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GEORGE KATON vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR.

G.R. No. 151149, 9/7/2004

DOCTRINE:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear
from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by
the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds.
Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.

FACTS:

On August 2, 1963, a parcel of land located in Sombrero Island, Puerto Princessa, Palawan
was reclassified from forest to agricultural land upon the request by the above-named
petitioner. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and
Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.

Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No.
G-7089 on March 3, 1977 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.

Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title
covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of Manuel Palanca and the
other respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud.

Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.

On the other hand, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for
the island and insisted that they already had their respective occupancy and improvements
on the island. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their
respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they
have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years.

Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is
concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a
mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure
to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.

In the instant case, petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application
for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its
conversion from forest land to agricultural land.

The assailed Resolution by the CA, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner. It affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on
the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUES 1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on
an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition?

2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section
1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not
raised in the Petition?
HELD:

Propriety of Ruling on the Merits.

1.Yes.This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA’s
ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved for
reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its
November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:

"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way
and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming importance of the interests and
issues involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear
the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, submissions bearing on
incidental matters. We stand corrected.

That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA’s Resolution on this
point has rendered petitioner’s issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further.
Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdiction in ruling on the
merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari
is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the
evidence,more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial
court, as in this case.

Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction

2. No. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon
the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or
the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based,
therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was
not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
disposition of the case on appeal.

What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the
courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule
9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint
motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of
jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.

Nonetheless, In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own
complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even
if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v.
Gegato,we also explained thus:

"x x x Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-
barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v.
Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28,
1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such
ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after
judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA
705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is
found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission
House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has
been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is
that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently
and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's
complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence."45 (Italics supplied)

Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they
are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to
prevent future litigations.

FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

JULY 14, 2008

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in
which the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first
time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case.

The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches
has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial
went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
raising the jurisdictional infirmity.

The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further
absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.

Hence, this petition.


ISSUE: WON petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this
case, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the
CA

HELD: No.

Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only
in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.

Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,


that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at
a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches.

In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner
Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction
based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate
court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single
piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the
judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the
natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that
impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that
time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.

- HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, NAMELY, ANITA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,


SONIA J. TOLENTINO AND RODERICK JULAO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
ALEJANDRO AND MORENITA DE JESUS, Respondents

G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014


Doctrine: Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.

Facts:

Sometime in the 1960’s, Telesforo Julao (Telesforo) filed before the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Baguio City, two Townsite Sales Applications. Upon his death on
June 1, 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs. On April 30, 1979, Solito Julao (Solito)
executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights transferring his hereditary share in the property covered by
TSA No. V-6667 to respondent spouses Alejandro and Morenita De Jesus. In 1983, respondent
spouses constructed a house on the property they acquired from Solito. On March 15, 1996
however, the DENR rejected TSA No. V-6667 and recognized TSA no. 2132 valid, thus, the lands were
transferred to the heirs represented by Anita Vda. De Enriquez.
On March 2, 1999, petitioners Anita Julao vda. De Enriquez, Sonia J. Tolentino and Roderick Julao,
representing themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Baguio City, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property against respondent
spouses. Petitioners alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter parcel
of land located at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, that respondent spouses’ house encroached on 70
square meters of the subject property; and upon demand, refused to leave the said land and
insisted.
During the trial, petitioners disputed the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights executed by
Solito. They presented evidence to show that Telesforo submitted two applications, TSA No. V-2132
and TSA No. V-6667. The first one, TSA No. V-2132, resulted in the issuance of OCT No. P-2446 in
favor of the heirs of Telesforo, while the second one, TSA No. V-6667, was dropped from the records.
The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Julao stating that they were able to convincingly show that
Telesforo filed with the DENR two applications, covering two separate parcels of land, and that it
was his first application, TSA No. V-2132, which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. P-2446. And
since what Solito transferred to respondent spouses was his hereditary share in the parcel of land
covered by TSA No. V-6667, respondent spouses acquired no right over the subject property, which
was derived from a separate application, TSA No. V-2132” The CA however overruled the decision
of the RTC stating that petitioners-herein failed to identify the land, and the RTC has no Jurisdiction
over the case.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
RTC has no Jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. An action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property sought to be
recovered determines the court’s jurisdiction. In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the
assessed value of the subject property must exceed P20,000.00 (Section 19(2) and Section 33(3) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691). Since petitioners failed to allege
in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the
Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the
assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, Article 434 of the Civil Code states that in an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.” The plaintiff, therefore, is duty-bound to clearly identify the land sought to be
recovered, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. It bears stressing
that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the identity of the property claimed is fatal to his case.In
this case, petitioners failed to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to describe
the location, the area, as well as the boundaries thereof. In fact, as aptly pointed out by the CA, no
survey plan was presented by petitioners to prove that respondent spouses actually encroached
upon the 70-square meter portion of petitioners’ property. Failing to prove their allegation,
petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in their Complaint.

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