V.
TERRITORY
A. Island of Las Palmas Case (US v. Netherlands),
2 RIAA 829
The Island of Palmas Case (Scott, Hague Court
Reports 2d 83 (1932), (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), 2 U.N.
Rep. Intl. Arb. Awards 829) was a territorial dispute
over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) between
the Netherlands and the United States which was
heard by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. Palmas (Indonesian: Pulau Miangas) was
declared to be a part of the Netherlands East
Indies and is now part of Indonesia.
The case is one of the most influential precedents
dealing with island territorial conflicts.
Palmas (Miangas) is an island of little economic value
or strategic location. It is 2.6 km in north-south length
and 1.0 km in east-west width.[1] It had a population
of about 750 in 1932, when the case was decided.
The island lies between Mindanao, the southernmost
part of the Philippines, and the Nanusa Islands, the
next-northernmost part of Indonesia.
In 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United
States in the Treaty of Paris (1898) and Palmas is
located within the boundaries of that cession. In 1906,
the United States discovered that the Netherlands
also claimed sovereignty over the island, and the two
parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration by
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. On 23 January
1925, the two governments signed an agreement to
that effect. Ratifications were exchanged
in Washington, D.C. on 1 April 1925. The agreement
was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on
19 May 1925.[2] The arbitrator in the case was Max
Huber, a Swiss lawyer.
The question before the arbitrator was whether the
Island of Palmas (Miangas) formed part of United
States territory (referring to what is now
the Philippines) or Dutch territory (referring to what is
now Indonesia).
On 1 January 1906, General Leonard Wood,
Governor of Moro Province, Philippines, visited
Palmas. According to the Counter-Memorandum filed
in the case by the United States, he had already
visited the island in "about 1903". The report of Wood
to the Military Secretary, United States Army, on 26
January 1906, and the certificate delivered on 21
January by First Lieutenant Gordon Johnston to the
native interrogated by the controller of the Sangi
(Sanghi) and Talauer (Talaut) Islands clearly show that
the 21 January visit relates to the island in dispute.
The visit led to the US statement that the Island of
Palmas, undoubtedly included in the "archipelago
known as the Philippine Islands," as delimited by
Article III of the Treaty of Peace between the United
States and Spain, also called "Treaty of Paris," and
ceded in virtue of the said article to the United States,
was considered by the Netherlands as forming part of
the territory of its possessions in the East Indies.[3]
The United States, as the successor to the rights of
Spain over the Philippines, based its title in the first
place on discovery. The existence of sovereignty thus
acquired was not merely confirmed by the most reliable
cartographers and authors and even by treaty,
particularly the Treaty of Münster of 1648, which was
agreed to by Spain and the Netherlands. According to
the same argument, nothing had occurred of a nature to
cause the acquired title to disappear in international
law. The United States argued the latter title at the
moment when Spain ceded its title to the Philippines by
the Treaty of Paris in 1898. Thus, it was unnecessary to
establish facts showing the actual display of
sovereignty precisely over the Island of Palmas.
Principle of contiguity[edit]
The American government finally maintained that
Palmas forms a geographical part of the Philippine
group and is closer to the Philippines than to the Dutch
East Indies. Thus, the principle of contiguity
substantiated the claim that it belongs to the power with
sovereignty over the Philippines.[4]
Dutch arguments[edit]
The Netherlands considered that the fact of discovery
by Spain was not proved, and the same held for any
other form of acquisition. Even if Spain had ever the
title, it had been lost. The principle of contiguity was
contested.
The main argument was that the Netherlands,
represented by the East India Company, possessed
and exercised rights of sovereignty from 1677 or even
prior to 1648. Sovereignty arose out of conventions
entered into with native princes of Sangi (the main
island of the Talautse Isles) to stabilize the sovereignty
of the Netherlands over the territories of the princes,
including Palmas (or Miangas). That state of affairs set
up was claimed to be validated by international treaties.
[5]
Issues[edit]
Huber had to determine "whether the Island of Palmas
(or Miangas) in its entirety forms a part of territory
belonging to the United States of America or of
Netherlands territory." Based on the arguments made
by both states, there were two main issues:
•Did the inchoate title claimed by the United States
prevail over a continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty exercised by Netherlands?
