CRITIQUE OF PLATO’S EXAGGERATED REALISM

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.

Plato’s Exaggerated Realism

Regarding the problem of the universals, Plato’s (427-347 B.C.) doctrine is described as
an exaggerated realism, or ultra-realism, or extreme realism, affirming that universal ideas really
exist in extra-mental reality as universals, as universal Forms in a world of Ideas or Forms. “The
tenet common to all forms of extreme realism is this, that the objects apprehended by intellect in
conception as universals exist also as universals outside the mind, or independently of thought.”1
Plato taught, for example, that if we are able to talk about sacrifice and explain its timeless
demands on persons in a way that transcends the individuals who ought to live by this admirable
virtue, it is because sacrifice, as universal, really exists in itself extra-mentally as an eternal,
absolute and immutable Idea or Form in a world of Ideas or Forms, knowable not by the senses
but by the intellect. “Exaggerated realism teaches that universals exist not only in name and in
the mind, but also formally in reality, i.e., universals as such exist in reality. Plato taught that
universals exist formally as universal entities in an intelligible and immutable world, a world
which the soul contemplated before its union with the body. The sensible world is constituted by
a participation of the intelligible world; and, when it is perceived by the senses, it recalls the
intelligible world to the soul’s memory. Thus, besides the men whom we see, there exists in the
intelligible world the existing idea of man, i.e., subsisting Man. All men are constituted by a
participation of subsisting Man. And this is the reason why the universal concept which signifies
subsisting man is predicated of singular men. And so it is with all things, with the wolf, color,
quantity, etc.”2 “For extreme or ultra-realists, not only is it true that there are universal terms and
ideas, but corresponding to these ‘universals’ in the mind is a world of universal Forms outside
the Mind. This is the fundamental doctrine of the Platonists, and their realism is called ‘extreme’
because universality is considered to be characteristic not only of ideas (in the mind) but also of
reality itself. Individual ‘things’ are no more than imperfect ‘copies’ or ‘participations’ of the
fundamental reality of Universal Forms. Hence it is only in a derivative sense that the individual
‘things’ of our experience are ‘real.’”3

Plato’s Theory of Ideas or Forms

The nucleus of Plato’s philosophy is his Theory of Ideas (also called the Doctrine of
Forms or Theory of Forms). The things in the world that our senses behold, Plato teaches, are but
faint copies or replicas of their exemplars, the Ideas or Forms, which are eternal, immutable, and
absolute, existing in a world of Ideas or Forms. It is the world of the Ideas or Forms, and not the
changing world of things that we see around us by means of the senses, that constitutes the true
world. Our senses can only give us opinion (doxa), whereas our intellect, contemplating the
Ideas or Forms, gives us true knowledge or science (epistème). “For Plato the objects of our
concepts were the Ideas. These are not constructs of human thought, but are mind-independent

1
P. COFFEY, Epistemology, vol. 1, Peter Smith, Gloucester, MA, 1958, p. 292.
2
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstan’s University, Charlottetown, 1950, p. 141.
3
R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt, New York, 1959, p. 274.

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realities which the mind knows. They are not in the mind; they have their being above and
beyond this world of sense in the world of the Ideas. To every concept we can have there
corresponds a reality – which is abstract and universal – an Idea, and it is this latter which our
concept represents to us.”4

Plato’s philosophy is centered around and dominated by his Theory of Ideas or Doctrine
of Forms wherein the specific object of human knowledge is the real world of Ideas or Forms, of
which the changing world of things perceived by the senses is but the shadow or the copy. Real
being, according to him, is not to be found in the particular sensible objects that make up what
we call Nature, but rather in the extra-mental universal essences. Particular beautiful persons or
things that we see in the world around us, for example, are not real Beauty; only the universal
essence or Idea or Form Beauty is. Particular sensible things only imitate the true reality insofar
as they imitate the Ideas or Forms. Particular horses in this world of becoming, for example, are
only imitations of the one, eternal, universal Idea or Form Horse. The very essence of Plato’s
Theory of Ideas or Doctrine of Forms is that the extra-mental universals are the true realities and
the particulars, the individual things that we experience in changing Nature, are only imitations
of these true realities. Plato’s Ideas or Forms are primarily objective realities in themselves
existing extra-mentally as universals. They are objective universal essences existing apart from
the phenomena of the sense world and apart from our conceptual representations. How did he
arrive at such a false conclusion, namely, that universal Ideas really exist apart from the human
mind, in extra-mental reality, as universals, in a world of Ideas or Forms? Maritain notes that
“failing to analyze with sufficient accuracy the nature of our ideas and the process of abstraction,
and applying too hastily his guiding principle, that whatever exists in things by participation
must somewhere exist in the pure state, Plato arrived at the conclusion that there exists in a
supra-sensible world a host of models or archetypes, immaterial, immutable, eternal, man in
general or man in himself, triangle in itself, virtue in itself, etc. These he termed ideas, which are
the object apprehended by the intellect, the faculty which attains truth – that is to say, they are
reality.”5

In the metaphysics of Plato, the Ideas or Forms are “existing in and for themselves, as
having the character of substantiality. They are substances, real or substantial forms, the original,
eternal transcendent archetypes of things, existing prior to things and apart from them, and thus
uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The particular objects which we perceive
are imperfect copies or reflections of the eternal patterns. Particulars may come and go, but the
idea or form goes on forever…The variety and diversity of independent forms, or ideas, is
endless, nothing being too lowly or insignificant to have its idea. There are ideas of things,
relations, qualities, actions, and values; ideas of tables and beds and chairs; of smallness,
greatness, likeness; of colors, odors, and tones; of health, rest, and motion; of beauty, truth, and
goodness…”6

For Plato, “(1) Forms or ideas, defined as the objects corresponding to abstract concepts,
are real entities; the Platonic form is simply the reification or entification of the Socratic concept
– endowed with the properties of the Eleatic being. (2) There is a great variety of forms,

4
J. T. BARRON, Elements of Epistemology, Macmillan, New York, 1936, p. 92.
5
J. MARITAIN, An Introduction to Philosophy, Sheed and Ward, London, 1956, p. 57.
6
F. THILLY and L. WOOD, A History of Philosophy, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1957, pp. 80-81.

