Nature of Class Struggle in Bangladesh

Author(s): B. K. Jahangir
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 50 (Dec. 10, 1977), pp. 2063-2066
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4366181
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 Nature of Class Struggle in Bangladesh
B K jahangir

While the forces of production in post-colonial Bangladesh have continued to remain relatively
stagnant, there has been a constanit struggle to transform the existing relationis of production to the
advantage of this or that contending group. During the regime of Sheikh Mujib, the rural rich contended
successfully for political power; and even though this class lost political power at the national level
followving the political changes in the later part of 1975, it continues to be dominant in the rural areas.
This article examines the nature and significance of these changing production relations in
Bangladesh.
THE process of capital accumulation
in Bangladesh has generated class
differentiations within the economy of
small peasant producers (Sobban, 1968,
Alamgir, 1976). The pressure of the
of the market, various agricultural and
economic policies of the government
and the nature of the State have all
affected the forms of landed property
and the labour system (Abdullah, et al
1976, Abdullab, 1976). The changes
in the land-property system and in the
forms of labour-power transformed
land and labour into commodities. The
differentiation process that developed
led to the stabilisation of a rich pea-
sant layer on the one hand, and a
depressed layer of impoverished mid-
dle and poor peasants on the other. In
such a process, the landless peasant
and the poor peasant not only become
labourers, but also become consumers
of foodstuffs purchased at local shop,
etc. Their main source of livelihood
consists of wages; and along with
other peasants, they buy in the market
goods which previously did not go
through the market system. The latter
is controlled by the rural rich and by
the urban investors and, is affected by
the government's agricultural and
economic policies (Jahangir, 1976).
All this has resulted in a social
polarisation in the rural agriculture
sector of the national economy. Capital
accumulation, generated by the natio-
nal economy, has had a differential
repercussion on agriculture: much of
this capital has accumulated in the
hands of the rural rich and the urban
businessmen, and even the rich pea-
sants invest some parts of their
profits outside agriculture (Jahangir,
1976). Galeski (1975) pinpoints the
problem: "Many of the social effects
of the process of capital accumulation
occurring in the village - and quite
often its basic effects - have repercus-
sions not so much in the countryside
as in the towns". Thus, sapital accu-
mulation in rural areas cannot be
analysed as an isolated phenomenon,
for it is an integral part of the natio-
nal economy. Capitalistic development
in the post-colonial period (Alavi, 1975)
in Bangladesh is uneven and has
produced two interlinked but contra-
dictory effects in the rural areas.
Firstly, it has generated class differ-
entiations within the peasantry and has
shaped the polarisation process;
secondly, it has determined the placing
of the different peasant classes within
the wider social structure and has
defined the role of agriculture within
the national economy.
The agricultural, commercial and
economic policies pursued by the
State, both in the colonial and the
post-colonial periods (Alamgir, 1975,
Abdullah, 1976, Sobhan and Ahmad,
1976) produced muitually interlinked
and contradictory structures in the
rural areas. All these structures are
interlinked through the process of
change in the system of ownership and
control of the means of production and
through the concentration of capital
accumnulation. In a peasant society
like Bangladesh, where private owner-
ship of means of production is consti-
tuitionally guaranteed, the poorer
peasants have little access to the means
of production. As a social class it is
the r-ich peasants who control the
means of production. The latter are
the main decision makers in the rural
areas (Rashiduzzaman, 1968, Jahan,
1972). They also control the sources
of economic and political power.
However, the government is the
principal agency of development in
Bangladesh. The State is the major
owner of the means of production
through the nationalisation of banks,
insurance companies, transportation
and large industries (Sobban and
Ahmad, 1976), and thus, those social
groups that control political powei
also control an important sector of the
means of production by formulating
economic policies and taking deci-
sions concerning investments, credits,
purchases, duties and taxes. Seen in
this light, political power is crucial in
the analysis of socials inequality and
social conflict. Ownership of land is
one form of control over the means
of production in the rural areas; but
that control is reinforced by control
over the means of production natio-
nally, which itself rests upon political
power. Hence in the Bangladesh
rural situation we find that class
differentiation is shaped both by access
to the means of production and by
access to political power.
