G.R. No. 165697. August 4, 2009.

* action at the first instance has already been settled by the Court of
ANTONIO NAVARRO, Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the proceedings, the
petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of laches vis-
COMPANY, respondent, à-vis the imprescriptibility of Clarita’s cause of action because the said
decision is not the one on appeal before us. But more importantly, the
G.R. No. 166481. August 4, 2009.* Court takes notice that the decision rendered in that case had already
CLARITA P. NAVARRO, become final without any motion for reconsideration being filed or an
petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are left with no other recourse
COMPANY, respondent. than to uphold the immutability of the said decision. No other procedural
law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes
final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal,
except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro
tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the
Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; No other procedural law judgment itself is void. The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold: (1)
principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes final, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the
it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except discharge of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an
only for correction of clerical errors, or the making of end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies cannot be
allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and obligations of every
_______________
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
Same; Same; Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal
* THIRD DIVISION.
within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
150
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and

50 satisfaction of the judgment.—Just as a losing party has the right to file

Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or
execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to thwart this
where the judgment itself is void.—While the Court agrees that an action
rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savor the fruit of
to declare the nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of
his victory must immediately be struck down.
limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such
 Actions; Motion to Dismiss; Laches; As a ground for the dismissal of
a complaint, the doctrine of laches is embraced in the broad provision in
Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the various
grounds on which a motion to dismiss may be
151
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
based—Paragraph (h) thereof states that the fact that the claim or
demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion to
dismiss.—Laches, or what is known as the doctrine of stale claim or
demand, is the neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction
with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the
assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the
inequity founded on some change in the condition of the property
involved or in the relations of the parties. It is based on public policy
which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale
demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. As a ground for the
dismissal of a complaint, the doctrine of laches is embraced in the broad
provision in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates
the various grounds on which a motion to dismiss may be based.
Paragraph (h) thereof states that the fact that the claim or demand set
forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion to dismiss. The
language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words
“abandoned” and “otherwise extinguished” to the phrase “claim or
demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading” is broad enough to include
within its ambit the defense of bar by laches.
Same; Dismissal of Actions; Where the complaint is dismissed on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations, or that the claim or demand set forth in the
151 plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished, or that the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds, such dismissal
operates as one with prejudice and which therefore precludes the filing of
another action based on the same claim.—In United Coconut Planters
Bank v. Belus, 530 SCRA 567 (2007), and Strongworld Construction
Corporation v. Perello, 496 SCRA 700 (2006), the Court held that where
the complaint is dismissed on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; or that the
claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; or that the claim on
which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds, such dismissal operates as one with prejudice and
which therefore pre-
152
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
52
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
cludes the filing of another action based on the same claim. Hence,
according to Madrigal v. Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation, 436 SCRA 123 (2004), such dismissal already constitutes res
judicata.
 Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; The principle of res judicata
denotes that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in their
former suit.—The principle of res judicata denotes that a final judgment
or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points
and matters determined in their former suit. It obtains where a court of
competent jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment or order on the
merits of the case, which operates as an absolute bar against a
subsequent action for the same cause. A substantial identity is necessary
to warrant the application of the rule, and the addition or elimination of
some parties or the difference in form and nature of the two actions
would not alter the situation. In other words, when material facts or
questions in issue in a former action were conclusively settled by a
judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions constitute res
judicata and may not be again litigated in a subsequent action between
the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; The very object for which courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies.—It needs no elucidation
that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its
appointed organs, should be regarded as a final and conclusive
determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the
controversy at rest. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some
definite time fixed by law. For, after all, the very object for which courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nelson A. Loyola for Antonio Navarro.153
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009 153
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
Magno & Associates for Clarita P. Navarro.
Alfonso M. Cruz Law Offices for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
The tendency of the law must always be to narrow
down the field of uncertainty. Judicial process was
conceived in this light to bring about a just
termination of legal disputes. Although various
mechanisms are in place to realize this fundamental
objective, all of them emanate from the essential
precept of immutability of final judgments.
