RULE 112 a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
Preliminary Investigation They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or
Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. — Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at
least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. (1a)
Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. —
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
Sec. 3. Procedure.– The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable
cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of
whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if
he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching
to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and
these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination,
copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn
to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within
the ten (10) day period, the investigating office shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence
presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or
witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other
documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5)
days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not
there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to
submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the
resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such
action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation
is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information
against the respondent, or direct any other assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without
conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu
proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding
information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of
the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (4a)
Section 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. — Within ten (10) days after the preliminary
investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall state the findings of
facts and the law supporting his action, together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the
warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting
evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused and the order for his release; (d) the
transcripts of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of cancellation of
his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.
1
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city prosecutor, or the Ombudsman
or his deputy, as the case may be, shall review the resolution of the investigating judge on the existence
of probable cause. Their ruling shall expressly and clearly state the facts and the law on which it is
based and the parties shall be furnished with copies thereof. They shall order the release of an accused
who is detained if no probable cause is found against him. (5a)
Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or
information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has
been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace office directly with the proper
court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation
in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for
bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused
may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the
same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (7a; sec. 2, R.A. No. 7438)
RULE 113
Arrest
Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered
for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10)
days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a
report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state
the reasons therefor. (4a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
RULE 126
Search and Seizure
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court
where the criminal action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall
issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search
of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless
the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which
case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date.
Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)
2
 G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.
MANZANAS, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR,
THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at
Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE
PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch
35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of
law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines
for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran,
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand,
she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
3
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a
defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on
press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their
discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827
and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated
April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

4
 G.R. No. 110436 June 27, 1994
ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR., petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeks the reversal of the Orders
issued by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14252, dated February 17, 1993 1 and May
12, 1993, 2 denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
The facts are summarized in the Memorandum of public respondents as follows:
1. The Government Service Insurance System (the GSIS, for short) filed two separate
criminal complaints against petitioner Roman A. Cruz, Jr., a former public official who
used to be the President and General Manager of the GSIS and, also, the President
of the Manila Hotel, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. The first complaint against petitioner was filed with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (the OSP, for short) and docketed as OSP-88-02028 while the second,
which involved the same set of facts, was filed with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (the PCGG, for short) but which was later endorsed to the Office of
the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-0-91-0986. . . .
2. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the PCGG where petitioner duly
submitted his counter-affidavit. As a consequence’ of said investigation, an
Information was filed with the first Division of the Sandiganbayan, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 14134, charging petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019. . . .
3. During the proceedings before the OSP, petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint.
The OSP, however, denied the motion and filed with the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan an Information charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents (Articles 171 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code), docketed as
Criminal Case No. 14252. Petitioner was deemed by the OSP to have waived his right
to submit a counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. . . .
4. As a result of the filing of two informations with respondent Sandiganbayan
involving the same accused (herein petitioner) and the same set of facts, Criminal
Case No. 14252 was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 14134 which was pending
before the First Division of respondent Sandiganbayan. . . .
5. Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, remanded the consolidated cases against
petitioner to the Office of the Ombudsman for reinvestigation inasmuch as:
a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14134 was ordered dismissed in compliance
with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al., G.R. Nos.
92319-20, October 2, 1990, which declared null and void the preliminary
investigations conducted by the PCGG in all criminal cases involving matters which
were the subject matter of civil cases earlier filed; and
b) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 was correctly assailed by petitioner as
having been filed without the proper preliminary investigation. . . .
6. During the preliminary investigation conducted anew by the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit and supporting documents.
After the completion of said investigation, Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo of the
Office of the Ombudsman prepared a Resolution dated February 11, 1992, which
recommended the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252. . . .
7. Respondent Ombudsman, however, despite the above recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor ordered the prosecution to proceed under the existing
Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 on his observation, viz:
Let us not do the defending for the accused. The explanations
offered are too strained to be believed. At best they are matters of
defense for the accused to prove at the trial.
The alleged character of the funds involved being confidential and
requires no auditing is totally immaterial. It could even explain why
this anomaly was committed. . . .
8. Petitioner thus filed with respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) an Omnibus
Motion to Quash the Information, dated September 17, 1992, wherein he prayed ". . .
for the production of (the) record of the preliminary investigation), and that the
information be quashed outright or the disapproval of the Ombudsman set aside, or in
the alternative, that the Office of the Ombudsman be ordered to conduct further
proceedings, particularly the handwriting analysis prayed for by the petitioner which
would establish who committed the alleged falsification. . . .
On February 17, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution dated
February 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr.
is DENIED for lack of merit. . . .
10. A Motion for Reconsideration, dated April 12, 1993, of the aforequoted Resolution
was filed by petitioner . . . .
11. On May 12, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. of this
Court’s Resolution dated February 17, 1993 is DENIED for lack of merit. . . .
3
12. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion:
1. In not dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsman’s approval of
the order dismissing the complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor;
2. In not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary investigation in
wanton disregard of petitioner’s right to due process;
3. In not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating
prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash advance; and
4. In not requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings.
We do not find the instant petition to be impressed with merit as to warrant the extraordinary writs
prayed for.
The information filed against herein petitioner charging him with estafa through falsification of public
documents and for which he stands to be tried before respondent court alleges:
That on or about or during the period from March 26, 1984 to May 11, 1984, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the City of Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Roman Cruz, Jr., then President and General
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and likewise President
of the Manila Hotel, hence a public official having been duly appointed/elected and
qualified as such, taking advantage of his position, by means of deceit, committing an
5
 offense in relation to his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify Manila Hotel Invoices, Transportation, Charge, Cash, Budget for Food and
Drinks vouchers in the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 and then make it appear
that the GSIS management and staff had a five-day coordination meeting at the
Manila Hotel from March 23 to 30, 1984 at the cost of P350,000.00, for which reason
the GSIS paid/issued its check with No. 039511 dated May 11, 1984 in the amount of
P350,000.00 which check was deposited to the account of the Manila Hotel, and
thereafter cause the Manila Hotel to issue its check with No. 007272 dated May 11,
1984 in the amount of P350,000.00 payable to Roman Cruz, Jr. or himself, when in
truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that there was no such five-day GSIS
management and staff coordination meeting conducted/held at the Manila Hotel; and
further thereafter convert and appropriate to his own personal use and benefit/deposit
the said check to his own personal account with the Far East Bank and Trust Co. the
said check/amount of P350,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the GSIS and/or
Manila Hotel and/or the government in the said amount of P350,000.00. 4
I. Petitioner initially submits that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsman’s disapproval of the order dismissing the
complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor, in violation of the cardinal rules set forth
in Ang Tibay, et al. vs. CIR, et al. 5 The submission is premised on the theory that said rules apply to a
preliminary investigation which is to be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Petitioner avers that it is the
duty of the Ombudsman to assess the evidence and defenses of the respondent in deciding a case, a
failure wherein constitutes a violation of one’s right to due process of law. He further claims that "while
the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support the decision. The Ombudsman in
this case not only failed to decide right but has nothing at all to support his decision." 6
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Office of the Ombudsman is not exercising quasi-judicial
or quasi-legislative powers because "it does not act as a court" when it conducts preliminary
investigation of cases falling under its jurisdiction.
It is settled that the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which is defined as "an inquiry or proceeding
for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," 7 is, like court proceedings, subject to the requirements of
both substantive and procedural due process. This is because, a preliminary investigation is considered
as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions,
acts as a quasi-judicial officer. As we held in Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al.: 8
. . . It must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is to be observed
in order to assure that a person undergoing such preliminary investigation will be
afforded due process.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of due process is
that the person who presides and decides over a proceeding, including a preliminary
investigation, must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same
investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the
end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the
accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of
the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so
that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to
order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It
is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard
and for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to
conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a
regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a
"judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi-
judicial officer.
In the present case, petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated in that respondent
Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the evidence presented by petitioner in disapproving the
recommendation for dismissal of the case by the investigating prosecutor, and his ruling is not
supported by the evidence on record. The argument is specious.
His submission that he was deprived of his right to due process hinges on the erroneous assumption
that the order of the Ombudsman for the filing of the necessary information is lacking in any factual or
legal basis. Such a conclusion, however, stems from the fact that said order did not entail a discussion
of the rationale for the Ombudsman’s action.
It may seem that the ratio decidendi for the Ombudsman’s order may be wanting but this is not a case
of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. What is
actually involved here is merely a review of the conclusion arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as
a result of his study and analysis of the complaint, counter-affidavits, and the evidence submitted by the
parties during the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman here is not conducting anew another
investigation but is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation given by
the investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the
findings of fact of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the
findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter’s report and
recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to
prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but
his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a
probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the
respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another
preliminary investigation. 9
With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from that of
the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the Ombudsman
committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under
the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the
offense charged.
As aptly pointed out by respondent court in its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
"to the Ombudsman, the narration of facts by Prosecutor Tamayo, . . . demonstrated adequate cause to
prosecute the accused Cruz." 10 Furthermore, public respondents, in their Memorandum, correctly
observed that "(f)rom the tenor of respondent Ombudsman’s statement, it is clear that he agreed with
the findings of facts of the investigating prosecutor but disagreed with the latter’s conclusion on
the import and significance of said findings. On the basis of the findings of facts of the investigating
prosecutor, which were not disputed by petitioner, respondent Ombudsman believed that there was
6
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime had been committed and that petitioner
is probably guilty thereof." 11
Petitioner argues that the indication of disapproval by the Ombudsman which consists merely of two
paragraphs fails to point out the issues and relevant facts and is consequently whimsical, capricious and
arbitrary. Such proposition is fallacious. The mere fact that the order to file an information against
petitioner consists only of two paragraphs is not sufficient to impute arbitariness or caprice on the part of
the Ombudsman, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in disapproving the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. Neither is it tainted with vindictiveness or oppression.
He disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutor because he sincerely believed that there
is sufficient evidence to indict the accused. This is an exercise of the Ombudsman’s power based upon
constitutional mandate, and the courts should not interfere in such exercise.
The rule is based not only upon the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same
way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complaint. 12
II. Petitioner next avers that the error of respondent court in not requiring the production of the record of
the preliminary investigation is two-fold. First, it was in violation of the constitutional right against
arbitrary arrests because probable cause was not "personally determined by the judge," considering
that the records of the preliminary investigation were not elevated to the judge for examination. Second,
it was in violation of petitioner’s right to due process of law since he was deprived of the opportunity to
examine the evidence against him and prepare his defense.
On the first issue, petitioner relies on the ruling in Lim, Sr., et al. vs. Felix, et al. 13 which held that —
If a judge relies entirely on the certification of the prosecutor as in this case where all
the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor.
The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The judge commits a grave
abuse of discretion.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for
the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or one for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first aspect of preliminary investigation is
executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution’s job. The second kind of preliminary investigation,
which is more properly called preliminary examination, is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
judge.14
For the latter, in the exercise of the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause. 15
Coming now to the case at bar, contrary to petitioner’s thesis, respondent court, in its resolution
promulgated on February 17, 1993 denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information, found the
existence of probable cause after making a deliberate and exhaustive review of the facts obtaining in
the case. Thus:
All of the above logical process, which is supported both by the finding of fact in the
Resolution and by admissions in the Motion of the accused, lead to the conclusion
that probable cause exists against accused Roman Cruz, Jr., for acts described in the
Information in the instant case.
The narration of facts culled from the record (as affirmed by both parties) support the
narration of facts in the Information. The superficial analysis of the admissions made
above indicate that the elements of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code as well as
of Articles 171 and 172 thereof may probably be established.
It is true that the Manila Hotel eventually treated the P350,000.00 as a "cash
advance" to him. Accused Cruz, however, does not claim that there were cash
advances made by him as a consequence of which he received this sum. Nor has
accused Roman Cruz said that he had obtained a loan or cash advance from the
Manila Hotel for a particular purpose for which he was expected to subsequently
render an accounting. All that Manila Hotel’s subsequent description of this amount as
a "cash advance," in fact, says is that when it turned out that P350,000.00 could not
be properly accounted for, it had to be treated as an amount which accused Cruz had
to pay back; thus, accountingwise, a cash advance.
For accused to have received such a large amount from a company of which he was
the President required him to sign a receipt which would specify clearly what he was
receiving it for. If he received the sum as a cash advance for some future expense,
the Manila Hotel documents would clearly so demonstrate. If he received it as a cash
advance (against his salaries or other benefits), it would appear as a loan in Manila
Hotel’s books. Accused Cruz, however, has said no such thing in any of his pleadings
nor apparently has he so stated during the preliminary investigation.
In other words, accused Cruz as President of the Manila Hotel — and, therefore, in a
position of great fiduciary nature — received P350,000.00 in 1984 either for a non-
existent reason or for a false reason.
He may have an explanation. As of this time, however, if the evidence on record is
actually presented at trial, enough evidence would exist to put accused Roman A.
Cruz, Jr. at peril of his liberty and would require him to explain his side of the matter.
A case has, therefore, been demonstrated in the record and in the averment of
accused Cruz himself that the crime charged has probably been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.(Emphasis supplied.) 16
Petitioner would have respondent court order the production of the records of the preliminary
investigation in its determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. First and foremost, as hereinabove stated, in a preliminary examination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the court is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that the judge personally evaluates the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause. 17 This is precisely what
respondent court did. In resolving the issue of probable cause, respondent court made an in-depth
analysis of the findings of fact of Prosecutor Tamayo, as well as the Omnibus Motion submitted by
petitioner. The correctness of these facts was not even questioned by herein petitioner but, on the
7
contrary was expressly affirmed in the latter’s Omnibus Motion dated September 17, 1992 wherein it
was stated that "(t)he Order issued by the investigating prosecutor . . . contains a lucid narration of the
relevant facts."
The case of Lim cited by petitioner is not applicable to the present case because, in the former, a
warrant of arrest was issued by the respondent judge therein without conducting his own personal
evaluation of the case even if only on the basis of the report submitted by the fiscal. Instead, the
respondent therein simply declared: "Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such
duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete
in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely
on the prosecutor’s certification in each information . . . . This is far from what actually transpired before
the Sandiganbayan as reflected by the records in this case. Hence, the ruling in Lim cannot be properly
invoked.
As to the second issue, petitioner relies on the provisions of Section 8, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. — The record of the preliminary
investigation whether conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the
record of the case in the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court, on its own
initiative or that of any party, may order the production of the record or any part
thereof whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or any
incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for its
production.
Petitioner’s prayer for the production of the record is intended not only for proper observance of the
constitutional requirement that probable cause be determined personally by the judge, but also to
enable him to examine the evidence and prepare his defenses and for trial.
Public respondents contend that the production of the record of the preliminary examination is not
necessary since petitioner can always resort to any of the modes of discovery available to an accused
under the Rules of Court, specifically citing Section 11 of Rule 116, which provides:
Sec. 11. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution.
— On motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to all parties, the
court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the
prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, of
any written statements given by the complainant and other witnesses in any
investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or any other investigating
officers, as well as of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not otherwise privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case, and which are in the
possession or under the control of the prosecution, the police, or any other law
investigating agencies.
This rule refers to the right of the accused to move for production or inspection of material evidence in
the possession of the prosecution. It authorizes the defense to inspect, copy or photograph any
evidence of the prosecution in its possession after obtaining the permission of the court. A motion
showing good reasons for the granting of the permission must be filed by the defense for this purpose,
with notice to all parties. 18
It will be noted at the outset that precisely, as suggested by public respondents, herein petitioner, in
asking for the production of the records of the preliminary investigation in order to enable him to prepare
for his defense and for trial, is actually trying to avail of this mode of discovery. There was good cause
shown for the motion to produce the records, that is, so that they may be introduced as evidence by the
party requesting for their production, which is one of the grounds provided for under Section 8, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court.
It is true that the granting of permission lies within the discretion of the court. However, respondent court
in this case has failed to sufficiently justify its refusal to have the records of the preliminary investigation
produced before it so that petitioner may use them for his defense, either in its resolutions denying
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, or in the pleadings and Memorandum filed
by herein respondents before this Court. Consequently, we find no reason to deny petitioner the right to
avail of such mode of discovery. If only for the reason that petitioner should be given the opportunity to
inspect the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation solely for the purpose of enabling
him to prepare for his defense and for trial, this questioned resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan
should be modified.
III. It is likewise contended that respondent court abused its discretion in not dismissing the information
considering that, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash
advance for which he can only be held civilly liable, but which civil liability has already been
extinguished. Citing the case of Yong Chan Kim vs. People, et al., 19 which held that a cash advance is
in the form of a loan and, therefore, there can be no estafa committed, petitioner argues that he only
incurred civil liability for the cash advance he obtained from the Manila Hotel. However, he contends
that such liability had allegedly been extinguished when his leave credits and other benefits were
withheld, the total of which was more than sufficient to liquidate the advance made.
Also, it is argued that petitioner was denied due process when respondent court failed to remand the
case to the Ombudsman for further proceedings for the purpose of determining the persons who
actually forged the questioned documents by conducting a handwriting analysis. This would have
secured him from hasty and malicious prosecution, and would even have led to the discovery of the true
culprit, if indeed documents had been fabricated.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against whom it is
taken in jeopardy. 20
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 21
Conformably therewith, the arguments raised by herein petitioner that the cash advance is actually in
the form of a loan and therefore no criminal liability attaches, and that respondent court should have
remanded the case for further investigation to determine the true identity of the forgers, are all matters
of defense which are best presented during the trial before respondent court for its consideration.
The main function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to
determine the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be
so. And, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 22
8
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman found that there was sufficient ground to believe that petitioner is
guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the factual findings of Prosecutor Tamayo in the latter’s Order
dated February 11, 1992 which were arrived at after taking into consideration the evidence presented by
the parties. A cursory perusal of the records of this case will show that the findings of fact by the Office
of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, hence the same should be considered
conclusive. 23

Furthermore, the Ombudsman’s findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said
findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner is liable for estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising
questions of fact here. 24 His arguments are anchored on the propriety of or error in the Ombudsman’s
appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more
so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorariwhere neither questions of fact nor even of
law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. 25 Insofar as this third issue is concerned, therefore, we find that no grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
respondent Ombudsman is DIRECTED to produce the pertinent records of the preliminary investigation
before the Sandiganbayan at the proper juncture of the proceedings therein and on sufficient
justification therefor.

