Documenta Ophthalmologica 106: 61–66, 2003.

© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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The function of stereotypes in visual perception

Greg O. Niemeyer
Departments of Art Practice and of Film Studies, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-3750,
USA

Key words: art, cinema, culture, flow, recognition, sensory overload, stereotype

Abstract
Human vision is a product of both physiological and cultural dispositions. This cultural study investigates the
role of cultural dispositions in visual perception. In particular, the study focuses on the role of stereotypes,
which are involved in recognition. I propose that stereotypes are essential for basic functions of perception and
human perception. However, stereotypes also introduce significant limitations on human experience. The fact that
stereotypes are abstract simplifications of realities is not the limiting factor, since scientific and cultural progress
continually refines stereotypes. The very principle of the stereotype appears to introduce the limitation, because
the process of forming stereotypes requires both temporal and functional fragmentations of the continuum of our
perception. This fragmentation can be a cause of sensory overload, a postmodern condition that generates cultural,
perceptual and behavioral problems. To address this problem, I propose a cultural modification to our modality
of perception. The modification shifts the emphasis of our perception from the recognition of stereotypes to the
recognition of flows, processes and durations. References to the work of Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger
provide the philosophical basis for this modification and several empirical and experimental examples illustrate
such modifications in practice.

Introduction

αντ α ρι, “Everything flows” is a fragment of text
attributed to Heraklit in ancient, ancient Greece. It
describes a worldview, in which nothing is static, in
which, as another fragment from Heraklit says,
One cannot step into the same river twice.
The less ancient Greek philosophers, especially Plato,
disagreed. The world in flux, he argued, is a flut-
tering of empty hulls before our eyes: it is nothing
but illusion. The empty hulls are surfaces corrupted
by space and time, mere traces of the original ideas,
which contain the true essence of reality. What we see
of the world is actually a projection, which emanates
from the eyes. The eyes are an extension of the human
mind. The mind knows about the original, pure ideas,
which constitute reality. Far from true insight, humans
access only the stereotypes, or the shadows of these
original ideas, and only rarely glimpse an aspect of the
original ideas. Nevertheless, Plato considered these
stereotypes to be shadows of the original ideas from
which the world derived its forms. Even the shadow
of the original idea, is far closer to reality than visual
experience. Despite the strange path of light out of the
eye and into the world, the underlying concept of the
primacy of ideas over reality, serves as the foundation
of our culture today, including scientific investigation.
As we know, the world does not emanate from pro-
jections of our eyes. Through a detour of Euclidian
geometry and optics, Descartes first described the cor-
rect path of light entering the eye. Since then, modern
science has described many of the steps involved in
vision with much precision and vision is no longer
a matter of light shining out of people’s eyes. If the
Greek concept of vision falls to the insights of science,
does the concept of the primacy of ideas over reality
fall as well?
One major step in vision is the conversion of
visual sensations from the retina to perceptions of our
mind. Therefore, perception is not only a matter of
the senses; it is also a matter of the mind. After all,
if we would see the sensations our eyes provide us
at any given instance, we would only see a central,
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small, sharp, colorful, detailed heap of information
surrounded by sparser information of light and dark-
ness. This information includes about one million data
points, about the same as a good photograph. Our
conscious mind does not perceive any of data this
directly. Instead, the mind converts this continuous
flux of sensations into shapes, movements and colors,
