Endencia and Jugo v David (Collector of Internal Revenue)

August 31, 1953 | Montemayor, J.. | Branches of Government; Judiciary with the Power to Construe

PETITIONER: PASTOR ENDENCIA AND FERNANDO JUGO

RESPONDENT: SATURNINO DAVID as Collector of Internal Revenue

SUMMARY:
This case is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
declaring Section 13 of RA 590 unconstitutional. RA 590 is a legislation enacted
as an attempt to overrule the interpretation or construction of the Constitution by
the Supreme Court on the case of Perfecto v Meer. The Supreme Court
construed Article VIII, Sec. 9 of the 1935 Constitution and ruled that the
collection of income tax from the salaries of judicial officers is a diminuition of
their salaries. In addition, this case also shows the separation of powers, that
judiciary is independent as mandated in the Constitution.

The issues in this case is whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is

unconstitutional and whether or not the legislature can overrule the
interpretation or construction of a statute of the Constitution as based on Article
8.

The Supreme Court held that RA 590 is unconstitutional. The case explains
the reasons why the legislature cannot override the Supreme Court’s
interpretation. Aside from a clear separation of powers of the judiciary and the
legislative, the Supreme Court construing Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1935
Constitution shall prevail over the legislated RA 590, Section 13 that expresses,
“no salary whenever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of
which the is hereby declared not to be a diminuition of his compensation fixed
by the Constitution or by law (Gesmundo, 2009).

DOCTRINE:
Legislature cannot overrule judicial construction. The legislature has no
power to overrule the interpretation or construction of a statute or the
Constitution by the Supreme Court, for interpretation is a judicial function
assigned to the latter by the fundamental law. While the legislature may indicate
its construction of a statute in the form of a resolution or declaratory act, it
cannot preclude the courts from giving the statute a different interpretation
(Gesmundo, 2009).

FACTS:
1. Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice
Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec.
13 of Republic Act No. 590
2. Section 13, RA 590 provides that, “No salary wherever received by any public officer of
the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax,
 payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by
the Constitution or by law.”
3. The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt
from taxation – this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the
executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that
under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may not be
diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a
diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
4. The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the Commission of Internal Revenue, states
that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the legislature can overrule the interpretation or construction of a statute
of the Constitution as based on Article 8.

RATIO:
1. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law,
the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition.
2. The legislative cannot overrule Supreme Court decision unless the SC overrule its
previous construction given a modification or repeal of the very statute or the 1935
Constitution (which was changed later on in the 1973 constitution)

HELD:

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the
effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a
case by the highest court of the land (Endencia v David, 1953, SCRA)
 Angara v. Electoral Commission

PETITIONER: Jose A. Angara

July 15, 1936 | Laurel, J. | Branches of Government

RESPONDENT: Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
SUMMARY:
Jose Angara, receiving the highest number of votes on October 17, 1935, was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers
as the member-elect of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas Province. Pedro Ynsua, a fellow candidate who lost vying
for the same position filed a motion for protest before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly, and 1 day after the filing of
such motion, the Election Commission passed a resolution stating that Dec 9 would be the deadline for filing of protests relating to
election, and others issued on the members of the Assembly. Angara thereafter filed a motion to dismiss but was denied, hence this
action, with issues questioning if SC has jurisdiction over the said commission and if the said commission acted w/o or in excess in
cognizance of the protest. The Supreme Court held that yes it has jurisdiction in order to determine the character, scope and extent of
the Commission’s constitutional grant. The Election Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
take cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against Jose Angara.

DOCTRINE:
Section 4 Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.

FACTS:
1. Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas Province.
2. On October 17, 1935, having received the greatest number of votes, Jose Angara (petitioner) was
proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the member-elect of the National Assembly.
3. Angara took office on November 15, 1935; and on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of those who were not subjected an election
protest prior to the adoption of this resolution.
4. On December 8, 1935, private respondent Ynsua filed a “motion of protest” against Angara
before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly – and prayed, he (respondent) be
declared as the elected member or the election of the said position be nullified.
5. On December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission passed a resolution stating that Dec 9 is the last
day for filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Assembly.
6. On December 20, 1935, Angara (petitioner) filed before the Election Commission a “motion to
dismiss” the “motion of protest” of private respondent Ynsua on ground that the protest was filed
out of the prescribed period but was denied.
7. Angara prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the Electoral
Commission which was also consequently denied.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the controversy
 2. Whether or not the Electoral Commission, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest despite the previous confirmation of such election by the
resolution of the National Assembly?
RATIO:
1. YES – The Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter to determine the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as the “sole judge of all contests relating the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly” which can be found in Section 6 of Article VI of
the Constitution.
2. NO – The Court concluded that the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the Legislature with respect to contests relation to elections, returns
and qualifications of its members to the Electoral Commission. Along with such transfer
includes the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding such concerns. In view of the
deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was
acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative.
a. the transfer of such power is grounded that Section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution repealed not only Section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of
the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the
adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and
expenses of contest.
HELD:
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
 3. Tañada v. Tuvera (Ian)
Dec. 29, 1986 | Cruz J. | Publication of Laws
PETITIONER: LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI)
RESPONDENT: HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC.,
ET AL.
SUMMARY:
This case is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April
24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. Likewise,
respondent further raises the following questions, specifically, must distinction
be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not and the
manner of publication required for such. The issues in this case is whether or not
a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication; and whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation. The Supreme Court held that the clause
“unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as
an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the
law.
DOCTRINE:
Publication is indispensable in every case. The clause “unless it is otherwise
provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
FACTS:
1. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, due process was invoked
by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. The Court affirmed the necessity for
the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive
 portion as follows:
a. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
2. Respondent now argues that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
3. Likewise, respondent further raises the following questions, specifically,
must distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not and the manner of publication required for such.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not publication is indispensable when the provides for their
own effectivity.
2. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication.
RATIO:
1. On the first issue, yes, publication is indispensable. The clause “unless it
is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication. All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
2. On the second issue, no, the SC held that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
3. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or
as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.
4. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose
is to inform the public of the content of the law.
5. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. As
such, the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in
full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
 G.R. No. L-5
Petitioner: CO KIM CHAM
vs.
Respondednts: EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of
Manila

