Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Kate J. Neville, Jackie Cook, Jennifer Baka, Karen Bakker & Erika S. Weinthal
To cite this article: Kate J. Neville, Jackie Cook, Jennifer Baka, Karen Bakker & Erika S. Weinthal
(2018): Can shareholder advocacy shape energy governance? The case of the US antifracking
movement, Review of International Political Economy
ARTICLE
ABSTRACT
Research on socially responsible investing (SRI) and investor-led governance,
especially in the climate sector, suggests that shareholders adopt social move-
ment tactics to influence corporate governance, including building networks,
engaging directly with corporations and lobbying regulators. Further, research
on corporate transparency and financial disclosure has proliferated, notably in
the extractives sector. Our work builds on these existing literatures, with a
focus on shareholder resolutions on hydraulic fracturing (HF) in the United
States. We analyze US HF-focused shareholder resolutions from 2010 to 2016
to evaluate filing strategies and outcomes. We argue that these resolutions
provide space for a range of new actors to shape corporate governance—but
their power is constrained. The constraints flow from the same political econ-
omy factors that enable shareholders to take collective action: the distance
between individual investors and financial decisions; the structure of resolu-
tions and managerial responses; and the complexity of investment vehicles
and vote shares. We assess how shareholders respond strategically by altering
the focus of resolution demands, liaising with external campaigns and net-
works, and engaging with government to enhance regulatory interventions.
Our work reveals how the upstreaming of power in commodity chains inter-
sects with the power of management boards and the challenges of financiali-
zation, with consequences for corporate and energy governance.
KEYWORDS
Shareholder resolutions; hydraulic fracturing; corporate governance; financialization; social
movements; socially responsible investing (SRI)
While shareholder resolutions are within the bounds of accepted and regu-
lated investor activities (along with other tools such as campaigning around
board of director elections), investors who take advantage of such opportuni-
ties to attempt to influence corporate governance are often described as
‘activists’ (e.g. Del Guercio, Seery, & Woidtke, 2008; Gillan & Starks, 2007;
Goranova & Ryan, 2014). However, within the investment world, progressive
shareholder demands on issues of social responsibility tend to be described as
“advocacy” (e.g. As You Sow, n.d). We adopt this latter terminology in our
paper, with a focus on institutional and SRI investors leading the push for
ESG-focused changes in corporations, referring to investor/shareholder advo-
cacy, advocacy groups, and ESG advocates. In some cases, these identities
intersect with extra-institutional efforts in climate, environmental health, and
social justice, which we describe as activism.
Our focus on shareholder resolutions as a specific tool of investor ESG advo-
cates follows from our interest in understanding the mechanisms of shareholder
coordination and the constraints that face investors seeking to change corporate
structures. While the literature on shareholder resolutions suggests these tools
have limited impacts on individual firm value, research from social movement
perspectives indicates they have significant potential to shape a corporate sector.
Thus, we place our study in the context of trends in investor advocacy and
shareholder resolutions (Gillan & Starks, 2000, 2007; Graves et al., 2001; Ma &
Liu, 2016; Sjo€stro€m, 2008), the heterogeneity of investors (Gourevitch, 2007), the
impact of investor demands and advocacy on financial outcomes and investment
incentives (King & Soule, 2007; Revelli & Viviani, 2015), the strategies of advo-
cacy networks and campaign tactics (McAteer & Pulver, 2009) and the conse-
quences of coordinated and coalition-based activism (Cook, 2012).
The coordination of resolutions across an issue area, such as HF, repre-
sents one of many forms of investor-led governance. Our work highlights the
role of publicly traded companies in the arena of energy governance—corpo-
rations where shareholders have a voice in corporate activity—and the role of
institutional investors and non-profit organizations in the development of
issue-based campaigns. These dynamics are thus only part of the broader glo-
bal energy governance picture, but still represent a significant component of
the industry, especially in the US (Rapier, 2016). We argue that although
shareholder resolutions provide space for a range of new actors to shape cor-
porate governance, their power is constrained in three ways: (1) boards of
directors often have competing interests, which they assert through manage-
ment responses; (2) individual shareholders have limited leverage due to the
attenuated information available to those who invest via institutional share-
holders; and (3) the changing nature of hedge funds and other complex
investment vehicles alter the one-share one-vote alignment of power.
Shareholders respond to these barriers by using adaptive claim-making strat-
egies, including altering the focus of resolution demands to attract broader
support and engaging with government and industry bodies to advance regu-
latory intervention. Our work follows on other recent research that suggests a
powerful role for shareholders in shaping corporate behavior, such as
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 5
Serafeim (2017), who suggests that investors engage closely with business
when they have long-time horizons for their investments and hold shares in
multiple companies within the same sector.