•Did a title of contiguity have foundation in
international law?
Decision[edit]
Huber ruled for the Netherlands:
For these reasons
The Arbitrator in conformity with Article I
of the Special Agreement of 23 January
1925 DECIDES that : THE ISLAND OF
PALMAS (or MIANGAS) forms in its
entirety a part of the Netherlands
territory. done at The Hague, this fourth
day of April 1928. Max Huber,
ArbitratorMichiels van Verduynen,
Secretary-General.[6]
Right by discovery[edit]
The United States argued that it held the island
because it had received actual title by legitimate
treaties from the original discoverer of the island,
Spain. The United States argued that Spain acquired
title to Palmas when Spain discovered the island and
the island was terra nullius. Spain's title to the island,
because it was a part of the Philippines, was then
ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris
(1898) after Spain's defeat in the Spanish–American
War. The arbitrator noted that no new international
law invalidated the legal transfer of territory via
cession.
However, the arbitrator noted that Spain could not
legally grant what it did not hold and the Treaty of
Paris could not grant Palmas to the United States if
Spain had no actual title to it. The arbitrator concluded
that Spain held an [1] title when Spain "discovered"
Palmas. However, for a sovereign to maintain its initial
title via discovery, the arbitrator said that the
discoverer had to actually exercise authority even by
as simple an act as planting a flag on the beach.
Spain did not exercise authority over the island after
making an initial claim after discovery and so the
American claim was based on relatively weak
grounds.
Contiguity[edit]
The United States argued that Palmas was American
territory because the island was closer to the
Philippines than to the Netherlands East Indies. The
arbitrator said that there was no positive international
law for the American view of terra firma in which the
nearest continent or island of considerable size gives
title to the land in dispute. The arbitrator held that
mere proximity was not an adequate claim to land and
noted that if the international community followed the
proposed American approach, that would lead to
arbitrary results.
Continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty[edit]
The Netherlands' primary contention was that it held
actual title because the Netherlands had exercised
authority on the island since 1677. The arbitrator noted
that the United States had failed to show
documentation proving Spanish sovereignty on the
island except the documents that specifically mentioned
the island's discovery. Additionally, there was no
evidence that Palmas was a part of the judicial or
administrative organization of the Spanish government
of the Philippines. However, the Netherlands showed
that the Dutch East India Company had negotiated
treaties with the local princes of the island since the
17th century and had exercised sovereignty, including a
requirement of Protestantism and the denial of other
nationals on the island. The arbitrator pointed out that if
Spain had actually exercised authority, there would
have been conflicts between the two countries, but
none is provided in the evidence.
Thus, a title that is inchoate cannot prevail over a
definite title found on the continuous and peaceful
display of sovereignty. Peaceful and continuous display
of territorial sovereignty is as good as title. However,
discovery alone, without a subsequent act, cannot
suffice to prove sovereignty over the island. The
territorial sovereignty of the defendant, Netherlands,
was not contested by anyone from 1700 to 1906 so the
title of discovery at best an inchoate title and does not
prevail over the Netherlands claims of sovereignty.[4]
Precedent[edit]
Under the decision, three precedents for resolving
island territorial disputes were decided:
•Title based on contiguity has no standing in
international law;
•Title by discovery is only an inchoate title;
•If another sovereign begins to exercise continuous and
actual sovereignty openly and publicly and with good
title, but the discoverer does not contest the claim, the
claim by the sovereign that exercises authority is then
greater than a title based on mere discovery.
B. Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 53
Citation. Court of Int’l Justice, 1993 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53 at 71
Brief Fact Summary. The statement made by the
Norwegian Minister was claimed to be binding on his
country by Denmark (P).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A country is bound by the
reply given on its behalf by its Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
Facts. The agreement not to obstruct Danish (P)
plans with regard to Greenland was what Denmark
wanted to obtain from Norway (D). To this request, a
declaration on behalf of the Norwegian government
(D) was made by its Minister for Foreign Affairs that
Norway (D) would not make any difficulty in the
settlement of the question.