Facts:

The petitioner had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during
the time of the Japanese occupation. Whilst, the respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused
to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation
on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General MacArthur that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control” had taken effect therefore rendering all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation null and void,
and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue the proceedings pending in the courts
of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of the enabling law granting such.
The respondent judge contended that the government established in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation was not a de facto government.
Issues:
W/N The governments established in the Philippines under the names of Philippines Executive
Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation were indeed
de facto governments and if they are valid and will remain valid even after reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States.
Commented [AV1]: Civil case No. 3012
Commented [AV2]: W/N That it was intended to annul all
other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during
the Japanese military occupation.
If so, according to international law, non-political judgments
and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid
and will remain valid even after the occupied territory has
been liberated, in which it could not have been MacArthur’s
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in
violation of international law.
Commented [AV3]: The de facto doctrine is a rule or
principle of law which, in the first place, justifies the
recognition of the authority of governments established and
maintained by persons who have usurped the sovereign
authority of the State, and asset themselves by force and
arms against the lawful government
-1910 publication on the de facto doctrine, Albert
Constantineau

W/N The proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur has
invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings
Decision:

The writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him
to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Held:

1. Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid, until repealed.
2. By identifying that the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines, falls under Government of paramount force a classification of de facto
government
3. The laws prior to occupation remain valid, therefore the Court of First Instance must
continue hearing the pending civil case No. 3012
4. MacArthur can annul the proceedings of other governments, but not the judicial
proceedings because it would violate the law of nations/international law.
SIDE NOTES:
Please take note of the following—
Commented [AV4]: Three kinds of de facto governments:
1. Government de facto in the proper legal sense-- that
government that gets possession and control of, or
usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the
rightful legal governments and maintains itself against
the will of the latter.
2.Government of paramount force-- that which is
established and maintained by military forces who invade
and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war.
3.That established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against
the parent state

A few rules of Stat Con that might be relevant to the case at bar:
- “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”
- “Where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief
done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.”

Also,

The Principle of Postliminy — In international law, the fact that a territory which has been
occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty,
does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for
one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control,
when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they
take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time
by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.
 PNB v. CA (Hazel P.)
May 17, 1993 | Melo, J. | Sources of Phil. Laws and when they take effect
PETITIONER: Phil Nat’l Bank (PNB)
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals (CA) and Epifanio de la Cruz
SUMMARY:
In the case at bar, petitioner PNB here is contending that there was no violation
on its part regarding the publication requirement under Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135 on
Notices of Sale on extra-judicial foreclosure of real properties. The requirement is
that such notices shall be published once a week for at least 3 consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or municipality. PNB published
the Notices of Sale of 2 parcels of land, previously owned by respondent de la
Cruz and which were already foreclosed by PNB, on March 29, April 11 and April
12, 1969 in the Daily Record. Petitioner contends that it was able to publish for 3
consecutive weeks bec after the first publication of March 28, the second notice
was published on April 11 (the last day of the second week), while the third
publication on April 12 was made on the first day of the third week. He relies on
Bonnevie v. CA to press the point that the notice need not be published for 3 full
weeks. The issue then is W/N there was a valid compliance of the publication
requirement on the Notices of Sale. The Court held that, no, there was no valid
compliance. This is so bec petitioner’s contention rests on the erroneous
impression that the day of the first publication (March 28), should be excluded in
counting the period of a week pursuant to Art. 13 of the New Civil Code. Art. 13
is silent on as to the definition of what is a “week”. But in Concepcion v. Zandueta,
this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of 7 consecutive
days. And in the ruling in Derby, the first day’s publication is not to be excluded
from the computation. Hence, the publication effected by petitioner PNB on April
11 is not sufficient publication for the second week bec the period for the first
week should be reckoned or counted from March 28 to April 3, while the second
week should be from April 4 to April 10. Thus, it is clear that the publication made
on April 11 was already accomplished on the first day of the third week, and
therefore, cannot be interpreted as compliance w/ the requirement of the law.
DOCTRINE: Sorry, I’m not super sure what the doctrine in this case is as related
to Stat Con. Will add the doctrine after Sir discusses it in class.
FACTS:
1. The notices of sale under Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135 on extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate are required to be posted for not less than 20 days
in at least 3 public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos(??),
such notices shall also be published once a week for at least 3 consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city
2. Respondent court (CA), declared void the auction sale of the foreclosed
parcels of land, the final deed of sale, and the consolidation of ownership
of said land by the petitioner PNB. Hence, this present petition by
petitioner PNB.
3. Respondent court had opined in its Decision:
a. The notices of sale of appellant’s foreclosed properties were
published on March 28, April 11, and April 12, 1969 issues of the
newspaper “Daily Record”. The date March 28 fell on a Friday,
while April 11 and 12 fell on a Friday and Saturday, respectively.
Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale
shall be published once a week for at least 3 consecutive weeks.
Evidently, defendant-appellee PNB failed to comply w/ this
requirement.
b. Hence, the CA ruled in its Decision that in view of PNB’s
admission in its pleading showing that there was no compliance
of the requirement w/ respect to the notice of sale of the
foreclosed real properties, It declares the auction sale as void.
 4. Petitioner now contends that there is no breach on its part bec after the first DISPOSITION:
publication of March 28, the second notice was published on April 11 (the Petition dismissed. CA Decision is affirmed.
last day of the second week), while the third publication on April 12 was
made on the first day of the third week. He relies on Bonnevie v. CA to
press the point that the notice need not be published for 3 full weeks.
5. Private respondent believes, however, that the period between each
publication must never be less than 7 consecutive days.

