.

SISON-BARIAS VS RUBIA

Facts:

Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before

the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia.

The first case is an intestate proceeding. 1 Complainant filed a petition for

letters of administration over the intestate estate of her late husband,
Ramon A. Barias.This was opposed by her mother-in-law,
RomeliasAlmeda-Barias.

The second case is a guardianship proceeding over RomeliasAlmeda-

Barias. Evelyn Tanael, the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a
property inventory report that included not only the properties of
RomeliasAlmeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of
complainant's late husband.

The third case is a civil action 5 for annulment of contracts and

reconveyance of real properties filed by RomeliasAlmeda-Barias,
represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among others.
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in
the petition for issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then
informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen
Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. 8

Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun"
Sison, Jr., met with respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010. During this
meeting,
complainant informed respondent Pecaña of the delay in the publication of
the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then
asked respondent Pecaña to check the status of the publication of the
notice. 11 Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant's number so that she
could inform her as soon as any development takes place in the case. 12
Enrique 13 and Perlito 14 executed affidavits to corroborate these
allegations.
Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in
Biñan,

Laguna. Complainant went there with Enrique. 16 Respondent Pecaña

then informed complainant that she could no longer assist her since
respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration of the properties
to Evelyn Tanael. 17

Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of

administration to Tanael because these concerned the properties of her
mother-in-law, RomeliasAlmeda-Barias. She was only concerned with the
administration of the properties of her late husband, to which respondent
Pecaña replied, "Ah ganunba? Ibapalaungkaso mo." Complainant called
respondent Pecaña who informed her that respondent Judge Rubia wanted
to talk to her. 21 Complainant agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia
over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaña would be present as
well.

On March 3, 2010 23 at around 7:00 p.m., complainant picked up

respondent Pecaña at 6750 Ayala Avenue in Makati City. They proceeded
to Café Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said
that respondent Judge Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming from
a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.

Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During
the dinner meeting, respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate
questions. Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still
connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. 25
Complainant was then informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this
fact through Atty. NoeZarate, counsel of RomeliasAlmeda-Barias. This
disclosure surprised complainant, as she was under the impression that
opposing counsel and respondent Judge Rubia had no business discussing
matters that were not relevant to their pending cases. 27

Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her
supposed involvement with another man and other accusations made by
RomeliasAlmeda-Barias.

These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the

pleadings or in the course of the trial. Thus, she inferred that respondent
Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing counsel regarding these
matters outside of the court proceedings. The impression of complainant
was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in favor of
Atty. Zarate.

To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to

just talk to Atty. Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice
person. Complainant was appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] 'Why
will I talk to him? Judge di koyata kaya gawin un.'" Complainant alleged
that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that showed manifest
partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely, RomeliasAlmeda-Barias
and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty. NoeZarate. She
alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing of the
pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and RomeliasAlmeda-Barias,
and despite their non-compliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were
postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default. 44 She
also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden to prove
ownership of the property was on complainant, when in fact it was the
oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof to
show that the land was fraudulently transferred to her late husband.
Complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubia's inhibition. This was
denied on October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a motion for
reconsideration denied in an order 49 dated November 15, 2010. On
November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit 51 before the
Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Pecaña for gross
misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a
judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence,
and gross misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held
administratively liable.

HELD:
Yes. This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the
report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña
should be held administratively liable for their actions.

Pecaña took place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in
Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter
meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on their way to the parking lot.
This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do
not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by
complainant, since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting
alleged by complainant took place on different dates.

Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between complainant and

respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by
respondents, this does not discount the veracity of complainant's
allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and
the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of
Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed respondent Judge Rubia
ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary
Club of Makati.

The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet and the program
of meeting that Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date
indicated on the attendance sheet and on the program of meeting was
March 10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate
the time of arrival or departure of the attendees. Neither was there an
indication of the time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance
sheet and the program of meeting, by themselves or taken as corroborative
evidence of Rodel's testimony, do not discount the distinct and tangible
possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place.

On the other hand, we find the allegation that the dinner meeting took place
on March 3, 2010 more credible.

Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from

January to March 2010. 119 She identified her cellular phone number 120
as well as respondent Pecaña's. 121 Respondent Pecaña admitted that the
number identified by complainant was her number. 122 On March 2 and 3,
2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaña's number. 123 Respondent
Pecaña admitted that she had received a call from complainant before the
latter picked her up at 6750 Makati City. 124 However, no calls to
respondent Pecaña were recorded on March 10, 2010 in the document
presented. 125 On the other hand, the calls made to respondent Pecaña as
shown in the document coincided with complainant's allegations.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent
Judge Rubia and Rodel's narration of events. The strongest corroborative
evidence to support complainant's allegations was the exchange of text
messages between complainant and respondent Pecaña regarding the
dinner meeting. These text messages were admitted by respondent
Pecaña. 128 However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the
exchange of text messages. This fact was not included in his investigation
report.

