Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises
Vanguardia, A.M.
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC: Adopting the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
WHEREAS, at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, on 25-26 November 2002, at which
the Philippine Supreme Court was represented by the Chief
Justice and Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Bangalore Draft
of the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Judicial Group on
Strengthening Judicial integrity was deliberated upon and
approved after incorporating therein several amendments;
WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft, as amended, is intended to be the
Universal Declaration of Judicial Standards applicable in all
judiciaries;
WHEREAS, the Bangalore Draft is founded upon a universal
recognition that a competent, independent and impartial judiciary
is essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in upholding
constitutionalism and the rule of law; that public confidence in
the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the
judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society;
and that it is essential that judges, individually and collectively,
respect and honor judicial office as a public trust and strive to
enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system;
WHEREAS, the adoption of the universal declaration of standards
for ethical conduct of judges embodied in the Bangalore Draft as
revised at the Round Table Conference of Chief Justices at The
Hague is imperative not only to update and correlate the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted for the
Philippines, but also to stress the Philippines’ solidarity with the
universal clamor for a universal code of judicial ethics.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts this New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:
1. Prior to the adoption of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
(NCJC), judicial ethics was governed by the Code of Judicial
Conduct approved by the SC on September 5, 1989 and
which took effect on October 20, 1989
2. During the roundtable meeting of the Chief Justices at the
Peace Palace, The Hague in 2002, the so-called Bangalore
Draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“Bangalore Draft”)
was approved. The Bangalore Draft was subsequently
adopted by the Philippine SC through A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC
and which took effect on June 1, 2004
2015 Bar, Q. XIV: Identify and briefly explain three (3) canons
under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine  Judges must carry out their judicial functions on the basis of
Judiciary. their own discernment and judgment. Such discernment and
judgment must be free from any undue outside influence.
Qualifications of Judges  At the first attempt at extraneous influence, the judge must
promptly and decisively, but in a courteous manner, reject
Canon 1: Independence or decline the attempt. In this way, the judge asserts his
individual judicial independence.
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a
Sec. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore
from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is
uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
obliged to make independently.
individual and institutional aspects.
1. Individual Independence from Judicial Colleagues
1. Canon 1: Independence
 Every judge must decide independently, even in collegial
In the Matter of Macasaet, (2008). Chief Justice Shirley
court divisions.
Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that
 While there may be discussions and exchanges of ideas
judicial independence encompasses two distinct but related
among judges, at the end of such discussion, the judge must
concepts of independence.
decide on the basis of his own, sole, judgment.
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 1, Sec. 2
each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to
Re: Letters of Vasquez, Jr., (2008). A Justice of the CA who, in
decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A
violation of the internal rules (IRCA), allowed herself to be rushed
judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job
into signing a decision without reading the parties’ memoranda
without having to hear – or at least without having to take it
and without the deliberation among members of the Division
seriously if he does hear – criticisms of his personal morality and
required by the IRCA, showed “weakness and lack of
fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional
independence on her part” (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal,
judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the
admonished)
judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a
class.
Sec. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts
of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the administrative agency.
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the
1. Duty Against Meddling with Another Court or
public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of
this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Administrative Agency
Third Estate.
Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor, (1991). A Judge should avoid
2. Judicial Independence, as a duty of a lawyer (Rule 13.03, impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
CPR) The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation
or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04).
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on
Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the
the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a
end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation
conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 1, Sec. 3
1. Individual Judicial Independence
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(a) Marces v. Judge Arcangel, (1996). A judge writing a note to
another judge which states:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia
Br. 3, City Trial Court
Davao City
Dear Ed:
If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still
pending, please issue another alias warrants as the accused is
now in town.
Thanks.
(Sgd.) Paul Arcangel
The judge thereby committed impropriety.
(b) Marces v. Judge Arcangel, (1996). Respondent Judge who
allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely
private matter between feuding families. In attending, at the
request of Mrs. Canas, the barangay conciliation
proceedings and introducing himself there as the Executive
Judge of the RTC in an obvious demonstration of support for
Mrs. Canas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a
party in a case.
(c) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). A judge entering his appearance
in a court case representing himself but signing the pleading
wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC,
Br. 73, Malabon City and appending to the pleading a copy
of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking is trying to
influence or put pressure on a fellow judge.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships
to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial
office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.
1. Individual Independence from Private Interests
 Relationships with the judge can be used, for selfish
interests, to influence a judgment. The judge must be ever
aware that such friendly or cordial relations should not be
exploited to influence a decision.
 Consequently, the judge should not allow or tolerate those
friendly or cordial relations to be used by his friends and
relatives to protect the image that the judge can be
influence. Hence, the judge must be conscious of
relationships.
2. Judge’s Family, Defined
“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-
law, daughter-in-law, and any other relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a companion
or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
3. Mandatory Inhibition
Hurtado v. Judalena, (1978). Where a relative of the judge is one
of the parties to a case, within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, the disqualification is mandatory.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate
connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative
branches of government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
1. Judicial Independence from the Executive and Legislative
Branches of Government (Canon 1, Sec. 5)
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 1, Sec. 5
(a) Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto, (2002). Referring the matter of
the transfer of court employees to a local government
official, in this case to the Vice-Mayor, where the liaison
work “for all liaison and coordination activities with the
Legislative and Executive departments as well as with local
government officials” was the sole responsibility of the
Court Administrator and not the trial judge. The personnel
action initiated by the trial judge was a clear derogation of
the power of administrative supervision of the SC over court
employees.
Bagatsing v. Herrera, (1975). For judicial independence to be a
reality, the least interference by or influence from other
governmental departments is of the essence.
OCA A.C. 17-99. Lest it be against ignored, we stress in this regard
that only this Court has the authority to order a personnel
accounting of locally-funded employees assigned in the lower
courts to determine the necessity of their detail, and that
accordingly, all requests for detail of locally-funded employees,
including complainants herein, must pass the OCA for review and
appropriate action.
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Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises
Vanguardia, A.M.
2014 Bar, Q. I: Judge A is a close friend of Governor G. On several
occasions, Judge A would borrow vehicles from the Office of the
Governor to travel to his judicial station. Judge A’s actuation:
(a) Violates the Canon on Propriety
(b) Creates an appearance of an improper connection with the
executive branch
(c) Is downright unethical
A: (a)
Alternative: (b)
3. Illustration Where There is No Undue Influence
Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Joboco, (1998). Congenial
relationships, however, between a judge and a provincial
governor does not by itself tarnish the image of an independent
judiciary. A LGU which provides a vehicle for the use of the judge
does not impinge on judicial independence, in the absence of any
indication of corruption or anomalous undertakings.
Sec. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in
general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which
he or she has to adjudicate.
1. Individual Independence from Society and from Litigants
 Canon 1, Sec. 6 speaks of independence “in relation to
society” and does not speak of withdrawal from society.
