G.R. No.
198356, April 20, 2015 learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY:
ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA
LORENCE, ALL SURNAMED SUPAPO, AND SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-
SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS,
MACARIO BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER
THEM, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners
Esperanza Supapo and Romeo Supapo2 (Spouses Supapo) to assail the
February 25, 2011 decision3 and August 25, 2011 resolution 4 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto
and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and
persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land
located in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot).
The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416
registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an
assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos
(39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax
declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. 7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not
employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year.8 During
one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot.
The houses were built without their knowledge and permission. They later
occupied the other one.9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate
surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate
Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle
amicably.10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The
trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO
DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each
accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal
was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise
known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to
the dismissal of the criminal case.15
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final. 16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the
execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the
subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the
writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but
the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge
the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent's From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with
motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the RTC.24
the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil
liabilities were extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads: The RTC Ruling25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with prayer for The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action
injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the exclusive
Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. jurisdiction of the RTC.
C-45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently
ENJOINED from further executing or implementing its decision dated March It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC
18, 1996. has jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed
within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made.
SO ORDERED. Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before
the RTC.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
does not mean that people now have unbridled license to illegally occupy
lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
property rights of legitimate landowners.19 In cases of violation of their
property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby
proper action for recovery of possession.
declared NULL and VOID.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-
21 29245 for lack of jurisdiction.
After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative
defenses for preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1) there is another
SO ORDERED.26
action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion
publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapo's
cause of action is barred by prior judgment. In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that
the court's jurisdiction over an action involving title to or possession of land
The MeTC Ruling23 is determined by its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive
jurisdiction on all complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary value of the subject lot falls within MeTC's jurisdiction.
hearing. It ruled that the arguments advanced by the respondents are
evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value
of the subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of action had already
prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the ten (l0)-year (2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is
prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code. 28 As it was not proven imprescriptible under the Torrens system.
when the actual demand to vacate was made, the RTC ruled that the
reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been filed is The Respondents' Case33
counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The
certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed
complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or more in the wrong court; (2) barred by prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.
than ten (10) years thereafter.
Issues
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA. 29
The issues for resolution are:
The CA Ruling30
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that the period to III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res
file the action had prescribed. judicata.

The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

Our Ruling
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and
Order dated October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED. The petition is meritorious.

SO ORDERED We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of
action has not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the
CA decision; hence, they came to us through the present petition. Accion Publiciana and
the Jurisdiction of the
The Petition MeTC

In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue
that:
(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion
publiciana where the assessed value of the property does not
exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in
Metro Manila; and that
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 34
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of
possession of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession
on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is
to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise
the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine
who between the parties has the right to possess the property. 35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is
only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication
of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication,
in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. 36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over
the subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or the
respondents should have the right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real
property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is plenary. 38
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and
granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is
located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value.40 The
assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. 41
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA � that all cases of
recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts
regardless of the value of the property � no longer holds true. As tilings
now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the
assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and
P50,000.00, if within.43 (Emphasis supplied.) The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for
accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the
certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period
provided by law.
nature of the action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint,
the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or over the subject property, and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible
and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right to recover
all of the claims asserted therein.44
possession because of laches.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for
the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the
accion publiciana more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action
tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The
was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is
respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax
declaration. imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under the
Torrens system.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional
requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the
Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in
The cause of action
has not prescribed 1979.46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence,
authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.47
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have
dismissible for being filed out of time.
allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The
may lose his possession: respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot in good
faith. Having possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they
xxxx claim that they can no longer be disturbed in their possession. 48

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents'
the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of contentions have no legal basis.
possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a
title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have
also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land
involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 49 of the Civil Code in
relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
152950].51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits
under the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present case is
concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered
land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title
over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. 52 The right to possess
and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of
ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens
Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right
is imprescriptible.54
55
In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the
Torrens Title were aware of the other persons' occupation of the property,
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right
to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. 56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale
or transfer of the property, we still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens
Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-
registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater probative
weight to the plaintiffs TCT vis-a-vis the contested unregistered deed of sale
of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the
respondents did not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses
Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore that we uphold the
indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses
Supapo's TCT, this Court merely recognizes the value of the Torrens System
in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land
registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him
as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will
force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence
will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. 58
With respect to the respondents' defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that
the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings.60 In other words, the party alleging laches must
adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier
of facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not
pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to
deny the Spouses Supapo's petition.61 On the contrary, the facts as culled
from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise
their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they
brought the dispute to the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal
complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the action publiciana. To
our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right
to recover possession of the subject lot is not barred by prescription.
The action is not barred (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
by prior judgment subject matter, and cause of action.

As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
They contend that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the
filing of the action publiciana. While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is
no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action between the
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the
criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action
respondents to challenge the RTC's issuance of the writ enforcing their civil for the recovery of the subject property.
liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their conviction
under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition and permanently
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although
enjoined the execution of the respondents' conviction because their
initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people
criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal of the law under which of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and
they were tried and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from
in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
the crime had also been erased.
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced. prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion
publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the
conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).62 Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental
interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been
Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over
judicially tried on the merits and determined by a court of competent the subject property and recover its possession.
jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. 63
defense of res judicata has still no basis.
The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is
are:
identity of causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and
identity of parties.65
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
subject matter and the parties; and
litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. 66

As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal

complaint under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion
publiciana. For this reason alone, "collusiveness of judgment" does not
apply.

Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties,
"conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there is no
identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents
(accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the information, while the
only issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better
right than the respondents to possess and occupy the subject property.

For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.

Final Note

As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the
issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to
possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the
issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third
persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and

consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and
August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
 G.R. No. 164560

Present: Promulgated:

July 22, 2009

ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

and ALEJO DOPEO,

Chairperson,

Petitioners, CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

- versus -
PERALTA, JJ. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, in her capacity as the

DECISION
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87; HON. MANUEL TARO, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 42; and the HEIRS OF SPOUSES
APOLONIO V. DIONISIO and VALERIANA DIONISIO PERALTA, J.:
(namely, ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO and ELEANOR R.
DIONISIO, herein represented by ALLAN GEORGE R.
DIONISIO),

Respondents.
 This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978,
be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses
Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a Complaint2 against herein petitioners
and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria,
Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. Private respondents alleged that subject property located in
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled
in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners,
with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a
parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private
respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and
using subject property. It was further alleged in the Complaint that
petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged property was
spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole
and absolute owners of the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to
surrender possession of subject property to them; that petitioners and
Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay actual and moral
damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss3 said complaint
on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The MeTC then issued an Order4 dated July 4, 2002 denying the
motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving
title to or possession of real property of small value.
 Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for
certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 was discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the
denied. dismissal of the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction
over the same. In the assailed CA Resolution dated September 15, 2003, the
CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available
to petitioners as they should have availed themselves of the remedy of
Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition
appeal. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal
for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87.
was denied per Resolution8 dated June 1, 2004.
However, in its Decision5 dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the
petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC
Presiding Judge. The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in
accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and, in support thereof,
B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for Accion they allege that:
Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and possession of real
property located in Quezon City, with an assessed value not exceeding
P50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration6 of the Decision was filed by
petitioners, but was denied in an Order7 dated July 3, 2003.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC)
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR
 CERTIORARI AND FOR FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE
RAISED IN THE CERTIORARI REGARDING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF A CASE OF ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FATIMA
GONZALES-ASDALA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC
BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF (SIC)
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND IN RESOLVING THAT A CASE OF ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT MANUEL TARO AS
PRESIDING JUDGE MeTC, BRANCH 42, QUEZON CITY,
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SO
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE COMPLAINT FOR ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA IN CIVIL CASE NO. 27434 ENTITLED,
HEIRS OF SPS. APOLONIO V. DIONISIO AND VALERIANA
DIONISIO, ETC. VS. ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO, ET. AL.9
The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have
been entertained from the very beginning.
The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari,
as provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
in Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court expounded as follows:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a
decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65, because such
recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case,
petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special
civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct
remedy.
xxxx
Settled is the rule that where appeal is available
to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari
will not be entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.
Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in
one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One
of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where
an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
 discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by Petition for
Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and the instant
petition must, therefore, fail.11
For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted
properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground
that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of
certiorari. Verily, the present Petition for Certiorari should not have been
given due course at all.
Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for
review on certiorari had lapsed by the time the instant petition was filed,
the assailed CA Resolutions have attained finality.
Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the
ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,12 to wit:
In a number of cases, we have held that actions
for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to
quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein.
xxxx
x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no
substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one,
the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary
estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one
involving title to property under Section 19(2). The
distinction between the two classes became crucial with
the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994,
which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction
over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to,
possession of, real property or any interest therein"
under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the
first and second level courts, with the assessed value of
the real property involved as the benchmark. This
amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded
dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier
administration of justice."13
 Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter
lack of merit. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78978, dated September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005]
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR,
LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, petitioners, vs. ALLAN
T. SALVADOR, respondent.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and
VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM, respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 63737 as well as its Resolution[2] denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and
Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T.
Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from
Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated as
Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon,
Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary
share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father
was still single, and which adjudication was known by the
plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling
unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs
father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their
predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate
the premises but the latter manifested that he have (sic)
asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion
Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs
brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no
avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto
attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the
property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame,
humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were
constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.[3]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in their favor, thus:
 WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after
due process (sic), an order be issued for the defendant to vacate
and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property
and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
a. actual damages, as follows:
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with
the projected settlement of the case
amounting to P1,500.00 and for the
subsequent attendance to the hearing of
this case at P1,500.00 each schedule;
a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00
and P500.00 for every court appearance;
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent
upon the Honorable Court to determine; and
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under
the premises.[4]
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7691.[5] He averred that
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed
value of the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify
and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the
subject-matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the
jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case,
however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally
absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in
the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the
Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be
surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed value
of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it
falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of
Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather
than before the RTC. [6]
The petitioners opposed the motion.[7] They contended that the RTC
had jurisdiction over the action since the court can take judicial notice of the
market value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per square
meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more
or less, the total value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the
petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and the proper time to
interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of
such value.
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion
to dismiss, holding that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation,
and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed
his answer with counterclaim.[9] Traversing the material allegations of the
complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against
him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his
grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-
Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-
Intervention[10] making common cause with the private respondent. On her
own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor. [11]
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No.
8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed value of
P5,950.00.[12]
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of
the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over
to the plaintiffs the occupied property; and
 Dismissing defendants counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor
Salvador appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May
23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for
want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its
refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the
recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action,
conformably to Section 33[15] of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision,
which the appellate court denied.[16] Hence, they filed the instant petition,
with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ROMBLON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN
THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE
MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE
SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.[17]
The Ruling of the Court
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction
over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the
private respondent, who was the defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action
is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation;
thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive
jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners,
in their opposition to respondents motion to dismiss, they made mention of
the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount of
P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one
for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
therein.[18] The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature
of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer
of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling
of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion
reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was
an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real
property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which
has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said
ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery
of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause
of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[19]
 The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not
involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-
owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private
respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989
without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite
demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate
the property and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A.
No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared
for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or
possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said
property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real
property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.[20] The fair market value
is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled
to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not
contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of
the complaint.[21] The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of lands.[22] Absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the
RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners
action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property in
1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in
evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property
when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed
value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and
not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case
involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00.[23]
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion
reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the
property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has
jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC,
if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the
property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the
case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and
presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose
 remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such
this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit (P200,000.00).
B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an
action involving title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed
has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located,
value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said
and not the court a quo.[24]
damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value action for recovery of possession of real property.[26]
of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all
by the proper government agency.[25]
the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void.
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the The complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]
complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED.
Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the
Costs against the petitioners.
determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs. SO ORDERED.
This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in
the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies
to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation

[G.R. No. 140973. November 11, 2004]
JUSTINO LARESMA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On May 24, 1994, respondent Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo, Cebu, Branch 29, against
petitioner Justino Laresma, a farmer, for recovery of possession of Lot 4-E of
subdivision plan psd. 271428, a parcel of agricultural land located in Tampa-
an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. The lot had an area of 21,223 square meters covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47171. He alleged, inter alia, that
since 1985, the petitioner had been a lessee of a certain Socorro Chiong,
whose agricultural land adjoined his own; and that sometime in 1985, the
petitioner, by means of threat, strategy, and stealth, took possession of his
property and deprived him of its possession.[1] The respondent prayed that,
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, ordering the
petitioner to vacate the property and pay him actual damages, attorneys
fees, and expenses of litigation.[2] Appended to the complaint was a contract
of lease[3] executed by the petitioners wife, Praxedes Seguisabal Laresma,
on March 1, 1977, over a parcel of land owned by Socorro Chiong covered
by Tax Declaration No. 05561.
To support his complaint, the respondent presented his father,
Teotimo Abellana, as witness. Teotimo testified that the petitioner married
his maid, Praxedes Seguisabal, after which the couple resided in the
property of Socorro Chiong,[4] which abutted the property of the petitioner
and a portion of the property of the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras. The
petitioner thus became a tenant of Socorro Chiong. Teotimo further
narrated that sometime in 1989 and 1990, the petitioner transferred his
house to the property of his son, the respondent, in the process destroying
coconut trees planted on the property to pave the way for the construction
of the barangay hall. According to the witness, he reported the incident to
the office of the chief of police and the barangay captain. However, the
matter was not acted upon.[5]
Teotimo also testified that his son, the respondent, purchased the
property from his uncle, Mariano Paras, who, in turn, bought the same from
his parents, the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras.[6] Based on the said sale,
the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 47171 over the property under the
name of the respondent on April 2, 1980.[7] The respondent had since then
declared the property for taxation purposes,[8] and paid the realty taxes
therefor.[9] Teotimo declared that he requested Geodetic Engineer Lordeck
Abella to relocate the property, and the engineer prepared a sketch plan
showing that the said lot abutted the property of Socorro Chiong on the
northeast and that of Agnes Abellana on the north.[10] He admitted that he
and the respondent were informed that the property had been placed under
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT), and that they refused to acknowledge
the information.[11]
The respondents aunt, Socorro Chiong, testified that on October 14,
1972, she and Felicidad Paras Montecillo purchased from her parents, the
Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras, a 19-hectare land in Tampa-an,
Aloguinsan, Cebu, Lot 4-C of Psd. 271428 Lot 4-E, covered by Tax Declaration
No. 009088.[12] Chiongs parents died in 1977. In an Order dated November
8, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) affirmed the July 11,
1988 Ruling of the DAR Regional Director that the deed of sale over the
property executed by her parents in her favor was valid; that the tenants
therein, including Justino Laresma and his wife, were bound by the said sale;
and that the tenanted portion of the property, including that portion leased
to Praxedes Laresma, was outside the scope of the OLT. [13] She confirmed
that the property of the respondent abutted her property on the north. [14]
 In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner averred that the dispute
between him and the respondent was agrarian in nature, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, involving as it did his right of possession
covered by Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-031817 issued to his wife
Praxedes. He alleged that the property titled in the name of the respondent
consisted of a portion of that property owned by the Spouses Vicente and
Susana Paras covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 780 which was
placed under OLT under Presidential Decree No. 27. Being a beneficiary of
the agrarian reform program of the government, his wife was issued CLT No.
0-031817 on July 13, 1982 over a portion of the property, Lot No. 00013,
with an area of 0.1700 hectares. Since then, he and his wife became owners
of the property and, as such, were entitled to the possession thereof.
The parties agreed to defer further proceedings for the conduct of an
ocular inspection of the property to determine whether Lot No. 00013
covered by CLT No. 0-031817 was, indeed, a part of Lot 4-E covered by TCT
No. 47171. On January 13, 1995, the trial court issued an Order allowing the
said inspection with Socorro Chiong in attendance.[15] The parties were
advised to make a report on the same. The court designated its process
server, Felix Navarro, as its representative during the inspection. [16] The
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, for its part, designated Municipal
Agrarian Reform Technologist Alberto Epan as its representative.
On February 16, 1995, Epan inspected the property in the presence of
the petitioner. The petitioner pointed to Epan eight of the ten OLT
muniments. Epan also noticed that there were coconuts scattered on the
property, that corn was planted in the plan area, and that the house of the
respondent was in the property titled to the petitioner. On February 17,
1995, the parties respective counsels, including Navarro and Epan,
inspected the property. Epan, thereafter, submitted his Report dated
February 22, 1995,[17] with a sketch at the dorsal portion showing the
respective locations of the property cultivated by the respondent, his house
and the OLT muniments.[18] Navarro submitted a separate report on March
7, 1995,[19] where it was indicated that the parties had agreed that the house
of the petitioner was located at the respondents property.
The petitioner denied being the tenant of the respondent. He testified
and adduced evidence that he and his wife were married on September 23,
1953,[20] and, thereafter, resided in the property of the Spouses Paras [21]
where he was a tenant.[22] He delivered one-half of the produce from the
land to Susana Paras and kept the rest as his share. Shortly thereafter, the
Spouses Paras sold a portion of the property to the respondent. Sometime
in 1976 or 1977, the subject property was placed under the OLT.[23] The
respondent and Roque Paras protested the inclusion of the property, which
was, however, rejected.[24] The petitioner also testified that after the death
of the Spouses Paras, he gave the share of the produce to the spouses
daughter, Socorro Chiong.[25]
The petitioner further testified that on July 13, 1982, his wife was
issued CLT No. 0-031817 over Lot No. 00013, the property he was
cultivating. The lot had an area of 0.1700 hectares and was located at
Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. Because of lack of funds, his wife was able to
make only partial payments of her amortizations for the property to the
Land Bank of the Philippines for which she was issued receipts. [26] After CLT
No. 0-031817 was issued to his wife, he kept all the produce from the land.
The petitioner also presented Felix Navarro and Alberto Epan who
affirmed their respective reports on the conduct of the inspection on the
property.
On October 30, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
respondent and against the petitioner. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff as against defendant declaring:
1 - That plaintiff as the lawful owner in fee simple of the
entire real property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 47171 [Exhibit D]; and, declaring further
that plaintiff is entitled to recover possession thereof
from defendant;
2 - That the occupation, use, and possession of defendant
under the latters claim as bona fide tenant of plaintiff
over the latters property is null and void ab initio in
violation of aforecited provision of the Code of
Agrarian Reform, R.A. 3884;
3 - That defendant, his wife, Praxedes Laresma and their
children and his agents or representative are hereby
 ordered to vacate and to surrender the entire
possession, use, and occupation of said real property
covered by TCT No. 47171 to and in favor of plaintiff;
4 - That defendant is hereby declared liable and ordered to
pay plaintiff the sum of P70,000.00 as actual
damages, the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees,
and P5,000.00 as costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[27]
The court ruled that, as evidenced by the contract of lease executed by
Praxedes Laresma and Socorro Chiong, the petitioner was the tenant of
Chiong and not of the respondent. Thus, the court had jurisdiction over the
case. The court rejected the reports of Epan and Navarro, and considered
the same as barren of probative weight, considering that the said reports
failed to take into account the technical descriptions of Lot 4-C owned by
Chiong, Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171, and Lot 00013 covered by CLT
No. 0-031817.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The petitioner points out that the property subject of the complaint is
covered by a CLT issued by the DAR in the name of his wife. The petitioner
avers that although the complaint of the respondent appeared to be one for
the recovery of possession of the said property (accion publiciana), by
claiming that the petitioner was the tenant of Socorro Chiong, the
respondent indirectly attacked the said CLT. Hence, the action is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform and
Adjudication Board (DARAB) under Republic Act No. 6657. The petitioner
asserts that, by declaring that the landholding was not legally possessed by
him and that he was not a de jure tenant, the trial court thereby declared
him as having forfeited his rights under the CLT. He was, thus, prevented
from paying his monthly amortizations over the property to the Land Bank
of the Philippines as required by law.
The petitioner further asserts that he was the agricultural tenant of the
Spouses Paras, the original owners of the property. His right as a farmer
subsisted, notwithstanding the transfer of the property of the deceased
prior to October 21, 1972, which transfer was registered with the Register
of Deeds only on December 21, 1977. He contends that since the
landholding was already placed under the scope of OLT, the respondent
merely stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Paras. Moreover, having
become owners of the property on October 21, 1972, the petitioner and his
wife were not obliged to pay damages to the respondent; as such, there was
no factual basis for the award of actual damages in the amount of P70,000
in favor of the latter.
In his comment on the petition, the respondent avers that the
threshold issue in this case is factual; hence, the remedy of the petitioner
was to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals by a writ
of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. He contends that he did not, in
his complaint, attack the CLT issued to Praxedes Laresma because the
property covered by it is a portion of the property of Socorro Chiong, and
not that of his property covered by TCT No. 47171. He also posits that the
said title is valid and insists that the petitioner had actual knowledge of the
sale of the property to him. The petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in
Antonio v. Estrella[28] to bolster his claim.
As gleaned from the petition, the comment thereon, and the
memoranda of the parties, the issues for resolution are the following: (a)
whether the action of the respondent in the trial court is in reality an indirect
attack on the validity of CLT No. 0-031817 issued to Praxedes Laresma in the
guise of an action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) of the
property covered by TCT No. 47171; (b) whether the RTC had jurisdiction
over the action of the respondent; and (c) whether the petitioner is liable
for damages in favor of the respondent.
On the first two issues, the petitioner avers that he and his wife
Praxedes became owners of Lot No. 00013 by virtue of CLT No. 0-031817
which was awarded in the latters favor. As such, they are entitled to the
possession of the lot. The petitioner contends that unless and until CLT No.
0-031817 is nullified in a direct action for the said purpose before the
DARAB, they cannot be evicted from the said property. He posits that the
action of the respondent against him in the RTC for recovery of possession
of real property is, in reality, an indirect attack on the CLT issued to his wife
which is proscribed by the ruling of this Court in Miranda v. Court of
Appeals.[29] He asserts that the decision of the trial court declaring him in
illegal possession of the property and not a de jure tenant of the respondent
operates as an illegal forfeiture or cancellation of the CLT.
For his part, the respondent asserts that his complaint against the
petitioner did not indirectly assail the CLT issued to the latters wife. He
contends that his action was one for the recovery of his possession of a
portion of his property Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171, and not that of
Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 which is a portion of Lot 4-C
owned by his aunt Socorro Chiong. He notes that the petitioner himself
admits that he has never been his agricultural tenant over his property.
Consequently, the respondent concludes, the trial court correctly ruled that
the dispute between him and the petitioner is civil in nature and within its
exclusive jurisdiction.
We agree with the respondent that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over
his action against the petitioner. The bone of contention of the parties and
the decisive issue in the trial court was whether or not Lot No. 00013
covered by CLT No. 0-031817 is a portion of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No.
47171 under the name of the respondent. This is the reason why the parties
agreed to have Lot No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C owned by
Socorro Chiong and to Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent. After a
calibration of the evidence on record and the reports of Epan and Navarro,
the trial court ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C owned by
Socorro Chiong and not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent:
Plaintiff unabashedly claims that defendant has never been
his tenant over the formers property, Lot No. 4-E, but defendant
claims otherwise. The evidence of plaintiff tends to establish that
defendant is not his or has never been his tenant over his
agricultural land, Lot 4-E, but defendant Justino Laresma is rather
the tenant of Socorro Chiong over her property, Lot 4-C. In
support of this contention that defendant is not plaintiffs own
tenant but that of Socorro Chiong, plaintiff offered and adduced
the contract of lease duly entered by and between Socorro
Chiong and defendant [Exhibit B] in 1977 wherein it was clearly
stipulated [that] Socorro Chiong as the agricultural lessor leased
a portion of her land to defendant, in the latters capacity as
agricultural lessee of Lot 4-C with the obligation to pay Socorro
Chiong rentals during the stipulated crop years.
This particular contract of lease [Exhibit B] does not show
that plaintiff is a privy (sic) to it. It is (sic) goes to show that
plaintiff is [not] bound by the terms and conditions thereof.
In the order of DAR under DARRO Adm. Case No. VII-98-88
dated November 8, 1994 [Exhibit A] which is actually a decision
arising from the tenancy relationship between Socorro Chiong
and defendant Justino Laresma, the DAR had expressly ruled that
defendant is the tenant of Socorro Chiong of her property but
limited to an actual area of 3.7316 hectares and excluding the
area of 4.4905 [page 3, Decision] from the scope of the operation
of Operation Land Transfer. It was further ruled therein that the
landholding of Socorro Chiong was a part of the total landholding
owned by her parents, Vicente N. Paras and Susana Paras, both
deceased, which was, subsequently, sold by her parents to her as
evidenced by a deed of sale dated October 14, 1972 [Exhibit C].
This deed of conveyance was affirmed by the DAR as validly
executed between Socorro Chiong and defendant Justino
Laresma because the latter had actual knowledge and recognition
of the said transaction between Socorro and her deceased
parents. This actual transfer of ownership of said parcel of land
from Socorro Chiong[s] deceased parents to her was evidenced
by the execution of the contract of lease between her and
defendant on March 10, 1977 (sic) [Exhibit B].
But in the said ruling of the DFAR (sic), defendant has been
expressly declared by DAR as a bona fide tenant of Socorro
Chiong but his farmholding inside her property is limited to an
actual area of 3.7316 hectares and excluding the area of 4.4905
[page 3, Decision] from the scope of the operation of Operation
Land Transfer.
If defendant were (sic) truly a tenant of plaintiff, he would
have also asked plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest to execute
that necessary contract of lease like the instrument, which
Socorro Chiong executed in favor of defendant as her tenant. In
the absence of said instrument to establish his tenancy over
plaintiffs landholding, this Court cannot just presume the
 existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship between
plaintiff and defendant.[30]
However, this Court cannot accept these ocular reports and
the accompanying sketches thereof so as to correctly reflect the
identity of defendants farmholding and to establish its exact
location within the land of plaintiff in view of the absence of
pertinent technical description of said farmholding in relation to
the metes and bounds of plaintiffs land whose technical
description is clearly mentioned in plaintiffs Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 47171 [Exhibit D]. The said technical description of the
defendants farmholding is required to clearly pinpoint its identity
with its area and boundaries in relation to the titled property of
plaintiff. Without said technical description, it is very difficult to
identify defendants landholdings to be within plaintiffs real
property.
In view of the absence of the above-mentioned
indispensable requisites or any one of them in order to establish
the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship between
plaintiff and defendant, as earlier mentioned, does not make
defendant a de jure tenant under the Land Reform Program of
the government under existing tenancy laws. [Caballes v. DAR,
ibid.].[31]
The petitioner has not assailed the aforequoted findings of the trial
court in the petition at bar; hence, he is bound by the said findings.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material
averments of his complaint, the action of the respondent against the
petitioner is not an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein.[32] In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing
Corporation,[33] we ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of
the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant.[34] Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end
of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[35] that, in
American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of
jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily
from the face of the judgment only.
It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its jurisdiction
over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a
defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties.[36] But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine
the allegations of tenancy.[37] If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been
shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.[38]
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a
tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the
law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over
the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not
by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action.[39] Lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action
cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of
the parties.[40] If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it
may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the court
without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become
final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or
collaterally.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court that based on the material
allegations of the respondents complaint and even on the admission of the
petitioner, the latter had never been an agricultural tenant of the
respondent. In fact, the respondent claimed that based on the CLT issued to
his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As such,
the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the said action. The dispute between the
respondent, as plaintiff, and the petitioner, as defendant, in the RTC
involving the de jure possession of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 is not
an agrarian dispute. Decisive of the issue is our ruling in Heirs of the Late
Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals:[41]
 Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
DARAB, provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228, and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, by Republic Act
No. 6389, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. (Italics
supplied)
Agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic
Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
stewardship or, otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact,
both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject
property.
In the case of Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there
must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties.
In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a
dispute, it would be essential to establish all its
indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of
Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction
of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the
following: a) adjudication of all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of
agrarian conflicts and land tenure-related problems;
and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion,
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into
residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial,
leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have
brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform
laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private
respondents petition for injunction in the first place.[42]
However, we find and so hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action of the respondent. In this case, the respondent filed his complaint
against the petitioner on May 24, 1994. Hence, the jurisdiction of the regular
court over the nature of this action is governed by Republic Act No. 7691,
which took effect on April 15, 1994. Section 3 thereof amended Section 33
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, and reads:
 Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared
for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
On the other hand, Section 1 of the Rule amending Section 19 of B.P.
Blg. 129 reads:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdictions:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) .
The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions are accion
publiciana and reinvindicatoria. To determine which court has jurisdiction
over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon. In this case, the
complaint of the respondent against the petitioner for recovery of
possession of real property (accion publiciana) reads:
3. That plaintiff is the owner and possessor of Lot 4-E
covered by TCT No. T-47171 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu;
4. That defendant is the tenant of the land of Socorro P.
Chiong, which adjoins the parcel of land owned by the plaintiff as
shown by a leasehold contract hereto attached as Annex A and
made an integral part hereof;
5. That sometime in 1985, by means of threats, strategy, and
stealth, the herein defendant took possession of the parcel of
land owned by herein plaintiff, thus effectively depriving plaintiff
of the possession thereof;
6. That the defendants, while illegally occupying the land of
herein plaintiff, cut trees, and harvested the fruits of said land
causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P50,000.00;
7. That despite demand, defendant has refused to vacate
said land and return the possession thereof to herein plaintiff,
thus compelling the plaintiff to file the present action;
8. In filing the present action, the plaintiff engaged the
services of counsel for P10,000.00 and expects to incur expenses
of litigation in the amount of P5,000.00.[43]
The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed value of
Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no showing on the face of
the complaint that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent. Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments
issued to the respondent, the assessed value of the property in 1993 was
P8,300.00.[44] Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of Aloguinsan, Cebu,
and not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction
over the action of the respondent.[45] Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC,
including its decision, are null and void.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions of the court, there is no longer a
need to still resolve the third issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Toledo, Cebu City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-466
is NULLIFIED for lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the action of the
respondent against the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 premises but the respondents refused to heed. They also tailed to settle
amicably when the case was brought before the barangay for conciliation.

