Social Networks 33 (2011) 166–171

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Social Networks
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/socnet

Power and the perception of social networks夽

Brent Simpson ∗ , Barry Markovsky, Mike Steketee
University of South Carolina, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Keywords: Previous work has led to divergent conclusions about how power affects the accuracy of network per-
Accuracy ceptions in groups and organizations. This paper develops and tests an argument linking higher power to
Cognitive social networks less accurate network perception. Results from the first experiment showed that, relative to participants
Network perception
primed with high power, those primed with low power had more accurate perceptions of who was tied
Perception
to whom in novel networks. The second experiment demonstrated that such differences in perceptual
Power
Priming accuracy do not emerge for non-social relations.
Social cognition © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The literature on cognitive social networks addresses the accu-
racy of people’s perceptions of network ties within groups and
organizations (Bondonio, 1998; Casciaro et al., 1999; Freeman
et al., 1987; Johnson and Orbach, 2002). One question to which
researchers have devoted increasing attention is how power
influences the accuracy of perceptions of who is tied to whom
(Casciaro, 1998; Krackhardt, 1990). This question is important
because, as Krackhardt (1990) has argued, accurate network per-
ception is an important basis for power. Solving the puzzle of how
power impacts network perceptions is therefore important for the
following reason: if more powerful actors have more accurate per-
ceptions, this would provide a means through which extant power
inequalities are maintained or amplified. On the other hand, if less
powerful actors have more accurate perceptions, it would pro-
vide one mechanism through which social psychological processes
reign-in structurally determined power processes (Simpson et al.,
forthcoming).
Previous work has yielded somewhat contradictory conclu-
sions about the impact of power on perception of networks:
some research has found a negative relationship between power
and perception of network ties (Casciaro, 1998; Simpson and
Borch, 2005), while other studies find no significant relationship
(Krackhardt, 1990). These prior studies of power and network per-
ception operated through disparate conceptual frameworks and,
夽 This research was supported by grant SES-0551895 from the National Science
Foundation to the first two authors.
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina,
Columbia, SC 29208, United States.
E-mail address: bts@sc.edu (B. Simpson).
with the exception of Simpson and Borch (2005), investigated nat-
urally occurring networks in formal organizations. The problem,
as noted by classical theorists (Weber [1918] 1968) and repeat-
edly echoed in more recent work (Bacharach and Lawler, 1976;
Lovaglia, 1997; Thye, 2000) is that power has many correlates such
as status and wealth. As explained below, such factors may con-
found the study of power and perception in natural settings. We
may therefore observe empirical links between power and percep-
tion in organizations that are due to power’s direct effects, or to
indirect effects, or both. Our research utilized experiments that, by
controlling or ruling out such correlates, help to generate a clearer
understanding of the relations between power and network per-
ception.
1. Theoretical arguments
Our arguments are centered on certain key terms, defined as fol-
lows. Power is the potential to obtain favorable outcomes in social
relations, as a result of asymmetric dependence or control of valued
resources (Emerson, 1972; Molm, 1990; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959;
Willer et al., 1997). Accuracy in network perception is “the degree
of similarity between an individual’s perception of the structure of
. . . relationships in a given social context and the actual structure
of those relationships” (Casciaro et al., 1999:286). In our research
the “actual structure” is created experimentally, sidestepping the
informant accuracy problem that can occur in natural contexts (see
Bondonio, 1998; Freeman et al., 1987).
Our theoretical argument explains how low-power actors can
have more accurate network perceptions than high-power actors.
The argument begins with insights from the social cognition lit-
erature explaining how power affects social cognition (Fiske and

0378-8733/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007
 B. Simpson et al. / Social Networks 33 (2011) 166–171
Taylor, 2008).1 A number of studies show that experiencing low
power leads to more controlled cognition, whereas the experience
of high-power leads to more automatic (heuristic-based) social
cognition (e.g., Fiske, 1993a,b; Fiske and Taylor, 2008; Keltner et al.,
2003). Furthermore, power-induced social cognitions occur spon-
taneously (see Keltner et al., 2003 for a review). As a result, those
low in power engage in more systematic cognition even when the
additional cognitive resources cannot increase their power.2 One of
our key goals is to assess whether low power actors have more accu-
rate network perceptions, even in contexts where more accurate
perceptions cannot benefit them.