These two petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 separately filed by petitioners Antonio
Navarro and Clarita Navarro, respectively docketed as
G.R. No. 1656971and G.R. No. 166481,2 assail the July
8, 2004 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76872 which ordered the dismissal of the
complaint filed by petitioner Clarita Navarro in Civil
Case No. 02-079—a case for declaration of nullity of
title and for reconveyance and damages.
Petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro
were married on December 7, 1968.4 During their
union, they acquired three parcels of land in Alabang,
Muntinlupa City on which they built their home.
These pieces of land were covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 155256, 155257 and
155258 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
The TCT’s, however, are registered in the name of
“Antonio N. Navarro… married to Belen B.
Navarro.”5 Sometime in 1998, respondent Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 11-25.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 13-34.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; Rollo(G.R. No.
165697), pp. 31-35; Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 38-42.
4 Records, p. 8.
5 Id., at pp. 9-17.
154
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
(MBTC) had caused the judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage which Antonio had earlier constituted
on the subject properties as security for a loan he
allegedly obtained from MBTC. In December of that
year, the properties were sold at public auction where
MBTC, as the lone bidder,6 was issued a certificate of
sale.7
Clarita brought before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 an action for
the declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage
and the foreclosure sale. The complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-177, named as defendants Antonio,
MBTC, the Sheriff of Makati City and the Register of
Deeds of Makati City. In it, Clarita alleged that the
properties involved belonged to her and Antonio’s
conjugal partnership property as the same were
acquired during their marriage and that Antonio, with
the connivance of a certain Belen G. Belen, had
secured the registration thereof in their names without
her knowledge. She pointed out that Antonio and
Belen then mortgaged the properties to MBTC in 1993
likewise without her knowledge. She ascribed fault
and negligence to MBTC because it failed to consider
that the properties given to it as security belonged to
her and Antonio’s conjugal partnership property.
Accordingly, she prayed for reconveyance as well as for
payment of damages.8
MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground, inter alia, of laches. With the denial of its
motion, MBTC filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 55780. The Court of Appeals found merit in the
petition and ordered the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the same was already barred by
laches, pointing out that it had taken Clarita 11 long
years since the issuance of the TCTs on May 27, 1988
before she actually sought to annul the mortgage
_______________
6 Records, pp. 124-125.
7 Id., at pp. 108-110.
8 Records, pp. 136-140.
155
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
contract.9 The decision had attained finality without a
motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal
being taken therefrom.
Subsequently, on April 17, 2002, Clarita instituted
another action also before the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 25610 but this time for the declaration of
nullity of the TCTs covering the same properties and
for reconveyance and damages. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-079 and it impleaded
Antonio, Belen, MBTC and the Registers of Deeds of
Makati City and Muntinlupa City as defendants. This
constitutes the root of the two petitions at bar.
The said complaint was basically a reiteration of
Clarita’s allegations in Civil Case No. 99-177.
Specifically, it alleged that the conjugal properties
involved were fraudulently registered in the name
“Antonio N. Navarro…married to Belen B. Navarro”
and that the mortgage on the properties were likewise
fraudulently secured by Antonio and Belen to acquire
a loan from MBTC the proceeds of which, however, did
not inure to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Accordingly, she prayed that at least her one-half
conjugal share in the properties be reconveyed to her
without prejudice to MBTC’s rights against Antonio
and Belen.11
MBTC moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it was already barred by the prior
155
judgment in Civil Case No. 99-177, and that Clarita’s
claim had already been waived, abandoned and
extinguished.12 The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss in its November 8, 2002 Order, noting that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 did not
constitute res judicata because a dismissal on laches
and failure to implead an indispensable party could
never be a dismissal on the
_______________
9 See the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780, CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