ISSUES:
1. W/N there was valid compliance of the publication requirement on the
Notices of Sale - NO

RATIO:

1. The Court is not convinced of petitioner’s contentions because it rests on

the erroneous impression that the day of the first publication (March 28,
1969), should be excluded in counting the period of a week pursuant to
Art. 13 of the New Civil Code.
2. The Court concedes that Art. 13 is silent on as to the definition of what is
a “week”. In Concepcion v. Zandueta, this term was interpreted to mean
as a period of time consisting of 7 consecutive days. And in the ruling
made in Derby, the first day’s publication is not to be excluded from the
computation.
3. With this, the Court rules that the publication effected by petitioner PNB
on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient publication for the
second week bec the period for the first week should be reckoned or
counted from March 28 to April 3, while the second week should be from
April 4 to April 10. Hence, it is clear as day that the publication made on
April 11 was already accomplished on the first day of the third week, and
cannot be interpreted as compliance w/ the requirement of the law.
4. Where the term “week” is used simply as measure of duration of time and
w/out reference to the calendar, it means a period of 7 days w/out regard
to the day on which it begins.
 Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC
No. L-58011-12. July 20, 1982.

PETITIONER: VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES,

INC
RESPONDENT: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA, RUBEN ARROZA, JUAN
GACUTNO, LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO
ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG, SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA,
ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE ENCABO

SUMMARY:
The case before the court is a petition for certiori seeking the
annulment or setting aside, on the grounds of excess of jurisdiction
and grave abuse of discretion, of the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in consolidated NSB Cases
Nos. 2250-79 and 2252-79. The NLRC overturned the previous
decision of the National Seamen Board (NSB) which granted a
ruling in favor of Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services.

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
1. Rogelio Bisula, Ruben Arroza, Juan Gacutno, Leonilo Atok, Nilo Cruz, Alvaro Andrada,
Nemesio Adug, Simplicio Bautista, Romeo Acosta and Jose Encabo, the private respondents of
this case, were contracted by Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, the petitioner, for a period of
one (1) year.
a. The terms and conditions were based on the standard contract of the NSB
b. The contract was then approved by the NSB
2. The petitioner and private respondent issued a side contract which stated that if private
respondent was required by the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) to pay the rates
imposed by them, then, PR would pay afterwards petitioner would reimburse them
3. March 23, 1979 -- the petitioner received a cable from the PR stating that they were not content
with their salary and demanded a 50% increase ‘best and only solution to solve ITF problem.’
4. March 24, 1979 -- faced with the dilemma of having their ships detained by the ITF if the rates
weren’t paid, the petitioners replied to the cable stating that they can increase the salary of the
PR’s by 25% plus special compensation
5. March 26, 1979 -- the petitioner wrote a letter to the NSB regarding the circumstances with the
PRs and their request for pay increase and the answer that petitioner provided. Petitioner also
stated that they have contacted their principle, Messrs. Kyoei Tanker Company, Limited, to
 inform them of this development and in order to amend their contract to reflect these changes.
6. April 4, 1979 - The principle rejected the amended the contract between them and their petitioner
and decided to terminated their contract effective of the ship docking in Japan or any port by the
end of April.
7. April 6, 1979 -- Petitioner wrote a letter to NSB asking that they be allowed to cancel their
employment contract with PR due to the circumstances.
8. April 10, 1979, the NSB through its Executive Director Cresencio C. Dayao wrote petitioner
authorizing it to cancel the manning contract.
9. The seamen were accordingly disembarked in Japan and repatriated to Manila. They then filed a
complaint with the NSB for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages.
a. The NSB found that the implied threat of the PR regarding the “ITF problem” in order to
demand an increase on their already agreed upon salaries justified the their termination
10. The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB and
required the petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of the said contract
by petitioner was without valid cause
11. The petitioners filed a petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it overturned the decision
of the NSB and required petitioners to pay PR their remaining salaries
2. WON the NLRC had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the PR since the law requires an
appeal be filed within ‘ten days’ of the NSB’s judgement