We extend prior work on power and perception to address how
power differences and the resultant cognitions affect perceptions
of relationships and social structures. We expect that those who
engage in more controlled social cognition will have more accu-
rate perceptions of social ties between others. Those who engage
in more automatic social cognition, in contrast, can be expected to
rely more on heuristics such as a balance schema (e.g., Press et al.,
1969).
Prior research has demonstrated that heuristics play an impor-
tant role in the perceptions of social networks (DeSoto, 1960; Press
et al., 1969). For instance, Freeman (1992) noted that people tend to
perceive the presence or absence of social ties according to clearly
delineated groups, even though actual human social interaction is
rarely organized so neatly. That is, we “fill in the blanks” by per-
ceiving transitivity in intransitive relations. These heuristics have
advantages such as decreasing the amount of cognitive resources
devoted to perceiving social relations. They come with a cost, how-
ever: relative to more effortful social cognition, they can result in
less accurate network perceptions.
Based on the forgoing argument, if those low in power engage
in more systematic social cognition whereas those higher in power
rely on heuristics, then we may hypothesize that low-power actors
will have more accurate perceptions of network ties than high-
power actors.3 This hypothesis runs counter to prior work that sug-
gested a positive relationship between power and perception (see
Simpson and Borch, 2005 for a review). For instance, Krackhardt
(1990:345) argued that more powerful members of organizations
have more opportunity to observe a larger share of organizational
networks, and so have more accurate perceptions. It is reasonable
to assume that greater availability of information of networks will
lead to greater perceptual accuracy, however this assertion may
confound power with opportunity for perceptual accuracy. In the
experimental tests outlined below, we thus hold constant the infor-
mation available to high-power vs. low-power actors.
1
Automatic social cognition occurs rapidly. It employs routine mental shortcuts
or heuristics and therefore requires fewer cognitive demands (Keltner et al., 2003).
Controlled social cognition, on the other hand, entails a more comprehensive assess-
ment and analysis of stimuli (Chen et al., 1999). Controlled social cognition is more
effortful and deliberate, and relies less on simple heuristics to form impressions and
make judgments (Keltner et al., 2003).
2
As an example, after priming participants with high- or low-power, Galinsky
et al. (2006) asked them to draw an “E” on their foreheads. Participants primed with
low-power cognitions were more likely than those primed with high-power to draw
an “E” so that it could be read by other people. Importantly, participants primed with
low-power could not benefit from spontaneously taking others’ perspectives. Their
low-power cognitions simply generated systematic social cognitions that accounted
for others’ perspectives.
3
Although we do not investigate mediators here, prior research suggests that
the impact of power on systematic vs. heuristic social cognition may be mediated
by affect. Briefly, experiencing low and high power leads, respectively, to negative
and positive affect (Anderson et al., 2001; Molm, 1991; Willer et al., 1997). Also,
as noted by Hertel (1999:232; see also Schwartz and Clore, 1996) “negative feeling
states prompt more detail oriented, systemic processing in order to cope with the
problematic situation. Positive mood, however, signals that no problem solving is
needed, so that individuals may rely on simple heuristics and save cognitive capacity
until it is needed.”
167
1.1. Evidence from prior research
Consistent with our hypothesis, Simpson and Borch (2005)
found that occupants of low-power positions in “exchange net-
works” had more accurate perceptions of network ties than
high-power actors. While suggestive, the applicability of those
results to our hypothesis is limited for several reasons. First,
although the number of ties to a network position (degree centrality)
does not by itself determine power (e.g., Bonacich, 1987; Cook et al.,
1983; Freeman, 1979), it was partially confounded with power in
the Simpson–Borch experiment: high-power actors tended to have
more ties than low-power actors. Thus, a kind of “information over-
load” is an alternative explanation for high-power positions’ less
accurate perceptions of network relations. They would have needed
to gather, organize, and analyze more information about bargaining
events than the less central low-power actors (Shaw, 1978).