Issue. Is a country bound by the reply given on its
behalf by its Minister of Foreign Affairs?
Held. Yes. A country is bound by the reply given on its
behalf by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore in
this case, the response by the diplomatic
representative of a foreign power is binding upon the
country the Minister represents.
Discussion. The main source of international law on
treaties is the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. The Convention was ratified by 35 countries
but not by the United States. Unilateral statements
may also be binding on states.
C. SS Lotus Case, PCIJ Ser. A, No.
10The Lotus case concerns a criminal trial which was
the result of the 2 August 1926 collision between the
S.S. Lotus, a French steamship (or steamer), and the
S.S. Bozkurt, a Turkish steamer, in a region just north
of Mytilene (Greece). As a result of the accident, eight
Turkish nationals aboard the Bozkurt drowned when
the vessel was torn apart by the Lotus.
Background[edit]
On 7 September 1927 the case was presented before
the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
judicial branch of the League of Nations, the
predecessor of the United Nations.
The issue at stake was Turkey's jurisdiction to try
Monsieur Demons, the French lieutenant on watch
duty at the time of the collision. Since the collision
occurred on the high seas, France claimed that the
state whose flag the vessel flew had exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter. France proffered case law,
through which it attempted to show at least state
practice in support of its position. However, those
cases involved ships that both flew the flag of the
same state. The Court, therefore, by a bare majority,
rejected France's position stating that there was no rule
to that effect in international law.
Lotus principle[edit]
The Lotus principle or Lotus approach, usually
considered a foundation of international law, says
that sovereign states may act in any way they wish so
long as they do not contravene an explicit prohibition.
The application of this principle – an outgrowth of the
Lotus case – to future incidents raising the issue of
jurisdiction over people on the high seas was changed
by article 11[1] of the 1958 High Seas Convention. The
convention, held in Geneva, laid emphasis on the fact
that only the flag state or the state of which the alleged
offender was a national had jurisdiction over sailors
regarding incidents occurring in high seas.
The principle has also been used in arguments against
the reasons of the United States of America for
opposing the existence of the International Criminal
Court (ICC).[2]
Trivia[edit]
In the court Turkish side was represented by Mahmut
Esat Bozkurt, the Minister of Justice. In 1934, when
Turkey adopted the formal surname system, Mahmut
Esat chose the surname Bozkurt suggested by Kemal
Atatürk as a reminiscence of the case.
Brief Fact Summary. Turkey’s (D) assertion of
jurisdiction over a French citizen who had been the first
officer of a ship that collided with a Turkish ship on the
high seas was challenged by France (P) as a violation
of international law.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A rule of international law,
which prohibits a state from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts
outside of the state’s national jurisdiction, does not
exist.
Facts. A collision occurred shortly before midnight on
the 2nd of August 1926 between the French (P) mail
steamer Lotus and the Turkish (D) collier Boz-Kourt.
The French mail steamer was captained by a French
citizen by the name Demons while the Turkish collier
Boz-Kourt was captained by Hassan Bey. The Turks
lost eight men after their ship cut into two and sank as a
result of the collision.
Although the Lotus did all it could do within its power to
help the ship wrecked persons, it continued on its
course to Constantinople, where it arrived on August 3.
On the 5th of August, Lieutenant Demons was asked by
the Turkish (D) authority to go ashore to give
evidence. After Demons was examined, he was
placed under arrest without informing the French (P)
Consul-General and Hassan Bey. Demons were
convicted by the Turkish (D) courts for negligence
conduct in allowing the accident to occur.
This basis was contended by Demons on the ground
that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. With this,
both countries agreed to submit to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the question of whether
the exercise of Turkish (D) criminal jurisdiction over
Demons for an incident that occurred on the high seas
contravened international law.
Issue. Issue: Does a rule of international law which
prohibits a state from exercising criminal jurisdiction
over a foreign national who commits acts outside of
the state’s national jurisdiction exist?
Held. (Per curiam) No. A rule of international law,
which prohibits a state from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts
outside of the state’s national jurisdiction, does not
exist. Failing the existence of a permissive rule to the
contrary is the first and foremost restriction imposed
by international law on a state and it may not exercise
its power in any form in the territory of another state.