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including the forms of classes of things – house, dog, man, etc.; of qualities – whiteness,
roundness; of relations – equality, resemblance, etc.; of values – goodness, beauty, etc. (3) The
forms belong to a realm…a ‘heaven of ideas,’ separable from concrete particulars in space and
time. The separation of the forms and their exemplifications is commonly referred to as the
Platonic dualism. (4) The forms are superior to particulars in degree of reality and value; the
forms are the realities of which particulars are mere appearances. The form is a model or
archetype of which the particular is a copy. (5) The forms are non-mental and subsist
independently of any knowing mind…Their mode of being is unique; they are neither mental nor
physical, but are none the less real. (6) Since they are non-temporal, as well as non-spatial, they
are eternal and immutable. (7) The forms are logically interrelated and constitute a hierarchy, in
which the higher forms ‘communicate’ with lower or subordinate forms. The supreme form in
the hierarchy is the form of the Good. (8) The forms are apprehended by reason, not by sense –
though sense may provide the occasion and the stimulus for the apprehension of the form which
it embodies. (9) Finally, the relation between a particular and the form which it exemplifies is
called ‘participation’; all particulars with a common predicate participate in the corresponding
form. A particular may participate simultaneously in a plurality of forms, and when it undergoes
change it participates successively in different forms.”7

As was mentioned, Plato’s Theory of Ideas or Forms can be classified as an exaggerated

realism or ultra-realism, which holds that the universal Ideas or Forms are real, existing by
themselves in extra-mental reality as universal, in a world of Ideas or Forms. Bittle explains that,
for Plato, “the Idea is the only reality which is permanent and unchangeable in the continuous
flux of concrete phenomena. The Idea is thus the very essence of the reality of ‘being’ and of the
reality of scientific ‘knowledge.’ The ideas are, therefore, not only objects of thought, but also
realities in themselves; they not only exist as universals in the mind, but also as universals in
nature. Subjectively and objectively they are truly universal. The concepts of our intellect are
universal, because they represent the universal Ideas which exist independently of the mind in a
world of their own. The Ideas are real things, beings, essences, which subsist entirely outside the
physical world of concrete phenomena which we see around us, in a transcendental world of
their own, in a heavenly sphere of unchangeable existence, where they have an eternal being.

“The physical objects of the material universe are nothing but faint copies of these eternal
Ideas, and such objects, since they are singular in essence and in a continual state of change,
cannot account for the permanent and universal concepts in our minds; our universal concepts,
and the scientific knowledge based on them, can derive their origin only from the eternal and
universal Ideas. Man, therefore, must have had a previous existence in which he possessed a
direct intuition of these Ideas, and his present universal concepts are but the products of a
reminiscence of his former contemplation of these Ideas in the transcendental realm. There are,
then, three distinct worlds for Plato: the world of absolute and eternal Ideas, the world of
concrete, ever-changing phenomena (the universe), and the world of universal concepts in our
mind. For every single universal concept in our mind there exists a corresponding universal Idea
which has its own being in this noumenal world, because our concepts are merely intellectual
copies or reproductions of them. These Ideas are the original universals, prior in existence to the
physical world and to our universal concepts. Our universal concepts are valid, therefore,
because they are a faithful representation of reality, namely of the reality of the Ideas which are
7
F. THILLY and L. WOOD, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

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themselves universal and eternal. By means of this unique theory Plato attempted to show that
our universal concepts or ideas have objective value and can give us true scientific knowledge.”8

Coffey’s Critique of Plato’s Ultra-Realism or Exaggerated Realism

Peter Coffey: “1. Now, if the universal is in no real sense in the singular, but wholly
apart, isolated, and transcendent in reference to the latter, the ‘participation’ can mean really
nothing more than a mere extrinsic denomination of the singular in terms of the universal, a
denomination without any real ground, so that judgments in which we predicate the universal of
the singular should be logically held to give us no sort of knowledge (i.e. interpretation, or
insight into the nature) of the latter, not even conjectural knowledge; and the whole domain of
sense experience, the whole world of physical nature, should be held to be wholly unknowable,
and therefore to be, for aught we know, unreal.

“Moreover, if the universal were a subsisting reality transcending the singulars, all our
singular judgments would be false. It would be false, e.g., to say ‘James is a man,’ if I mean by
‘man’ a single, real, self-subsisting entity or nature above and beyond and apart from this
qualitatively and quantitatively determined sense individual called James: for the judgment
identifies what I mean by ‘man’ with the individual subject ‘James’; and the most I could assert,
on Plato’s theory, would be that ‘James’ somehow partially manifests, or reflects, or shares in,
the transcendent reality which I mean by ‘man.’ But a theory of knowledge which is in such
flagrant opposition to the common and spontaneous convictions of mankind, a theory which,
purporting to explain to us how we come to know the world revealed to us through our senses,
ends by asking us to believe that we do not know this world at all, that the objects of our
knowledge are transcendent entities wholly other than anything which we perceive, and that
finally all our singular judgments are false, – such a theory cannot be regarded as satisfactory.

