children in the house of a neighbor. Upon
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
promise upon the part of the husband to mend his ways,
marital life was resumed towards the end of the same year.
Four years later, she was maltreated again and thus left with
her children for San Jose asylum in Cebu. She there remained
for some time under the care of the sisters of charity, giving
birth to her last child. About September, 1920, the plaintiff
was forced to present a civil action seeking an order requiring
the defendant to supply maintenance for herself and children,
but in 1926 the defendant prevailed upon her to dismiss said
action upon his promise to supply her needs. This promise
was not kept.
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu by Aleida Saavedra against her husband, Ceferino
Ybañez Estrada. The purpose of the complaint is to secure a
judgment for maintenance for the plaintiff and her children
from the defendant, who is her husband, and to obtain an
order requiring him to pay such maintenance not only in the
future but for a period in the past, beginning in 1920, during
which the defendant has contributed nothing for the support
of his family. The petitory part of the complaint asks for other
incidental relief consisting of an accounting, and a writ of
injunction to prohibit the defendant, his attorneys, agents
and representatives from selling, mortgaging, or in any
manner transferring the property pertaining to the conjugal
partnership, without express authorization from the court.
The Trial Court entered an order requiring the defendant to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P200 per month beginning
September, 1929, the date of the filing of this action,
and ending with the month of March 30, 1930, when this
decision was promulgated, after which he required the
defendant to pay, in future installments, a monthly stipend of
P200, and further to reimburse the plaintiff in the amount of
P2,000 for attorneys' fees, and the costs of the action. From
this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not awarding the
judgment for past due maintenance accruing under a
preliminary order from September, 1920 running until the
present action was instituted.
RULING:
NO. It appears that an order for maintenance pendente lite
was entered by the trial court in the first case filed by plaintiff
and nothing has ever been paid upon said account.
Nevertheless, it appears that plaintiff cause said action to be
dismissed in the first case, in reliance upon the defendant's
promises. The dismissal of the said case necessarily had
the effect of abrogating the order for maintenance
pendente lite, and placed the plaintiff in a position
where she is unable to enforce that order. An order
pendente lite is in its very nature contingent, and the
dismissal of the action had the effect of abrogating the
order.
It appears, however, that as a result of the failure of the
defendant to pay said maintenance under the order referred
It’s not a PROVREM 2015  20
 Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)
to, the present plaintiff has been compelled to incur debts for
the maintenance of herself and family, and to pay these
debts, so far as they have been paid, she has been compelled
to sacrifice valuable paraphernal property under authority
granted by the court. The amount which the plaintiff has been
compelled to disburse in this way, and the value of the
paraphernal property sacrificed, or obligations incurred, have
not been proved; and while it is obvious that the defendant
is under an obligation to reimburse the plaintiff for these
outlays and sacrifices, we are not in a position to give her
relief as to such items, under the prayer of the present
complaint. But the order hereinafter made for the affirmance
of the judgment in this respect will be made without prejudice
to her right hereafter, by independent action, or in the
ultimate liquidation of the conjugal estate, to be reimbursed
as to the matters mentioned.
Short digest:
About September, 1920, the plaintiff was forced to present a
civil action seeking an order requiring the defendant to supply
maintenance for herself and children, but in 1926 the
defendant prevailed upon her to dismiss said action upon his
promise to supply her needs. In a later action, the trial court
entered an order requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P200 per month beginning September, 1929, the
date of the filing of this action, and ending with the month of
March 30, 1930, when this decision was promulgated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not awarding
the judgment for past due maintenance accruing under a
preliminary order from September, 1920 running until the
present action was instituted.
RULING: NO. An order for support pendente lite is intended
to be operative exclusively during the pendency of the
litigation. Hence, the voluntary dismissal of the action by the
plaintiff has the necessary effect of abrogating the order, and
has thus placed the plaintiff in a position where she is unable
to enforce that order.

It’s not a PROVREM 2015  21