SO ORDERED.

9
 G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the.
prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if,
upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable
cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated January 14,
2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C.
Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C.
Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo. 3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car
Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of
the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without
Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the
payments totalling ₱886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s
custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the
files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the
unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of
₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to prove ownership
over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it
could not have suffered damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution 7 finding probable cause
and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. 8 He then filed a petition for review with
the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft 10 and estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of
probable cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On February 4, 2009, the
parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution. 14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an
order15 dismissing the complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the assailed
Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding
of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x. 16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a
criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor." 18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, 19 reversed the trial court, and
reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her own
findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."20
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued that
the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on
record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive
determination of probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable
cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x." 22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that were
a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment 24 that the
appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against
Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior
faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of
probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of the trial court should be accorded greater weight than
the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the
basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable
cause by the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft 27 and estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the
existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. 29 If upon evaluation
of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause
the filing of the information with the court.
10
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence" 30 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether
there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable
cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v.
Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on
hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge
does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause
independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan Cerbo
allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was
filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a
complaint-affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend
the information, which was granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy
Cerbo as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable cause. The
trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court of
Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the
reinstatement of the amended information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of Private
Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its
face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the
public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters
should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the
public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly
understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government
prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize
this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when
there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s
duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of
probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the
deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and
evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x." 37 There was nothing in his
resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law and
jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion
to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and
proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court
cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the
judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause."
Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or
a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to
section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
11
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2)
issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first
option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)

It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion
of the court."40

In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and
concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of
qualified theft and estafa."41Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent
evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned
by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of
qualified theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the
alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the
accused,"43 which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:

x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory hearing to
clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the private complainant to
bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view
of satisfying itself that indeed probable cause exists to commit the present case which private
complainant failed to do.44

Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly
dismissed the case against Alfredo.

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence
before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of
probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause,
he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05
against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

12
 G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991
VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners, vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991
JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG, MAYOR
NESTOR C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO KHO, petitioners, vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely
on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of
arrest?
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman
Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar
Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another
security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O.
Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an
amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr.,
Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport
incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating
therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during
the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the
amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly
Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho,
Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-
57)
xxx xxx xxx
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of
P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which was
granted by the court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for
Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.
On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages
were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane
was designated to review the case.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima
facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all
of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case
of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot
wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment of Fiscal Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R.
Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor
Susana Lim was denied.
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate
informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for
change of venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)
On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice,
to wit:
Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812, 5813,
and 5814 from the Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts
at Quezon City or Makati, the Court Resolved to (a) GRANT the aforesaid petition for transfer
of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article VIII, Section 5(4) of the Philippine
Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to
transmit the records of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Makati, for raffling among the other branches of the court; and (c) ORDER the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate to desist from further taking cognizance of the said cases until
such time that the petition is finally resolved.
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations which in substance prayed for the following:
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment
of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause
or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the
mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing
magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a
matter of right; and
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause, to
be allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p. 17, Rollo, G.R. Nos.
94054-57)
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really
exists aprima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some
witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the
prosecution.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and
manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The
respondent Judge said:
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court
of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple
13
 murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed
upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four
separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom
such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each
information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this
Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information which
reads: (pp. 19-20, Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-57; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990 Order.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents to CEASE and DESIST
from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without bail issued against the petitioners in his
Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.
In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering and directing
the respondent judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the warrants of arrest
without bail issued against and served upon herein petitioners Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them from confinement at PC-CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the
respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST
from enforcing or implementing the warrants of arrest without bail issued against petitioners
Mayors Nestor C. Lim and Antonio T. Kho.
The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a warrant
of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a
probable cause exists.
This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled that a
judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973
Constitution which provides:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce . .
. the above interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:
We ruled:
. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of
judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination
conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it,
he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This
has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And
this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13,
15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and
other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the
information filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the
determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had
submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in
the case where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.
The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. We stated:
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be
authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge
alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely
assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow
what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause
is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all
14
other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in
assisting the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have
authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in
them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964,
(See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in
Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from
them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985,
(Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting that
power to said Judges. We had occasion to point tills out in Salta v. Court of Appeals,
143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that
the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the
prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough
his or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave
this job which is essentially executive to them," and the fact "that a certain power is
granted does not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective
on October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin
Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial
Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having
authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the
power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant).
Such a power –– indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power –– has been and
remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the
1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule
or Statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC
Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is
sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the
authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is
probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that
this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both
law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the
function to be judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is
an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called
preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . .
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990) there
is a statement that the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same
token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that ". . . the court
may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is
probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article III,
Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that
the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies
on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation.
The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records
which sustain it.
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are still
bound by the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly
confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the
rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is
no duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest
especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant
and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word
before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have
no more time for his or her more important judicial functions.
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . .
probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed
by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had
nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for
the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
15
Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's
certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so
require.

It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge
documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case
against them. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the
determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R.
No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 [1972]) the respondent Judge
before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the
preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned
witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General
recognized the significance of the recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a
reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:

It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are
affidavits of recantation subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an
affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's witnesses, Renato and
Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written statements of these
witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the existence of a prima facie case
against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information.
Evidently, the same written statements were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification",
since the attached affidavits of recantation were not yet then available. Since the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses is now assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners have not
yet been arraigned, it would be to the broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation
of this case be had to secure the petitioners against hasty prosecution and to protect them
from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public
trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga v. Paño G.R. No.
59524, February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying
on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses
that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's
certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other
basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and
VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued
in the instant Petitions are made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

16
 [G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.] injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the
VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided
ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of
ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents. the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax
DECISION assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on
the documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary The petition should be granted for the following reasons:
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly 1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman,
pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court
February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments
on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents, "(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
papers and effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein. probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)

On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter "SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for search
warrant which was attached to the letter. "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, "SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the
respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce
following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and
signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par.
respondent Judge. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be
conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,"
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment
had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion in the Constitutional
stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is
respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge
signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, "SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la justicia
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señoria que causaria
warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’ cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar los fines de la
lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was justicia o si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de compaginar los fines de la
attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes justicia con los derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.
of documents.
"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria pregunta por la
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the siguiente razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito
search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de

17
sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante o alguna persona que "Q And thereafter?
solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya "A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a sea peticion sino que el juez examiner a ese "Q Who is this he?
denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin examiner a los testigos. "A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito siempre "A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
requeriria algun tiempo?.
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible
las vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant
dos males debemos escoger. el menor. No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of
x x x warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the
in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of
warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to
has any witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . ." personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, record of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge
for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ." respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his
witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of
warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists 2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be
delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the question is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed
and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred
to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against to above. Thus we find the following:
herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well
to recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent
Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and
complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that fraudulent returns.
time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the
hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the
went to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. information required under the Tax Code.
Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special
Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows: Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any
article subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to
them, requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the official
and without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio and/or employee who caused the violation shall be responsible.
whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de
Leon. Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output
removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.

18
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The
first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are
interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is
the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of
Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed
or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are
embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs.
208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is
not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was
issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more
apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred
sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the
former rule by inserting therein the phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the
sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3,
Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense.’"
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants."
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said
warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records
of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, to wit:
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not
be made, — that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this
constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be
this manner: guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any
books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the
accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen
and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."cralaw virtua1aw library such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have
mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among
others, enumerated in the warrant.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et
Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions considering the circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.’ the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due process taints the

19
proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the
Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.) said search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to
petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition,
search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention. as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized under the search
warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is No pronouncement as to costs.
charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the
exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such
corporation, we do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity,
under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but
an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself
as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot
be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is
protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 50 L. ed. 652.)

"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied
to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the
rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result
might have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of
America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)

In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said
corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of
a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers
and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom
the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On
that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by petitioners
— at least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents seized by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-
half months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the
documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those assessments should therefore not
be enforced.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by

20
 G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE
PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. As
we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy
of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty
English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was
monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord
and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and
protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require
otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure
conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in
his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained
(which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against
the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or
some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No
less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. 5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific
offense.7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in
the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding
provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then already
embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter,
following a brief debate, approved by the Convention.8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them
to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the
above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the complainant's
two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for
a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two
(2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented
to me their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator
assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application
was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the
contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the application was
not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if
the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his
own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the
applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to
him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
21
 Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he niay produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it
wifl be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the
aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the
undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The
rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the
applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify
the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their
own personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of
the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if
the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed
to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations
in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the
respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of
the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a
"Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard
as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight
men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly,
and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the
gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38
caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so
certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the
first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really
done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These
would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the
witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to
the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically
coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to
the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and
the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as
we held in a previous case,21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect
for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an
intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the
petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even
without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and
considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not
validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had
no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule
were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the
guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that
they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for
the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and
articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made
incidental to a lawful arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may
otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to
prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable
cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of
their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly
agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that
prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer
comes upon them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these
things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule
having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and
bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution.
While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because
"the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was
nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The
22
decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal
action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said
articles must remain in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the
quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. But as
we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby
declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

23
 G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937
NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting
books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of
Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain
the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be
returned to him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department
of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance
of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in
Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his
oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions
were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements
upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of
the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of
the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of
in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the
petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took
possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger,
two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums,
three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two
bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two
packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of
invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504
chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.
The search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated
his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the
documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search
warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent
Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the
office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the
order of the court. On said date the court issued an order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the
articles seized within twenty-four hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of five
(5) days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On June
10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the
order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the
articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation. The attorney for the
petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that, notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said
month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying
that a search warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his custody and
deposit of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an
ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited some documents and papers
in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory duly verified by oath of all the
documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit it presented in support
thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and prayed that said agent be directed
to filed the documents in question immediately. On the 25th of said month the court issued an order
requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court,
together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the
articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for the petitioner filed another petition alleging that
the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet been returned to date together with the
proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be
issued directing the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be
declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On
September 10, 1936, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and
issued in accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be
cancelled, and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore,
be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the
unextendible period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized
appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The assistant chief of the
Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that
the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of
the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney for the
petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify the
time needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be retained,
granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the assistant chief of the
Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten (10) days to comply with the order of
September 25th and that the clerk of court be ordered to return to him all the documents and papers
together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an order of October 2d of said year, granted him the
additional period of ten(10) days and ordered the clerk of court to send him a copy of the inventory. On
October 10th, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to examine
the documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5,
1016, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be granted
said period of sixty (60) days. In an order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of sixty (60)
days to investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the
respondents, that these nineteen (19)documents continue in the possession of the court, the rest having
been returned to said petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95,
General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and
papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed.,
241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29
Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs.Elias, 147 N.
E., 472).
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a
liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer
County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the
proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure
or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189;
24
Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So.,
613).
III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has
been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he
had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the
warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person
whom he considered reliable. To the question "What are your reason for applying for this
search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been reported to me by
a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities
as a money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in attesting
the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent states that he found them
to be correct and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides
that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place top be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General
Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and
upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not only
probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be
based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party
signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7;
Pumphery vs. State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac.,
378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof
is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking
the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed.,
621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U. S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S. vs. Lai Chew,
298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon
and affiant be held liable for damages caused (State vs. Roosevelt Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct.,
244 Pac., 280; State vs. Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizure. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace
against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable
search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is
said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined
in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are
reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374;
Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed.,
145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16
Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit,
which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective
by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the
search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other
papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was
subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared
illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the
applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless it be
supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by
him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General
Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine
under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in
this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he
did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor
General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the
latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit
of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it
is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is
likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search
warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section
101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively
asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively
upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search
could not legally be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant
was issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be
seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General
25
 Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for
determining whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must
contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S.,
24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U.
S. vs.Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605;
People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 4125); but where, by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required
that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue
(People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles
given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said
premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law."
Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to
give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially
complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was
thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant
was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might
provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed
against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the case
raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been
seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of
the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be
filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the
purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession
they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is
equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused
to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs.Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620;
Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U.
S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the
search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the
search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the
purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no
such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second,
because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation
of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the
petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not
the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the
insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because he
can appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition. Section 222
of the Code of Civil Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion, however, that an
appeal from said orders would have to lapse before he recovers possession of the documents and
before the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6
Phil., 426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking,
14 Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:
1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and
seizure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the
constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict the
enjoyment of the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the individual,
they should be strictly construed;
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the
warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of
the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of
seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted
against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;
4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in
the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated,
neither could the search and seizure be made at night;
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the
applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when
the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the
judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause
exists;
6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be
seized is necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description
must be rather general, but is not required that a technical description be given, as this would
mean that no warrant could issue;
7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or
settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search
and seizure; and
8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an
effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the
petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.
For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of
the respondent court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal and are
set aside, and it is ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the
immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents designated on pages 1 to 4 of the
inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
26
 [G.R. No. 140946. September 13, 2004]
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated 23
December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of
Appeals reversed the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila (RTC), denying respondent
Maxicorp, Inc.s (Maxicorp) motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp.
Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright infringement under Section 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 49 (Section 29 of PD 49)[4] and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).[5]
Antecedent Facts
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. (NBI
Agent Samiano) filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged
violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination
of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-
452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorps
premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there
was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of general warrants. The
RTC denied Maxicorps motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorps motion for
reconsideration.
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano,
John Benedict Sacriz (Sacriz), and computer technician Felixberto Pante (Pante). The three testified on
what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented
certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities
using petitioners products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set
aside the RTCs order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order denying
Maxicorps motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioners motion on 29 November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary
examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought
the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;
3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;
4. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE GENERAL WARRANTS.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of law. Maxicorp insists
that the arguments petitioners presented are questions of fact, which this Court should not consider in a
Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues they presented in this petition involve
questions of law. Petitioners point out that the facts are not in dispute.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions of
law.[6] Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal, [7] subject to exceptions as when the
findings of the appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial court. [8]
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists
when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact
exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems
simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For example,
it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve purely
questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence.[9] The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. [10] If the query requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to
each other, the issue in that query is factual. [11] Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno[12] is illustrative on this
point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or
rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.
Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary
evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not
certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests
as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a
party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this situation does not
automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The issues must meet the
tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal personality of the petitioners, the nature of
the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause only the first two qualify as questions of law.
The pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a question of
fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since it does not concern itself with
the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue would require this Court to inquire into
the probative value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them.[13]
27
 Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising arguments requiring an
examination of the TSNs and the documentary evidence presented during the search warrant
proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals by conducting our own evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the situation which
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise only questions of law.
This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence. [14] When
we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only in the
presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.[15]
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the Court of Appeals
conflict with the findings of the RTC.[16] Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting findings of the
lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper party
to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of the People of the
Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this case.[17] We ruled
in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[18] that the petitioner-complainant in a
petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if
there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This avoids a situation where a
complainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless
to pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact that the
sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals
disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the existence of
probable cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC. Maxicorp
maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was defective.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the
sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp
was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz. Second, the fact that petitioners other witness, John Benedict
Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs findings.
Probable cause means such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper.[19] Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. [20]
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the
complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause.[21] The applicant must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances. Reliable information is insufficient.[22] Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must
depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.[23]
The Court of Appeals reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that the two witnesses
for petitioners during the preliminary examination failed to prove conclusively that they bought
counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a failure to prove
the existence of a connection between the offense charged and the place searched.
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and
unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the
testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that
petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one
of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw
Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to the
requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale
counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software were produced and
packaged within Maxicorps premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the
products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving the
accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when Maxicorp
installed petitioners software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale
of petitioners software within Maxicorps premises. Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell
their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they
presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed,
there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the
prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorps premises, they were also
produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words
themselves, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man,[24] not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed
rule for its determination exists.[25] Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a
given situation.[26] Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply
because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his
name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of
petitioners software occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano
presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit
Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners software.[27] Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit. [28] Pante,
the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners software on the same
computer unit.[29] There was a comparison between petitioners genuine software and Maxicorps
software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased. [30] Even if we disregard
the sales receipt issued in the name of Joel Diaz, which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent
28
Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals ruling on Sacrizs testimony. The fact that Sacriz did not
actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of probable
cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit
goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including
the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies of petitioners
witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require
that the judge examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to
determine probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. [31] For this
reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such
findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of
reason.[32] Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal any impropriety on
the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily see, here the judge examined thoroughly the
applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary and untimely. The
prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation if it were required to present all its evidence at
such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized.
The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly
described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no
unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.[33]
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall
issue in connection with one specific offense. The articles described must bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is issued.[34] Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the
articles subject of the search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific
offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the specificity
required with respect to the objects to be seized. After examining the wording of the warrants issued,
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and reversed the RTCs Order thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioners store can be seized on the ground that
it is used or intended to be used in the illegal or unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private
respondents software and their manuals.[35]
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e) of the search
warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that similarly worded warrants, all of which
noticeably employ the phrase used or intended to be used, were previously held void by this
Court.[36] The disputed text of the search warrants in this case states:
a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft software bearing the
Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION contained
in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft instruction manuals and/or
literature bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements
and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all
other books of accounts and documents used in the recording of the reproduction and/or
assembly, distribution and sales, and other transactions in connection with fake or
counterfeit products bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by
MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CD-ROM
drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines and other
equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and
unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or
which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFT
CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and copyrights; and
f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access all computer hard drives,
data bases and other information storage devices containing unauthorized Microsoft
software.[37] (Emphasis supplied)
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow.[38] The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The
nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is
a matter of concern.[39] Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general
warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they were also
specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to
those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners software.
This language meets the test of specificity.[40]
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found the
warrants too broad because of particular circumstances, not because of the mere use of the phrase
used or intended to be used. In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of
television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x were found too broad since
the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes. [41] The mere presence of counterfeit video
tapes in the defendants store does not mean that the machines were used to produce the counterfeit
tapes. The situation in this case is different. Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners.
In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they
authorized the seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of the defendant. [42] And
in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant because it merely
gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are generally connected
with the legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes. [43]
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c)
states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements
and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION;
29
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other
purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description covers
property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors.
Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately
possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or unfair
competition.

Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some
items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A
partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant. [44] A search
warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant.[45] The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure.
Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d,
e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search
Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.

SO ORDERED.

30
 [G.R. Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY
TEE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the consolidated judgment [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City, Branch 6, dated September 17, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, involving
violations of Section 8, Article II, of the Dangerous Drugs Law.[2] Since appellant was acquitted in the
second case, we focus on the first case, where appellant has been found guilty and sentenced to death
and fined one million pesos.
The decretal portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 15800-R, the Court finds the accused Modesto Tee guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana of about 591.81 kilos in violation of Section 8,
Article II of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged in the Information, seized by
virtue of a search warrant and sentences him to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of 1
million pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 591.81 kilos of marijuana contained in 26 boxes and one yellow sack (Exhibits U-1 to U-27) are
ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
2. In Crim. Case No. 15822-R, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused
Modesto Tee beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of the charge of illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8, Art. 2 of RA 6425 as amended by Section 13 of RA 7659 as charged
in the Information since the marijuana confiscated have to be excluded in evidence as a product of
unreasonable search and seizure.
The 336.93 kilos of marijuana contained in 13 sacks and four boxes (Exh. B to S and their component
parts) although excluded in evidence as the product(s) of unreasonable search and seizure, are
nevertheless ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law
considering that they are prohibited articles.
The City Jail Warden is, therefore, directed to release the accused Modesto Tee in connection with
Crim. Case No. 15822-R unless held on other charges.
COST(S) DE OFFICIO.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid
conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police
Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence
yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too
general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges
against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15800-R, the
City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of
marijuana, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. One hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of dried
flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of 336.93 kilograms; and
3 Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (boxes) and a
yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms,
all having a grand total weight of 928.74 kilograms, a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to
possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On August 7, 1998, the prosecution moved to amend the foregoing charge sheet considering that
subject marijuana were seized in two (2) different places. [5]
As a result, the information in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was amended to read as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
- Six hundred two (602) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in twenty-six (26) boxes and
a yellow sack, weighing 591.81 kilograms
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
A separate amended information docketed as Criminal Case No. 15822-R was likewise filed, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1998 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly have in his possession the following, to wit:
1. Ninety-two (92) bricks of dried flowering tops separately contained in four (4) boxes; and
2. hundred fifty-eight (158) bricks, twenty-one (21) blocks, and twenty-three (23) bags of
dried flowering tops separately contained in thirteen (13) sacks, with a total weight of
336.93 kilograms;
a prohibited drug, without the authority of law to possess, in violation of the above-cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
On September 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion to quash the search warrant and ordered
appellants arraignment.
When arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R, appellant refused to enter a plea.
The trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him.[8] Trial on the merits then ensued.
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:
Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto Tee
are well acquainted with each other, since Abratiques wife is the sister of Tees sister-in-law.[9]
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him a place for the storage of
smuggled cigarettes.[10] Abratique brought appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a house
for rent in Bakakeng, Baguio City. After negotiating the terms and conditions, Ballesteros agreed to rent
out his place to appellant. Appellant then brought several boxes of purported blue seal cigarettes to the
leased premises.
Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes stored in his place were not blue
seal cigarettes but marijuana. Fearful of being involved, Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both later
prevailed upon appellant to remove them from the premises.[11]
31
 Appellant then hired Abratiques taxi and transported the boxes of cannabis from the Ballesteros
place to appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. [12]
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext of
buying and transporting strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant directed Abratique
to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where appellant proceeded to load several sacks of marijuana in
Abratiques taxi. He then asked Abratique to find him a place where he could store the contraband. [13]
Abratique brought appellant to his grandmothers house at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., QM Subdivision,
Baguio City, which was being managed by Abratiques aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Nazarea agreed to rent a
room to appellant. Abratique and appellant unloaded and stored there the sacks of marijuana brought
from Sablan.[14] Abratique was aware that they were transporting marijuana as some of the articles in
the sacks became exposed in the process of loading. [15]
Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of the goods stored in the rented
room. She confided to her daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their predicament. As Alice Fianzas
brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent, Alice and Abratique phoned him and disclosed what
had transpired.[16]
On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by information that appellant would retrieve the sacks of
prohibited drugs that day, Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at No. 27, Dr.
Cario St. While the NBI agents were conducting their surveillance, they noticed that several PNP
NARCOM personnel were also watching the place.[17] The NBI then learned that the PNP NARCOM had
received a tip from one of their informers regarding the presence of a huge amount of drugs in that
place. The NBI and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.
As the day wore on and appellant did not show up, the NBI agents became apprehensive that the
whole operation could be jeopardized. They sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau to enter the room
rented by appellant. She acceded and allowed them entry. The NBI team then searched the rented
premises and found four (4) boxes and thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana, totaling 336.93 kilograms. [18]
Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied for a
search warrant from RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence.[19] Judge Reyes ordered the NBI
agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah Muoz, so the proceedings could be properly
recorded. After Atty. Muoz arrived, Judge Reyes questioned Lising and Abratique. Thereafter, the judge
issued a warrant directing the NBI to search appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley,
Baguio City for marijuana.[20]
The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow, proceeded to appellants
residence where they served the warrant upon appellant himself. [21] The search was witnessed by
appellant, members of his family, barangay officials, and members of the media. [22] Photographs were
taken during the actual search.[23] The law enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of dried marijuana [24] in
the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellants residence. [25] The total weight of the haul was
591.81 kilograms.[26]Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist
Maria Carina Madrigal conducted the tests. Detailed microscopic and chromatographic examinations of
the items taken from appellants rented room at No. 27, Dr. Cario St., as well as those from his
residence at Green Valley, showed these to be marijuana.[27]
In his defense, appellant contended that the physical evidence of the prosecution was illegally
obtained, being the products of an unlawful search, hence inadmissible. Appellant insisted that the
search warrant was too general and the process by which said warrant was acquired did not satisfy the
constitutional requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Moreover, Abratiques testimony,
which was heavily relied upon by the judge who issued the warrant, was hearsay.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, the trial court agreed with appellant that the taking of the 336.93
kilograms of marijuana was the result of an illegal search and hence, inadmissible in evidence against
appellant. Appellant was accordingly acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court found that the
prosecutions evidence was more than ample to prove appellants guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R
and as earlier stated, duly convicted him of illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Before us, appellant submits that the trial court erred in:
1UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT DESPITE LACK OF
COMPLIANCE OF (sic) SEVERAL REQUIREMENTS BEFORE IT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ISSUED AND IT BEING A GENERAL WARRANT;
2.GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REOPENING THE CASE AND ALLOWING
ABRITIQUE TO TESTIFY AGAINST APPELLANT;
3GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ABRITIQUE;
4. NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES AND SENTENCING HIM TO
DEATH DESPITE THE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AS FOUND IN THE FIRST
CASE.[28]
We find that the pertinent issues for resolution concern the following: (1) the validity of the search
conducted at the appellants residence; (2) the alleged prejudice caused by the reopening of the case
and absences of the prosecution witness, on appellants right to speedy trial; (3) the sufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence to sustain a finding of guilt with moral certainty; and (4) the propriety of the
penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for and
seize an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence, void for vagueness. He insists
that Abratique could already estimate the amount of marijuana supposed to be found at appellants
residence since Abratique helped to transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is issued
if a judge finds probable cause that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that he
believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The OSG points out that, as the trial court observed,
it is impossible beforehand to determine the exact amount of prohibited drugs that a person has on
himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase an undetermined amount of marijuana as used in the search
warrant fails to satisfy the requirement of Article III, Section 2 [29] of the Constitution that the things to be
seized must be particularly described. Appellants contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized
and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items;[30] and (2) leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and
seizures.[31] What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general
characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an
offense.[32] However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required,[33] particularly,
where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the
requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. [34]
32
 Thus, it has been held that term narcotics paraphernalia is not so wanting in particularity as to
create a general warrant.[35] Nor is the description any and all narcotics and all implements,
paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to the use, possession, or sale of narcotics or
dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional. [36] A search warrant commanding peace officers to
seize a quantity of loose heroin has been held sufficiently particular. [37]
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description an undetermined amount of marijuana
must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be
seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of
its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further
description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and
the circumstances.[38] Thus, this Court has held that the description illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
and sets of paraphernalia particularizes the things to be seized.[39]
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, undetermined amount of
marijuana or Indian hemp, in our view, has satisfied the Constitutions requirements on particularity of
description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2)
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the peace officers may be guided in making the
search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued. [40] Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the
objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory searches, which
might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could be
guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement as said
statute lists a number of offenses with respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he contends, said warrant is a
general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his
possession and control marijuana or Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98),[41] and we find that it is captioned
For Violation of R.A. 6425, as amended.[42] It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that there is
probable cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659 has been and is being committed by
one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio
City by having in his possession and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or
INDIAN HEMP in violation of the aforementioned law.[43] In an earlier case, we held that though the
specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. [44] Appellants
averment is, therefore, baseless. Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one offense,
namely, illegal possession of marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to
exhaustively examine the applicant and his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate should not
have swallowed all of Abratiques statements hook, line, and sinker. He points out that since Abratique
consented to assist in the transport of the marijuana, the examining judge should have elicited from
Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for squealing on appellant. Appellant further
points out that the evidence of the NBI operative who applied for the warrant is merely hearsay and
should not have been given credit at all by Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellants contention is apparent. The OSG points out that
Abratique personally assisted appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the latters house
and to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates personal
knowledge on Abratiques part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be eyewitnesses to every crime; they
are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge. In this case, witness Abratique personally
saw and handled the marijuana. Hence, the NBI did not rely on hearsay information in applying for a
search warrant but on personal knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution [45] and the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[46] require that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not be merely routinary
or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.[47] In the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge
Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the applicant for the
search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes of the proceedings were taken by
Atty. Delilah Muoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to
be summoned. In the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to
Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of notes at pages 7-11.[48] We have thoroughly perused the
records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere find said notes. The depositions of Lising and
Abratique were not attached to Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the Rules of Court. We
must stress, however, that the purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the
examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause. [49] The Bill of Rights does not make it an
imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant.
Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing
what testimony was presented.[50] In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes required
Abratique to confirm the contents of his affidavit;[51] there were instances when Judge Reyes questioned
him extensively.[52] It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, [53] absent a
showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, [54] as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.[55] Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such
facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in
the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No. 415
(7-98) in his motion to quash before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague generalities that
Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions of the applicant and his witness. Belatedly, however, he
now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said witness. [56] But it is settled that when a motion
to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and objections then available, existent or known, should be
raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they are
deemed waived.[57]
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lisings knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in appellants
house was indeed hearsay. But he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal knowledge about
said drugs and their particular location. Abratiques statements to the NBI and to Judge Reyes contained
credible and reliable details. As the NBIs witness, Abratique was a person on whose statements Judge
Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellants activities with respect to the seized drugs was
substantial.In relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not depending on casual rumor circulating
in the underworld, but on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
33
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether
it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused.[58]
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate the place
to be searched. The OSG points out that the address stated in the warrant is as specific as can be. The
NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the premises prepared by Abratique, thus ensuring that there
would be no mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended [59] and distinguish it from other places in the
community.[60] A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement
of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search warrant.
Appellant fails, however, to point to any evidentiary matter in the record to support his contention.
Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellants mother, testified on the search conducted but she said
nothing that indicated the use of force on the part of the NBI operatives who conducted the search and
seizure.[61] What the record discloses is that the warrant was served on appellant, [62] who was given
time to read it,[63] and the search was witnessed by the barangay officials, police operatives, members
of the media, and appellants kith and kin.[64] No breakage or other damage to the place searched is
shown. No injuries sustained by appellant, or any witness, appears on record. The execution of the
warrant, in our view, has been orderly and peaceably performed.
2. On The Alleged Violation of Appellants Substantive Rights
Appellant insists that the prosecutions unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness Abratique
unduly delayed the resolution of his case. He points out that a total of eight (8) scheduled hearings had
to be reset due to the failure or willful refusal of Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists that
said lapse on the prosecutions part violated Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98.[65] Appellant now
alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to delaying the case to cause him untold miseries.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a great length
of time as to amount to a violation of appellants right to a speedy trial. A trial is always subject to
reasonable delays or postponements, but absent any showing that these delays are capricious and
oppressive, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prosecute the criminal
action.
On record, the trial court found that prosecution witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to appear in no
less than eighteen (18) hearings, namely those set for February 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24; March 9, 15,
22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16, and 19, all in 1999. [66] No less than four (4) warrants of arrest were issued
against him to compel him to testify.[67] The NBI agent who supposedly had him in custody was found
guilty of contempt of court for failing to produce Abratique at said hearings and sanctioned. [68] The
prosecution had to write the NBI Regional Director in Baguio City and NBI Director in Manila regarding
the failure of the Bureaus agents to bring Abratique to court. [69] Nothing on record discloses the reason
for Abratiques aforecited absences. On the scheduled hearing of June 7, 1999, he was again absent
thus causing the trial court to again order his arrest for the fifthtime.[70] He also failed to show up at the
hearing of June 8, 1999.[71]
Appellant now stresses that the failure of Abratique to appear and testify on twenty (20) hearing
dates violated appellants constitutional[72] and statutory right to a speedy trial.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules
and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. [73] In Conde v. Rivera and
Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of
time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty,
by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has
been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the
delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to
assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.[74]
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be
one hundred eighty (180) days.[75] However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case.[76] The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;[77] or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured;[78] or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. [79]
In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20)
hearing days, there is no showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratiques
absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. On record, after Abratique
repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went to the extent of praying
that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The prosecution
likewise tried to get the NBI to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureaus custody, but to no
avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to present Abratique and rest
its case on the evidence already offered.[80]
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay of
less than two months has been found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of time.[81]
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the inability of the
prosecution to produce its witness. Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to
require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure that the latter would testify when required. [82] Appellant
could have moved to have Abratique found in contempt and duly sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is
a bit too late in the day for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellants claim that his constitutional right to speedy trial was
violated. One must take into account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other causes of
delay. But in the absence of a showing that delays were unreasonable and capricious, the State should
not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused. [83]
Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited partiality,
when it allowed the reopening of the case after the prosecution had failed to present Abratique on
several occasions and had been directed to rest its case. Appellant stresses that the lower courts order
to reopen the case to receive Abratiques further testimony is an indication that the trial court favored the
prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.
On appellees behalf, the Solicitor General points out that the trial courts order was in the interest
of substantial justice and hence, cannot be termed as an abuse of discretion. The OSG points out that
34
the prosecution had not formally rested its case and had yet to present its formal offer of evidence,
hence, the submission of additional testimony by the same witness cannot be prejudicial to the accused,
it being but the mere continuation of an uncompleted testimony. Furthermore, appellant did not properly
oppose the prosecutions motion to reopen the case.
At the time Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure were in effect. There was no specific provision at that time governing motions to
reopen.[84] Nonetheless, long and established usage has led to the recognition and acceptance of a
motion to reopen. In view of the absence of a specific procedural rule, the only controlling guideline
governing a motion to reopen was the paramount interests of justice. As a rule, the matter of reopening
of a case for reception of further evidence after either prosecution or defense has rested its case is
within the discretion of the trial court.[85] However, a concession to a reopening must not prejudice the
accused or deny him the opportunity to introduce counter evidence. [86]
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A
motion to reopen may properly be presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and
closed their evidence, but before judgment.[87] In the instant case, the records show that on April 19,
1999, the prosecution was directed to close its evidence and given 15 days to make its formal offer of
evidence.[88] This order apparently arose from the manifestation of the prosecution on April 16, 1999
that should they fail to produce witness Abratique on the next scheduled hearing the prosecution would
rest its case.[89] On April 19, 1999, which was the next scheduled hearing after April 16, 1999, Abratique
was absent notwithstanding notices, orders, and warrants of arrest. However, on April 27, 1999, or
before the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, Abratique was brought to the trial court by the
NBI. In its order of said date, the trial court pointed out that the prosecution could move to reopen the
case for the taking of Abratiques testimony.[90] On May 7, 1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing
that it had not yet formally offered its evidence and that the substantial rights of the accused would not
be prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to present his evidence. Appellant filed no opposition to the
motion. The trial court granted the motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing to reopen, as the
prosecution had not formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratiques testimony was not
for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, but more properly for the completion of his
unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs. Base,[91] we held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the
proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and the case submitted for decision, by the
calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judges mind with reference to
particular facts involved in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to
complete his testimony, which is what happened in this case. It is but proper that the judges mind be
satisfied on any and all questions presented during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.
Appellants claim that the trial courts concession to reopen the case unduly prejudiced him is not
well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his case or
to refute the prosecutions evidence point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short,
appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due
process in criminal justice.[92] Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called reopening in order to complete the testimony
of a prosecution witness.
3. On the Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
In bidding for acquittal, appellant assails the credibility of Abratique as a witness. Appellant insists
that Abratiques testimony is profuse with lies, contrary to human nature, hence incredible. According to
appellant, Abratique was evasive from the outset with respect to certain questions of the trial court. He
adds that it appeared the court entertained in particular the suspicion that witness Abratique had
conspired with appellant in committing the crime charged. Appellant questions Abratiques motive in
informing the NBI about his activities related to the marijuana taking, transfer, and warehousing.
The OSG contends that Abratiques testimony, taken as a whole, is credible. It points out that
Abratique testified in a straightforward manner as to his knowledge of the huge cache of prohibited
drugs stashed by appellant in two different places. His testimony, said the OSG, when fused with the
physical evidence consisting of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana found by law enforcers at appellants
residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of appellant.
It is the bounden duty of the courts to test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no innocent
person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties meted out for drug offenses. [93] Though we
scrutinized minutely the testimony of Abratique, we find no cogent reason to disbelieve him. From his
account, Abratique might appear aware treading the thin line between innocence and feeling guilty, with
certain portions of his story tending to be self-exculpatory. However, his whole testimony could not be
discredited. The established rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved
in other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case. But it is accepted, as a matter of common sense, that if certain parts of a witness testimony are
found true, his testimony cannot be disregarded entirely. [94]
Abratique testified in open court that appellant rented the taxicab he was driving, and he helped
appellant transport huge amounts of marijuana to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St.,
Baguio City and to appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. He
also declared on the witness stand that out of fear of being involved, he decided to divulge his
knowledge of appellants possession of large caches of marijuana to the NBI. When the places referred
to by Abratique were searched by the authorities, marijuana in staggering quantities was found and
seized by the law enforcers. Stated plainly, the physical evidence in this case corroborated Abratiques
testimony on material points.
Appellant imputes questionable motives to Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He demands that
Abratique should likewise be prosecuted. However, by no means is the possible guilt of Abratique a
tenable defense for appellant. Nor would Abratiques prosecution mean appellants absolution.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with
moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated
drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.[95]
We find the foregoing elements proven in Criminal Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable doubt.
In said case, the testimony of Abratique and the recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from
appellants residence served to prove appellants possession of a prohibited drug. Tests conducted by
the NBI forensic chemist proved the seized articles to be marijuana. These articles were seized
pursuant to a valid search warrant and hence, fully admissible in evidence.
In People v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies
generally to all persons and proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by any person, and no person is
authorized to sell such drugs. Said doctrine is equally applicable with respect to possession of
prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes the possession of prohibited drugs, applies
equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to possess said articles, without
authority of law.
Anent the third element, we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs must
be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or
control of said articles.[96] Nonetheless, this dictum must be read in consonance with our ruling that
possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
35
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession. [97] In
effect, the onus probandi is shifted to accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi[98] in this situation.
Appellant Modesto Tee opted not to testify in his defense. Instead, he presented his mother as his
lone witness, who testified on matters totally irrelevant to his case. We can only conclude that, failing to
discharge the burden of the evidence on the possession of prohibited drug, appellants guilt in Criminal
Case No. 15800-R was established beyond reasonable doubt.
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00)
PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

