THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018

MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon his admission to the Bar that he would do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, and that he would conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients. His violation of the Lawyer's Oath through the commission of falsehood can be condignly
sanctioned.

Antecedents

In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges that the

respondent consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal act of falsifying a public document in
violation of Article 171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code; and that he thereby
violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The public document in question was the deed of donation2 executed in favor of Princess Anne
Apolinar-Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar (Mommayda) who were only 12 years
old and 16 1/2 years old, respectively, at the time of its execution.3 Asserting that the respondent had
known of the minority of the donees, Marjorie insists that he was thereby guilty of falsification first in
his capacity as a lawyer by preparing the deed of donation and indicating therein that both donees were
then "of legal age"; and as a notary public by notarizing the document. She claims that he, being
Mommayda's counsel in the latter's adoption case, was aware of the untruthful statements he made in
the deed of donation because he thereafter submitted the deed of donation as evidence therein.4

In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita Apolinar (Margarita) and her sister-in-law Justina
Villanueva-Apolinar (Justina) went to his law office sometime in 2000; that Margarita was a grandaunt
who owned a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro that she wanted to donate to Princess Anne,
Marjorie's own daughter, and Mommayda, the adopted daughter of Justina; that upon learning of
Princess Anne's minority, he advised that she had to be represented by either parent;5 that not one to
be easily turned down, Margarita persisted, and prevailed over him; that he thereupon prepared the
deed of donation but left the date, the document number and page number blank; that he reserved the
notarization for later after the parties had signed the document; that he allowed Margarita to bring the
deed of donation to Manila where she was supposedly proceeding in order to procure the signature of
Princess Anne thereon and as a way of avoiding additional travel expenses; and that Justina had
mentioned to him at the time that Margarita was then suffering from colon cancer and had only a little
time to live.

The respondent recalled that a month afterwards Margarita and Justina returned to him with the signed
deed of donation; that he then noticed that the document did not bear the signatures of Princess Anne's
parents; that Margarita again offered to procure the signatures on the document; and that Margarita
and Justina did not anymore return with the document until the time when he had to enter the
instrument in his notarial book for his monthly report.

Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on, with issues about her properties left unresolved,
the relationship among her relatives quickly turned sour, and the deed of donation again came to the
fore. In 2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to see the respondent and confided to him that they
were entangled in a court battle with Marjorie, their niece, over Margarita's properties, including the
apartment in Manila where they had been occupying since 1980. They then learned from the
respondent that because Mommayda's birth certificate had been simulated, they needed to legally
adopt her in order to enable her to inherit from them. Hence, they filed a petition for the adoption of
Mommayda, which did not sit well with Marjorie.

Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir to Tomas vis-a-vis would be adversely affected by
the adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie vigorously opposed the petition for adoption, and argued for its
dismissal on the basis that Tomas and Justina were not morally capable of adoption as shown by their
simulation of the birth of Mommayda. Marjorie also brought several criminal cases in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on the ground of the simulation of the birth and falsification of the birth certificate
of Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code.

Marjorie's opposition to the petition for adoption and her criminal charges were dismissed. Also
dismissed were her opposition to the petition of Tomas and Justina for the correction of entry in
Mommayda's birth certificate, as well as Marjorie's motion to recall the social worker for cross
examination in the adoption case. The respondent claims that Marjorie -exasperated and dissatisfied
with the outcome - then turned against him and instituted the complaint for his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.6

The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal in the deed of donation; that as the sole owner of
the donated land, Margarita had an absolute right to dispose of her property by donation; that no law
prohibited donations to minors; and that the filing of the petition for judicial partition was an express if
not implied ratification of the defect in the donation; and that in regard to the submission of the
simulated birth certificate in evidence, the purpose of filing the petition for adoption was to rectify the
simulation and to convert the relationship between Mommayda and her adopting parents into a legal
one.7

During the mandatory conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, Marjorie admitted that a petition for judicial partition involving the donated land was
meanwhile filed; that a compromise agreement8 was reached; and that Princess Anne sold her share to
Mommayda.9

In his position paper,10 the respondent asserts that the complaint was pure harassment calculated only
to besmirch and malign his reputation; and that the complaint was also a premeditated tactic to prolong
or pre-empt the adoption case considering that a favorable ruling thereat would adversely affect
Marjorie's rights as an heir of Mommayda's parents.