“2. Again, if each universal is, as such, extramentally real, then the ‘participation’ of
individuals in any universal which we predicate of them can only mean that they are partial
manifestations of one and the same reality, – that John and James, for example, are partial
manifestations of one single reality, viz., ‘universal humanity,’ or ‘human-nature-in-general’;
that all individual ‘beautiful’ things are beautiful because, and in so far as, they are identical with
a single self-subsisting reality, viz. ‘beauty-in-general.’9 But this is certainly not what we mean to
assert in such judgments. On the contrary, reflection shows us that the universality of our
universal predicates or thought-objects is not a mind-independent attribute of the reality of these
objects, but a logical relation, an intentio logica, which is the product of the mind’s mode of
considering them: when I say of a man, a horse, and an oak, that they are ‘living’ things, or
endowed with ‘life,’ I do not fuse or confound or identify the three lives in one single real life;
on the contrary, I apprehend three numerically distinct real lives; and because I intellectually
apprehend each life in the abstract and apart from whatever really differentiates it from the others
I apprehend it as a conceptual unity, and, as such, see it to be one-common-to-the-three, and to
others indefinitely. The unity of the universal is logical, not real. ‘The objects which intellect
considers separately or apart from individuating notes,’ says St. Thomas,10 ‘need not have a

8
C. BITTLE, Reality and the Mind, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1959, pp. 230-231.
9
Cf. PLATO, Phaedo, xlix.
10
De substantiis separatis, ii.

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separate real existence; and hence universals should not be held to subsist as such apart from
singulars, or the objects of mathematics [e.g. points, lines, surfaces, etc.] to subsist apart from the
things of sense: for universals constitute the essences of singulars, and mathematical objects the
real terminations or limits of the corporeal things of sense.’

“3. Plato’s theory is based on a defective analysis of the conditions which render
scientific knowledge possible, and leads to an erroneous interpretation of the objects of such
knowledge.

“Plato rightly repudiated the teaching of Heraclitus that all reality consists in change, that
there is no stable object within reach of human thought; and the corollary drawn from this by
Protagoras, that all knowledge is relative to the individual mind, what whatever appears to the
individual is true for him, but that there is no absolute truth, no fixed standard for individual
minds, that the individual ‘man is the measure of all things.’ He rightly accepted the undeniable
fact that there is an absolute distinction between truth and error, a distinction valid for all minds;
and, furthermore, that there are judgments which, being necessarily, eternally, immutably, and
universally true, are strictly scientific. But from the stability which science presupposes in its
objects, as a condition of their intelligibility, he wrongly inferred that such objects can be in no
true sense in, or identical with, the ever-changing and transient individual phenomena which
constitute the world of sense experience; and that accordingly they must be apart from, and give
us no scientific knowledge of, these latter.

“Wrongly; because he failed to distinguish between the mode in which the objects of
science are present to intellect and the mode in which they really exist; he failed to see that the
stability, necessity, eternity, universality, etc., which condition the relations we establish between
them in the necessary judgments of science, are merely modes of their intelligibility, modes
which affect their presence to intellect, modes consequent on the abstract manner in which
intellect apprehends them; that therefore those objects may and do really exist without these
modes in the individual data of sense; that when we predicate such thought-objects of these data
we do not attribute to these data the modes which those objects have only in and for thought; but
that nevertheless by predicating those objects, as to their content, of the data of sense, we are
attributing to these latter what is really in them, and are therefore obtaining genuine if inadequate
scientific knowledge about them.

“The possibility of scientific knowledge is conditioned not by the existence of universals

a parte rei, as Plato thought, but by the power which intellect possesses of abstracting and
universalizing the natures which, independently of it, are concrete and individual. Universality,
as Cajetan remarks in his Commentary on Aristotle, is not an object of science, but a conditio
sine qua non of science.11 The objects of science may have a mode of real being other than the
mode of their being known. In order to be known scientifically they must of course be
intelligible, i.e. present to intellect in a manner conformable with the nature of the intellect. But
this mode of their presence may be distinct from that of their real existence; and reflection on our
processes of thought and sense perception, processes of the same self-conscious mind or soul,
processes wherein we spontaneously recognize the objects of thought and the objects of sense to
be identical in reality, – reflection on these processes convinces us that things really exist and
11
Cf. CAJETAN, In I. Post. Anal., c. 9. – apud D. MERCIER, Critériologie générale, Louvain, 1906, p. 366, n. 2.

5
reveal themselves to sense in modes other than those which they assume on becoming objects of
thought.12”13

Shallo’s Critique of Plato’s Ultra-Realism or Exaggerated Realism

Michael W. Shallo: “Exaggerated realism holds that the formal universal exists as a real
object, i.e., that there actually exists in nature an object corresponding to our univeral idea, not
only as to what is represented by the idea, but also as to the manner in which it is represented,
viz., apart from the individuation, e.g., an existing cicle, horse, etc., which is no particular circle
or horse, but circle or horse in general. This is clearly absurd. For, the universal man, for
instance, would either exist in every individual man, or he would not. In the latter case, he would
not be a universal man, but an individual, and no other object but himself could be truly called a
man. In the former case, he would either be one and the same identical man, in each and all of
the individuals called by that name; and then there would be but one man in all the world, and
every so-called man would be his own son, grandfather, neighbors, etc. – one man multilocated
in time and space; or he would be different men, multiplied as often as there are actual or
possible men, and then he would be one and many at the same time.”14

Toohey’s Critique of Plato’s Ultra-Realism or Exaggerated Realism

John J. Toohey: “Ultra-realism is false if there is no such single object in the external
world as Justice or Beauty or Man-as-such ; But there is no such single object in the external
world as Justice or Beauty or Man-as-such ; Therefore ultra-realism is false.