This does not imply that international law prohibits a
state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case that relates to acts that have
taken place abroad which it cannot rely on some
permissive rule of international law. In this situation, it
is impossible to hold that there is a rule of
international law that prohibits Turkey (D) from
prosecuting Demons because he was aboard a
French ship. This stems from the fact that the effects
of the alleged offense occurred on a Turkish vessel.
Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over this matter because there is no rule of
international law in regards to collision cases to the
effect that criminal proceedings are exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the state whose flag is flown.
Discussion. In 1975, France enacted a law regarding
its criminal jurisdiction over aliens because of this the
situation surrounding this case. The law stipulates that
aliens who commit a crime outside the territory of the
Republic may be prosecuted and judged pursuant to
French law, when the victim is of French nationality.
This is contained in 102 Journal Du Droit International
962 (Clunet 1975). Several eminent scholars have
criticized the holding in this case for seeming to imply
that international law permits all that it does not forbid.
D. Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, PCA
The State of Eritrea and the Republic of Yemen both
claimed sovereignty over a group of islands in the Red
Sea and disagreed as to the location of their maritime
boundary. The Arbitration Agreement, between the
Parties dated October 3, 1996, required the Tribunal to
rule on these two issues in separate stages.
In its award in the first stage dated October 9, 1998, the
Tribunal found that neither Party made a significantly
more convincing case for ownership of any of the
islands based on ancient title, as argued by Yemen, or
a succession of title, as asserted by Eritrea. After
reviewing the evidence, the Tribunal decided that
Eritrea had sovereignty over the Mohabbakhs, the
Haycocks, and the South West Rocks, because of their
proximity to the Eritrean mainland. The Tribunal found
Yemen to be sovereign over the Zubayr group because
of its installation and maintenance of lighthouses on
certain of these islands and the inclusion of the Zubayr
group in two oil production agreements contracted by
Yemen with private firms. Yemen was also found to be
sovereign over the Zuqar-Hanish group on the balance
of the evidence regarding the exercise of the functions
of state authority.
In the second award dated December 17, 1999, the
Tribunal effected its delimitation of the maritime
boundary between Eritrea and Yemen. While Eritrea
was not a party to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982 (“UNCLOS”), the Tribunal
found that many of the relevant elements of customary
international law were incorporated into the
corresponding provisions of UNCLOS and that Eritrea
had accepted the application of these provisions by
reference to UNCLOS in the Arbitration Agreement.
The Tribunal ruled that the international maritime
boundary between the Parties “shall be a single all-
purpose boundary” that “should, as far practicable, be a
median line between the opposite mainland coastlines.”
This solution was not only in accord with precedent but
was also familiar to both Parties and reflected by
offshore petroleum agreements entered into by Yemen,
Eritrea, and Ethiopia. The Tribunal then calculated the
boundary line resulting from the application of these
principles and set out the geographical coordinates of
the international maritime boundary in the dispositif of
the award.
E. Preah Vihear Temple Case, ICJ Reports, 1962
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
Cambodia complained that Thailand had occupied a
piece of its territory surrounding the ruins of the Temple
of Preah Vihear, a place of pilgrimage and worship for
Cambodians, and asked the Court to declare that
territorial sovereignty over the Temple belonged to it
and that Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw
the armed detachment stationed there since 1954.
Thailand filed preliminary objections to the Court’s
jurisdiction, which were rejected in a Judgment given
on 26 May 1961. In its Judgment on the merits,
rendered on 15 June 1962, the Court noted that a
Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1904 provided that, in the
area under consideration, the frontier was to follow
the watershed line, and that a map based on the work
of a Mixed Delimitation Commission showed the
Temple on the Cambodian side of the boundary.
Thailand asserted various arguments aimed at
showing that the map had no binding character. One
of its contentions was that the map had never been
accepted by Thailand or, alternatively, that if Thailand
had accepted it, it had done so only because of a
mistaken belief that the frontier indicated
corresponded to the watershed line. The Court found
that Thailand had indeed accepted the map and
concluded that the Temple was situated on
Cambodian territory. It also held that Thailand was
under an obligation to withdraw any military or police
force stationed there and to restore to Cambodia any
objects removed from the ruins since 1954.

F. Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali),

ICJ Reports, 198

G. Libya v. Chad, ICJ Reports 1994
The Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad) [1994] ICJ 1 is a public
international law case before the International Court of
Justice on 3 February 1994. The case was won by
Chad, whose sovereignty over Aouzou Strip was
affirmed (by a majority of 16 to 1).
Facts
The Aouzou Strip is a barren piece of land located on
the border of Chad and Libya. Libya had begun to
stage troops on the strip in order to assist with the
defense of its citizens who lived in the area. Despite
the land having no strategic or functional value to
Chad, the government saw the Aouzou Strip as part of
their sovereign territory. Due to the inability of both
countries to internally establish a line of demarcation,
the case was referred to the International Court of
Justice for adjudication in 1990.
Each country has a differing basis from which it is
deriving its claims of the Aouzou Strip. Libya’s claim is
on "the basis of a coalescence of rights and titles of
the indigenous inhabitants, the Senoussi Order, the
Ottoman Empire, and through an agreement that its
government made with Italy." However, Chad has
argued that the border was established through the
Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness which
was concluded between France and Libya in 1955.
From Libya’s perspective, there is not enough
evidence to show that a boundary was ever
established and that they have adequately lay claim to
the Aouzou Strip through administrative control.
Chad’s use of the Treaty of Friendship and Good
Neighborliness as basis of its claim has also been
challenged due to the treaty being in effect for only 20
years (1955-1975).
Judgment
The International Court of Justice ruled that the
boundary between Chad and Libya is defined by the
Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness which
was concluded between France and Libya in 1955.
Conversely, this gives Chad territorial sovereignty
over the Aouzou Strip
Chad-Libya Conflict
· FACTS: Chad contests that the Aouzou strip
belongs to them b/c of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship
& Good Neighborliness b/t Libya and France
(France’s claims to its borders in colonial Africa); it’s a
classical border dispute, territory (classic intl law
case)
o At the time Chad was a part of France’s colonial
territory, along w/ the Aouzou Strip, and that was
included as a part of France’s territory (and thus Chad)
in the treaty
o Libya agreed to these boundaries, but NOW it
claims that the treaty was invalid (Libya’s king was
allegedly coerced to sign the treaty…); also allegiance
to Libya in the area; and also title to the area by the
Ottoman Empire and then Italy (predecessor; =>
history)
o If there is a treaty, then there is no question about it;
IF there is NO treaty, then the two most important
factors to consider are:
§ 1) WHO lived there => where do they have
allegiance to (complicated => when?)
§ 2) Not only the inhabitants, but some historical facts;
effective administrative control,
government/municipality, etc.
o THUS, Libya uses mostly “factual” arguments, and
some minor legal arguments
§ One minor legal argument => that the treaty was
invalid (coerced to sign)
· But Libya did not fight very hard against this
treaty, so hard to support
o BUT, there was also the 1966 Treaty between Chad
& Libya =>it discussed frontier questions, but there was
nothing about border disputes
§ 1955 treaty was more explicit, but 1966 treaty
support is, more direct because it was between Libya
and Chad directly (not France and Libya)
· RULING/REASONING: The ICJ ruled that even
though one treat supercedes another, the boundary still
remains…
o What can we gather from this? => interpretation is a
CHOICE (in most cases judges have a choice, which
means more than one interpretations)
§ When you make a choice you choose whichever you
can support, rationalize
o Thus the Ct held that the 1955 Treaty prevails =>
there must have been some purpose, an object for this
treaty, which led to this interpretive choice by the court
§ The court wanted the boundary to be FINAL =>
permanence
§ Why is this important? => sanctity of
boundary/border, & sanctity of treaty
· If we can so easily vanquish a treaty, than why
have treaties in the first place? You should give treaties
certain weight, what’s written in them
o ALSO, the subject matter is important; 1955 was
specifically about the borders/boundary lines
§ THUS, the court made this choice b/c of the sanctity
of borders, & of treaties
SIDE NOTE:
o QUES: What is the International Court of Justice?
