Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of
all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
 done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-
666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of
a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice
of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of
law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the
Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work.
And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that
which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal
profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip,
a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen
whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-
giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the
corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy
of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of
major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of
the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have
some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex
legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer,
earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number
of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations
farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a
staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction
may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to
deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into
the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of
the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively
small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted
by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching
method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which
are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need
to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but
with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has
gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as
barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ
from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of
all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
 indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work
with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning
and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate
all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved
in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They
differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It
needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to
give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able
to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991,
p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of
their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional
security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his
oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the
instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups,
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies
that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the
meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3)
conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting
and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the
work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or
an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the
only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation,
the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped
notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is
far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others
on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.

Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.

Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.

Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM:

This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991 by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and
Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The respondent
is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a
damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.

Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil
nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne &
Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).

Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in
Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose P.
Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).

Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the
profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20, 1991, he was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice.
Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not effectively reform him.

The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court of Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation,
report and recommendation. The following are Judge Bernad's findings:

The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She
complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr.
Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five
(5) days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.

However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child.

Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages
against the hospital and the attending physicians of his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint entitled: "Attorney
Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong.

On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were
entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles.

On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs.
Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles
and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the
folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the office.

Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia
near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car).
When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what
she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given
the papers which he had filched from medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back to
chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to
her office.

In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give
her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared
that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the
crumpled pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to
the man.

After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in a dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital
where she later regained consciousness.

In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were
recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit a
formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.

A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in
Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and asked
for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his province by Grecia.

He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."

PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".

The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina
Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.

On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.

At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No.
3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro, counsel of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical folder
which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for
Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of
paper. Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered the courthouse.

Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the
detached pages of the medical record was actually "planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.

He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's
"Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He did
not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He
branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the act imputed to him, because the medical
chart was the very foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered why the man, alleged to be his driver, to
whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical chart, was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even established.

He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had never seen him before.

He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the
medical record and he alleged that the unidentified man remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.

In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina
Robles entirely credible and "without any noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination" (p.
11, Judge Bernad's Report).

That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on
seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record, was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they had
the presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith took appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and
PO3 Alabastro had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's "driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting him
led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical chart.

Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the man was fruitless for he was never seen again.

Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an
unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed
to mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.

His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who,
he knew, had been looking for the man to ascertain his identity.

In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and
candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on
July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not
sharp when he was cross-examined regarding more recent events. For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the
truth is that a hearing was held on that date as shown by the transcript.

When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in
court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the chart be left with the clerk of court.

His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause
is specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to
stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.

On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By
stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:

Canon 1. . . .

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60
A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of
justice."

The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court
repeatedly.

. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer
can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this
end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-
14.)

. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the
discharge of professional duties as a member of the bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)

. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients and the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan
Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)

By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral
unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for
conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs.
Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, p. 15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer.
Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty
of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963

PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member
of the Bar;1 that they were married on 27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that she supported him and spent for his
studies; that after passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the
Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children. She prayed
that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice and a copy of the complaint. 3The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter, which was received in this Court on 4,
October 1956, averring that the complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for the
suspension or disbarment of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer could not be made in the logical
sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity in the filing of the complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June
1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him three children is not true because her very informant, whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit
to the effect that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children referred to by the
complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding. Attached to his answer are the affidavit of
Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9
October 1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of
the case was received by the Office of the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957
and 5 August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during which the complainant presented her evidence both oral and
documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his
behalf but reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife and immorality
for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the
Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to answer the same within 15 days
from receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958 the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground "that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the
Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13
September 1958 the respondent filed a motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or, that, should it be denied,
he be given a period of ten days within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be returned to the Solicitor General for reception
of his evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in
abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and was given a
period of 15 days within which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt
of a copy of the respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958, within the extension of time previously granted, the respondent
filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in reply.

Section 6, Rule 128, provides:

The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the
case, if the respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any
intention of introducing additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer or upon the expiration of the
time to file the same. (Emphasis supplied)

The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer
to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the
answer. Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present evidence in his
behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present
evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed
in this Court.

The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law student, were
married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they lived in the house of her
parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Far Eastern
University,5 and she remained in Camiling to practice her profession. While the respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camiling once a week
or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to
Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived with his brother Cleto and
Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about three or four months before his graduation. On
the day of his graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that she was a
nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for the bar examinations. She
specifically mentioned that three days before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again came to see him.
Since then they became actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned
that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked her to
follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either.

Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the respondent, his
family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and
wife, and have a child named Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived with them. The couple slept together in the same room with their
daughter Angie and ate their meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out somewhere. The respondent used to
call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and
has resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent because he headed a survey party that surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to
the landless. Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's place of residence and office at Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an
Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of residence and office. Among those
who lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town).
He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's place of
residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at
about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station
wagon behind the respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of
the station wagon in their proper places and while he was helping Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for money to
buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."

The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child
has been established by the testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been put to a severe and searching
test by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and cross-examined the witnesses during the
investigation. Asked by the investigating Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or coached her on what to
testify or whether she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration, Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward manner
answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell nothing but the truth
about the respondent's affair with his paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify at the investigation; and that she
was not promised anything by way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the
witness how she was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, which could be
a motive for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister; that they paid
regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded her for she was a
woman of few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the reason she left them was because she just felt lonesome for her parents.
Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as a woman of fair complexion.
Comparing her (Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer
figure, because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with Corazon, the
Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and
she replied that she had not.

Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the complainant, and
Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the
complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description of the respondent's paramour, the witness
stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer figure than the
complainant.

The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in education, and
understands little English. She did not even finish the sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive questions propounded to her by the
investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by the respondent himself would have revealed herself if she was
lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to understand the
questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of more than
average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her confusion was compounded.
Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth.
And even if his testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.

The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in evidence during the
investigation.

The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree
of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar.6

THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,

vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral
conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo
who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named
John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a
religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife
was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet,
Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and
cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a
laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F,
which were confirmed by their testimonies.

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head
of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five
photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to
85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun,
corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with
Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent
quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional
obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the
complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his
adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming
carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August
14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain
the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 481 February 28, 1969

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST ARTURO P. LOPEZ.

VIRGINIA C. ALMIREZ assisted by her father, AGAPITO ALMIREZ complainants,
vs.
ARTURO P. LOPEZ, respondent.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Respondent Arturo P. Lopez is sought to be disbarred upon the ground of immorality. Complainant Virginia C. Almirez, assisted by her father Agapito
Almirez, charges him with having succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, under promise of marriage, which he failed and refused to fulfill, despite
a child begotten in consequence thereof.

In his answer, respondent denied having ever had or solicited any sexual relation with the complainant, but affirmed that they had agreed to be married
as soon as he became financially stable; that he could not carry out his part of the agreement having discovered, on April 4, 1961, that complainant was
pregnant by another man; and that she filed the present charges out of spite for him, in view of his refusal to marry her.

Upon investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred, the latter submitted his report finding respondent guilty as
charged, and then filed the corresponding complaint for his disbarment.

In his answer thereto, respondent reiterated, in effect, the allegations and defenses made and set up in his previous answer. He, moreover, averred that,
while the matter was being investigated in the Office of the Solicitor General, complainant had filed an affidavit stating that he (respondent) is not the
father of her child and a motion withdrawing her complaint.

Respondent having, moreover, expressed the wish to introduce additional evidence, the Court dated its Legal Officer-Investigator for the reception
thereof, after which the latter submitted his report concurring in the findings of the Solicitor General, although recommending merely the suspension of
respondent herein. After furnishing him with a copy of this report, the case was set for hearing, at which a representative of the Solicitor General and
counsel for respondent appeared and were given a period to file their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

The record shows that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957 and has been engaged in the practice of law in Manila. After meeting the
complainant then about 23 years of age — in Mauban, Quezon — of which their families are residents — sometime in December, 1958, respondent
courted her by correspondence. Presently, they became sweethearts. Complainant having come to Manila in November, 1960 and operated therein a
store, in partnership with others, respondent used to visit her. Although he had told the complainant, as early as May 1960, of his intent to marry her, it
was understood that the wedding would take place upon consummation of a given deal in which he expected to make a big amount of money. From
November, 1960 to April, 1961, they had carnal knowledge of each other, several times, in various hotels in Manila, particularly the Palo Alto Hotel, the
Springfield Hotel, and the Shanghai Hotel. On December 31, 1960, complainant informed respondent that her menstruation was overdue, whereupon he
caused her to be examined by a lady physician, who found that she was in the family way. Thereupon, he gave her some pills, to be taken three (3)
times a day, for the alleged purpose of hastening the flow of her menstruation. Then, he called her up, day and night, to inquire about her menses and,
when the same did not eventually come, he urged her to see another lady doctor, who could perform an abortion. Complainant was averse thereto, but,
respondent was so insistent that she went to the clinic of said physician. The operation was not performed, however, for neither the latter nor
complainant were agreeable thereto. On August 22, 1961, complainant gave birth to a baby boy, Francisco Arnold, at the Maternity and Children's
Hospital in Manila.