“The Major is evident from the doctrine of the ultra-realists. The Minor is true, because
such words as ‘Justice,’ ‘Beauty’ and ‘Man-as-such’ are shorthand or non-literal expressions
respectively, for ‘is a just being,’ ‘is a beautiful thing’ and ‘Every man by the fact that (or so far
as) he is a man.’ Thus, the sentence, ‘The justice of John Brown has been established,’ is the
same as ‘That John Brown is a just being has been established.’ ‘The beauty of this rose is
evident’ is the same as ‘That this rose is a beautiful thing is evident.’ ‘Man, as such, is a social
being’ is the same as ‘Every man, by the fact that he is a man, is a social being.’”15

Bittle’s Critique of Plato’s Ultra-Realism or Exaggerated Realism

Celestine Bittle: “There is no empirical evidence whatever for the existence of universal
objects or essences outside the mind; it is a pure assumption…Our experience tells clearly that
individual men, trees, animals, stones, metals, and similar objects, exist in nature; but nowhere
do we find anything that would correspond to our idea of a universal man, or of a universal tree,
or of a universal animal, or of a universal stone, or of a universal metal, and so on. The only
actual things we know are single, individual objects, not universal natures and essences; and
there is nothing in nature to indicate the existence of such universal entities. Not only do the
objects in nature appear as individuals; they also act as such. Nothing is clearer to us through our

12
Cf. ST. THOMAS, In I. Metaphy., l. 10.
13
P. COFFEY, op. cit., p. 297.
14
M. W. SHALLO, Lessons in Scholastic Philosophy, Peter Reilly, Philadelphia, 1916, p. 88.
15
J. J. TOOHEY, Notes on Epistemology, Fordham University Press, New York, 1952, p. 156.

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experience than the fact that we are individual men in our own right; but of universal beings, for
instance, of a universal man or humanity, we have no experience at all.

“Platonic ultra-realism leads to evident absurdities; hence, it must be false.

“We must bear in mind that, according to this theory, the universal essences are in reality
as our universal ideas are in the intellect; in other words, they really exist in the same manner as
we conceive them. Let us see just what this means. We possess generic universal ideas, like
‘animal,’ ‘organism,’ ‘body,’ ‘substance.’ By ‘animal’ we mean ‘a sentient organism.’ Our idea
does not state whether this sentient organism is ‘rational’ or ‘non-rational’; the distinction is
omitted, so that the definition applies to both the rational and non-rational animals, to men and
brutes, but the idea of ‘animal’ is conceived as being neither rational or non-rational. And that is
precisely the way in which the Platonic Idea or essence of ‘animal’ must exist: it is neither
rational nor non-rational, but indifferent. That, however, is impossible. The terms ‘rational’ and
‘non-rational’ are contradictory and mutually exclusive. An existent thing must either be one or
the other; it cannot be both nor can it be neither. If it is ‘rational,’ it cannot be ‘non-rational,’ and
if it is ‘non-rational,’ it cannot be ‘rational’; and if it is anything at all, it must be either ‘rational’
or ‘non-rational’: otherwise the principle of non-contradiction would be violated. Since, then, the
Platonic Idea or essence of ‘animal’ would be neither a rational nor a non-rational entity, it
violates the principle of non-contradiction and is thus an absurdity. And if it is stated that this
essence is both rational and non-rational, because our idea of ‘animal’ applies to rational men
and non-rational brutes, it would again violate the principle of non-contradiction, because no
entity can be both rational and non-rational at the same time. To state that the universal essence
of ‘animal’ is ‘rational’ (but not ‘non-rational’), would exclude all brutes from this universal
essence; and that is inadmissible, because the universal idea of ‘animal’ in our intellect applies
also to the brutes. And it would be equally inadmissible to accept this universal essence as ‘non-
rational’ (but not ‘rational’), because then all men would be excluded, although they are included
in the universal idea of ‘animal’ in our intellect. We thus see that the Platonic Ideas or essences
either do not correspond to the universal ideas as we have them or they violate the principle of
non-contradiction.”16

Barron’s Critique of Plato’s Ultra-Realism (Exaggerated Realism or Extreme

Realism)

Joseph Thomas Barron: “The best argument against extreme realism is the exposition of
moderate realism. That theory accounts for the existence of concepts; it maintains that while our
concepts are abstract and universal only individual things exist in the objective order. It is
therefore in full accord with experience. It makes unnecessary the postulating of universal
realities to which our concepts correspond.”17

16
C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 245-246.
17
J. T. BARRON, op. cit., p. 93.

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 Berghin Rosè’s Critique of Plato’s Ultra-Realism or Exaggerated Realism

Guido Berghin-Rosè: “Realismo assoluto. A) Dottrina. – «La corrispondenza tra

conoscenza e cose è totale; ma le idee sono universali; dunque anche nella realtà esiste
qualcosa di veramente universale». L’universale esiste identico «in mente et in re».

“…B) Giudizio. – Il Realismo assoluto non è accettabile.