The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaña belied

respondents' claim that the alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was
only a chance encounter.

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Bktxagalitkngmkpgktakasminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end

up filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, jujrubia will definitely get mad
wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.) 130 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Pecaña used the phrase, "mkpgkta," which may be translated

to "have a meeting." "Mkpgkta" can in no way mean a chance encounter.

Further, respondent Pecaña's text messages sent to complainant belied

her claim of an innocent chance encounter. She said that respondent
Judge Rubia would get angry after complainant had informed her that her
lawyer might file an administrative case against them. Respondent Judge
Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset because of the possibility
of administrative liability if an innocent and coincidental encounter
happened and not a dinner meeting. However, if the meeting took place as
alleged by complainant, this would have logically led to a hostile reaction
from respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.

There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to
greet respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly
reminded that court employees should not have any dealings with litigants,
respondent Pecaña should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge
Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.

Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New

Code of Judicial Conduct

By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel,

respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity
mandated by his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of
respondent Pecaña's actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment.
At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of
Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. As a judge, he
had the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not
they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the
esteem of their office.

Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made

several warnings to all court employees not to intercede in any case
pending before any court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge.
However, nothing in the record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took
action after being informed of respondent Pecaña's interactions with a
litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to
admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of
the Court Administrator.

For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held

administratively liable.

Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a

meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his
sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubia's mere presence in the dinner
meeting provides a ground for administrative liability.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,

142

this court reminded judges:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.

They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the

embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct
should be beyond reproach. 148 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the
exacting nature of judicial propriety. Instead of being outraged by
respondent Judge Rubia's meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate
defended respondent Judge Rubia's actions.

Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge
Rubia, it should have been done in open court with the record reflecting
such an initiative.

The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no

consequence. Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be
construed as basis to question its veracity or credibility. There are
considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative
case against judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where
the possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative
complaint has been filed is high. Filing an administrative case against
respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require additional
time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of
preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread
with caution so as not to incur the ire of Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal
that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint. Judges
and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of
cases filed. Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases
against judges and court personnel. In any case, administrative offenses,
including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are not
subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. To stress how
the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s
activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife —
above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a
deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must
exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a
private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in
and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation. Judge
Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating
in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her
admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1508 - January 17, 2005]

RE: LOSS OF COURT EXHIBITS IN THE MTCC OF CADIZ CITY,

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE
ROLANDO V. RAMIREZ, and Clerk of Court SANDRA M. LEDESMA,
MTCC, Cadiz City, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The loss of firearms and ammunitions and other exhibits stored within the
office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cadiz City, resulted in
this administrative case against Presiding Judge Rolando V. Ramirez (Judge
Ramirez) and Sandra M. Ledesma (Ledesma), Clerk of Court of the MTCC.

In the morning of 10 October 2001, Evan Rose Whitaker, Court

Stenographer II of the MTCC, Cadiz City, noticed that her cassette tape
recorder, which she had kept inside the drawer of her table, was missing.
The MTCC staff was alerted to this fact and they then discovered that the
door of the staff room of the RTC, Cadiz City, had been forcibly opened. This
prompted Marie Viason, MTCC Cash Clerk, to immediately check the steel
cabinet where the court exhibits were placed and she found out that it had
been forcibly opened and a sack containing assorted firearms and
ammunitions was missing. Thereafter, Whitaker reported the incident to the
PNP for investigation.1
At the time of the incident, Judge Ramirez and Ledesma were attending the
Eighth Regional Seminar for Judges, Clerks of Court, Branch Clerks of Court,
Legal Researchers and Sheriffs conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA) at the Bacolod Convention Plaza, Bacolod City. It was only on 11
October 2001 when they reported back to their office that they learned of
the robbery.2

Judge Ramirez wrote a letter dated 11 October 2001 to this Court reporting
the loss of assorted firearms and ammunitions and other exhibits in his
court.3 In a Resolution4 dated 21 January 2002, the Court directed Executive
Judge Renato Muñez (Executive Judge Muñez) to investigate the incident.
Investigations were separately conducted by Judge Ramirez himself,
Executive Judge Muñez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cadiz City, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Bacolod District Office and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Cadiz City. The investigations revealed in
common that when the robbery took place, the three (3) guards on duty
were Carlos P. Jimenez (Jimenez), Domingo L. Delotina (Delotina) and
Delson V. Historia (Historia).5 At the time of the robbery, they were on duty
for twenty-four (24) hours on shifting basis. Jimenez was the watchman on
the first shift which began at eight o'clock in the morning to four o'clock in
the afternoon; Delotina on the second shift which starts from four o'clock the
afternoon to midnight, while Historia was the guard on duty on the third shift
from midnight up to eight o' clock in the morning.