Hence, the judge is not expected to live in isolation away
from society
 Canon 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics
Canon 30: It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial
duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in
social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A
judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before
him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business
relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial course.
 More importantly in Canon 1, Sec. 6 is the independence
from the party-litigants. Party-litigants must be kept at a
distance during course of the litigation. Hence, ex parte

communications with any of the parties must be vigorously
avoided.
 In case of social contact with a litigant, the pending case
should never be discussed.
 In the same way, emissaries for the party or go-betweens
should be rejected by the judge
2. Violation of Independence from Litigants
Tan v. Rosete, (2004). The act of a judge in meeting with litigants
outside the office premises beyond office hours violates the
standard of judicial conduct.
Sec. 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the
discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
1. Duty to Uphold Safeguards
 There are safeguards put in place by the ROC, circulars from
the SC, and even ordinary protocols. These safeguards are
designed to promote judicial independence.
 The judge must zealously uphold such safeguards
Sec. 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial
conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary,
which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
1. Duty of High Standards in Judicial Conduct
Arban v. Borja, (1986). Sec. 8 is a mere affirmance of the judges
are the visible representation of the law and justice.
Dimatulac v. Villon, (1998). A judge should always be imbued
with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must
view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to
a religious crusade.
Canon 2: Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
1. Duty to Disclose to the Appointing Authority and JBC
OCA v. Judge Estacion. Respondent judge was dismissed for
concealing from the appointing authority information regarding
the criminal charges for homicide and attempted homicide filed
against him.
Re: Judge Cube. Judge Cube was dismissed from the service when
he purposely did not disclose his previous dismissal when he
accomplished the bio-data form required by the JBC.
Court Administrator v. Judge Magtibay. There was deliberate
concealment of his prior suspension in A.C. 2489.
Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
1. Duty to be Above Reproach and Duty to Appear Above
Reproach
Gacayan v. Hon. Pamintuan, (1999). “The Court pointed out in
Dawa v. De Asa that the people’s confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and
diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to
possess.
2. Integrity is a Necessity
Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio, (2003). In the Judiciary, moral
integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity.
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
1. Duty of Public Conduct
Junio v. Rivera, Jr. (1993). The judge must not only appear to be a
“good judge” but also appear as a “good person”. This must be so
at all times.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 2, Sec. 2
(a) Dawa v. De Asa, (1998). Sexual harassment upon his court
employees by forcibly kissing them (Judge dismissed from
the service)
(b) In re: Judge Marcos, (2001). Maintaining a mistress and
bringing such mistress in functions attended by other judges
(Judge dismissed from the service)
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Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises
Vanguardia, A.M.
(c) Lachica v. Flordeliza, (1996). Asking intimidating questions
while in an inebriated or drunken state during a party of a
municipality.
(d) City of Tagbilaran v. Hontanas, (2002). Habitually gambling
and frequenting casinos and cockpits. The judge’s argument
that he only played the slot machines was not accepted as
such machines were also for gambling.
(e) Judge Naval v. Judge Panday, (1997). Having sexual
intercourse with a 15-year-old minor (Judge dismissed from
the service)
(f) Judge Alumbres v. Judge Caoibes, (2002). Punching a fellow
judge in the face after a disagreement over the use of an
office table.
Sec. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
1. Duty to Instill Discipline Among Lawyers and Court
Personnel
Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Joboco, (1998). A judge has the
prerogative to discipline his staff for negligence and/or a mistake.
However, a judge should not make it a habit of showing fits of
temper and resorting to verbal abuse against erring employees.
Thus, he should be mindful of the need to maintain professional
and harmonious relations with his personnel with a view to the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
However, judges do not have the power and authority to
preventively suspend a clerk of court as such power is vested
exclusively with the SC
2. Slightest Impropriety of Court Personnel Should be
Checked
Buenaventura v. Benedicto, (1971). Oftentimes, such leniency
provides the court employees the opportunity to commit minor
transgressions of the laws and slight breaches of official duty
ultimately leading to vicious delinquencies. The respondent judge
should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his
employees. He should realize that big start small. His constant
scrutiny of the behavior of his employees would deter any abuse
on the part of the latter in the exercise of their duties. Then, his
subordinates would know that any misdemeanor will not remain
unchecked. The slightest semblance of impropriety on the part of
the employees of the court in the performance of their official
duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the
judicial administrators. The slightest breach of duty by and the

slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and
employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the
faith of the people in the judiciary.
Canon 3: Impartiality
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.
1. Duty to be Impartial
Edano v. Asdala, (2007). This duty does not apply only to the
decisions but to the process as well.
Castillo v. Juan, (1975). Hence, the objectivity is essential to an
independent judiciary.
In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the
manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone
concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not
for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to
the at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to
refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It
would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of
reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in
the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be
obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the
traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides
with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an
unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should
possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to
hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should
avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartially. What has
been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed
with constitutional significance.
2014 Bar, Q. XIX(a): After the pre-trial of a civil case for replevin,
Judge D advised B’s counsel to settle the case because according
to Judge D, his initial assessment of the case shows that B’s
evidence is weak.
Did Judge D commit an act of impropriety? Explain.
A: Yes, Judge D acted improperly.
Sec. 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary provides that “judges shall not knowingly,
while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make
any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
In the case of Castillo v. Juan (G.R. No. L-39516-17, January 28,
1975), a judge spoke to the complainants in two rape cases in his
chamber before trial, and advised them to settle their cases with
the accused because their evidence was weak. The SC found the
conduct of the judge to be violative of duty of impartiality.
The Court stated that the judge should avoid any conduct that
casts doubt on his impartiality. It is not merely a matter of judicial
ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
2. Allegations of Partiality Must Be Substantiated
Dimo Realty & Dev. Inc. v. Dimaculangan, (2004). Allegations of
partiality or bias must have a factual basis. Bare allegations or
suspicions of partiality will not be sufficient to cause the
disqualification of the judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor,
bias or prejudice.
1. Duty to be Free From Favor, Bias or Prejudice
 Justice is rendered exclusively on the basis of the law, the
relevant facts, and the jurisprudence
 All other human factors such as emotions, relationships,
preconceptions are unseen by Lady Justice, and are to be
excluded totally from the judge’s consideration.
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out
of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and
of the judiciary.
1. Duty to Appear Impartial
Sps. Nazareno v. Judge Almario, (1997). A judge should only be
impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest as well.
The judge should be careful with his public conduct and his
speech and remarks to others. Hence, the judge must exercise
prudence and restraint and should reserve personal views and
predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and
unfairness.
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Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises
Vanguardia, A.M.
Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, (2000). “Like Caesar’s wife, a judge
must not only be pure but above suspicion”
People v. CA. The judge must portray the “cold-neutrality of an
impartial juge”
2. Illustration of Violation of this Canon 3, Sec. 2
(a) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). Stating to his court staff and the
PAO lawyer that he is “pro-accused” particularly concerning
detention prisoners, the judge opened himself up to
suspicion regarding his impartiality.
