The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

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The Extractive Industries and Society

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/exis

Original article

The politics of extractive industry corporate practices: An anatomy of a

company-community conflict in Bangladesh
M. Omar Faruque
Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, 725 Spadina Avenue, Toronto, ON, M5S 2J4, Canada

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This article analyses a case of mining company-host community conflict in Bangladesh. It focuses on the cor-
Bangladesh porate strategies of a British mining company. The company and its allies framed it as a landmark foreign
Coal mining investment project and a vital project for Bangladesh’s energy security. Such a narrative fits a neoliberal policy
Corporate practice agenda, i.e. privatizing resource extraction and creating a favorable environment for export-oriented foreign
Social license to operate
investment projects. A coalition of local, national, and transnational activist groups challenged this dominant
Social movements
policy agenda and the coal mine project was contested for more than a decade (2005–2015). Eventually, the
project was shelved. Many existing studies on mining conflicts emphasize various exogenous factors, but this
article draws attention to corporate practices. I argue the underlying factors in the death of the Phulbari coal
project were rooted within the organizational culture of extractive industries, namely, the use of: 1) corporate
science to misrepresent risks; 2) corporate communication strategies to take advantage of a crisis; 3) rhetoric to
disregard the reality and glorify myths invented by the extractive industry. These factors resulted in the failure of
the mining company to earn either a social or a legal license to operate in Bangladesh.

1. Introduction
Natural resources are the blood in the country’s veins and the
driving force of the economy. It is our moral duty to expose the
conspiracies of the multinational companies. ... There is no material
reason for the movement. The compulsion is spiritual; it is our social
responsibility to rise up in protest [against any] plan to hand over
the country’s natural resources to multinational companies, com-
promising the interest of the people at large. (Islam, 2010: para-
graph # 4, 9)
In the above passage, a leading activist explains the roots of popular
struggles against multinational energy companies in Bangladesh. One is
a fight with a British mining company planning to develop a large open
pit coal mine in Phulbari, a densely populated agricultural area in the
northwest region of the country. This case of company-community
conflict is not unique. Similar conflicts are mentioned in the literature
on the extractive industry and its relationship with host communities in
the Global South (Horowitz and Watts, 2017; Deonandan and
Dougherty, 2016; Bebbington, 2012; Bebbington and Bury, 2013;
Jalbert et al., 2017). The literature notes that mining companies adopt
various corporate practices to minimize conflict in the host commu-
nities, convince policy actors to advance their interests, and discredit
their opponents (Horowitz, 2015; Rajak, 2011; Welker, 2014; Gardner,
2012; Kirsch, 2014). The objective of this article is to critically examine
the corporate strategies of the mining company behind the Phulbari
coal mine.
Company-community conflict in the Phulbari case has been studied
by several scholars (Bedi, 2015; Chowdhury, 2016; Faruque, 2017b;
Luthfa, 2015, 2017; Karim, 2016; Nuremowla, 2016). They have
carefully documented various aspects of this conflict by tracing the
response of local communities and state agencies, and the actions of an
organized anti-mining movement led by a coalition of local commu-
nities and their allies. Some have focused on the role of transnational
advocacy groups to support and strengthen the local campaign against
extractive capital, taking it beyond the national border of Bangladesh.
These studies have uncovered many significant issues, including the
rationale and dynamics of grassroots grievances, the influence of the
national political context, place-based memory and cultural identity,
and the role of radical anti-corporate political movements. However,
none has examined the conflict by paying close attention to the mining
company itself.
An exception is Bedi’s (2015) examination of the practices of cor-
porate claims-making to discredit other narratives. But Bedi was con-
cerned with a specific issue and highlighted the contradictions between
the human-rights centered narrative of the United Nations, which urged
the Bangladeshi government to halt the coal mine project and the CSR-
driven narrative of the mining company. Notwithstanding Bedi’s

E-mail address: o.faruque@mail.utoronto.ca.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.11.009
Received 8 April 2017; Received in revised form 17 November 2017; Accepted 17 November 2017
2214-790X/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Faruque, M.O., The Extractive Industries and Society (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.11.009
M.O. Faruque
Fig. 1. Dinajpur: The Phulbari Coal Mine.66
excellent analysis of the practices of corporate claims-making, we still
do not have a clear understanding of the strategies of mining cor-
porations to ‘manage’ company-community conflicts. This article will
fill this gap and contribute to existing scholarship by critically ex-
amining documents and practices of the mining company to understand
its failure in Bangladesh. More specifically, it asks how certain actions
of the mining company created a congenial environment to mobilize a
strong anti-mining movement.
Before moving to my arguments, a brief narrative on the empirical
case is warranted. The Phulbari coal mine is in Dinajpur district, a town
2
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near the India-Bangladesh border, 300 kilometers northwest of Dhaka
(Fig. 1). An Australian mining company, BHP, discovered it in 1997 but
decided not to develop it (Islam, 2008). A new company, Asia Energy
Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd (AEC), later acquired the project.
AEC, an Australian mining company, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a
British mining investment company, GCM Resources Plc.1 The
1
AEC, a new mining company formed in 1997 by two senior managers of BHP, is
registered in New South Wales, Australia. An Australian mining investment company
bought the majority of its share and entered into an agreement with a British mining
M.O. Faruque
Bangladeshi government approved the transfer in 1998.
AEC tried for ten years (2005–2015) to get government approval for
the Phulbari coal project. It planned to invest more than $2 billion to
produce 15 million tons of coal annually, of which 12 million tons
would be exported to neighboring Asian countries (GCM, 2010).2 Other
mining companies have failed to get government approval elsewhere,
but the Bangladeshi case is interesting for several reasons. Like all other
cases of mining projects in the Global South, when AEC arrived in
Bangladesh in 1998, it was welcomed by business elites; bureaucratic
and political elites wholeheartedly supported its agenda. International
financial institutions, aid agencies and diplomatic missions of several
Western countries, and Bangladeshi media praised its plan. Other spe-
cial interest groups, such as foreign investors’ groups and the Bangla-
desh chapter of the International Chamber of Commerce and Industries,
lobbied government officials in its favor.3 However, a counter-move-
ment, led by local communities and their allies (radical social move-
ments and like-minded civil society groups), turned things upside down
(see Faruque, 2017b). Their relentless activism (2005–2015) forced the
Bangladeshi government to gradually back down. Various scientific
studies commissioned by the government eventually established the
validity of the protesters’ claims and discredited ‘scientific’ claims of the
mining company.4
During its community consultation process in early 2005, AEC va-
guely5 informed local communities that it would build an open pit coal
mine if it received government approval. Without knowing much about
the project, the local communities were initially supportive. They
participated in AEC’s social surveys, but they slowly became concerned
with the project. They realized the open pit mine would destroy their
agricultural land and damage the environment, most notably under-
ground water resources, and they were unconvinced by the narratives
assuring them the coal mine would bring benefits (Das, 2009; Gain,
2007; Hashem, 2006; Muhammad, 2006). They turned against the
mining company and urged the Bangladeshi government to shelve the
project. In a petition to the Prime Minister, they demanded the can-
cellation of the coal mine project. It reads:
5-6 lakh6 people, who live in the proposed mine area, are spending
days in anxiety and panic. [AEC] is campaigning that the majority of
the people spontaneously support the coal mine project. We are
firmly declaring that it is not correct in any way. We are not against
the welfare of the country and nation. Our concern is: can we think
of the welfare [of the country] while standing in the tower of our
destruction? We believe you are not against hundreds of thousands
of helpless people. If the coal mine is developed, farmers will lose
agricultural land, people will become unemployed and jobless. [We
(footnote continued)
investment company to form a parent company named Asia Energy Plc in 2003. Asia
Energy Plc acquired AEC as its subsidiary and began share trading at AIM at London Stock
Exchange in 2004. AIM is a market for smaller growing companies. After police brutality
toward protesters in Phulbari on August 26, 2006, the company suspended its share
trading for few months and twice changed the name of the parent company. It is now
known as GCM Resources Plc, and its majority shares are owned by investment companies
including Polo Resources Ltd and Barclays Bank Plc. The Phulbari coal project is its only
business concern, but it has been on hold since August 2006. See Faruque (2016a)
Faruque (2016b) for a detailed analysis of the formation of this dubious mining company.
2
GCM (2010) is a set of webpages on various aspects of GCM’s subsidiary, AEC, and its
principal project in Bangladesh (the Phulbari coal mine). These pages were collected from
its website (http://www.phulbaricoal.com/) [accessed on 9 November 2010].