3. On The Proper Penalty

Under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00)[99] shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana involved in a conviction for
possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more. [100]

In the present case, the quantity of marijuana involved has been shown by the prosecution to be
far in excess of 750 grams, as stressed by the trial court:

The volume is rather staggering. It is almost one whole house or one whole room. In fact, when they
were first brought to the court, it took hours to load them on the truck and hours also to unload them
prompting the court to direct that the boxes and sack of marijuana be instead kept at the NBI office in
Baguio. And the identification of said marijuana during the trial was made in the NBI premises itself by
the witnesses since it was physically cumbersome and inconvenient to keep bringing them to the court
during every trial.[101]

In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana bales
involved, but also the acts of accused of hiding them in different placesand transferring them from place
to place and making them appear as boxes of cigarettes to avoid and evade apprehension and
detection. They showed his being a big supplier, said the trial court, [whose] criminal perversity and craft
that deserve the supreme penalty of death.[102]

We are unable to agree, however, with the penalty imposed by the trial court. The legislature
never intended that where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in Section 20 of Republic Act No.
6425 the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be imposed.[103] The statute prescribes two
indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua and death. Hence, the penalty to be imposed must conform with
Article 63[104] of the Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659
did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.[105] The rules in Article 63 apply although the
prohibited drugs involved are in excess of the quantities provided for in Section 20 of Republic Act No.
6425.[106] Thus, finding neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the present case, appellants
possession of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, does not merit capital
punishment but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The trial court imposed a fine on appellant in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of
conviction of possession of illegal drugs. This being within the limits allowed by the law, the amount of
the fine must be sustained. All these sanctions might not remedy all the havoc wrought by prohibited
drugs on the moral fiber of our society, especially the youth. [107] But these penalties should warn
peddlers of prohibited drugs that they cannot ply their trade in our streets with impunity.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case
No. 15800-R, convicting appellant MODESTO TEE alias ESTOY TEE of violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby

36
 G.R. No. 89103 July 14, 1995
LEON TAMBASEN, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR GLORIA
LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 44, Bacolod City, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside
the Order dated July 20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Bacolod City in Civil Case
No. 5331, which nullified the order earlier issued by the Municipal Trial Circuit Court (MTCC) of the City
of Bacolod. The MTCC Order directed the return to petitioner of the amount of P14,000.00 which had
been seized by the police.
I validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes L.
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC,
alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house at the North
Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols
(Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended
to be used" for illegal purposes (Rollo, p. 14). On the same day, the application was granted by the
MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in
the application (Rollo, p. 15).
At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized
the following articles:
(1) Two (2) envelopes containing cash in the total amount of P14,000.00 (one
envelope P10,000.00 and another P4,000.00);
(2) one (1) AR 280 handset w/antenae (sic) SN-00485;
(3) one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R w/Antenae (sic);
(4) one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base;
(5) one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V. 13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC;
(6) one (1) brown Academy Notebook & Assorted papers; and
(7) Four (4) handsets battery pack (Rollo, p. 16).
On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the seized
articles, issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day,
Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in contemplation of
law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and
verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was the
applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was not present when it was served.
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be
declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In his answer to the motion, Lt. Col.
Nicolas Torres, the station commander of the Bacolod City Police, said that the amount of P14,000.00
had been earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the Armed City Partisan (ACP) and other
"known NPA personalities" operating in the City of Bacolod.
On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized
to petitioner. The court opined that in the implementation of the search warrant, any seizure should be
limited to the specific items covered thereby. It said that the money could not be considered as
"subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects of gambling.
Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before the RTC, Branch 44, Bacolod City a petition
for certiorariseeking the annulment of the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331). The petition alleged
that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its return
citing the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987) and Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986).
In those cases, the Court held that pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles,
they should remain in custodia legis. The petition also averred that a criminal complaint for "any of the
crimes against public order as provided under Chapter I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code" had been
filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No. 88-1239) and therefore, should the money be found as having
been earmarked for subversive activities, it should be confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an order granting the petition for certiorari and directing the
clerk of court to return to the MTCC the money pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation
being conducted by the city prosecutor on the criminal complaint. In said order, the RTC held:
The Court observed that private respondent Leon Tambasen never questioned the
Magallanes. A perusal of private respondent's "Motion to Declare Search and Seizure
Illegal and to Return Seized Properties" dated October 7, 1988 shows that
respondent Tambasen questions not the validity of the search warrant issued by
respondent Judge Demosthenes Magallanes, but rather, the execution or
implementation of the said warrant principally on the ground that the articles seized
are not allegedly mentioned in the search warrant. However, the question thus raised
involves matters determinative of the admissibility in evidence and the legality of the
articles seized. These matters, it is submitted, go beyond the immediate and limited
jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to inquire into the validity of the search warrant
he issued. These issues which relate exclusively or principally with the intrinsic and
substantive merits of the case or cases which are being prepared against respondent
Tambasen, and insofar as Tambasen is concerned involve matters of defense which
should be properly raised at the criminal action or actions that may be filed against
respondent Leon Tambasen (see DOH v. Sy Chi Siong Co., Inc. et. al., G.R. No.
85289, Feb. 20, 1989). They cannot be addressed to the respondent Judge because
the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the said issue. It is clear therefore that
respondent Judge has transcended the boundaries of his limited jurisdiction and had
in effect encroached upon the jurisdiction of the appropriate trial court or courts that
will try the criminal case or cases against respondent Leon Tambasen, in issuing the
assailed order dated December 23, 1988. Ostensibly, the assailed order, if not
corrected, will unduly deprive the prosecution of its right to present the evidence in
question and, consequently, will improperly oust the trial court, which will try the
criminal case or cases against private respondent Leon Tambasen of its original and
exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility and legality of the said evidence. This
order of respondent court is tantamount to a denial of due process. It may be
considered as a grave abuse of discretion reviewable by certiorari (Esparagoza v.
Tan, 94 Phil. 749) (Rollo, pp.
47-48).
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order commanding the city prosecutor to cease and desist from continuing with
the preliminary investigation in BC I.S. No. 88-1239 and the RTC from taking any step with respect to
Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed that Search Warrant No. 365 and the seizure of his personal
effects be declared illegal and that the Order of July 20, 1989 be reversed and annulled.
Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered three offenses: "(1) illegal possession of armalite
rifle and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and dynamite sticks; and (3) illegal
possession of subversive documents" (Rollo, pp. 3-4) in violation of Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
37
Revised Rules of Court. He assailed the legality of the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned
in the search warrant. Moreover, since a complaint against him was filed only after his house had been
searched, petitioner claimed that the police were "on a fishing expedition."
During the pendency of the instant petition, a series of events related to the questioned search and
seizure transpired. At around 10:30 P.M. of March 1, 1990, petitioner, who was then on board a
passenger vehicle, was arrested by intelligence operatives in Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City and
forthwith detained. On the strength of sworn statements of two rebel returnees, the police filed a
complaint for subversion against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor. The following day, the
City Prosecutor filed an information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Law against petitioner with RTC,
Branch 42, Bacolod City (Criminal Case No. 8517). An order for the arrest of petitioner was issued on
March 2, 1990.
On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 8517.
On March 15, 1990, RTC, Branch 42 granted petitioner's motion to quash and recalled the warrant of
arrest. The court also directed the City Prosecutor to resolve BC-I.S. Case No. 88-1239.
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing
Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v.
Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary
methods that the Constitution itself abhors."
For the retention of the money seized by the police officers, approval of the court which issued the
search warrant is necessary (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]). In like manner, only the
court which issued the search warrant may order their release (Temple v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295
[1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 [1967]).
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with petitioner as the sole accused, was ordered quashed
by the trial court and the prosecution's motion for the reconsideration of the quashal order had been
denied. Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239, which was being investigated by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Marcos, petitioner was dropped as a respondent. Hence, there appears to be no criminal
prosecution which can justify the retention of the seized articles in custodia legis.

On March 20, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria Lastimosa Marcos manifested before RTC, A subsequent legal development added another reason for the return to him of all the seized articles:
Branch 42 that petitioner had been "dropped" from BC-I.S. No. 88-1239. However, the City Prosecutor R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed by R.A. No. 7636 and, therefore, the crimes
had, by then, filed a motion for the reconsideration of said Resolution of March 15, 1990. The motion defined in the repealed law no longer exist.
was denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the People of the Philippines is ORDERED to RETURN
Under this factual matrix, this Court is confronted with the question of whether RTC, Branch 44 gravely the money seized to petitioner.
abused its discretion in directing that the money seized from petitioner's house, specifically the amount
of P14,000.00, be retained and kept in custodia legis. SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search
Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No.
365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216
SCRA 101 [1992]).

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The evident purpose
and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and
that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.]
Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional
provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted
(People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized from
petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is
not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance
of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual
(People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public
welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law

38
 G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma.
Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252 of the
Penal Code, and sentencing him to four months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the
proposition that the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe
search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the
House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more
than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had
been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the
secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of
the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after
three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and
barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so
as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them
was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the
search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John
Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was
considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils,
Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in
conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and
Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to
meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part
of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and
Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte,
cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again
refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the
policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen
were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.
In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All
of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception
of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the appellate court
where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable
Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except that
he stresses certain points as more favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously
indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the
search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the
police by force. The nature of this defense makes it advisable to set forth further facts, relating
particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the
search warrant. The application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.
APPLICATION FOR (G)
SEARCH WARRANT
Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduño, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.
Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47
Revellin, detective.
Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C.,
City of Manila? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According to the
best of my information the house is occupied by John Doe.
Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that in said premises there
are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips,
lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are or there will
be gambling conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises are known as
gambling house. I have watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a
gambling house and a place where instruments and devices used in gambling games,
such as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited
games are kept.
I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing
questions and answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court
The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant
alone. This document reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,
vs.

39
 JOHN DOE, Defendant.
SEARCH WARRANT (G)
The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the
Police Force of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good
reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building
occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building numbered 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of
the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other
utensils used in connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John
Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using
them in violation of the Gambling Law.
Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10)
days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house
situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest of the above
described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you are
commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO
Judge, Municipal Court
Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the person
is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right to be secured against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although naturally
entering more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant shall not
issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized." (Section 97.) After the judge or justice shall
have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and shall have taken their
depositions in writing (section 98), and after the judge or justice is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must
issue the warrant which must be substantially in the following form:
. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of
............................, or in the house situated ...................................... (describing it or any other
place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case may be) for the following
property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with a crime may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the crime. (Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions
under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen.
Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of
requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J.
Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are
material differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe search
warrants we propose to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant, thus
following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of the
issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal
Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is found the
following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where
the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable
the officer to identify him when found.
xxx xxx xxx
Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be
apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as
will enable the officer to identify the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the
essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank
warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the
name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without
other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not
justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio
personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this
description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the
warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his
occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be
identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other
hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States
Supreme Court, is the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there
appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe or
Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown," had committed an assault
and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issued against "John Doe or Richard Roe,
whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing complaint." Neither
the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of identification of the person
to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice
Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:
40
 We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of
the defendant at the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain
the name of the defendant, nor any description or designation by which he could be known and
identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was in effect a general warrant, upon
which any other individual might as well have been arrested, as being included in the
description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to elementary principles,
and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of
Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that all warrants, therefore, are
contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected
persons or to seize their property be not accompanied with a special designation of the
persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an ancient
common law right. It was always necessary to express the name or give some description of a
party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and without
other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster,
312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose
name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to
be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served,
by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his
residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)
The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person
on whom he attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The
defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by force, using no more than was
necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in
question, if they were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an
unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be convicted
of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional
and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly"
describe the person to be seized. A failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the search
warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process must be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly
resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as the law
was summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings forth
certain points of paramount force and exercising a decisive influence. We will now make mention of
them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building
to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This,
without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a
description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance
Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers were accordingly authorized to break down
the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When
inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to
confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with
the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the
cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search
warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be
seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession
in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124
Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the
Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic Act requires a
particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized, and that the
warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition,
contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is
invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in
those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the
accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the
warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his
possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John
Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma.
Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club
purposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully
protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club
with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended for nefarious practices. In a
club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly be varying occupancy, a number of
John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his
dwelling, a man has a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much less so in
a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more force
than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of the
authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case
for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable
legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3
Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified
therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information,
permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The
Attorney-General adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant
since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough
of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched
judicial interference.
41
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the
search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of
the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.

The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member of
the House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the facts
as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We doubt, however, that
advantage was taken by the offender of his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The
offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime.
Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the
Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by
the Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the
trial judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results that
the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the
defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor,
with the costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this judgment into effect
issue.