(b) Sison v. Judge Caoibes, (2004). A judge based in Las Pinas
was dismissed from the service after it was found that the
judge had, without basis and authority, cited an MMDA
traffic enforcer for indirect contempt after the MMDA traffic
enforcer cited the judge’s driver, his son, for traffic violation
along EDSA. The judge’s argument that his driver was on
official errand was not given credence and the Court ruled
that the contempt charge was actually a retaliation.
(c) Cabreana v. Avelino. Hitching a ride in the car of a party-
litigant on the way to an ocular inspection.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves
as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for
them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
1. Duty Not to Give Cause for Disqualification
Te v. CA. Disqualification is also called inhibition or to recuse.
Where the allegation of partiality has not been reasonably
established, then there would be no ground for the judge to
inhibit. The test to determine the propriety of the denial of a
motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair
and impartial trial.
People v. Gako, Jr. A ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot be
overturned in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge. Where, however, bias and partiality is evident,
then the judge must inhibit from the case.
2. Guidepost for Voluntary Inhibition of Judges
Pimentel v. Salonga, (1967). The Court laid down the following
guideposts for voluntary inhibition of judges:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced

to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.
Constante v. Pimentel, (1978). The procedure for disqualification
of judges in Rule 137, Sec. 2 must be substantially followed.
3. Provision in the ROC
Rule 137: Disqualification of Judicial Officers
Rule 137, Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges – No judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
Rule 137, Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made
and effect – If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from
sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency
may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the
grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with
the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision
shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers
in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by
reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after
final judgment in the case.
4. Persons Who Are NOT Parties May NOT Seek Inhibitions
Hilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). Persons who are not parties to the
case may not seek the inhibition of a judge
Sec. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or
could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges
make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the
fair trial of any person or issue.
1. Duty to Refrain from Undue Comments on a Case
Cacatian v. Liwanag, (2003). Irresponsible speech or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
Fecundo v. Berjamen, (1989). A judge’s language, both written
and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued.
Where such comment has been made, the judge would have the
obligation to recuse himself from hearing the case.
Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material
witness in the matter in controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an
economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness
therein;
(e) The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the
fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a
financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
1. Instances of Mandatory Inhibition
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Vanguardia, A.M.
(a) Austria v. Masaquel, (1967). Where the judge can be
associated with either of the parties or their counsel
(b) Umale v. Villaluz, (1973). Where the judge has prior
personal knowledge about the facts of the case.
(c) People v. Gomez, (1967). Where the judge is biased or
partial
(d) Villauz v. Mijares, (1998). Where the judge is related to the
party-litigant or the counsel. In this case, the judge took
cognizance of a petition for correction of entry in the birth
record of her grandson, Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, the
child of her daughter Ma. Pilita M. Guarango,
notwithstanding such close relationship
2016 Bar, Q. II: State at least five (5) instances where judges
should disqualify themselves from participating in any
proceedings where their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
A: Canon 3, Sec. 5 of New Code Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
Rule 137, Sec. 1, ROC provides for similar grounds.
2015 Bar, Q. XIII(A): In a land registration case before Judge
Lucio, the petitioner is represented by the second cousin of
Judge Lucio’s wife.
Differentiate between compulsory and voluntary disqualification
and determine if Judge Lucio should disqualify himself under
either circumstance
A: In compulsory disqualification, the judge is compelled to inhibit
himself from presiding over a case when any of the ground
provided by the law or the rules exists
Under Rule 137, Sec. 1, ROC, no judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case:
(1) In which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
(2) In which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or
(3) In which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or
(4) In which he has been presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the

written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
Sec. 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary adds the following grounds:
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or
personalknowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material
witness in the matterin controversy;
In voluntary disqualification, a judge may inhibit himself in the
exercise of his discretion.
Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, ROC provides that “a judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.”
The New Code of Professional Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
adds that “judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in
any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially (Canon 3,
Sec. 5)
There is no mandatory ground for Judge Lucio to disqualify
himself. The second cousin of his wife, a sixth degree relative, is
appearing not as a party but as counsel.
2015 Bar, Q. XIII(B): In a land registration case before Judge
Lucio, the petitioner is represented by the second cousin of
Judge Lucio’s wife.
If none of the parties move for his disqualification, may Judge
Lucio proceed with the case?
A: If none of the parties moves for his disqualification, Judge Lucio
may proceed with the case. All the more so if, without the
participation of the judge, the parties and their lawyers execute a
written agreement that Judge Lucio may proceed with the same,
and such agreement is signed by them and made a part of the
records of the case.
2014 Bar, Q. XVII: Judge Clint Braso is hearing a case between
Mr. Timothy and Khristopher Company, a company where his
wife used to work as one of its Junior Executives for several
years. Doubting the impartiality of the Judge, Mr. Timothy filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Clint Braso. Judge Clint Braso refused on
the ground that his wife has long resigned from the company.
Decide.
A: The fact that Judge Braso’s wife used to work for Kristofer
Company is not a mandatory ground for his inhibition.
However, Sec. 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges should disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceeding in which “it may
appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide
the matter in partially”. The SC has advised that a judge “should
exercise his decision in a way that the people’s faith in the courts
of justice is not impaired” (Pimentel v. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934,
September 18, 1967).
While it may not be reasonable to believe that Judge Braso cannot
be impartial because his wife used to work as a Junior Executive
for Kristofer Company, the better part of prudence would dictate
that he inhibit himself from the case involving the said company.
2014 Bar, Q. XIX(b): After the pre-trial of a civil case for replevin,
Judge D advised B’s counsel to settle the case because according
to Judge D, his initial assessment of the case shows that B’s
evidence is weak.
What remedy or remedies may be taken by B’s lawyer against
Judge D? Discuss fully.
A: B’s lawyer could move for the disqualification or inhibition of
the judge, and if he refuses to inhibit, his refusal can be raised to a
higher court by certiorari.
2. Instances When Judge Need Not Inhibit
(a) Aparicio v. Andal, (1989). The fact that an administrative
case has been filed by a party against the judge is not a
ground for inhibition in the absence of factual basis for bias
and prejudice. This is especially true where the
administrative cases were filed only to force the judge to
inhibit himself from the consideration of the case before
him.
(b) Choa v. Chiongson, (1996). The fact that the judge is a next-
door neighbor of the complainant was found to be petty.
(c) Macariola v. Asuncion. Close personal friendship is not a
ground for inhibition. As long as that friendly relations with a
party-litigant does not influence his official conduct as a
judge in the cases where his close friend was a party.
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Santos v. Judge Lacurom, (2006). There must be convincing court
to his close friend, or that his close friend benefited from his
personal relations with respondent judge, or that respondent
judge used his influence, if any, to favor his close friend. However,
it would have been prudent for the judge to inhibit himself.
