Republic of the Philippines traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments and
SUPREME COURT other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS
CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ,
ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL
DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this
petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was
appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional
Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly
for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said
members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on
March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective
certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for
the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid
election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the
Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a
letter which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and
dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully
chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and
may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional
Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of
your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the
Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and
cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting
Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that
there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending
business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting
Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following
telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM
RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY
MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM
AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE
DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO
15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO
SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS
UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of
petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad (a) This Petition be given due course;
10. Tomawis, Jerry (b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their
authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, (c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held
hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following (d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative
Assemblymen present: Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer and subsisting, and
2. Ali Salic (e) Making the injunction permanent.
3. Ali Salindatu Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.
4. Aratuc, Malik 2

5. Cajelo, Rene Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR
7. Dagalangit, Rakil P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that
9. Ortiz, Jesus the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic]
10 Palomares, Diego the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered
11. Quijano, Jesus resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing
13. Tomawis, Acmad in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement
14. Tomawis, Jerry by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads: paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5
the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of
I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and
votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before
But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question
Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7
Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot
session. and academic". 8
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions. The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ... We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's
Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1 expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic,
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows: and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold
that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place,
there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation,
and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming
that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do
so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the
Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this
writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To
be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a
conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that
was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled."
11Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no
matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and
hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in
administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party
need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear
herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had
in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot
be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their
accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere
accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of
vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from
what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed,
it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner]
before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members
claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as
representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify
expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,
14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may
be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past
acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is
enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings
therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process.
And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to
punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s)
are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs,
much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue:
Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX
and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979.
Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the
two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,"
17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities 18specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all
internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act
on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the
National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-
banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of
all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous
Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23
"and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim
Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign
to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the
Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no
controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in
these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category
[CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the
organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former
class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32
If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the
latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in
perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the
former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In
the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made
to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook
shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the
framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the
following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the
Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this
Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by
the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other
social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and
culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the
enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure
that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national
legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang
Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the
petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the
grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5,
1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant),
did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the
Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his
ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except
by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise
that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short
intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as
to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1
through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the
petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents
and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their
Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that
protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate
dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents
on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals."
Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have
validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November
1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no
recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it
was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second
place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission
sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does
not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his
back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find
equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the
ground of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the
aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about
his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are
convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as
establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly
declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the
petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses
in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful
meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from
reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do
so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate
obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the
petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2)
REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES
MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),
respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant
petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding
paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to
impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is
contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy"
and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is
said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections
11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article
XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21,
Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing
lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on
Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment
of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a
franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally
conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The
operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of
revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D.
1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this
objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to
enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following
declared policy —
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore
authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the
following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and
conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled,
administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and
recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries,
etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games
of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional
revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood
control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan
ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such
other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated
facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist
attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils,
malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct
and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government
involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over
the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are
accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government
revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of
Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly
remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of
franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and
Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural
and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various
governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations.
In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR
remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31,
1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos
nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four
Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They
allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public
policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy",
and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well
as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11
(Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth)
of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough
scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as
it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most
delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the
government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA
323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal
and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the
time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a
statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in
favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task
with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the
executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority
under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it
fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez,
supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court
thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the —
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases
where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are
involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one
who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render
it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all
possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton,
106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46
SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30,
55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983]
cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory
Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are
questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and
in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
(Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan,
163 SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the
cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and
intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued
by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed
the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must
technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in
many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the
substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited.
But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government
cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has
been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
(Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163
SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does
not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent
domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the
most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to
govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The
police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is
most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is
a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of
change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to
"regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas
clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was beneficial
not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source
of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided
funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny,
regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas
Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct
intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go
with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the
City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in
P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be
referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as
the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind
or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever
nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under
this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge
attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise
tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the
Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be
due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu
of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or
national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following
reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of
Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7
SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of
Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a
legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state
itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973]
Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress.