In his resolution dated May 22, 2008,11 the IBP Commissioner recommended that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned Commissioner finds respondent
Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot to have violated the Notarial Law, his act having undermined the confidence
of the public on notarial documents; and, respectfully recommends his suspension from notarial
practice for a period of one (1) year while the other complaints against him are recommended dismissed
for lack of merit.12

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent submitted that he did not employ any falsity
because it was only Margarita - the donor - who had in fact attested to the execution of the deed of
donation in the notarial acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it was inconsequential even if
Princess Anne had signed the deed of donation not in his presence; that in conveyances, only the person
encumbering or conveying needed to personally appear, sign and acknowledge the deed before the
notary public; and that Princess Anne and Mommayda's names were placed in the document merely for
them to accept the donation.

The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his liability considering that he has exhibited candor in
admitting his offense. He represents that his act was not gross enough as to justify suspension; that the
complainant had thereby suffered no damage, but had actually benefitted from the act; that he had
notarized in good faith; and that with this offense being his first in his 12 years as a law practitioner and
as notary public, humanitarian considerations should be considered in his favor because he had children
to support and had been his family's sole bread winner.

In her comment on the respondent's motion for reconsideration,14 Majorie avers that Princess Anne
could not have signed the instrument in Manila because her daughter was then studying in Victoria,
Oriental Mindoro.

In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline, but modified the penalty by
recommending the immediate revocation of the respondent's notarial commission and his
disqualification from reappointment as a notary for two years, thus:15

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent's violation
of the Notarial Law, Atty. Aristedes Maramot is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year, immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission if presently Commissioned and Disqualified from
reappointment as Notary Public for Two (2) years.16
The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration through Resolution No.
XIX-2011-424 dated June 26, 2011,17 thus:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or reason
to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008 is hereby
AFFIRMED.18

On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this Court his Comment on the IBP Board of Governor's
Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No. XIX-2011-424 dated August 16, 2011.19

In its Report dated June 27, 2012,20 the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended to treat the
comment as a petition for review.

On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an amended comment dated December 5, 2011.21

On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the respondent to furnish the IBP a copy of his
amended comment and submit proof of its service within ten (10) days; and (2) to require the
complainant to file her comment thereon within 15 days from receipt.22

Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment on November 9, 2012, opposing the respondent's
prayer for reconsideration and asking the Court to uphold the Resolutions of the IBP Board of
Governors.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.

A.

As a Lawyer

Every lawyer before entering his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
Court, professes as a natural course the promises contained in the Lawyer's Oath, to wit:

I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis
supplied)

The letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath are oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted in the course of
the lawyer's practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has adopted and instituted the Code of
Professional Responsibility to govern every lawyer's relationship with his profession, the courts, the
society, and his clients.

Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which provide:

CANON 1 - x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - x x x
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the document, he
actually knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that her parents
should represent her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a minor. His
awareness of the latter's minority at the time was not disputed because he was also representing
Mommayda in the latter's adoption proceedings aside from being Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless,
he still indicated in the deed of donation that the donees were of legal age. His doing so, being
undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He thereby
consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct, defying the law and contributing to the
erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.

The respondent's explanation that it was only Margarita who actually acknowledged that the deed of
donation was her own free act and deed does not extricate him from responsibility. The deed of
donation, whether or not acknowledged by the donees, should not bear any false statement upon a
material fact. The ages of the donees were material because they bore on their capacities to render the
donation efficacious. That neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged the deed of donation
did not cure the defect.

The respondent justifies himself by stating that the persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed upon
him to prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to the donor's assurance that she
would herself procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document. He also submits
that the execution of the deed had redounded to the advantage of the minors; and that there was no
law that prohibited the donation in favor of minors.