In addition, the Simpson–Borch study only addressed the impact
of one source of power (structural) in one type of network (resource
exchange). Perhaps most importantly, the experiment did not allow
a test of the argument outlined above that low-power actors have
more accurate perceptions even when those perceptions can have
no impact on power inequalities. Below we outline a new experi-
ment designed to overcome these limitations and show that the
theorized effects of power on perception generalize beyond the
preliminary results just presented. These limitations motivate the
first experiment outlined below.
1.2. Priming power
Both studies introduced in the sections to follow build on the
growing literature on priming: the activation of particular cogni-
tions or knowledge structures in a given situation (Bargh et al.,
1996). Primes may be either subliminal, i.e., occurring outside of the
participant’s conscious awareness, or supraliminal (e.g., Galinsky
et al., 2003). Although participants are aware of supraliminal
primes, they are generally unaware of their effects on subsequent
behaviors (Fiske and Taylor, 2008:28ff).
Below we describe a commonly used method of priming power.
For the high-power prime, subjects are asked to recall and write
about an event in which they had power over another person or
persons. The power positions are reversed for the low-power prime.
This procedure has generated a number of important insights
(see reviews by Gruenfeld et al., 2003, and Keltner et al., 2003).
For example, participants primed with high (vs. low) power take
more risks (Anderson and Galinsky, 2006), are more likely to treat
interaction partners as means to ends (Gruenfeld et al., 2008),
and are less likely to spontaneously take the other’s perspective
(Galinsky et al., 2006). More generally, the effects of priming are
not unlike those resulting from structural manipulations of power
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003).
2. Experiment 1
We conducted two experiments at a large public university with
students from Introductory Sociology courses. Those who agreed
to participate did so during regular class periods. Experiment 1
addressed the effects of power on perceptions of social relations.
Experiment 2, to be reported in the next section, was designed to
rule out an alternative explanation of the results of Experiment 1,
and addressed the impact of power on perceptions of non-social
relations.
Data for Experiment 1 were gathered in two classroom ses-
sions. After all subjects in a given session had read and completed
a consent form, a research assistant distributed a packet of mate-
rials containing condition-specific information and the dependent
168 B. Simpson et al. / Social Networks 33 (2011) 166–171
measure. Another research assistant projected the instructions on
a large screen and read them aloud. The instructions explained that
the research deals with various aspects of social relationships and
that subjects would begin by writing an essay based on a personal
event. They were then directed to the first page of their information
packet for instructions.
As noted above, the power manipulation has become the stan-
dard method of priming high- vs. low-power cognitions (e.g.,
Anderson and Galinsky, 2006; Smith and Bargh, 2008; Weick and
Guinote, 2008). Following Galinsky et al. (2003), instructions for
subjects in the high-power priming condition stated:
Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over
another individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situation
in which you controlled the ability of another person or persons
to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evalu-
ate those individuals. Using the space provided below, please
describe this situation in which you had power what happened,
how you felt, etc.
Participants in the low-power condition were asked to write
about a situation in which someone had power over them. Subjects
had 10 min to think about an event and to describe on the provided
form how it made them feel. They were encouraged to continue
writing about the event until the research assistant asked them to
stop.
Following the priming manipulation, subjects completed a net-
work perception task developed by Janicik and Larrick (2005). The
procedure builds on the classic studies of network accuracy. It
presents subjects with a novel network, then measures the accu-
racy of their perceptions of the network and the types of errors
they make while learning it (see, e.g., DeSoto, 1960; DeSoto and
Kuethe, 1959; Flynn et al., 2006; Freeman, 1992). Specifically, sub-
jects were given a description of influence relations among a group
of five scientists in a fictitious biotech company called “MedPro.”