It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has
the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its
"general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo
v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control
over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950).
And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has
long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to
regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority
of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or
other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog
race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and
establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling
shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and
verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses
or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to
demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of
"licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers
(Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of
the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the
responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over
such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including,
but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws,
changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters
concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding,
except only with respect to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The
latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the
federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government
over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the
entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way
(taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political
subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to
prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern
Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable
activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation"
(U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to
destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power
to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the
Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument.
Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such
guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject
to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869
remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3,
Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes
and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation
or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under
the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra
sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in
imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be
delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which
concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for
Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing
with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of
the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or
express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local
corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of
power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent
with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-
Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal.
99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan
Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted
gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution,
drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The
petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal
protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long
as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force
on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not
require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is
violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The
mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse
racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races
(RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions,
while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869
for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been
applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all
occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the
state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short
of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the
harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made
mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of
the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and
toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a
ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs
counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive
Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare
what the law is and not what the law should be.1âwphi1 Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of
all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not
necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide
whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or
prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality
Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely
statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-
executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define
and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were
rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the
executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the
available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express
their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature
through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for
PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition
this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly
establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must
fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore,
inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation
considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise,
privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth
and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 —
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137
has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and
constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not
overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in
the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute.
This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the
Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners
have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of
the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to
this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon.
Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of
government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and
this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This
excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of
the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual
outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost
their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives
does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to
gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not
necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been
preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001]
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA,
and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO
DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the decision[1] dated February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order[2] dated April 21, 1997
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM
20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of
San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground
for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on
September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO
NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKAT, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKAT, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalot
higit sa mga kabataan;
KUNG KAYAT DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at
Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C.
Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa
pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano
mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalot higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang
pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-
ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong
lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang Jueteng.[3]
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento
asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the
following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a
lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao,
promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or
enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and
representatives are hereby enjoined from implementing or enforcing
resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the
province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently
denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997, which reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina,
Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru counsel, with the
opposition filed by plaintiffs counsel and the comment thereto filed by
counsel for the defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby
denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following
errors were committed by the respondent trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM
IMPLEMENTING KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE
OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED
BY THE PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR
PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR
OFFICES, PRIOR CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED
SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy
declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement
objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a
valid exercise of the provincial governments police power under the
General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991.[6] They also maintain that respondents
lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by
the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to
the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.[7]
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is,
in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the
national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted
its operations around the country.[8] As for the allegation that no prior
consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang
panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this is not
mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of
policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local Government Code of
1991.[9] He also states that his operation of the lotto system is legal
because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had
been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress. [10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the
Provincial Government of Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of
gambling which has been authorized by the national government. [11] He
argues that this is based on the principle that ordinances should not
contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the
national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This being the
case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The OSG also adds that
the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to
determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since
Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to
conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the
provinces Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said
authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the
denial of a mayors permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior
consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed
before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to
issue a mayors permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private
respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The
ordinance, however, merely states the objection of the council to the said
game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council,
which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even
petitioners admit as much when they stated in their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and
clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration of the Provincial Government
of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of
and/or all forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province
of Laguna.[12]
As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the
lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not
mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a
measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national
government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the
PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:
Section 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.- The Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the
principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health
programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national
character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section
thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as
amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other
similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined,
and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the
Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance,
the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot
issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits.
Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law,
such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or
resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to
legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power
coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,[13]ordinances should not
contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this
is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.[14]
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may
destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from
existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so
far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it,
the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids,
etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy
dictates a different conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning
to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control
of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes
the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of
the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature
is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its
will or modify or violate it.[15]
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so,
any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be
limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio.[16]
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San
Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his
municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local
legislative unit concerned. The Boards enactment, like spring water, could
not rise above its source of power, the national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that
Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto
outlets around the country. These provisions state:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. x x x
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and peoples organizations, and other
concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be
evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor
national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution
national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It
sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It
falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayors refusal to issue
Government Code. the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
thereof.[17] Section 26 reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from
Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every national agency or implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of
government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause SO ORDERED.
pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of
crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and
objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the
measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse
effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be
interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those
enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause
pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion
of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-
land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species
from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality
where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be
produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by
petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part. There is no indication
in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his
refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses,
BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR.,
respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive
Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and
HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative
Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment
of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article
X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted
Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the
National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from
a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The organic act shall define
the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within
eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the
organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be
the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized,
maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws.
The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the
National Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its
historical background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg,
S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she
advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all
revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the
President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and some
members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on
September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As
Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera
Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA a ceasefire
agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O.
220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people
shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but
by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall
be a continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera people shall
have been substantially granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the
government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to
the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman
of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which
state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a
preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft
organic act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of
the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera
people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into
law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her
legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created
the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of
Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the
City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and
social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in
the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as
well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the
supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and
accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor
the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects
in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly
as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and
Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional
government is established and organized [sec. 17].
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last
"Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment
of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent
need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the
President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure
in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the
Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-
empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the
creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was
enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices
and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature is
reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as
well as all offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 shall
cease to exist immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the
Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I 18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and
stated powers and prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful
adherence to the principle of separation of powers, require that its
enactment be accorded the presumption of constitutionality. Thus, in any
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and
unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon the
challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the
challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated
petitions.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220
the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually
pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act
and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully
studied the Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the
conclusion that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent
to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually
envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services
of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas
covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of
autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission
shall first be created. The President shall then appoint the members of a
regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-
sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the
organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by
the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months
from the time of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there
shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec.
region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still
exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened,
saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed
and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No.
220. The steps taken by the President are obviously perceived by
petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as
capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg,
as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the
measures taken by the President, We can only inquire into whether or not
the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they do
not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily
mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the
interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p.
25].
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the
autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and
special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X,
sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish
an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services
[secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly,
to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among
others, identifying priority projects and development programs [sec. 9]. To
serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board
composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and
representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic
groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all
regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as
ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11].
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies.
They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings
together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is
underscored by the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and
appropriate national departments and agencies to make available sources
of funds for priority development programs and projects recommended by
the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the
appropriate executive departments and agencies of the National
Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was
convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera
Regional Consultative Commission. The President then appointed its
members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which became the
basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera
autonomous region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A
plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall
complete the process outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than
two years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region
in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of
petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that E.O.
No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether
or not it is a territorial and political subdivision. The Constitution provides
in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we now address
petitioners' assertion that E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by
creating a new territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it
did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing
ones into a larger subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and
political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality,
unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the
powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to
sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to
create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was
created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the
delivery of services is nothing new.1âwphi1 The Integrated Reorganization
Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later increased
to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up
field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established
pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies,
plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the
regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to
the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other
departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with
local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other
functions as may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the
Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative
regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220
the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line
departments and agencies of the National Government but also the local contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
solely for that purpose. executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with
2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency
of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent
Government, similar to the regional development councils which the territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or
President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of autonomy.
departments and other government offices, and representatives from non- Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the
governmental organizations within the region for purposes of creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the
of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
III SO ORDERED.
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR
contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province)
and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the
concept of local autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in
the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of
local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-
31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the
1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution
[Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee under the
1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No.
2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the
irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the
country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195770 July 17, 2012
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON
ALCANTARA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and SECRETARY
CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
For the Court’s consideration in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
is the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 20111 which provides a P21
Billion budget allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program
(CCTP) headed by the Department of Social Welfare & Development
(DSWD). Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa and DSWD Secretary Corazon Juliano-Soliman from
implementing the said program on the ground that it amounts to a
"recentralization" of government functions that have already been devolved
from the national government to the local government units.