3
Based on the WikiLeaks cables, British newspaper The Guardian reported: ‘The US
ambassador to Dhaka … held talks with the country's chief energy adviser [in 2009],
urging him to approve plans by the British company Global Coal Management (GCM) to
begin open-cast coal mining in the country's Phulbari area. … [He] privately noted: ‘Asia
Energy, the company behind the Phulbari project, has sixty percent US investment’
(Karim, 2010).
4 11
EMRD provided (2006, 2012) two studies identifying the pitfalls in AEC’s feasibilities
studies.
5
The mining company did not circulate an easy-to-understand information sheet/
bulletin in local language during its community consultation process.
6
The numerical unit 1 lakh equals 100,000.
3
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believe] you will be with us against this coal mine because it will
cause damage to the environment, air, water, and forest resources.
We believe the foreign company will profit more from the open pit
mine than the country. Therefore, the earnest demand of the people
in the mine area is: we want to stay at our homes as it is; we do not
want a coal mine; we will give our lives, but not [our] parents’
cemetery; we will not let our dreams of a thousand years be de-
stroyed.7
For more than a year (April 2005-July 2006), their anti-mining
campaign received no response from the government or the mining
company. The silence of these two powerful forces led to a violent mass
uprising on August 26, 2006, where 50, 000 people participated in a
rally against the planned coal mine project (Gain, 2007). A violent
crackdown unleashed by government paramilitary forces created
mayhem in Phulbari. Three protesters were killed, and many were in-
jured (see Gain, 2007; Hashem, 2006).8 The combination of mass up-
rising and state violence forced the Bangladeshi government to accept9
all demands of the protesters and agree to suspend mining activities,
which were at a very early stage anyway, and cancel open pit coal
mining in Bangladesh (Muhammad, 2006).10
However, the mining company did not leave Bangladesh, optimistic
that the mine would go ahead because of Bangladesh’s perennial elec-
tricity crisis. Bangladesh’s electricity generation is less than the in-
creasing demands of a growing economy. Natural gas, the main source
of electricity, is in short supply, and regular power outages consistently
create a 2–3 percent loss in Bangladesh’s annual GDP (World Bank,
2016a). Policymakers had understandably hoped domestic coal pro-
duction could be a viable solution, a plan backed by business elites who
demanded a stable power supply. Even though open pit coal mining was
cancelled in 2006,11 the government12 seemed likely to change its
mind; the Energy Ministry designed a master plan in 2010, which
specified that by 2030, half the country’s electricity would be generated
by domestic primary energy, about 25 percent of which would be do-
mestic coal (GoB, 2011b). The Energy Ministry intensified efforts to
7
Representatives of local communities, the Phulbari Raksha Committee, sent this peti-
tion to the Prime Minister on June 18, 2005. This quotation is translated from the original
Bangla version.
8
This incident created a national political crisis. An oppositional political alliance led
by the BAL enforced a one-day countrywide hartal (strike). Student groups enforced an-
other one-day country-wide strike in educational institutions. There was a heated debate
in the national parliament; the Energy Minister and the opposition leader blamed each
other for the Phulbari crisis. Eminent citizens, human rights organization, political par-
ties, and civil society groups released press statements condemning the killing of pro-
testers and demanded punishment for those responsible (see various reports on this issue
published in The Daily Star from August 28 to September 17, 2006).
9
In addition to the fierce community resistance supported by an anti-corporate radical
social movement, the existing confrontational political context worked in the protesters’
favor. The BNP-led government did not want to give the BAL-led opposition parties an
opportunity to capitalize on the local turmoil and derail BNP’s plan to comfortably win
the next national elections slated for January 2007. Therefore, the BNP leader and the
Prime Minister quickly dispatched emissaries and put out the fire without realizing the
long-term impacts of the MOU signed with the protesters. The Economist Intelligence
Unit, a UK-based research and analysis division of The Economist termed this deal ‘a blow
to foreign investment prospects’ in Bangladesh (UNB, 2006).
10
The Bangladeshi government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with
the protesters on August 30, 2006. The first clause of the MOU: ‘All contracts with Asia
Energy [AEC] will be cancelled; Asia Energy will be withdrawn from four upazilas [sub-
district] including Phulbari and Bangladesh. Open pit coal mine will not be developed
anywhere in the country including above four upazilas. If any other method is used to
mine coal, it will be done based on people’s consent.’ The BAL-led opposition parties held
a rally in Phulbari and urged the BNP-led government to immediately implement the
MOU. Therefore, the MOU was ratified by two major political parties in Bangladesh.
Moreover, since the Bangladeshi government already implemented part of the MOU, a
retired judge of Bangladesh High Court suggested it had legal status as per Bangladesh’s
contract law (Rabbani, 2007).
As per the MOU signed between the Bangladeshi government and the protesters.
12
A new government led by the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) came to power in
early 2009. Although the leader of BAL (now the Prime Minister) supported the anti-
mining movement in Phulbari while she was in opposition party, she changed her mind
after assuming power.
M.O. Faruque
develop coal mines, and despite the 2006 setback, from 2007 to 2013,
the government and the mining company worked together to begin
mining in Phulbari.13
Once again, the government backed off. The relentless pressure of
grassroots anti-mining activists and their urban allies persuaded it to
gradually acknowledge the validity of the claims against the coal pro-
ject. This policy shift began in 2014, when the Prime Minister, who also
held the energy portfolio, decided to move away from open pit coal
mining to protect precious farm land and water resources: ‘First, the
farmers’ land must be protected. After this, we will decide what we
want to do. We want to keep coal extraction for the future’ (Bdnews,
2014: Paragraph #8). The policy shift was also rooted in the govern-
ment’s plans to reduce rural poverty by growing the economy through
advances in agriculture.14 The Prime Minister instructed the Energy
Ministry to prepare a new energy plan to protect agricultural land (BBC
Bangla, 2014).15
Taking a U-turn from its earlier policy position supporting AEC’s
project,16 the Bangladeshi government made two critical decisions in
2015–2016. First, it decided the feasibility study of the mining com-
pany was unacceptable (Ahsan, 2015). Earlier, two expert committees
had found it incomplete, saying the mining company neglected some
critical issues such as large-scale population displacement and the loss
of agriculture and environmental damage (EMRD, 2006; EMRD, 2012).
The Energy Ministry engaged the Geological Survey of Bangladesh to
conduct a new feasibility study (EMRD, 2016). Second, the government
decided to ban17 open pit mining as it was not economically or tech-
nically feasible in Bangladeshi coal fields (Jahangir, 2016).18 Although
these policy changes suggest the death of the Phulbari coal project, AEC
remains hopeful. In its recent annual report, the mining company says it
expects to get government approval (GCM, 2016). Given the govern-
ment’s waffling over the project, the company may well be correct.
Against this backdrop, this article explores a significant empirical
puzzle: bureaucratic and political elites strongly supported the mining
company, but the project did not move ahead. My overarching research
question is: why did the mining company fail to get government approval
even though its feasibility study to begin mining was accepted by the
Asian Development Bank and many government officials supported it?
Without discounting the role of the anti-mining mobilization by local
communities, national activists, civil society groups, and transnational
advocacy groups in persuading the Bangladeshi government to abandon
the Phulbari coal project,19 I turn my attention to corporate practices i.e.
the actions of the mining company.20 Drawing on a careful reading of its
13
Eventually the Bangladeshi government backed down. A new master plan unveiled
in June 2016 envisioned increasing electricity production by using imported coal (GoB,
2016).
14
In a recent study, the World Bank (2016b) confirmed agriculture is a key driver in
reducing poverty in Bangladesh.
15
In fact, she expressed her preference to keep coal underground at a meeting with the
Bangladesh Engineers’ Institute in 2012. She said her government would keep coal for
future generations; she expected new technology would be developed to allow coal ex-
traction without harming the land or environment (Prothom Alo, 2012).
16
In its Sixth Five Year Plan (2011–2015), the Bangladeshi government identified
three actions for strengthening domestic coal production. One was: ‘Building up mass
awareness regarding the extraction procedure of coal especially for the open extraction
method’ (GoB, 2011a:154).