In their Motion to Dismiss,7 respondents claimed that the complaint failed

to state the assessed value of the property which is needed in determining
G.R. No. 215640, November 28, 2016 the correct amount of docket fees to be paid. Also, Cabrera did not fulfill an
essential condition prior to the filing of the complaint which was submission
NESTOR CABRERA, Petitioner, v. ARNEL CLARIN AND WIFE; MILAGROS of a government approved technical survey plan to prove the alleged
BARRIOS AND HUSBAND; AURORA SERAFIN AND HUSBAND; AND encroachment. Cabrera anchors his claim of ownership in the certificate of
BONIFACIO MORENO AND WIFE, Respondents. title registered in his and his father Ciriaco Cabrera's name. Cabrera did not
aver that it was his portion of property that respondents have intruded as
DECISION there was no proof of partition of the property since his father who was an
American citizen died in the United States of America.8
PERALTA, J.:
In an Order dated June 19, 2007, the RTC denied respondents' motion, and
For resolution of this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule directed them to file their Answer.9 The RTC cited the case of Aguilon v.
45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Nestor Cabrera (Cabrera) assailing Bohol10 in ruling that based on the allegations in the complaint, the case is
the Decision1 dated July 25, 2014 and Resolution2 dated November 21, 2014 the plenary action of accion publiciana which clearly falls within its
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100950, which reversed and jurisdiction. The trial court, in an Order11 dated October 19, 2007, declared
set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, respondents in default upon tailing to file their Answer, and allowed Cabrera
Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 752-M-2006. to present his evidence ex parte. On February 5, 2009, respondents filed an
Omnibus Motion12 to set aside the order of default, to admit Answer, and to
The facts are as follows:cralawlawlibrary set the hearing for the presentation of their evidence.

The instant petition originated from a Complaint4 for accion publiciana with In a Decision dated May 30, 2012, the RTC ruled in favor of Cabrera. The
damages filed before the RTC by Cabrera5 against respondents Arnel Clarin dispositive portion reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(Clarin) and wife, Milagros Barrios (Barrios) and husband, Aurora Serafin
(Serafin) and husband, and Bonifacio Moreno (Moreno) and wife.6 Cabrera WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
alleged that he is the lawful and registered owner of a parcel of agricultural favor of the [petitioner]:cralawlawlibrary
land located at Barangay Maysulao, Calumpit, Bulacan, with a total area of
60,000 square meters (sq. m.) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 1. ORDERING the [respondents] and all other persons claiming rights under
No. T-4439. He was in actual and physical possession of the land until he them to vacate the subject portions of [the] land and surrender possession
discovered the encroachment of respondents sometime in December 2005. thereof to the plaintiff;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
By means of fraud, strategy and stealth, respondents usurped and occupied
portions of the said property, viz.: Clarin with 63 sq. m. thereof, Barrios with 2. ORDERING the [respondents] to pay attorney's fees in the amount of Fifty
41 sq. m. thereof, Serafin with 30 sq. m. thereof, and Moreno with 11 sq. m. Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) and Ten Thousand Pesos ([P]10,000.00)
thereof. He made numerous oral and written demands to vacate the litigation expenses.
 amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691
SO ORDERED.13 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case before the CA which then
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC in a Decision dated July 25,
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
2014. The fallo of the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 30, exclusive original jurisdiction.
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malolos, Bulacan is REVERSED
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the complaint for accion publiciana with
damages filed by [petitioner] Nestor Cabrera is DISMISSED without property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
SO ORDERED.14
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Finding no cogent reason to deviate from its previous ruling, the CA denied Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Cabrera. Courts;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Hence, the instant petition raising the following x x x x

issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error when it held that "since [petitioner] failed to allege
the assessed value of the subject property, the court a quo
has not acquired jurisdiction over the action and all
proceedings thereat are null and void," as such conclusion
is contradictory to the doctrine of estoppel.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error when it failed to take into consideration the tax
declaration annexed to the Appellee's Brief which
provided the assessed value of the property subject
matter of the case.
The instant petition lacks merit.
In essence, the issue presented before this Court is whether or not estoppel
bars respondents from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:cralawlawlibrary
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein docs not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
x x x15
Before the amendments, the plenary action of accion publiciana was to be
brought before the RTC regardless of the value of the property. With the
modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the
first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real
actions where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, P50,000.00
where the action is filed in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the jurisdictional
element is the assessed value of the property.16
A perusal of the complaint readily shows that Cabrera failed to state the
assessed value of the disputed land, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
[T]he plaintiffs are the lawful and the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land and more particularly described under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-4439, a copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex
"A" and made an integral part hereof;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[T]he defendants had illegally encroached the property of the plaintiff by
means of fraud and stealth and with force and intimidation. Defendant Arnel
Clarin had encroached an approximate area of SIXTY THREE (63) SQUARE
METERS, while defendant Milagros Barrios had encroached an approximate
area of FORTY-ONE (41) SQUARE METERS, defendant Aurora Serafin had
encroached an approximate area of THIRTY (30) SQUARE METERS while
defendant Bonifacio Moreno had encroached an approximate area of
ELEVEN (11) SQUARE METERS, copy of the relocation plan is hereto attached
and marked as Annex "B" and made an integral part of this
complaint;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The plaintiffs had already informed the defendants of the illegal
encroachment but the defendants refused to heed the call of the plaintiffs
to vacate the land in question and threaten plaintiff with bodily
harm;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That prior to the discovery of the encroachment on or about December
2005, plaintiff was in actual and physical possession of the premises.
That this matter was referred to the attention of the Office of the Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Maysulao, Calumpit, Bulacan and a Lupong
Tagapamayapa was constituted but no conciliation was reached and the
Lupon issued a Certificate to File Action, copy of the Certificate to File Action
is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C" and made an integral part
hereof;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That notwithstanding numerous and persistent demands, both oral and
written, extended upon the defendants to vacate the subject parcel of land,
they failed and refused and still fail and refuse to vacate and surrender
possession of the subject parcel of land to the lawful owner who is plaintiff
in this case. Copy of the last formal demand dated January 18, 2006 is hereto
attached and marked as Annex " " and the registry receipt as well as the
registry return card as "D" Annexes "D-1," and "D-2,"
respectively;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That because of this unjustifiable refusal of the defendants to vacate the
premises in question which they now unlawfully occupy, plaintiffs [were]
constrained to engage the services of counsel in an agreed amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS ([P]50,000.00) Philippine Currency, as acceptance fee
and THREE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]3,000.00) Philippine Currency, per day of
Court appearance, which amount the defendants should jointly and
solidarity pay the plaintiffs, copy of the retaining contract is hereto attached
and marked as Annex "E" and made an integral part of this
complaint;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That in order to protect the rights and interest of the plaintiffs, litigation
expenses will be incurred in an amount no less than TEN THOUSAND PESOS
([P]10,000.00), which amount the defendants should jointly and solidarily
pay the plaintiffs;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]3,000.00) per month
should be adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff as against the defendants by
way of beneficial use, to be counted from the day the last formal demand
until they fully vacate and surrender possession of the premises in question
to the plaintiffs. x x x.17
In dismissing the case, the CA noted such fact, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bench, the complaint for accion publiciana filed by [Cabrera]
failed to allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the
complaint or the interest therein. Not even a tax declaration was presented
before the court a quo that would show the valuation of the subject
property. As such, there is no way to determine which court has jurisdiction
over the action or whether the court a quo has exclusive jurisdiction over
the same. Verily, the court a quo erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed
by [respondents] and in taking cognizance of the instant case. 18
Indeed, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject
property ever mentioned. On its face, there is no showing that the RTC has
jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, it cannot readily be determined which
court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar. The courts
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.19
We note that Cabrera, in his Comment/Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss,20 maintained that the accion publiciana is an action incapable of
pecuniary interest under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. 21 Thereafter,
he admitted in his Brief before the CA that the assessed value of the subject
property now determines which court has jurisdiction over accion publiciana
cases. In asse1iing the trial court's jurisdiction, petitioner averred that his
failure to allege the assessed value of the property in his Complaint was
merely innocuous and did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC to decide the
case.
Cabrera alleges that the CA erred in concluding that the RTC has not
acquired jurisdiction over the action in the instant case being contrary to the
doctrine of estoppel as elucidated in Honorio Bernardo v. Heirs of Villegas.22
Estoppel sets in when respondents participated in all stages of the case and
voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction seeking affirmative reliefs in
addition to their motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded. It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the
jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced.23 A court's
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal
for the same is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.24 It
applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal
or even after final judgment.
The exception to the basic rule mentioned operates on the principle of
estoppel by laches whereby a party may be barred by laches from invoking
the lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything
done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea.
In the oft-cited case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,25 the party-surety invoked the
jurisdictions of both the trial and appellate courts in order to obtain
affirmative relief, and even submitted the case for final adjudication on the
merits. It was only after the CA had rendered an adverse decision that the
party-surety raised the question of jurisdiction for the first time in a motion
to dismiss almost fifteen (15) years later. Hence, the Court adjudicated a
party estopped from assailing the court's jurisdiction, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
[a] party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. . . ., it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject
matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such practice cannot be tolerated - obviously for reasons of
public policy.
x x x26
However, it was explicated in Calimlim v. Ramirez27 that Tijam is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited
case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said
case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which
justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine
had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was
ruled that the lack of judsdictiou having been raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling
had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred
by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.28
In the case of La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,29 We illustrated
the rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter.
Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This
defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty,
37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion,
et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111
Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue or estoppel,
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction
or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon
the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law,
and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S.,
861-863).
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that the lower
court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the
parties, has no bearing thereon. x x x.30
Guided by the abovementioned jurisprudence, this Court rules that
respondents are not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over
the subject civil case. Records reveal that even before filing their Answer,
respondents assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC through a motion to dismiss
as there was no mention of the assessed value of the property in the
complaint. We note that the RTC anchored its denial of respondents' motion
to dismiss on the doctrine enunciated in a 1977 case - that all cases of
recovery of possession or accion publiciana lie with the RTC regardless of
the value - which no longer holds true. Thereafter, the respondents filed
their Answer through an omnibus motion to set aside order of default and
to admit Answer.
The circumstances of the present case are different from the Heirs of
Villegas31 case. First, petitioner Bernardo in the Heirs of Villegas case actively
participated during the trial by adducing evidence and filing numerous
pleadings, none of which mentioned any defect in the jurisdiction of the
RTC, while in this case, respondents already raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction in their Motion to Dismiss filed before their Answer. Second, it
was only on appeal before the CA, after he obtained an adverse judgment in
the trial court, that Bernardo, for the first time, came up with the argument
that the decision is void because there was no allegation in the complaint
about the value of the property; on the other hand, herein respondents
raised the issue before there was judgment on the merits in the trial court.
Respondents never assumed inconsistent position in their appeal before the
CA.
Furthermore, the unfairness and inequity that the application of estoppel
seeks to avoid espoused in the Tijam case, which the Heirs of Villegas
adheres to, are not present. The instant case does not involve a situation
where a party who, after obtaining affirmative relief from the court, later
on turned around to assail the jurisdiction of the same court that granted
such relief by reason of an unfavorable judgment. Respondents did not
obtain affirmative relief from the trial court whose jurisdiction they are
assailing, as their motion to dismiss was denied and they eventually lost
their case in the proceedings below.
Anent the issue of the CA's failure to consider the tax declaration annexed
in the Appellee's Brief, Cabrera insists that its attachment in his Brief without
objection from the other party sealed the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction, and
cured the defect of failure to allege the assessed value of the property in the
complaint as provided in Section 5,32 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Such averments lack merit. The Rules of Court provides that the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. 33 A formal offer
is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. Conversely,
this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not
be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.34 We relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally
offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the
following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case.35
Based on the petitioner's admission, he presented the Tax Declaration 2006-
07016-0039436 dated November 13, 2006 purporting to prove the assessed
value of the property for the first time on appeal before the CA in his Brief. 37
There was no proof or allegation that he presented the same during the trial
or that the court examined such document.38 Since the tax declaration was
never duly identified by testimony during the trial albeit incorporated in the
Appellee's Brief, the CA will not be required to review such document that
was not previously scrutinized by the RTC. As the assessed value is a
jurisdictional requirement, the belated presentation of document proving
such value before the appellate court will not cure the glaring defect in the
complaint. Thus, jurisdiction was not acquired.
We find Cabrera's application of Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court to
support his claim that failure of the respondents to object to his
presentation of the tax declaration before the CA constitutes an implied
consent which then treated the issue of assessed value as if it had been
raised in the pleadings specious. Such rule contemplates an amendment to
conform to or authorize presentation of evidence before the trial court
during the trial on the merits of the case. As held in Bernardo, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals,39 this Court expounded:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is settled that even if the complaint he defective, but the parties go to
trial thereon, and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces sufficient
evidence to constitute the particular cause of action which it intended to
allege in the original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces
witnesses to meet the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined as
fully and as effectively as if it had been previously joined by the most
perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 40 (Emphases supplied)
It bears emphasis that the ruling in Tijam establishes an exception which is
to be applied only under extraordinary circumstances or to those cases
similar to its factual situation.41 The general rule is that the lack of a court's
jurisdiction is a non-waivable defense that a party can raise at any stage of
the proceedings in a case, even on appeal; the doctrine of estoppel, being
the exception to such non-waivable defense, must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor.42
All told, We find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing the Complaint
for lack of jurisdiction and for not reviewing the document belatedly filed.
Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. Indeed, a void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all, and cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. 43
WHEREFORE, petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Nestor
Cabrera is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2014 and
Resolution dated November 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 100950 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
G.R. No. 165777 July 25, 2011
CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], substituted by her HEIRS, represented
by LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, and RHODORA R. PELOMIDA as
their Attorney-in-fact, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA.
DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB,
RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, and ROSALIE CASTOR
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated May
26, 2004 and the Resolution 2 dated September 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60764.
On August 26, 1999, respondents Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor (Rosario),
Nepthalie Castor Itucas, Ferolyn Castor Facurib (Ferolyn), Rachel De Castor,
Lea Castor Dollolosa and Rosalie Castor Benedicto, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint 3 for ownership,
possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare
two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal
share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner
Ceferina de Ungria, defendants Avelino Gumban, Dolores Cagaitan, Zacasio
Poutan, PO1 Jonas Montales, Ignacio Olarte and alias Dory. Respondent
Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while the rest of
the respondents are their legitimate children. The documents they sought
to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including
Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by
Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the
Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio
in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to Dismiss4 (Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam)
on the following grounds: (1) the claim or demand has been extinguished by
virtue of the valid sale of Lot No. 1615 to Eugenio; (2) the action is barred by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription; (3) the action is barred by laches; and
(4) plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, or filed the case prematurely for
failure to resort to prior barangay conciliation proceedings.
Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss5 raising the
following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and
(2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay
the filing fee in full. Respondents filed their Opposition thereto.
On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 denying the motion to
dismiss, to wit:
After the motion to dismiss and its addendum have been received, it is now
ripe for resolution. One of the grounds alleged in the complaint is for the
recovery of conjugal share on Lot No. 1615, of Pls-209 D with damages.
It is alleged that the late Fernando Castor and Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor
were married on September 15, 1952, and the application to the land was
dated January 17, 1952 and the patent was issued by the President on
November 19, 1954.
The said land was sold to the defendant on October 3, 1960 (Annex C) and
an Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 which was made a
part thereof as Annex "D." Considering the marriage of September 15, 1992,
the said land became conjugal as of the date of the marriage and, therefore,
½ thereof belongs to the wife, Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor.
Thus, considering the above, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. 7
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which the RTC
denied in an Order9 dated February 4, 2000.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion10 asking the RTC to resolve the issues of
(1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the
records pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the
findings contained in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in
abeyance the submission of the answer to the complaint.
Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow 11
them to continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants.
On March 8, 2000, the RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion in an Order 12 that
read in this wise:
On the omnibus motion regarding filing fees, the plaintiffs asserted in its
motion that they are charging defendant actual and compensatory damages
such as are proved during the hearing of this case. So also are attorney’s fees
and moral damages, all to be proved during the hearing of this case.
Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic) to
determine how much is to be charged.
At any rate, if after hearing the Clerk of Court determine that the filing fees
is still insufficient, considering the total amount of the claim, the Clerk of
Court should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must
require the private respondent to pay the same x x x.
As to the second issue, the same has already been decided in its order
dated February 4, 2000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the omnibus motion is DENIED.
The defendant shall file their answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this order.13
From this Order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
clarification on whether plaintiffs should be allowed to continue prosecuting
the case as indigent litigants.
On March 30, 2000, the RTC issued a Clarificatory Order14 reading as follows:
As has been said, the plaintiff asserted in its motion that they are charging
defendants actual and compensatory damages as has been proved during
the hearing of this case. So also are attorney's fees and moral damages all
to be proved during the hearing of this case.
Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic) to
determine how much is to be charged.
At any rate, after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is
still insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that
may be entered.
As to the motion seeking from the Honorable Court allowance to allow
plaintiff to continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants, suffice it to
say that the same is already provided for in this order.
WHEREFORE, the defendants shall file their answer within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Order.15
In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated
November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.
In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS
found that SC Circular No. 7 would not apply where the amount of damages DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET
or value of the property was immaterial; that the Circular could be applied FEES.
only in cases where the amount claimed or the value of the personal
property was determinative of the court's jurisdiction citing the case of THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte.16 The CA found that respondents ACTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS BARRED BY LACHES AND
had paid the corresponding docket fees upon the filing of the complaint, EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.18
thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the failure to
state the amount of damages claimed in the body of the complaint or in the We find the petition without merit.
prayer thereof. The CA found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's
Preliminarily, although not raised as an issue in this petition, we find it
motion to dismiss. It noted that the RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March
necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
30, 2000, which stated that "if after hearing the Clerk of Court determines
case. Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa
that the filing fee is still insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on
Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already
the judgment that may be entered" was in accordance with the rule laid
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion.17 The CA proceeded to state
of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
that a judicious examination of the complaint pointed to a determination of
Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.19 Section 1 of RA
the respective rights and interests of the parties over the property based on
7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive
the issues presented therein which could only be determined in a full-blown
original jurisdiction on the following actions:
trial on the merits of the case.
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as
Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the
follows:
defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. It
found that the subject property is covered by a Torrens title (OCT No. V-
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
19556); thus, it is axiomatic that adverse, notorious and continuous
exclusive original jurisdiction:
possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is
ineffective against a Torrens title; that unless there are intervening rights of
third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision directing (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
the return of the lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of laches will not incapable of pecuniary estimation;
apply as against the registered owner.
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
following assignment of errors: the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), except actions for
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
 Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA No. 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law (BP Blg. 129) is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, we would first
determine whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
case based on the above-quoted provisions.
The Complaint filed by respondents in the RTC was for ownership,
possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare
two documents as patent nullities and/or for recovery of conjugal share on
the subject land with damages or redemption of the subject land. In their
Complaint, respondents claimed that Rosario and Fernando are the
registered owners of the subject land with an assessed value of ₱12,780.00;
that the couple left the cultivation and enjoyment of the usufruct of the
subject land to Fernando's mother and her second family to augment their
means of livelihood; that respondent Rosario and Fernando thought that
when the latter's mother died in 1980, the subject land was in the
enjoyment of the second family of his mother, but later learned that the
subject land was leased by petitioner Ceferina; that sometime in August
1999, respondents learned of the existence of the Deed of Transfer of Rights
and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960, where
Fernando had allegedly transferred his rights and interests on the subject
land in favor of Eugenio, petitioner Ceferina's father, as well as an Affidavit
of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor
of petitioner Ceferina; that Fernando's signature in the Deed of Transfer was
not his but a forgery; and the Affidavit of Relinquishment was also void as it
was a direct result of a simulated Deed of Transfer.
Respondents prayed that they be declared as absolute and lawful owners of
the subject land and to order petitioner and the other defendants to vacate
the premises and restore respondents to its possession and enjoyment
therefore. On their second cause of action, they prayed that the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest Including Improvements Thereon be declared
as a forgery, purely simulated and without any consideration; hence,
inexistent, void ab initio and/or a patent nullity, as well as the Affidavit of
Relinquishment which was the direct result of the Deed of Transfer.
Respondents also prayed in the alternative that if the Deed be finally upheld
as valid, to order petitioner to reconvey to respondent Rosario the
undivided one-half portion of the subject land as conjugal owner thereof
and to account and reimburse her of its usufruct; and/or to allow them to
redeem the subject land.
It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of recovery
of possession and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real
action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was
₱12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since it is a real action
with an assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00, the case would fall under
the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided under the above-quoted Section 33
(3) of BP 129, as amended.
Notably, however, respondents in the same Complaint filed alternative
causes of action assailing the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest executed by Fernando in favor of petitioner's father. Respondents SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive
also sought for the reconveyance to respondent Rosario of the undivided counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or
one-half portion of the subject land as conjugal owner thereof in case the for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a
Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest will be upheld as valid; and/or for complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the
redemption of the subject land. Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property
action which comprehends more than the issue of possession of, or any in litigation, is:
interest in the real property under contention, but includes an action to
annul contracts and reconveyance which are incapable of pecuniary xxxx
estimation and, thus, properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC. 20
(b) For filing:
In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,21 we held that:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first cannot be estimated ........ ₱400.00
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
2. x x x
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
and shall be the basis in computing the fees.25
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not
(now Regional Trial Courts).22 susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of
the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the
subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be
Thus, respondents correctly filed their Complaint with the RTC.
based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal
Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of ₱400.00
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the
was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by
complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and
the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the
filing fees.23 It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint.
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests
Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
terminated. 26
action.24
Notably, petitioner’s claim that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction in this
Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
case is premised on her contention that respondents violated SC Circular No.
7 issued on March 24, 1998 requiring that all complaints must specify the
amount of damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in
the prayer to be accepted and admitted for filing. Petitioner argues that
respondents alleged in paragraph 13 of their Complaint that:
(T)he reasonable rental for the use of the [subject] land is ₱2,000.00 per
hectare, every crop time, once every four months, or ₱6,000.00 a year per
hectare; that defendants in proportion and length of time of their respective
occupancy is and/or are jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs of the
produce thereby in the following proportions, viz: (a) for defendant Ceferina
de Ungria for a period of time claimed by her as such; (b) for defendants
Dolores Cagautan, a certain alias "Dory," and PO1 Jonas Montales, of an
undetermined area, the latter having entered the area sometime in 1998
and defendant alias "Dory," only just few months ago; that defendant
Ignacio Olarte and Zacasio Puutan of occupying about one-half hectare
each.27
and in their prayer asked:
x x x Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, in proportion to the
length and area of their respective occupancy, to pay reasonable rentals to
the plaintiffs in the proportion and amount assessed in paragraph 13 of the
First Cause of Action.
xxxx
(a) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs
actual and compensatory damages such as are proved during the
hearing of this case;
(b) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs
attorneys' fees and moral damages, all to be proved during the
hearing of this case.28
Thus, the RTC should have dismissed the case, since respondents did not
specify the amount of damages in their prayer.
We are not persuaded.
SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 29 where we held that a
pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being
asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,30 we laid down the
following guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said
lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Subsequently, in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,31 we said:
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment of
damages "in amounts justified by the evidence" does not call for the
dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated March 24,
1988 which required that all complaints must specify the amount of
damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer
in order to be accepted and admitted for filing. Sun Insurance effectively
modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for damages and
awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally
granted by the trial court.
x x x judgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as
may be proven during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees
which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It would then be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his duly-authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees. 32
A reading of the allegations in the complaint would show that the amount
of the rental due can only be determined after a final judgment, since there
is a need to show supporting evidence when the petitioner and the other
defendants started to possess the subject land. Thus, we find no reversible
error committed by the CA when it ruled that there was no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC in issuing its Order dated March 30, 2000,
where the RTC stated that "since there was no hearing yet, respondents are
not in a position to determine how much is to be charged and that after
hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still insufficient,
the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered."
Petitioner claims that the action is barred by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription and laches. Petitioner contends that she took possession of the
land in the concept of an owner, open, exclusive, notorious and continuous
since 1952 through her predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio, and by herself up
to the present; that the late Fernando and private respondents had never
taken possession of the land at any single moment; and that, granting
without admitting that the transfer of rights between Fernando and Eugenio
was null and void for any reason whatsoever, petitioner's possession of the
land had already ripened into ownership after the lapse of 30 years from
August 1952 by virtue of the extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
We are not persuaded.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land
in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.33 Prescription is unavailing not only
against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. 34 In
this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled property, i.e., titled
in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.
Petitioner claims that respondent had impliedly admitted the fact of sale by
Fernando to Eugenio in August 1952, but only according to respondents, the
sale was null and void because it violated the provisions of the Public Land
Act. Petitioner argues that the application of Fernando, dated January 17,
1952, was not the homestead application referred to in Sections 118 and
124 of the Public Land Act; and that Fernando's application was only as
settler, or for the allocation of the subject land to him vice the original settler
Cadiente.
Such argument does not persuade.
The trial in this case has not yet started as in fact no answer has yet been
filed. We find that these issues are factual which must be resolved at the
trial of this case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.
Anent petitioner's defense of laches, the same is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. Without solid
evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss respondents'
complaint.35 Notably, the allegations of respondents in their petition filed
before the RTC which alleged among others:
7. That sometime between the years 1965 to 1970, defendant
Ceferina de Ungria, accompanied by Miss Angela Jagna-an,
appeared in the residence of plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de
Castor in Bo.1, Banga, South Cotabato, and requested her to sign
a folded document with her name only appearing thereon, telling
her that it has something to do with the land above-described, of
which she refused telling her that she better return it to the x x x x36
person who requested her to do so (referring to her mother-in-
law), more so that her husband was out at that time; would not conclusively establish laches.1avvphil Thus, it is necessary for
petitioners to proceed to trial and present controverting evidence to prove
8. That when the matter was brought home to Fernando Castor, the elements of laches.
the latter just commented that [his] mother desires the land
above-described to be sold to defendant Ceferina de Ungria which WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
however he was opposed to do so even as they occasionally come
into heated arguments everytime this insistence on the same SO ORDERED.
subject propped up;