“1) Ragioni generali: a) L’esistenza reale dell’universale non è provata. Questo realismo
parte dalla stessa premessa che già il Nominalismo, che cioè la forma dell’oggetto debba esistere
in mente nello stesso modo in cui si trova nell’oggetto; ora ciò non è necessario ed in concreto
può darsi che lo stato di universalità dipenda dal soggetto e sia un modo di essere che la forma
dell’oggetto assume in lui. Perciò il realismo dell’universale non è provato.

“Si osservi l’importanza di questo argomento. Infatti l’unica base di questi sistemi è
l’impossibilità di spiegare in altro modo i caratteri dell’idea, in una concezione realista della
conoscenza. Cadendo tale impossibilità, essi perdono ogni ragion d’essere.

“b) Non sembra che tale realismo possa evitare il panteismo. Infatti se la natura
universale non è individuata intrinsecamente non esisterà che un uomo, un animale, un vivente,
un essere. Il panteismo poi, oltre a contrastare con i più sicuri dati di coscienza, è
intrinsecamente contraddittorio.18 Perciò il realismo di cui sopra non si può ammettere.

“2) Ragioni particolari: a) Non è possibile che esista l’universale come tale, a sè,
sussistente fuori di ogni realtà individua, come vorrebbe Platone. Un universale esistente
realizzerebbe la contraddizione di un essere che è insieme «unum» (omne ens est unum) e «non
unum» perchè non individuo. Non può quindi esistere l’uomo senza essere questo uomo o il
cavallo senza essere questo cavallo.

“Inoltre il platonismo importa l’esistenza reale di tutti gli universali; però ci sono
universali che non possono esistere da sè, quali: l’uguale e il diverso, le tenebre, l’ignoranza, il
nulla. Infine nel platonismo, come pure nell’Ontologismo, si deve negare la conoscenza
intellettuale del singolare corporeo: se infatti ogni idea è fuori della realtà sensibile, non è più
giusto dire che Tizio è uomo o animale o sostanza…

“… – Difficoltà. – 1) Se l’universale non esiste, le nostre scienze non hanno valore

oggettivo poichè esse riguardano l’universale.

“R. Affinchè le scienze abbiano valore oggettivo non è necessario che i loro oggetti
esistano in stato di universalità, è sufficiente che essi posseggano effettivamente quella data
essenza anche se singolarizzata. Così non è necessario che esista il ferro; è sufficiente che esista
del ferro…”19

18
Vedi Teologia naturale. Per esso infatti la stessa realtà sarebbe, insieme: infinita, semplice, immutabile…e finita,
composta, mutevole…
19
G. BERGHIN-ROSÈ, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 5 (Critica), Marietti, Turin, 1958, pp. 97-99.

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 The Correction of Plato’s Exaggerated Realism (Ultra-Realism) by Aristotle and
Aquinas

Correcting Plato’s error of exaggerated realism or ultra-realism we have the moderate

realism espoused by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas: “Our words and universal concepts no
doubt signify certain natures, but these natures do not exist in themselves but are individualized
in things. Only individual beings exist in reality, for the things that exist cannot be predicated of
another. Universality is a property only of our abstract concepts; it is by virtue of their
universality that they are predicable of many. ‘Something is a universal not only because it can
be predicated of many, but also because what is signified by its name can be found in many.’20
For example, justice is a virtue proper to human nature; hence, the foundation of its demands is
found in every individual subject who possesses that nature. The common nature that is
possessed by many individual beings is common not numerically but formally. If I write ‘A’
twice – ‘A’ and ‘A’ –, I reproduce the same form in two numerically distinct letters; in the same
way, human nature is actualized in John, Frederick, and Timothy, in such a way that numerically,
each one has his own individual nature.

“For a nature to be multiplied in several individuals, the form must be capable of being
received in several material subjects. The answer to the problem of the universals is, therefore,
linked to the hylemorphic composition (the union of matter and form) of material beings (John
and Peter are both men because they share the same nature; but they are distinct individual men
because the formal principle of that nature has been received in different matters). As regards
accidental properties, the answer of moderate realism involves the distinction between substance
and accident (the property ‘yellow’ can be multiplied if there are many substances capable of
receiving it).”21

Solution to the Problem of the Universals: Moderate Realism

The Solution to the Problem of the Universals: Moderate Realism. The real solution to
the problem of the universals, that which corresponds to reality, lies in the position of moderate
realism. “The position of St. Thomas, and others besides, is called ‘moderate’ realism as a means
of distinguishing it from the ‘extreme’ realism of the Platonic doctrine of Forms or Universal
Essences. Fundamentally, this position is as follows: universals as universals exist only in the
mind, so that it is false to suppose (as the Platonists do) that there is a world of universal Forms.
However, there is a basis in reality or foundation in things for the universal ideas that exist in our
minds. Even though reality itself is individual, it is nevertheless possible to abstract from things
certain intelligible data that are given in experience. These intelligible data are certain ‘natures’
that are common to many, and it is the fact that things have or ‘share’ certain natures which
constitutes the basis in reality for the universal concepts that exist in our minds.22”23

20
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, In I Perih., lecture 10.
21
J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, pp. 41-42.
22
Here, of course, we should keep in mind that each of these ‘natures,’ as found in a subject, is always
individualized by the subject to which they belong.
23
R. J. KREYCHE, op. cit., p. 275.