2016 Bar, Q. IX: Atty. Tristan filed a motion to disqualify Judge
Robert from hearing a civil case on the ground that the latter
was the classmate and fraternity brother of Atty. Mark, Atty.
Tristan's opposing counsel. Judge Robert denied the motion on
the ground that under Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
he is not required to inhibit in all cases where his classmates and
fraternity brothers are participating lawyers in cases before him.
Is Judge Robert correct in denying the motion?
A: Judge Robert is correct in denying the motion for inhibition on
the ground that he was the classmate of Atty. Tristan’s adverse
counsel.
That one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the judge is
not a mandatory ground for his disqualification (Vda. De Bonifacio
v. BLT Bus Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-226810, August 31, 1970; Santos v.
Lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006).
However, he may inhibit on the discretionary ground that his
refusal to inhibit may reasonably cause the parties to lose trust
and confidence on the court.
Sec. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties
and lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation, all agree
in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding.
The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
1. Grounds for Inhibition May be Waived by the Parties
 In order for a valid waiver to be made, the judge must first
be transparent and forthright with the grounds for
inhibition. The waiver should be made by the parties and
their counsels and the waiver must be in writing.
 Canon 3, Sec. 6 would be applicable only in the event that
the grounds for inhibition are immaterial or unsubstantial.
Canon 4: Propriety

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
1. Duty to Avoid Improprieties and Appearance of
Improprieties
 A judge is not just a person who was given an employment
in government to decide disputes. A judge occupies a
position in government which gives a tangible semblance to
an important intangible concept, viz: justice in society.
 Thus, appearance of the judge is not just a shallow concept
but an embodiment of society’s aspiration for justice itself.
2. Illustrations of Violations of Canon 4, Sec. 1
(a) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). Including self-laudatory details
stated in his professional calling card such as that he topped
the bar exams with a grade of 87.55 and having graduated
with “full second honors” from ADMU, breached the norms
of simplicity and modesty required of judges. Circulating or
distributing such calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements is simple misconduct.
(b) OCA v. Judge Floro, (2006). Announcing, through his branch
clerk of court, his qualifications, in open court before the
start of the proceedings is unnecessary publicity. The Court
noted that such a practice shows that “the judges appear so
unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants
and their lawyers’ approval”. Since the questioned practice
occurred only for one (1) week the judge was found guilty of
simple misconduct.
(c) Presado v. Genova, (1993). The judge and his family were
found to be using his chambers as their residence, with the
provincial government paying for the electric bills. The judge
was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
(d) Alday v. Cruz, (2001). Poking a gun at a person with whom
he had a traffic altercation (Judge suspended for 1 year and
fined P50,000)
3. Gross Misconduct of a Judge, Defined
SPO2 Yap v. Judge Inopiquez, Jr. (2003). “Misconduct” is defined
as a wrong or improper conduct, while “gross” connotes
something “out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be
excused; flagrant; shameful”
Francisco v. Cosico, (2004). For serious misconduct to exist, the
judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules.
Sec. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
1. Personal Restrictions in the Conduct of Judges
Vedana v. Valencia. Upon taking his oath of office as a judge, the
judge, who was formerly an ordinary lawyer, surrenders his
former lifestyles to the guarded lifestyle of a judge. He steps onto
a stage always subject to public scrutiny. A judge’s official life
cannot simply be detached from his personal life.
Resngit-Marquez v. Judge Llamas, (2002). A “magistrate has to
live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct
of others when his own needs judgment. It should not be ‘do as I
say and not what I do’. For then the court over which he is called
to preside will be a mockery, one devoid of respect.
2. Illustrations of Violations of Canon 4, Sec. 2
(a) Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, (1999). A party-litigant and the
judge were photographed coming out of a private room of a
resort hotel. While the photographs did not show that
parties in sexual activity, the Court gave due credence to the
complainant’s allegation that the judge solicited sexual
favors from her while she had a pending case before the
judge
(b) Fidel v. Judge Caraos, (2002). A judge who went to a police
station demanding the release of a detention prisoner and
ing: “Putang ina ninyong mga pulis kayo, nasaan si hepe?
Hoy, ilabas ninyo ito ngayon din, putang ina ninyong mga
pulis. Sinong masusunod dito, mayor, pulis o judge?, is guilty
of conduct unbecoming a judge.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their
court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
1. Duty to Restrict Relations with Lawyers
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 The judge must maintain a respectable distance between
himself and the lawyer that appear before him. Cordial
relations should be maintained at a respectable level.
 Excessive camaraderie can be misinterpreted as a ground to
unduly influence the judge. Conversely, excessive closeness
can be exploited to portray a baseless image of influence
over the judge.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 3
(a) OCA v. Judge Paderanga, (2005). A judge who unjustifiably
used his contempt powers. While a lawyer may have been
discourteous by repeatedly interrupting the court
proceedings, that lawyer should have been first warned. A
magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament
of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable
qualities of every judge. A short temper may create an
image of bias against a particular lawyer or party
(b) Omana v. Yulde, (2002). A judge who engages in a drinking
spree with a lawyer who has pending cases before him.
2015 Bar, Q. XXI: Judge Junior attended the 50th birthday party
of his fraternity brother, Atty. Vera. Also present at the party
was Atty. Rico who was Atty. Vera's classmate way back in high
school and who was handling Civil Case No. 5555 currently
pending before Judge Junior's court. Well-aware that Atty. Rico
had a case before his sala, Judge Junior still sat next to Atty. Rico
at a table, and the two conversed with each other, and ate and
drank together throughout the night. Since Atty. Vera was a
well-known personality, his birthday party was featured in a
magazine. The opposing party to Atty. Rico's client in Civil Case
No. 5555, while flipping through the pages of the magazine,
came upon the pictures of Judge Junior and Atty. Rico together
at the party and used said pictures as bases for instituting an
administrative case against Judge Junior. Judge Junior, in his
answer, reasoned that he attended Atty. Vera's party in his
private capacity, that he had no control over who Atty. Vera
invited to the party, and that he and Atty. Rico never discussed
Civil Case No. 5555 during the party. Did Judge Junior commit an
administrative infraction? Explain.
A: Canon 4, Sec. 3 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary provides that “judges shall, in their personal relations
with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
The act of Judge Junior in sitting next to Atty. Rico, a lawyer whom
he knew had a case before his sala, and dining and conversing

with him throughout the night, violates the foregoing rule. It
tends to give rise to suspicion of partiality. It is improper conduct
for which he may be reprimanded.
3. Related Provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 3.04 – A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants
are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case
in which any member of their family represents a litigant or is
associated in any manner with the case.
1. Restrictions Involving the Judge’s Family
Garcia v. De la Pena. The rule on compulsory disqualification of a
judge to hear a case where the respondent judge is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity
rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law
conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or
impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him
and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of
written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
2. Illustrations of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 4
(a) Ortiz v. Jaculbe, (2005). Hearing a case wherein his son-in-
law, who is within the first degree of affinity, appeared as
counsel of the plaintiff.