From this perspective, all rural
development programmes and agrarian
reform initiated by the government are
likely to generate social conflict. In
both the colonial and post-colonial
periods, land reform and agricultural
policies did not lead to the destruction
of rural privileged groups and to the
creation of a new social and political
order (Abdullab, 1976). Rather, they
helped to strengthen an expanding rich
peasant category and were primarily
designed to induce the growth of
agricultural output needed to, comple-
ment industrial development, Thus,
land reform and agricultural strategies,
instead of destroying the power-base
of the rural elite, enlarged their
social base and linked them with the
national power structure. Economic
policies initiated by the post-colonial
State affected productive forces directly
and influenced the other elements in-
directly. At present, in Bangladesh,
land, agricultural, trade and economic
policies are intended to increase the
existing productive means. These
means in the rural areas are controlled
by the rich peasants, and consequently,
their position becomes more entrenched
in the socio-economic and political
structures. Peasants are now mainly
exploited through a private property
system which curbs the effective use of
labour power, tools and draught
animals, and fails to stimulate enthu-
siasm for work or increase peasant's
co-operation and solidarity.
While capitalism develops the forces
of production on a national scale in
the post-colonial situation of Bangla-
desh, the nation state guarantees the

2063
December 10, 1977
existing relations of production. This
situation produces and intensifies un-
even development and combines already
established patterns of exploitation and
modern forms of economic activity.
The State in the post-colonial situation
is linked to factional competition be-
cause resources are distributed un-
equally among the peasantry as part
of the process of 'intervention' or
'penetration' by the State. The com-
petition that occurs within the rich
peasant class is an instance of this.
As the State is associated with one
pattern of distribution and not another,
the institutions of the State generate
factionalism in their allocative deci-
sions. Thus competition within the
rich peasant class and allocative deci-
sions by the State reinforce the
factional mode of operation. This link
between the rich peasant class and the
State institutions contributes to the
strength and solidarity of the dominant
classes both in rural and urban areas.
Competition among the rich peasants
is another name for entering into new
alliances. - These are necessary to
provide a secure environment for pro-
ductive investments. In this way, the
factionat struggles of the rich peasants
and the rural entrepreneurs develop
into a class alliance which extend into
the towns and administration. This
alliance is composed of rich peasants,
rural entrepreneurs and urban investors
in agriculture. These, in turn, are
clpsely aligned with the bureaucracy,
the dominant political parties and the
larger urban financiers.
But how far has this alliance of the
dominant classes hindered the emerg-
ence of class solidarity among the poor
peasants and the landless labourers?
The formation of capital in the post-
colonial situation has eroded loyalties
previously structured by kinship and
has, for example, undermined certain
vertical relationships of interdepend-
ence (Jahangir, 1976). This is reflected
in the growing ' importance of wage
labour. The rapid rise in the prices
of agricultural commodities and' the
expansion of the cultivated area and
improved crop yields have increased
the seasonal demand for labour at
harvest time. What then would be the
outcome if, for example, the poor
peasants and the landless labourers
demanded an increase in the wage
rate ? The rich peasant could do two
things. Either he could use his con-
tacts to obtain labour-displacing
machines (tractors, etc) or he could
activate his network to get political
backing in order to confront the poor
2064
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
peasants and the landless labourers
forcefully. In such a situation the poor
peasants and the landless labourers
must also have their own organisation
to confront the rich peasant (Wood,
1974). This highlights the objective
interests of respective 'classes. In the
one case, factional conflict among the
rich peasant category turns into class
alliance; and in the other, vertical
interdependence gives way to class
solidarity. Thus a class struggle
emerges involving cleavages within the
village.
We may further explore the prob-
lems of class solidarity and class
conflict in relation to development
programmes. The existing conflicts
between the privileged and under-
privileged peasants influence attitudes
develop-
towards programmes of
ment. Different classes in the rural
area will evaluate the programmes of
development from their own perspec-
tives, assessing whether the program-
me will strengthen their power, and
enlarge their social base, or alternatively
whether it will weaken the ruling
group and introduce new forces into
the political terrain. These conflicting
outlooks affect class solidarity and the
nature of the class struggle. In the
case of the rich peasants, class soli-
darity at the village level is rathei
loose, and their factional fights do not
directly threaten their overall class
interests. They compete among them-
selves for control over the existing
resources, but at the same time impose
their domination over the rest of the
peasant population. In the case of
the underprivileged peasants, class
solidarity is forged locally and is rein-
forced by their links with the left-
wving political parties, but is rather
loose regionally or nationally.
Thus, the pace of class solidarity and
class struggle has depended on three
factors: (a) the state of the national
economy, (b) the mediating role of the
political parties and the political elite,
and (c) the characteristics of the speci-
fic local situation. The slow growth of
capitalism has affected the social for-
mation and deforned the emergence
of a national economy with an elabo-
rate division of labour on a national
scale. It has kept the class struggle
fragmented and has debarred the
possibility of an alliance of the poorer
peasantry across regions.