9. That even after the death of the mother of the late Fernando
Castor in Bo. Bula, City of General Santos, sometime in 1980, the
latter and his surviving wife thought all the while that the land
above-described was in the enjoyment of his late mother's family
with his 2nd husband; that it was only after sometime when
plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor heard that the land above-
described had even been leased by defendant Ceferina de Ungria
with the Stanfilco and Checkered farm;

10. That sometime in 1997, defendant Ceferina de Ungria sent

overtures to plaintiffs through Ester Orejana, who is the half
sister-in-law of plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor that she
desires to settle with them relating to the land above-described;
that the overtures developed into defendant Ceferina de Ungria
meeting for the purpose plaintiff Ferolyn Castor Facurib where the
negotiation continued with Lolita Javier as attorney-in-fact after
defendant Ceferina de Ungria left to reside in Manila and which
resulted later to the attorney-in-fact offering the plaintiffs
₱100,000.00 to quitclaim on their rights over the said land, which
offer, however, was refused by plaintiffs as so [insignificant] as
compared to the actual value of the same land; that in that
negotiation, defendant Ceferina de Ungria was challenged to
show any pertinent document to support her claim on the land in
question and where she meekly answered by saying at the time
that she does not have any of such document;
 Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision14[1] dated 22
November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94800. The Court
of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Order15[2] dated 24
March 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City, in
THIRD DIVISION Civil Case No. RTC-2006-0030, ordering petitioner Ruby Shelter Builders
and Realty Development Corporation to pay additional docket/filing fees,
G.R. No. 175914 : February 10, 2009
computed based on Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, amended. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner, vs. HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court Branch 21, Naga City, as Pairing Judge for Regional
Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly Presided By HON. NOVELITA VILLEGAS-
LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May 2006), ROMEO Y. TAN, ROBERTO L. OBIEDO
and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES, Respondents. The present Petition arose from the following facts:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
DECISION

Petitioner obtained a loan16[3] in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
respondents Romeo Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured
by real estate mortgages over five parcels of land, all located in Triangulo,
Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 38376,17[4] Deeds of Absolute Sale would be uniformly dated 2 January 2006, and state
No. 29918,18[5] No. 38374,19[6] No. 39232,20[7] and No. 39225,21[8] that petitioner sold to respondents Tan and Obiedo the parcels of land for
issued by the Registry of Deeds for Naga City, in the name of petitioner. the following purchase prices: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When petitioner was unable to pay the loan when it became due and
demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an extension of the
TCT No. Purchase Price
same. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
38376 P 9,340,000.00

29918 P 28,000,000.00

38374 P 12,000,000.00
In a Memorandum of Agreement22[9] dated 17 March 2005, respondents
39232 P 1,600,000.00
Tan and Obiedo granted petitioner until 31 December 2005 to settle its
39225 P 1,600,000.00
indebtedness, and condoned the interests, penalties and surcharges
accruing thereon from 1 October 2004 to 31 December 2005 which chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

amounted to P74,678,647.00. The Memorandum of Agreement required, in

turn, that petitioner execute simultaneously with the said Memorandum, by
way of dacion en pago, Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan Petitioner could choose to pay off its indebtedness with individual or all five
and Obiedo, covering the same parcels of land subject of the mortgages. The parcels of land; or it could redeem said properties by paying respondents
Tan and Obiedo the following prices for the same, inclusive of interest and
penalties: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Memorandum of Agreement further provided that should petitioner