The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a lawyer, he should not
invoke good faith and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be
truthful and honest in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that regard were clear and
unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas,23 this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the
highest value for attorneys, thus:
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He
should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon
the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The
courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected
to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
truth.24

The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor of a minor. Such position was not a factor,
however, because whether or not a minor could benefit from the donation did not determine the merits
of the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Neither was his claim that
the filing of the petition for judicial partition amounted to the ratification of the deed of donation a
factor to be considered in his favor. The decisive consideration is whether or not he committed a
falsehood in his preparation of the deed of donation. Sadly for him, the answer is in the affirmative.

Relative to the respondent's submission of the false birth certificate of Mommayda in the proceedings
for her adoption, we adopt with approval the following findings and recommendation made by the IBP
Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:

The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar is certainly a simulated one where it
was made to appear that she was the biological child of Spouses Tomas V. Apolinar and Justina P.
Villanueva when she was not. It was not shown, however, that respondent has a hand when its contents
were given to the employee of the Local Civil Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro Oriental. From the face of
the document, it appears that Tomas Apolinar himself gave the details and he signed the Certificate of
Live concerned.

When the respondent used the document in the adoption case of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar
by the Spouses Tomas and Justina Apolinar (docketed as Spec. Proc. No. R-04-5396, RTC, Branch 40,
Calapan City, Mindoro Oriental), the respondent did not misrepresent that Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar
is the biological daughter of the petitioners. In fact, there was nothing that was misrepresented in the
allegations in the petition. This led to the filing of another case for the correction of entry in the birth
certificate of the same Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar docketed as Spec. proc. CV-05-5445. It was alleged
therein that Leini Villanueva Guerrero and Johnny Ortega are the biological parents of Ma. Mommayda
Apolinar.25
B.

As a Notary Public

The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the notarial acknowledgment for the
deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having actually appeared before him.

The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or dishonesty, and that he did not make
untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment.

In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:

It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the Notarial Law when he, by his own admission,
notarized the Deed of Donation which was signed by at least one of the parties, namely: the donee,
Princess Anne Petilo, who signed not in the presence of the Notary Public but somewhere in Metro
Manila. This fact the respondent has admitted in his Answer (records, P. 22 Statement of Facts, par. 3).
For this reason, notaries public are once again reminded to observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarized a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein (Serzo vs.
Flores, A.C. No. 6040 [formerly CBD 02-972, July 30, 2004] citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216,
2200221).26

The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his foregoing observations on the assumption that Princess
Anne had herself acknowledged the instrument not in the presence of the respondent as the Notary
Public. But, as borne out by the acknowledgment, only Margarita's name was indicated as the person
appearing before the respondent during the notarization of the instrument, to wit:

BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited personally appeared Margarita V. Apolinar with her
CTC indicated below her name and signature, issued at Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, all known to me the
same person who executed the foregoing instrument and she acknowledged to me that the same is her
own free act and deed (Emphasis supplied)27
Nonetheless, the respondent's denial of having employed any falsity or dishonesty, or of making
untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day for
him. There is no question that a donation can be accepted in a separate instrument. However, the deed
of donation in question was also the same instrument that apparently contained the acceptance.28 The
names of Princess Anne and Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been included
in the notarial acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the names of their
respective parents (or legal guardians) assisting them should have also been indicated thereon. This
requirement was not complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and Mommayda should have also signed
the deed of donation themselves along with their assisting parents or legal guardians.