(b) Sales v. Judge Calvan, (2002). The Court found that Judge
Calvan violated the rule on disqualification of judges as set
out in the Code of Judicial Conduct and the ROC when he
conducted the preliminary investigation of a criminal case
where his wife was the niece of the private complainant and
who was also one of the witnesses.
2016 Bar, Q. V: Constantino was accused of estafa by Hazel, the
wife of Judge Andres, for misappropriating the ring she
entrusted to him. Since Judge Andres was present when Hazel
handed the ring to Constantino, he was compelled by his wife to
testify as a witness for the prosecution in the criminal case. Did
the judge commit any violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary? Explain.
A: Canon 4, Sec. 4 of the NCJC for the Philippine Judiciary provides
that “Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in
which any member of their family represents a litigant or is
associated in any manner with the case.”
Judge Constantino’s appearance as a witness in the criminal case
in which his wife was the offended party is violative of this rule.
It may also be violative of Canon 3, Sec. 1, which provides that
“Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome
of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency."
Sec. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a
member of the legal profession to receive clients of the latter or
of other members of the legal profession.
1. Restrictions in the Use of Judge’s Residence
 Judges must keep their distance from lawyers and avoid
involvement with their respective practice of law even if
such lawyers have no pending cases before them.
 Judges and lawyers must maintain a discreet relationship. As
such, vulgar display of friendship must be avoided.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 5
J. King & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, (2004). A judge inviting
a litigant to his house in order to demand from him a certain
amount
Sec. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
1. Exercise of Constitutional Rights Should NOT Impinge
Judicial Independence
 While judges continue to enjoy their constitutional rights as
citizens, their exercise of such rights must be mindful of
their equally important constitutional duty to uphold judicial
independence.
 In the event that such constitutional rights and
constitutional duty clash, the judge must be mindful of the
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judicial office which he holds and his sworn duty to uphold
judicial independence.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 6
(a) In re: Judge Acuna, (2005). A judge who expresses himself
with expletives commits an impropriety. Hence, the use of
“putris” and “putang ina” were unfit expressions for men of
the robe. It did not matter that they were not directed to
any person in particular, as they give the impression of a
person’s ill manners. Considering that the respondent is not
an ordinary citizen, such intemperate language detracts
from how a judge should conduct himself. The respondent’s
use of such expletives is improper for the extolled office of a
magistrate of the law. Thus, the respondent’s claim that his
“favorite expressions” were not directed at anyone in
particular is unacceptable”
(b) Seludo v. Judge Fineza, (2004). The judge was Fined for
using intemperate language.
Sec. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal
fiduciary and financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts
to be informed about the financial interests of members of their
family.
1. Duty of Financial Transparency and Duty to Avoid Financial
Conflicts of Interests
 A judge should avoid financial improprieties. He must be
always conscious of his and his family’s financial dealings,
when practicable, to avoid being caught inadvertently in
financial entanglements.
 Where a potential financial conflict would occur, the judge
becomes duty-bound to inhibit from the case.
 A judge should be conscious about going into a debtor-
creditor relationship with others, as well as mindful of his
financial investments.
Sec. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of
their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special
position improperly to influence them in the performance of
judicial duties.
1. Duty NOT To Use Judicial Influence
 A judicial office carries a certain amount of prestige and
influence in society. That prestige and influence should be

used to promote and enhance respect for the law and the
administration of justice, and not to further the judge’s and
his family’s personal interests
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 8
(a) Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, (2005). A judge who attends the
proceedings of an election protest before a MCTC where his
brother was the election protestor purportedly in order to
give moral support to his brother.
(b) Perez v. Costales, (2005). In writing to the administrative
officials of the university which employs the professors sued
by the judge’s wife, respondent judge obviously sought to
influence or put pressure on them with regard to the actions
to be taken against the four professors. His wife could have
written the letter herself, as she is the complainant in the
criminal cases against the four professors. Instead, it was
respondent judge who did, and he even used and stated his
judicial position in his letter, thereby insinuating that it
should not be ignored or trifled with. It cannot be gainsaid
that respondent Judge is aware that his judicial position
alone could exert influence or authority over the university
officials, and he took advantage of such authority.
2015 Bar, Q. V: Judge Ana P. Sevillano had an issue with the
billings for the post-paid cellular phone services of her 16-year-
old daughter for the last three consecutive months. Although
Judge Sevillano had been repeatedly calling the Customer
Service Hotline of Universal Telecoms, the billings issue was
never fully settled to Judge Sevillano's satisfaction. Finally, Judge
Sevillano wrote the National Telecommunications Commission a
letter of complaint against Universal Telecoms, using her official
court stationery and signing the letter as "Judge Ana P.
Sevillano." Did Judge Sevillano violate any professional or ethical
standard for judges? Justify your answer.
A: Judge Sevillano violated Sec. 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provides that
“judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to
advance their private interests, or those of a member of their
family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to
convey the impression that anyone is in a special position
improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial
duties, as well as Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “a lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.”
In the case of Ladigon v. Garong (A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712, August
20, 2008), where a MTC Judge wrote a letter to a religious
organization abroad, about the complaint of one of its members,
using the stationary of his court and signing with his title of
“Judge”, the SC held with regard to the use of the stationary, that:
In the present case, the respondent Judge crossed the line of
propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint
involving an alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of
Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to
a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the
impression of official recognition or notice of the reported
violation.
With regard to the use of the judge’s title in signing the letter, the
SC held that:
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the
use of the title of "Judge" or "Justice" in the correspondence of a
member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an official
designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a
line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of
the appellation. While the title can be used for social and other
identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use
the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal,
family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a
judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge. To do
any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.
Sec. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial
capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose
related to their judicial duties.
1. Duty of Confidentiality
 Judges come into possession of various information in the
course of their judicial duties. These information should only
be used in arriving at a decision of a case, and not for any
other use.
 Hence, the judge may not use any information for other
unofficial purposes.
2. Court Records as Public Documents; Access Requires
“Legitimate Reasons”
In re: Gitto, (2005). Relevant documents which are submitted to,
and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course
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of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies. Courts in the U.S. have
recognized the general right to inspect and copy public records
and documents, including judicial records and documents.
FTC v. Standard Financial Management Corp. (1987). The
presumption that the public has a right to see and copy judicial
records attaches to those documents which properly come before
the court in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding and which
are relevant to the adjudication.
In the Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, (1984).
The policy reasons for granting public access to criminal
proceedings include the public’s right to monitor the functioning
of our courts, thereby ensuring quality, honesty and respect for
our legal system. Such policy reasons apply to the grant of public
access to civil cases as well.
tHilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). Not all court records may be
accessed by the public:
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other
documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public
concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of
establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or
a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may
be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed them is to
be considered.