17
Earlier the Energy Ministry appointed an international consultant to study the fea-
sibility of open pit mining in northern part of Barapukuria, near Phulbari. The pre-
liminary findings recommended that this method of mining was not suitable in
Barapukuria or Phulbari coal fields for economic and environmental reasons. In a new
feasibility study of the Phulbari coal mine in 2015–2016, Geological Survey of
Bangladesh (GSB) confirmed that for environmental and economic reasons, open pit
mining was not suitable in Phulbari (EMRD, 2016:109-111).
18
These policy changes notwithstanding, both local and national anti-mining activists
remain vigilant; they do not trust the actions of the Energy Ministry. Until the Energy
Ministry nullifies its agreement with the mining company, the case is open.
19
Other scholars, as mentioned above, have adequately examined these aspects.
20
This will supplement existing scholarship on the Phulbari movement and offer a
nuanced understanding of the demise of the Phulbari coal mine.
4
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documents21 and reports of two expert committees22 commissioned by
the Bangladeshi government, I argue three factors caused the death of the
project. These were the use of: 1) corporate science to misrepresent risks
of open pit coal mining; 2) contradictory corporate communication
strategies to take advantage of a crisis; and 3) rhetoric to disregard the
reality and glorify myths invented by the mining company. Because the
mining company opted for these corporate practices, it eventually alie-
nated many ardent supporters, including influential business elites23
when many of these practices were critically diagnosed by local experts
and widely publicized by its opponents. The outcome is its failure to
secure a ‘social license to operate’ in Bangladesh. By emphasizing these
claims, this article adds a new dimension to existing scholarship on
popular protests and resource conflicts in Bangladesh by examining
corporate practices in extractive industries. It shows that AEC’s corporate
practices were part of a standard organizational culture of extractive
industries. However, unlike other cases where mining companies man-
aged to sell their ideas, and bureaucratic and political elites comfortably
accepted them for economic and political reasons, AEC failed miserably.
In the Bangladeshi context or at least in the case of the Phulbari conflict,
standard corporate practices of extractive industries failed to achieve
desired corporate goals.
This is a qualitative study. I used various primary sources for em-
pirical information. First, I conducted open-ended in-depth interviews
with local people (peasants, agricultural laborers, elected re-
presentatives, community elites), activists associated with local and
national movements, and several energy experts.24 During my field-
work in 2009–2013, I participated in various protest events to observe
the dynamics of local and national mobilization.25 Second, I closely
examined a series of documents of the mining company and govern-
ment agencies available for public use. Finally, I used newspaper re-
ports on coal mining in Bangladesh published in local and national
newspapers during 2004–2016.
The article is organized in four sections. I begin with a review of
selected literature on mining conflicts in the Global South to put the
Bangladeshi case into a broader perspective. Section two presents the
arguments for and against the Phulbari coal mine, with close attention
to the political economy of resource extraction in Bangladesh. Section
three critically analyses selected documents of the mining company to
emphasize its erroneous justification of various corporate strategies. I
compare its arguments with those of activists, independent experts, and
government-commissioned expert committees. I show how standard
corporate practices of extractive industries can undermine their efforts
to gain a ‘social license to operate’ in the host country. Section four
connects this empirical analysis to recent critical scholarship on ex-
tractive industry corporate practices.
2. Extractive industry and company-community conflict in the
global south
Resource extraction is a contentious political issue in many coun-
tries in the Global South (Deonandan and Dougherty, 2016). The
21
This includes volumes of feasibility studies on various aspects of the Phulbari coal
mine and AEC’s communication materials (information sheet, brochure, advertisements,
annual reports).
22
EMRD, 2006; EMRD, 2012.
23
For example: ‘FBCCI urges govt. to renegotiate deal with Asia Energy’; ‘Top business
leaders oppose Phulbari deals with Asia Energy, demand fresh deal’ (Bdnews, 2006b,
2006c).
24
During 2009–2013, I visited Phulbari and Dhaka three times and conducted 72
interviews. I also conducted several follow-up interviews by phone during 2014–2015.
Interviews of national-level activists were long (averaging two hours) and those of local-
level activists and community people in Phulbari were short (averaging one hour). In this
article, I used minimum materials from my interviews. I mostly relied on selected
documents of the mining company and various agencies of the Energy Ministry of
Bangladesh.
25
Officials of Bangladesh’s Energy Ministry and the mining company declined to be
interviewed. Therefore, I used media interviews of their officials.
M.O. Faruque
phenomenal growth of demand for mineral resources in emerging
economies such as China and India have pushed multinational mining
companies to explore new investment opportunities (Haarstad, 2012).
At the same time, the hegemony of market-based policies to privatize
and liberalize resource extraction in these countries has led to the
emergence of multi-scalar social movements contesting these neoliberal
policies within the framework of democracy, citizenship, and territorial
sovereignty of indigenous peoples (Bebbington, 2012; Bebbington and
Bury, 2013). Recent social science scholarship on these social move-
ments considers dispossession, environmental damage, the political
economy of development, and state-corporation alliances.
Simply stated, struggles over the extraction of mineral resources are
shaped by two opposing economic principles of resource governance:
market economy versus resource sovereignty (McNeish et al., 2015).
The former is the mantra of transnational capital and neoliberal state
and ruling elites, who adopt a technocratic rational-actor model; the
latter is often the most important political slogan of social movements
opposing neoliberal policies. They articulate a more complex political
economy perspective on resource development. The debate over na-
tionalization versus privatization of resource extraction often reflects
these conflicting views (see Petras and Veltmeyer, 2014).
Many social struggles over resource extraction stem from conflicting
understandings of resources and places to different actors. Elites (local
and transnational capital and the state) and social movements do not
share the same meanings in resource-rich territories. In most cases, the
ideas of the former are opposed to those of the latter. For example,
many anti-mining social movements conceptualize places in both a
material and a symbolic sense. Places are material sites, as they are
sources of people’s livelihoods; places are also sites of memory and
identity (Aguilar-Stoen, 2015; Bebbington and Bury 2013; Kirsch 2006;
Kumar 2014). In contrast, the discourses of local elites and transna-
tional mining companies focus on short-term economic gain. For them,
there should be no obstacle to the free flow of capital and commodities.
When neoliberal states in the Global South take the side of transna-
tional capital in the name of economic growth, conflict is the inevitable
result. The conflict is exacerbated by an asymmetric power relationship
between the two assemblages (capital and the state versus peasant and
indigenous communities and their translocal allies).
Anti-mining politics goes beyond place-based social struggles (as
mentioned above), with many local movements building a broader
political base and contesting the dominant paradigm of neoliberal de-
velopment (Nem Singh and Camba, 2016). That said, anti-mining
movements are not homogenous in their claims-making or political
strategies. Some, mostly led by NGOs, can be considered ‘reformists;’
they prefer to negotiate with capital and the state and invoke justice-
based claims to ensure fair compensation for host communities affected
by environmental damage and social and economic disruptions. Others
have a more radical and anti-capitalist understanding of the role of
foreign capital in the Global South.
The outcomes of the two types of mobilizations are mixed. As Nem
Singh and Camba (2016) show, anti-mining activists in the Philippines
have failed to have a tangible impact on national policy discourses, as
both reformist and radical opponents are politically marginalized
groups. In contrast, in Latin American countries, particularly in Andean
societies, indigenous communities and new social movements have
‘successfully mobilized, and campaigned for substantive rights, terri-
tory, and inclusion, as well as a greater share of extraction revenues’,
forcing states to move away from a neoliberal resource policy and enter
a ‘post-neoliberal era’ of resource governance (Haarstad, 2012:1). To
what extent these transformations have benefitted marginalized pea-
sant and indigenous communities is questionable, however, and some
scholars see the continuation of neoliberal policy regimes within the
‘post-neoliberal’ modes of resource governance (Petras and Veltmeyer,
2014).
In many places in the Global South, the unequal share of resources
generates conflict over resource extraction. In her ethnographic study
5
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
of friction over a resource development project in Bangladesh, Gardner
(2012) shows that a large proportion of the profit goes to transnational
energy companies. In Gardner’s view, the contentious issue is the role of
transnational energy companies in promoting or hindering economic
development in the Global South. Social movements opposing neo-
liberal policies claim that ‘foreign companies profit from natural re-
sources at the expense of national interests’ (Gardner, 2012:24).