and eventually into meaningful perceptions, memor-
ies, imaginations and even dreams. This process is
called recognition.
Recognition
Recognition appears to be a sorting process. The mind
compares incoming shapes with shapes, which are
already stored in our minds. These shapes, which
are already stored in our mind, are well-categorized
stereotypes. The progressive sorting process stops
when the mind accepts a match between a shape and
a memory as a best fit. At that point, the object
is classified and recognized, until there is evidence
that a better classification is possible. It appears that
the mind compares shapes with best matches in the
following categories, faces, hands, food, bodies, let-
ters and symbols, patterns, objects and places. The
mind seems able to perform non-exclusive matches.
Single perceptions can match with multiple categor-
ies simultaneously. For example, my mind might first
categorize a shape as either large or small, and then
symmetrical or asymmetrical. Then it might be clas-
sified as curved or straight-angled. Assume that it is
smooth. It then might be classified as a member of
the faces, hands, food, bodies, letters and symbols,
patterns, objects and places. Based on context, motion,
color, texture, etc., it might be classified as something
on a hand. If it is golden in color, we might decide
that it is a wedding ring. The same process might
classify a very similar shape in a similar context with
similar properties classified as a penny. The penny
greatly differs from the wedding ring. Under certain
conditions, we might be inclined to mistake one for
the other. Perceptions, right or wrong, depend on the
fact that we already know what a penny or a wedding
ring is. The stereotypes ‘wedding ring’ and ‘penny’
are a condition of our perception of the ‘wedding ring’
and the ‘penny’. As Plato might put it, our perceptions
are defined by our ideas. The process of recognition
then proves, to a significant extent, Plato’s statement
of the primacy of ideas over reality. What we see is not
only a measurement of light reflecting on us, but also
a stereotyped interpretation of the shapes surrounding
us.
Stereotypes and perception
It seems to me we scan the world for things we always
knew. But what about things we never saw before?
How can we recognize those? We stick to the same
method; we seek a best match between sensation and
stereotype. If we see an object for the first time, we
are likely to say that that new sensation reminds us
of a stereotype we already know. We then classify
the new sensation near that stereotype. We create a
new categorization for that object by name, function,
shape, and experience. The next time we see this same
new thing, we already have a fitting new stereotype
for that sensation. The generation of new stereotypes
is perhaps an essential component of learning.
For example, I remember the first time I saw the
inside of a computer. I thought it looked much like a
city from the air (Figure 1). That was a useful categor-
ization, because some of the processes of cities are
useful metaphors for understanding the inner work-
ings of a computer. Nevertheless, the new sensation I
have never seen before has now generated its own new
stereotype near by the ‘bird’s eye view of a city’ ste-
reotype, and I now recognize the insides of computers.
I learned how to perceive this sensation: I learned how
to see it. The only problem is that now, cities from
above look to me like computers. I see the insides
computers more often than cities.
Individually, the process of acquiring new stereo-
types amounts to learning. Collectively, the process
of acquiring new stereotypes is a part of cultural
progress. Both science and art participate in this pro-
cess. Both disciplines are in the business of trading
up from false ill-fitting stereotypes to more, better-
fitting stereotypes. In the case of science, stereotypes,
which do not fit the results of an experiment are dis-
carded, and replaced with stereotypes, which better
accommodate the results of an experiment. Hypo-
thesis and conclusion encapsulate such developments
of stereotypes.
In the case of art, an artwork seeks to propose a
better way of representing an aspect of human exper-
ience. The representation proposes a new stereotype,
which can replace an older one, if indeed the new
stereotype provides a benefit to a culture. The bene-
fits typically include new cultural identities, new ways