The instructions explained that the subject’s task was to learn who
influences whom among the scientists at MedPro. Because influ-
ence networks are directed graphs (e.g., Mike can influence Bob
without Bob influencing Mike), there are 20 possible influence rela-
tions in a five-person network. Of these, six actually existed in
the MedPro network. Fig. 1a shows the text given to participants
regarding the influence relations, however participants were not
shown the schematic diagram that appears in Fig. 1b.
Subjects had 1 min to consider the list of ostensive “actual”
influence relations at MedPro. They were instructed to not write
anything during this period. When the minute elapsed, the research
assistant removed the MedPro influence structure from the screen
and, following Janicik and Larrick (2005), each subject was directed
to a response form in his or her experiment packet. The response
form contained ten yes/no questions about the influence struc-
ture in MedPro (e.g., “Does Bob influence Doug?”). Three of these
questions measured the accuracy of subjects’ perceptions of exist-
ing ties and the remaining seven measured subjects’ perceptions of
absent ties. Thus, given that there were 6 existing ties and 14 non-
existing ties, we have accuracy scores for half of each type. The
correspondence between a participant’s perceived structure and
the actual structure is our dependent measure. Following comple-
tion of the network perception questionnaire, research assistants
collected materials and explained the purpose of the study. The
entire procedure took approximately 15 min.
2.1. Results
A total of 97 students participated in Experiment 1. Table 1
presents the results for subjects in the two conditions. Our hypoth-
esis predicted that subjects primed with low power would report
more accurately on network ties in the MedPro organization. The
Table 1
Perceptual accuracy of social network ties (Experiment 1).
High power priming Low-power priming p (2-tailed)
Absent + present ties 76% 84% ≤.05
Absent ties only 70% 83% ≤.01
Present ties only 88% 86% n.s.
first row of the table shows that low-power priming resulted in
significantly more accurate perceptions of the MedPro network
than did high-power priming, 84% vs. 76% (t(95) = 1.99, p ≤ .05). This
supports the hypothesis.
Breaking down the results into “true positives” (accurate recall
of existing ties) and “true negatives” (accurate recall of absent ties)
yields greater insight into the perceptual acuity of those primed
with low versus high power. We conducted a repeated measures
ANOVA with tie-type (present vs. absent) and power as predictor
variables. The overall F tests showed a significant effect of tie-type
[F(1, 95) = 13.60, p < .001], qualified by a tie-type × power inter-
action [F(1, 95) = 7.50, p = .007]. As shown in the last two rows
of Table 1, while power did not affect the accuracy of percep-
tions of existing ties (t(95) = .51, p = .62), those primed with low
power had significantly more accurate perceptions of absent ties
(t(95) = 2.51, p ≤ .01). Viewed differently, although low-power actors
had relatively accurate perceptions of both present and absent
ties (t(51) = .95, p = .35), participants in the high-power condition
seemed to focus their attention on ties that were present, as
indicated by their greater accuracy scores for present vs. absent
relations (t(44) = 3.55, p < .001).
The kinds of misperceptions made by high-power actors shed
additional light on these results. Specifically, those primed with
high power seemed to assume that the most influential scientist
in MedPro (Ken) was universally influential, and that the most
influenced scientists in MedPro (Mike and Bob) were universally
influenced. Further analyses showed that those primed with high
power were more likely than those primed with low power to state
erroneously that non-existent ties originating at Ken, or ending at
Mike or Bob, actually existed (t(95) = 2.41, p ≤ .05). This suggests
a form of schematic processing of network information: those
primed with high power tended to “fill in the blanks” (Freeman,
1992), inferring non-existent network ties in a way consistent with
a fully-stratified power system.