contest, judicially or otherwise, any act, transaction, or event related to or
TCT No. Redemption Price
necessarily connected with the said Memorandum and the Deeds of
38376 P 25,328,939.00
Absolute Sale involving the five parcels of land, it would pay respondents
29918 P 35,660,800.00
Tan and Obiedo P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages inclusive of costs and
38374 P 28,477,600.00 attorneys fees. Petitioner would likewise pay respondents Tan and Obiedo
39232 P 6,233,381.00 the condoned interests, surcharges and penalties.23[10] Finally, should a
39225 P 6,233,381.00 contest arise from the Memorandum of Agreement, Mr. Ruben Sia (Sia),
President of petitioner corporation, personally assumes, jointly and
severally with petitioner, the latters monetary obligation to respondent Tan
and Obiedo. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the event that petitioner is able to redeem any of the afore-mentioned
parcels of land, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the said property shall
be nullified and have no force and effect; and respondents Tan and Obiedo
shall then return the owners duplicate of the corresponding TCT to Respondent Atty. Tomas A. Reyes (Reyes) was the Notary Public who
petitioner and also execute a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage. However, if notarized the Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 March 2005 between
petitioner is unable to redeem the parcels of land within the period agreed respondent Tan and Obiedo, on one hand, and petitioner, on the other.
upon, respondents Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds of chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Absolute Sale covering the same to the Office of the Register of Deeds for
Naga City so respondents Tan and Obiedo could acquire TCTs to the said
properties in their names. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioner, represented by Mr.
Sia, executed separate Deeds of Absolute Sale,24[11] over the five parcels
of land, in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo. On the blank spaces
provided for in the said Deeds, somebody wrote the 3 rd of January 2006 as
the date of their execution. The Deeds were again notarized by respondent
Atty. Reyes also on 3 January 2006. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Without payment having been made by petitioner on 31 December 2005,
respondents Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated 3
January 2006 before the Register of Deeds of Naga City on 8 March 2006, as
a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of land
in their names. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 16 March 2006, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint25[12]
against respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity
of deeds of sales and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the basis of the facts already recounted above, petitioner raised two
causes of action in its Complaint. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As for the first cause of action, petitioner alleged that as early as 27
December 2005, its President already wrote a letter informing respondents
Tan and Obiedo of the intention of petitioner to pay its loan and requesting
a meeting to compute the final amount due. The parties held meetings on 3
and 4 January 2006 but they failed to arrive at a mutually acceptable
computation of the final amount of loan payable. Respondents Tan and
Obiedo then refused the request of petitioner for further dialogues.
Unbeknownst to petitioner, despite the ongoing meetings, respondents Tan
and Obiedo, in evident bad faith, already had the pre-executed Deeds of
Absolute Sale notarized on 3 January 2006 by respondent Atty. Reyes. Atty.
Reyes, in connivance with respondents Tan and Obiedo, falsely made it
appear in the Deeds of Absolute Sale that Mr. Sia had personally
acknowledged/ratified the said Deeds before Atty. Reyes.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In support of its second cause of action, petitioner narrated in its Complaint
that on 18 January 2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly took over,
with the use of armed men, possession of the five parcels of land subject of
the falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale and fenced the said properties with
Asserting that the Deeds of Absolute Sale over the five parcels of land were
barbed wire. Beginning 3 March 2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo started
executed merely as security for the payment of its loan to respondents Tan
demolishing some of the commercial spaces standing on the parcels of land
and Obiedo; that the Deeds of Absolute Sale, executed in accordance with
in question which were being rented out by petitioner. Respondents Tan and
the Memorandum of Agreement, constituted pactum commisorium and as
Obiedo were also about to tear down a principal improvement on the
such, were null and void; and that the acknowledgment in the Deeds of
properties consisting of a steel-and-concrete structure housing a motor
Absolute Sale were falsified, petitioner averred: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
vehicle terminal operated by petitioner. The actions of respondents Tan and
Obiedo were to the damage and prejudice of petitioner and its
tenants/lessees. Petitioner, alone, claimed to have suffered at least
P300,000.00 in actual damages by reason of the physical invasion by
13.That by reason of the fraudulent actions by the [herein
respondents], [herein petitioner] is prejudiced and is now respondents Tan and Obiedo and their armed goons of the five parcels of
in danger of being deprived, physically and legally, of the land. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
mortgaged properties without benefit of legal processes
such as the remedy of foreclosure and its attendant
procedures, solemnities and remedies available to a
mortgagor, while [petitioner] is desirous and willing to pay
its obligation and have the mortgaged properties
Ultimately, petitioners prayer in its Complaint reads:
released.26[13] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, G.R. No. 158121
prayed of this Honorable Court that upon the filing of this SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-
complaint, a 72-hour temporary restraining order be PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA,
forthwith issued ex parte: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO
P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS
(a)Restraining [herein respondents] Tan and Obiedo, their LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P.
agents, privies or representatives, from committing act/s CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA,
tending to alienate the mortgaged properties from the BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA Present:
[herein petitioner] pending the resolution of the case, P. CONCHA-NUNAG,
including but not limited to the acts complained of in Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
paragraph 14, above; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
– versus – CORONA, and
AZCUNA, JJ.
(b)Restraining the Register of Deeds of Naga City from SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO[1]
entertaining moves by the [respondents] to have and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA
[petitioners] certificates of title to the mortgaged J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND
properties cancelled and changed/registered in SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO Promulgated:
[respondents] Tans and Obiedos names, and/or released and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,[2]
to them; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Respondents. December 12, 2007
x––––––––––––––––––—––––––––––––x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the
(c)After notice and hearing, that a writ of preliminary
decision[3] and resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -
injunction be issued imposing the same restraints
G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions[5] and order[6] of
indicated in the next preceding two paragraphs of this the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil
prayer; and chanroblesvirtual Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate
motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the respondents.
The relevant facts are undisputed.
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr.,
claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No.
5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196 -A (Civil Case No.
5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196 -B and 7529-A
(Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141),
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings
Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda.
de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case
No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the
subject lots.
The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr. [7] and
his children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Ed uardo, Alberto,
Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha,
filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title
with Damages against “Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and
Bienvenida Guya.” They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX -
8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-22556 issued in the name of “Gregorio Lumocso” covering
Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City,
Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended
Complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX -8)985 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and
void ab initio;
2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122 -hectare as
private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141
otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA
1942;
3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the
properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 h ectares
in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the
decision in this case and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of
Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the
defendant[s] themselves;
4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for
the 21 forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages;
P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 for litigation
expenses; and to pay the cost of the proce edings;
5. Declaring the confiscated three ( sic) flitches kept in
the area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a
total volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff
[they] being cut, collected and taken from the l and possessed,
preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;
6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and
remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.[8]
On September 3, 1999, two separate complain ts for
Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners,[9] this
time against “Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan” for a one -hectare
portion of Lot No. 6196 -A and “Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and
Balbina T. Lomocso” for a one -hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196 -
B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9
of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433
and 5434,
respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that
judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 619 6-A titled under OCT (P23527)
4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion
of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B)
CA 141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT ( sic) as amended by
RA No. 1942;
2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1)
hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of
the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in
this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888,
located at its Western portion and if she refuse ( sic), ordering
the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed
of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the
defenda[n]t herself;
3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees
illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay
the cost of the proceedings.[10]
In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be
rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529 -A under OCT (P -23207)
12870 and Lot 6196 -B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one
hectare located as ( sic) the western portion of said lots as
private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.]
141 otherwise know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended
by RA 1942;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of on e
(1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question in
favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of th e
decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P -23207)
12870 and OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its
Western portion and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court
of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance
with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants
themselves[;]
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6) forest
trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for
Attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and t o pay
the cost of the proceedings.[11]
The three complaints[12] commonly alleged: a) that on May 21,
1958, petitioners’ parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea
Concha) acquired by homestead a 24 -hectare parcel of land
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses
Concha “painstakingly preserved” the forest in the 24 -hectare
land, including the excess four (4) hectares “untitled forest land”
located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess
4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195, one -hectare
portion of Lot No. 6196 -A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos.
6196-B and 7529-A) “continuously, publicly, notoriously,
adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the ( sic)
owner since 1931;” d) that they c ontinued possession and
occupation of the 4 -hectare land after the death of Dorotea
Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12,
1999; e) that the Concha spouses “have preserved the forest
trees standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion o f the
defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931” up to
November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for
Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, “by force,
intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered the premises,
illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed” of 21 trees (for Civil Case
No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil
Case No. 5434); f) that “the land is private land or that even
assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had alr eady
acquired imperfect title thereto” under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No.
141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that
respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No.
6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subjec t
lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer
in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents
“surreptitiously” filed free patent applications over the lots
despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i)
that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey
over the lots never informed them of the
survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents’
applications; j) that respondents’ free patents and th e
corresponding OCTs were issued “on accou nt of fraud, deceit,
bad faith and misrepresentation”; and k) that the lots in
question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of
the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the
complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for
reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment,
laches and estoppel.[13] On the issue of jurisdiction,
respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
(B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the
assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,[14] contending that the instant cases
involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of
pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two
main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the
value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of
the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls
within the exclusive origina l jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of
respondents.[15] The respondents filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration,[16] to no avail.[17]
Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance
of Restraining Order Ex Parte[18] with the CA, docketed as CA -
G.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,[19] the CA reversed the
resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even
assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same
have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled
that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in
ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed
as they involve titles issued for at least twenty -two (22) years
prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it
unnecessary to resolve the other issues.
Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following
issues, viz:
FIRST – WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN REVERSING THE
ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY
COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD
BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVID ENTIARY MATTERS.
SECOND – WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
THIRD – WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW
THAT PETITIONERS OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST
PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE
TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
FOURTH – WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
(FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ THEREIN FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE
COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM
AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).[20]
In their memorandum,[21] respondent s reiterated their
arguments in the courts below that: a) the complaints of the
petitioners in the trial court do not state causes of action for
reconveyance; b) assuming the complaints state causes of
action for reconveyance, the same have already been barred by
prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for
reconveyance in the complaints are barred by waiver,
abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by laches and
estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting a review
by this Court.
Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution
of the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved
to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental
Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.[22]
In their Supplemental Memorandum,[23] petitioners contend
that the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and
as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or
annulment or cancellation of OCT s and damages. The cases
allegedly involve more than just the issue of
title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to
respondents and the reconveyance of the subject properties
were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under
Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has
jurisdiction “[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.” Petitioners
cited: a) Raymundo v. CA[24] which set the criteria for
determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation; b) Swan v. CA[25]Santos v. CA[26] where it was
similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and
damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d)
Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v.
CA[27]P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has
jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. where it was held
that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of
the RTC; c) where it was held that “[w]here the action affects
title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the
property is located.” Petitioners also contend that while it may
be argued that the assessed values of the subject properties ar e
within the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC),
they have included in their prayers “any interest included
therein” consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut
by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the
properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the
estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by
petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos (
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the genera l class to which the proceedings in
question belong.[28] It is conferred by law and an objection
based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.[29] To
determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it is important to d etermine the nature of the
cause of action and of the relief sought.[30]
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve
actions for reconveyance.[31] An action for reconveyance
respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seek s
the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in other persons’ names, to its rightful
and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better
right.[32] There is no special ground for an action for
reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal
claim on the property superior to that of the registered
owner[33] and that the property has not yet passed to the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value.[34]
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify
an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common
allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to
constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his
spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] th e
forest standing in the area [of their 24 -hectare homestead]
including the four hectares untitled forest land located at th e
eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly
married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or
possession;[35]
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha
have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of
land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other
persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No.
5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when
defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly
entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total
of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty -two
(22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case
No. 5434] of various sizes;[36]
(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land
or that even assuming it was part o f the public domain, plaintiff
had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of
[C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as
amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];[37]
(d) That [respondents and their predecessors -in-interest knew
when they] surreptitiously filed[38] [their respective patent
applications and were issued their respective] free patents and
original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the
petitioners];[39]
(e) [That respondents’ free patents an d the corresponding
original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud,
deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;[40] and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent
purchaser.[41]
These cases may also be considered as ac tions to remove cloud
on one’s title as they are intended to procure the cancellation
of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners’ alleged title
which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their
alleged title.[42]
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to
remove cloud on one’s title, the applicable law to determine
which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ( P50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are
less than P20,000.00, to wit:
Civil Case No. Lot No. Assessed Value
5188 6195 P1,030.00
5433 6196-A 4,500.00
5434 6196-B 4,340.00
7529-A 1,880.00.[43]
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners’ contention that this case is one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation under the exclusive o riginal jurisdiction of
the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
reconveyance[44] of or for cancellation of title[45] to or to quiet
title[46] over real property are actions that fall u nder th e
classification of cases that involve “title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein.”
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its
forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,[47] as amended, gave the
RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original
jurisdiction “[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A.
296, as amended).” Thus, under the old law, there was no
substantial effect on ju risdiction whether a case is one, the
subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation,
under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property
under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes
became crucial with the am endment introduced by R.A. No.
7691[48]where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos ( P20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos ( P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs.” Thus, under the present law, original
jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves “title
to, possession of, real property or any in terest therein” under
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second
level courts, with the assessed value of the real property
involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to
“unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result
in the speedier administration of justice.”[49] in 1994 which
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts to include “all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein
The cases of Raymundo v. CA[50] and Commodities Storage and
ICE Plant Corporation v. CA, [51] relied upon by the petitioners,
are inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a
complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance
or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the
case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering
petitioner’s contention that the pecuniary claim of the
complaint was only attorney’s fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC
had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining
whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated
the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction
of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The claim for attorney’s fees was merely incidental
to the principal action, hence, said amount was not value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ( P50,000.00).” It is tru e
determinative of the court’s jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject
Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to properties may be included in the term “any interest
petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was therein.” However, the law is emphatic that in determining
venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the
accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on realty involved that should be computed.[54] In this case, there
October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties
resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that “[w]here the as shown by their tax declarations are less than
action affects title to property, it should be instituted in th e P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs
[RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & not to the RTC but to the MTC.
Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid.” hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no
jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.
Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA[52] and Santos v. CA[53] cited No costs.
by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature SO ORDERED.
of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The
complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being
one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction
under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly
held that the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and
damages is also one that involves title to and possession of real
property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court
held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified act ions
for “annulment of title” and “cancellation of title, reversion and
damages” as civil actions that involve “title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein” under Section 19(2) of
B.P. 129.
Petitioners’ contention that the value of t he trees cut in the
subject properties constitutes “any interest therein (in the
subject properties)” that should be computed in addition to the
respective assessed values of the subject properties is
unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R .A. No.
7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction “in all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
 [G.R. No. 152526. November 25, 2004]

RAMON R. JIMENEZ JR. and ANNABELLE L. JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. JUAN

JOSE JORDANA, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Oft-repeated is the doctrine that the cause of action in a civil case is

determined by the allegations of the complaint, never by those of the
defendants answer. However, ambiguities and lapses in the language of
these allegations may be understood or clarified through a recourse to the
annexes of the complaint, related pleadings or other submissions of the
plaintiff.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