The Facts
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the
poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries.2Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang
Pilipino," it was pre-pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat and
Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the municipalities of Lopez Jaena and
Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga Region; and the cities of
Pasay and Caloocan3 upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos
under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department
of Budget and Management.4
On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative Order No. 16, series of
2008 (A.O. No. 16, s. 2008),5 setting the implementing guidelines for the
project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program" (4Ps), upon the
following stated objectives, to wit:
1. To improve preventive health care of pregnant women and young
children
2. To increase enrollment/attendance of children at elementary level
3. To reduce incidence of child labor
4. To raise consumption of poor households on nutrient dense foods
5. To encourage parents to invest in their children's (and their own) future
6. To encourage parent's participation in the growth and development of
young children, as well as involvement in the community. 6
This government intervention scheme, also conveniently referred to as
CCTP, "provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the
members of the families to meet certain human development goals." 7
Eligible households that are selected from priority target areas consisting
of the poorest provinces classified by the National Statistical Coordination
Board (NCSB)8 are granted a health assistance of P500.00/month, or
P6,000.00/year, and an educational assistance of P300.00/month for 10
months, or a total of P3,000.00/year, for each child but up to a maximum
of three children per family.9 Thus, after an assessment on the appropriate
assistance package, a household beneficiary could receive from the
government an annual subsidy for its basic needs up to an amount of
P15,000.00, under the following conditionalities:
a) Pregnant women must get pre natal care starting from the 1st trimester,
child birth is attended by skilled/trained professional, get post natal care
thereafter
b) Parents/guardians must attend family planning sessions/mother's
class, Parent Effectiveness Service and others
c) Children 0-5 years of age get regular preventive health check-ups and
vaccines
d) Children 3-5 years old must attend day care program/pre-school
e) Children 6-14 years of age are enrolled in schools and attend at least
85% of the time10
Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also institutionalized a coordinated
inter-agency network among the Department of Education (DepEd),
Department of Health (DOH), Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and the
local government units (LGUs), identifying specific roles and functions in
order to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the CCTP. As the
DSWD takes on the role of lead implementing agency that must "oversee
and coordinate the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the
program," the concerned LGU as partner agency is particularly tasked to –
a. Ensure availability of the supply side on health and education in the
target areas.
b. Provide necessary technical assistance for Program implementation
c. Coordinate the implementation/operationalization of sectoral activities
at the City/Municipal level to better execute Program objectives and
functions
d. Coordinate with various concerned government agencies at the local
level, sectoral representatives and NGO to ensure effective Program
implementation
e. Prepare reports on issues and concerns regarding Program
implementation and submit to the Regional Advisory Committee, and
f. Hold monthly committee meetings11
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)12 executed by the DSWD with each
participating LGU outlines in detail the obligation of both parties during
the intended five-year implementation of the CCTP.
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success of the CCTP by
providing it with funding under the GAA of 2008 in the amount of Two
Hundred Ninety-Eight Million Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P298,550,000.00). This budget allocation increased tremendously to P5
Billion Pesos in 2009, with the amount doubling to P10 Billion Pesos in
2010. But the biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the GAA of 2011
at Twenty One Billion One Hundred Ninety-Four Million One Hundred
Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P21,194,117,000.00). 13 1âwphi1
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator, joined by Sergio Tadeo,
incumbent President of the Association of Barangay Captains of
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and Nelson Alcantara, incumbent
Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Monica, Quezon City, challenges
before the Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation
of the CCTP which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy
of the LGUs.
The Issue
THE P21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD IN
THE GAA FY 2011 VIOLATES ART. II, SEC. 25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING FOR THE
RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.
Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP as a poverty
reduction strategy for the Philippines is with the legislature. They take
exception, however, to the manner by which it is being implemented, that
is, primarily through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to
which the responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare,
agriculture and health care services have been devolved pursuant to
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, in relation to Section 25, Article II & Section 3, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification
of beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered or
conditionalities are to be complied with, instead of allocating the P21
Billion CCTP Budget directly to the LGUs that would have enhanced its
delivery of basic services, results in the "recentralization" of basic
government functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy
and the avowed policy of decentralization.