Prior thereto, or late in February, 1961, their respective applications for a marriage license were filed and their marriage license was issued on March 13,
but, the wedding, scheduled for March 18, 1961, did not take place, owing to the absence of the Mayor who was to solemnize it. On April 6, 1961,
complainant learned, from her sister-in-law, that respondent had confided to the latter his unwillingness to marry her (complainant). When, soon
thereafter, complainant asked him for his reason therefor, respondent blamed her for refusing to undergo an abortion. Thereupon, or on April 18, 1961,
she filed the complaint herein.

It further appears that on September 25, 1962, while this case was pending in the Office of the Solicitor General a motion signed by the complainant,
withdrawing her complaint, was filed with said office. The reason given was that the complaint was "a result of serious misunderstanding" and had been
filed "in the heat of anger" and that it would be unjustified to proceed further on account of complainant's belief in his innocence. This motion was,
however, withdrawn by her, on November 25, 1963, for the reason that respondent had secured her signature thereto upon the assurance that he would
thereupon marry her and that he did not only fail to do so, but, also, married another woman. In fact, respondent and one Evelyn Orense were married in
January, 1963.

Upon the other hand, respondent would have us believe that complainant had freely and voluntarily signed her aforesaid motion to withdraw her
complaint. In fact, he added, she made the affidavit, Exhibit 34, stating that he is not the father of her child. In rebuttal, complainant testified, however,
that she signed said motion and a blank sheet of paper, which is now the affidavit Exhibit 34, he having convinced her that they would be married soon
thereafter.lawphi1.nêt

He, likewise, tried to prove, through his testimony that it was complainant who asked him to take her nightclubbing in Manila, which he did; that it was
she who asked him, at the Bayside Nightclub, on December 31, 1960, to marry her; that she reiterated this request in January, 1961, for fear that her
father may call her back to Mauban; that she having brought up the same subject in February, 1961, they signed the necessary applications late in
February, 1961, and got the corresponding marriage license sometime later, although the wedding, scheduled for March 18, had to be postponed
indefinitely because of the absence of the officer, who was to solemnize it; that after a drinking spree in Manila, in the evening of April 4, 1961, he felt it
would be unwise for him to drive his car home to Quezon City, in view of which he decided to spend the night at the Shanghai Hotel; that while there, he
remembered having an appointment with complainant, whom he, accordingly, called by telephone to apologize to her and informed her of his condition
and whereabouts; that soon later, complainant arrived unexpectedly at the hotel and asked permission to sleep with him there, stating that she had
quarreled with her sister-in-law; that after switching off the light and undressing herself, complainant started massaging his head, for he had a slight
headache; that as complainant kissed him, he noticed that she was pregnant and told her so; that after saying that she merely had a stomach ache,
complainant eventually confessed that another man had abused her; that angered by this revelation, respondent dressed up and prepared to step out,
but, before he left the hotel, she asked his forgiveness and promised to behave thereafter; that she went to his office, the next day, but he refused to talk
to her; that as she insisted upon talking with him privately, they went to an ice cream parlor where she begged him to marry her and save her honor,
suggesting that their marriage would be in name only and that they need not live together, if he did not want to; that complainant even said that her
father 1 would give P5,000 if he married her, but he rejected the offer and volunteered to prosecute the man responsible for her condition, if she would
identify him; and that, when respondent still refused to marry her, complainant threatened to bring disbarment proceedings against him.

Upon a review of the record, we agree with the solicitor, who first investigated this case, and the Legal Officer-Investigator, before whom additional
evidence were introduced, that respondent's version is unworthy of credence. Indeed, despite the averments in his answers to the effect that he had
never solicited or had carnal relations with the complainant, his very testimony shows that they had met in a hotel room under conditions attesting to a
condition of intimacy clearly revealing past extra-marital relations between them. Then, too, respondent's promise to marry complainant has been, not
only admitted by him, but, also, bolstered up by their applications for a marriage license and the marriage license actually secured by them.

The breach of such promise on his part is thus patent. What is more, when her pregnancy was confirmed by a physician, respondent firstly persuaded
the complainant to take some pills for the avowed purpose of hastening the flow of her "menstruation", and, eventually, urged her to have an abortion, to
which she did not agree. Worse still, when this case was pending in the office of the Solicitor General, respondent prevailed upon her to sign a motion
withdrawing her complaint, under the false allegation that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him, as well as to sign a blank sheet of paper
— which now appears to be her aforementioned affidavit Exhibit 34 under — promise to thereupon marry her, without the slightest intention to keep it,
because, instead he married another woman soon later.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arturo P. Lopez is hereby found guilty of gross immoral conduct rendering him unfit to continue a member of the Bar, 2 for
which reason he is hereby barred from the practice of law, and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,

vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).