Research on mining conflicts shows that weak institutions, dimin-
ished regulatory capacities, and corruption involving foreign invest-
ment projects are the most important aspects of these conflicts in many
developing countries (Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2016). The im-
plementation of the structural adjustment policies of Bretton Woods
Institutions, which favour large mining projects owned by foreign in-
vestors, in areas where marginalized indigenous communities are pu-
shed out with no alternative livelihood prospects, has exacerbated these
conflicts (Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007). Abundant literature on ex-
tractive capital and indigenous communities shows that the state-MNC
alliance, within the framework of the neoliberal economy, increases the
interests of extractive industries and curtails indigenous people’s rights
and, in the long term, fails to generate significant socio-economic
changes in affected communities (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012; Hilson
2010; Gilberthorpe and Hilson 2014).
Fabiana Li’s (2015) research on mining conflicts in Peru finds a lack
of consensus among opposing actors on the nature of the social, cul-
tural, and environmental effects of mining. Opposing groups perceive
the impact of mining differently than mining companies and state
agencies. Their analysis of the perceived risks is entirely different. Li
argues, ‘As mining technologies transformed, severed, or realigned re-
lationship between people and the landscape, the “environment”’
emerged as an increasingly contested terrain of political action’
(2015:20–21). Although experts hired by mining companies attempt to
make their operations-related matters transparent, Li suggests that the
knowledge-making process renders ‘other things invisible’ (2015:23).
Through their technocratic and economic languages, the experts render
invisible other issues such as land-based relationships, culture, or his-
torical memories. Li’s study shows that struggles over resource extrac-
tion also involve contested science and knowledge. Mining corporations
invoke the rationality of commensurate payment, using science to put
an economic value on each resource that might be affected by their
operations. Instead of placating communities, this generates conflict.
Local people contest the technical knowledge of mining companies,
seeing the social and environmental risks differently and assigning a
different value to them.
Moving beyond this micro-level analysis of resource conflicts, James
Ferguson (2006) focuses on the macro-dynamics of resource conflict,
particularly the role of international financial institutions in their pro-
motion of foreign investments in the Global South. Countries are beg-
ging for foreign investment because, in the language of ‘scientific ca-
pitalism,’ it yields high rates of economic growth (Ferguson, 2006).
Ferguson shows that foreign investment in mineral resource extraction
generally offers little benefit to the wider society. In several African
countries, for example, these investment projects are ‘in capital-in-
tensive enclaves that are substantially insulated from the local
economy’ (2006:35). Economic growth and social development are the
most common logics used by international financial institutions, busi-
ness elites, and politicians to legitimize large resource extraction pro-
jects run by foreign private investment. To demystify these, Ferguson
cites a World Bank report on Ghana which shows that massive foreign
investment produced few economic benefits. Given the tax incentives,
Ghana gained little revenue generation. Nor did these capital-intensive
and technology-driven projects improve unemployment.
Besides making a false promise of local economic development,
foreign investment in mineral extraction results in ‘colonial rule’ in
many resource-rich countries, particularly in Africa (Butler, 2015).
Drawing on a rich ethnographic study on Canadian mining in con-
temporary Africa, Butler argues, ‘Canada is exercising political and
M.O. Faruque
economic force in various African countries to obtain privileged access
to lucrative minerals and metals at the expense of African populations’
self-determination and development opportunities’ (2015:59).
Struggles over resource extraction often involve host states and
multinational corporations as opposing entities. With mounting pres-
sure from myriad forms of movements from below, some countries in
the Global South have changed laws and policies to protect the rights of
citizens whose livelihoods are threatened by destructive extraction
practices. For example, Costa Rica and El Salvador implemented legal
reforms to ban open pit gold mining (Broad and Cavanagh, 2015).
However, transnational mining companies struck back, using their
power to circumvent national sovereignty through capital-friendly in-
vestment agreements championed by comprador ruling elites and in-
ternational financial institutions, such as the World Bank, which runs a
private court (ICSID) for transnational corporations to settle their dis-
putes with nation-states. For example, a Canadian mining company
challenged the sovereign power of El Salvador when the country im-
plemented a moratorium on gold mining because it caused severe da-
mage to water, land, and the livelihood of peasant communities de-
pendent on those resources (Broad and Cavanagh, 2015).26
Social science scholarship on social struggles over resource extrac-
tion suggests that as capitalist investments expand to extract new
commodities, new forces emerge to challenge its pace.Polanyi’s seminal
work (2001) offers possibly the best explanation of the emergence of
these new forces. His theory of ‘double movement’ refers to a situation
where capitalist commodification of what he calls ‘fictitious commod-
ities’ (e.g. land, labour, money) is challenged by myriad forms of re-
sistance to protect society from the intrusion of market forces. Echoing
Polanyian views, Bebbington and Bury suggest that ‘[the] extraction of
minerals and hydrocarbons seems to be particularly significant in the
formation, deepening, and radicalization of [various political] iden-
tities’ (2013:6).
3. Phulbari coal mine: friction over resource extraction
As mentioned earlier, BHP discovered the Phulbari coal mine in
1997. When it signed an agreement with the Bangladeshi government,
it planned to develop an open pit coal mine and negotiated a very lu-
crative deal (Rahman, 2008). BHP later changed its plan. According to a
BHP consultant, the mining company decided not to develop the mine
because the depth of coal was not suitable for open pit mining (Islam,
2008). A new mining company, AEC, acquired the project in 1998.
Initially, it hoped to build a small open pit mine to meet the country’s
domestic needs of coal.27 AEC changed its plan28in 2003 for two rea-
sons: the rapid increase in the price of coal in the international market
and the high demand for coal in India and other Asian markets (AEC,
2004b). It conducted a feasibility study and submitted a mine devel-
opment scheme for government approval in October 2005 (AEC,
2005a).
AEC argued the coal mine would significantly contribute to regional
and national economic growth. According to its economic estimates, the
mine would add one percent to Bangladesh’s annual GDP, and it would
transform the regional economy from agriculture-dependent to in-
dustrial (AEC, 2005a, 2006a). AEC suggested that the mine would ‘ra-
dically improve the social and economic well-being of the local, re-
gional and national community of Bangladesh’ (AEC, 2006b:8).
26
After a prolonged legal battle, the Government of El Salvador won the case and
ICSID ruled against the Canadian mining company. The New York Times reports that ‘The
ruling was a relief to the Salvadoran government, which faced a demand for $314 million
in compensation from Pac Rim Cayman for the loss of expected profits from the mining
venture’ (Malkin., 2016).
27
It planned to produce nine million tons of coal annually. Six million tons would be
used to generate electricity, and three million tons would be used by other domestic
sectors such as brick kilns makers.
28
AEC increased its production target from 9 million to 15 million tons and decided to
export 80 percent (12 million tons) to neighboring Asian markets, particularly to India.
6
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Although its economic estimates were not evaluated by any in-
dependent expert, the mining company claimed the project would
generate tremendous economic outcomes, including local job growth in
different types of industries. A critical aspect of its economic projection
was the enormous financial gain for the Bangladeshi government
without requiring it to make any investment. The company also argued
the coal mine would not entail environmental, social, or economic risks
(AEC, 2006a). It portrayed the project as win–win for the mining
company and the government. Bangladeshi policymakers and political
and economic elites largely agreed with this growth-oriented narrative.
At the time, a top official of the Energy Ministry said: ‘The Phulbari
[coal mine] project will bring a great momentum in the economic life in
the industrially backward northern region and create employment for
thousands of people’ (UNB, 2005: Paragraph#13).
However, the narrative of the mining company failed to convince
local communities and their urban allies (Das, 2009; Gain, 2007; NCBD,
2005). When the mining company conducted socio-economic and de-
mographic surveys, local people voluntarily participated. They were
expecting an underground coal mine like the nearby Barapukuria coal
mine.29 According to local people I interviewed, the confusion arose
from the fact that the mining company did not disclose adequate project
related information.30 When they discovered the reality,31 they turned
against the mining company and joined the anti-mining movement.
During my fieldwork, many people whom I interviewed claimed the
mining company officials failed to address their concerns, and they
were not convinced an open pit coal mine would benefit local people.
The leader of an indigenous community (adivasi people) said:
They [mining company staff] came to our village several times. They
discussed many aspects of coal mine such as its benefits and what
local people would get etc. We did not understand many of those
issues. However, one thing we clearly understood. The mining
company would evict us from our ancestral land. We would lose our
land and other resources. Whenever they came, we said: NO. We
never agreed to their plans. Each time they came to consult with us,
we said: NO.32
As local people saw it, the mining company would displace people,
destroy land and the environment, and disrupt community relations.