Our Ruling
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy
of local governments14 and even devotes a full article on the subject of local
governance15 which includes the following pertinent provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
xxx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils
or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives
from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development
of the units in the region. (Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy
that would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective
partners in the attainment of national goals,16 Section 17 of the Local
Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions
pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of
the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services
and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works
and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered
under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals17 that while it is through a
system of decentralization that the State shall promote a more responsive
and accountable local government structure, the concept of local
autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into
"mini-states."18 We explained that, with local autonomy, the Constitution
did nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not
intend to sever "the relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government units." 19 In Pimentel v.
Aguirre,20 the Court defined the extent of the local government's autonomy
in terms of its partnership with the national government in the pursuit of
common national goals, referring to such key concepts as integration and
coordination. Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments,
including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local
affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at
the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local government
unit as to preclude any and all involvement by the national government in
programs implemented in the local level would be to shift the tide of
monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would amount to a
decentralization of power explicated in Limbona v. Mangelin 21 as beyond
our constitutional concept of autonomy, thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power.1âwphi1 There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments ‘more
responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit
of national development and social progress.’ At the same time, it relieves
the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
‘general supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to
be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart
its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization
of power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.22
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the
Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government
is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 23 Petitioners have
failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions
under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an
intervention program formulated by the national government itself but
implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve the
common national goal development and social progress can by no means
be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN
RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS,
respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA
MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR.
TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO; MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO
MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO
MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.;
BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION;
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS,
respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL;
BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS,
INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M.
DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL;
AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO
PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M.
DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN
LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.; MUNICIPALITY
OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by
affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or
fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or
making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family,
to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than
protecting him and keeping his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one
hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and
sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake
Development Authority." This Government Agency is supposed to carry out
and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within
the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and
economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern
for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the
lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective
uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries,
and the like. Concern on the part of the Government and the general
public over: — the environment impact of development on the water
quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of
polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural
wastes from developed areas around the lake; the increasing urbanization
which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to
check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the
lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de
Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the
lake and its river systems, — likewise gave impetus to the creation of the
Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the national policy
to promote, and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns
hereinafter referred to as the region, within the context of the national and
regional plans and policies for social and economic development and to
carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case,
include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding
thereto seven new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m),
(n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to
engage in fish production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna de
Bay and other bodies of water within its jurisdiction and in pursuance
thereof to conduct studies and make experiments, whenever necessary,
with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, with the end in view of improving present techniques
and practices. Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by the
procedure provided in the following sub-paragraph, the present laws, rules
and permits or authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities
in Laguna de Bay, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue
new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said lake including navigation, construction, and operation of
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary
safeguards for lake quality control and management and to collect
necessary fees for said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees
collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other
government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may
be determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of
the Authority's Board: Provided, further, That the Authority's Board may
determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may
place under the supervision of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources taking into account the overall development plans and
programs for Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided, finally,
That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines promulgate such rules and regulations which shall govern
fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into
consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of
bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or collectively in the form
of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fishpen
construction and operation, communal fishing ground for lake shore town
residents, and preference to lake shore town residents in hiring laborer for
fishery projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region
to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the same
with the assistance of the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, to
exercise water rights over public waters within the Laguna de Bay region
whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing governmental agencies in
establishing water quality standards for industrial, agricultural and
municipal waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with said
existing agencies of the government of the Philippines in enforcing such
standards, or to separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as
provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this Act: Provided, That in
case of conflict on the appropriate water quality standard to be enforced
such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA Board. 2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act
No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be
completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land and waters
of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring
judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability
and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing options for the use
of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having
created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority
in the light of the limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive
Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of
the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of
Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water
within the Lake Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the
Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in
or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region"
shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo,
Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan,
Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and
Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and
the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro
Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect
fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial
purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal,
industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose;
Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with
other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be
subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be
shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the
lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development
Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75
percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the
implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery
Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as follows: 35
percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent
goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall
be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form
part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National
Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1234. (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813
defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in
this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered
by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of
elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean
lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are
public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991.