According to Historia, on 8 October 2001, he was present at the City Hall

before ten o'clock in the evening because he was assigned for the activation
of the siren at ten o' clock in the evening. After the siren sounded, at past
ten o' clock in the evening, he fell asleep and when he woke up at two
o'clock in the morning, he immediately conducted a roving inspection of the
City Hall and discovered that the door of the courtroom of the MTCC was
already open. Upon noticing this, he decided not to enter the room but
instead awakened his two fellow watchmen who were asleep at the time.
When Jimenez examined the lock, he saw that it had been forcibly opened.
The three guards, however, failed to immediately report the matter to the
authorities.6

After Ledesma, the custodian of the court exhibits, came to know of the
robbery on 11 October 2001, she made an inventory of the items kept inside
the steel cabinet and found out several firearms and items were lost. The
missing items were as follows:

A. one (1) homemade .12 shotgun

B. four (4) live ammos for .12 gauge shotgun

C. one (1) homemade magazine for .12 shotgun

D. one (1) homemade pistol cal. 7.62

E. one (1) live ammos (sic) for cal 7.62

F. one (1) homemade .12 gauge shotgun (pistolized)

G. one (1) homemade magazine with four (4) live ammos for .12 gauge
shotgun

H. one (1) .12 gauge shotgun

I. three (3) live ammos for .12 gauge shotgun

J. one (1) homemade cal. 38 revolver without serial number

K. one (1) armscor cal. 38 with defaced serial number

L. six (6) live ammos for cal. 38

M. five (5) live ammos for cal. 38 revolver

N. one (1) two-way icom radio

O. cash amounting to P6,600.00.7

An operation was subsequently conducted by the Cadiz PNP which yielded to

the confiscation of one homemade shotgun, one homemade magazine and
four live ammos for shotgun8and the arrest of Michael Adelantar, Sunny Boy
Celiz, Juan Carlos Gonzales and Edenpol Alogon who were caught in
possession of these weapons. The same items confiscated were presented to
Ledesma for identification purposes and she identified them as among those
declared lost at MTCC. A certain Demole Magbanua stated in a sworn
statement that the same Juan Carlos Gonzales and Michael Adelantar
arrested by the police had approached him in order to sell the subject
firearms. They told Magbanua that they obtained the gun from the Cadiz
City Hall.9 Eventually, the NBI recommended that its own investigation be
considered closed and terminated.10

The investigations conducted by Judge Ramirez himself and Executive Judge

Muñez disclose that no court personnel were implicated in the robbery
incident.11 It was also discovered that the guards on duty failed to report to
the authorities the robbery that took place.12 Instead, they fixed the
detached wood block to the door without waiting for the investigators to
check the physical evidence.13

After receipt of the investigation report on the matter, this Court, in

its Resolution14 dated 18 November 2002, resolved to: (a) direct Judge
Ramirez to take proper steps towards the recovery of the stolen firearms
and ammunitions and other exhibits and to seek relief from accountability of
lost government properties caused by the robbery, within thirty (30) days
from notice hereof, pursuant to Sec. 638 of the Revised Administrative
Code; (b) require Judge Ramirez to submit a status report on the criminal
cases filed against the robbers-accused within ten (10) days from notice
hereof; and (c) direct Executive Judge Muñez to reinvestigate the possible
complicity of the guards on duty in the robbery and to submit to the court
his report and recommendation thereon within ten (10) days from notice.