The omission indicated that the deed of donation was not complete. Hence, the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed of donation was improper. Rule II Section 1 of the Rules on Notarial
Practice provides that:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or
document; x x x x

We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of suspension for one year. The circumstances
peculiar to the complaint call for lenity in favor of the respondent, but who must nonetheless be sternly
warned against a repetition of the offense at the risk of suffering a more stringent penalty. We hold that
the penalties commensurate to the offense is suspension from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES MARAMOT guilty of violating
the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial Practice; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for six months effective from notice of this decision, with revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from being re-appointed as Notary Public for two years effective upon receipt; and
warns him of a more stringent penalty upon repetition of the offense.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11111

In Re: G.R. No. 157659 "ELIGIO P. MALLARI v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and the
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA.",

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is an administrative case involving a member of the bar. In our Decision in G.R. No. 157659 entitled
Eligio P. Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga1
promulgated on January 25, 2010, this Court directed the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP-CBD) to investigate respondent Atty. Eligio P. Mallari (respondent) for what
appear to be: (1) his deliberate disregard of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence pertinent to
theissuance and implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135,2 as amended; and (2) his
witting violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).3

The facts leading to this disciplinary action, as found by this Court in G.R. No. 157659, are as follows:

In 1968, respondent obtained two loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the
total amount of ₱34,000. These loans were secured by mortgages over two parcels of land registered
under his and his wife's names. Eventually, respondent was unable to meet his obligations to the GSIS,
which prompted the latter to remind him to settle his account.4

On March 21, 1984, the GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage due to
respondent's failure to settle his account. Respondent, however, was able to stall this by requesting for
a final computation of his outstanding account and persuading the Sheriff to hold the publication of the
foreclosure notice in abeyance. On December 13, 1984, the GSIS responded to his request and rendered
a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it sent another updated statement of account.
For failing to settle his account, the GSIS finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
respondent's mortgaged properties on July 21, 1986.5
On August 22, 1986, respondent filed a complaint for injunction with application for preliminary
injunction against the GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in Branch 44 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), in San Fernando, Pampanga. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 7802.6 The RTC ultimately
decided Civil Case No. 7802 in his favor. Upon appeal by the GSIS, the CA reversed the RTC on March 27,
1996. This Court, in G.R. No. 124468, denied respondent's petition for review on certiorari on
September 16, 1996, as well as his motion for reconsideration on January 15, 1997. As a result, the CA
Decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory, rendering unassailable the extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale held on September 22, 1986, and the issuance of titles in the name of the
GSIS.7

On September 2, 1999, the GSIS filed an ex parte motion for execution and/or a writ of possession. The
RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession on October 21, 1999, ordering the Sheriff to place
the GSIS in possession of the properties.8 The Sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of
respondent's request for an extension of time within which to vacate the properties. Respondent,
however, instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution on March 27,
2000.9

Respondent also filed a case for consignation with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order against the GSIS and the provincial Sheriff in the R TC in San Fernando,
Pampanga. This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 12053,10 was dismissed by the RTC on November 10,
2000 on the ground of res judicata, impelling respondent to appeal the dismissal to the CA.11

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 7802, respondent filed: (1) a motion dated April 5, 2000 to hold the GSIS, et
al. in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution; and (2) a motion dated April 17, 2000 to hold the
GSIS and its local manager Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for ordering the electric company to
cut off electric services to the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or
quash the writ of execution.12

Eventually, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge denied the motions
for contempt of court on July 30, 2001 and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-
implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21, 1999. Respondent
sought reconsideration but this was denied on February 11, 2002.13
Respondent assailed the orders denying his motions for contempt, the order causing the re-
implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and the denial of his motion for
reconsideration with the CA. The CA, however, denied his petition for certiorari. 14

Respondent brought the matter before us in G.R. No. 157659, where we affirmed the CA's Decision. We
held that the issuance of the writ of possession in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is purely
ministerial.15 We further stressed that respondent, as a lawyer, should have known that, as a non-
redeeming mortgagor, he had no more right to challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ
of possession upon the ex parte application of the GSIS, especially after the consolidation of ownership
of the properties in the GSIS.16 Thus, his actions can only be tainted by bad faith.17 This Court further
agreed with the CA's observation that the petition before it is "part of the dilatory tactics x x x to stall
the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved
with finality by no less than the highest tribunal of the land."18 Thus, we deemed it proper to direct the
IBP-CBD to conduct an investigation on respondent, the pertinent portion of which we quote:

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to investigate the
petitioner for what appear to be (a) his deliberate disregard of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence
pertinent to the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as
amended; and (b) his witting violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.19 (Italics in the original.)