It is necessary now to discuss the
mediating role of the political parties
and political elite in relation to the
political economy of pre- and post-
colonial Bangladesh. The national
elite group of the British colonial
period was composed of surplus peas-
ants and an urban professional class
(Abdull-ah 1976; Mukerjee, 1957; Bell,
1942). The more immediate objective
of political movements during this
period was to achieve national libera-
tion from colonial domination on the
one hand, and from Hindu domination
on the other. For these reasons, issues
relating to rural development or radical
agrarian reform were never focused
sharply. After the partition of India
in 1947, the Act of 1950 was promul-
gated which abolished the Permanent
Settlement systemn.This Act effectively
eliminated Hindu domination. It also
set an upper ceiling on land-holding at
33 acres. The historical and cumula-
tive polarisation process intensified
rural stratification. This gained momen-
tum because of the flow of surplus
extracted from rural Bangladesh and
the steady expansion of a capitalist
mode of production within the one-
state structure of Pakistan. In the
second colonial setting, the character
of political movements was marked by
the struggle to establish the legitimate
position of the Bengalis in the politico-
administrative decision-making process
and to put an end to the exploitation
of Bangladesh by the West Pakistan
capitalists (Alavi, 1971; Jahan, 1972).
The political parties in power or in
opposition in Bangladesh during the
second colonial imposition seldom came
face to face with the people in the
rural areas or confronted the issues of
social and economic development. At
the same time, no significant challenge
to the leadership came from the
peasants. The attitude of the Bengali
bourgeoisie towards the policies of
Bengali nationalism was one of guarded
support. They gained greatly from
the policies of nationalism but at the
same ti'me were afraid of its leftward
gravitation. These pressures of colo-
nial and class exploitation during the
second colonial period brought about
the extreme polarisation between the
two wings of Pakistan regionally as
well as between rural classes national-
ly. From this double polarisation sprang
up a unique alliance between the
politics of Bengali nationalism and the
different classes, which culminated in
liberation.
However, after the establishment of
Bangladesh, the clash between the
two types of politics became more
pronounced. The ruling party, the
Awami League, introduced land reforms
limiting o}wnershipto .33 acres (which
had been upgraded to 125 acres during,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY December 10, 1977

Avub's regime) and eliminated tax on in imiarketedsurplus and at the same 3(}0 per cent. Eventually, internal
landc upto 8.3 acres. But the Awami time pressed for terms of trade even security became a problem of both
Leagtue refrained from introducing more favourable to agriculture. economic and political imnportance,
fundlamental structural changes in the given the governmenit's clear inability
The Awami League was founded
rural areas. A new era of patronage to control the numerous pro-govern-
upon an alliance between urban and
started. All these together produced ment paramilitary forces (Mujibbahini,
Kulak interests (Ali, 1975; Alavi, 1971;
an inflationary pressure which tended Lalbahani, etc) and the left-wing gueril-
in Forum, March 13, 1971). An important la groups.
to reinforce the polarisation process
featture of this alliance was that the
the rural areas during the post-colonial Thus, Sheikh Mujib's regime failed
in l)ourgeois forces were less dominant,
period. The climax w,as reached to incorporate the largely populist
since the Kulak sought to legitimise
the floods and famine of 1974 with the masses into a representative democracy.
and secure their own interests by pene-
dleaths of many peasants, the aliena- It could not satisfy the rural rich
trating the opposition parties as a
tion of many from the land and the without losing urban middle class sup-
precaution against the advent of non-
enrichment of others (Alamgir 1976: port and risking a military reaction. It
Awami League ministries. This pene-
Yunus, 1976). was this dilemma that influenced Sheikh
tration had its impact on the policy
Mujib's decision to form one 'national'
It is necessary, in this context, to formulation of the pro-Moscow Com-
examine Bangladesh land legislation munist party (Khan, 1972) and of the party. He hoped that this would be
either an opportunity for political ac-
policies and the actual effect of the National Socialist Party (Gonokontho,
commodation, or at least serve as a
land legislation programme upon the 197.3, January 10). They- all opted for
manoeuvre to defuse the situation. It
agrarian structure and upon the the present land ceiling and gave
guarded support for land distribution. was neither. BAKSAL (Bangladesh
marketed surplus.