42
 [G.R. No. 126859. September 4, 2001]
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ISAM MOHAMMAD ABDULHADI, WAIL RASHID AL-KHATIB, NABEEL
NASSER AL-RIYAMI, ASHRAF HASSAM AL-YAZORI, AND MOHAMMAD
ABUSHENDI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners assail the decision[1] dated September 30, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, thereby dismissing
petitioners special civil action for certiorari.[2]
The facts leading to the present petition under Rule 65 are as follows:
On March 31, 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95[3]and 55-
95[4] for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo
Road, Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1)
.45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were:
2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions
1 Bar of demolition charge
1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live 45
ammunitions
1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder
1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber ammunitions
2 pieces of fragmentation grenade
1 roll of detonating cord color yellow
2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance
22 detonating cords with blasting caps
and pound of high explosives TNT
1 timer alarm clock
2 bags of suspected gun powder
2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance
1 small box of plastic bag of suspected dynamites
One weighing scale
Two (2) batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and detonating cord.[5]
The firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the apartments
were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in
informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67, accusing them with illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.[6] Thereafter,
petitioners were arrested and detained.
Petitioners filed a motion for bail on May 24, 1995, the resolution of which was held in abeyance
by the RTC pending the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to determine whether or not the
evidence presented is strong.[7]
On February 7, 1996, at the hearing for bail, the RTC admitted all exhibits being offered for
whatever purpose that they maybe worth after the prosecution had finished adducing its evidence
despite the objection by the petitioners on the admissibility of said evidence.
On February 19, 1996, the RTC denied petitioners motion for bail earlier filed, giving as reasons
the following:
To begin with, the accused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under
Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its
maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.[8]
As petitioners action before respondent appellate court also proved futile, petitioners filed the
instant petition on the ground that it had acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. They present for our consideration the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION ARE
ADMISSIBLE;
II. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED HAVE THE RIGHT TO BAIL.[9]
The issue on bail has been resolved in our resolution dated November 24, 1998, where this Court
ruled:
Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under which petitioners were charged, has
now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior
to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 [10]
xxx
WHEREFORE, the petitioners motion is hereby GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court in the Resolution of November 20, 1996 is hereby PARTIALLY LIFTEDin so far as
petitioners pending motion for bail before the RTC of Kalookan City, Branch 123 is concerned. The trial
court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the motion for bail and resolve the same with
dispatch.[11]
The issue that remains is whether the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion
when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question are valid and the objects seized admissible
in evidence.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of
Rights[12] as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure [13]because the
place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the two-
witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126[14] was ignored when only one witness signed the
receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at the
trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the implementation of the search warrant
was rebutted by the defense during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. According to
petitioners, respondent court failed to appreciate the fact that the items seized were not turned over to
the police evidence custodian as required under Section 18 of the Department of Justice Circular No. 61
dated September 21, 1993. Finally, they fault the lower courts finding that petitioners were in
possession of the items allegedly confiscated from them.[15]
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the search of Apartment 2 was legal,
and the items seized therein are admissible in evidence. However, the OSG agrees with petitioners that
the search warrants issued by the RTC, Branch 125, Kalookan City on March 31, 1995, namely search
43
warrant 54-95[16] and search warrant 55-95,[17] specified the place to be searched, namely Apartment
No. 2, 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. There was no mention of Apartment No.
8. Thus, we find that the search conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of
the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion,[18] the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor
amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing
so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at
Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against
petitioners.
Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the
presence of its occupants, herein petitioners,[19] in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court.[20]
Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the
warrants. Hence, they also question the seizure of the following articles from Apartment No. 2, namely:
One M16 rifles, Colt AR-15 with 2 magazines and 20 rds ammo live
One (1) bar demolition charge
One (1) .45 caliber pistol numbers were defaced with magazine and with three (3) live .45 cal ammos
One (1) .22 caliber handgun with live ammos in its cylinder
One (1) box containing (40) forty pieces of .22 cal. live ammos (magnum)
Two (2) pieces fragmentation grenade
Two (2) magazines of M16 rifles with live ammos.[21]
To appreciate them fully, we quote the search warrants in question:
Search Warrant 54-95
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath P/Sr Insp Joel D.
Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his witness SPO1 Cesar R. Rivera of District
Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District Command with postal address c/o NPIU, NPDC,
PNP, Langaray St., Kaunlaran Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a. GHUL a.k.a. NADI,
a.k.a. NABIL and several John Does of Apartment Nr. 2, Nr. 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo
Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the following:
1. One (1) 45 Caliber Pistol
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY and NIGHT of the
premises above-mentioned and forthwith, seize and take possession of the foregoing property, to wit:
1. One (1) .45 Caliber Pistol
and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct.[22]
Search Warrant 55-95
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath P/Sr. Insp. Joel D.
Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his witness SPO1 Cesar R. Rivera of District
Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District Command with postal address c/o NPIU, NPDC,
PNP, Langaray St., Kaunlaran Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a. GHUL a.k.a. NADI,
a.k.a. NABIL and several John Does of Apartment Nr. 2, Nr. 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo
Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the following:
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosives
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY or NIGHT of the
premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the foregoing properties, to
wit:
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosives
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct.[23]
That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant above-quoted appears to us beyond cavil. The items
seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of
the items ordered to be seized did not require, in our view, a technical description.Moreover, the law
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for
the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are
looking for.[24] Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so
invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in
the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.
In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932), this Court said, While it is true that the property to be
seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow. Where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general,
it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue. As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude that where the description of those
goods to be seized have been expressed technically, all others of a similar nature but not bearing the
exact technical descriptions could not be lawfully subject to seizure.Otherwise, the reasonable purpose
of the warrant issued would be defeated by mere technicalities.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of
the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant
is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued. A careful examination of Search Warrant Nos. 54-95[25] and 55-95[26] shows that
they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation
to the offense of violation of Section 1[27] and 3[28] of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the warrants authorized
was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.
Lastly, on this score, we note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners waived their right to
raise any attack on the validity of the search warrants at issue by their failure to file a motion to
quash.[29] But, in conducting the search at Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as ordered
specifically in the search warrants, the police committed a gross violation we cannot condone. Thus, we
conclude that the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in evidence, but those articles
including guns, ammunitions, and explosives seized in Apartment No. 2 are admissible in evidence.
Coming now to the two-witness requirement under Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, petitioners claim the rule was violated because only one witness signed the receipt for the
properties seized. For clarity, let us reproduce the pertinent section:
SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a
detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and
44
seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he
found the seized property.

Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the premises
searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the search and seizure operation was
conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser
admitted being an actual occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2. [30] Hence, we find here no violation of
Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioners contend that they could not be charged with violation of P.D. 1866 because the seized
items were not taken actually from their possession. This contention, however, cannot prosper in the
light of the settled rule that actual possession of firearms and ammunitions is not an indispensable
element for prosecution under P.D. No. 1866. In People v. Dela Rosa, 284 SCRA 158, 168-169 (1998),
we clarified that the kind of possession punishable under P.D. 1866 is one where the accused
possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendior intent to possess said
firearm. Whether or not the evidence would show all the elements of P.D. 1866 in this case is a different
matter altogether. We shall not preempt issues properly still within the cognizance of courts below.
Likewise, whether or not the articles seized were planted by the police, as claimed by the
petitioners, is a matter that must be brought before the trial court. In the same vein, petitioners claim
that the properties seized were not turned over to the proper police custodian is a question of fact best
ventilated during trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search conducted at Apartment No. 8
is hereby declared illegal and the item (.45 caliber pistol) seized therein inadmissible in
evidence. However, the search at Apartment No. 2 pursuant to Search Warrant 55-95 is hereby
declared valid and legal, and the articles seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in
evidence. Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, for trial
on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67 with dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

45
 [G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000] 7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations and he is
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.
REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.
DECISION On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the
BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application
KAPUNAN, J.: sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof. After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The first[2] is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim
that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit[1]stating: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as 7th Judicial Region
UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active management of UY Branch 28
CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without Mandaue City
issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme: Plaintiff,
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company; - versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
canned sardines processed by UNIFISH; UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys Unifish Packing Corporation
from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases; Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City
(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho x-------------------------/
delivers to the different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.; (with sketch)
(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks SEARCH WARRANT
drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
also not receipted (sic); G R E E T I N G S:
(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had
withdrawn from the corporation; It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N. Labaria,
3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the sale of Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic) probable
imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH, being cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been
an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain exemptions in their committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing
importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export. These tax Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the following:
exemptions are granted by the government on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers. Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax exemptions 2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as containers for its 3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to other food processing 4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
companies. 5. Sales Records, Job Order;
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION was 6. Corporate Financial Records; and
then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as 7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now
running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises
acts as what is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present. and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned
6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH AND and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt
PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue with as the law directs.
City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts, sales invoices, delivery receipts, WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting records (such as ledgers, journals, cash receipts (sgd.)
books, and check disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is best described in the herein MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of the corporation which is made Judge
an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A,

46
 The second warrant[3]is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine
OF SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They
content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said
page. search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of
7th Judicial Region Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
Branch 28
Mandaue City On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, of the Cebu RTC.
Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253 reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the
Unifish Packing Corporation Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:
Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof shall
x-------------------------/ be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
(with sketch) decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and
SEARCH WARRANT papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2) the
G R E E T I N G S: Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N. Labaria,
Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic] probable
cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been
committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy
and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and
control, the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said premises
and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned
and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt
with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,[4] which was docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-
80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263 (hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for
the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant (Section 238 in relation to
Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery receipts
and/or sales invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying the
motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the Department of
Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a Motion to
Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the merits, or after the case
shall have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs. Intermediate 220SCRA 149 and the
pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other remedies
available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari) from the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have been
granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law
against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent
appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the
Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's
resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by P.D.
911); 3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the information in the
trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of
Court). 4. If themotion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the case shall have bee
n tried on the merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the case
of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case isdenied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial witho
ut prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. In the event that an adverse
decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal step.
Xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants
without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court committed

47
an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search Warrants did not
describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of probable cause; and for having
allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us, are merely
errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.[5]
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for
review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and
documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for Reconsideration. An
examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in their Reply,
after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its credit,
it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been decided without
these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to the resolution of the
case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case,[6] we held that the
submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial
compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a certified true
copy of material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant
or pertinent thereto along with the petition. So should it be in this case, especially considering that it
involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim could be defeated. [7]
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the resolution
denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate, cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in 220 SCRA 149.
The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by petitioners, [8] appears to have been
taken from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is
inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash a complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to
quash a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[9] where we held that the issuing judges disregard
of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which
may be remedied by certiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari is
available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de
Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically
and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that
a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized; and that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders the
warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order complained of is a
patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the existence
of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy
remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her personal property
had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had been improperly
seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari can be
allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC
of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,[10] which also involved a special civil action for certiorari:[11]
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional requirement that
he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave
abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114
SCRA 657, the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before
issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search warrants,
which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the
enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation thus resulting
in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy that would afford
petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
48
 (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants.[13] The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of
requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify under it.[14]
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-
1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the
same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also
dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they
claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to
petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence. [15]
Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho
alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same warrant states the address
as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the
address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description
of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized. [16]The rule is that a description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended[17]and distinguish it from other places in the community.[18] Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. [19] Thus, in Castro vs.
Pabalan,[20] where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners therein as
Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court "admitted that the deficiency in
the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu
City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of
petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the
premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1
and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy. Search Warrant A-
2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing
Corporation.
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,[21] it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from
which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant to
name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the
search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name
the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the
warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted
in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is
otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be
searched.[22]
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or
occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be
declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises,
because of inconsistencies in stating their names.[23]
Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place
In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same
crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search
Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as
well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search
Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the
persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to be
searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants
authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing
Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed revoked by the
former.
The alleged absence of probable cause
Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search
warrants.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [24]
In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. [25] Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a
general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. [26]
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.[27] Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
suspicion or belief.[28]
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely,
Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish. Petitioners
49
claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this contention, but only as
to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination:
Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?
A. No.
Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of the
legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.
Q. From where did you get that information?
A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.[29]
The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities
of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by Abos. Therefore,
the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the
search warrants.[30]
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was apparently
obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed by
Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where the documents
supposedly evidencing these schemes were located:
Q Do you know Frank Uy?
A Yes.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.
Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
A Hernan Cortes St.
Q What is it being engaged of?
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings that
he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q How is it done?
A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his
authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells these
products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole Philippines. He makes
it appear that it is the company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he
does not issue any invoices.
Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
A Thru delivery receipts.
Q Is the delivery receipt official?
A No. It is unregistered.
Q For how long has this been going on?
A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.
Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?
A August, 1993, last month.
Q How did you happen to know about this last month?
A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not go
directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the goods
that he sold.
Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?
A White Gold and Gaisano.
Q How did you know this fact?
A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last three
years. I was the Operating Chief.
Q Until now?
A No. I was separated already.
Q When?
A August, 1993.
Q How does he do this manipulation?
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his
customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever?
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not for the BIR but
it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and him. It is not
made to be shown to the BIR.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts, sales
records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit, which are
only for the consumption of the company?
A Yes, not for the BIR.
Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of the
whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the
confidential transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and
notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the records
from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the receipts. The second
girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are
stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina because
according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?
A Yes.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go straight
there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q Where are they now?
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me, especially this
one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the months of January,
February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox copies which
appear in the ledger being shown to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
50
 Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January, what
does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it does not reflect.
Q What are these xerox copies of checks?
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of
sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna for
export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they
profit more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are sold to another
company.
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but instead
they are selling it locally?
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was the
delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling (sic)
it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging materials. When
you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that advantage of that
exemption, they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since according
to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by Gina?Are
you sure that these documents are still there?
A Yes. I have received information.
COURT: Alright.[31]
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records,
and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this witness
did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the deposition clearly
demonstrate otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the
judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to be
sufficiently probing.
Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject warrants
and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,[32] Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,[33]and Asian Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.[34]
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by
the Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the
things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major object: the
elimination of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those
in Stonehill:
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in
this manner:
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements
books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities;
contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications;
accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals;
and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
xxx
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, to wit:
x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, -
that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision
borne out by the American authorities.
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when
the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer may be guided
in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing
tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant
must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the
articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this
event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the
dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of
stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications,
checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in
the warrant.
51
 In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized, i.e.,
Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss,
Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc.
was held to be an omnibus description and, therefore, invalid:
x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in several motions filed for early
resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their
business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its
numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the
general public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We have
before Us the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be
seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said
photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a
general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be
seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description
in a warrant.[35] The use by the issuing judge of the terms multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers,
journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts,
production record books/inventory lists, stock cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial
records, and bank statements/cancelled checks is therefore unacceptable considering the
circumstances of this case.
As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase & sales invoices,
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these
documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered.[36] Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a
particular description of the contents thereof.[37] Although it appears that photocopies of these
unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical
to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to the
minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts
and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is
severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant. In United States v. Cook,[38] the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the
following pronouncement:
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415
(1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described books and
myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only the
books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged that the
warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the defective
portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately,
must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The
invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books x x
x. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles.
xxx
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state courts
that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge should sever the
infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488
F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in the
warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with
the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits the
Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally obtained
evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not particularly described serves as an
effective deterrent to those in the Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant without the
necessary description. As the leading commentator has observed, it would be harsh medicine indeed if
a warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to
be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a
search for other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by
the enforcing officers:
1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,
2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,
6. Surety Agreement.[39]
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and Development
Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional
provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must
be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder. [40] In Tambasen vs.
People,[41] it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose
and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
52
described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and
that abuses may not be committed (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.],
Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same constitutional
provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted
(People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized from
petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is
not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance
of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of an individual (People
v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is
the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez
v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198
SCRA 614 (1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors.

The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the
penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such
violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized.
As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the present
proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties.[42]

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May
1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the
unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with
respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue
is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and belonging to
petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices.
SO ORDERED.

53
 G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon
Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St.
Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or
"wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars
nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car.
Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to
take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had
come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the
shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the
cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he
positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the
assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his
lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any
such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be
filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide,
filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the
bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion
itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action
on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who,
on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner
was in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended.
He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The
Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall
have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the
following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours
from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the
prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition
for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme
Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of
Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was
arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not
guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September;
on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged
that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him,
after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released
on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain
his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.
54
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first
witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2)
petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was
arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established
through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been
an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station,
one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his
arrest. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and
seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order
because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so
as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid
commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the
authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the
petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the
Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal
case below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second,
whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these
issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had
been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon
Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested
six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station
Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a
warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which
Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the
information for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went
to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the
police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly
none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had
been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of
this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the
warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the
offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant
case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously
commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the
fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case
falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides
as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may
ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but
he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for
bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
55
 If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of
the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police
Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication
he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed
under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith
subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation,
we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been
filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to
have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory
right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation
was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing
of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial
Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus
motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to
the Court for appropriate action.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court
or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the
fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due
process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
20
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . . . (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation
and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the
Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for
murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy
of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed
with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary
investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the
petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the
Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the
(mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be
held to have been substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that
right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk
of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not
to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to
hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be
to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the
instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already
before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his
right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and
proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for
preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on
the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary
investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of
criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the
trial court. 25
56
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and
was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his determination to respect those rights and liberties.
hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the
recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of
hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the
recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
bail as a matter of right. investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the
the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact preliminary investigation.
upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be
released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One
respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail? Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order
that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude SO ORDERED.
that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion
that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional
point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due
process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary
investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking .
During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of
petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and
objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic
and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and
prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the
trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his
objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his
"continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition
to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his
detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it
was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge,
and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of
truth in the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt
be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for
cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective
assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation
and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to
legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or
culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing
point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and
to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not
compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idleceremony; rather, it would be a celebration