The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of
this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges
therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussel or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal
waters, as determined by it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry or
kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal waters
by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free from any
rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant exclusive
privileges of constructing fish corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching
of bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any species or fish
within the municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing
privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the
Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied
almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the
occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000
hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages
were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on
fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate
independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within
their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake
area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the
general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL
V. RAMOS given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic
Act 4850 as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927
series of 1983 and in line with the policies and programs of the
Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the general
public is hereby notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the
Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no
application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake
Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared
outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so
declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be
undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures
be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act
4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of
these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a
fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the
court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one
(1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA
why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
should not be demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners
of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within
10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against
the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No.
759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito
Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM
Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No.
566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch
163, Pasig, filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and
Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition,
Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal,
filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f)
Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 79, Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp.
and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for
Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR
Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing
Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on
jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied.
Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining
the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in
question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R.
Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as
parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and respective
private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of
Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the
construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The Authority
sought the following reliefs, viz.:
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining order/writs of
preliminary injunction issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from
exercising jurisdiction over cases involving the Authority which is a co-
equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of
1991) did not repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as
amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay and that,
the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive authority to
issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated
petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A)
LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose
decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA
charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens
are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing
privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local
Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to
grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local
government units concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has
returned to this Court charging the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED
AN ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 813
AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC
ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN
PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED
(LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only
issue posed is: Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake
Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that
the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to
grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may
grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal
waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development
Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de
Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority.
It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the
legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The
repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general
law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled
rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular
case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in
its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to
include the cases embraced in the special law."3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the
special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not
favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of
the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which
are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable
development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the
Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake
Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of
water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km² lake surface
water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers
that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or watershed transcending
the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro
Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one
integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with
uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining
sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource — a very
limited one — which requires judicious management and optimal
utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and
balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a
national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced
growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the
inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of
the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when
they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to govern the
management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of
management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise
exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage
thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom
or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only
that specific portion but the entire 900 km² of lake water. The
implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource
management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and
sustainably develop Laguna de Bay."5
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that
Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local
governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The
Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region
(Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management.6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the
Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail
over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial
agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section
4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to
the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special
law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that
the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad
grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled
rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is,
perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to
issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction
of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna
de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the
Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be
instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions
necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the
Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has
not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated
therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter
vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render
nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake
Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render
useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the
Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of
1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are
hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake
Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo
Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC,
Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC, Branch
163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered
set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited
from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region, their
previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits
issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D.
Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of
Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and ordered
cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by
operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the
Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet Development,
Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc.,
represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures
Industrial Development Corporation and R.J. Orion Development
Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing
Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation;
Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP
Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR
Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR
Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to
demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to
solve urgent problems of the people. But even when government is armed
with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the
rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal
attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private
subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be promoted,
we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h
Y a preliminary injunction.[2] Respondent questioned the denial before the
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
(BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside
Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its
Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to
open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
The notice reads: Court
"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic
"Dear President Lindo,
"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or
Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use
of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective
January 2, 1996.
"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the
points of entry and exit on said street.
"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be
extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing
traffic in the area.
"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction
of the President on the matter.
"Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman"[1]
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished. Sppedsc
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for
injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street
and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued
a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted
an ocular inspection of Neptune Street[3] and on February 13, 1996, it
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the
MMDAs proposed action. [4]
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the
merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the
City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of as follows:
Jurissc
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated
January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made
permanent.