The loss of land and livelihood and ancestral ties were two significant
aspects of the grassroots grievances, largely because they could neither
be replaced nor compensated. The mining company publicized an ex-
tensive plan to offer adequate compensation for land and other re-
sources. It also designed a resettlement plan. But the local people I
interviewed found these plans unsatisfactory. Mining and resettlement
experts and advocacy groups also found many holes in the displacement
and resettlement plan (Kalafut and Moody, 2008). It is important to
emphasize that local people did not want more money and better re-
settlement facilities. Their arguments rejected the rationality of com-
mensuration and the logic of equivalence. The compensation formula,
29
Discovered by the Geological Survey of Bangladesh (GSB) in 1985, the Barapukuria
coal mine is adjacent to the Phulbari coal mine. A state-owned mining company, BCMCL,
hired a Chinese mining company to design and construct an underground mine and
produce coal. It began commercial coal production in September 2005. See Imam (2013)
for a detailed analysis of mining method and other relevant aspects of the Barapukuria
coal mine.
30
During this time, the mining company only distributed English-language bulletins;
there was no information center in the project site. Some bulletins included a contact
address for the consultants (located in Dhaka) hired to conduct socio-economic studies. Its
first project information bulletin in the local language (Bengali) was distributed at the end
of its survey period (July 2005), and a project information center was opened in Phulbari.
31
A leftist activist group involved with peasant mobilizations in the region collected
detailed information about the project and the company behind it. From their Marxist
point of view, the mineral resource project of a foreign private company was an attempt
to plunder precious resources of a poor country. They organized a mass rally in Phulbari
on April 16, 2005 (the first protest event) and urged local people to mobilize. Also see
Bablu (2005).
32
Interview conducted in Phulbari in January 2013.
M.O. Faruque
i.e. putting a price on everything a household possesses, made no sense
to them. They questioned the logic of quantifying the unquantifiable.
For those whose livelihood was dependent on land, the permanence of
land could not be quantified by a mathematical formula. Nor would
financial compensation allow them to buy similar land elsewhere in a
land-scarce country like Bangladesh.
The symbolic meaning of land was no less significant. Identity,
culture, and community are attached to land-related practices. These
issues repeatedly emerged during my interviews. The loss of ancestral
ties was an emotional issue beyond the boundaries of rational thought.
The mining company and its supporters either ignored or did not an-
ticipate the complex land-based culture in Phulbari. The following two
quotations reflect these diverse and complex issues. A well-off farmer, a
grassroots organizer of the anti-mining movement, argued:
I have X amount of land. I cultivate those lands. I also have an ir-
rigation facility and I sell water during Boro season. I make enough
money by running this irrigation facility and selling surplus crops
each year. I inherited this land from my father who inherited it from
his father. My kids will inherit it from me; they will continue cul-
tivating these lands. The use of these lands will never end. How can
the mining company compensate me for these lands? How much
money they will offer me? How they will calculate the price of land
which will remain productive until the destruction of earth?33
And an elderly woman commented bitterly:
If we are displaced from our home and land, we will not be able to
live with our neighbors and community in one place. All will be
scattered in different places and we will lose our kinship relations.
Just think how long it took to establish this community and to make
a relationship of fellow-feeling. In our communities, people of dif-
ferent religions maintain a harmonious living environment. It took
decades to build such as a trustworthy relationship. If we are dis-
placed from this community and the mining company resettles us in
various places, it will take the rest of our lives to make community
relations like this one in a new place. By that time, our lives and our
existence will come to an end.34
Instead of addressing these complex issues, the mining company
used simplistic economic logic. It garnered the support of political and
business elites by highlighting the project’s future economic contribu-
tions, and it framed the mine as the only viable option for a long-term
solution of Bangladesh’s electricity crisis. Its economic logic did not
withstand rigorous scrutiny, however. For example, an expert com-
mittee appointed by the Energy Ministry did not find its economic
projections convincing. The committee found the mining company ex-
aggerated project benefits and minimized the risks (EMRD, 2006). Six
years later, another expert committee concluded that the project would
benefit only the mining company (EMRD, 2012).
The conflict over the Phulbari coal mine featured two antagonistic
groups with different views about the politics of resource extraction and
energy security. One group mobilized support for the mining company
and the other mobilized fierce opposition to it. The former included the
Bangladeshi government, international financial institutions (Asian
Development Bank), aid agencies and diplomatic mission of various
Western countries (UK, USA, Germany, Australia), UN organizations
(UNDP), special interest groups of foreign corporate capital in
Bangladesh (American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Foreign
Investor’s Chamber), and local business elites (the Federation of
Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, FBCCI). Their neo-
liberal economic agenda emphasized the liberalization of trade and fi-
nance, the minimal role of the state, increased power and authority of
private capital, and export-oriented economic policy. They supported
33
Interview conducted in Phulbari in July 2009.
34
Interview conducted in Phulbari in August 2009.
7
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
the mining company for two reasons. First, its business included a
‘landmark’ foreign investment project, and this, in turn, would lead to
economic growth and development. Second, the mining company
wanted to make Bangladesh a coal exporting country; this would turn a
peripheral economy into a regional leader. The latter group featured
several subaltern actors.35 It included local community groups,36 their
urban allies,37 and several civil society organizations.38 Although they
had diverse views on resource extraction and energy security, they
stood behind three key demands: no open pit mining, no foreign com-
pany, and no export of mineral resources (see NCBD, 2005; Bablu
2005).
These three demands39 combined local and national concerns to
oppose ‘neoliberal rationality’ as a key premise of resource extraction
and development.40 Activists advocated for national resource policies,
calling for increased national capacity building for self-reliant resource
development. They opposed an export-led resource development
policy, advocating more not less state control over resource extraction.
For these actors, privatization of resource extraction was an ‘anti-
people’ economic strategy preferred by those wanting a neoliberal
economic doctrine in the Global South (see Shaheedullah, 2009;
Muhammad, 2014). In their view, mineral resources were strategic
resources of a country, and control over these resources (i.e., energy
sovereignty) was necessary to maintain the political sovereignty of a
peripheral country in an era of neoliberal global capitalism (see NCBD,
2009; Mustafa et al., 2010; GA, 2013). In other words, their views si-
tuated local concerns at the center of a broader anti-corporate struggle
against neoliberal global capitalism in the Global South.
4. Extractive industry corporate strategies: myth and reality
I mentioned earlier that the strategic choices adopted by the mining
company were standard corporate practices of extractive industries. To
develop a nuanced understanding of the demise of the Phulbari coal mine
project, it is necessary to take a closer look at them. Drawing on a reading
of a set of mining company documents, I argue certain issues created
pitfalls for the mining company. Opponents pounced on and repackaged
those issues. The mining company could not recover from the relentless
critique supported by credible scientific analyses by independent ex-
perts.,41 In my view, the strategic choices of the mining company can be
blamed for its failure to gain a ‘social license to operate’ in Phulbari. Its
use of corporate science provided opponents an opportunity to discredit
it, and the Bangladeshi government eventually agreed.
The two principal strategies adopted by the mining company that I
discuss here were its use of corporate science and communication
rhetoric. Corporate science, as Kirsch (2014) points out, does not offer a
full scenario of the pros and cons of a mining project. It presents dis-
torted scientific findings that conform to corporate interests. Commu-
nication rhetoric, as Schneider et al. (2016) show, aims to control
public opinion. Carefully crafted communication materials and media
campaigns involving journalists and paid experts with a credible public
image present only positive messages and hide negative issues. To il-
lustrate this, I use an advertisement of the mining company (Fig. 2)42 as
35
Here I conceptualize subaltern in a loose sense to denote those actors with less
power than those in the movement from above who can influence policymaking.
36
The Phulbari Raksha Committee and other local civil society groups.
37
A Dhaka-based radical social movement organization, the National Committee to
Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Port (NCBD).
38
Such as Bangladesh Economic Association, Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon,
Bangladesh Environment Network, Jatiya Adivasi Parishad, and Bangladesh Adivasi
Forum.
39
See Faruque (2017b) for a sociological analysis of the movement. For other relevant
scholarly work on this issue, see Chowdhury (2016) and Luthfa (2017).
40
See Faruque (2017a) for a detailed analysis of this aspect of popular struggles
against privatized resource extraction in Bangladesh.
41
I have drawn on my interviews with activists and energy experts to highlight the
pitfalls of the corporate strategies deployed by the mining company.