On February 17, 2010, the IBP-CBD notified respondent of the Decision in G.R. No. 157659 and required
him to file his verified answer.20

In the meantime, respondent's motion for reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No. 157659 was
denied with finality by this Court on April 28, 2010.21

In his answer to the disbarment complaint,22 respondent claims that he did not deliberately disregard
the Rules of Court and jurisprudence relative to the issuance and implementation of the writ of
possession, as well as the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.23 He maintains that he is still the owner of the
unlawfully foreclosed properties because: (1) the GSIS' action for mortgage has prescribed since more
than 10 years had lapsed since the contracting of the obligations;24 (2) he still has in his favor the one
year right of redemption, to be counted from February 22, 1997, the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 7802;25 (3) he preserved his right of redemption by effecting a valid tender of payment and
consignation to the GSIS on May 28, 1997 ;26 and (4) due to GSIS' refusal to receive his payment, he
filed the case for consignation (Civil Case No. 12053) on March 27, 2000.27 Hence, respondent
concludes that, as owner of the properties, he has the right to exclude any person from its enjoyment
and disposal and may use such reasonably necessary force as allowed under Article 429 of the Civil
Code.28 In any case, he asserts that all the pleadings in this case were signed by his lawyer, Atty. Andres
Ocampo, except for two: (1) reply to GSIS dated September 11, 2003; and (2) petition for review in G.R.
No. 157659.29

The IBP-CBD, in their Report and Recommendation,30 found that the means employed by respondent
are dilatory moves to delay the execution of the judgment in favor of the GSIS. In the process, he
violated his Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.3, Canon 10 of the CPR. The IBP-CBD thus recommended that
respondent be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for at least one year.31

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-513,32 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings and
recommendation of IBP Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero. It also denied respondent's subsequent
motion for reconsideration in Resolution No. XXI-2015-368.33

These Resolutions, together with the records of the case, were transmitted to this Court for final action,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b).34

We adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on respondent's unethical conduct, but modify the
penalty in accord with recent jurisprudence.

A lawyer must never be blinded by the cause of his client at the expense of justice, even if the latter
turned out to be himself. He must never overlook that as officer of the court, he is primarily called upon
to assist in the administration of justice.35 Often designated as vanguards of our legal system, lawyers
are called upon to protect and uphold truth and the rule of law.36 They are obliged to observe the rules
of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.37

In this case, the judgment in favor of the GSIS concerning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings had long became final and executory in G.R. No. 124468. Despite this, respondent, with the
single purpose of delaying the execution of the judgment by the winning party, took the following series
of actions which effectively obstructed the execution of a final and executory judgment: (1) he caused
the Sheriff to fail in his service of the writ of possession upon his representation that the GSIS had
agreed to his request for extension of time to vacate the premises; yet, he did not vacate the premises
and instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution; (2) he commenced
a second case against the GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga for
consignation coupled with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
knowing fully well that his right to redeem has expired; and (3) he went on to file a motion for contempt
against the GSIS, et al. for painting the fence of the property, and for ordering the electric company to
cut off electric service, despite knowledge that the GSIS' ownership over the properties has been
upheld.

This Court, unable to turn a blind eye to the maneuverings employed by respondent, previously
observed:

Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his afore-described worthless and vexatious legal maneuvers for
no other purpose except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of possession, despite knowing, being
himself a lawyer, that as a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn both the extrajudicial
foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; and that the
enforcement of the duly-issued writ of possession could not be delayed. He thus deliberately abused
court procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to obstruct and stifle the fair and quick
administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and purchaser GSIS.