"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del
Rosario in contempt is denied.[5]
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."[6]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September
28, 1998. Hence, this recourse. Jksm
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
"I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA)
THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC
PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT
BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION
ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED
FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO
OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj
V units.[14]Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE
SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED
BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?" [7]
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside
Bel-Air Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the
financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to
Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the
two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet
high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia,
formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic,
while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends
of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street
to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic
services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general
public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this
Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court.[8] From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that
there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening
Neptune street to the public.[9]
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.[10] The power is plenary
and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for
public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. [11]
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature.[12] It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals
not possessing legislative power.[13] The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. [15]
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." [16] The
politic and corporate"[17]-- one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.[18] Local government units are
the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. [19] They are also the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state.[20]
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in
the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section
16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: Chief
"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants." [21]
Local government units exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial
government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government
is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the
sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang
barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang
bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may
be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality]
provided under the Code x x x."[22] The same Code gives the sangguniang
barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to
promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." [23]
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities,
namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay,
Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and
Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San
Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924[24]
in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development
and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA.[25]
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact
and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such
that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual local government units comprising Metro Manila." [26] There are
seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover
the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic
management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control
and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection
and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport
and traffic management includes the following: Lexjuris
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation,
coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and
projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion
of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for
the mass transport system and the institution of a system to regulate
road users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing
system in Metropolitan Manila;"[27]
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the
following powers and functions: Esm
"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority.The MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and
long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land
use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with
national development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term
investment programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources
and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall
include the packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions;
Esmsc
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects
for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the
approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate
project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs
and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to
problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro
Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically
pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request,
it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not
limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies
and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and
collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules
and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement
of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD
1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the
Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro
Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly
licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the
MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local
government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination
with and consent of the local government unit concerned." Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is
undertaken by the local government units, national government agencies,
accredited peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA
has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other
cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required
services within Metro Manila.[28]
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The
Council is composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5
municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and
the president of the Metro Manila Councilors League.[29] The Council is
headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with
the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the
Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects,
and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of
said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates
the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of
service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are
particularly enumerated as follows: LEX
"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the
purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of
the Council to be effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It
shall fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and
approve the annual budget thereof for submission to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and
standards for metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic
services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and
collect fines and penalties." Jj sc
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the
seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management
which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and
projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe
movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system
and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system
in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is
expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate
and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In
addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing
system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
Ca-lrsc
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative
bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No.
7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
a "development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units
concerning purely local matters."[31]
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate
Appellate Court[32] where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the
Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an
exercise of police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of
the petition,[33] while the second decision denied reconsideration of the
first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of
Appeals.[34]
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by
respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other
residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati
Development Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The
petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds of
sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the
prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the
lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes.
Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter
Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into commercial
establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent
Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street
by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from
the residential section of the village.[35]
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal
Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village
as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to
the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by
the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National
Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air
Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block
adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. [36]
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the
boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter
Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held
that the perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to separate the
residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security reasons,
hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the
"deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Scc-alr
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a
legitimate exercise of police power.[37] The power of the MMC and the
Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general
welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of
Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in
terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened
by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public
streets adjacent to the Village.[38] The same reason was given for the
opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the same
village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under
the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter
wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and
impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the mayor
was proper and legal.[39]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply
to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the
municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis
for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of
December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its
president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply
relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads
and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons."
Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall
within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the
imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied
grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in
Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present
MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the
charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers
which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous
four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen
(13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas,
Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and
Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of
Bulacan.[40] Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding
that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and
economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and
unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective
local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically
if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination,
"especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of
social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent
[were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety
and security of the State."[41]
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the
following powers: Calrs-pped
"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby created a
public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with
powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make
contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold,
transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are
necessary to carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be
administered by a Commission created under this Decree." [42]
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer
programs and provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend
money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of
indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be
operative until otherwise modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government
and review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in
accordance with the established policies of the Commission, without
prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units
involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and
acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for
any violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or
imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for a
single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making
functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire
services of the city and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct
garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall
direct traffic activities; Jjjuris
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities
pertaining to essential services such as transportation, flood control and
drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental
services, housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social,
economic and physical planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the
affairs of their respective local governments and to propose to the
President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for
implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an
annual report to the President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic
report whenever deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the
President of the Philippines." Sc jj
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the
purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services
common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy
and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect
fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same
time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and
resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all
ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen
(13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P. D. No. 824 further provided:
"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and
thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist
in their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The
members of the existing city and municipal councils in Metropolitan
Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December
31, 1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is
hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan
Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many
barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission,
and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as
may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Commission.
x x x.