Figure 1. Typical example of computer motherboard, appearance matching with authors stereotype of cities seen in a bird’s eye view.
of thinking, new ways of dreaming, or new ways of
seeing emotional experiences.
In these ways, science, art and the many discip-
lines, which constitute cultural progress, improve the
fit between stereotypes and reality. If we take this
thought to it’s conclusion, a culture would be fully
evolved when it attains a complete match between
stereotypes and reality. Perhaps a complete match
between stereotypes and reality would include a com-
plete consciousness of reality. Then, there would be no
more accidents and surprises, no more misunderstand-
ings, errors and omissions.
Indeed, we are moving in that direction. Inform-
ation technology provides us with more information
about reality and about artifacts of our culture. Ac-
cording to one study, the growth of information on
the World Wide Web has outpaced the collective ca-
pacity of our species to absorb that information. Even
if every human being would read different parts of the
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web all day long, we could never finish reading all the
information.
In this way, information technology and the media
add a new visual reality to the world. The primary
visual reality of the world, nature, meets the eye less
and less. Instead, we look at mediations of the primary
visual reality more and more. Those mediations con-
figure a secondary visual reality. The secondary visual
reality consists of all images, which are derived from
reality or which are synthesized. It includes all pho-
tos, letters, images, websites, movies, mirrors, and
information displays and other artifacts. The density
of the secondary visual reality commonly covers 100%
of our visual field, in instances such as the cinema, city
streets, and supermarkets. In this postmodern land-
scape, how is the mind to keep up with the dramatic
increase of shapes and visual information?
By many accounts, the mind’s response is to re-
duce the sensitivity of the senses, apparently through
the limbic system. However, the secondary visual
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reality constantly increases the contrast, brightness,
volume, scale and frequency of its displays. Re-
pressing excess stimulation becomes a more difficult
task for the mind, especially for children. The con-
sequences of chronic sensory overload appear to range
from distraction to serious health risks.
Perhaps our ability to perceive is outpaced by our
production of visual stimulation, and we are literally
lost in our own artifacts. There are so many images
within images flashing at us, that we no longer can
keep up with our process of matching each shape with
a stereotype, and the world becomes a noisescape.
I have experienced such sensory overload at times,
mostly in shopping malls. I found myself forgetting
what I wanted, and, on occasion, my wife had to stop
me from buying nonsense and signing up for strange
payment plans. Overexposure to visual stimulation can
create the opposite of a complete understanding of
reality: it can create disemancipation.
I believe that sensory overload occurs when visual
and other sensations exceed our perceptual capacity:
we cannot keep up matching our sensations to the ste-
reotypes in our minds. Perhaps the images are not at
fault, here; the way, in which we look, is. Perhaps the
problem is in our cultural disposition to match each
sensation with a stereotype.
Flow and perception
The French Philosopher Henri Bergson studied prin-
ciples of consciousness. In his 1904 book Creative
Evolution, he argues that our consciousness is similar
to a cinematograph, in that it is aware of the world
in states. Like a cinematograph, our minds perceive
the world as a succession of states. For example, we
perceive an arrow in flight as two states: In a first
state, we see the arrow in the hand of the bowman.
In a second state, we see the arrow in the target. If
we film the arrow in flight, we might see the flight
as a series of images representing the different states
of the flight. These states are cut out of the duration
of the flight. They are abstractions of the arrow in
flight itself. He argues that our mind works much like
a cinematograph, abstracting discreet states from the
flow of events in the world. These states provide the
basis perceptions, memories, words, logic, science
and the bulk of Western consciousness. As the bulk
of Western consciousness proves, the cinematograph
system works very well. The system works well for
conceiving and executing plans. While we navigate
the day, everything usually happens according to our
plans, which are successions of states.
We get up in the morning, shower, and eat break-
fast, go to work, eat lunch, go back to work, go home,
eat and go to bed again. Perhaps what makes us so
tired during the day is the activity of keeping reality in
line with our plans. Any discrepancies between reality
and our plans bring great frustration. The dire con-
sequences of such discrepancies range from falling in
love, to waking up as a big bug, and to catastrophic
events like September 11. The dire consequences of
such events are that they challenge our plans, and what
good is the bulk of Western consciousness, if things
are not going according to the plan.
However, Henri Bergson points to the limitations,
which the temporal and functional fragmentation of
a continuous reality into states imposes on our con-
sciousness. Existence itself, which is certainly con-
tinuous, cannot be perceived or understood through
states, he says. A consciousness of states even fails
to examine the reality of a simple action such as an
arrow in flight. The difference between the real arrow
in flight and its abstract representation as a series of
states is the duration of the flight. It is the duration we
fail to perceive. To perceive the reality of the duration
between the bowman’s release and the arrow’s strike,
we need to modify our thinking and our perception to
focus on the flow of time.
In hearing, we readily switch between state-based
perception and flow-based perception. Music is an ex-
perience of duration. Music as a state is a sheet of
notes. If we played them all at the same time, we
would not hear the music. Music is only perceptible
once we hear the notes with duration. We listen for
states, when we recognize the words and grammar in
someone’s speaking voice. We listen for flow when we
listen to the same voice speaking a language unknown
to us. We also listen for flow when we identify who
is speaking on the phone. The first word, Hello, is not
important as a word, but as a sound, a timbre, and a
flow, since it provides information about the identity
of the caller.
Is there a flow-based perception in vision? Re-
cently, my wife worked at the computer all day. To
relax, she went jogging. On her return, she commen-
ted how she looked at the trees and the sunlight in a
different way than she looked at her screen. I believe
that she switched her modality of perception from the
stereotype-driven perception fitting an office environ-
ment to a flow-driven perception fitting the natural
environment. When we look at a forest, a flowing