§ Highest court of the UN; a kind of Supreme Ct of UN
(but there are no lower cts)
§ Why can’t an individual file a complaint in the ICJ?
· The individual is a member of the intl
community…
· BUT, members of the intl community/ICJ are
STATES not individuals
o Intl law is about state-to-state
§ What about jurisdiction?
· 1) Two members sign an agreement (like
arbitration)
o Sign a special agreement that gives type of jx
· 2) Automatic Provision
o There are certain explicit provisions that give jx…
“if there is a dispute that rises under this issue… can
go to ICJ”
· 3) Self-Declaration
o Succumb yourself to the jx of the ICJ
· First, in Chad-Libya think of why these two
countries bothered to dispute over this seemingly
insignificant piece of land. In resolving this dispute,
what do you think was the role (or value) of
international law?
o The two countries bothered to dispute over it b/c
it’s a power struggle => boundary lines/territory is a
significant power to a sovereign state, an exercise of
sovereignty…
§ Being able to exercise sovereignty/use that right is
part of being a nation state
§ It’s a part of defining oneself, and it can hold
historical significance as well
o It could be a political issue => national pride;
potential issue => vulnerability
o Intl law helped resolve this issue without resorting
to just self-help (war) => there had been several
armed conflicts, but it helps avoid outright war; helps
promote a sense of international community…
§ Helps sovereign states compromise and live in
harmony…
§ INTL law worked here, the stronger/more powerful
country (Libya) lost here
· As to the ICJ (International Court of Justice)’s
interpretation, what was the main source of
international law on which the ICJ relied? Or did the
ICJ rely more on other (non-legal) aspects of the
dispute, such as actual behaviors of countries
concerned?
o The ICJ relied mainly on the 1955 treaty between
Libya & France, and used behavior to confirm that =>
it was almost akin to a contract (there are the terms of
the contract, and when/if it’s ambiguous you can
consider the actions of the parties…)
o THUS, the ICJ actually interpreted 2 different
treaties, the 1955 and the 1966 treaties; they also
interpreted many facts (attitudes of the two
countries…, other circumstances)
§ They interpreted the behaviors of the parties,
AFTER the treaty; it’s very strong supplemental
evidence from the legal evidence of the treaty
§ Even after the 1966 treaty, Libya never complained
about the border; if it was so important to them and
they were so against it, why did they remain silent?
· Logical conclusion is that Libya kind of tacitly
agreed => estoppels
§ On the other hand, Chad vehemently advocated their
case (3 diff. fora)
· 1) Organization for Unity of Africa
· 2) United Nations General Assembly
· 3) United Nations Security Council
· Libya should comply with the results because
their actions went against their words; fear of going
against more than just Chad once submitted to ICJ…
o Other countries were more sympathetic to Chad;
political pressures for Libya to w/draw
· Can’t it be both a victory for intl law as well as a
political loss for Libya?
· Q1: What if Libya unilaterally terminated the
treaty?
o Positivism, you can create a treaty, and you can
destroy a treaty
o It’s not that easy to terminate a treaty => certain
procedural conditions, notification, etc.
§ Even if you effectively terminate, there are factual
circumstances => estoppels
§ THUS, still Libya had a very weak case
· Q2: Why did Chad (or Libya) care for such a
useless piece of land? (as seen above in notes)
o Maybe there were other disputes between the two
countries; manifested in border
o Set an example, weaker countries can win => INTL
law worked
· Q3: Why did Libya agree to be subject to the ICJ,
adjudicated (it’s a more powerful country…)?
o They knew they had a weak case? That they would
lose… => for finality?
o Going to ICJ lends credibility (matter of pride) =>
they’re not just giving in, it’s forced
o Maybe there was a lot of political pressure => so
legalization gives a type of shelter
§ We’re still a good country, respectfully comply with
the decision (no humiliation)
o We’re not in a political vacuum; Libya was powerful,
but not compared to many other countries, and it was
not well favored => so legalization is a deflection of
criticism
o THUS, legalization was a win-win for Libya
· Q4: What if a similar dispute arises between
China and Russia today?
o Who knows…
· THUS, in this case we can celebrate, that intl law
works (it worked here), BUT you can’t say so for every
situation that passed or that is to come… => it’s
different
o That’s why positivism still exists…
o Treaties are still an important part of intl law
(source), but there are interesting dynamics with other
situations, facts, etc.
H. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports,
1951

The United Kingdom v Norway [1951] ICJ 3 also known

as the Fisheries Case was the culmination of a dispute,
originating in 1933, over how large an area of water
surrounding Norway was Norwegian waters (that
Norway thus had exclusive fishing rights to) and how
much was 'high seas' (that the UK could thus fish).

History
The situation which gave rise to the dispute and the
facts which preceded the filing of the British Application
are recalled in the Judgment. The coastal zone
concerned in the dispute is of a distinctive
configuration. Its length as the crow flies exceeds 1,500
kilometers. Mountainous along its whole length, very
broken by fjords and bays, dotted with countless
islands, islets and reefs (certain of which form a
continuous archipelago known as the skjaergaard,
"rock rampart"), the coast does not constitute, (as it
does in practically all other countries in the world) a
clear dividing line between land and sea. The land
configuration stretches out into the sea and what really
constitutes the Norwegian coastline is the outer line of
the land formations viewed as a whole. Along the
coastal zone are situated shallow banks which are very
rich in fish. These have been exploited from time
immemorial by the inhabitants of the mainland and of
the islands: they derive their livelihood essentially from
such fishing. In past centuries British fisherman had
made incursions in the waters near the Norwegian
coast. As a result of complaints from the King of
Norway, they abstained from doing so at the beginning
of the 17th century and for 300 years. But in 1906
British vessels appeared again. These were trawlers
equipped with improved and powerful gear. The local
population became perturbed, and measures were
taken by Norway with a view to specifying the limits
within which fishing was prohibited to foreigners.
Incidents occurred, became more and more frequent,
and on July 12, 1935 the Norwegian Government
delimited the Norwegian fisheries zone by Decree.
Negotiations had been entered into by the two
Governments; they were pursued after the Decree was
enacted, but without success. A considerable number of
British trawlers were arrested and condemned in 1948
and 1949. It was then that the United Kingdom
Government instituted proceedings before the Court.
Facts
On 28 September 1949, the UK requested that the
International Court of Justice determine how far
Norway's territorial claim extended to sea, and to
award the UK damages in compensation for
Norwegian interference with UK fishing vessels in the
disputed waters, claiming that Norway's claim to such
an extent of waters was against international law.
Assembly’s 1960 resolution 1514 (XV) — containing the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples — in the decolonization
of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of
self-determination through the free and genuine
expression of the will of the peoples of the territory.

Judgment
On 18 December 1951, the ICJ decided that Norway's
claims to the waters were consistent with international
laws concerning the ownership of local sea-space.

The Court found that neither the method employed for

the delimitation by the Decree, nor the lines
themselves fixed by the said Decree, are contrary to
international law; the first finding being adopted by ten
votes to two, and the second by eight votes to four.
Three Judges — MM. Alvarez, Hackworth and Hsu
Mo appended to the Judgment a declaration or an
individual opinion stating the particular reasons for
which they reached their conclusions; two other
Judges—Sir Arnold McNair and Mr. J. E. Read—
appended to the Judgment statements of their
dissenting Opinions.

I. Western Sahara Case, ICJ Reports, 1975

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE
On 13 December 1974, the General Assembly
requested an advisory opinion on the following
questions : “I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and
Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain
a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius) ?” If the
answer to the first question is in the negative, “II.
What were the legal ties between this territory and the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity ?” In
its Advisory Opinion, delivered on 16 October 1975,
the Court replied to Question I in the negative. In reply
to Question II, it expressed the opinion that the
materials and information presented to it showed the
existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal
ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and
some of the tribes living in the territory of Western
Sahara. They equally showed the existence of rights,
including some rights relating to the land, which
constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity,
as understood by the Court, and the territory of
Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court’s
conclusion was that the materials and information
presented to it did not establish any tie of territorial
sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara
and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity.
Thus the Court did not find any legal ties of such a
nature as might affect the application of the General