If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or
interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen's
constitutional right to information.
Once a particular information has been determined to be of public
concern, the accessory right of access to official records, including
judicial records, are open to the public.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be
restricted on a showing of good cause. How "good cause" can be
determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Republican Company v. Appeals Court teaches:
The public's right of access to judicial records, including
transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court orders, maybe
restricted, but only on a showing of "good cause." "To determine
whether good cause is shown, a judge must balance the rights of
the parties based on the particular facts of each case." In so doing,
the judge "must take into account all relevant factors, 'including,

but not limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy,
the type of information and the privacy interests involved, the
extent of community interest, and the reason for the request.'"
And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and
protective powers of every court over its own records and files.
The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the
court to exercise supervisory powers over materials surrendered
into its care, held:
It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound
to inquire into the use that is to be made of them and, in my view,
is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate
undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect
competing interests.
In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered
into its care, the court may regulate the use made of it. In an
application of this nature, the court must protect the respondent
and accommodate public interest in access. In an application of
this nature the court must protect the respondent and
accommodate the public interest in access. This can only be done
in terms of the actual purpose, and in the face of obvious
prejudice and the absence of a specific purpose, the order for
unrestricted access and reproduction should not have been made.
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion
and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court,
after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request
for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties.
In the exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be
relevant: "whether parties have interest in privacy, whether
information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper
purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious
embarrassment to party, whether information is important to
public health and safety, whether sharing of information among
litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, whether party
benefiting from confidentiality order is public entity or official,
and whether case involves issues important to the public."
Accordingly then, as long as any party, counsel or person has a
legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and pays court
fees, a court may not deny access to such records.
3. Rationale for Public Access to Court Records
Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co. The foundation of the right
of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the fact
that the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what goes on
in the court is news, or would be interesting, or would furnish
topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to know
whether a public officer is properly performing his duty. In other
words, the right of the public to be informed of proceedings in
court is not founded in the desire or necessity of people to know
about the doings of others, but in the necessity of knowing
whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his duty.
The case of Cowley vs. Pulsifer is so pertinent to the questions
presented for our decision in the case at that we cannot refrain
from quoting extensively therefrom.
The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings
made public more than counterbalances the inconveniences to
the such proceedings."
The chief advantage to the country which we can discern, and
that which we understand to be intended by the foregoing
passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper
administration of justice. It is desirable that the trial of causes
should take place under the public eye, not because the
controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern,
but because it is of the highest moment that those who
administer justice should always act under the sense of public
responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy
himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is
performed.
From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the
supreme court of Massachusetts to lay down the proposition that
simply because a pleading happened to be filed in public office it
became public property to such n extent that any individual,
whether interested or not, had the right to publish its contents, or
that any newspaper was privileged to scatter the allegations
contained therein to the four corners of the country. The right of
the public to know the contents of the paper is the basis of the
privilege, which is, as we have said, the right to determine by its
own senses that its servant, the judge, is performing his duties
according to law
4. Court Records or Judicial Records, Defined
Hilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). The term "judicial record" or "court
record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of
the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers,
exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued
and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word
testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the
possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for
purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described
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to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape,
photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter's notes,
transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in
physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or
in connection with the transaction of any official business by the
court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case.
Sec. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties,
judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning
the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or
related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned
with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract
from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere
with the performance of judicial duties.
1. Allowable Judicial Activities
 A judge, just like any other human beings, should have other
social and professionally-related activities. Nevertheless,
these activities must be consistent with the dignity and
responsibility of the judicial office
Sec. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial
office.
1. Duty NOT To Practice Law
Carual v. Judge Brusola, (1999). The basis for this rule is public
policy.
The rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It
also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention
to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special
favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to
promote the public interest.
2. Private Practice by a Judge, Defined
Ziga v. Judge Arejola, (2003). “Private practice” is more than an
isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
OCA v. Judge Floro. Where it appears that save for the “Motion
for Entry of Judgment” it does not appear from the records that
Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court
proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to
conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for
entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise
constitute private practice of law. Moreover, Judge Floro is
obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is
the petitioner.
3. Other Basis for Prohibition
Rule 138, Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice – No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge shall not
engage in the private practice of law.
Sec. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or
participate in other organizations representing the interests of
judges.
1. Involvement in Judicial Organizations
 Membership and active participation of judges, in judges’
organizations is a welcome activity.
 Such social activities of judges with lawyers are restricted,
such activities afford an opportunity to socialize with one’s
peers. It is also a venue to pursue professional development
in the exchange of ideas with fellow judges.
Sec. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask
for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her
in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
1. Duty of Judges and Members of His Family Against
Soliciting or Accepting Financial or Material Gain
Haw Tay v. Singayao. The acts of respondent Judge in demanding
and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court
constitute serious misconduct in office. This Court condemns in
the strongest possible terms the misconduct of respondent Judge.
It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of
those who are charged with the responsibility of administering
the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes
the respect for law and the courts without which government
cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity.
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 4, Sec. 13
NBI v. Judge Reyes, (2000). A judge who asked for a sum of
money in return for the dismissal of drug-related criminal charges
was entrapped by the NBI.
2014 Bar, Q. IX: Judge A accepted a gift consisting of assorted
canned goods and other grocery items from his compadre whose
friend has a pending case with him. He accepted the gift just so
as not to embarrass his compadre. When his compadre left his
chambers, he asked his secretary to donate the gift he received
to the victims of Typhoon Yolanda.
Did the judge cross the ethical line? Explain your answer.
A: In accepting a gift from his compadre, which he must have
suspected was connected with the case of his compadre’s friend,
because he accepted just in order not to embarrass his compadre,
Judge A violated Sec. 13, Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary which provides that:
Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.
Sec. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their
duties or functions.
1. Duty of Court Staff and Persons Under the Judge’s
Authority Against Soliciting or Accepting Financial or
Material Gains
 What a judge cannot do directly, the judge should not be
allowed to do through his staff and other under his
authority.
 Canon 4, Sec. 13 and 14 postulate that those enjoying the
judge’s trust and confidence should not be used as “bridges”
to the judge himself.
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Sec. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public
disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as
appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that
such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as
intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial
duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
1. Acceptable Financial or Material Gains
 Token gifts or reasonable occasions are acceptable/ Three
factors would be relevant:
(a) The value of the gift which obviously should not be
excessive.
(b) The regularity of the occasion. Thus, it should not be for a
frivolous occasion not normally celebrated.
(c) The source of the gift. If the gift-giver happens to be a party-
litigant with a pending case before the judge, the value of
the gift might be immaterial as the propriety of the gesture
might be misconstrued or questioned
Canon 5: Equality
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is
essential to the due performance of the judicial office.
Sec. 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in
society and differences arising from various sources, including but
not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and
economic status and other like causes.