By considering resolutions within the context of broader civil society
efforts to advance environmental health, address climate change, and shift
energy production and governance, we seek to develop a better understanding
of the strategic choices of investor advocates, the repertoires that they
employ, and the limitations and opportunities provided by different tools of
claim-making. In a time where divestment is a visible strategy of climate acti-
vists (as seen with recent efforts to prompt individuals to close accounts with
banks that provide pipeline financing, as reported by Brownstone (2017) and
Remle (2017), among others, and with recent actions by high-profile investors
and philanthropic foundations to pull funds from oil and gas, as reported by
Schwartz (2014)), shareholder resolutions represent an important and less vis-
ible form of activism that, at times, converges with the climate movement.
To illuminate the importance of shareholder resolutions and investor
advocacy for understanding private energy governance, the article proceeds as
follows: Section I reviews the political economy literature on commodity
chains and broader research on private governance, with an overview of strat-
egies used by financial actors to influence corporate management. Section II
traces the rise of ESG investor-advocacy through shareholder resolutions. We
introduce our case study in Section III, explaining the significance of HF for
the global energy landscape and presenting our empirical work on share-
holder resolutions. In Section IV, we consider the direct and indirect impacts
of resolutions, and highlight the strategic adaptation of shareholder advocates.
In Section V, we offer our conclusions, including on the structural limitations
of resolutions as tools for shaping corporate governance. Through this work,
we add support to previous scholarship that views shareholder resolutions as
part of broader social movements. By connecting theoretical IPE work on
commodity chains and finance to shareholder advocacy, we articulate and
analyze intersections of corporate governance with energy governance.
(b)
Num.
Model Resoluon Resns Typical Resolved Clause
Voted
RESOLVED: Sha rehol ders reques t tha t the Boa rd of Di rectors prepa re a report by [da te], a t rea s ona bl e cos t a nd omi ng propri etary
Ha za rds to a i r, wa ter a nd i nforma on s uch a s propri etary or l ega l l y prejudi ci a l da ta, s umma ri zi ng: 1) Known a nd potena l envi ronmental i mpa cts of
11
s oi l qua l i ty [compa ny na me]'s fra cturi ng opera ons ; a nd 2) Pol i cy opons for our compa ny to a dopt, a bove a nd beyond regul a tory requi rements
a nd our compa ny's exi s ng efforts , to reduce or el i mi na te ha za rds to a i r, wa ter, a nd s oi l qua l i ty from fra cturi ng opera ons .
RESOLVED: Sha rehol ders reques t the Boa rd of Di rectors report to s ha rehol ders , us i ng qua ntave i ndi ca tors , by [da te], a nd
Advers e envi ronmental a nnua l l y therea er, the res ul ts of compa ny pol i ci es a nd pra cces a bove a nd beyond regul a tory requi rements , to mi ni mi ze the
6
a nd communi ty i mpa cts a dvers e envi ronmental a nd communi ty i mpa cts from the compa ny's hydra ul i c fra cturi ng opera ons a s s oci a ted wi th s ha l e
forma ons . Such report s houl d be prepa red a t rea s ona bl e cos t, omi ng confi dena l i nforma on.
RESOLVED: Sha rehol ders reques t the Boa rd of Di rectors to report to s ha rehol ders vi a qua ntave i ndi ca tors by [da te], a nd a nnua l l y
Advers e wa ter res ource therea er, the res ul ts of compa ny pol i ci es a nd pra cces , a bove a nd beyond regul a tory requi rements , to mi ni mi ze the a dvers e
3
a nd communi ty i mpa cts wa ter res ource a nd communi ty i mpa cts from the compa ny's hydra ul i c fra cturi ng opera ons a s s oci a ted wi th s ha l e forma ons . Such
reports s houl d be prepa red a t rea s ona bl e cos t, omi ng confi dena l i nforma on.
Communi ty concerns , RESOLVED: Sha rehol ders reques t tha t the Boa rd of Di rectors prepa re a report to i nves tors by [da te], a t rea s ona bl e cos t a nd
known regul a tory excl udi ng confi dena l or l ega l l y prejudi ci a l da ta, on the s hort-term a nd l ong-term ri s ks to the compa ny's opera ons , fi na nces a nd
3
i mpa cts , mora tori ums , ga s expl ora on a s s oci a ted wi th communi ty concerns , known regul a tory i mpa cts , mora tori ums , a nd publ i c oppos i on to hydra ul i c
a nd publ i c oppos i on fra cturi ng a nd rel a ted na tura l ga s devel opment.
RESOLVED: Sha rehol ders reques t tha t [compa ny na me] i s s ue a report to s ha rehol ders , us i ng qua ntave a nd qua l i tave mea s ures
Envi ronmental a nd s oci a l
to des cri be how the Compa ny ma na ges the envi ronmental a nd s oci a l cha l l enges a nd opportuni es a s s oci a ted wi th wel l
cha l l enges a nd 2
s mul a on tha t empl oys hydra ul i c fra cturi ng. The report s houl d be a va i l a bl e by [da te], be prepa red a t rea s ona bl e cos t, a nd omi t
opportuni es
propri etary i nforma on.