10 Presided by Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
11 Records, pp. 1-6.
12 Id., at p. 59.
156
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
merits.13 MBTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied for lack of merit in the trial court’s April
21, 2002 Order.14
Aggrieved, MBTC elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with an application for temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction, attributing grave
abuse of discretion to the trial court in denying its
motion to dismiss.15
In the meantime, a compromise agreement was
executed by Antonio and Clarita in which the latter
waived and condoned her claims against the former,
who in turn acknowledged his wife’s share in the
properties subject of the case. Antonio likewise
stipulated therein that he had not availed of any
mortgage loan from MBTC and that it was the bank
manager, Danilo Meneses, who facilitated the
manipulation of his account with the bank which led to
the constitution of the mortgage and the eventual
foreclosure thereof.16 The trial court approved the
compromise on November 5, 2003,17 thereby leaving
the case to proceed against MBTC.
On July 8, 2004, the Court of Appeals, finding merit
in MBTC’s petition, rendered the assailed Decision.18 It
held that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 on the
ground of laches should preclude the filing of Civil
Case No. 02-079 because the former had the effect of
an adjudication on the merits. Also, it pointed out that
inasmuch as the two cases presented identical issues
and causes of action and prayed for the same relief, the
second complaint must likewise suffer the effect of
laches. Citing Section 3,19 Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court, it
_______________
13 Id., at p. 213.
14 Records, p. 90.
15 CA Rollo, pp. 2-27.
16 Records, pp. 497-499.
17 Id., at pp. 500-501.
18 CA Rollo, pp. 140-144.
19 Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
157
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009 157
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
emphasized Clarita’s neglect to prosecute her claim
since it took her another two years since the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 99-177 to file Civil Case No. 02-079.
In conclusion, it held that the trial court indeed
gravely abused its discretion when it denied MBTC’s
motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the
dismissal of the complaint as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Order dated November 8, 2002 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 is REVERSED.
Civil Case No. 02-079 is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.” 20
Antonio and Clarita are now before this Court
assailing the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals.
They believe that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in directing the dismissal of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 02-079.
Both Antonio and Clarita advance that it was error
for the Court of Appeals to direct the dismissal of the
complaint in the present cases despite the fact that the
prior dismissal of the complaint for declaration of
nullity of mortgage and foreclosure in Civil Case No.
99-177 was predicated on Clarita’s failure to implead
Belen as an indispensable party therein which, in
effect, amounted to the court’s lack or jurisdiction to
act on the parties present and absent.21 Additionally,
Clarita posits that the principle of laches is not
applicable because an
_______________
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or nay order of
the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared
by the court.
20 CA Rollo, p. 538.
21 Rollo, (G.R. No. 165697), p. 17; Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 19-20.
158
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
action to declare the nullity of a mortgage contract is
imprescriptible.22
MBTC, for its part, argues that because the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780
ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 had
already become final, then the same should bar the
filing of Civil Case No. 02-079 inasmuch as the two
cases raised identical causes of action and issues and
prayed for the same relief.23 In particular, it also notes
that Clarita had failed to timely file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision and that the
motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio himself
should not be considered to redound to Clarita’s
benefit since Antonio, in the complaint filed before the
trial court, was impleaded as one of the defendants.24
The petitions are utterly unmeritorious.
A perusal of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55780, which ordered the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 99-177, tells that the complaint therein
was dismissed not on the ground of non-joinder of
Belen as an indispensable party, but rather on the
ground of laches. Indeed, what is clear from the said
decision is that the dismissal of the case was due to
Clarita’s unjustifiable neglect to timely initiate the
prosecution of her claim in court—a conduct that
warranted the presumption that she, although entitled
to assert a right, had resolved to abandon or declined
to assert the same.25
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the
nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches
from bringing such action at the first instance has
already been settled by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the pro-
_______________
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 19-20.
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 165697).
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 179-184.
25 See Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil 19, 33-34; 267 SCRA 339,
357 (1997).