assailing the February 28, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 66455. The CA disposed as follows:
In fine, then, we find and so declare that the [respondent]
had a cause of action against the [petitioner spouses] for Specific
Performance and Damages. Hence, the [c]ourt a quo committed
a reversible error in dismissing the Supplement to Amended
Complaint of the [respondent] as against the [petitioner
spouses].
Before we write finis to the present recourse, we stress that
our resolution of the issue on the nature of the transaction over
the property between the [respondent] and x x x Bunye is merely
provisional. The final resolution of the issue will have to be
rendered by the court a quo after the parties shall have adduced
their respective evidence on said issue.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Order of the [c]ourt a quo, dated February 1,
2000, is SET ASIDE. Let the records be remanded to the [c]ourt a
quo for further proceedings.[3]
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
Madeliene S. Bunye was the owner of a parcel of residential
land, located in Adelfa Street, Ayala Alabang Village, Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 17133 issued by the Register of Deeds. On December
27, 1993, [Respondent] Juan Jose Jordana wrote a letter to x x x
Bunye offering to purchase the said property for the price of
P12,300,000.00 payable in cash, on January 31, 1994, and to
remit to her, by way of earnest money, the amount of
P500,000.00 within five (5) days from his receipt of her
acceptance of said offer. On December 28, 1993, x x x Bunye
wrote a letter to [respondent] informing the latter that she
accepted his offer and requesting him to remit the earnest money
within five (5) days from his receipt of said letter. [Respondent]
received the letter, on December 29, 1993, and had until January
3, 1994 within which to remit the earnest money. [Respondent]
did remit the P500,000.00 earnest money but x x x Bunye refused
to receive the money. On January 3, 1994, x x x Bunye wrote a
letter to [respondent] confirming her rejection of the earnest
money and that she can no longer accept his offer of
P12,300,000.00 as her property was worth much more. She
apologized for any inconvenience caused to him. However, she
added that she would be willing to sell her property to him for
P16,000,000.00.
Unknown to [respondent], x x x Bunye executed a Special
Power of Attorney on December 29, 1993, or a day after [she]
accepted [his] offer to purchase the property, authorizing
Lourdes Cuerva to sell the said property and to execute the
appropriate contract therefor. The latter did offer to sell the said
property to the [petitioners,] Spouses Ramon R. Jimenez, Jr. and
Annabelle L. Jimenez, for the price of P14,350,000.00, and the
couple agreed. On August 5, 1994, x x x Bunye, through her
attorney-in-fact, Lourdes Cuerva, as Seller, and [petitioner-
]spouses x x x as Buyers, executed a Contract to Sell over the said
property for said price, of which P4,500,000.00 was payable,
upon the execution of said deed, and the balance payable on or
before March 30, 1995 and with the understanding of the Seller
that:
2. Upon completion of payment, the SELLER
agrees to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over subject
property in favor of the BUYERS free from all liens and
encumbrances, and in connection therewith, the
SELLER agrees to submit/surrender to the BUYERS all
documents and papers evidencing their right of
ownership over the property subject of this Contract
necessary to formalize BUYERS title over the same, and
undertake to sign all documents that may be necessary
for the purpose.
Conformably with the said deed, [petitioner-spouses]
remitted to x x x Cuerva, on August 5, 1994, the amount of
P4,500,000.00 as downpayment for the property for which x x x
Cuerva issued a Receipt. To protect their rights over the
property, the spouses x x x executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim over the property and had the same annotated, on August
15, 1994, at the dorsal portion of Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT]
No. 171333.
On March 1, 1995, [petitioners] wrote a letter to x x x Cuerva
informing her that they will be paying the balance of the purchase
price of the property earlier, on March 3, 199[5], at 8:00 oclock in
the morning, x x x.
 On March 7, 1995, [petitioners] received a letter from x and that no formal deed of sale has been executed between
x x Cuerva informing [them] that she was no longer the [respondent] and Bunye over the property.
attorney-in-fact of Bunye, who was then in the United States
On the same day, Bunye wrote a letter to [petitioners]
of America and suggested that [petitioners] communicate
informing them that she will be in the Philippines on March 23,
with her at her address in the United States stated in the
1995. [Bunye] requested the spouses to have the Deed of
letter.
Absolute Sale over the property prepared for her signature when
On March 10, 1995, the Register of Deeds cancelled the she arrived in Manila.
Adverse Claim of [petitioners] annotated at the dorsal portion of
On March 17, 1995, [respondent], through counsel, wrote a
[TCT] No. 171333.
letter to x x x Bunye in the United States informing her of the
On March 14, 1995, [petitioners] wrote a letter to Bunye, in filing, by [respondent] of his complaint against her, with the
the United States of America, informing her that they had already Regional Trial Court, for Specific Performance.
deposited the balance of the purchase price of the property, in
In the meantime, on March 19, 1995, [petitioners] wrote a
her account, with the Asian Bank, Greenbelt Branch, under
Savings Account No. 2006-13-00558-4. [They then] requested letter to Madeliene S. Bunye suggesting that she execute a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing Lourdes Cuerva to execute
Bunye to execute the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale over the
the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in their favor even
property in their favor and deliver to them the owners duplicate
before her arrival in the Philippines. Bunye agreed to the
of the title to the property under their names, within five (5) days
from her receipt thereof. appointment of an attorney-in-fact, in the person of Ernesto del
Rosario.
On March 15, 1995, or more than one (1) year from the
When Bunye received the letter of the counsel of
rejection by Bunye of his proferred earnest money, [Respondent]
[respondent], she wrote a letter to [petitioners], dated March 23,
Jordana filed a complaint against Bunye, with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, entitled and docketed as Juan Jose Jordana, 1995, informing them of the claim of [respondent] in his
complaint and that, as soon as she received the Special Power of
Plaintiff versus Madeliene S. Bunye, Defendant, Civil Case No.
Attorney from the Secretary of the State of Washington, she will
95-443, for Specific Performance and Damages praying that,
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor x x x. return to the Philippines.
In the meantime, [respondent] filed, on March 24, 1995, in
[Respondent] alleged, inter alia, in his complaint, that he
Civil Case No. 95-443, a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, praying
and x x x Bunye had already entered into a perfected contract
that an x x x an Order [be] immediately issued directing the
over the property but that, despite his demand, she refused to
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property despite his Register of Deeds of Makati to immediately annotate the [Notice
of] Lis Pendens on TCT No. 171333.
offer to remit the earnest money and his readiness to pay the
balance of the purchase price of the property. The summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 95-443 were
On March 15, 1995, [respondent] filed a Notice of Lis served on Bunye through her security guard, Joseph Ytac, on
March 23, 1995, as she was still in the United States of America.
Pendens with the Register of Deeds, for annotation at the dorsal
portion of [TCT] No. 171333. However, the Register of Deeds
refused claiming that the action of [respondent] was personal
 On March 28, 1995, [petitioners] filed, in Civil Case No. 95-
443, a Motion for Leave to Intervene x x x. However,
[respondent] opposed the motion x x x.
[Petitioners, on the other hand,] opposed the motion of
[respondent] to compel the Register of Deeds to annotate the
Notice of Lis Pendens at the dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 171333.
On March 30, 1995, [respondent] executed a Notice of
Adverse Claim and had the same annotated on March 31, 1995
at the dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 171333.
On April 5, 1995, [TCT] No. 171333 was cancelled on the
basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on March 30, 1995
by Bunye, pendente lite, in favor of [petitioners] and, on the same
day, the Register of Deeds issued [TCT] No. 200308 over the
property to and under the name of the said spouses. The
Adverse Claim of [respondent] was carried over in said title, x x x,
as Entry No. 18053.
On June 13, 1995, [petitioners] secured a loan from the
Urban Bank in the amount of P12,000,000.00 and executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over the said property, as security therefor
which deed was annotated, on June 14, 1995, at the dorsal
portion of [TCT] No. 200308.
On September 12, 1995, [respondent] filed an Amended
Complaint impleading the [petitioners] as Parties-Defendants x x
x.
[Petitioner] spouses x x x filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint on the grounds that the Amended
Complaint did not state a cause of action against them and [for]
laches. [Respondent] filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss of [the] spouses.
In the meantime, the Register of Deeds caused the
annotation, on October 24, 1995, of the Notice of Lis Pendens
filed by [respondent] at the dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 200308.
Before the Court could resolve the Motion to Dismiss of the
[petitioners], [respondent] filed a Motion for Leave to File
Supplement to Amended Complaint, impleading the Urban
Bank, as [p]arty-[d]efendant x x x.
On February 7, 1996, [respondent] filed his Supplement to
Amended Complaint x x x.
[Petitioners] filed an Opposition to [respondents]
motion. On July 2, 1996, the Court issued an Order granting the
motion of [respondent] and admitting [his] Supplement to
Amended Complaint. [Petitioners] filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order of the Court. [Urban]
Bank likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss the Supplement to
Amended Complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of
action against it. [Respondent] filed an Opposition to the Motion
for Reconsideration of [petitioners] and the Motion to Dismiss of
the x x x bank. On February 1, 2000, the Court issued an Order
granting the Motion to Dismiss of [Urban] Bank and the Motion
for Reconsideration of [petitioners] on the ground that the
Amended Complaint and the Supplement to Amended Complaint
did not state causes of action against [them].[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the trial court had erred in dismissing the
Supplement to Amended Complaint. The appellate court held that
respondent alleged a sufficient cause of action against petitioners for the
recovery of the Adelfa property. The CA said that such action was real, not
personal.
Moreover, the appellate court held that respondent and Bunye had
entered into a Contract of Sale -- not a Contract to Sell -- which was
perfected by their mere consent thereto. Thus, Bunye was deemed to have
relinquished ownership of the property to respondent.
 Regarding the double sale of the property, the CA said that the spouses
could not have registered the second sale in good faith because they had
prior knowledge of respondents claim. It noted that even the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners had been executed during the pendency
of the Complaint.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
The trial court and the CA differed in characterizing the suit of
respondent. The RTC opined that he failed to allege against petitioners a
cause of action for specific performance. On the other hand, the appellate
court held that the action was actually for recovery of real property. Clearly
then, the crux of the present controversy is the nature and the sufficiency
of respondents cause of action against petitioner-spouses.
In resolving this issue, we shall begin with some basic rules and guiding
principles regarding cause of action, dismissal of suit, and the law on sales.

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Has Jordana alleged a sufficient cause of action against the
Spouses Jimenez?
2. Did Jordana and Bunye execute a contract of sale or a contract
to sell the subject property?
3. Did Jordana make a valid tender and consignation of payment
to Bunye?
4. Did the Spouses Jimenez register their title to the subject
property in good faith?
5. Is Jordana guilty of laches?[6]
Cause of Action
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.[7] It has the following elements: 1) the legal right
of the plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that
legal right; and 3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such
right.[8]
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought,[9] not by the defenses
asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.[10] Thus, the complaint must
contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts[11] constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action.[12]

The foregoing questions point to only one main issue: the nature and In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of
the sufficiency of respondents cause of action, if any. the material allegations of the plaintiffs complaint. This hypothetical
admission extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the
inferences fairly deducible from, the complaint.[13] Hence, to determine
whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a
The Courts Ruling cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged,
can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?[14]
The Petition has no merit. To sustain a motion to dismiss, the movant needs to show that the
plaintiffs claim for relief does not exist at all. On the contrary, the complaint
Main Issue:
is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though
Nature and Sufficiency
the allegations may be vague or indefinite, in which event, the proper
of Respondents Cause of Action
recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of
particulars.[15]
Generally, the court takes into account only the material allegations of
the complaint, without considering extraneous facts and circumstances. In
some cases, however, the court may also consider -- in addition to the
complaint -- annexes or documents appended to it, other pleadings of the
plaintiff, or admissions in the record.[16] It must then bear in mind that the
facts proving the existence of a cause of action do not have to be established
or alleged by the complaint and/or the other pleadings at the outset but,
under exceptional circumstances, even during the trial on the merits of the
case.[17]
Contracts of Sale
The elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil
Code are the following: (1) the parties consent or meeting of minds, (2) a
determinate subject matter, and (3) a price certain in money or its
equivalent. Being consensual, a contract of sale is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the buyer and the seller as to the object of the sale
and the cause or consideration.[18] From that moment on, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance; that is, the vendee may compel the
transfer of the ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may
require the vendee to pay the price of the thing sold.
We shall now apply the foregoing discussion to the issues at hand.
In the present case, the cause of action of respondent against
petitioners was premised on the material averments in the Complaint as
follows:
1. He offered to buy,[19] and Bunye agreed to sell[20] to him, the Adelfa
property for P12,300,000.
2. As agreed, he tendered to her the sum of P500,000 on January 3,
1994, but she refused to accept it.[21]
3. She informed him by letter, which he received on January 4, 1994,
that she could no longer accept the offer of P12,300,000, but that she was
willing to sell it for P16,000,000; thus, she was declining to receive the
P500,000 earnest money he had sent.[22]
4. There was a perfected contract of sale, which Bunye breached by
her unreasonable refusal to complete the sale.[23]
5. She unreasonably refused to heed his demand for compliance with
the contract, which she should be compelled to specifically perform.[24]
6. On or about March 30, 1995, she sold the same property to
petitioners, pursuant to which TCT No. 171333 was cancelled and TCT No.
200308 issued to the latter on April 3, 1995.[25]
7. Bunye and [the] Jimenezes should be compelled to execute a
contract or deed of sale over the subject property in [his] favor x x x which
complies with the requirements of Article 1358 of the Civil Code[26] that a
contract involving real rights over immovable property must appear in a
public document.[27]
8. As a result of Bunyes and the spouses unreasonable breach and
circumvention of the contract, he suffered actual damages.[28]
9. Having acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner, Bunye and petitioners should be ordered to pay
exemplary damages.[29]
10. Their acts or omissions have compelled him to litigate, for which
they must be ordered to reimburse attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.[30]
Specifically, respondent expressly prayed for a judgment ordering
Bunye and petitioners to immediately and specifically perform on the
contract to sell the subject property to [him] for P12,300,000.00;[31] to
execute a contract or deed of sale in [his] favor x x x over the subject
property;[32] and to pay him actual and exemplary damages plus attorneys
fees and litigation expenses.[33]
What appears from all these contentions is that the action rests upon
the basic hypothesis that, prior to the second sale and delivery to
petitioners, there was already a perfected sale of the Adelfa property to
respondent. Hence, Bunye was duty-bound to execute a deed of sale; and
petitioners, to reconvey the property to him. From this hypothesis sprang
the CAs conclusion that the suit against petitioners was for recovery of
property.
We agree with the appellate court. Indeed, what respondent
instituted against petitioners was a real action for the recovery of
property. It has been held that where a party makes a claim contrary to
ownership, and the relief prayed for cannot be granted without the court
deciding on who has a better right to the property, the suit is a real action.[34]
The correctness of the ruling as to the nature of the case, however,
answers only half of the issue. The other half is whether respondent has
alleged a sufficient cause of action for recovery of property against
petitioners. Like the CA, we find that he indeed has. There are at least three
reasons for this conclusion.
First, it is readily apparent that respondent has stated a demandable
right over the subject property. Assaying the allegations of the Supplement
to Amended Complaint -- allegations that were hypothetically admitted to
be correct for the purpose of the Motion to Dismiss -- he averred that
through an exchange of letters,[35] a definite offer and an unqualified
acceptance as to the object of the sale and the cause or consideration
therefor transpired between him and Bunye. Upon these allegations, a
contract of sale was deemed perfected as of December 29, 1993, the day he
received Bunyes letter of unqualified acceptance.[36] From that moment,
respondent acquired the legal right to compel the transfer of ownership of
the property to him.
Second, respondent has the right to compel petitioners to respect, not
violate, his rights as a prior buyer. His reference to the second sale to
petitioners -- in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Supplement to Amended
Complaint, in which he had alleged that they did not have any rightful or
valid title to the subject property[37] -- was only for the purpose of
underscoring that fact.
Third, despite the discrepancies and the linguistic lapses in the material
averments of the Supplement, the acts and/or the omissions that violated
respondents rights are fairly discernible from the records and the pleadings
of the plaintiff. They more than compensate for such shortcomings.
By intervening[38] in Civil Case No. 95-443, petitioners made of record -
- long before the Amended Complaint[39] and the Supplement to Amended
Complaint[40] -- the essential factual allegation that they had actual notice
and knowledge of the claim of respondent against Bunye; but that, just the
same, they proceeded to purchase the subject property. Also, upon such
intervention, the faxed messages between them and Bunye regarding
respondents Complaint were inscribed in the record of the case.
Likewise, the Oppositions[41] of respondent to the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners are heavy with
allegations of the latters actual notice and knowledge of the previous
sale. He averred thus:
4. In fact, Intervenors were officially notified on March 24,
1995 about plaintiffs earlier contract with Madeliene E. Bunye on
December 29, 1993 to purchase the same property. The sellers
refusal to honor the contract was highlighted in said letter which
prompted [respondent] to file this suit to enforce his contract
against [Bunye], docketed as Civil Case No. 94-443.
5. Earlier on March 15, 1995, a Notice of Lis Pendens was
filed by plaintiff before the Register of Deeds, Makati, Metro
Manila informing the Honorable Office of the pendency of a case
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-443 involving the property covered
by TCT No. 17133.
6. Based on these factual setting, it would readily reveal
that Intervenors are no longer buyers in good faith and as such
has no interest whatsoever against both [respondent] and
[Bunye] much more on the property in question covered by TCT
No. 171333 x x x.[42]
Clearly then, he has successfully shown their knowledge of his claim
prior to the actual sale of the property on March 30, 1995, before the
registration of the property in their names on April 3, 1995. In Voluntad v.
Spouses Dizon,[43] we explained as follows:
x x x. It is a settled rule that a purchaser of real estate with
knowledge of any defect or lack of title of the vendor cannot
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against
 the true owner of the land or interest therein. The same rule argue that the parties have no privity of contract. We stress that
applies to one with knowledge of facts which should have put him participation in a contract is not necessarily an element that determines the
on inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint existence of a cause of action.[49]
him with the defects in the title of his vendor. If circumstances
Having decided that the CA correctly ruled that respondent had a cause
exist that require a prudent man to investigate and he does not,
of action against petitioners, we deem it no longer necessary to take up the
he is deemed to have acted in mala fide. A partys mere refusal
to believe that a defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to other issues. These questions deal with evidentiary facts that need to be
finally resolved by the trial court after trial on the merits.
the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendors title will
not make him an innocent purchaser for value if it afterwards The Court must, however, emphasize the provisional nature of any
develops that the title was in fact defective. x x x.[44] ruling herein on the nature of the contract between respondent and Bunye,
Taken together, the allegations in the Complaint, the pleadings of the as we have premised such ruling only on the hypothetical admissions of
petitioners averments. Additionally, in determining that a cause of action
plaintiff and the record of the case sufficiently support a cause of action for
exists against petitioners, the Court has necessarily inquired only into the
recovery of property against petitioners. It is generally accepted that when
property belonging to a person is unlawfully or fraudulently taken by sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.[50] The truth of those
allegations, as well as petitioners defenses, can be determined only after the
another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery
parties have adduced their respective sets of evidence.
of the property.[45]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
Respondent himself recognizes that his causes of action against Bunye
and petitioners, which are subject to joinder under Section 5 of Rule 2 [46] of AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
the Rules of Court, are entirely different. Notably, he stated in his SO ORDERED.
Opposition[47] to Urban Banks Motion to Dismiss that his case was one for
specific performance by Bunye and reconveyance by the Jimenezes.
Certainly, as he seeks the consummation of the Contract of Sale by Bunye,
so also must he ensure the recovery of the property, which was allegedly
wrongfully registered in petitioners name.
His averments as to Bunye are inclined to support the conclusion that
there was a breach of contract. Such breach gives rise to a cause of action
for specific performance, the remedy he has chosen as against rescission.[48]
To this effect, he contends that Bunye must be compelled to complete the
sale, to execute the Deed of Sale in accordance with the requirements of
Article 1358 of the Civil Code, and to pay him actual damages for the breach
and the circumvention of the contract. Article 1475 of the Civil Code gives
the parties to a perfected contract of sale the right to reciprocally demand
performance and to observe a particular form, if warranted.
On the other hand, respondent is not suing petitioners for contractual
breach but for a recovery of property. It is not relevant, therefore, even to
G.R. No. 174497 October 12, 2009

HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE AURELIA CENSERO SEBE and LYDIA SEBE,

Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and TECHNOLOGY AND LIVELIHOOD
RESOURCE CENTER, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case concerns the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts over actions
involving real properties with assessed values of less than ₱20,000.00.

The Facts and the Case

In this petition for review on certiorari1 petitioners seek to reverse the

Order2 dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog
City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, for annulment of documents,
reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over an action where the
assessed value of the properties is less than ₱20,000.00. Petitioners asked
for reconsideration3 but the court denied it.4
On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and their
daughter, Lydia Sebe, (the Sebes) filed with the RTC of Dipolog City 5 a
complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla and Technology and
Livelihood Resources Center for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance
and Recovery of Possession of two lots, which had a total assessed value of
₱9,910.00, plus damages.6 On November 25, 1999 they amended their
complaint7 to address a deed of confirmation of sale that surfaced in
defendant Sevilla’s Answer8 to the complaint. The Sebes claimed that they
owned the subject lots but, through fraud, defendant Sevilla got them to
sign documents conveying the lots to him. In his Answer 9 Sevilla insisted that
he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular manner.
While the case was pending before the RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so
his wife and children substituted him.10 Parenthetically, with defendant
Veronico Sevilla’s death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in
this case.11
On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter considering that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought
was the reconveyance of title and possession over two lots that had a total
assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00. Under the law,12 said the RTC, it has
jurisdiction over such actions when the assessed value of the property
exceeds ₱20,000.00,13 otherwise, jurisdiction shall be with the first level
courts.14 The RTC concluded that the Sebes should have filed their action
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dipolog City.
On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration. They 15
pointed out that the RTC mistakenly classified their action as one involving
title to or possession of real property when, in fact, it was a case for the
annulment of the documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since
such an action for annulment was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it
squarely fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of
Batas Pambansa 129, as amended.
To illustrate their point, the Sebes drew parallelisms between their case and
the cases of De Rivera v. Halili16 and Copioso v. Copioso.17
The De Rivera involved the possession of a fishpond. The Supreme Court
there said that, since it also had to resolve the issue of the validity of the
contracts of lease on which the opposing parties based their rights of
possession, the case had been transformed from a mere detainer suit to one
that was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Under Republic Act 296 or the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, civil actions, which were incapable of
pecuniary estimation, came under the original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance (now the RTC).18 The Sebes pointed out that, like De Rivera,
the subject of their case was "incapable of pecuniary estimation" since they
asked the court, not only to resolve the dispute over possession of the lots,
but also to rule on the validity of the affidavits of quitclaim, the deeds of
confirmation of sale, and the titles over the properties.19 Thus, the RTC
should try the case.
The Copioso, on the other hand, involves the reconveyance of land the
assessed value of which was allegedly ₱3,770.00. The Supreme Court ruled
that the case comprehended more than just the title to, possession of, or
any interest in the real property. It sought the annulment of contracts,
reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages. In other
words, there had been a joinder of causes of action, some of which were
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, the case properly fell
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Here, petitioners argued that their case
had the same causes of actions and reliefs as those involved in Copioso.
Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over their case.
On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the Sebes’s motion for reconsideration,
pointing out that the Copioso ruling had already been overturned by
Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.20 Before the Huguete, cancellation of
titles, declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and partition were actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the jurisdiction over
actions of this nature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the
properties. In this case, the MTC had jurisdiction because the assessed value
of the lots did not exceed ₱20,000.00.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the Sebes’s action involving the two
lots valued at less than ₱20,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Court’s Ruling
Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular
action is determined by the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint and the
principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction
of courts.21
The gist of the Sebes’s complaint is that they had been the owner for over
40 years of two unregistered lots22 in Dampalan, San Jose, Dipolog City,
covered by Tax Declaration 012-239, with a total assessed value of
₱9,910.00.23 On June 3, 1991 defendant Sevilla caused the Sebes to sign
documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim.24 Being illiterate, they relied on
Sevilla’s explanation that what they signed were "deeds of real estate
mortgage" covering a loan that they got from him.25 And, although the
documents which turned out to be deeds conveying ownership over the two
lots to Sevilla for ₱10,000.0026 were notarized, the Sebes did not appear
before any notary public.27 Using the affidavits of quitclaim, defendant
Sevilla applied for28 and obtained free patent titles covering the two lots on
September 23, 1991.29 Subsequently, he mortgaged the lots to defendant
Technology and Livelihood Resource Center for ₱869,555.00.30
On December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale
covering the two lots.31 Upon closer examination, however, their signatures
had apparently been forged.32 The Sebes were perplexed with the reason
for making them sign such documents to confirm the sale of the lots when
defendant Sevilla already got titles to them as early as September. 33 At any
rate, in 1992, defendant Sevilla declared the lots for tax purposes under his
name.34 Then, using force and intimidation, he seized possession of the lots
from their tenants35 and harvested that planting season’s yield36 of coconut
and palay worth ₱20,000.00.37
Despite demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots,
forcing them to hire a lawyer38 and incur expenses of litigation.39 Further the
Sebes suffered loss of earnings over the years.40 They were also entitled to
moral41 and exemplary damages.42 They thus asked the RTC a) to declare
void the affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds of confirmation of sale in the
case; b) to declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore
possession to them; and d) to order defendant Sevilla to pay them
₱140,000.00 in lost produce from June 3, 1991 to the date of the filing of the
complaint, ₱30,000.00 in moral damages, ₱100,000.00 in attorney’s fee,
₱30,000.00 in litigation expenses, and such amount of exemplary damages
as the RTC might fix.43
Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebes’s complaint, the
law that applies to the action is Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this
case were decided under the original text of Batas Pambansa 129 or even
under its predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the
case as a real action would have ended the controversy. Both real actions
and actions incapable of pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC.
But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601, the
distinction between these two kinds of actions has become pivotal. The
amendment expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts to include real actions involving property with an assessed value of
less than ₱20,000.00.44
The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, 45 as
amended,46 to hear actions involving title to, or possession of, real property
or any interest in it now covers only real properties with assessed value in
excess of ₱20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power to hear
actions the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Thus–
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
 (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts; x x x.
Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real
property outside Metro Manila involved in the suit is ₱20,000.00 and below,
as in this case, jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level courts. Thus—
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases -- Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) x x x.
But was the Sebes’s action one involving title to, or possession of, real
property or any interest in it or one the subject of which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation?
The Sebes claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of the
documents of conveyance that defendant Sevilla tricked them into signing
and, second, for the reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots
that Sevilla succeeded in getting. The subject of their action is, they
conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation.1avvphi1
An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff’s cause
of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the
legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition
of the same.47 Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns
property and (2) the property itself."48
"Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of
ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the
government through the Register of Deeds.49 While title is the claim, right
or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.
Another way of looking at it is that, while "title" gives the owner the right to
demand or be issued a "certificate of title," the holder of a certificate of title
does not necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance of
a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title than what he
actually has in law.50 Thus, a plaintiff’s action for cancellation or nullification
of a certificate of title may only be a necessary consequence of the
defendant’s lack of title to real property. Further, although the certificate of
title may have been lost, burned, or destroyed and later on reconstituted,
title subsists and remains unaffected unless it is transferred or conveyed to
another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.51
Nestled between what distinguishes a "title" from a "certificate of title" is
the present controversy between the Sebes and defendant Sevilla. Which of
them has valid title to the two lots and would thus be legally entitled to the
certificates of title covering them?
The Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never
transferred ownership of the same to anyone. Such title, they insist, has
remained with them untouched throughout the years, excepting only that
in 1991 they constituted a real estate mortgage over it in defendant Sevilla’s
favor. The Sebes alleged that defendant Sevilla violated their right of
ownership by tricking them into signing documents of absolute sale, rather
than just a real estate mortgage to secure the loan that they got from him.
Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim
of ownership over the two lots, they would then be entitled, first, to secure
evidence of ownership or certificates of title covering the same and, second,
to possess and enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens
titles issued to defendant Sevilla, direct the latter to reconvey the two lots
and their corresponding Torrens titles to them as true owners. 52

The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of
the documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title
covering the two lots. These would merely follow after the trial court shall
have first resolved the issue of which between the contending parties is the
lawful owner of such lots, the one also entitled to their possession. Based
on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla
defrauded the Sebes of their property by making them sign documents of
conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt to
him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the
lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the
assessed value of such lots.

Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is ₱9,910.00.
Clearly, this amount does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value of
₱20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are merely
incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the
computation of the jurisdictional amount.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Order

dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9,
in Civil Case 5435, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.