M.O. Faruque
Fig. 2. ‘Our Commitment’: an advertisement of the Mining Company.67
my point of departure before going on to critically examine relevant
documents of the mining company to expose their creation of a cor-
porate mythology that was quickly debunked by experts and locals
alike. The figure includes five broad categories and 23 sub-categories,
all highlighting AEC’s ‘commitment to deliver project benefits.’ These
broad categories are: 1) helping resolve the energy crisis; 2) con-
tributing to national and regional growth; 3) meeting national and in-
ternational standards; 4) sustainable environmental management; and
5) responsible management of social impacts.
The first aspect of AEC’s corporate strategy that ultimately wea-
kened it was changing its business plan and devising a communication
rhetoric to hide the changes. The strategy also created a gap between its
scientific studies and communication materials. As a comparative
analysis of company documents makes clear, the mining company in-
itially planned to build a small open pit coal mine to produce coal for
domestic use only. It quickly turned to an export-oriented business plan
to export coal to international markets in the commodity boom of the
mid-2000s. During a presentation to prospective investors in London,
the mining company highlighted its lucrative contract with the
Bangladeshi government, assuring them that the mine would be ex-
tremely profitable because the company could export coal without
paying export tax (AEC, 2004a). This argument was missing in its
public relation materials, however, as these sought to create the im-
pression that the principal objective of the Phulbari coal mine was to
supply primary energy for solving Bangladesh’s electricity crisis. My
interlocutors (both local and national) said the media turned a blind eye
to the discrepancy; the newspaper reports of 2004–2016 show they
were correct − the media glorified the mine as a landmark foreign
investment project.43 In short, the company tailored its reports for its
different audiences, whether investors, policymakers, or local people −
42
This advertisement succinctly offers a narrative of AEC’s project benefits.
43
AEC partnered with Bangladesh Energy Reporters’ Association and organized a
series of workshops to train its members and other journalists in coal reporting. Their
reports on coal mining in Bangladesh repeated the points made by the mining company.
8
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
in some cases, this worked but in others it did not, and critics quickly
noted the attempts to mislead.
Second, the debate over the suitability of open pit mining in
northern Bangladesh had been resolved in the early 1990s, in the case
of the Barapukuria mine, but the mining company ignored previous
conclusions. When the Bangladeshi government decided to develop a
coal mine in Barapukuria, it appointed a British consulting firm
(Wardell Armstrong) to conduct a feasibility study and determine the
appropriate mining method. The consultant recommended an under-
ground mine, not an open pit. The Bangladeshi government sought the
expert opinion of other international consulting firms; some suggested
open pit mining would be better, while others supported the British
firm. The government accepted the recommendation of the British firm
and engaged a Chinese mining company, as a contractor, to develop the
Barapukuria underground coal mine (Imam, 2013). Barapukuria and
Phulbari coal mines have the same geological conditions. If open pit
mining is not suitable for Barapukuria, the company’s defense of open
pit mining in Phulbari immediately becomes suspect. Ignoring the
evidence of the government-appointed specialists, AEC argued that
their proposed mining method was determined after a rigorous scien-
tific study of geological conditions and other technical issues associated
with coal mining. Yet a former consultant of BHP, who has some inside
knowledge about the Phulbari coal project, mentioned that AEC ori-
ginally planned to develop a small underground mine (Islam, 2008).44
AEC changed its plan during 2003–2004 when coal prices increased
rapidly because of increased demands in Asian countries like China and
India − not because it cared about the suitability of the mining method.
Moreover, its environmental and social impact studies suggest that the
company picked the mining method with the best yearly production
rate, designed an appropriate investment plan, and conducted various
scientific studies to justify those choices. Profit not science determined
the mining method. In fact, one of its reports mentioned any option
other than open pit mining would not be a sustainable investment
strategy (AEC, 2006a). The obvious preference of profit over genuine
scientific analysis undermined the credibility of the company’s scien-
tific studies, and those studies failed to convince independent experts
working for the Energy Ministry (EMRD, 2006; EMRD, 2012). But long
before these expert opinions were made public, anti-mining activists
and their allies questioned the credibility of the company sponsored
scientific studies (Bablu, 2005; NCBD, 2005).45
Third, AEC deployed both scientific studies and communication
materials to create and popularize a manufactured myth about under-
ground coal mining. In those documents, the company claimed under-
ground mining would allow the extraction of only 15–20 percent or less
of the coal, much less than open pit mining. A senior manager of the
mining company said:
For the conditions of Phulbari and Barapukuria area, any under-
ground mining will hardly allow us to extract 10–20 percent of re-
sources compared to 95–100 percent by using open cast. At the same
time, safety-wise and mine management-wise, the underground is much
more complicated, expensive, and unsafe, whereas open cast is simple,
easily manageable, and almost no danger is associated with mining.46
But according to the World Coal Association47 75 percent can be
extracted using underground mining methods.48 AEC used the case of
Barapukuria coal mine to justify its decision not to use the underground
method; in fact, Barapukuria was having problems but they had nothing
44
Islam (2008) also says he had a copy of the original plan of AEC.
45
See Faruque (2016a) for a comparative analysis of two cases of mining conflict in
Canada and Bangladesh where credibility of company-sponsored scientific studies was the
key aspect of the conflicts.
46
This quotation is taken from the transcript of a documentary (Phulbari, The Coal
Capital of Bangladesh) made by AEC (emphasis added).
47
https://www.worldcoal.org/coal/coal-mining (accessed on 1 November 2017).
48
China, the largest producer of coal builds more underground mines than open pit
mines to protect farm lands. It produces 95 percent of its coal in underground mines.
M.O. Faruque
to do with the type of mining. Since the start of the project in the late
1990s, Bangladeshi media widely reported on this mine, highlighting
how corruption, cronyism, and mismanagement led to poor mining
design, no environmental protection, and low productivity (Daily Star,
2008). In short, AEC ignored the reality and manufactured and dis-
seminated a myth to justify its choice of open pit mining in Phulbari
(AEC, 2005c). This communication rhetoric worked so well that Ban-
gladeshi policymakers were convinced of the very low productivity of
underground coal mines (Daily Star, 2010), even though an expert
committee said a well-designed underground mining method would be
able to extract more than 70 percent of coal resources (EMRD, 2012).
Fourth, AEC used a German coal mine as a comparable exemplar to
strengthen its arguments for open pit mining in a densely populated
agricultural area in Bangladesh. The mining company argued that both
coal mines were in similar geological conditions suitable for open pit
mining. Since the German mining company, RWE, had successfully
managed mine-related social, cultural, and environmental issues, the
same could be done in Phulbari (AEC, 2006a).49 To make its case, the
mining company sponsored a German tour for ministers, senior officials
of the Energy Ministry, parliamentarians, and journalists.50 After the
German tour, a parliamentary committee on the Energy Ministry urged
the government to allow the mining company to go ahead with its
Phulbari project (Karmakar, 2011), and the Environment Minister,
whose visit was sponsored by the German government, submitted a
report favoring the mine (New Age, 2009). These efforts to sway the
Bangladeshi government failed. A junior minister in the Energy Min-
istry, despite being an ardent supporter of open pit coal mining, re-
jected the recommendations of those who had gone to Germany. He
visited several coal mines in different countries and observed major
differences in the geological conditions of Bangladesh. He was con-
vinced that open pit mining was not appropriate in Bangladesh as it
could not protect farmers’ land.51 Energy experts and environmentalists
also considered the German comparison a corporate strategy to con-
vince policymakers struggling to resolve the energy crisis and spoke out
against it (Khalequzzaman, 2007; Khan, 2007).
Fifth, the Phulbari area is known as the food basket of Bangladesh. It
supplies a significant amount to the domestic food market each year
(DAE, 2017). It is a flood-free zone, and farmers usually grow three
crops a year. The coal mine would destroy prime arable land, affecting
agricultural production and the livelihood of land-dependent commu-
nities. A government report said more than 70 percent of the people
were dependent on land-related occupations (BBS, 2011). Two expert
committees also emphasized this aspect (EMRD, 2006; EMRD, 2012),
but AEC said it would implement agricultural programs to minimize
losses. The gains of these programs, it said, would cancel out the losses
(AEC, 2006a). More specifically, its project would contribute
$541million during 30 years of mine life through increased local pro-
duction efficiency in rice and fish cultivation (AEC, 2006b). No expert
agreed with the mining company on the impact of mining on regional
food production. AEC’s scientific studies also severely underestimated
the risks associated with underground water resources, a critical re-
source for local agriculture. Although Bangladeshi geologists and en-
ergy experts identified it as a unique hydrological case unlike coal
mines in other countries (Shamsuddin, 2007, 2010), AEC argued that
‘de-watering of the mine site will not have an adverse impact on water
supplies for surrounding villages’ (AEC, 2006b:13). But two expert
49
As mentioned previously, two expert committees (EMRD, 2006; EMRD, 2012) re-
jected the comparison. Independent mining experts and geologists criticized AEC, as the
geology and demography were quite different.