RATIO:
1. YES. The National Labor Code in Article 20 provides for the creation of the NSB and gave them
authority to have “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over Filipino seamen and overseas
employment and that their decisions will be “final and unappealable”
a. The NLRC only had the power to decide questions of law since as to factual matters, it
may exercise such appellate jurisdiction only “if errors in the findings of fact are
raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.”
2. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that 10 days being referred to in Art 223 of the Labor Code refers
to 10 CALENDAR DAYS and NOT WORKING DAYS since it will prejudice the workers who
would have to shoulder the burden of the suit. Nevertheless, the SC presumed that the PR were
misled and proceed with the case.
a. July 9, 1980 - PR received the judgement of the NSB
b. July 23, 1980 or (14) days after - PR filed their appeal to the NLRC

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition herein is granted and the decision of the NLRC
complained of hereby set aside; the decision of the NSB should stand.
Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Syllabus: Purpose and Objective of the
C onstitution)

David Nit afan, Wencelao Polo, Maximo Savellano jr., petitioners, vs. Commissioner of
Int ernal Revenue and The Financial Officer, Supreme of the Philippines, respondents.

G.R. L-78780

July 23, 1987

FACTS:

David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo, and Maximo Savellano jr., are the presiding judges of
Branches 52, 19, and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region.

They filed a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court to enjoin respondents,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
deducting the withholding taxes from their salaries. Nitafan, submit that “any tax withheld
from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes and decrease of
diminution of the salaries”, this being contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution: “during their continuance in office their salary shall not be decreased”.
The contrast isexplained below.

Prior to the filing of the petition, the Supreme Court had administratively dealt with
the subject of withholding the taxes from the salaries of Judges. En Banc reaffirming the
directive of the Chief Justice:

The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing

directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue
with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of
the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
judiciary.

With the filing of the petition, the Supreme Court found it necessary to settle
thislegal issue through judicial pronouncement.

ISSUE:
 Whether the salary of judges are subject to income tax.

DEC I SI ON :

Petition is denied. Judges salaries are subject to income tax.

H EL D:

I n cases such as these, the intent of the framers of the C onstitution must be
taken into account. T he intent can be found in the records of the deliberations of the
1986 C onstitutional C ommission (please see the records provided in the case). I n the
deliberations, the true intent of the framers in adopting the constitutional provision in
question was to make the salaries of the members of the Judiciary taxable. I t can also be
construed from Sec. 10, Art. V I I I of the C onstitution that it authorizes C ongress to
pass legislation changing the salaries of the members of the Judiciary. But, such rate
must be higher than what they are currently receiving; or in case of a lower salary, will
only apply to those who were made members after its approval. T o construe that it
exempts judiciary from income tax is “strained construction”. T he ground used by the
petitioners, were the rulings in the Perfecto vs M eer and Endencia vs David, where it
was decided that the salaries of the members of Judiciary were exempt from income tax
as such tax was considered as a diminution of their salaries. These ruling have now been
disregarded by the Supreme Court, in their new decision.

SIDE NOTE: (seemsimportant for Stat Con)

“The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter

assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution.”
 FILOTEO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 79543
October 16, 1996| Justice Panganiban| Proceptivity of Laws; Judicial Decisions
PETITIONER: Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. (Police investigator, Western Police District)
RESPONDENTS: Sandiganbayan
SUMMARY:
Filoteo, together with follow co-accused were charged with violating PD No.
532 “Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law,” and was sentenced to 13
years imprisonment. Filoteo together with two armed with guns, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with the intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and
intimidation, stop the Postal van of the Bureau of Postal while travelling along
McArthur Hwy, robbed and carried away the several mail matters abroad, SSS
medicare checks, treasury warrants and a total of P253,728.29 (more or less)
belonging to US Government pensionados.
FACTS:
• May 6, 1982 – Postmaster general requested the assistance of the Special
operations Group of the Ph Constabulary to investigate the hi-jacking
incident,
• May 30, 1982 – Filoteo executed two documents: (1) the surrender of
various US checks and vouchers; (2) sworn statement wherein petitioner
attested to his waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code; (b) he was apprised of his constitutional rights, that he understood all
his rights thereunder, that investigators offered him counsel but he refused
to avail of such privilege; (3) that he was not hurt or maltreated not was
anything taken away from him.
• Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment against lt.
Rosendo Ferrer (Filoteo claims he was coerced into implicating someone)
• August 8, 1983 – Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan for robbery-
in-hand and hi-jacking.
• June 18, 1987 – judgment finding Filoteo, Mateo and other co-accused guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Reclusion perpetua)
ISSUES:
1. W/N written statements, particularly extra judicial confessions executed
by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence
against him? (MAIN ISSUE)
2. W/N said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment, and
intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible?
3. W/N petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid and proper?
4. W/N the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt?
RATIO:
1. YES
• Petitioner’s contention that Article III Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution cannot hold.
• “Article 8 of the Civil Code: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.”
• Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.”
• Petitioner executed his extrajudicial confession and waiver to right to
counsel on May 30, 1982 or BEFORE April 26, 1983.
• Petitioner contends that Article 22 of the RPC provides that “penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the criminal
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal.”
• What is being construed here is a constitutional provision, not a penal
provision.
• Waivers of the right to counsel during the effectivity of the 1973
constitution should, by argument, be admissible.
• Purpose of the Constitution: enumerates the rights of the individuals
(Bill of Rights); designed to protect against violations by the
government, or by individuals or group of individuals.
• It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the
power of the State.
Article IV Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution
“No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Article III Section 12 of the 1987 waivers made prior to the April 26, 1983 date
Constitution of the promulgation of Morales.”
Section 12. (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission PRINCIPLE:
of an offense shall have the right • The principle of prospectively of statutes, original or amendatory,
to be informed of his right to applies to judicial decisions.
remain silent and to have • Purpose of the Constitution.
competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own JUDGMENT:
choice. If the person cannot - Petition is DENIED; decision is MODIFIED.
afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of
counsel.