1. Duty to be Aware of Social Diversities
 A judge should not find a witness less credible simply
because of the lack of education or under-education of that
witness, or because a witness is a gay or a lesbian. These are
matters irrelevant in deciding a case.
 Understanding social diversities would also help a judge in
appreciating the witness because of a particular social trait.
 A Muslim litigant or witness would be better understood, in
terms of religious belief or customs, by a Christian judge, or
that the testimonial inclination of a pauper litigant would be
different from the inclinations of a well-off witness.
Sec. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person
or group on irrelevant grounds.

1. Duty Against Bias and Prejudice
State Prosecutors v. Muro. What is required on the part of judges
is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges
can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are
both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their
role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit
limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not
to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw
his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He
is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial
necessity of order in the social life."
Sec. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation
on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance
of such duties.
1. Duty to Give Due Consideration, Respect and Courtesy
 Judicial functions should be carried out in an orderly manner
free from any extraneous disruptions. Acts of
inconsiderateness disrespect and discourtesy disrupts
judicial proceedings which unduly hampers the judge’s task.
 In the end, it is the administration of justice which suffers as
a result of poor human relations with the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and even judicial obligations.
2. Illustration of Lack of Consideration to a Judicial Colleague
Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. (2008). A CA Justice
was found to be disrespectful to a judicial colleague “when he
unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the decision
that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly
forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had
already been “reorganized-out” of the Special Ninth Division as of
July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he
should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why
he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to his or her influence, direction or control to differentiate
between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any
irrelevant ground.
1. Duty to Ensure Equal Treatment by Court Staff
 Inappropriate conduct of the court staff towards the party-
litigants should be the accountability of the judge. His failure
to properly supervise his staff constitutes negligence on the
part of the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the
court to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally
relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of
legitimate advocacy.
1. Duty to Ensure Lawyers are NOT Biased or Prejudiced
 Without awaiting the objection from the opposing counsel,
the judge may motu proprio rule a manifestation, which
smack of bias and prejudice, as immaterial and irrelevant.
 Pursuant to Canon 5, Sec. 5, the judge may reprimand the
counsel for such biased or prejudiced manifestation.
Canon 6: Competence and Diligence
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office.
Sec. 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all
other activities.
1. Primacy of Judicial Duties
In re: Echiverri, (1975). Judges should be attentive of their work
ethic:
Judges are duty bound to comply with the above to insure the
maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy administration
of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five hours per working day
of the week will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as
possible and to dispose with regular dispatch the increasing
number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters
needing the attention of the judge are to be attended to outside
of this five-hour schedule of trial.
Sec. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial
duties, which include not only the performance of judicial
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functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the
court’s operations.
1. Coverage of Judicial Duties
Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Joboco, (1998). A judge was
“Admonished” for his refusal to sign the certificates of service of
his Clerk of Court which resulted in the withholding of the clerk’s
salary. The judge was also “Advised” “to exert care and
consideration in his dealings with his office staff.
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and
enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary
for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage
for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should
be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
1. Duty of Professional Development
In re: HDO Issued by Judge Sardido, (2001). The Court
reprimanded Judge Sardido for issuing a HDO contrary to Circular
No. 39-97.
Cabilao v. Judge Sardido, (1995). The Court fined the same Judge
Sardido P5,000 for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion and gross misconduct. The Court gave stern warning to
Judge Sardido that a commission of the same or similar act would
be dealt with more severely.
Almeron v. Judge Sardido, (1997). The Court imposed on the
same Judge Sardido, once again, a stiffer fine of P10,000 for gross
ignorance of the law. He was again sternly warned that the
commission of the same or similar act in the future would be dealt
with more severely including, if warranted, his dismissal from the
service.
Torcende v. Judge Sardido, (2003). The Court found Judge
Sardido again guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of gross
misconduct. This time the Court dismissed Judge Sardido from the
service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits.
2. More Than Just a Cursory Acquaintance with the Statutes
and Procedural Rules is Needed
Aguilar v. Dalanao, (2000). There is the need to be diligent in
keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence, for
the study of law is a never-ending and ceaseless process.

Almeron v. Sardido, (1997). Members of the judiciary are
supposed to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules, more so with legal principles
and rules so elementary and basic that not to know them, or to
act as if one does not know them, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
Sec. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant
developments of international law, including international
conventions and other instruments establishing human rights
norms.
1. Duty Towards Developments in International Law and
Human Rights
1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2. The Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land.
 International law, therefore, is an indispensable basis of
judicial action. In today’s era of international inter-
dependence and international trade and relations,
knowledge of international law has become imperative.
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.
1. Duty to be Efficient, Fair and Prompt
2. Illustration of Violation of Canon 6, Sec. 5
(a) Sabatin v. Mallare, (2004). Undue delay in the resolving
pending motions or incidents within the reglementary
period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.
(b) OCA v. Judge Floro. Directing the release of an accused on
recognizance on the basis of a cursory interview of the
custodian and the applicant without an investigation report
from the probation officer is a violation of the rules on
probation under P.D. 968 (Probation Law). Under the
Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted
only during the period for awaiting the submission of the
investigation report on the application for probation and the
resolution thereon.
3. Illustration of Ignorance of Procedural Rule
(a) Oral Orders Not Reduced into Writing
OCA v. Judge Floro. The judge’s argument that his Orders need
not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes was due to ignorance of a procedural rule.
Echaus v. CA, (1990). No Judgment, or order whether final or
interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down
in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e. delivered by the Judge to
the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation.
4. Judicial Errors
Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, (2000). Not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of law. If committed in good faith, such errors
do not warrant administrative sanctions. Otherwise, judges, in
effect, will be expected to render infallible judgments. However,
this would apply only within certain tolerable judgments and does
not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of
error.
Manlavi v. Gacott, Jr. A judge is not subject to disciplinary action
for acts committed in his judicial capacity unless they were
committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption and bad faith.
Gil v. Judge Lopez, (2003). Where the judge acted in good faith
but his ignorance is so gross or patent or when the judge acts
fraudulently, he should be held liable.
5. Delay in Resolving Cases
In re: Request of Judge Masamayor, (1999). For failure to resolve
cases within the reglementary period, a judge may be held liable
for gross inefficiency and dereliction of duty. On meritorious
grounds, judges may ask for additional time to resolve cases. But
such application for extension must be filed before the expiration
of the prescribed period.
CJC, Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Fernandez v. Hamoy, (2004). The judge may not attribute delay in
resolution to a mix-up of the records. The inefficiency of his court
personnel was not given serious consideration in view of the
Court’s observation that “it was the judge’s duty to devise an
efficienct recording and filing system in his court to enable him to
monitor the flow of cases. In this case, the case was not resolved
for 13 years (Judge dismissed from service)
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Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC-Iriga City, Br. 34,
(2000). Delay in resolution of cases also constitutes a violation of
the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of
their cases.