50
The journalists published a series of reports supporting the narrative of the mining
company (Khan, 2007a, 2007b). But they did not mention that the mining company
sponsored their visit to Germany, and their reports contained the points that had been
rejected by experts.
51
Taken from the Minister’s interview with the host of Ajker Bangladesh (a talk show
on independent TV), 14 June 2015.
9
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
committees rejected the claim (EMRD, 2006; EMRD, 2012), and one
said AEC’s water-related studies were based on computer simulations
(EMRD, 2006). A consultant of the mining company suggested that it
required adequate field trials, which it did not conduct (AEC,
2005d:156). As might be expected, its communication rhetoric re-
presented the project positively, for example: ‘Phulbari Coal: Provides
Energy Security, Enhances Food Security’ (see Islam and Badruzzaman,
2014). Once again, both expert committees and local people rejected
this rhetoric. The two expert committee reports (EMRD, 2006; EMRD,
2012) suggested that the mining company relied too much on corporate
science and hid critical information.
Sixth, AEC said it would require 5900 ha land for the core mining
zone. AEC proposed acquiring this land in phases; at the end of the
mining (about 38 years), it would reclaim 2550 ha for agricultural
purposes. But various reports show that more than half (2642 ha) would
be lost forever; 2550 ha could be used for agricultural purposes if it
could be properly rehabilitated, but land reclamation is costly and time
consuming. It could take decades to reclaim a small part. Mining ex-
perts in Bangladesh doubted the mining company had the financial and
technical capacity to reclaim such a big portion of land. Moreover,
Bangladesh’s mining law has no regulatory framework for this; the
mining company would not be legally bound to reclaim land. Energy
experts I interviewed said the land could not be returned to its original
shape. Although a significant part would be an overburden pit
(1946 ha) and a large, deep empty space (696 ha), the company’s public
relation materials and feasibility study reports showed these two places
as a forest area and a lake of sweet fresh water respectively (AEC,
2006a). AEC suggested they could be used as tourism and entertain-
ment sites. Energy experts told me both sites would contain tons of toxic
chemicals and would require careful maintenance for a long period, but
AEC’s communication materials avoided mentioning this critical fact.
Finally, AEC’s displacement and resettlement plan raised both
technical and social concerns. For example, mining experts and former
officials of the Energy Ministry did not support the claim of the mining
company that it could acquire land in phases and resettle people ac-
cordingly (NCBD, 2005). They argued this was a corporate tactic to
reduce the fears of policymakers and local communities about large-
scale displacement and resettlement in a densely populated region.
During public consultations, the mining company staff said local people
would be resettled in new model towns with modern living arrange-
ments and showed them computer-generated diagrams of these towns.
My interlocutors living in rural areas in Phulbari said such arrange-
ments were not suitable for them because they needed more space for
their livestock and other agricultural-related materials. More sig-
nificantly, they didn’t think the mining company could find a huge tract
of land to build model towns in a land-scarce country like Bangladesh.
Local communities had cultural concerns about the resettlement
plan as well. Internally displaced people who have lost their homes
because of river erosion or other natural calamities live in government-
supported rehabilitation centers known as guccha gram. These people
are stigmatized and have lower social status. As my interlocutors saw it,
the residents of the model towns would have the same social and cul-
tural status as residents of guccha gram. Although the mining company
conducted a resettlement survey to describe relocation options for po-
tentially project affected people (AEC, 2005b), my interlocutors
claimed it did not ask whether they wanted to be relocated.52
5. Corporate scicne and communication rhetoric: the politics of
extractive industry practices
Simply stated, to maximize their profits, corporations seeking to
exploit natural resources revise science to create corporate science and
52
See the quotation that I used at the beginning of this narrative (interview with an
adivasi leader).
M.O. Faruque
disseminate that revised knowledge to make new converts and silence
critics. Stuart Kirsch argues the manipulation of scientific studies and
findings is ‘intrinsic to contemporary capitalism’ more generally, and
corporations ‘use science in managing their relationships to the public’
(2014:13). Mining companies use tactics such as measurement error
and information control to minimize the possible negative con-
sequences of their operation (2014: 128–154). Put otherwise, they
knowingly fail to paint an accurate picture of the risks. My analysis of
AEC’s scientific claims about the coal mine project, particularly its
claims about food production and water resources, agrees with Kirsch’s
observation.
In Kirsch’s theorizing of the relationship between corporations and
their critics, the most significant aspect of the use of corporate science
to distort reality is the fact that such practices are inherent in the or-
ganizational culture of capitalist corporations. He argues that certain
norms and practices of manipulating science and concealing facts have
become institutionalized and legitimized. Kirsch cites many examples
to show how scientific studies underestimate outcomes; tellingly, most
are conducted by consultants who are not legally accountable for the
accuracy of their studies. A developing country with weak regulatory
and institutional capacities is unlikely to detect, let alone prevent, these
corporate strategies. Nor are international financial institutions helpful;
a study by the World Bank ‘failed to examine how corporate self-in-
terest affected the studies produced by the mining company’ in Papua
New Guinea (Kirsch, 2014:137).53 In a similar vein, although expert
committees engaged by the Bangladeshi government and other in-
dependent experts identified many loopholes in AEC’s feasibility studies
(a form of ‘corporate science’), as mentioned in the previous section,
Asian Development Bank (ADB), which agreed to offer political risk
insurance to the mining company, approved it in 2006.54
Mining companies use corporate science to establish the superiority
of their technical knowledge and contest the alternative knowledge of
their critics. They invoke the rationality of commensurate payment (Li,
2015), using science to put an economic value on each resource that
might be affected by their operations. Instead of placating communities,
this generates conflict. Local people contest the technical knowledge of
mining companies, seeing the social and environmental risks differently
and assigning different value to them. Li’s ethnographic work on mining
conflicts in Peru shows how they emerge from contested scientific
knowledge espoused by competing agents. For example, a mining
company may seek to discredit the arguments of its critics by labeling
them political statements with no scientific merit, while defending its
own arguments as scientific and technical. Such corporate practice, Li
(2016) contends, masks a broader issue − the industry practice of using
scientific studies for corporate interests. As the analysis presented
above shows, AEC and its critics had different perspectives on the use
and value of land and other resources.55
Corporate science obviously needs effective communication rhetoric
to popularize its claims and discredit critics. Mining corporations
carefully craft their public relations materials to advance their political
and economic agendas. Schneider et al. (2016) argue that mining
companies deploy various strategies to influence policymaking pro-
cesses and sway public opinion. The main objective is to marginalize
the environmental concerns of policymakers and advocacy groups by
highlighting positive aspects of the plan to avert a crisis. This resembles
‘disaster capitalism,’ whereby authorities take advantage of a crisis to
further their political and economic agendas (see Klein, 2008;
Loewenstein, 2015). The communication rhetoric of mining companies
boldly uses corporate oxymoron, such as ‘open pit mining can maximize
extraction without major risks,’ in public discourses to displace other
53
For more on this aspect, see Leonard (2016) and Burgis (2015).
54
Later in 2008 ADB withdrew its support for the mining company.
55
The CEO of the mining company told a BBC journalist that ‘Coal under the ground is
worth more than growing rice on the surface’ (Melik, 2006).
10
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
ways of thinking about mineral development (see Foster, 2010). The
use of the corporate oxymoron is ‘part of a larger set of strategies used
by corporations to manage or neutralize critique’ (Benson and Kirsch,
2010:45). As the preceding analysis shows, AEC crafted its messages to
fit its coal mine project into the overall development priorities of the
Bangladeshi government, emphasizing its ability to produce enough
coal to satisfy domestic needs for electricity and downplaying en-
vironmental concerns. The choice to highlight only the positive aspects
ultimately could not withstand critical examination.