Judge Ramirez, in compliance with said resolution, submitted a Compliance

Report15 dated 14 January 2003 on the status of criminal cases filed against
the robbers and a letter16dated 8 January 2003 to the Commission on Audit
seeking relief from accountability of lost government properties subject to
the robbery. Executive Judge Muñez submitted a Reinvestigation
Report17 dated 16 January 2003 finding that the complicity of the guards on
duty at the time of the robbery was remote although they may be guilty of
simple neglect of duty.18 However, sanctions could not be imposed on them
since they were under the direct supervision and control of the Office of the
City Mayor of Cadiz City and not in any way connected with the Judiciary
since the building where the MTCC and the RTC was located formed part of
the City Hall of Cadiz City.19

The Reinvestigation Report likewise unveiled the fact that the suspects in the
robbery were minors who belonged to prominent families in Cadiz City and
neighboring cities.20 Michael Adelantar, the leader of the group, is the
grandson of retired Judge Adelino Ledesma and nephew of both herein
respondent Ledesma and MTCC Process Server Armando Ledesma. Executive
Judge Muñez opined that the suspects were able to enter the premises of
the court with ease, since Michael Adelantar had free access to the court due
to ties to his aunt, the Clerk of Court, and his uncle, the process
server.21 The report also noted that the steel cabinet where evidence was
stored was already dilapidated. Its original lock was already destroyed and
at the time of the robbery, secured by a small padlock and small chain
passing through the holes where the two handles of the cabinet were once
attached. The location of the cabinet, which was situated near the main door
of the courtroom, further added to the risk.22

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), after considering the reports
submitted to it, recommended to this Court that the matter be formally
docketed as an administrative case against Judge Ramirez and Ledesma and
directed them to explain within ten (10) days from notice why they should
not be held administratively liable for the loss of court exhibits at MTCC,
Cadiz City.23 The Court adopted this recommendation in a Resolution24 dated
10 September 2003, hence the present complaint.ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In an Explanation dated 6 November 2003,25 Judge Ramirez and Ledesma

argue that they should not be held administratively liable since they were
attending the live-in seminar for judges and clerks of court when the
incident occurred. Further, the stolen court exhibits were wrapped in a sack
placed inside a steel storage cabinet which was locked and that the Cadiz
City Hall is provided with guards who regularly inspect the premises.

After considering the records and the investigations conducted on the

matter, we find that Ledesma failed to meet the requirement expected of her
as a Clerk of Court. Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court is explicit
that the clerk shall safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits, and
public property committed to her charge.26 The Office of the Clerk of Court
performs a very delicate function, having control and management of all
court records, exhibits, documents, properties and supplies.27 Being the
custodian thereof, the clerk of court is liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of said funds and properties.28

Indeed, the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office

charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Conduct at all times must not only be characterized with
propriety and decorum, but above all else, must be above suspicion.29 As
court custodian, it was Ledesma's responsibility to ensure that records are
safely kept and the same are readily available upon the request of the
parties or order of the court. The Clerk of Court must be diligent and vigilant
in the performance of official duties and in supervising and managing court
docket and records. This custodial duty necessarily extends to evidence
submitted by the parties and marked as exhibits.30

Evidently, the Office of the Clerk of Court ought to be exacting as to the

observance of ethical norms for what is sought to be protected is the very
institution to which it serves'the courts of justice. The image of the judiciary
is the shadow of its officers and employees. A simple misfeasance or
nonfeasance may have disastrous repercussions on that image. Thus, a
simple act of neglect resulting to loss of funds, documents, properties or
exhibits in custodia legis ruins the confidence lodged by the parties to a suit
or the citizenry in our judicial process.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ
Those responsible for such act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary
power of this Court.

Ledesma contends that when the robbery occurred, she was in Bacolod City
attending a seminar sponsored by PHILJA. However, such fact alone will not
exculpate Ledesma from any liability. The records note the dilapidated
condition of the steel cabinet where the pieces of evidence are stored. This
fact already requires immediate attention from the clerk of court, he or she
being the custodian of court's funds, documents and exhibits. A simple
exercise of diligence would have alerted the Clerk of Court to inform the
judge of the necessary repair and to resort to reliable safety measures to
ensure the safety of the contents of the cabinet. In failing to observe this,
Ledesma is held liable for simple neglect of duty. This Court has emphasized
that the Clerk of Court is the administrative officer of the court who
has control and supervision of all court records, exhibits, documents,
properties and supplies.31Indeed, Section 1 of Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel32 stresses that court personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and with diligence.

Moreover, the records disclose that the robbers, who are related to Ledesma
and the process server of the court where the robbery took place, had
apparent access, and perhaps familiarity of the facilities of the MTCC. A
custodian of court's records, documents or exhibits should guard against the
risk created by familiarity of court facilities by strangers and even those
related to him/her.