CASE DECISION
Magtoto v. Manguera Court categorically held that the aforequoted
(1973) provisions of the 1973 constitution (which
were not included in the 1935 chapter) must
be prospectively applied.
Morales, Jr. v Enrile “The right to counsel may be waived but the
(1983) waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel.”
People v. Luvendino “Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became
part of the Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, but do not affect or reach
 9. JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. LTA (Ian)
Febuary 18, 1970 | Fernando, J. | Language Employed of the Constitution
PETITIONER: J.M. TUASON and CO., INC.
RESPONDENT:THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SUMMARY:
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the
Tatalon Estate jointly owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and
Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor et al was authorized to be expropriated. More
than a year later Land Tenure Administration was directed by the executive
secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property. Appellee
thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent
respondents from instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the
said act was unconstitutional and a writ of prohibition was granted to the
appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A. The issue in this case is whether or not
the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? The Supreme Court held
in the affirmative. The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding
that RA 2616 is unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed. . The
question is one of constitutional construction. The task is to ascertain the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting the
Constitution. It is assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions
express the objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except when technical terms are employed in which case the
significance attached to them prevails. This case is such a case and is therefore
one of minimal construction. The congress has the legislative will to
expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it
cannot be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The
language employed is not covered in obscurity (because congress has the
legislative power as stated in the constitution). It is presumed that the
constitution suffices to govern the life of the people not only at the present time
but also in the indefinite future. The constitution though does not give rigid
answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may pose.
Further, it is the failure to provide equal protection of the laws (Article 3, Section
1, par.1 of the Constitution) that rests the case of the petitioner. Since the statute
in question, R.A. 2616, singles out the Tatalon Estate for expropriation, the
petitioner is in the right to assert a denial of equal protection. However, there is
nothing to prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its disposal to follow a
system of priorities, especially when a serious social or economic problem is at
hand. In the bill’s Explanatory Note, Congress claims that given the problem of
Quezon City’s growing population, expropriating the land will help solve the
overpopulation and “implement the land-for-the-landless program of the
present Administration.” Singling out Tatalon Estate doesn’t stigmatize the
effort of the statute as denial of equal protection. On the occasion of
expropriation, whatever contractual rights might be possessed by vendors and
vendees could be asserted and accorded the appropriate constitutional protection.
DOCTRINE:
Language employed in the Constitution - It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to
a minimum.
FACTS:
1. On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616 took effect without executive
 approval. It is therein provided: "The expropriation of the Tatalon Estate
in Quezon City jointly owned by the J. M. Tuason and Company, Inc.,
Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, et al., is
hereby authorized."
a. The lands involved in this action, to which Republic Act No.
2616 refer and which constitute a certain portion of the Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision, have a total area of about 109
hectares and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
42774 and 49235 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (Quezon
City) registered in the name of petitioner.
2. petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed before the lower court on
November 17, 1960 a special action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction against respondents praying that the above act be declared
unconstitutional, seeking in the meanwhile a preliminary injunction to
restrain respondents from instituting such expropriation proceeding,
thereafter to be made permanent after trial.
3. The lower court granted the prayer for the preliminary injunction upon
the filing of a P20,000.00 bond. After trial, the lower court promulgated
its decision on January 10, 1963 holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as
amended is unconstitutional and granting the writ of prohibition prayed
for.
4. Hence this appeal by respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 2616 is constitutional?
RATIO:
1. Yes, The Supreme Court held that RA 2616 is constitutional.
2. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear
implication from constitutional provisions. It may be exercised if an
affected party files the appropriate suit to test the validity of a legislative
act, executive act, or municipal ordinance for that matter.- The
constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all governmental
agencies. Failure to comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental
measure.
3. The question is one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the
constitution). The task is to ascertain the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in adopting the Constitution. It is
assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions express the
objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except when technical terms are employed in which case the
significance attached to them prevails. This case is such a case and is
therefore one of minimal construction. The congress has the legislative
will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise
such authority. The language employed is not covered in obscurity
(because congress has the legislative power as stated in the constitution).
It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern the life of the
people not only at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The
constitution though does not give rigid answers but is flexible and
accommodates the problems the future may pose.
4. The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the
socialpolitical environment of the times. It adapts and changes. Although
looking at the historical reasons for why an act was passed would be
helpful, it is not enough.
5. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to
expropriate lands is limitless. There is to be just compensation. This
means the equivalent for the value of the property at its taking. The
market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the owner
of the condemned property is entitled.
6. 5. According to the Chief Justice, “acts of Congress, as well as those of
the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity.”
7. 6. It is the failure to provide equal protection of the laws (Article 3,
Section 1, par.1 of the Constitution) that rests the case of the petitioner.
Since the statute in question, R.A. 2616, singles out the Tatalon Estate
for expropriation, the petitioner is in the right to assert a denial of equal
protection. However, there is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the
public funds at its disposal to follow a system of priorities, especially
 when a serious social or economic problem is at hand. In the bill’s - respondents may now properly file the expropriation proceedings
Explanatory Note, Congress claims that given the problem of Quezon - Doesn’t agree with the court that the constitutional power of the Congress
City’s growing population, expropriating the land will help solve the for the expropriation of lands is “well-nigh all embracing.”
overpopulation and “implement the land-for-the-landless program of
the present Administration.” Singling out Tatalon Estate doesn’t
stigmatize the effort of the statute as denial of equal protection.
8. 7. On the occasion of expropriation, whatever contractual rights might be
possessed by vendors and vendees could be asserted and accorded the
appropriate constitutional protection.
9. 8. The statute of concern can stand the test of validity. If it were
otherwise, then the judiciary may lend itself susceptible to the charge that
in its appraisal of governmental measures with social and economic
implications, its decisions are characterized by the narrow, unyielding
insistence on the primacy of property rights, contrary to what the
Constitution ordains.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963

holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as amended by Republic Act No. 3453 is
unconstitutional is reversed. The writ of prohibition suit is denied, and the
preliminary injunction issued by the lower court set aside. With costs against
petitioner.

OTHER OPINIONS:

TEEHANKEE, concurring and dissenting

- Concurs with main opinion to reverse the decision of the lower court dated
January 10, 1963
Syllabus: Constitutional Law: Disqualification and Disabilities, Executive Department; Statutory
C onstruction: L anguage of the C onstitution

C ivil L iberties Union vs Executive Secretary; G.R . 83896

&

Anti-Graft L eague of the Philippines vs Juico; G.R . 83815

or

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, vs.

PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as
Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDESQUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDONEZ, as
Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, asSecretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS
SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National
Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of
Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and
Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO
GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health;
REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the
National Economic Development Authority

FACTS:

Petitions seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284,

which states:

“SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his

position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporationsand receive the corresponding compensation therefor;
 Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or
to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the C hairman.

“SEC T I ON 2. I f a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary

or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions
than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case
shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

“SEC T I ON 3. I n order to fully protect the interest of the government in

government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the
members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.”

Petitioners, C ivil L iberty Union (C L U) and the Anti-Graft L eague of the Philippines,
maintain that Executive Order N o. 284 allows members of the C abinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary position, which is contrary to Section 13, Article V I I of the 1987 constitution, which
states:

“Sec. 13. T he President, V ice-President, the Members of the C abinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this C onstitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. T hey shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. T hey shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.”

Petitioner Anti-Graft L eague, also seeks extraordinary writs of prohibition and

mandamus, and a temporary restraining order, directing the public respondents (Secretaries
and C ommissioners) to cease and desist from holding any office other than their official
position and to return any salaries they may have received during their tenure as such.

T he Anti-Graft L eague also objects to DOJ Opinion no. 703 and Executive Order N o.
284 as they allegedly “lumped together” Section 13, Article V I I and Section 7, par. 2, Article
I X -B of the C onstitution, which respectively address distinct groups of public officers. One,
being the President and her official family and the second, public servants in general.
Petitioners argue that the exceptions provided in Section 7 only apply to employees of the
C ivil Service and do not extend to those mentioned in Section 13. For reference, Section 7, par.
2, Article I X -B reads:

“Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,

no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of E.O. 284 on the principle that it provides
for an exception to constitutional provisions under Section 13, Article V I I , other than those
provided in other parts of said C onstitution. Such being that “(1) the V ice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the C abinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article V I I thereof; and (2)
the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar C ouncil by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article V I I I ”. And that since the phrase “unless provided in this C onstitution” is
used, any exception to Section 13, Article V I I must be given in the C onstitution and can not
be provided in a subsequent law.

Public respondents, Juico et. al., hold multiple offices and positions within the
government. T hey maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the C onstitution”
in Section 13, Article V I I makes reference to Section 7, par. 2, Article I X -B, insofar as
appointive officials are concerned.

ISSUES:

W/ N, the exceptions provided for in Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B apply to the prohibited
officialsunder Section 13, Article VII.

W/ N, E.O. 284 isconstitutional.

DECISION:

NO

NO

Petition isGranted
HELD:

“A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration.” The intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution must
be considered in construing the aforementioned Constitutional provisions. Being written after
the period of martial law, during which the holding of multiple offices was widespread and
was prone to self-enriching practices, one of the “selling points” of the 1987 Constitution was
that the practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the government and
collecting the salaries from it would be discontinued. In addition to Section 7, Article IX-B,
the framers had created Section 13, Article VII. Which prohibits the family of the president (
president, vice-president, and Cabinet) from holding other government offices, unless allowed
so as provided “in the constitution.” This provision means that no law, except the
fundamental law, may allow the family of the president to hold other offices.

Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it allows members of the Cabinet, their
secretaries and undersecretaries, to hold other offices in the government. This contradicts the
provision in the 1987 Constitution which expressly prohibit the family of the president from
holding other offices.
DOJ OPI N I ON N o. 703

Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez, construing Section 13, Article V I I in relation to Section
7, par. (2), Article I X -B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion N o. 73, series of 1987, 5 declaring
that C abinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold
other public office, including membership in the boards of government corporations: (a)
when directly provided for in the C onstitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is
made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar C ouncil under Section 8, paragraph 1,
Article V I I I ; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their
respective positions NOTE: and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the
Philippines, on July 25, 1987, or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987,
promulgated Executive Order No. 284.
 [Nos. L-10360 and L-10433]| ALBA V EVANGELISTA
January 17, 1957 | Felix, J | Presumption of Constitutionality

PETITIONER: JULIANO A. ALBA, in his capacity as Acting Vice Mayor of Roxas City
RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE JOSE D. EVANGELISTA, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz and VIVENCIO C. ALAJAR

SUMMARY:
Vivencio C. Alajar, was originally appointed by the President to be the Vice-Mayor of the
City of Roxas (1954). Alajar continued holding office until November 1955 when he received
communication from Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema informing him that the
President has designated Juliano Alba in his stead as the Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas, and to
turn over his position. Alba took oath and assumed office (1955). Alajar instituted Quo Warranto
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Capiz against Alba contending that Alba usurped the
position; that there was no vacancy for such appointment; and that there was no legal cause or
reason for removal of Alajar from the position. Lower court grants the petition, making Alajar
entitled for the position with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto until he
resigns, dies or is removed for cause. Alba appealed while Alajar moved for the immediate
execution of the judgment. The latter was granted. The matter is brought to the Supreme Court,
with petitioner Alba praying for (1) a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, retraining Alajar
from discharging the duties and functions of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas so that Alba
shall continue acting in the position until the final determination of the validity of the order of
immediate execution, (2) declare null and void the judgment of Hon. Evangelista for the immediate
execution of Quo Warranto on the ground that the same was improperly issued as their existed no
good reason for its issuance and (3) for such other relief as may be just and equitable. The Solicitor
General requested for intervention to defend the constitutionality of Sec. 8 of Republic Act No.
603 which the lower court overlooked. Motion for intervention was granted.
The issues at hand are WHETHER OR NOT the appointment of Alba by the President to
hold office at his pleasure to assume the position of Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City is
constitutional and WHETHER OR NOT certain positions are terminable at the pleasure of an
appointing authority despite the constitutional provision “no officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”. The Court dismissed
the quo warranto proceedings as Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 is constitutional (presumption
of constitutionality and its application to a previous case), and the cases brought to discussion by
the respondents were appointment with fixity of terms as opposed to the case at bar, appoint at the
pleasure of the President without fixity of term. In this case, NO FIXITY OF TENURE has been
provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been exercised in accordance with the policy
laid down by Congress therein. “Fixity of tenure destroys the power of removal at pleasure
otherwise incident to the appointing power; the reason of this rule is the evident repugnance
between the fixed term and the power of arbitrary removal”. Removing at pleasure an official
without a fixed term, and if such appointment is at the pleasure of the appointing authority, the
power of removal is exercisable at its mere discretion, with or without cause.
DOCTRINE:
1. Presumption of Constitutionality of Statutes: Statutes are presumed valid and
constitutional. Its invalidity must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, this is in respect to
the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism of the legislative body in the passage of bills.
2. Tenure of Office of a Vice-Mayor: Tenure of office may be removed with or without cause
by the appointing officer IF the manner of appointment was AT PLEASURE of the
appointing officer WITHOUT fixity of term. In such a case, the term expires by mere
discretion of the appointing officer.
3. A proceeding in a lower court is perfected by mere notice of appeal to a higher court. The
lower court losses jurisdiction except in matters relating to the issuance orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, as provided in the Rules of Court.