57
 [G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession
of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver." [1]
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866[2] thru the
following Information:[3]
"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919
with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight
(8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and possess the
same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."[4]
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,[5] but granted his application for bail.[6] During the
arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, [7] upon
advice of counsel,[8] to make any plea.[9] Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in any and all
stages of the case.[10]
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994
convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum".[11] Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. [12] Pending the appeal in the
respondent Court of Appeals,[13] the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong
evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of
this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's
conviction,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his
provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby
cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order
of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons
thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. This
shall be immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report
of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED."[15]
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. [16] On August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for
reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)" [17] but the same was denied by respondent court in
its September 20, 1995 Resolution,[18] copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27,
1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with
application for bail[19] followed by two "supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, [20] a "second
supplemental petition"[21] and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for
bail. Again, the Solicitor-General[22] sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the Court
agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996.[23] The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's
motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his
reply.[24] However, after his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the
respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the
respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In
Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal.[25]
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and given credence
by respondent court, is as follows:[26]
"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang and his
compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo,
Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15,
1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp. 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway
(ibid). While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running
fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident
considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis
na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid). True enough, immediately after
the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-
8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny
Cruz, quite sure of what had happened, remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had
been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle occupying the
edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang,
being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating
Council, decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p.
10, ibid). He took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine
National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the call, the
vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the north
(p. 11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, rode on his
motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make out the
plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15, 1993). He called the Viper
through the radio once again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate
number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The
Viper, in the person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the
message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle (p.
20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the alarm was its Patrol
Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23,
1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile
58
patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan
bridge since it was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about
ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from SPO2 Buan
was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol along
Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and
SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to
proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p.
10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the hit and run
incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep
in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-
12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang,
he proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-
14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and
SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He
approached them and informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10,ibid). Upon
learning that the two police officers already knew about the incident, Manarang went back to
where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he
saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the corner
adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that the license plate
hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p.
15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10,
TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their
position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated
the siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the
path of the vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23,
1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its
driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while
raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case
(p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja
noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p.
14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was
wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such that when he alighted with
both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p.
15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to
confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by
legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by
legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant,
SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p.
17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the
cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado,
SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most
senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant
that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to
appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the
hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and,
instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3
Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because
appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked
in appellant's back right pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant
turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the
magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a
rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from
going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He
saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a
long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked
appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at
his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by including as its
ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp.
31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta
pistol(Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded
with seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing
two additional long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-
37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was
transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the City Hall
Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus
Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted
possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not
able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp.
16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior Inspector
Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8,
TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms confiscated from
appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and
Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of
Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by
Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of
Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms
and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule;
(2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry
the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and
cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records[27]of this case, the Court is convinced that petitioner's guilt of
the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no
warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the
Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: [28]
59
 "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle
figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby
AND proceeds at once to the scene."[30] As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its
driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near
the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.[31]
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who
actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. [32] We beg to disagree. That Manarang
decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run)
in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact
the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself,
inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a
suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an
untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality
that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private
citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not
become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the
arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted
by an urgent need to render aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit,[34] a fleeing
suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which
speed is essential and delay improvident. [35] The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of
the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.[36] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession
of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. [37]
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for
themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, [38] its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported
by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. [39] These formed part of the arresting police
officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal
knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. [40]
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. [41]Petitioner's belated challenge
thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.[42] Likewise, by applying for bail,
petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.[43]
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid,[44] are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[48]
3. search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[50]
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled
upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is
commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. [51] The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of
the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and
back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same
justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver's seat.[52] Thus it has been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police
officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the
guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti."[53]
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant."[54]
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police.[55] This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against
60
the alleged search and seizure[56], and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect.[57]
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the
authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless
can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a protective search [58] of the passenger compartment and
containers in the vehicle[59] which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of
the offense.[60]This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched
(vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control[61] and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest.[62] The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded
by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents
or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.[63]
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D.
1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms
and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order [64] and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP
Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The
contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess.[65] The first element is beyond dispute as
the subject firearms and ammunitions[66] were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid
warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same
was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our
meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere
afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from
respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him
by the police officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant
had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority to
possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the charge
against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the
ample time given him, present any proper document showing his authority. If he had, in
actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those
documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary
investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is
authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and
Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have
produced these documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not
even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.
"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested contain no
allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to possess
and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one James Neneng
to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not even mentioned. James
Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were
reset until the defense found Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without
subpoena on January 13, 1994."[67]
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's
alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were
owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left
at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming
innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare
him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive
of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement
units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP, the
Mission Order should be shown without resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or
misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential instruction will
be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of
laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to such
violation."[68]
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably
controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the
dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
behalf.[69] His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes." [70] In addition, only
Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum
Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs.[71] PNP Supt. Rodialo
Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit
Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an
unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in
force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City,"[72] areas outside Supt.
Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval "by next higher Headquarters" [73] which
is absent in this case. The Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by
the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that:
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without corresponding
certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP
unit that such firearm has been officially taken up in that units property book, and that
report of such action has been reported to higher AFP authority."
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot present the
corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for Personnel of
the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents
61
or Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by
petitioner's counsel.[74] The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and
Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry
firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the
government agency involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian
agent must be included in a specific law enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or
special project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment
and that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent
level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher levels of command." [75]
Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:
"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must
be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law
enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the service they are rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the
firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not
licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner.[76]Thus:
"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find, if any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm pistol,
Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked
whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the caliber
.357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the same serial number which
is the same as that licensed and/or registered in the name of one Albert
Villanueva Fallorina.
"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is a
pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the names of
the accused in this case?
"A. Yes, sir.[77]
xxx xxx xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
"PNPFEO5 28 November 1992
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder
of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL
M76C4476687.
"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per verification
from available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y, licensed/registered to
one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO M.
ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch" [78]
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm.[79] In People vs. Tobias,[80] we reiterated that such certification is sufficient to
show that a person has in fact no license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does
not have the license or permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The
certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidence [81] that an M-16 rifle and any short
firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a
civilian,[82] as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to depart from the factual
findings of both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with
respect and finality.[83]
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic
ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied
instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed
under P.D. 1866 no longer exists.[84] He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years
for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.[85]
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are
bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.[86] Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law as it stands.[87] And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D.
1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous
averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to
come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive','wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community' " [88]
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the
nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences
of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.[89]
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the
invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly
discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
62
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication,[90] as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality
of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. [91] Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent
laws on illegalpossession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. .
."[92] Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to
us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves
or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.

With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum),
we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian[93] where the Court en
banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1)
day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following
explanation by the Court:

"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or proved, In
accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon,[94] although
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal
Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should
be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the
medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20
years.

"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not
merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the
penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period.[95]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's
conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is
AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

SO ORDERED

63
 [G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998]
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated
January 16, 1995,[1] which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1,
convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized
by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession and under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing
crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams which is a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.[2]
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on
July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio
Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora
and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling
something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified
themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana.
Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited
drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail [3] and the trial court issued his order of release on July
29, 1991.[4]
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified
that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo
Espano for examination tested positive for marijuana, with a total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was
awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his
brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police
station for investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna
corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioners defense as a mere afterthought and found the version of the
prosecution more credible and trustworthy.
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused Rodolfo Espano
y Valeria guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of
Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a
fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous
Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the
following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he was denied the
constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his conviction was based on
evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason
sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a
high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in
a better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the
appellants.[6]
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than
those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him,
was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to
him such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco,[7] this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty which provides:
x x x. Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team are
policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who were motivated either by the desire
to extort money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her.
And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a
serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had
been framed.[8]
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply
contended that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently held
that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that
he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible
for him to be there. Moreover, the claim of a frame-up, like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably
viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and is a
common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.[9] No clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecutions failure to present the alleged informant in court
cast a reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the
64
prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best
witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat.
Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended petitioner, testified on the actual incident of July 14,
1991, and identified him as the one they caught in possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no
compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the
lone witness for the prosecution, was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing. The testimony of a
sole witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to
convict.[10]
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagans testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner
indeed committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule
113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
x x x x x x x x x.
Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of
a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the
illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw
petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and
discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags
of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under
Article III, Section 2 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be
said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made
incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the
said provision, the penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on
December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7629, Section 20, and as interpreted in People v.
Simon[13] and People v. Lara,[14] if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the
imposable penalty ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that
petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity of
marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be
applied. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall
be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. [11] It may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest at
Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

In the case of People v. Lua,[12] this Court held:

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellants house, the trial court correctly ignored it
apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful,
the warrantless search made inside the appellants house became unlawful since the police operatives
were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under search made incidental to a lawful
arrest, the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person
arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the

65
 G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength
mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally
seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the
revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an
arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto
Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen.
They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to
run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects
were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38
caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified
as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken
from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under
his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper
authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan,
who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house
in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the
robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part,
Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and
claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted
over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led
to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have
been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the
alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial
court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in
any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned
Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule,
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote
and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
66
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution
when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under
either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question,
the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to
the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them
the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The
question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might
have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had
no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the
morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He
was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine
about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion
was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a
bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself
sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found
to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently
upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion
other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could
it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was
be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He
was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution
incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied.
The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had
yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were
they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had
appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's
supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person,
the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact
(or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of
Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within
his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection
with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was
that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically,
it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making
the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the
recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he
is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could
clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal
act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a
police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting
officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here
make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the
time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The
67
testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.

We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not
only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to
stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with
no expectation of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their
over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid
search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.

This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the
acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically
enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

68
 [G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002]
RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft, and the resolution[2] dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in the
Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about
630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and
prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine
patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with
"kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the
vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not
answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The
conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires
came from and appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers
away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought
to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with
the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident
of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification card
(ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney,
he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in his jeepneyconductor wires
which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last trip for the day
from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM
headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to
happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former would act
as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own vehicle, its
tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with kakawatileaves. The
loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing
a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De
Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his
jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police
headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked him
up in jail for a week."[4]
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment[5] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of property
worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS],
FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS
of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power Corporation in the amount
of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to
wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant RUDY
CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and penalized under
Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances, he is
hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs."[6]
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers searched
his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when samples of the wires
and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged in an
entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said defense;and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to presumption of
innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search
and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and validity of
his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot again sustain such
view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that
considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must
be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in
the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of
practicability. The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No.
83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that
automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not
justifying warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be
arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of
criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and
People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even without a
69
warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the police officers are not
only authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant."[7]
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine
patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court
as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the
vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and
seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof,
which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; [8] (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view;[9] (3) search of moving vehicles;[10] (4) consented warrantless search;[11] (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);[12] and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[13]
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.[14]
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at
bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from
the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution
cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[15] Thus, the rules governing search and
seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that
a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.[16]Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or
'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. [17]
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion
to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause.[18] Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such
facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. [19] The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but
is resolved according to the facts of each case.[20]
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or
police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, [21] for as long as it is warranted by
the exigencies of public order[22] and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. [23] A checkpoint
may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds;[24] (2) simply looks into a vehicle;[25](3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors;[26] (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; [27] (5) where the
inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; [28] and (6) where the
routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[29]
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,[30] the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of
the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a physical
intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not conduct a search
when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to see and to smell things he
could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion
of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent
police officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck
his head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
70
offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be
searched.[31]
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police
("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited
drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested
to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same
physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;[32] (5) the accused who
were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential
reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving
vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a
deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to
which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country. [33]
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered
with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in the
said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and
searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did you
do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."[34]
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
covered by those and I flagged him, sir."[35]
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such
to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of
a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,[36] we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused was
different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas
coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police
authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause.Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable
cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise
over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior,
i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can
return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach
of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g.,
bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report
and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where
they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist
- accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no
classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The
fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area
did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis
supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have
sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become
a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.[37] Unfortunately, none exists in
this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed
in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. [38]
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks[39] and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor
immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the
leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In
such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure
of the articles without further search.[40]
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with
the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims
that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the
specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied
acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
71
detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion.[41] Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence.[42] The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.[43] Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; [44] (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found;[45] (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting.[46] It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. [47]
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was
conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on said
date and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes driving a
vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I
became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged
him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and by
so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told him
I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from
the Cavinti area, sir."[48]
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and
seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated
to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was
requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he
also understood the nature and consequences of such request. [49]
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,[50] the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent
to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,[51] the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding
the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in
mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had
nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,[52] the accused admitted that they
signed a written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI
agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,[53] it was held that the accused
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or
intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People
vs. Omaweng,[54] the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag to
which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the policemen
asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a
valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2)
that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [55]
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the
consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's
vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents
of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those
words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the
vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein
petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases
where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent
of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the
statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they
will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and
granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the
vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the
aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told
petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat.
de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his
consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for
permission to conduct the search.[56]
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,[57] appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box,
boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found
marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to
object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the
accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed
to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,[58] to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain petitioners conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right
of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
72
 [G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997]
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited,
flexible responses -- like stop-and-frisk -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information
they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the
citizens constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its
Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Alain Manalili y Dizon.
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,[1] Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by
Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows:[2]
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana
residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. [3] With the
agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.[4] After
trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal
Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision [5] convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana
residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the
costs.
xxx xxx xxx.
Appellant remained on provisional liberty. [7] Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a
Notice of Appeal[8] dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court[9] promulgated its assailed
Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial court: [10]
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects. Costs against appellant.
Respondent Court[11] denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994,
disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellants motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: [12]
At about 2:10 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the
Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug
addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person
was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person
tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person
tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in
his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat.
Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept
the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters
and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl.
Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong
wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote Evidence A 4/11/88 Alain
Manalili. The white sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped in a
smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter
prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried
the referral slip (Exhibit D) to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana
residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of
Exhibit D.
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana
residue at 7:40 oclock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit D.
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the
specimen which she identified. (Exhibit E)[13] Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as crushed
marijuana leaves in her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit F). [14] These crushed marijuana leaves
gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she
also found that the crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a
Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit G).
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and
sealed it. (Exhibit E). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit E-1).
73
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to
Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City
Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit C)
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of
the cemetery when he was apprehended.[15]
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows: [16]
At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a
tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three
policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger
were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside
the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the accused
and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and
the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on the
persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they
brought the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again
search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to follow
him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival
thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another
companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to
look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the
companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused.The accused
was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of
his pants.
At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and
was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to settle
the case. The policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and
Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The
accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an
inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the
Fiscal told the accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City
Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were
stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen
found nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April
11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to
take off his pants at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures
showing that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.[17]
The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the
strength of the arresting officers testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral and
disinterested witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their
duties. Substantially, they asserted that the appellant was found to be in possession of a substance
which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellants defense that this charge was merely trumped up, because
the appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a
reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged serious discrepancies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the
essential veracity of the narration. It further found petitioners contention -- that he could not be convicted
of illegal possession of marijuana residue -- to be without merit, because the forensic chemist reported
that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the
guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the
purpose of extorting money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is
consistent with both innocence and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in
evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2)
the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the
defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that
they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5, 1994,
which was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana
leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object
to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the
search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.
74
 We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In
the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,[18] a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of
the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced
in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.[19]
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective
crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate
circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there
is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function
which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion
whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time,
while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred
with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years experience to have
failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held
that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject
to challenge.[20] Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence
as a fruit of the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute.[21] The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver
by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. [22] In People vs.
Encinada,[23] the Court further explained that [i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable
cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,[24] the Court held that there are many instances
where a search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of
which is stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped
petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioners bag one
.38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear
gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to
search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much
too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
marijuana in petitioners possession:[25]
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery,
Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around
at A. Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one
Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we
called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and
introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high
on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
75
 Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his
hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed
residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto
during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived
existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had
an actual intention to relinquish the right. [26] Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the
failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have
waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the
appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be
pleaded for the first time on appeal.[27]
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers testimony contained polluted, irreconcilable
and unexplained contradictions which did not support petitioners conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial courts assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great
weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they
testified before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated
by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not
countenance a departure from this rule.[28]
We concur with Respondent Courts ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential
veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that As long as the witnesses concur on the
material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential
veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the
bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritus testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite
Pat. Lumabas contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit [29] signed by
both arresting policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioners wallet or
inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said
substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in
petitioners possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor, and does not destroy Espiritus
credibility.[30]
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[31]
The substance found in petitioners possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida
Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioners lack of authority to possess these leaves was
established. His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when
stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was
holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was
prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to
believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against
the arresting officers or present any evidence, other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for
his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail
as early as April 26, 1988.[32] Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was
no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with
disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate. [33]
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside
from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate
penalty:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who
shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Underscoring
supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for
illegal possession of marijuana:
Sec. 8. x x x x
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years. [34]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6)
YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
76
 G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of
their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent
than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have
been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless
arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on their
personal knowledge. The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly
contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the
accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the meaning
of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk"
action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without
improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III,
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should be
acquitted.
I It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector
Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text
message from an unidentified civilian informer" 2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat)
"[would]be transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of
San Gabriel, La Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." 5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime
Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the
waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. 6 A passenger jeepney from
Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. 8 SPO1
Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed
and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a
yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. 11 Cogaed and Dayao told
SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their
barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of
what looked like marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti
nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag." 14 "SPO1
Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station."15 Cogaed and
Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags"16 inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit)
requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of
suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected
marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. 21 PSI Bayan personally delivered
the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector
Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5
grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. 25 The marijuana collected from
Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and
Dayao’s bags.27
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to
take him"28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and
recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao
and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his
things, which included a travelling bag and a sack." 32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to
the market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked
Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know. 34SPO1 Taracatac then talked
to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation. 35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested
Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station. 36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was
apprehended.37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head."38 The bags were also
opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.39
illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. 40 The information against them
states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED
Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and
possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred
twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165
(otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"). 41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed and
Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old
at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or
Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the
Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one
million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had
77
just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered
illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived
his right to object to such irregularity" 49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying
himself, asked him to open his bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and
affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his
bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:
I 4. Consentedwarrantless search;
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN
UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER
CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF
THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on
the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many
dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures
are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements
of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge.56The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking
searching questions and answers.57Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense
alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must
be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. 59 In the Rules of
Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. 60 This court
has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured."61 The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches
are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches
incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 66 This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches 68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe —
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police
officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit
act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by
people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and
[who was] walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police
officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
78
drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and]
investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. 76 This man was also
"wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit." 77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight
added to the suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed "homemade
firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first." 82 This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a
man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a
person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda
jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag.
The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the
driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
COURT:
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason to believe that the
accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary
to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less than this
would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to
determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 86 one of the earliest cases adopting the
"stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag
there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicionsupported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable
cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes of the
"stop and frisk" exception:92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes
omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on
a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." 96 The Constitution
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. 98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched
was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the
bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough
reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting
the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. 102 In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. 103 At the bus
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. 104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged
that she allowed them to look inside her bag.107The bag contained marijuana leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. 109 There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. 110 It was
only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was not
admissible because of the illegal search.112Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
79
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s informant,
who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. 114 Here, the National Bureau
ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. 115 The NBI
waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. 116 Like
in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turnedout to be
marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand seizure was illegal. 118 Aminnudin was
acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles
City."121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. 122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. 125 The man alighted from
his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live
ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was holding. 128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation when the
police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.The
facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to
be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, withouta
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At the
time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a
crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two elements
must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
inthe presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed
was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that
Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last
allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object
when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to
the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a
natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into
his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such
waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be discerned again from the
testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, ma’am.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, ma’am.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the contents ofthe bag, you
have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it not?
A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses to Judge Florendo’s
questions:
COURT:
....
Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was somewhat
frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he was already stepping down and he put
down the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me
to carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police
officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer must also
inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his
or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy
requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135
80
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures
should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." 137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to
one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we
cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack
of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y
ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being heldfor
some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