9
 Describing moderate realism, Jacques Maritain writes: “The moderate realist school,
distinguishing between the thing itself and its mode of existence, the condition in which it is
presented, teaches that a thing exists in the mind as a universal, in reality as an individual.
Therefore that which we apprehend by our ideas as a universal does indeed really exist, but only
in the objects themselves and therefore individuated – not as a universal. For example, the
human nature found alike in Peter, Paul and John really exists, but it has no existence outside
the mind, except in these individual subjects and as identical with them; it has no separate
existence, does not exist in itself.”24

Sanguineti argues the case for moderate realism in two steps: “a) Firstly, we show that
common names express universal concepts. Common names do not signify concrete images or
concrete actions, but universal and intelligible essences. The signs with which animals
communicate with one another always have a material and concrete content. They may
sometimes give the impression of universality, but this is because some animals can associate
images and other sensible signs with one another (when the dog hears a certain sound, it ‘knows’
it is going to eat). On the other hand, words are signs of an act of understanding; they transmit
intelligible meaning. For example, when a man hears the term ‘relation,’ he does not understand
a concrete relation, but the essence of relation as such. When he grasps the meaning of ‘circle,’
he is not thinking of the circle on the blackboard but of the nature of the circle as such. The
concept of a circle is not material; it is not an image and it cannot be localized in a material
place; and yet, it is not something vague: it has a very precise intelligible meaning that is
applicable to every circle that we draw or imagine. Common names, therefore, express universal
concepts.

“b) Secondly, we show that concepts signify a real nature. When we speak of a ‘parrot,’
a ‘chair,’ or an ‘oath,’ we are referring to a certain perfection or essence which is found in
several individuals. These words do not signify something only in our mind; otherwise, there
would be no such thing as extramental reality. All chairs have a common structure or form which
is materialized in every chair that exists. The mind understands this form by abstracting it from
concrete chairs. What we understand by ‘chair’ is not something added to this particular chair: it
is precisely what this object called chair is. When we point to an object and ask ‘What is it?’ our
intention is not to find out ‘what it is called,’ though the reply to the former means giving the
reply to the latter. If the names of things did not signify the being of things – what things are - ,
they would only point to what we think about things or what we do with them. Hence, concepts
signify real natures.”25
24
J. MARITAIN, op. cit., p. 120.
25
J. J. SANGUINETI, op. cit., pp. 43-44. Joseph Thomas Barron writes: “Moderate Realism. Distinction Between
the Senses and the Reason. Introspection clearly evidences the distinction between our higher and lower cognitional
powers. Through the senses we become aware of particular things. For example, through the sense of sight I see this
or that particular object, possessing a certain size, shape, and color, existing in this place at this time. If we touch an
object, the resistance we encounter is this resistance, and if we strike it we hear this sound. Whenever we sense a
reality, it is always endowed with individuality – it always has specific individuating notes. But reflection tells us
that we have another kind of knowledge which differs widely from sense knowledge. It is not a knowledge of the
particular and concrete, but of the general and abstract. I can, for example, think of a book which is totally different
from this book I now sense, and which has none of its individuating characteristics. This new thought is no longer
bound up with this particular book. It is applicable, as I can see by reflection, to any number of individual books. Its
object is not a particular object but a universal object. Furthermore my senses do not tell me what things are; they do
not apprehend the essence or whatness of things. But I seemingly do know what things are; I know not only the

10
qualities of things but I also know what things are in themselves; I know their natures. Thus my senses alone do not
tell me this is a book. They report color, size, shape, etc., but I know it is a book, proving thereby that I have a kind
of knowledge which is not sense knowledge.
“Again, I know what is meant by such notions as justice, hope, causality, knowledge, none of which I can sense.
None of these can be perceived through a sense organ, yet I can and do know them. Moreoever, the senses have not
the power of reflection. They cannot make their data the objects of their own examination. But the power of
reflection is a fact, and this points also to a difference between sense knowledge and a higher kind of knowledge.
Then there are our judicial and ratiocinative powers. These cannot be allocated in the senses. From a comparison of
the conceptual, judicial, and ratiocinative aptitudes of the intellect with the functioning of the senses we see that
there is a radical difference between the senses and the intellect.
“But while we differentiate the one from the other, and while we see they are irreducible to each other, we must
not think that though distinct they are separate. Intellect and sense do not function separately and apart from each
other. In actual concrete experience we cannot divorce the operation of the lower faculty from that of the higher. In
our adult experience the sensuous and intellectual elements are closely interwoven. A sensation is hardly, if ever,
given without an accompanying intellection. Continuity and solidarity are always present between them. So closely
are they interwoven that it is often difficult to discriminate between the purely sensory elements in our knowledge
and those which are the result of higher factors. We must not forget that the knowledge-process is complicated, and
that sensation, perception, retention and reproduction, conception, judgment, and reasoning, all intermingle with one
another, and that all have an integral part in the process of cognition.
“The existence of rational concepts has been established. The formation of concepts depends on and begins with
sense knowledge, but it is completed by the intellect. The process whereby concepts emerge from precepts demands
an exposition.
“The Origin of Concepts. Since our concepts are not a priori (or prior to sense experience) and since
introspection shows us that in our judgments we identify these concepts with the data of sense, the intellect must
apprehend them in some way in the data of sense (we are constantly making judgments in which we identify the data
of sense with our concepts, e.g., ‘This is a book’). There is no other explanation. The intellect gets all its data or
objects in and through sense perception – and self-consciousness. This does not mean that the intellect can conceive
only what the senses perceive, i.e., only the physical or material. This is the sensistic interpretation of this principle.
The principle means that while the intellect gets its data from sense perception it nevertheless has the power of
apprehending modes of being which transcend sense perception. For example, it can form such concepts as ‘being,’
‘quality,’ ‘change,’ ‘thought,’ none of which objects can be the objects of the senses. Again, the intellect can reflect
on its own activities and form concepts such as ‘intellect,’ ‘cognition,’ which are concepts of realities unperceivable
by the senses. Our theory of moderate realism, therefore, which holds that the thought-objects of the intellect are
somehow apprehended in the data of sense is not sensistic.
“The Theory of Abstraction. Since the thought-objects of the intellect are apprehended in sense data, the obvious
question arises: How is the concept derived from the percept – or sense data? How can we bridge the gap between
sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge? The answer is: by the process of abstraction. An extramental object
produces an impression on one or more of the senses. Through this impression the mind becomes cognizant of a
concrete object. This impression evokes the activity of the intellect. In every object there are certain qualities or
attributes which may or may not belong to the object without any substantial or essential difference being made in
the nature of the object; e.g., the height, weight, and clothing of any individual may all be different from what they
are and he would still be a man. There are other attributes, however, the absence of which would destroy the
character of the object and cause it to be other than it is. If we did away with either the rationality or the animality of
a man he would no longer be a man. The functioning of the intellect at this juncture is abstractive. Abstraction is the
concentration of the intellect on these latter elements to the exclusion of the former. It is the withdrawal of the
attention of the mind from what is accidental and the fixing of it on the essential. It is the act whereby the intellect
abstracts or selects from an object that portion which is essential and neglects the rest. The result of this abstraction
is the concept which expresses in the abstract the essence of the object. The concept is not the representation of a
single, particular object; it is universal and abstract because, as we shall see, it is capable of being realized in an
indefinite number of objects. In a word, the intellect conceives what the senses perceive but in a different way.
“The term ‘abstraction’ as descriptive of the conception process has given rise to much misunderstanding. Some
have understood it as connoting the taking away of something from the concrete object. Such a view is a travesty on
the nature of abstraction. The essence or nature which is said to be abstracted is an attribute of the object and it never
ceases to be such. Abstraction is a purely mental process. It does not take away the physical essence of the object.
Just as the eye can see an object, so does the intellect represent to itself the object without changing in any way its