In Bangladesh, where peasants consti- Krisak Sramik AwaamiLeague) revital-
Sheikh Mujib's government strength- tute a majority of the population, a ised the political base, and at the same
ened the rich peasants by abolishing secure, rural power hase is indispens- time rejected any compromise with
agricultural taxation and by subsidising able if constitutional politics is to be the military. On the other hand, the
agricultural inputs. In the post- preserved. In this way, both the ruling government policies were enough to
liberation period cereal prices were six and the opposition parties sanctioned create military and middle class cons-
to eight times higher from pre-libera- the ascendancy of the Kulaks, and ternation (YuLnus,1976).
tion prices, and in certain cases, they within the system the Kulaks and the
The country becamnea case study in
were even higher than the prices of bourgeoisie continued their battle for
economic stagnation, social tensions
some manufactured goods. Though power.
and political violence. Price inflation
agriculture's taxable capacity was
Duiring Sheikh Mujib's regime, the accelerated; wage inflation, despite
increased and the marketed surpluis
controls, followed; and with these, in
exhibited a definite upward tendency, country was livirng on a knife edge.
1975, there was devaluation. As a
Sheikh Mujib's government was re- Politically, there was no open challenge
result, the middle class found its
luctant to tax agriculture, and even to the regime. But this was achieved
withdrew certain measures which by an authoritarian rule so severe that prosperity crumbling and its goals
receding, though, a few people, includ-
faced stiff opposition from the agri- opposition could come only from the
ing some close to the government,
cultural bloc in Parliament. The go- liberal mniddleclass element alarmed
continued to do well. The military
vernment at this juncture prepared itA by the kind of State being created in
was reacting increasingly and madle a
first plan document (Planning Com- their name. The economic policies
mission: The First Five-Year Plan, created deeper divisions between decisive entry into politics by staging
a series of coups (August 15, 1975;
1973) which gave emphasis to rapid classes and regions. These latter cir-
industrialisation. This was a someewhat cumstances did not outweigh the November 3, 1975; November 7, 1975).
paradoxical situation, because the attraction of personal affluence to most The n-ew rulers are basically suppor-
government, on the one hand, supported middle class citizens, who seemed . to ters of urban interests and are deter-
the rural sector, and on the other, laid be caught up in a vortex of instant mriinedto release reserves from agri-
a plan for all-out industrialisation, thus constumption tintouched by efforts to culture for industrialisation. Towards
failing to exploit agricultures' taxable tuirn prosperity to national advantage. that end they have withdrawn subsidies
capacity. In this battle between rural The country's consumer boom was from agricultural inputs and have
and urban bias, during Mujib's period, financed not hy domestic production introduced miieasures to extract sur-
rural interest gained. As rural bias b,luthv foreign money and aid. How- pluses from agriculture. These mea-
operated in favour of rich peasant, it ever, the government failed to reduce sures, which mostly affect the poor and
was this class that benefited from economic and social polarisation; nor a section of the middle peasants, are
favourable terms of trade, subsidies at did it control inflation. Instead, govern- manoeuvres aimed at siphoning off
the expense of other social groups, ment began by experimenting with capital fi om agricultural production for
and exemption from an associated set draconian measures to restrict wages investment in urban industrial growth
of taxes. Land legislation, govern- and to encourage exports. But these and at more effectively controlling the
ment agricultural and trade policies measures were unsuccessful, largely powerful class of rich peasants and-
thus changed the agrarian structure because oL the composition of the limiting their political power (jahan.
and tilted it in favour of the rich ruling party, the trade union and the 1976).
peasant and paved the Nway for the bureauicracy (Sobhan and Ahmad,
we find in post-colonial
development of capitalist agriculture. 1976). The Budgets of 1974 and 1975 Thus,
With it a powerful pressure group became unbalanced; reserves were Bangladesh the power elites striving
emerged wvhich helped the growth of depleted and inflation ran riot, with to increase production by shifting the
agricultural output and a steady rise the cost of living index rising by somei emphasis within the existing produlc-

2065
 10, 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
December

tioIi relations. During Sheikh Mujib's Crises of Pakistan', The Socialist ment in Bangladesh", Legislative
power bloc Register, (ed) Ralph Milibanvi and Studies Quarterly.
period the agricultural Jahangir, B K (1976): "Differentiation,
John Saville.
l)ecame a contender for national powei Alavi, H (1973): 'Peasant Classes and Polarisation and Confrontation in
hut in the changed context, their Primodial Loyalties', The Journal of Rural Bangladesh", unpublished PhD
position has lecome subordinate to Peasant Studies, Volume I, Number Thesis, University of Durham.
the urban power l)Ioc. But though I. Durham.