His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he
was enjoined as a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and xxx not [to] misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice." By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyer's Oath,
particularly:

xxx I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients xxx

We stress that the petitioner's being the party litigant himself did not give him the license to resort to
dilatory moves.1âwphi1 His zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had and to promote his
perceived remaining interests in the property already lawful transferred to GSIS should not exceed the
bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of the Court burdened to conduct himself
"with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients." His true obligation as a lawyer should not
be warped by any misplaced sense of his rights and interests as a litigant, because he was, above all,
bound not to unduly delay case, not to impede the execution of a judgment, and not to misuse Court
processes. Consequently, he must be made to account for his misconduct as a lawyer.38 (Italics in the
original, citations omitted.)

Notably, when asked to answer the administrative charges against him, respondent does not lament the
actions he has taken. Rather, he justifies them by insisting that this Court has erred in its decisions in
G.R. No. 124468 and G.R. No. 157659-decisions which have long attained finality. He again bombards
the Court with arguments against the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in this
disciplinary case knowing fully well, he being a member of the bar, that final and executory decisions
may no longer be disturbed. The same holds true with regard to respondent's reliance on Article 429 of
the Civil Code. His refuge, if at all, under the article is tainted with bad faith since he knew that the issue
on ownership of the properties has long been settled in G.R. No. 124468. Such action on his part only
affirms his misplaced zealousness and malicious intent to reopen the case in the hopes of gaining a
favorable judgment. He demonstrates his propensity to abuse and misuse court processes to the
detriment of the winning party and ultimately, the administration of justice. As such, he violated Canon
10 and Rule 10.03 of the CPR:

Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

xxxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.

Respondent owes good faith, fairness and candor to the court. By arguing a case that has already been
rejected repeatedly, he abused his right of recourse to the courts.39 His acts of not conducting himself
"to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts" constitute serious
transgression of his professional oath.

Moreover, the filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine
of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 1240 of the CPR, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.41 Respondent's
act of filing Civil Case No. 12053 (which was dismissed by the R TC on the ground of res judicata) further
indicates his proclivity to muddle the issues of the case in order to delay the execution of judgment in
Civil Case No. 7802. By his conduct, respondent violated not only the lawyer's mandate "to delay no man
for money or malice," but also Rules 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR:

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

xxxx

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.

Respondent must be reminded that he is not merely the litigant in his case. He is also his own counsel
and an officer of the court with a duty to the truth and the administration of justice:

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration
of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished
as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary
action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney
to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just
and are consistent with truth and honor.42 (Citation omitted.)

Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that it was his counsel, Atty. Ocampo, who signed most
of the pleadings. We note that respondent admits that he filed the petition for review in G.R. No.
157659 before us. By doing so, he ratified the previous actions taken by his counsel. For otherwise, if he
did not in fact sanction these deeds, he would not have elevated before us the denial of the motions for
contempt, the order causing the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and
the denial of his motion for reconsideration. This behavior on his part reveals that the actions
undertaken by his counsel were under his strict instructions, or at the very least, with his consent. For
having done so, respondent also breached his oath as an officer of this Court not only by filing
groundless suits, but also by instructing another member of the bar to do so.
In sum, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP-CBD holding respondent guilty of violating the
Lawyer's Oath; Canons 10 and 12; and Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the CPR. However, we deem it
proper to increase the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to two (2)
years.43

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Eligio P. Mallari is hereby found GUILTY of violating
the Lawyer's Oath; Canons 10 and 12; and Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective
upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice
SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 12156, June 20, 2018

PAULINO LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated March 9, 2015 filed by Paulino Lim (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera (respondent), praying that the latter be meted disciplinary
sanctions for defrauding the former by issuing a worthless check as guarantee for the payment of
respondent's loan.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in June 2014 in the hallway of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then inquiring about the status of a case.
The two (2) became acquainted after striking a conversation with each other. The following month, or in
July 2014, respondent borrowed from complainant the amount of P75,000.00, which the former needed
immediately.2 Complainant did not think twice in lending money to respondent and issuing in his favor
BDO Check No. 03565553 dated July 3, 2014 for P75,000.00, especially since the latter issued a
guarantee check (Union Bank Check No. 00034057804 dated July 19, 2014) to ensure payment of the
loan. Subsequently, respondent made several other loans in the amounts of P150,000.00, P10,000.00,
and another P10,000.00, for which he no longer issued any guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to
have been taken by respondent's sweet talk and promises of payment considering the millions he
expects to receive as contingent fee in one (1) of his cases.5