As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were residing in the province of
Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts
of stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).

On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and Recommendation, viz.:

Evidence of the complainant:

. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and
first year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of
her sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog
City; that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred
his residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).

That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason's convention in
Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent
did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she served as usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up
from her residence every morning and took her home from the convention site at the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).

That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride with the permission of
her mother who was a former classmate of respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then they strolled along
the beach, and in the course of which respondent proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that if she would accept him, he
would marry her within six (6) months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that she would think it over first; that from
then on respondent used to visit her in their house almost every night, and he kept on courting her and pressed her to make her
decision on respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent continued
his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).

That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that
at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy ride
and took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach where there were no houses around;
that in the course of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his promise to marry her and then started caressing
her downward and his hand kept on moving to her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said:
"What is this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and reminded her also that "anyway,
December is very near, the month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not
be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same time pulling down her panty; that she told him that
she was afraid because they were not yet married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with
him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent again reiterated his promises and assurances
not to worry because anyway he would marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).

After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about
twice or three times a week, after which he would take her to the airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they had
this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of two or three times a week, and she consented to all these
things because she loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).

Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her menstruation which usually occurred during the
second week of each month did not come; she waited until the end of the month and still there was no menstruation; she submitted
to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed respondent and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but
she objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not to worry because they would get married within one month
and he would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).

On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her parents about their marriage; it was agreed that
the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and
her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while respondent would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in
Singalong, Manila, in the house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).

On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that
he could not marry complainant because he was already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans,
so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured
complainant not to worry because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16 years and he would work for the annulment
of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila
and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually sent the
promised support; he came back to Manila in January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked about the annulment of his
previous marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in
March 1974 and told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when she
delivers the child, but her mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog and instead
suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma took
her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in
Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).

In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but
to no avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house; she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical
treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer
and filed an administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; the case was referred to the
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp.
150-151, tsn, id.).

Evidence for the Respondent

The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old; that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his
wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since 1952 because he was his teacher; likewise he knew
complainant's mother because they were former classmates in high school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he
used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually became friends and often talked with each other, and even talked
about their personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with the consent of her parents he
invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192,
tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him to fetch her from her residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was
during this occasion that they became close to each other and after the convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that
(sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).

That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at
the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair, complainant complained to him of a headache, so he
decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the
airport; that when they were at the airport, only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they were carried by their passion;
they forgot themselves and they made love; that before midnight he took her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual
intercourse many times whenever they went on joy riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only place they
could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).

That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be
delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the parents of
complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married but estranged from his wife; that when complainant was
already in Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry again, otherwise, he would be
charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his marriage as he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that
complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit
or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by complainant because of his failure to give the money to support
complainant while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's medical expenses when she went to
Zamboanga City for medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).

FINDING OF FACTS

From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed:
 1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the time
(July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, having been born on December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said
relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;

2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that
said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his relationship with complainant;

3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime, having been a former student of complainant's
father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as
he used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended complainant and who became a close friend when he invited her,
with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30,
1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the morning and took her home from the convention site after each day's
activities;

4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973;
that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber of
Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but before
going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, where there were no houses
around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that after the
first sexual act, respondent used to have joy ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make love
twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant became pregnant;

5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver
her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her
brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973,
and again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that
on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that
about the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification
Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she instituted the present disbarment proceedings against
respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be
disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).

After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor General.

From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a married individual. The fact
of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as
being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for
the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly,
respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to
contract another marriage.

Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never
introduced his son and went around with friends as though he was never married much less had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone
belies respondent's claim that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore
inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in
accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is, her father being the Assistant Principal of the local
public high school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.

But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with this
relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral
sense is so seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:

(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.

Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into
the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by
any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:

When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because he was already married and would open him to a
charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming, why
 did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having been
married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because the
complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977). Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a
moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with complainant
because he knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious claim
that he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).

By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence,
his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in
order. Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon
admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179
SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.

As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30
January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to
be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior marriage to another
man was null and void ab initio and she was still legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot
a child with her, abandoned her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).

Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing
that he did not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her
pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. Respondent having
exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action — disbarment.

The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in
guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA
439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead a
life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA
757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).

In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed continued membership in the ancient and learned profession
of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).

ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is hereby
ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
EN BANC
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of
moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate
who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against
him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided
to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to
the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney
in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was
allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-
Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre
Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC
was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee
of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by
political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by
Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May
2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts
for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of
the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was
not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to
be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken
his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice
of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that
he was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990

KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.

Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado
(San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-
88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies
of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26,
1989. 2

On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the
petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also
the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified
true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4

Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed
with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all
the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The
complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-
complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which,
as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty.
Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On March 21,
1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8

In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very
strict practices of the Justices concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing
the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have
no more jurisdiction to give such order."10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to
answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11

Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the
complaint he lodged with the Office of the President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as follows:

VI

That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was legally
constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the
scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and just investigations,
which the accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the
undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated
to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)

VII

That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein
are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by
the undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to
sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will
be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined
Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of your people and the only
country which God has given us. — PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)

VIII
 That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent
accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14

IX

. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal
of the petition was based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino,
who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth
Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking
person in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't be
reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and
hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any
man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final
denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same
which legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or inhumane and
so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a
common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned above. 16

xxx xxx xxx

D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges and Justices, against practicing lawyers,
party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for
contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent
complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17

scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary)
Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court maintains a
double standard in dispensing justice — one set for the rich and another for the poor — went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism."
They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all
justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before
it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.

It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No.
1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989, after due publication. It is
true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a
duplicate original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in
complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the other
questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence
excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling
reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that
"(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be shown that such non-
compliance was due to compelling reasons."

It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but
simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the
Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak,
are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the
confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer
must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation,
and innuendo."22

To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible
mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this
regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:

CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing language or behavior before the courts.

RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case.
 xxx xxx xxx

We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system —
the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this
occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments
or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment
on any of the Court's acts.

Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict
practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. The
arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the President,
and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was
not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second
Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an
officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine
seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a
WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's
record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other
Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., Paras and Feliciano, JJ., is on leave

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992

CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine
Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88
then pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi
was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.

Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein
complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case
Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal
court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default.

In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23
April 1974, which reads as follows:

Atty. Ireneo Bunye

928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila

Dear Atty. Bunye:

xxx xxx xxx

Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no
objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him.

xxx xxx xxx

I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
 My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) CESAR L LANTORIA

Major Inf PC (ret)
Executive Director 5

On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise:

Dear Major Lantoria,

At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters received, which is about the preparation of
the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other
professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also
to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa
(sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there.

Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to
satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the
preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept his suggestions or correction to
charge or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily
and please request for each copy for our hold.

xxx xxx xxx

Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there. Regards to you and family and prayer
for your more vigor and success.

Brotherly
yours,

(SGD.)
IRINEO
L.
BUNYI 6
Counsel

It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the contents of which read as follows:

928 Rizal
Ave., Sta.
Cruz,
Manila
March 4,
1974

Dear Major Lantoria,

This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the
Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you
have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the information comes from him. But, you
can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could
be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to
him at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in
Butuan City.

Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.

 Truly
yours,

(SGD.) L.
BUNYI 7

Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly
on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases
because to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions
warranted disciplinary action against him.

By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint, admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June
1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same was written by
the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be
drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to him, because he was at that time holding
two (2) salas — one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of
Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases
involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by
the Respondent. Instead, it came from the under-standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters,
had demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the
Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis.
He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default,
the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the
place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)

c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to
suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);

d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the same to the Complainant and
expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)

In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July
1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12,
September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979,
both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following development —

Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to before the investigating Solicitor, praying that
the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his
charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent manifested that he has no objection to
the withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited
testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint,
and hence, he was not prepared to prove his charges. 10(emphasis supplied)

In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to
complainant, showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had
previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost
the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to
dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the
letters.

Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as
an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial
determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent.

In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties
as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.

On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981,
respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that
the next hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit his children and
at the same time have a medical check-up.

On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was
directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted
that although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to influence the Judge in
allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his
preparation of the draft decisions.

We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding
complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even
asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.

With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be
resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of
law.

The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in
Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's
consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an
officer of the Court.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted
by him), which provides as follows:

3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court

Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties,
subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or
argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt
to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty,
without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal
and official relations between bench and bar.

16
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which
read:

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the court.

Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with
judges.

17
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice
hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this
suspension.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.