I have mentioned this before: the use of corporate science and
communication rhetoric can undermine companies’ efforts to get a
‘social license to operate’ (SLO) in host communities. By that I mean the
approval of the general public in those areas. Although mining projects
are regulated by national laws and other policy frameworks, mining
companies and their financiers are increasingly required to go through
extra-legal procedures to win the trust of host communities (Prno and
Slocombe, 2012). An SLO is a critical step for a mining company to
begin its work even when it has the legal right to build a mine
(Costanza, 2016). Obtaining the support of local communities is no less
significant than obtaining legal rights and other permits. The successful
implementation of an SLO is contingent on the socio-political context of
host communities (Wilson, 2016). AEC failed miserably in its attempts
to secure a SLO. Local communities in Phulbari did not believe that a
foreign mining company would contribute to their welfare. They just
didn’t trust the company or its intentions, especially after they dis-
covered the various deceptions mentioned earlier in the article. During
an interview, a Bangladeshi geologist argued, ‘Even if AEC offered a
gold bar to each family in Phulbari, the families would not accept it
because they did not consider AEC a trustworthy development
partner.’56; In other words, the misrepresentation of reality turned
people against the project. The analysis in the previous section shows
that the company’s business strategy to make the Phulbari coal mine a
low-cost coal producing site57 inspired its use of corporate science to
downplay risks and financial costs associated with those risks. And this
strategy did not work − there was no social license to operate. People
began to protest and they kept protesting.
Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt (2007) makes an interesting observation about
the corporate practices of extractive industries. She argues that mining
companies are not really interested in ‘the complexities in social rela-
tions and territorially embedded nature of communities’ (2007:61).
AEC has never publicly acknowledged the widespread discontent in
local communities or the risks associated with mining. AEC even said,
‘A large majority of the respondents (79.3 percent) agreed that “The
coal project is necessary for the development of the country” … In the
same survey, 74.1 percent agreed with the statement: “As long as fair
compensation is paid for affected assets, I will support the coal project”’
(AEC, 2005e: 35). The denial represents another corporate practice −
manipulating statistics to discredit critics (see Kirsch, 2014). Lahiri-
Dutt contends: ‘For the mining engineers who make almost all plans,
the mining project itself assumes great importance, subsuming people
into disposable “overburden” of mining operations’ (2007:61).
As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, BHP, an Australian
company, discovered the Phulbari coal mine after securing a very lu-
crative investment agreement with the Bangladeshi government.58 Yet
it did not develop the mine. A senior consultant of BHP who was closely
involved with the company since the beginning of its business in Ban-
gladesh and a senior official of the Bangladeshi government59
56
My interview with the geologist in December 2014.
57
See GCM (2009); the mining company compared its project to other coal mines
around the world and showed that its mine would produce coal at a low cost.
58
See Rahman (2008) for an analysis of several clauses of BHP’s investment agreement
with the Bangladeshi government. Rahman was once an adviser (Junior Minister) to the
Energy Ministry and Chairman of the Board of Investment (now Bangladesh Investment
Development Authority). He has inside knowledge of this agreement.
59
Director, Bureau of Mineral Development (an agency of the Energy Ministry,
M.O. Faruque
confirmed two things (Islam, 2008; Khan, 2006). First, BHP planned to
develop an open pit coal mine to maximize its profit from coal ex-
traction. However, after conducting a preliminary feasibility study, it
determined that the geological condition and the depth of coal deposit
were not suitable for this mining method. Second, BHP would not be
able to maintain environmental guidelines as per the Australian stan-
dards. Even if BHP ignored both points and opted for an open pit mine,
it realized the potential for a disaster like the one in Ok Tedi mine in
Papua New Guinea (see Kirsch, 2014).
If a feasibility study conducted by one of the largest coal mining cor-
porations in the world suggested that open pit mining was not a good option
for Phulbari, why did another feasibility study conducted by a little-known
mining company confirm that open pit mining was the best method?
Although AEC’s documents do not offer any credible explanation, my
analysis suggests the decision was based on the strategic use of corporate
science, wherein certain facts were disregarded (as mentioned in the pre-
vious section) for economic reasons.60 AEC did not seriously consider social,
environmental, and cultural risks associated with the coal mine61 as it was
pre-occupied with economic gains (AEC, 2004a; AEC, 2004b; AEC, 2006b).
AEC’s advertisement published in several local and national newspapers
said nothing about the risks associated with the Phulbari coal mine. This
was gross distortion of the reality of resource extraction.62
The death of the Phulbari coal mine project was caused, at least in part,
by AEC’s gross miscalculations. AEC’s feasibility studies (a form of corporate
science) misrepresented risks of open pit coal mining in Bangladesh’s spe-
cific social and geological context. It deployed contradictory communication
strategies to take advantage of the electricity crisis in Bangladesh to push its
corporate agenda. Its communication materials glorified manufactured
myths about underground mining and the benefits of the Phulbari coal
mine. Both its feasibility studies and communication materials disregarded
the reality to secure a narrow corporate agenda. These three strategies, al-
though designed to sway policymakers, convinced neither the local people
nor independent experts and they backfired in the end. At the outset, local
communities raised concerns and opposed the views of the mining com-
pany, pointing out the flaws in their arguments. Their allies (social move-
ments and civil society groups) and other independent experts joined in.
Finally, government-commissioned expert committees confirmed their
concerns. The counter-claims against the mining company were reinforced
by a new feasibility study conducted by the Geological Survey of
Bangladesh (GSB) during 2015–2016.63 The net outcome was AEC’s failure
to secure either a social or a legal license to operate in Bangladesh.
6. Conclusion
This article analyzes the conflict over the construction of a con-
troversial open pit coal mine in Bangladesh, focusing on the corporate
strategies of the mining company, AEC. It shows that AEC’s use of cor-
porate science and communication rhetoric undermined its chance to gain
a social license (or a legal license) to operate. Both practices created so
much distrust that the mining company was doomed to failure.64
(footnote continued)
responsible for dealing with legal aspects of mineral development projects).
60
Rahman (2008) says Bangladesh would benefit very little from this large mining
project. During his tenure as the adviser of the Energy Ministry, he demanded punishment
for those officials and politicians who were responsible for destroying Bangladesh’s in-
terest by signing such an agreement with AEC (Bdnews, 2006a).
61
Local communities, their urban allies, independent experts, and expert commissions
appointed by the Bangladeshi government highlighted these issues repeatedly.
62
Although AEC’s volumes of feasibility studies explain many risks associated with
open pit mining, its communication materials do not highlight those risks. It considered
those risks as ‘manageable’ (GCM, 2009).
63
See EMRD (2016):109-111).
64
After the August 2006 uprising, violent protests recurred in November 2012 and
November 2014 when the mining company took initiatives to begin new surveys in the
mine area. Each year, local communities celebrate Phulbari Day on August 26 to com-
memorate those who were killed. During this annual ceremony, they caution the
Bangladeshi government about its commitment laid out in the MOU.
11
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
The combination of corporate science and communication rhetoric
is part of a larger systemic problem of natural resource management in
the Global South. Multinational mining companies, corrupt political
and bureaucratic elites, and global financial management systems
create ‘a looting machine’ to plunder precious mineral resources
(Burgis, 2015). In The Plundered Planet: Why We Must—and How We
Can—Manage Nature for Global Prosperity, Paul Collier (2010) men-
tions many examples of how corrupt officials and multinational re-
source extraction companies, not the local people, are likely to benefit
from natural resources in poor countries.65 In the case analyzed in this
article, a little known mining company with no experience of resource
extraction secured a lucrative deal in a poor country. The deal guar-
anteed profits for the mining company, not for the people of Bangladesh
(Rahman 2008; EMRD 2006; EMRD, 2012), a classic case of resource
plunder, emphasized by Collier.
Resource extraction such as coal mining causes ‘slow violence’
(Nixon, 2011) in many forms, including landscape destruction, liveli-
hood disruption, water contamination, loss of biodiversity, and other
types of environmental damage. As this article shows, the genesis of this
violent process of resource development is rooted in extractive industry
practices. However, the dominance of these corporate practices does
not go unchallenged. Grassroots mobilization supported by external
allies and independent experts can persuade policymakers to confront
corporate science and make evidence-based policy choices, leading to
more effective management of strategic mineral resources in the Global
South.
Funding support
This research was supported by the Munk School of Global Affairs,
School of Graduate Studies, and the Department of Sociology at the
University of Toronto.
Acknowledgement
I gratefully acknowledge the insightful comments provided by three
anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of the article. Professor
Gavin Hilson, editor of The Extractive Industries and Society deserves
special thanks for his constant encouragement to complete the article.
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