81
ELENITA C. FAJARDO,Petitioner, G.R. No. 190889
- versus - January 10, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the February 10, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with
modification the August 29, 2006 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan,
finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.
The facts:
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No.
1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao,
Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without
authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two
(2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN
763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two
(2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces
live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber
.45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their
possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial
Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office, Kalibo,
Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive
Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.[3]
When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. [4] During pre-trial,
they agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
1. The search warrant subject of this case exists;
2. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this
case who is a resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo,
Aklan;
3. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of
August 27, 2002 but does not live therein;
4. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;
5. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the
morning of August 28, 2002; and
6. The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon
the arrival of the military personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw
them in possession of a firearm in the evening of August 27, 2002.[5]
As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and the CA, [6] these are the chain of
events that led to the filing of the information:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations
Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza
(P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and
Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men
drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial Office, the elements of the PISOG
proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in
different directions. The responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at
the policemen before entering the house of petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her
shorts, after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering petitioners house but, in order
to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited
for further instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and
negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No agreement materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava
(SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the
house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and inside
the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome
T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects,
which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number
(SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were
then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in
applying for and obtaining a search warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with
a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses, the police team
proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found and was able to confiscate the following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite Rifle;
2. Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess
the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant
was defective because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not
based on his personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the application:
That this application was founded on confidential information received by the
Provincial Director, Police Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.[7]
They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner, who
was inside the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen as they
explored the place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).
82
 Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared
by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff
sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding
team arrived. She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing garterized
shorts and a spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse.[8]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already
denied in the Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not appealed and have thus
attained finality. The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality
of their arrest since they participated in the trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by
applying for bail, they have effectively waived such irregularities and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having
served with the Philippine Army prior to his separation from his service for going on
absence without leave (AWOL). With his military background, it is safe to conclude
that Zaldy Valerio is familiar with and knowledgeable about different types of firearms
and ammunitions. As a former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and
disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of Elenita Fajardo is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for firearms,
explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and ammunition
were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact remains
that it is a government property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the
proper place to store those items. The logical explanation is that those items are
stolen property.
xxxx
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes
not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection
of the thing to ones control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which
the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law[,] the proprietary concept of
the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
xxxx
x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that
he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith
and without criminal intent.
xxxx
To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under
P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably
established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm ammunition or explosive
which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the
testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the
negative fact that the accused has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm,
ammunition or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or
certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit
G).
The judicial admission of the accused that they do not have permit or license
on the two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and
model M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition,
5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and
recovered from their possession during the search conducted by members of the
PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall
under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. [9]
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294,
which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber
and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms
but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three:
Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in
an Order dated October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of
law, and held that the search warrant was void based on the following observations:
[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan did not have
personal knowledge of the fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as
required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical statement on that point
during the application. Also, he failed to attach to the application a certification to that
effect from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police. x x x,
this certification is the best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed has no
license or permit to possess a firearm. There was also no explanation given why said
certification was not presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during the
application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was simply ignored. [10]
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioners residence were declared
inadmissible in evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house of
petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the plain view doctrine.
83
 Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a
firearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five (5)
years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00
fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated
December 3, 2009.[12] Hence, the present recourse.
At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information filed against petitioner and Valerio
charged duplicitous offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses.
A reading of the information clearly shows that possession of the enumerated articles confiscated from
Valerio and petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294.[13] Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite
rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber
.45 ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high
powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38
caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two
or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.[14]
On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no.
M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number, is penalized
under paragraph 1, which states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of
firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32
and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.[15]
This is the necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which
categorized the kinds of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license, according to their
firing power and caliber. R.A. No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of
firearm according to the above classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard
penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in
the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.)
By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal possession of firearm should now
particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified, and should
there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped according to the
categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to
lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated
provision, as in the instant case,[16] because different penalties are imposed by the law, depending on
the caliber of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.
Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses merits a quashal, but petitioner and
Valerio failed to raise this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a waiver, and they could be
convicted of as many offenses as there were charged in the information. [17] This accords propriety to the
diverse convictions handed down by the courts a quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity of the search warrant that led to
their confiscation, is now beyond the province of our review since, by virtue of the CAs Decision,
petitioner and Valerio have been effectively acquitted from the said charges. The present review is
consequently only with regard to the conviction for illegal possession of a part of a firearm.
The Issues
Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not
come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and
that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise
absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45
caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived.
Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the
receivers.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold that the receivers were seized in plain view,
hence, admissible.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
84
 Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
article A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to 12:00 oclock the following day.
Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28, 2002, can you recall where were you?
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be A Yes, sir.
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Q Where were you?
A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by the police.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall any unusual incident?
through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following circumstances: A Yes, sir.
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that incident?
custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and threw something.
against unreasonable searches and seizures.[18] Q And did you see the person who threw something out of this house?
A Yes, sir.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to xxxx
be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. [19] It Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person who threw that something outside the house?
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence A It was Zaldy Valerio.
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) COURT: (to witness)
the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The A Yes, sir.
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he Q Why do you know him?
can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a A Because we were formerly members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its
discovery inadvertent.[20] xxxx
PROS. PERALTA:
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the house, did you do something if any?
outside petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine. A I shouted to seek cover.

First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house and of the other law enforcers xxxx
around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take cover?
holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused the beam of the flashlight on the place where
circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived something was thrown.
engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being committed. There was Q What did you see if any?
thus sufficient probable cause for the policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for daybreak to A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.
apply for a search warrant. xxxx
Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of August 28, 2002, do you recall another
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio unusual incident?
emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier A Yes, sir.
sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown Q And can you tell us what was that incident?
might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. Indeed, A I saw a person throwing something there and the one that was thrown fell on top of the roof of another
when subsequently recovered, they turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol. house.
Q And you saw that person who again threw something from the rooftop of the house?
The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are elucidating: A Yes, sir.
Q Did you recognize him?
Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q Who was that person?
Q What were they doing? A Zaldy Valerio again.
A They were cordoning the house. xx x
Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader Deluso about that incident. What did he tell you? Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio thr[o]w something out of the house?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house carrying with him a gun. A I was on the road in front of the house.
Q And this house you are referring to is the house which you mentioned is the police officers were Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w something out of the house?
surrounding? A He was on top of the house.
A Yes, sir. xxxx

85
Q Later on, were you able to know what was that something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.
xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be seen right away.
xxx
Q What did you do if any?
A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.
xxxx
Q Who opened the fence for you?
A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.
Q When you entered the premises of the house of the lady, what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21]
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial
discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be
identified and known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized
item may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. The liability for
their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of
part of a firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, the following
disquisitions in People v. De Gracia[22] are instructive:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the
thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the
law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or
a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a
person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to
constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of
illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in
which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the
crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the
act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate
the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit
a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal
intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is
done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a
person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess
is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused
may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient
that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or
control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the
possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus,
although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.[23]
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder
thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24]
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject
receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when
the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during
their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one
in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any evidence
pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held liable
for illegal possession of the receivers.
Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the
assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her
shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete
evidence.
Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of
an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of
special law.[25] The quantum of proof required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as
petitioner is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband was not identified with sufficient
particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover,
86
SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG
arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely then that the receivers later on discarded were components
of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.

These findings also debunk the allegation in the information that petitioner conspired with
Valerio in committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is no evidence indubitably proving
that petitioner participated in the decision to commit the criminal act committed by Valerio.

Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
constitutional presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the evidence
adduced by the prosecution.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.

In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the
corresponding license for it.[26]

By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must yield
these requisites:
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and
(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to
which the seized part/component corresponds.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the markings United States Property and the
other bearing Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as Exhibits E and E-1,
respectively. They were also identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter Valerio
discarded them.[27] His testimony was corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega, who witnessed the
recovery of the receivers.[28]

Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon verification, it was ascertained that
Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber of firearms. [29] To
substantiate his statement, he submitted a certification[30] to that effect and identified the same in
court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element.[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo yCastro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on
the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

87
 [G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997]
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an Information[1] filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,[2] as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing
the necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment[3] on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2,[4] while
the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of
arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.[5]
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses:
Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who
examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in
response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police
officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised
of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug
Store. These men were acting suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast. [6]
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for
about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different
directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon
searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line. [7] Yus
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered.Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu
placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.[8]
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group
of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized
petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2
others attempt to detonate a grenade.The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased
petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further
admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu
saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were
supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt
for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.[9]
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain
Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla [10] for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the
inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by
competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapios advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their
willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners
uncounselled confession (Exh. E), there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted
possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of
petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action
Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit for examination.[11]
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioners confession knowing it was
inadmissible in evidence.[12]
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among
other things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a
request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a
grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and
time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination of the grenade, he [f]ound that [the]
major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present, and concluded that
the grenade was [l]ive and capable of exploding. On even date, he issued a certification stating his
findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. [13]
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990
and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990,
he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and
ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found
nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at
Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot
wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner [i]to ang tama mo sa akin. This officer then
inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioners mouth and said, [y]ou are the one who shot me. Petitioner
denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police
officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.[14]
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and
frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and
whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information.[15] Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been
committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would
have been premature.[16] The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were [c]onfronted with an
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of
evidence[17] and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner and his companions were acting
suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group
suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover
evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.[18]
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and since petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose
of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
88
 In its decision[19] dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court
thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No.
1866, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal [20] indicating that he was appealing to this
Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-
G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs.[21]
In his Appellants Brief [22] filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE
FROM HIM WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the
conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote.[23] As
such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and
prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto.[24]
In its decision of 24 January 1996,[25] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that
petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was planted by the
police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from
petitioners possession was not raised as an issue.Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility
in evidence of Exhibit D, the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as
petitioner was attempting to commit an offense, thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the
company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time
when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not
attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for
being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an
unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacats posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioners failure to rebut the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact
that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latters arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that
petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the accumulation of which was more than sufficient to
convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty,
not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill
several innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an
assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement
with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof
necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and
prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, [26] which petitioner
relied upon, was inapplicable in light of [c]rucial differences, to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a
busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a
[sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after
receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza
Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the
area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the person arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had]
personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he finally
succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the
following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND
LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the
warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was
attempting to commit a crime, as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was
standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. Finally, petitioner points out the factual
similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals
miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty
imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess
grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty,
and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua,
the appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129),[27] in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948,[28] Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution[29] and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court.[30]The term life imprisonment as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and
Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article
VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioners Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial courts decision to this
Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to
resolve the appeal.
89
 We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as
petitioners Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the
Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to
establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized
from petitioners possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly
seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom;
however, the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade
presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt.
Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioners arrest, but nearly seven (7)
months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo
received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the
grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and
was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade
he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard
and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group
about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to
arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily
cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner
simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes
and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioners eyes moving very fast.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial
investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in
palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was
present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then
available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent
and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of
counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of
petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same.[31] The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, [32] subject to certain exceptions. As
regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated
as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches;[33] (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest;[34] and (6) a "stop and frisk."[35]
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the
seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a
brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. [36] In this instance, the law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed.[37] At
bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the
area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.[38]
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search
in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act,
on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
90
 which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Amendment ***[39] G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of
reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED
frisk,"[40] it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. [41] Finally, a "stop-and- Costs de oficio.
frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an SO ORDERED.
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report
or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from
impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason
existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony,
contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended,
the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police
officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."

Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not
creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any
commotion?
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.[42]

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with
a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu
and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:

When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a
handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. [43]
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

91
 G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990, 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing
dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust
operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of
Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P.
Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional
Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian,
Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a
certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian
informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So
Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a
NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian
informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned
over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga
inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt.
Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given
P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali
Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh.
"L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-
arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he
had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the
target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga,
team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the
rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100
meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani
and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came
out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff.
Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa
went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the
contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his
companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two
civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the
house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his
house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later
came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team
returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's
wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find
the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00
was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had
slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside
it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to
the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two
newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" &
"D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari
Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two
newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped
marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana
(which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime
Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of the
marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-request, dated
December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime
Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory,
examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All
submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of
marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her Chemistry
Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-
5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought
at
the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen
written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the
one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989,
through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry
Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his
initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written
on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money
92
 (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon
(Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to
the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the
stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2)
Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house
at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his
one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa.
About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was
inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM
agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes,
got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not
ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM
agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked
them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The
NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not
know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was
living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length
away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the
NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at
Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated
by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or
document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the
marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa
refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was
not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although he himself told the
NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand
and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him
and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife
was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-
examination Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the
Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was
owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to
the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by
the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's
office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of
marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given
to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law
and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a
wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for
selling marijuana before.5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed
without subsidiary imprisonment.6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and
impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior
to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the
appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of
marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a
test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the
latter.7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt.
Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day.9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt.
Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house
located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt.
Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill
by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani
approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked
him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside
the house and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt.
Ani.13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal
of raising his right hand.15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and
made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked
him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust
operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant,
to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points, it
deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know
each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana
from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's
confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust
operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement
and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana. 17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the
appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the
93
commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the presence
of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the
illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco,19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the
commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house
are known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that these people will not report him to
the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga.
The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt.
Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish
between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And
since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated
testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his
companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer
based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana
cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different
from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on
those cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale of
more or less 10 to 15 meters.21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over
marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two.
The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads:22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the
house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego,
Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the
house near the road and he was met by one person and later
known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and
later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter
received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and came back
later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a
distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the
former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received
from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated
the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the
following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy
operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same
day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt.
Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM
agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City;26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt.
Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed
in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places;28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an
exchange of articles took place.29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani.
Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer
were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or
position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or
circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of
the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana
which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-
arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the
house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the
appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego
went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen."32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a
response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the
admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling
that these are admissible in evidence.33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v.
Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures.35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected,
exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most
important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest."37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
94
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer
to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that
"[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a
buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the
marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his
house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a
plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control.40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the
defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a
passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living
room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself,
observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a
brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The
package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law.
The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after
observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on
seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not
constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. 43 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain
view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine
will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from
the "plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to
retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house
and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view"
when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one
portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the
police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw
the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of
fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they
had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where
the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was
within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag
and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply
and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect
of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana,
in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the
testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to
Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
95
 [G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y
KO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28,
1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was
tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist
and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando
Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established
the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant [5] in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on
Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-
appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant
was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. [12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. [13] The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total
weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand,
the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be
marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by
his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave
their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men
in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in
the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was
withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a
licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. [17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on
accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-
appellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified
that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other
valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6)
months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional;
and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding
the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he
is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
96
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are
hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this
Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant
to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE
FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the employment of
unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. [22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search
warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V.
AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to
believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San
Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than
one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void
because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should
not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted
as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything
about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember
if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St.,
San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the
former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff
(shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that
the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is
genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of
shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP
Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result
for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-
414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy
bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
97
 Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus,
in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly
described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed
separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other
articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named
books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these
books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . . In so
holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under
all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially
general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale
seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as
to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because
the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence. [26] Accordingly,
we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellants house for
an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for
drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia
are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. [27] It will suffice to quote what this Court
said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of R.A.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that
There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St.,
Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which
is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a
basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of
Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A. 6425, without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of dried
marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic). This
Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence,
in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic
juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal
possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this
theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu,
the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it
was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several
offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No.
1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of
the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so
related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.
1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the
said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, the trial
court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several
documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant
which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street,
San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as a house without a
number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the
premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellants house under the leadership
of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in
the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of
appellants place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably appellants
house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through
their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation. [32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. [33] For example, a
search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street,
Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six
apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each
floor. However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the
warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro
Mass.[34] In this case, the location of accused-appellants house being indicated by the evidence on
record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
98
 In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants residence,
Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the
drug was seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. [35] For
this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and
(c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. [36]The question is whether these
requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the
valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any
basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a
lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate
control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a
weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-
appellants person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during
the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1
Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana
recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no
indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they
had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where
the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was
within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view was just the plastic bag and
not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. [41] In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped
in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have
been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were
discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without
a warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be
upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself
or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry
and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No
affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been
presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door
despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents
saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the
searching partys forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of
their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs
under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
99
 G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried
and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time
to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted
him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida
Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge
against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who
was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock
room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for
that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified
that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered
when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did
not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on
the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial
judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he
was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of
Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time
they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third
"weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June
25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on
that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular
informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the
coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance,
report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also
receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason
and we cannot Identify the person.
100
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you
many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that
was the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana
stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered
information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your
intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant
anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC.
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of
men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan
v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches
and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it
is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are
popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable
because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge)
that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without
trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more
flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest
that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption
is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution
is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court
for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use
Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was
no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules
of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
101
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I
think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged
on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