Re: Request for the Expeditious Resolution of Civil Case Pending
at RTC Branch 9, Tacloban City, (1998). By a regulation, a judge
may not receive his salary where a number of cases remain
unresolved. But a judge who collects his salary upon false
certification that he has resolved the required number of cases is
guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct.
Gaspar v. Judge Bayhon. Where, of course, they delay cannot be
attributed to the judge, such as when the completion of the
transcript of stenographic notes is up to a stenographer which is
not under the control of the judge, the judge may not be held
accountable.
6. Inefficiency of Court Personnel is NOT an Excuse
Pagayao v. Imbing, (2001). A judge may not raise as an excuse the
inefficiency of his court personnel.
Gonzales-Decano v. Siapno, (2001). The judge bears ultimate
responsibility for the inefficiency in his court.
Sec. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
1. Duty to Maintain Order, Decorum and Respect in Court
Proceedings
Fineza v. Aruelo. All judges should always observe courtesy and
civility.
Fidel v. Caraos. Judge must also be temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and language especially to those
appearing before him.
Turqueza v. Hernando, (1980). Judicial decorum requires a
magistrate to be at all times temperate in his language, refraining
from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting “to
language of vilification”

Impao v. Makilala. Judicial decorum also requires that a judge
must look respectable and be properly attired. Hence, a judge
must not attend to a case in sleeveless shirt and slippers or in a
polo jacket.
2. Television Coverage of a Trial
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan
of the Plunder Cases Against the Former Pres. Estrada, (2001).
The live media (television) coverage of a trial would be a denial of
due process as it could undermine a fair and impartial trial.
3. Illustration of Violation of Canon 6, Sec. 6
(a) OCA v. Judge Floro. A trial judge was found guilty of using
intemperate language upon the testimony of a clerk of court
in an administrative investigation of said judge. The clerk of
court testified:
Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence
of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk,
he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court.
There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-
luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not
during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter
"malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not surprise us
one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for
Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he
uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the
transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the
Court Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the
Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after
hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open Court, before all of us,
the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and
the defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not
to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive
languages against the justice system, against a certain judge,
against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against
people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit
of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between
the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of
Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in
the record because it contained offensive languages highly
improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang
ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera,
etcetera"
(b) Mane v. Judge Belen, (2008). A trial judge was reprimanded
after said respondent judge made “sarcastic and humiliating,
even threatening and boastful remarks to complainant who
is admittedly ‘still young’ ‘unnecessary lecturing and
debating’ as well as unnecessary display of learning
(c) Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, (2007). A judge who utters “next
time you see your husband, open your arms and legs”, was
found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct.
(d) Santos v. Cruz. Berating a witness and telling him: “You can
go to hell I don’t care or where do you want to go Mr.
Cano”
2015 Bar, Q. XI: Atty. Belinda appeared as counsel for accused
Popoy in a case being heard before Judge Tadhana. After Popoy
was arraigned, Atty. Belinda moved for a resetting of the pre-
trial conference. This visibly irked Judge Tadhana and so before
Atty. Belinda could finish her statement, Judge Tadhana cut her
off by saying that if she was not prepared to handle the case,
then he could easily assign a counsel de oficio for Popoy. Judge
Tadhana also uttered that Atty. Belinda was wasting the
precious time of the court. Atty. Belinda tried to explain that she
was capable of handling the case but before she could finish her
explanation, Judge Tadhana again cut her off and accused her of
always making excuses for her incompetence. Judge Tadhana
even declared that he did not care if Atty. Belinda filed a
thousand administrative cases against him.
According to Atty. Belinda, Judge Tadhana had also humiliated
her like that in the past for the flimsiest of reasons. Even Atty.
Belinda's clients were not spared from Judge Tadhana's wrath as
he often scolded witnesses who failed to respond immediately
to questions asked of them on the witness stand.
Atty. Belinda filed an administrative case against Judge Tadhana.
Do the acts of Judge Tadhana as described above constitute a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct? Explain.
A: Judge Tadhana has violated Sec. 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct of the Philippine Judiciary which provides that:
Sec. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.
The SC has held as follows:
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The duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court applies to
members of the bar and bench alike. A judge should be courteous
both in his conduct and in his language especially to those
appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the
public without being petty, arbitrary, overbearing, or tyrannical.
He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and
remember always that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all, he
must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason
for reproach. (Ruiz v. Bringas, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1266, April 6,
2000)
2014 Bar, Q. XI: A judge who insults counsel and shouts
invectives at a litigant is guilty of:
(a) serious misconduct
(b) committing acts unbecoming of a judge
(c) manifest bias and partiality
A: (b)
4. Related Provision in the Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants
are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Sec. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the
diligent discharge of judicial duties.
1. Conduct Compatible with Diligent Discharge of Judicial
Duties
 Canon 6, Sec. 7 covers all other questionable or doubtful
conduct of a judge
 Ultimately, the judge must serve the people by rendering
justice where justice is due.
Definitions
In this Code, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the
following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:
“Court staff” includes the personal staff of the judge including law
clerks.

“Judge” means any person exercising judicial power, however
designated.
“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-
law, daughter-inlaw, and any other relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a companion
or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
heretofore applied in the Philippines to the extent that the
provisions or concepts therein are embodied in this Code:
Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of
specific provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall be applicable in a
suppletory character.
This New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary shall
take effect on the first day of June 2004, following its publication
not later than 15 May 2004 in two newspapers of large circulation
in the Philippines to ensure its widest publicity.
Promulgated this 27th day of April 2004. The Code took effect on
June 1, 2004.
Other Notes
1. Evidence Required
Lachica v. Flordeliza, (1996). The quantum of evidence required
to hold a judge administratively liable is only substantial evidence.
2. Accountability as a Lawyer
NBI v. Judge Reyes, (2000). The judge who was charged with
bribery was dismissed from the service and was also disbarred.
3. Preventive Suspension of Judges
OCA v. Judge Floro. A judge may be preventively suspended by
the SC indefinitely or “until such time that a final decision is
reached in the administrative case against him or her.”
Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic Benefits of
Judge Iturralde, (2005). Unlike ordinary service officials and
employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense
warranting preventive suspension are not automatically
reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90) day period, as
Legal and Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises
Vanguardia, A.M.
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies
until a final decision is reached in the administrative case are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where
especially where there is a strong of likelihood of his guilt or such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof”.
complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
intended to shield the public from any further damage or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative
office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in
image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and the performance of their duties and functions
conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the
privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a
judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast
government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as
the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression.
4. The Requisite Exhaustion of Judicial Remedies Before
Resort to Administrative Charges Against the Judge
Hilado v. Judge Reyes, (2006). Resort to and exhaustion of judicial
remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among other
measures, an administrative complaint against the person of the
judge concerned.
Flores v. Hon. Abesamis. The law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a
Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary
remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a
motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary
in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for
inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative,
or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
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