11
physical reality. Abstraction does not change the nature of the object but rather the nature of our awareness of the
object. In brief, abstraction simply means the representation of the essence of an object in the intellect.
“The Universality of Concepts. The fact that concepts are devoid of the individuating characteristics which are
always found in sensed objects has two implications.
“(1) The thought-object considered in itself is neither universal nor particular (cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 4). The
concept considered in this abstract condition is said to be the direct or potential universal, and as such it is
fundamentally real, i.e., its basis is in the object independently of the work of the mind. We are warranted in
claiming objectivity for the direct or potential universal since the mind finds the content of the concept in the object.
The mind does not create the content of the universal by its own activity but it discovers the content objectively
existing.
“(2) After the direct universal has been generated the intellect sees that the thought-object is not only in this
object and predicable of it, but that it is capable of indefinite repeated realizations in an indefinite number of other
similar objects. It thus formally universalizes the concept. When by reflection a concept is seen to be universally
predicable of all the objects of a class it is said to be a formal or reflex universal. Thus at first one forms the concept
of man as a rational animal. This is a direct universal. By an act of reflection the concept ‘rational animal’ is seen to
be predicable of all men, past, present, and future – it is formally universalized (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 39, a. 3;
De Anima, 2; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2).
“The universalizing is the work of the intellect. Hence universals, as universal, exist in the mind alone. The
concept of the nature or essence which is universalized has its basis in the object of sense, but the universality and
abstractness which characterize the concept are the work of, and are in, the intellect. There are universal thought-
objects but no universal objects. Whatever is real, i.e., in the real or objective order, is individual. But individual
things, while they do not constitute one reality, have similar natures. Because of this the intellect can apprehend this
similarity of nature and form a concept, which it may universalize, and which is predicable of the various different
but similar individuals. This predication of the same attribute to different individuals does not imply that they are the
same reality. They are distinct and separate individuals, but because of their similarity of nature the same essence
can be predicated of them. Similarity is not a real identity – it is a mental identity.”(J. T. BARRON, op. cit., pp. 86-
92).
Regarding moderate realist abstraction Sanguineti writes: “1. Abstraction. The existence of ideas is a fact of
internal experience, and the capacity to produce ideas is called intelligence. For the critique of knowledge it is
important to ensure how the ideas are formed and what their meaning is. Classical rationalism considers them innate
and tends to connect them with a world of possible essences, while the existent reality would be the exclusive object
of sensible knowledge. Empiricism reduces the importance of ideas, which at best would be constructions of a very
vague, schematic imaginative knowledge, although they would be useful for orienting ourselves in the world. The
dissatisfaction awakened by these extreme solutions leads to other gnoseological theories: Kantian idealism
recognizes the value of necessity and of universality of the ideas, but believes them to be a human production which
serves to unify contingent and particular experience; absolute idealism reduces reality to idea, while sensible
knowledge becomes a mere phenomenal apparition; pragmatism, vitalism and existentialism place the ideas in
function of the activities of man, depriving them of cognitive value.
“For realistic philosophy, the idea or concept is derived from experience and corresponds to the being of things.
However, there does not exist a total conformity between the idea and the thing (as is conceived by the exaggerated
realism of Plato, or by idealism in another context), because the idea represents the thing in an abstract way, adding
to it some logical elements that belong no longer to that which is comprehended, but rather to the human mode of
comprehension. This relative unconformity can be known as such, and in some way is overcome thanks to the
connection of ideas with experience, or to the use of some conceptual techniques such as analogy.
“Let us briefly confront the problem of the formation of the initial concepts, leaving out some technical details
that are studied in psychology or that we have seen in formal logic. We refer for the moment to knowledge of
material reality, the point of departure of human thought.
“The intelligibility of things is not given to us in an immediate way: for the fact of seeing a thing, we do not
comprehend its essence. The things of the world are for us sensible in act, but intelligible in potency. For example,
we think of a group of persons that move, run, shake their hands, without knowing in a precise way what they are
doing. We must observe more attentively, comparing and keeping in cosideration the various movements in order to
understand their reason; only after this experimental knowledge, in which both the external and the internal senses
concur, one arrives at the point of understanding that which holds the interplay of relations together: we have
understood that this a game (or even a specific game) – that is, we have arrived at a new concept. In other words,