2.2. Discussion
Experiment 1 supported our central hypothesis predicting that
respondents primed with low power would have more accurate
perceptions of social ties. While low-power actors had relatively
accurate perceptions of existing and non-existing ties, high-power
actors systematically misperceived certain types of non-existing
ties. These results support our argument linking low power to more
accurate network perceptions, but permit an alternative expla-
nation: the experience of low power may have led to an overall
improvement in performance on cognitive tasks. For instance, the
priming procedure may have threatened the self-efficacy of low-
power subjects, leading them to respond by putting additional
effort into the task. According to this alternative explanation, the
content of the task for the dependent measure was irrelevant: those
primed with low power would have performed better at any task.
However, following Janicik and Larrick (2005) we suggest that the
perception of social relations is domain specific, such that the more
accurate perceptions of low-power actors should be limited to the
perception of social relations. If so, we would not expect to observe
differences between those primed with high and low power in
a non-social network domain. We tested this idea in our second
study.
 B. Simpson et al. / Social Networks 33 (2011) 166–171 169

Fig. 1. Influence relations for Experiment 1 (from Janicik and Larrick, 2005). Node size corresponds with number of influence relations.

3. Experiment 2 Table 2
Perceptual accuracy of non-social relations (Experiment 2).

Following Janicik and Larrick (2005), we used traffic network High power priming Low power priming p (2-tailed)
patterns to operationalize non-social relations. We administered Absent + present ties 77% 80% n.s.
the priming procedure from Experiment 1, then displayed a traf- Absent ties only 74% 77% n.s.
fic pattern isomorphic to the MedPro network used in the prior Present ties only 83% 89% n.s.
study. Data were gathered in two classroom sessions. With few
exceptions, procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1.
3.2. Discussion
Rather than describing the study as involving “social relationships,”
however, it was described as an investigation of how people form
We have addressed a longstanding issue in the social sciences:
mental maps of city streets and learn to navigate using direct
how does a person’s power affect the accuracy of her percep-
routes.
tions of the social ties that exist between group members? Prior
Subjects received a list of six one-way streets, each of which
research (Simpson and Borch, 2005) and Experiment 1 both sug-
connected two of six landmarks, e.g., a Pharmacy and a High
gest that those low in power have more accurate perceptions of
School. We used one-way streets for ease of comparison with
social ties, and this effect appears across different contexts and
the directed graph of influence relations from Experiment 1 (see
measures. Results supported the argument linking low power to
Fig. 1). Again, subjects were presented only with a text descrip-
more accurate network perceptions, whether the experience of
tion of the tie patterns and not an image of the network. All other
power stemmed from occupation of disadvantaged positions in
procedures were identical, and our perception measures included
a social network or via a standard method of priming low (vs.
only those relations that were isomorphic to the ones included
high) power, and whether the relations being perceived were
in Experiment 1. As above, the correspondence between percep-
ties among members of a network in which the perceiver was
tion of the network and the actual structure of that network is our
involved and from which he or she could materially benefit or
dependent measure.
in a network of influence relations in which the perceiver was
a third-party observer and could not benefit from more accurate
perceptions.
3.1. Results
Evidence from organizations research is also consistent with our
findings. Casciaro (1998) assessed the impact of formal positions in
A total of 100 students participated. Table 2 shows the per-
a university research center hierarchy on perceptions of friendship
ceptual accuracy of subjects primed with high versus low power.
and advice networks in the research center. Although she expected
In contrast to the results in Experiment 1, there was no effect of
to find a positive relationship between power (position in the hier-
power on perceptions of non-social ties. Those primed with low
archy) and perceptions of advice networks, she found that those
power had similar levels of perceptual acuity to those primed with
lower in power had more accurate perceptions of both friendship
high power 80% vs. 77%, respectively (t(98) = .816, p = .42). Nor did
and advice networks. In short, the finding that those low in power
we observe significant differences between those primed with low
have more accurate network perceptions appears to be relatively
versus high power when we separately considered those ties that
robust across a range of different types of networks and bases of
did exist (“true positives” = 89% and 83% for low and high power,
power. In line with our expectations, however, the results of Exper-
respectively, p = .63), or those that did not (“true negatives” = 77%
iment 2 suggest that power does not lead to a general increase in
and 74% for low and high power, p = .22).4
perceptual acuity, as power did not affect the perception of non-
social ties.