Reques ts for di s cl os ure of: (i ) envi ronmental a nd publ i c hea l th i mpa ct a nd ri s ks ; (i i ) a dvers e i mpa cts on ground a nd s urfa ce wa ter;
Other 3
(i i i ) potena l hea l th ha rms , envi ronmental ha rms , a nd nega ve communi ty i mpa cts
Figure 1. (a) Hydraulic fracturing resolutions that came to vote: 2010–2016. Colors of bars in 1a cor-
respond to the model requests in 1b. Percentages represent vote shares. (b) Model resolution
requests, with sample resolved clauses.
clauses modeled on only four different types of requests, and half of those
followed a single model resolution. These were the disclosure of general haz-
ards to air, water, and soil (22), strategies above and beyond government pol-
icy to address adverse environmental and community impacts (10), disclosure
of risks to finance and operations from community concerns and regulatory
impacts (8), and the development of qualitative and quantitative measures to
address community and environmental risk (4). The other 10 resolutions
addressed: strategies above and beyond government policy to address adverse
water and community impacts (3), strategies to address adverse impacts on
ground and surface water (2), disclosure and reduction of toxic chemicals (2),
reporting on environment and public health (1), impacts of HF on urban
areas (1), and appointment of a director with environmental expertise (1)
(see Figure 1(b) for model resolve clauses for the 28 resolutions that went to
a vote).
Using model resolutions helps to coordinate and align the actions of dis-
crete shareholder advocates, and propels action beyond individual firm-level
advocacy to broader industry, or ‘field’-level pressure. By forwarding similar
demands to multiple companies operating in the HF realm, shareholders can
push the sector towards harmonized reporting and governance outcomes.
Such strategic action enables smaller shareholders to benefit from the power
of their upstream position in the commodity chain by minimizing the admin-
istrative costs of developing their own resolution requests.
5. Conclusions
Corporations remain a contested space in global governance. Gourevitch and
Shinn (2006)’s examination of cross-national variation in corporate govern-
ance attributes outcomes to differing coalitions among workers, managers,
and owners, while Pinto, Weymouth, and Gourevitch (2010) link political
partisanship with shareholder protection levels. Our work adds to this IPE lit-
erature by examining the contested and heterogeneous identities of share-
holders. Given the documented power of corporations in shaping state
22 K. J. NEVILLE ET AL.
policies on climate change (Newell & Paterson, 1998), and the significance of
the relationships between state leaders and corporate executives in determin-
ing decisions about security and energy production (Nitzan & Bichler, 1995),
a shift in internal corporate governance could be significant in altering energy
and environmental outcomes.
Through our assessment of HF-focused resolutions, we address core ques-
tions about the opportunities provided to SRI shareholders by the trends of
distance, upstreamed power, and financialization in commodity chains. The
distance embedded in financialized corporate structures—where individuals
delegate investment authority to asset managers and pension funds—has both
benefits and drawbacks. Delegation allows for some coordinated filing activity
by expert managers, with strong ties to multiple networks, deep knowledge of
corporate governance and financial systems, and the ability to reduce costs of
filing activities through shared model resolutions and strategic planning.
While HF resolutions have not gained majority support from shareholders,
some have come close (Energen in 2011, as seen in Figure 1), and many have
been withdrawn as a result of corporate commitments. These outcomes sug-
gest the significance of these resolutions outweighs their ballot support. More
generally, resolutions calling for disclosures of climate risk and emissions of
greenhouse gases, including methane, have gained increasing popularity
among investors, with key successes in 2016 and 2017 pointing to the wider
recognition of environmental issues and climate change as material financial
risk considerations.
However, shareholder advocates vary widely, and the goals of these groups
and networks are uneven. A vast number of individual shareholders may
have no knowledge of the companies in which they are invested or the activ-
ities being forwarded on their behalf. This can limit the social mobilization
potential that might otherwise be present from such a large collective of
potentially concerned and active investors. Shareholder SRI networks counter
the distance in commodity chains by embedding concerns about the places
and people involved in production into investment decisions. Nonetheless,
the limited engagement of a large body of investors, including some institu-
tions with the greatest impact on the vote outcome, dilutes the potential of
investment strategies for wider transformation of corporate—and
energy—governance.
Our findings confirm the growing understanding in the shareholder advo-
cacy literature of resolutions as part of wider social movements, and further
these insights through our examination of adaptive repertoires of contention
within firms. As HF resolutions lost traction, shareholders switched tactics.
Increasingly, shareholders have forwarded methane and proxy access resolu-
tions. The latter shifts resolutions away from specific environmental and
social claims to wider corporate accountability and governance concerns,
thereby increasing the scope of shareholder support—in part, by appealing to
the governance concerns of proxy advisory firms. Naming directors with cli-
mate or other environmental and social expertise to boards of directors may
begin to close the distance between investment, corporate governance, and
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 23
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
3. Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) document private ownership and private
control of US petroleum resources; this is in contrast to other countries where
petroleum resources are usually owned and controlled by the state.
24 K. J. NEVILLE ET AL.
ORCID
Kate J. Neville http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2302-3769
Jennifer Baka http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3046-5039
Karen Bakker http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3522-0743
Erika S. Weinthal http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4117-6048
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