However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check No. 0003405780, it was dishonored for the
reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take or return complainant's calls nor
respond to the latter's text messages. He completely avoided complainant.6 Consequently,
complainant's lawyer wrote a demand letter7 dated October 15, 2014 for the payment of respondent's
indebtedness in the aggregate amount of P245,000.00, but to no avail. Thus, complainant was
constrained to file an administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8
In an Order9 dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed respondent to submit his answer to the complaint
within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order, failing which the case shall be heard ex
parte.10 However, respondent filed no answer.11 Subsequently, a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing12 scheduled on November 13, 2015 was sent to respondent on October 20, 2015,
during which the latter did not appear.13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation14 dated November 14, 2016, the IBP Investigating Commissioner (IC)
found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and be ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest reckoned from July 19, 2014.15 The other loans alleged by
complainant were not duly proven. 16

The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Citing the case of Foronda v. Alvarez, Jr.,17 the IBP IC held
that the issuance of a check that was later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him and hence, constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action.18 The penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was
based on the case of Lao v. Medel,19 where the Court meted the same penalty for gross misconduct
committed by deliberately failing to pay just debts and issuing worthless checks.20

In a Resolution21 dated June 14, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the aforesaid report and
recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
the issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR.
The Court's Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records showing the existence of the loan obligation incurred by
respondent as evidenced by complainant's BDO Check No. 0356555 dated July 3, 2014, as well as Union
Bank Check No. 0003405780 dated July 19, 2014 issued by respondent to guarantee the payment of said
loan but which was dishonored upon presentment for the reason "Account Closed," the Court concurs
with the findings and adopts the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, except for the return
to complainant of the amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest.

Time and again, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross
misconduct that a lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private
capacity. Good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law.
Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession
justifies disciplinary action,22 as in this case.

It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from complainant for which he issued a post-dated
check that was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his obligation despite repeated demands.
It has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts
and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility."23 Thus, the IBP IC correctly ruled that respondent's act of issuing a
worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which explicitly states:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In Enriquez v. De Vera,24 the Court categorically pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing a worthless
check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct penalized by
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which no conviction of the criminal charge is
even necessary. Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was '"designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because
the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated."25 Being a lawyer,
respondent was well aware of, or was nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and coverage of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly violated the law and thereby "exhibited his indifference
towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order."26

In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138,
Rules of Court.27 Respondent should stand foremost in complying with the directives of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline not only because as a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal orders of
duly constituted authorities, as well as court orders and processes, but also because the case involved
the very foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law. Therefore, his lack of concern or
interest in the status or outcome of his administrative case would show how much less he would regard
the interest of his clients.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
legal profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the consequence.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.28 In the cases of Lao v. Medel,29Rangwani v. Dino,30 and Enriquez v. De
Vera,31 the Court imposed the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law for
deliberate failure to pay just debts and for the issuance of worthless checks. In Sanchez v. Torres,32 the
Court increased the penalty to two (2) years in light of the amount of the loan which was P2,200,000.00,
and the fact that respondent therein had repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer and a
motion for reconsideration, which he nonetheless failed to submit, and had likewise failed to attend the
disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Considering, therefore, that the amount of the loan proven by
complainant herein is P75,000.00, the Court sustains the recommended penalty of one (1)-year
suspension from the practice of law. With respect, however, to the return of the amount of P75,000.00
which respondent received from complainant, the same cannot be sustained. It is settled that in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.33 In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,34 the Court held that its
"findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties
involved which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyer's professional engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such
nature."35 Thus, the return of the P75,000.00 clearly lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's Oath, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information
and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.