4
4. Discussion and conclusions
We also conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with Study (1 vs. 2), tie-type
(present vs. absent) and power as predictors of accuracy. Most relevant for cur-
rent purposes, a marginally significant interaction between tie-type and power [F(1, Previous work in sociology and organizational studies has led
193) = 2.67, p = .10] was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between to divergent explanations for whether and how power affects the
Study, tie-type and power [F(1, 193) = 5.51, p = .02]. Given that results are based on accuracy of perceptions of social relationships. Our research sought
analyses of two different experiments, they should be interpreted cautiously. Still,
the three-way interaction provides additional evidence that the greater perceptual
to produce a better understanding of the impact of power on per-
acuity of those lower in power (for absent ties) holds for social ties (Study 1), but ceptions of social ties. The gist of our argument linking low power
not for non-social ties (Study 2). to more accurate perceptions is that, compared to their high-power
170 B. Simpson et al. / Social Networks 33 (2011) 166–171
counterparts, low-power actors will engage in more systematic
network searches. As a result, we expected a negative relationship
between power and perception.
The results of Experiment 1 strongly supported the hypoth-
esized negative relationship. Subjects primed with low-power
cognitions had more accurate perceptions of ties in a novel network
than those primed with high-power cognitions. Furthermore, the
perceptions of high- versus low-power subjects differed for very
specific types of ties: compared to their low-power counterparts,
those primed with high power tended to assume that highly influ-
ential members of the network were universally influential and
that highly influenced members were universally influenced. As a
result, they tended to overestimate the existence of ties connecting
these actors to others in the network. Thus, high-power cognitions
seemed to prime participants to engage in a heuristic form of net-
work perception, whereas those primed with low power engaged
in more systematic searches. Importantly, however, results from
Experiment 2 showed that power priming did not affect the per-
ceptions of non-social relations.
These findings raise a number of additional questions about
the relationship between power and perception. For instance, do
low-power actors’ more accurate perceptions of networks actu-
ally benefit them? A number of scholars (Krackhardt, 1990; Pfeffer,
1981) have answered this question affirmatively. But, in a related
paper (Simpson et al., forthcoming), we argue and present exper-
imental evidence that having accurate network knowledge can
create a “social trap” (Komorita and Parks, 1996; Platt, 1973) for
low-power actors, wherein short-term individual gains generate
long-term collective losses.
The current research should also be extended to include a more
systematic investigation of the types of heuristics that high-power
actors invoke and their consequences for perceiving social net-
works. This is important because the beliefs of those at the top of
power and prestige orders are more likely to influence the behavior
of others than the beliefs of those with lower status (Berger et al.,
1977; Weber [1918] 1968). Thus, it is conceivable that the percep-
tions of those higher in power, whether or not these perceptions
are accurate, are reified by other group members.
Furthermore, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, future
research should investigate whether the effects of power on net-
work perception are mediated by culture. A. Fiske (1993) suggested
that, while the types of cognitive schema people use to organize and
perceive social relationships are relatively similar across cultures,
there is appreciable cultural variation in the extent to which a given
situation leads to the use of one schema vs. another. Because most
of the participants in the studies reported above are from an indi-
vidualist culture, it may be useful to replicate these studies using
participants in collectivist cultures.
Finally, some research suggests that those high in power engage
in more systematic cognitions if they feel their power is threatened
(e.g., Keltner et al., 2003). If so, we might expect that, during uncer-
tain times such as following threats of collective action by those low
in power or during organizational shake-ups high-power actors’
network perceptions may more closely resemble those of their low-
power counterparts. Additionally, as noted earlier, some research
(e.g., Burawoy, 1979) suggests that high-power actors may orga-
nize interaction in order to mask the relations that exist among
network occupants. Studying the tactics that actors use to influ-
ence others’ network perceptions should yield further insights into
the relationships between power and perception in more nuanced
real-world organizations.
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