Nevertheless, the culpability of Ledesma does not foreclose liability on the

part of Judge Ramirez. Section 2 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct33 provides that judges shall devote their professional activity to
judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial functions
and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other
tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operation.ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Being the presiding judge of the court where the robbery took place, he
should be aware that the condition of the facilities used by the court
conforms with the basic requirements of reliability and safety to avoid any
attempt by unscrupulous persons to frustrate the fair prosecution of cases
before the court or the fabrication, destruction or loss of evidence in its
custody. Although the primary responsibility of safekeeping of evidence is
not lodged with him, he should have at least exercised prudence and fair
judgment in anticipating the dismal future in defective court facilities
especially if a resultant prejudice to litigants is not a remote possibility.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we rule that Sandra
Ledesma, the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cadiz City, is guilty of simple
neglect of duty and is hereby punished to suffer a penalty of
SUSPENSION34 of one (1) month and one (1) day and that repetition of this
act shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Judge Rolando V.
Ramirez is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) considering that he had already been penalized by this Court
in a prior administrative case docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-01-135735 dated 28
March 2001 and ADMONISHED to ensure the reliability and safety of court
facilities and equipment to avoid repetition of the incident in his court.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-

Nazario, JJ., concur.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Case Digest

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, plea
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpe
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special court
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5
VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts:

Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in
the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil Service
Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment
with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US.
The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a
lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of
his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

Issues:

1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the
practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?
2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of property without due process?

Held:

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary has inherent power
to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public
responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one
of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if
the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

RIVERA v. CORRAL
Facts: Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice and
conduct unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case was
received by Atty. Corral’s secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty.
Corral on March 13, 1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the date
February 23 to February 29 without the court’s prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral
later on filed a reply to plaintiff’s manifestation claiming that he received the decision on
February 28, not 29 (because there is no Feb 29).

RECOMMENENDATION/S of IBP: respondent guilty as charged and recommended his

suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Issue: W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the
decision of the court without the court’s prior knowledge of decision

Held: No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made
not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the notice of appeal was
filed within the reglementary period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice
of appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament,
Atty. Corral altered the date he received the court’s decision. By altering the material dates to
make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of
dishonesty. Dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct.

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.

A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC July 22, 2005

Facts: Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his frustrations of the outcome of his
cases decided by the Supreme Court. The letter contained derogatory and malignant remarks which are highly
insulting. The Court accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain, however, instead of appearing before the court, he wrote
another letter with insulting remarks as the first one. The court was thus offended with his remarks.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks he has made in his letters
addressed to the court.

Held: Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have
no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt
of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and
to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less must this be and with greater reasons in the
case of the country’s highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, to which his
client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time
be lost to it. Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism
to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to
satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Thus,
ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143783. December 9, 2002]

DANTE SARRAGA, SR. and MARIA TERESA SARRAGA, petitioners,

vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE
BANK, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Spouses Dante Sarraga, Sr. and Maria Teresa Sarraga, petitioners, were
the absolute owners of three (3) parcels of land, one of which is Lot 416-B,
situated in Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City, and the other two, Lots 1053-A
and 1053-B, in Lapasan, same city.
 Sometime in the early 1980s, petitioners mortgaged their lots to Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino), respondent, as security
for a loan in the amount of P3,618,714.59.
Petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loan. Consequently, Banco
Filipino foreclosed the mortgage.
On June 29, 1984, Banco Filipino was placed in conservatorship by the
Central Bank of the Philippines. On January 25, 1985, it was ordered closed
and placed under receivership and liquidation.
On April 9, 1985, or before the expiration of the period for the redemption
of the lots, petitioner Dante P. Sarraga sent a letter to Banco Filipinos
receiver-liquidator offering to redeem the same.
On July 2, 1985, Deputy Receiver Arnulfo B. Aurellano wrote petitioners
that at this stage of the liquidation of the bank, we are not yet selling the
aforesaid properties.
Since petitioners were not allowed to redeem their lots within the period
prescribed by law, titles thereto were consolidated in the name of Banco
Filipino.
On October 10, 1986, petitioners received a letter from Banco Filipino
recognizing their intention to redeem their lots. Later, Banco Filipino, through
its liquidators, started negotiating with petitioners on the terms of redemption.
Finally, on October 30, 1990, Mr. Renan Santos, then Banco Filipinos
liquidator, wrote petitioners allowing them to repurchase the lots for
P8,506,597.73, with 12% interest per annum, under the terms stipulated
therein. The terms include, among others, that petitioners may pay by
[1]

installments and that upon full payment of the repurchase price, Banco
Filipino shall execute the corresponding deed of sale for the three (3)
lots in their favor. They were likewise granted the power to manage and
[2]

administer the building located in Lot 416-B. The terms were later embodied in
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the parties.
[3]