Figure 2. Schematic diagram of Oxygen Flute, structure in steel and silicon sheeting, bamboo plants, CO2 sensor and music synthesizing
computer, speaker system, and visitor ramp with door.
creek, or the passing weather, we do not match indi-
vidual leaves with leave stereotypes, we do not match
individual ripples with our stereotype of a sine wave,
and we do not match fog with Gaussian particle sys-
tems. Instead, we look at the being of the forest, the
creek, and the passing weather.
Perhaps, if we train our eyes to recognize less suc-
cessive states, but more flows, we can look even at
a postmodern world full of stereotyped images not in
terms of a dense array of states but in terms of the mul-
tiplicity of its being. Language can rustle, objects can
linger and images can shine. In perceiving the being of
the world, we may perceive our own being.
In my own artwork, I attempt to support the per-
ception of flows through computer technology, and,
in collaboration with Chris Chafe, through computer
music. To date, we have completed two major install-
ations for museums in California. Both installations
work as interactive systems, and aim to expand the
sensitivity of visitors for types of information which
are relevant to our well-being but for which we have no
organs. Both systems present information as continu-
ous flows. The first, PING, presents real-time com-
puter networking data as music in an eight-channel
sound environment. The second, Oxygen Flute (Figure
2), presents real-time Carbon cycle data from a growth
chamber in a four-channel sound environment.
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Both systems support both acoustic and visual per-
ceptions of dense data as a flow, not as a series of
states. Based on empirical evidence such as visitor
testimonies, I think that these perceptions support
a human experience, which can restore a sense of
agency as they validate the fundamental experience of
being.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my parents, Annerose and Gunter
Niemeyer, for their enthusiastic support of my de-
velopment as an artist. I would like to thank Gunter
especially for introducing me to the systems in his lab
at an age, where I was not yet aware of the differ-
ences between art and science. I would also like to
thank Intel Corporation for their generous support of
my creative research at UC Berkeley through the Intel
Research Council Grant.
References
1. Barthes, Roland. Image – Music – – Text, New York: Hill and
Wang, 1978.
2. Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution (Arthur Mitchell, Trans-
lator). Dover Press, 1998.
3. Gregory, Richard. Eye and Brain. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1997.
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4. Kahn, Charles (Editor). Heraclitos, Art and Thought of Herac- 8. Wanddell, Brian. Foundations of Vision. Sinauer Associates,
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5. Heidegger, Martin. Was heisst Denken. Max Niemeyer Verlag.
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Address for correspondence: G. Niemeyer, UC Berkeley, 345 Kroe-
Late Capitalism. Duke University Press, 1992.
ber Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
7. Rodieck, Robert, W. The First Steps in Seeing. Sinauer Associ-
Phone: +1-650-568-1620; E-mail: Niemeyer@uclink.berkeley.edu
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