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission
ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt; Provided,
that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall become effective,
until after its approval by the Commission; and Provided further, that
the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate
money and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission."
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the
Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the
component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the
MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The
Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the
adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself,
however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions
and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to
the MMCs approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies,
the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or
resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-
dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC
which fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever
legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were
all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to
restore the autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila.
Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sj
cj
"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy."
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating
metropolitan regions not only in the existing National Capital Region but
also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. [43] Section 11 of
the same Article X thus provided:
"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination."
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law,
create "special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited
to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities
comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their
own local executive and legislative assemblies.[44] Pending enactment of
this law, the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President
of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:
"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may
constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all
local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area."[45]
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers
and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to be
stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were
passed to the MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of
basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila."[47] The MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila
Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities
and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of
policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other
issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its
rule-making power.[48]
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became
primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political
subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common
problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It
did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local
government units technical assistance in the preparation of local
development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined
to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to
ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive
development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments
accordingly."[49]
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a
"special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a
"special development authority" whose functions were "without
prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units."
The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative
debates enacting its charter.
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was
introduced by several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and
Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives by
the Committee on Local Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R.
Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations with the local
government units in the National Capital Region (NCR), with former
Chairmen of the MMC and MMA,[50] and career officials of said agencies.
When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments,
the following debate took place:
"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has
been debated a long time ago, you know. Its a special we can create a
special metropolitan political subdivision. Supreme
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the
Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the
Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have
6. Now.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the
Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by the
Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a political
subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning
to say, that it has its own government, it has its own political
personality, it has the power to tax, and all governmental powers:
police power and everything. All right. Authority is different; because
it does not have its own government. It is only a council, it is an
organization of political subdivision, powers, no, which is not imbued
with any political power. Esmmis
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro
Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it
provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative
power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic services
which have to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective
as a political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and
protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise.
However, in the exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and
disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming an
authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in
order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right.
justice
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to
provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess any political
power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to
tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it must
have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It
coordinates practically all these basic services so that the flow and the
distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot
deny that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace
and order, we cannot deny these. Its right on our face. We have to look for
a solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that
there should be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All
right, if you do not want to call it an authority, its alright. We may call it a
council or maybe a management agency.
x x x."[51]
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bills presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I
think this was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of
the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no
objection to paragraph "f" And then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6.
"It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry
out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the
MMDA because that takes the form of a local government unit, a
political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say
that it has the policies, its very clear that those policies must be followed.
Otherwise, whats the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now,
the policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a
ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth,
your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the
power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the
case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that
that is the case now. Youve got the power to set a policy, the body wants
to follow your policy, then we say lets call it an ordinance and see if they
will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a
constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a political
subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a
plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive been trying to avoid
this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a
political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject to a
plebiscite. Im trying to make this as administrative. Thats why we
place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying
there is .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise.
Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances
of rules and regulations. That would be it shall also be enforced. Jksm
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you
impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal
connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor. sc
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually
considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions." [52]
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to
the House of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that
the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national
agency, not a political government unit."[53] The explanatory note was
adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee on Local
Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the floor and no
amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on the
same day it was presented.[54]
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were
made. These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA
as originally conceived in the House of Representatives. [55]
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit
or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11,
Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. [56] R. A. No. 7924 was
not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The
Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet
member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as
may be assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in local government
units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Newmiso
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as
the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils,
that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals
did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they
are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble
efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday,
traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once
sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city
streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a
social malaise affecting our peoples productivity and the efficient delivery
of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some
order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the
powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify
the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision
without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.