On May 16, 1991, Banco Filipino formally conveyed to petitioners the two
(2) lots (Lots 1053-A and 1053-B) located in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On October 30, 1992, petitioners paid in full the total repurchase price for
the three (3) lots. However, Banco Filipino refused to execute the
corresponding deed of sale and turn over Lot 416-B to petitioners.
Instead, Banco Filipino, on April 5, 1993, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, a complaint against petitioners for
[4]
quieting of title, recovery of ownership and possession, accounting and
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-186.
On April 27, 1993, petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. They [5]

were represented by Atty. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr. who formally entered his
appearance as their counsel of record.
However, prior to the pre-trial, Atty. Dumlao suffered a mild stroke,
incapacitating him from participating actively in the proceedings, prompting
petitioners to hire the services of another counsel, Atty. Rogelio Bagabuyo.
While the latter appeared for the petitioners during the hearing and signed
pleadings for them, Atty. Dumlao remained petitioners counsel of record. As
such, the trial court continued to serve pleadings, motions, processes, and
other documents upon Atty. Dumlao.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
[6]

portion of which states:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Declaring the sale and conveyance of the two (2) parcels of land (denominated as
Lots 1035-A and 1053-B) situated in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, as valid
and title thereto shall pertain to defendant spouses Sarraga;

2. Declaring plaintiff Banco Filipino to be the true and lawful owners of Lot 416-B
and the building therein (formerly known as the Lucar Building but now as Executive
Centrum) situated along J.R. Borja Street, Cagayan de Oro City;

3. Ordering defendant spouses Sarraga to immediately relinquish and surrender

possession of Lot No. 416-B and the building thereon to plaintiff Bank; and

4. All other claims of plaintiff Bank as well as counterclaims by the defendants are
dismissed.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. [7]

On July 1, 1998. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, signed by

[8]

both Attys. Dumlao and Bagabuyo.

On September 3, 1998, the trial court issued an order denying petitioners
[9]

motion. On September 10, 1998, the order was received by Ms. Llerna
Guligado, a newly-hired clerk at the office of Atty. Bagabuyo. Owing to her
lack of work experience in a law office, she merely left the court order on her
desk and eventually it was misplaced. She failed to bring the matter to the
attention of Atty. Bagabuyo when she resigned on September 15, 1998. The
day before, or on September 14, 1998, Atty. Bagabuyo was appointed Senior
State Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. Due to his excitement and
relocation to Manila, he failed to apprise Atty. Dumlao on the status of the
case.
Concerned that no action had been taken on their motion for
reconsideration of the Decision, petitioners, on December 7, 1998, verified its
status. In the trial court, they found that the records of the case were already
transmitted to the Court of Appeals due to a partial appeal interposed by
Banco Filipino.
This prompted petitioners to file with the trial court a notice of appeal
which was denied for being late.
Eventually, they filed a petition for relief from judgment. During the [10]

hearing, they came to know that the order dated September 3, 1998 denying
their motion for reconsideration was served upon Atty. Bagabuyo only.
On February 12, 1999, the trial court issued an order dismissing the
[11]

petition for relief on the ground that it was filed out of time. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied. [12]

They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA GR-SP No. 53765, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing their petition for relief from judgment.
On June 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision dismissing [13]

the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we hold that public respondent did

not err much less act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the disputed orders, for which reason, the herein petition has to
be, as it is hereby DISMISSSED.

SO ORDERED. [14]

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

The fundamental issues for our resolution are: 1) whether there was a
valid service of the trial courts order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration upon Atty. Bagabuyo; 2) whether Atty. Bagabuyo was
negligent which prevented petitioners from filing a timely notice of appeal; and
3) if so, whether such negligence is binding upon petitioners.
Petitioners maintain that Atty. Bagabuyo is not their counsel of record
since he did not file with the trial court a formal appearance. Consequently,
the service upon him of the trial courts order denying their motion for
reconsideration is not valid.
Such posture is untenable. It is undisputed that petitioners were
represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Dumlao and Bagabuyo. Pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, service of the trial courts order denying petitioners motion for
[15]

reconsideration may be made upon either counsel. [16]

The Court of Appeals correctly found that indeed petitioners counsel was
Atty. Bagabuyo, thus:

We find no merit in the first ground invoked by petitioners. As explained by the

court a quo in its May 24, 1999 order-

The records of this case show that Atty. Rogelio Zosa B. Bagabuyo did not merely
enter his appearance orally at every hearing which he attended. He filed several
pleadings in this case as counsel for the defendants in which he indicated his address.
The first pleading that he filed x x x was a MOTION TO HEAR SPECIAL AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AS IF A MOTION TO DISMISS HAD BEEN FILED,
dated November 28, 1994, which he signed alone as counsel for Defendants and in
which he indicated his address as Suite 201, Travellers Life Building, corners Tiano &
J.R. Borja Streets, City of Cagayan de Oro. Atty. Bagabuyo, since he started
appearing in this case, acted alone, signed pleadings alone, made decisions alone,
without in any way indicating to the court and the adverse party that he had to defer to
the judgment of Atty. Dumlao on any matter pertaining to the instant case. He
presented the defendant Dante Sarraga and the latters witness, Mr. Gaudencio Beduya,
at the trial of this case and terminated the presentation of the defendants evidence
without consulting, or intimating to the court and the adverse party that he had to
consult Atty. Dumlao on the matter. The MEMORANDUM FOR THE
DEFENDANTS dated April 8, 1996 was signed by him alone as counsel for the
defendants. Atty. Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo signed as lead counsel the defendants
Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 June 1998 and the Urgent Rejoinder to Plaintiffs
Opposition To Our Motion for Reconsideration dated 03 August 1998, in which he
indicated his address as 14th-10th Streets, Macasandig, City of Cagayan de Oro. He
signed alone as counsel for the defendants an URGENT MOTION TO CANCEL
SCHEDULED HEARING ON 31 July 1998 dated 28 July 1998 in which he indicated
his address as 72 corners 14th-10th Streets, Macasandig, City of Cagayan de Oro.
(Annex F, Petition, pp. 196-197, rollo).

Given the foregoing circumstances and the court a quos further observation that Atty.
Bagabuyo had been the one actively handling the case for the defendants since the
pre-trial stage, x x x it is simply absurd for petitioners to even suggest that service
upon Atty. Bagabuyo of a copy of the Order dated September 3, 1998 which denied
their Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment was ineffective or did not bind
them. To be sure, Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that (i)f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made
upon his counsel or one of them x x x. The obvious meaning of said rule is that if a
party is represented by more than one lawyer, service of pleadings, judgments and
other papers may be made on any one of them.

Obviously, Atty. Bagabuyo was negligent which prevented petitioners from

filing a timely notice of appeal. Atty. Bagabuyo knew that his clerk has no work
experience in a law firm. He should have supervised her office performance
very closely considering the importance of his legal calling. Time and again
this Court has admonished law offices to adopt a system of distributing and
receiving pleadings and notices, so that the lawyers will be promptly informed
of the status of their cases. Thus, the negligence of clerks which adversely
affect the cases handled by lawyers is binding upon the latter. [17]

Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence of counsel binds
the client. However, the application of the general rule to a given case should
be looked into and adopted according to the surrounding
circumstances. Thus, exceptions to the said rule have been recognized by
[18]

this Court: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of
justice so require. In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a
[19]

client who suffered thereby.

Here, we find that the negligence of Atty. Bagabuyo falls under the said
exceptions. Indeed, he committed gross negligence. Petitioners were deprived
of their right to appeal when he failed to inform them immediately of the denial
of their motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision. Ultimately, this
will result in the deprivation of their property, specifically Lot 416-B.
In Apex Mining, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
[20]

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error

committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good
cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give
the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party
has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyers
professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the
party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and
dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a
damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set
aside on such ground.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand
that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be
made suffer for the lawyers mistakes and should be afforded another opportunity, at
least, to introduce evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this case is
only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was
to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.

Petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to verify the status of their case
with the trial court since a client has the right to expect that his lawyer will
protect his interest during the hearing of his case.

A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations
and has the right to expect that his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of
his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or defend a case or
proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all
steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and
management of the suit, and in a defendants attorney, the power to take such steps as
he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant. [21]

Undoubtedly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the petition for relief. Considering the circumstances obtaining here,
petitioners should not be made to suffer the consequences of their counsels
negligence. Hence, the period within which to file their petition for relief should
be reckoned from their actual receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration, which is December 7, 1998. Accordingly, the petition for relief
filed on December 16, 1998 was well within the sixty-day period prescribed in
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Both lower courts actually sacrificed justice for technicality. This Court has
consistently ruled that it is a far better and more prudent course of action for a
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case
on the merits to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay,
if not a miscarriage of justice. Hence, it would be more in accord with justice
[22]

and equity to allow the appeal by petitioners to enable the Court of Appeals to
review the trial courts decision.
The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant
every opportunity to present evidence in their behalf in order that substantial
justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a
liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest
opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. The
dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities. [23]