159
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
ceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the
applicability of the principle of laches vis-à-vis the
imprescriptibility of Clarita’s cause of action because
the said decision is not the one on appeal before us.
But more importantly, the Court takes notice that the
decision rendered in that case had already become
final without any motion for reconsideration being
filed or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are
left with no other recourse than to uphold the
immutability of the said decision.
No other procedural law principle is indeed more
settled than that once a judgment becomes final, it is
no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or
reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or
the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is
void.26 The underlying reason for the rule is two-fold:
(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business,
and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the
risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies
cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang
in suspense for an indefinite period of time.27 As the
Court declared in Yau v. Silverio,28
“Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it
is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
159
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should
frown upon any attempt to prolong them.”
_______________
26 Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 520.
 27 Social Security System v. Isip, G.R. No. 165417, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA
310.
28 Supra note 26, at p. 531, citing Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786, April 17,
1989, 172 SCRA 211 (1983).
160
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction
of the judgment. Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule
and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savor the
fruit of his victory must immediately be struck
down.29 Thus, inHeirs of Wenceslao Samper v.
Reciproco-Noble,30 we had occasion to emphasize the
significance of this rule, to wit:
“It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system that
every litigation must come to an end x x x Access to the courts is
guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant’s rights
have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try.
The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if
endless litigations were to be encouraged, then unscrupulous litigants
will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of
justice.”
Moreover, laches, or what is known as the doctrine
of stale claim or demand, is the neglect or omission to
assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time
and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a
delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity
founded on some change in the condition of the
property involved or in the relations of the parties.31 It
is based on public policy which, for the peace of society,
ordains that relief will
_______________
29 Yau v. Silverio, Sr., supra note 26, at p. 531, citing Seven Brothers
Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 140613,
October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 67.
30 G.R. No. 142594, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 515, citing Pacquing v. Court of
Appeals, 200 Phil. 516; 115 SCRA 117 (1982).
31 De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506,
518.
161
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009 161
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be
a valid claim.32
As a ground for the dismissal of a complaint, the
doctrine of laches is embraced in the broad provision in
Section 133 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which
enumerates the various grounds on which a motion to
dismiss may be based. Paragraph (h) thereof states
that the fact that the claim or demand set forth in the 162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
or otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion plaintiff’s pleading” is broad enough to include within
to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on its ambit the defense of bar by laches.34
the relation of the words “abandoned” and “otherwise Moreover, what is striking is that a reading of the
extinguished” to the phrase “claim or demand set forth two complaints filed by Clarita one after the dismissal
in the of the other discloses that apart from the nature of the
actions, the allegations in support of the claims and
_______________ the reliefs prayed for in both complaints were but the
same. In her complaint in Civil Case No. 99-177,
32 Id.
denominated as an action for “declaration of nullity of
33 Section 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the answer
mortgage and foreclosure and sale of real property and
to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made
reconveyance with damages,” Clarita principally
on any of the following grounds:
demanded the reconveyance of at least her conjugal
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
share in the subject property, while claiming that the
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
registration of the properties as well as the mortgage
(c) That the venue is improperly laid;
thereof in favor of MBTC had been made without her
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
knowledge and consent.35 Yet in the complaint in Civil
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
Case No. 02-079, denominated as one for “declaration
same cause;
of nullity of TCT Nos. 155256, 155257, 155258 and for
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
reconveyance with damages,” Clarita relied on the
limitations;
same allegations embodied in her first complaint and
(g) That the pleading asserting a claim states no cause of action;
prayed for the same relief of reconveyance of at least
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been
her conjugal share in the property, while additionally
paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
seeking the declaration of nullity of the TCTs
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the
registered in the name of Antonio and Belen.36
provisions of the statute of frauds; and
Verily, we find no reason not to adhere to the
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has been complied with.
finding of the Court of Appeals that inasmuch as the
162
two cases successively instituted by Clarita were
founded on the same claim and would have called for
the same set of or similar evidence to support them,
then Civil Case No. 02-079 which is the subject of the
present petitions may well be deemed already barred
by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177.
Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court materially
provides:
_______________
34 Pineda v. Heirs of Guevarra.
35 See the Complaint in Civil Case No. 99-177, Records, pp. 136-141.
36 See the Complaint in Civil Case No. 02-078, Id., at pp. 1-6.
163
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
“Section 5. Effect of dismissal.—Subject to the right of appeal,
an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i)
of Section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.”
In United Coconut Planters Bank v.
Belus37 andStrongworld Construction Corporation v.
Perello,38 the Court held that where the complaint is
dismissed on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations; or that the claim or demand set forth in
the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; or that the
claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable
under the provisions of the statute of frauds, such
dismissal operates as one with prejudice and which
therefore precludes the filing of another action based
on the same claim. Hence, according to Madrigal v.
Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation, such dismissal already constitutes res
39
judicata.
The principle of res judicata denotes that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points
and matters determined in their former suit.40 It
obtains where a court of competent jurisdiction has
rendered a final judgment or order on the merits of the
case, which operates as an absolute bar against a
163
subsequent action for the same cause.41 A substantial
identity is necessary to warrant the application of the
rule, and the addition or elimination of some parties or
the difference in form and na-
_______________
37 G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 567, 602.
38 G.R. No. 148026, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 700, 716.
39 G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 138.
40 Taganas v. Emuslan, G.R. No. 146980, September 2, 2003, 410 SCRA 237.
41 State Investment Trust Inc. v. Delta Motors Corporation, G.R. No. 144444,
April 3, 2003, 400 SCRA 509; Dela Rama v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 135394, April 29,
2003, 401 SCRA 704.
164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
ture of the two actions would not alter the
situation.42 In other words, when material facts or
questions in issue in a former action were conclusively
settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or
questions constitute res judicata and may not be again
litigated in a subsequent action between the same
parties or their privies regardless of the form of the
latter.43
Petitioners furthermore raise that the constitution
of the mortgage was the result of the fraudulent act
committed by MBTC’s branch manager and Belen, and
for that reason the proceeds derived from it did not
redound to the benefit of their conjugal
partnership.44 But because this issue is factual in
nature and hence, not appropriately cognizable in a
Rule 45 petition where only questions of law may
generally be raised, the Court is left with no other
option than to decline to rule on the same. Anent the
question raised by MBTC of whether Clarita had
timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals, we find no necessity
to expound on the matter since in view of the
foregoing, the petitions at bar must be denied in any
event.
As a final word, it needs no elucidation that the
solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced
by its appointed organs, should be regarded as a final
and conclusive determination of the question litigated,
and should forever set the controversy at rest. Public
policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite time fixed by law. For, after all,
the very object for which courts were constituted was
to put an end to controversies.45
_______________
42 Dela Rama v. Mendiola, supra note 41.
43 Id.
44 Rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 378-380; Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 21-25.
45 Mata v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 525; 318 SCRA 416 (1999),
citingLegarda v. Savellano, 158 SCRA 194 (1988).
165
VOL. 594, AUGUST 4, 2009 165
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
All told, we find this basic rule decisive of the
present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165697
and 166481 are DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76872, which ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-079, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—There is “bar by former judgment” when,
between the first case where the judgment was
rendered, and the second case where such judgment is
invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action. There is “conclusiveness of judgment”
where between the first case wherein the judgment is
rendered and the second case wherein such judgment
is invoked, there is no identity of cause of action, the
judgment being conclusive in the second case only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. (Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 492
[1996])
The time-honored doctrine of immutability of
judgments states that except for correction of clerical
errors, final and executory judgments can neither be
amended or altered. (Swire Agricultural Products, Inc.
vs. Hyundai Corporation, 460 SCRA 77 [2005])
——o0o——