Alavi, H (1975): 'India and the Colo- Khan, A R (1972): "The Economy of
their position is subordinate now na- nial Mode of Production', The Socia- Bang-ladesh".
tionally, in the rural areas they continue list Register, (ed) Ralph Miliband and Mukerjee, R (1957): "The Dynamics
to be dominant. Against this domina- John Saville. of Rural Society".
tion is fragmented resistance. Although Ali, T (1975): 'Pakistan and Bangla- Rashiduzzaman, M (1968): "Politics
agrarian struiggles are spearheaded bx desh: Results and Prospects', "Ex- and Administration in the Local
the different left-wing parties, the plosion in Subcontinent: India, Councils: A Study of Union and
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Cevlon", District Coumcils in East Pakistan".
ideological differences among them are (ed) Robin Blackburn. Soblhan,R (1968): "Basic Democracies,
sbarp and attempts to link their
Bell, F 0 (1942): Final Report on the Works Programme and Rural Deve-
separate mnovement into one have so in lopment in East Pakistan".
Suirveql and Settlemient Operation
far been unsuccessful. This suggests the District of Dinaipur, 1939-40 Sobhb,n, R and Abmad, Muzaffer
that, in this context, fiagmentation of Government of Bengal, Alipore, (1976): "Public Enterprise in an
Bengal Government Press. Intermediate Regime".
the class struggle rather than primnor- Wood, G (1974): "The Political Pro-
Forum, Dacca, (1971 March 13).
dial loyalties (Alavi, 197:3), makes the Caleski, B (1975): "Basic Concept of cess in Rural Bangladesh- A Re-
peasants sometimes passive and indif- Rural Sociology". search Note" (mimeo).
ferent. Since fragmentation results Gon,okontho, Dacca, (1973 January 10). Yunus, S (1976): 'The Bureaucratic
f'rom the combination of the slow Jahan, R (1972): "Pakistan: Failure and Military Elites in Bangladesh',
growth of the economy, the ideological in National Integration". Bangladesh: Past and Present, Vol-
Jahan, R (1976): "Members of Parlia- Itine I, Number 2.
differences within the left and the
localised nature of political confronta-
tion, these factors account for the
temporary, and defensive
piecemeal,
struggles in rural GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS & ECONOMICS
nature of class
Bangladesh. Nevertheless, it is true PUNE 411004
that certain new forms of conscious-
ness are revealed by peasant action. Applications are invited for the following:
They are most marked in the relations 1) Lecturers and Research Associates
between peasant and the local agents
Whereas Minimum Qualification: A Second Class Bachelor's and Master's Degree
of the State bureaucracy.
in Economics together with Ph.D. in Economics.
the rural rich are structurally aligned
with the bureaucracy and the domi- 2) Research Assistants
nant political parties, the poor peasants, Minimum Qualification: A Second Class Bachelor's and Master's De-
organised by the left-wing, operate gree in Economics.
mainly in the local areas. The latteiL
attempts to challenge the existing 3) Three U. G. G.'s Senior Research Fellowships (Post-doctoral)
national power structure from a class at Rs. 600 p. m.
position, which, because of increasing College/University teachers without a Ph.D. but with some published
economic differentiation and polarisa- research are also eligible for Senior Fellowships.
tion, is becoming more clearly defined. One Senior Research Fellowship (Post-doctoral) for Studies
4)
In this way, the process of differenti-
expands the potential area of
in Economics of East European Countries at Rs. 600 p. m.
ation East
tension and dissatisfaction, and gives Knowledge of East European language and research work on the
European Economy is preferable.
shape to the forms and intensity of
po)litical confrontation at both village 5) Three Junior Research Fellowships. in the Centre for Studies
and national levels. in Economics of East European Countries
Master's
Minimum Qualification: At least a Second Class Bachelor's and
References Degree together with knowledge of East European language pre-
Abduliah, A (1976): 'Land Reform and ferable.
Agrarian Change in Bangladesh',
The BanglaideshDevelopment Studies, 6) One Junior Research Fellowship of the Reserve Bank of
Volume IV, Number 1. India for Ph. D. in Finance
Abdullah, A Mosharaff, H and Nations, Mas-
R (1976): 'Agrarian Structure and Minimum Qualification: At l1ast a Second Class Bachelor's and
the IRDP-Preliminary Considera- ter's Degree in Economics.
tions', The Bangladesh Development obtain-
Review, Volume IV, Number 2. Prescribed application forms and further particulars may be
Alamgir, M (1975): "Diagnosis of Agri- ed from the Registrar. Application form duly completed should reach
culture Sector and Evaluation of the undersigned before 16th January 1978.
Politics: A Case Study of Bangla-
desh" (mimeo). V. M. Dandekar
Alamgir, M (1976): "Bangladesh: A Director
Case of Below Poverty Level Equili-
brium Trap" (miimeo).
Alavi, H (1971): 'Bangladesh and the

2066