Hence, in cases where a party was denied this right, we have relaxed the
stringent application of procedural rules in order to allow a party the chance to
be heard. This policy applies with equal force in case of appeals. It has been
consistently held that the dismissal of appeal on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon. [24]

x x x, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very
aims. Verily, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may even stay the
dismissal of appeals grounded merely on technicalities, especially in this case where
petitioners appeal appears prima facie worthy of the CAs full consideration on the
merits.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated June 20, 2000 in CA-GR SP No. 53765 is SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City is
DIRECTED to grant the petition for relief filed by petitioners and to GIVE DUE
COURSE to their notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 93-186.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio- Morales, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., no part. Former counsel of a party.
MARCIAL L. ABIERO vs. ATTY.
BERNARDO G. JUANINO C. No. 5302.
February 18, 2005
FACTS:
Atty. Juanino, representing Abiero, won in a labor case. However, on appeal, the NLRC reversed
the arbiters decision and dismissed the case for lack of basis. Each time Abiero would follow up
the case, respondent would advise him to call on a later date at which time he may have some ne
ws of any development with the case. Atty Juanino then filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review and paid the corresponding docket fee. When c
omplainant verified with the Court of Appeals the status of the case, he found out that responde
nt never filed a Petition for Review of his labor case. Consequently, the NLRC decision became fi
nal and executory. In his defense, he said that he honestly believed that he could enforce the deci
sion against those who did not appeal, so he went to the labor arbiter and discussed it, but the ar
biter said he could not since the decision was reversed and there would be no basis for the enforc
ement. Too late, the period to file petition for certiorari had already expired.

ISSUE:

Whether or not discussing a legal action to a judge constitutes violation of the Code of Professio
nal Responsibility.

RULING:

Yes. As a lawyer, Atty. Juanino should’ve known that he is not required to seek prior approval fr
om the labor arbiter before he could file a motion for execution. Nevertheless, he presented hims
elf, not once, but thrice, before the office of the arbiter to discuss his plan to file a motion for exe
cution, only to discover that such recourse was not feasible. Worse, while respondent was waitin
g for the arbiters opinion, the period to file the petition before the Court of Appeals continued to
run, as in fact, it eventually expired.

Failure to appeal to the Court of Appeals despite instructions by the client to do so constitutes in
excusable negligence on the part of counsel because once a lawyer consents to defend the cause
of his client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must at all times be mindful of the trust and confi
dence reposed in him. His inexcusable negligence on such matter renders him liable for violatio
n of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Juanino is SUSPENDED f
rom the practice of law for six (6) months.

Sesbreno v CA GR 117438
FACTS:
Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and
backwages imploring Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The
employees and Atty. Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid 30% as attorney’s fees and 20% as
expenses taken from their back salaries. Trial court decided in favor of the employees and ordered the
Province of Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back salaries. The same was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise agreement was entered into by the
parties in April 1979. The former employees waived their right to reinstatement among others. The
Province of Cebu released P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through Atty. Sesbreno as
“Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.” The amount represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and
gratuity pay due to the employees. Ten employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting
that they agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40% to be taken only from their back salaries. The lower court
issued two orders, with which petitioner complied, requiring him to release P10,000.00 to each of the
ten private respondents and to retain 40% of the back salaries pertaining to the latter out of the
P2,300,000.00 released to him. On March 28, 1980, the trial court fixed the attorney’s fees a total of
60% of all monies paid to the employees. However, trial court modified the award after noting that
petitioner’s attorney’s lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have been only 50%. Atty.
Sesbreno appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services but was even
further reduced to 20%.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to
petitioner Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by
private respondents

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of professional services entered into by the parties 6
authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the employees’ back salaries only. The trial court,
however, fixed the lawyer’s fee on the basis of all monies to be awarded to private respondents. Fifty
per cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the provincial government,
according to the Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to the
contract of professional services. What a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney’s fees is always
subject to judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for
professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be
allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable unconscionable. A contingent fee
arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be
laid down in an express contract. if the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable
under the circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning “as much as he deserves,” is used as the basis
for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract. The Supreme Court
averred that in balancing the allocation of the monetary award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and
the other 50% to be allocated among all his 52 clients, is too lop-sided in favor of the lawyer. The
ratio makes the practice of law a commercial venture, rather than a noble profession. It would, verily
be ironic if the counsel whom they had hired to help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60%
of the total amount collectible by these employees. 20% is a fair settlement.

Petition is DENIED