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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 165496. February 12, 2007.]

HUN HYUNG PARK , petitioner, vs . EUNG WON CHOI , respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES , J : p

Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated
May 20, 2004 1 and September 28, 2004 2 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition
and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.
In an Information 3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg . 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law,
for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated
August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds.
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty"
to the offense charged. Following the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its
evidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent led a Motion for Leave of Court
to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the
prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption
of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. 4
By Order 5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati,
Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. 6
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect 7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil
aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the
evidence presented was insu cient to prove respondent's criminal liability, it did not
altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and
ordered respondent to pay him the amount of P1,875,000 with legal interest. 8
Upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its
decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that
the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case." 9
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he
elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition for
the following reasons:
1. The veri cation and certi cation of non-forum shopping attached to the
petition does not fully comply with Section 4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-
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2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it does not give the
assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct based on
authentic records.TCDHaE

2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other


material portions of the record, (i.e., motion for leave to le demurrer to
evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition thereto, and the
Municipal [sic] Trial Court's Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 294690)
as would support the allegations of the petition (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).

3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
attached to the petition is an uncerti ed and illegible mere machine copy
of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-
respondent in the petition. 1 0

In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of the appellate
court in dismissing his petition.
The manner of veri cation for pleadings which are required to be veri ed, such as a
petition for review before the CA of an appellate judgment of the RTC, 1 1 is prescribed by
Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise speci cally required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, veri ed or accompanied by
affidavit.

A pleading is veri ed by an a davit that the a ant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be veri ed which contains a veri cation based on


"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a
proper veri cation shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. 1 2 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
and independence, hence, he chose to a rm in his petition he led before the court a quo
that its contents are "true and correct of my own personal knowledge," 1 3 and not on the
basis of authentic documents.
On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be interpreted in a
conjunctive sense and construed to mean as "and," or vice versa, when the context of the
law so warrants.
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be
veri ed under either of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations
in a pleading may be a rmed based on either one's own personal knowledge or on
authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that
either source quali es as a su cient basis for veri cation and, needless to state, the
concurrence of both sources is more than su cient. 1 4 Bearing both a disjunctive and
conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signi cation avoids a construction that will exclude
the combination of the alternatives or bar the e cacy of any one of the alternatives
standing alone. 1 5
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Contrary to petitioner's position, the range of permutation is not left to the pleader's
liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant
that a veri cation be based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic
records, or on both sources.
As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for veri cation bear
signi cance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the allegations are based on the
records of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on
the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have
a rmed, based on his personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his
petition 1 6 before the CA that at the pre-trial conference respondent admitted having
received the letter of demand, because he (petitioner) was not present during the
conference. 1 7 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity.
Veri cation is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never
be sacri ced in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the
matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath 1 8 to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not
merely speculative. 1 9
This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of veri cation and
certi cation and enunciating that obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is
needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot just
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 2 0 While the requirement is
not jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule
can only be justified by the attending circumstances of the case. 2 1
To sustain petitioner's explanation that the basis of veri cation is a matter of simple
preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would
play on predilection and pay no heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of
the allegations.
On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition — that the petition was
not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record
as would support the allegations of the petition (i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February 27,
2003 Order dismissing the case) — petitioner contends that these documents are
immaterial to his appeal.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, however, the materiality of those documents is
very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which he is appealing, was likewise
dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer.
Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the CA copies of
the enumerated documents, save for the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as attachments
to his Motion for Reconsideration.
The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly legible
duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or nal orders of both lower courts,
certified correct by the clerk of court." 2 2
A perusal of the petition led before the CA shows that the only duplicate original or
certi ed true copies attached as annexes thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order
granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 RTC Order
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denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC
Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certi ed true copy and is not
even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his Motion for
Reconsideration a duplicate original copy. aHcDEC

While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for Reconsideration that the
February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G"
bares a replicate copy of a different order, however. It was to this Court that petitioner
belatedly submitted an uncerti ed true copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his
Reply to respondent's Comment.
This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that dated May 5,
2003, which petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.
Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect to the civil
aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to submit them in the required form. 2 3
In ne, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the
mandatory tenor of which is discernible thereunder and is well settled. 2 4 He has not,
however, advanced any strong compelling reasons to warrant a relaxation of the Rules,
hence, his petition before the CA was correctly dismissed.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while
the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules,
this we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the
rules applies only in proper cases and under justi able causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 2 5 (Emphasis
supplied)

As to the third reason for the appellate court's dismissal of his petition — failure to
implead the People of the Philippines as a party in the petition — indeed, as petitioner
contends, the same is of no moment, he having appealed only the civil aspect of the case.
Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there
are two actions involved in a criminal case. The rst is the criminal action for the
punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the
plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil
action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the
accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid
multiplicity of suits. 2 6 (Underscoring supplied)

It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent. 2 7 As a rule, a judgment of


acquittal is immediately nal and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the
acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the
judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no
interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal
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ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in
interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused .
28

Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.