102
 G.R. No. 188611 June 16, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02718, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City,
La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or
office.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the
following were stipulated upon:
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen
Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger
jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2)
bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination
gave positive result for the presence of marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for
examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn
Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino."
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation
of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was
composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When
the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to
proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in
motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2
Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top
of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a
few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already
being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen
Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor
of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes
later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round
bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were
recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime
laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio,
was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal
waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few
bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was
persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the
poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then
Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them.
Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police station, Lani
Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true
contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the
bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she
executed a Counter-Affidavit.3
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here
(sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.4
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the
evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her right against an
unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched
the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred
that PO2 Pallayoc’s purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the
same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable
cause for her arrest.6
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.7 She
alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series
103
of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said
regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or
paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of
the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the
identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to
prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of
custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the
warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal, 8 justified
as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from
their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of
marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" upon arraignment and participated in the trial
and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellant’s argument that the bricks of
marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately
after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable. 11
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision in toto.12It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from
the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The
CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag that
contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate
court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was
aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on
board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed
only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the
bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At
the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified
owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus,
there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to
intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc
was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other
recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving
vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the
vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the
facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of
the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have
been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality. 13
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State’s agents to conduct
searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures,
providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.
Appellant’s main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against
her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by
the apprehending officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause
for the warrantless arrest of appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section
13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was
conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by
a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.15
In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a
moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
104
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches
of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a
judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to
do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. 17 Without probable cause, the articles seized
cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.20
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before
a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where
moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. 21
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is
made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant
when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can
quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.22
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that
carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick
decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting
the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no
time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for
its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s arrest, the police received
information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a
checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met
the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc
had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.23
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is
necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.24
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 25
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a
neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership
thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary. 26
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and
good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this
case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable
under the Dangerous Drugs Act.28
105

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to
crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against
particular individuals, but against public order.29
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another." 30 There is no
definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish
the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question
as to the perpetration of the criminal act.31The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a
finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached.32
Moreover, appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable
presumption33that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.34 Appellant failed to rebut this
presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient.
Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her
and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained
and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they
disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the
bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking
the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular,
she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a
sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.35
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police
station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from
appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police officers.
The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded
two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops. 36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks.
He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present.
However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will
not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 37
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant’s arrest, she was immediately brought to the
police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the
packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime
laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s evidence establishes the
chain of custody from the time of appellant’s arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police
crime laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance
with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items
seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question
the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial. 38 Even assuming that the police
officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She
could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is
deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody,
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence
and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties
regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary. 39
In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellant’s guilt. Thus, her conviction must be
affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
106
 [G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law
enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing
to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and
arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately
eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.[1]
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their
testimonies, the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a
certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a
large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose
Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December
14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal
Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of
P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other
group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front
and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day
from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the
team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag,
the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that
said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the
prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged
illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-
judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the
incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had
just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an
old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt.
Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman
and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added
that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or
Objection to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized as
they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[2]
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search
of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search
warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM
agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a
general search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-
appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on
the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:
107
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time
prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest.[4]
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.[5]This exclusionary rule was later
enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the
houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual.The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of
restraint.[6]
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which
allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do
otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of
full protection and vindication yet often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;[9]
6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]
The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement
officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise
refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to
search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items
sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be
found in the place to be searched.[13]
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be
present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence
against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground
of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who
may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous
drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who
was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of
his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot
tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as
their business address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and
surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a
crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant,
especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused
the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such
circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without
108
a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police
officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant.Second, Arutas identity was priorly
ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a
moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was
searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles
coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received
from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant
would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-
appellants belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was
a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search
is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of
a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the
requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area
of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching
the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be
trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried
to resist.When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had
sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for
conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present
which, when taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the
warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates
a reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13,
1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain
Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon
of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December
14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as
the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about
the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; (5)When they opened the same, they
found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before
the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had
received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend
Aminnudin.When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any
item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential
information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing
in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This
intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and
his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a
warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19,
series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or
neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinadas constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have
been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and
was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled
out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not
for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,there was
no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for
the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there
any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-
appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of
the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first
undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this Court observed
that:
x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank
109
of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances,
he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and
seizure of accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain
view under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by
the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a
moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was
apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the
middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were
accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could
have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-
appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in
the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when
the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable
cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and
emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence
reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A
surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of
said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of
explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and
disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In
short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be
said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would
be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her
constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to
search and inspection citing People v. Malasugui[23] where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p.
631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened
after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with
our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was
carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside. [24]
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui case is
inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest
thereby making the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.[25] On the
contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the
instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which
accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized
from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in
handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or
an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v.
Encinada,[26] where this Court held:
[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless
search. This he gleaned from Bolonias testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he
carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise
illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not
voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant,
we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of
duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People v.
Barros:[27]
x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the
occasion of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object-
x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
110
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda.
de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As
clearly illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?
A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.
Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
A - He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).
Q - When he said that, what did you do?
A - We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q - When you said that, what did he tell you?
A - He said you can see it.
Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?
A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was
contained in the bag.
Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it
to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was
marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized
as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been
made, this Court would be the first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of
his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave prior
consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag,
which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the
police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured
only if accused-appellants name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as
in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.[30]
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without
too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be
searched has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently
ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-
appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner
bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner
buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the
vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars
would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in
the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the
instant case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of not
guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the
courtsjurisdiction.[32] The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the
search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not
extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to
object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a prioriargument
is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of
arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an
accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a
preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes,
or carries with it, waiver of the former--an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making
impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a
warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against
unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case
at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton
box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution. We consider that appellants objection to the admission of such evidence was made
clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under
the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis
supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
111
 The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the
letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally
and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary
rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is
based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. [35]
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of
the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government.[36]

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself.[37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

112
 G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as
the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in
Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the
case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December
1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late
afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on
13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number
AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered
his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint
in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up
a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and
CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going
towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear
thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on
his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as
ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did
not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian
couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said
bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they
would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's
defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer
about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his
pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV
of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
113
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant
and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible
as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 However, where the search is made pursuant to
a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. 6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon
his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused,10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession.
Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that
accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that
a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no
time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance
at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons
engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused
Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched
by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers
had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It
was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing
to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a
whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of
the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2)
travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information
received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to
search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
114
 G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and
MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against
Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under
bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of
the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit
respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496.
Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No.
67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo
Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the
afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine
bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon
investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the
name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo,
Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
"for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496,
alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having purchased
them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by
Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St.,
Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without
search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request
of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not
examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to
examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the
Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and,
undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because
Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported
illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the
Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their
constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios
Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-
named police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the
goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for
actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining
the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from
opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary
injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein
petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No.
67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt.
Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on
November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction",
denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other
actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First Instance of
Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause
of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in
the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods
because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police
Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons
deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and
arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not
be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that
the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs
Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago
and Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for
the lifting of the restraining order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and
for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered
that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the
claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police
Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the
contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release
the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the
appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact
that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory,
were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by
herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against
the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination
of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners
115
filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods amounted to
P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and
reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein
respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13,
1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold
the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present
action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition
petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the
release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of
First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2)
respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not
collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods
was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this
case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the
lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before
seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted by the
Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the
corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises and were
no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was
purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila
Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected
without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and
detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being
issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question because
they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present
action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any
objection to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said
goods may still be liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and
collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties,
accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds
upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported
from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As
long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and
other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be
in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of
this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison
of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon
examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to
avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties
collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory
contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of
ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in
Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and
120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal
watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in
Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6,
380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles
contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e
and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that merchandise,
the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released
contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs
area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were
intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department,
acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by
the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to
hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid
or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore,
were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition
for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over
said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and
forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037,
decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case,
it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90
bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru
the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island vessel.
When the goods where about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the
customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon examination the goods were found to be
different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial
subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it is a
purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of Customs
116
had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26,
1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila
to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no
jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not
liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were
not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary
to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On
November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of seizure and identification
against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs,
as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The
Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the
merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory
injunction, on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction,
and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January
12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by
Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed
with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize
the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First
Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities
to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance was
filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and
forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of the said
court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October
6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the
Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their
importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same
were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to
goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject to
seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues
from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on
customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be
found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to
seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses
therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act
1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in
cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs
authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of
its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra, Republic
Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon
the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while
the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not
to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the
jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present
case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from
that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would
the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10And so, it cannot be
said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the
respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent
Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed
before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over
the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned
order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department,
could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any
cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any
fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk,
envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence
therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as
aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila,
could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code
authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the
latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt.
Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine
bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make
the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without
any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
117
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our
considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein
the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs
Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first
Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a
movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it
was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and
adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which
or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been
introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in
charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or
merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully
brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for
trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year
and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described,
chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of
the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the
Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither §
3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed,
that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro,
107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and
amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that
there was a search. 18 All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search
warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were
detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat,
wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L.
ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27
A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question
raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched
without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a
trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the
constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure
without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is
forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the
Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is
or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied
by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower,
animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered
vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express
trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their
police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question
far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is itself
is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle
constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on
private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure
without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to
robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a
condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether
search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a
search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under which it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in
question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the
exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive
issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss
the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent
Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967
in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in
said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.
118
 G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y
SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated drug under Republic Act No.
6425, as amended. One of its derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously known in street
parlance as "shabu" or "poor man's cocaine."
Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia,
were charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III of the aforementioned statute otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Only
appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. They were sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each, and to pay the costs. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia
was discharged as a state witness. The pertinent portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or transport 56 teabags of Metamphetamine, a
regulated drug.
Contrary to law.1
The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group
engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an
evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created
in order to bust the suspected syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was carried
out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia
(hereinafter referred to as Tia).
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by another
confidential agent named George on August 3, 1987. Lim expressed a desire to hire a male travelling
companion for his business nips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip to China. In the course of
those meetings, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant), whom Tia found
out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities on the
suspected criminal syndicate. Meanwhile, the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887, Captain Luisito
Palmera, filed with his superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially informed the Dangerous
Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight. Before
they departed, Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return
to the Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two o'clock in the
afternoon.
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou, in the
People's Republic of China. Upon arriving there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a few hours.
The pair thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of tea. Tia saw the
paper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination during the purchase. Afterwards, they
returned to the hotel. Appellant kept the cans of tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to
appellant's room to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men with appellant. One was fixing the
tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter.
Appellant joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked
the latter what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed that their cargo
consisted of Chinese drugs. Tia stayed in the room for about twenty minutes before going back to his
room to sleep.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight. Appellant had with
him his red traveling bag with wheels. Before departing from Guangzhou however, customs examiners
inspected their luggage. The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of appellant. The
contents of the cans were not closely examined, and appellant was cleared along with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila International
Airport, on schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to appellant, while
Tia, upon being instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their
conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab after putting their
luggage inside the back compartment of the vehicle. Lim followed in another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act on the tip
given by Tia. On the expected date of arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain Palmera notified
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. After a briefing, the
operatives were ordered to take strategic positions around the arrival area. Two operatives stationed
just outside the arrival area were the first ones to spot the suspects emerging therefrom. Word was
passed on to the other members of the team that the suspects were in sight. Appellant was pulling
along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder bag. The operatives also spotted Lim
meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted them followed them.
Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut
into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim sped
away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their car, approached the taxicab, and
asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the
back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from the suspects permission to search
their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto
Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and
pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder resembling crushed alum
came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its contents more closely.
Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling bags opened for
inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found, including the one previously
opened. Nothing else of consequence was recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were taken
to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro Street,
Quezon City. Lim was likewise apprehended and brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation.
119
During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the traveling bag of appellant were
opened and examined. They contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white crystalline
powder inside instead of tea leaves.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder inside
the tea bag yielded a positive result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine. Samples from
each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. The tests were also positive for
metamphetamine. Hence, the three suspects were indicted.
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the
government anti-narcotics operatives, to whom the said court applied the well-settled presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.
Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE
ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING,
DISPATCHING OR TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR THE
PROSECUTION.2
We affirm.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless search and seizure made
against the accused is illegal for being violative of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons
that the PC-CIS officers concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had been
informed of the date and time of a arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two
(2) days in advance. The fact that the search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle,
appellant argues, does not automatically make the warrantless search herein fall within the coverage of
the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as
aforementioned, the anti-narcotics agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.
The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized
exceptions thereto. As set forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,3 these are: [1] a search
incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view
(emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made
as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on
appellant and his co-accused.
In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor General, as contained in the
appellee's brief, that the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must
be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in
the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity.4
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."5
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it
within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on
the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also
certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was
clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still
and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which
must still be present in such a case.
The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was charged and convicted under
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, which reads:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispose, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied).
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags
containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby implying that the
accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues that he
cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being
absent under the facts of the case. It is also argued that "dispatching' cannot apply either since
appellant never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for "transporting," appellant contends that he cannot
also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting necessarily requires a point of destination,
which again is non- existent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant and his
co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers
caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term
"transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one place to another." 6 The operative words in the
definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding
that the act of transporting was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is
reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co-
accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e. they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by the
search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been
commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.
Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts of delivery,
dispatch or transport, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of any of the acts so included
is sufficient for conviction under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an
offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the
act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the
offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so
punished, regardless of criminal intent.7
As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to testify for
the prosecution on the ground that there was no necessity for the same. Appellant argues that deep
120
penetration agents such as Tia "have to take risks and accept the consequences of their actions."8 The
argument is devoid of merit. The discharge of accused Tia was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court, which reads in part:

Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may directone or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state . . . (emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an accused is left to the sound
discretion of the lower court.1âwphi1 The trial court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the
conditions prescribed by the rule exist. 9 In the instant case, appellant does not allege that any of the
conditions for the discharge had not been met by the prosecution. Therefore, the discharge, as ordered
by the trial court, stands.

Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts surrounding
the commission of the offense proves that the discharge of accused Tia is unnecessary. The allegation
is baseless. Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony corroborates the testimony of the
discharged accused. The fact of corroboration of the testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned
discharge precisely because paragraph (a) of the aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the
testimony be substantially corroborated in its material points. The corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS
operative does not debunk the claim of the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the testimony
of accused Tia.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby
DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

121
 [G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y
MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y
Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425[2] as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams,
without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.[3]
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V
Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was
about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from
passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at
cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force
accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section.[4] The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the
complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get
his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When
requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside
the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. [5] At about
6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De
Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items--
the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag[6] and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline
substance.[7] When asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just
requested by a certain Alican Alex Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latters brother in Iligan
City.[8] The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential
Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought
the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,[9] while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent to
the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist
Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known
as shabu, weighing 399.3266 grams.[10]
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he
was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican Alex Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi
City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches
to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudis brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5
on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or maleta containing the
sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.[11] He stayed
at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan
port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead
of the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5)
members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin
no. 106 came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group
back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he
went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudis Samsonite suitcase. He left
the small maleta containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the
security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same
to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The
security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside
which they suspected to be shabu. They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him to
sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF. [12]
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of such
preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the
National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE
CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.[14]
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase
containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his
consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him. He also contends that People v. Marti[15] is not applicable in this case because a vessel
security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.[16] Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be
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stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its
agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,[18] [i]n the absence of governmental
interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. [19] The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.[20]
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed
by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for
like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer
in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast,
police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the
law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the
Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained shabu. He submits that without
knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime charged. [21]
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [22] The first two elements were sufficiently
proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. [31] To overcome
this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case,
the accused points to a certain Alican Alex Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no
evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of the
imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling
sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living,
breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the
accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could
testify and support the claim of the accused.[32]
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the
defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone
allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no
knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case
No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,[23] this Court has ruled that to warrant
conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus
possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles. [24] It has been ruled,
however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.[25] Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi.[26]

In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-
serving and incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-
settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal.[27] Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this
case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be
inspected.[28] Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a
combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his
small maleta for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes
would be confiscated,[29] but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained
expensive sunglasses, and even watches.[30]

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