G.R. No.

L-87584 June 16, 1992

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents.

FACTS:

(Gumuho ang ceiling ng cinema. Nagsuffer ang respondents ng physical injury kasi nasa loob din sila ng cinema. Force
majeure ba yung pag-collapse?)

Respondent Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theatre
which is owned by petitioner Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets. Hardly 10 minutes after
entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium
ensued. Shocked and hurt, respondents managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. They were confined in FEU, UST, and
in a hospital in Illinois, USA for further treatment.

Petitioner corporation tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to
force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling is a force majeure.

HELD: NO, IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE FORCE MAJEURE.

Force majeure is an event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail,
inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers. Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively
without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care
reasonably to have been expected. (Law Reports, 1 Common Pleas Division, 423; Law Reports, 10 Exchequer, 255.)

Besides, even assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable
because it was guilty of gross negligence. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised
due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.

Collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to construction defects and not to force majeure. It was the
burden of the petitioner to prove that its theater did not suffer from any structural defect when it was built and that it
has been well maintained when the incident occurred.

Also, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and structural engineers on the cause of the
collapse of the theater's ceiling. Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, He is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie (sic)
University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects. In fine, the
ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated, as an act, of
God.
[G.R. No. 126389. July 10, 1998]

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA
DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents.

FACTS:

(Malakas ang bagyo kaya nailipad ang roof ng school. Napunta ito sa roof ng private respondent kaya nasira portions ng
roof nila.)

Private respondents Dimaano are owners of a house near the petitioner’s four-storey school building. Then, powerful
typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off
and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondent’s house.

After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers
headed by the city building official. The city engineer recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives,
limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a structural
hazard. The following are the reasons:

1. One of the reasons is the formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind. Situated in
the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong winds having a
westerly direction, the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated
along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing,
those located on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.

2. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the
improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded on the
concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other
steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damage was due to fortuitous event.

HELD: YES, there was a fortuitous event. Hence, the petitioner is not liable.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for
the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse
consequences. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such
person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is
unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any
adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent
act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as
commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the omission
to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do.

In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of
the partial unroofing of petitioners school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications
and design of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from
the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was
basically flawed.
[G.R. Nos. L-36481-2. October 23, 1982.]

AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., Defendant-
Appellant.

FACTS:

Servando and Bico loaded their respective cargoes on board PSN or Philippine Steam Navigation's vessel for carriage
from Manila to Negros Occidental. The cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, into the warehouse of the
Bureau of Customs. Thereafter, the warehouse was razed by fire of unknown origin, destroying the rest of some cargoes.
Servando and Bico filed their claims against PSN for the recovery of the value of the goods destroyed by fire.

ISSUE: Whether or not fire that razed the warehouse is a fortuitous event or force majeure which was not forseen by
PSN.

HELD: YES, it is a fortuitous event and therefore, PSN is exempt from liability.

Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from
liability for non-performance. (See Art. 1174 of the New Civil Code.) In the case at bar, the burning of the customs
warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could
not have foreseen the event. Moreover, the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the goods
after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and stevedoring operator. No amount of
extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the goods by fire which was of
accidental origin. The consignee should bear the loss which was due to a fortuitous event.

The antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso fortuito" as "an event that takes place by accident and
could not been have foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of
robbers." In the dissertation of the phrase "caso fortuito" the Encyclopedia Juridicada Española says: "In a legal sense
and consequently, also in relation to contracts, caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the
cause of the unforseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must
be independent of the human will; (2) it must be impossible to forsee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or
if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it imposible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to creditor."

It would not be legal and just to hold the carrier liable to the consignee for the loss of the goods, where from the time
the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs’ warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two
o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, when the warehouse was burned, Servando and Bico, the consignees, had
reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her.
G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949

MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants-appellees

FACTS:

(Caretaker ng kalabaw namatay matapos na atakihin ng kalabaw na inaalagaan nya. Nag-keclaim ng damages ang
kapatid ng namatay sa owner ng kalabaw/employer.)

Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses Hisole as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation.
While tending the animals, Afialda was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries. According
to plaintiff Margarita Afialda who is the deceased’s sister, that the mishap was due neither to Loreto Afialda’s own fault
nor to force majeure.

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such
animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who may have suffered it.

ISSUE: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.

HELD: NO.

Article 1905 of the Civil Code appears applies in a case where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It
is different where the person injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important. The statute names
the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," as the one in a position to
prevent it from causing damage.

In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as
such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation
which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), the death of an
employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal
declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of
the Civil Code.
G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989

THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE
JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN

FACTS:

(Baha. Lumusong sa baha ang isang babae, tapos biglang nakuryente kasi grounded yung tubig at namatay. Liable ba ang
electric company?)

Typhoon “Gening” buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. After
the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased, Isabel Lao Juan, ventured
out, and proceeded to the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the
merchandise that might have been damaged.

Wading in waist-deep flood, Isabel was followed by 2 of her employees. Suddenly, the deceased screamed “Ay” and
quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but failed. There was an electric wire dangling from a post
and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. It was found out that the water was grounded.

To escape liability, Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INELCO) defended that the cause of electrocution of the deceased is
because the latter caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron
gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. It added that as
a public service operator and in line with its business of supplying electric current to the public, INELCO had installed
safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as
floods, typhoons, fire and others.

ISSUE: Whether or not INELCO is liable even if typhoon is a fortuitous event.

HELD: YES, INELCO IS LIABLE.

While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it
was through the intervention of INELCO’s negligence that death took place. When an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of INELCO to produce an injury, INELCO is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his
own negligent conduct or omission.

Indeed, INELCO was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity
is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be.

In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier
of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The
evidence does not show that INELCO did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or
otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office.

Engr. Juan from the NAPOCOR stated that when he set out that morning for an inspection, there was no INELCO line
man attending to the grounded and disconnected electric lines. The INELCO Office was likewise closed around the time
of the electrocution. At the INELCO, irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because “amperes of the
switch volts were moving”. And yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that
INELCO’s switch be cut off—but the harm was done.
G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.

FACTS:

(Collision ng sasakyan. Automatic ba na liable na rin yung employer ng driver ng truck?)

The car driven by Augusto Ramos collided with the truck of PEPSI, driven by the driver Andres Bonifacio. As a result, the
Ramos sued Bonifacio and Pepsi.The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Bonifacio and
PEPSI appealed to the Court of Appeals.

CA affirmed the decision of the trial court as to Bonifacio, but absolved PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that it
sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio. This is because PEPSI looked into his background,
asked him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to
take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: first, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving
examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
PEPSI did not just focus on mere possession of a professional driver's license; it carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of service.

ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA is also liable.

HELD: NO, only the driver is liable.

Article 2180 points out that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. This responsibility shall cease when the employers prove that they observed the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA shall be relieved from liability (rebuttable
presumption of negligence).

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that the
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

In this case, PEPSI COLA was able to prove that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Hence, it is absolved from liability and therefore not negligent.
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989

ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Kramer figured in a collision with an inter-
island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a
consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.

After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of
the Philippine On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines
during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of
the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended
from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.

On May 30, 1985, petitioners Kramer instituted a Complaint for damages.

CONTENTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT: PRESCRIPTION. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of
the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, he prescriptive period
for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained
that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action
accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May
30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: NO PRESCRIPTION. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period
was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date
when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the
four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. The
petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for damages is barred by statute of limitations or prescription

HELD: YES, the action has prescribed.

Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The
prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an
action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.

In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held as follows-

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a)
a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place
that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or
takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the
time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination
by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the
other party before he can file an action for damages.

Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8,
1976. The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive
period.