When a demurrer to evidence is led without leave of court, the whole case is
submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. 2 9 At that juncture, the court is called
upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved. 3 0
If the ling of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the
enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state
the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any. 3 1
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted. 3 2
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a
nding on the nal judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. 3 3
In case of a demurrer to evidence led with leave of court, the accused may adduce
countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. 3 4 Such denial bears no
distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary
value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court
may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the
demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insu cient to
prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insu cient as proof beyond
reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insu cient to establish a
preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil
aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on
demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a nding that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such
determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this
Court, in Salazar v. People, 3 5 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless
the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. 3 6

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without
any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that
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there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000
with the remainder representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of
P1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however, that the payments made by respondent
pertained to other transactions. 3 7 Given these con icting claims which are factual, a
remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for
the trial court to resolve the same.
Petitioner nally posits that respondent waived his right to present evidence on the
civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing
Section 1 of Rule 33, 3 8 and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioner's motion for
reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case
continue.
Petitioner's position is tenuous.
Petitioner's citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over
all issues that the law requires it to resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil
Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise
to the suit. 3 9
As for petitioner's attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with
certainty from the records the nature of the alleged oral objections of respondent to
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any
waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in
the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon, 4 0 hence, courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against it. 4 1
This Court therefore upholds respondent's right to present evidence as reserved by
his filing of leave of court to file the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further
proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case. SEHaTC

Costs against petitioner.


SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. CA rollo, pp. 113-114, penned by Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with the concurrence of
Justice Marina L. Buzon and Justice Noel G. Tijam.
2. Id. at 172-173, penned by Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with the concurrence of Justice
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Marina L. Buzon and Justice Monina Arevalo Zenarosa.

3. Rollo, p. 86.
4. Records, pp. 234-244, citing Ting v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 481 (2000).
5. Rollo, p. 245.
6. Id. at 87.
7. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-1836. Petitioner amended the Notice of Appeal on
June 2, 2003, after the case had already been docketed, to point out that he is appealing
the order of dismissal only insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned (vide
records, pp. 283, 288, 290, 422).
8. Rollo, pp. 113-117.
9. Id. at 143-146.
10. Id. at 162-163.
11. RULES OF COURT, Rule 42, Sec. 1.

12. As amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10 SC (2000).


13. Rollo, p. 64.
14. Vide Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, 387 Phil. 872, 881-882 (2000).
15. Vide China Banking Corporation v. HDMF, 366 Phil. 913 (1999).
16. Rollo, p. 53.
17. Records, p. 69; TSN, August 1, 2001.
18. Vide Grogun, Incorporation v. National Power Corp., 458 Phil. 217, 230-231 (2003) for a
definition of "verification."
19. Clavecilla v. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 623, 631.
20. Id. at 623.
21. Cf. Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981 (2001).

22. RULES OF COURT, Rule 42, Sec. 2 (d).


23. Cf. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 157 (1997), which ruled that a petitioner is not
required to attach to the petition before the Court of Appeals a certified true copy – but
only a true or plain copy – of the MeTC Decision since petitioner is not appealing
therefrom as it was rendered in her favor.
24. Atillo v. Bombay, 404 Phil. 179, 188 (2001).
25. Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 780, 784 (1996).
26. Salazar v. People, 458 Phil. 504, 514 (2003).
27. From the MeTC's order, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati instituted a special
civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 147.
Docketed as SCA No. 03-712 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hon Rommel O.
Baybay and Eung Won Choi," the petition was dismissed on October 28, 2003 for being
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improper and for lack of merit, which order eventually attained finality (vide records, pp.
335-341, 564-565, 676).
28. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 641, 653 (2002).
29. RULES OF COURT, Rule 119, Sec. 23 reads: Demurrer to Evidence. — After the
prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of
court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its
grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the
prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the
demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
30. In a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, no reservation to file the
civil action separately shall be allowed. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1, par. (b).

31. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, Sec. 2.


32. Sanchez v. Far East Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 155309, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA
97. TAEDcS

33. Vide RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 2, last par.


34. Supra note 29.
35. 458 Phil. 504 (2003).
36. Id. at 517.
37. Rollo, pp. 72-73.
38. "After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence."
39. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28 at 654.
40. Vide People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58 (1997).
41. Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 350 Phil. 700, 720 (1998).

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