12
this intelligible reality (because only the intelligence can register it) that first potentially existed in our experience,
has now passed to an intelligibility in act.
“This passage has not taken place in base of an a priori idea of game. The concept has been stripped from
experience, and is born precisely when the experience has become sufficiently mature. However, pure experience by
itself does not suffice to make seen the essence contained in this, because experience is always a particular fact,
while the idea, such as that of game, absolutely transcends this particular game that I can observe ‘here and now.’
Therefore, it is necessary for man to have an intellectual potency which is capable of illuminating the experience in
order that the essence may shine in it, which at first is hidden from our eyes. On the other hand, this illumination
also implies a separation of the intelligible element with respect to the sensible content, a procedure called
abstraction. For Thomism, the illuminating and abstracting potency is the agent intellect, called by this name
because it acts by performing the passage from the intelligible in potency to the state of intelligibility in act. In the
Kantian theory of knowledge, the human mind introduces the forms in matter, which is furnished by sensation. In
the Aristotelian doctrine of forms are in the things themselves: the intelligence uses its light in order to that these
forms become intelligible for man.
“Once the essence has been separated from the experience, it immediately impresses itself on the human
intelligence, which in this new function is called passive intellect; thus is produced the identification in act between
the intentional essence present to the intellect and the faculty that receives this content. Now the intelligence is
informed by the intellectual species and can pass to the act of knowing the object to which the intentional species
refers.
“However, this (abstract) object does not exist as such in the external world, and not even in the initial
experience. The sensible species of the external sensation refers directly to the present external object; the
imagination, not finding a present object, must forge a representation, which is the image; on its part, the human
intelligence is not only independent from the physical presence of the object, but comprehends the essence in a
different state from the one in which it is found in the individual being. Therefore, the intellect must conceive
a…concept or mental word (expressed species). On the one hand, the production of the expressed species is an index
of the imperfection of knowledge, insofar as it implies a certain distance from the object; nevertheless, in another
sense it implies perfection, if we consider it as an internal spiritual production that belongs to the proper immanence
of life. The concept is the immanent terminus of intellectual knowledge, be it a simple notion or rather a judgment
(which for Saint Thomas is also a conceptio intellectus, in the sense just explained). The concept is an intellectual
representation in which is contemplated the essence of the thing, as an object is contemplated in a mirror.
“However, the intellectual operation does not finish with the formation of the concept, because the abstract nature
of the latter does not perfectly express the thing that is intended to be understood, which is individual and material
(when considering knowledge of the physical world). After the separation of the essence performed by the agent
intellect there must follow an operation in the inverse sense, which will connect the essence, already comprehended,
with the reality it belongs to. ‘The nature of the rock or of any other material thing cannot be completely and truly
known until one knows it as existent in particulars, which are understood by means of the senses and the
imagination. Therefore, it is necessary, in order that the intellect may comprehend in act its proper object, that it
convert itself to experience (ad phantasmata), in such a way as to contemplate the universal nature as existent in the
particular’(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84, a. 7, c.).
“This operation is called conversio ad phantasmata, conversion of the mind to experience, where are to be found
the existent objects that are intended to be known. After the formation of the general concept of game, to continue
our example, we may return to the intuitive knowledge of these particular games, known now according to the new
essential content, and thus we do not limit ourselves to seeing colours, movements, etc., but rather we comprehend
the unity of these experiences as a game – that is, as a sensible reality in which there exists an essence known in act.
‘Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from experiences, insofar as it considers the nature of things in a
universal way; and yet, it comprehends them in experiences, since it cannot understand the things from where it
abstracts the species, without turning to experience’(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5).
“The intelligence knows in a direct line only the universals, because the material individuals are the object of
empirical experience. However, in an immediate, albeit indirect way, the intelligence comprehends the individual or
physical nature precisely in virtue of the intimate union between the intellective potency and human sensibility.
Therefore, there exists an intellectual comprehension of individuals, which for Saint Thomas is the work of the
cogitative, the superior faculty of sensibility, strictly united to the intelligence, in whose force it participates.
Without this bridge between the abstract intelligence and concrete sensibility, our intellectual comprehension would
be purely ideal, and our sensitive knowledge would regard only facts: an enormous gap would be opened between
these two spheres, which is precisely the abyss opened up by the currents such as Platonism, rationalism, and

13
empiricism, which have not suceeded in explaining the unity of human knowledge, even if it is so very clear on the
level of ordinary experience. For realism, the thesis of intellective knowledge of the concrete is very important,
because otherwise one risks blocking thought within the universals, which are not existent, while the existential
reality would remain entrusted to an impoverished experience”(J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic and Gnoseology,
Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1987, pp. 221-225).

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