FACTS:
1. This is an ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court for a review with preliminary
injunction of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in the Quo Warranto
proceedings initiated by Vivencio C. Alajar, originally appointed by the President to be the
Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas.
2. January 1, 1954: President appointed Vivencio Alajar as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas;
took his oath and assumed office on January 6, 1954; appointment was confirmed by
Commission on Appointment on March 31, 1954.
3. Alajar continued holding office until November 1955 when he received communication
from Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema informing him that the President
has designated Juliano Alba in his stead as the Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas, and to
turn over his position to the said designation, effective immediately. This was confirmed
by a telegram Alajar received from the President.
4. Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro addressed Juliano A. Alba a communication
informing him to enter upon the performance of office, furnishing the Commissioner of
Civil Service with the copy of his oath.
5. November 19, 1955: Alba took oath and assumed office.
6. Alajar instituted Quo Warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Capiz against
Alba contending (1) Alba usurped the office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas (2) That
there existed no vacancy of the office at the time of the designation of Alba by the President
and (3) There existed no legal cause or reason for the removal or disqualification of Alajar
by President as Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City.
7. Lower Court: Petitioner (Vivencio C. Alajar) was “entitled to remain in office as Vice-
Mayor of the City of Roxas with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto until he resigns, dies or is removed for cause.
8. Alba appealed. Alajar filed petition praying for immediate execution of judgment. Motion
was granted on February 18, 1956. Alba brought the matter to the Supreme Court praying
(1) a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, retraining Alajar from discharging the duties
and functions of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas so that Alba shall continue acting in
the position until the final determination of the validity of the order of immediate execution,
(2) declare null and void the judgment of Hon. Evangelista for the immediate execution of
 Quo Warranto on the ground that the same was improperly issued as their existed no good
reason for its issuance and (3) for such other relief as may be just and equitable.
9. Solicitor General requested intervention in the case alleging that the order of immediate
execution deprived him of the opportunity to be heard in defending the constitutionality of
section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 by the affirmative vote of 8 Justices as provided in the
Rules of Court. The stand of the Solicitor General is that the said section is constitutional.
The motion for intervention was granted.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT the appointment of Alba by the President to hold office at his
pleasure to assume the position of Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City is constitutional
2. WHETHER OR NOT certain positions are terminable at the pleasure of an appointing
authority despite the constitutional provision “no officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law”
RATIO:
1. Court DISMISSED the quo warranto proceedings. Alajar has no right to hold office. Alba
is designated as the Acting Vice-Mayor of Roxas City.
2. Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance in quo warranto proceedings is
perfected by the mere presentation of the notice of appeal, so “the trial court losses its
jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties…hence, in the case at bar, the trial court has no jurisdiction to provide
for the issuance of the writ for the advance execution of its judgment. The Court, therefore,
declared null and void such issuance, and made permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction by the herein petitioner.
3. Presumption of Constitutionality: Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 is constitutional.
Removal by exercise of discretion is constitutional. This act creating the City of Roxas
provides that the Vice-Mayor shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments and shall hold office at the pleasure of
the President. In this view of the law, could the President legally replace respondent Alajar
with or without cause? YES. On the other hand, Vivencio C. Alajar and judge José D.
Evangelista allege that a similar case (De los Santos vs. Mallare, SEC. 2545 of
Administrative Code) has been declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition “no
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law” as the two are mutually repugnant and irreconcilable. However, Solicitor
General shares in the view of the tenure of office of public officials. “A public office is the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign function of government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer”. The act of Congress
in creating a public office including the term (period which one may claim) and tenure
(period which an incumbent actually holds office) is a valid exercise of legislative power.
After all the foregoing circumstances, it must be shown that a statue violates the
constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation
in the mind of the court (Sharpless vs. Mayor). The court presumes that every statute is
valid and constitutional, on the theory of separation of powers and respect to the wisdom,
integrity, and patriotism of the legislative body. Before a legislature passes a bill, it is
 presumed that the body has decided the measure to be constitutional, until its violation to
the constitution is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Jover vs. Borra: ‘The legislative intent to provide for a fixed period of office tenure for
the Mayor of the City of Iloilo and not to make him removable at the pleasure of the
appointing authority may be inferred from the fact that whereas the appointment of the
Vice-Mayor of the same city and those of the Mayors and Vice-Mayors of other cities are
at pleasure, and that of the Mayor of Iloilo is for a fixed time. “It is an established rule that
when the law authorizes a superior officer to remove a subordinate at pleasure his
discretion in the exercise of the power of removal is absolute. As long as the removal is
effected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, it may not be declared invalid
by the courts, no matter how reprehensible and unjust the motives of the removal might be
(State vs. Kennelly, 55 Atl. 555).
5. Tenure VS. Term. Removal or Expiration? Removal at the pleasure of the appointing
officer of tenure without fixed term, with or without cause is VALID. The cases relied
upon by the respondents constituted removal of officials from office which prescribe fixity
of term. However, in the case at bar, the reappointment by the President constituted
expiration of term as no fixity of term was specified. Even if such action constituted the
removal, the act itself would still be lawful for under section 8 of Republic Act No. 603,
no fixity of tenure has been provided for, and the pleasure of the President has been
exercised in accordance with the policy laid down by Congress therein. “Fixity of tenure
destroys the power of removal at pleasure otherwise incident to the appointing power; the
reason of this rule is the evident repugnance between the fixed term and the power of
arbitrary removal”. Removing at pleasure an official without a fixed term, and if such
appointment is at the pleasure of the appointing authority, the power of removal is
exercisable at its mere discretion, with or without cause.

CONCURRING:
CONCEPCION, J., concurring
I believe that the word “tenure” in the foregoing expressions should be submitted by “term”, for:
The distinction between “term” and “tenure” is important, for, pursuant to the Constitution, “no
officer or employee in the Civil Service may be removed or suspended except for cause, as
provided by law” and this fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make
the tenure of some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by clothing the latter
with blanket authority to replace a public officer before the expiration of his term. In the case at
bar, the term is not fixed by law. However, the latter, in effect, vests in the President the power to
fix such term. Alajar was not removed from office, for “to remove an officer is to oust him from
office before the expiration of his term” Alajar merely lost the right to hold the office of ViceMayor
of the City of Roxas by expiration of his term as such.
 G.R. No. L-20387 Morfe v. Mutuc
January 31, 1986 | Fernando, J. | Presumption of Constitutionality
PETITIONER: Jesus P. Morfe
RESPONDENTS: Amelito R. Mutuc, Executive Secretary, et al.
SUMMARY:
This is a petition seeking to declare Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019) nulled and void. Section 7 requires the periodical
submission (every 2 years) of sworn statements of assets and liabilities by public
officials. The CFI ruled that such provision is null and void while the Supreme
Court reversed the decision invoking the presumption of validity of a law prevails
in the absence of evidence to rebut the contrary.
DOCTRINE:
Presumption of validity- In the absence of a factual foundation, or evidence to
rebut the presumption of validity of a law, such presumption of validity must
prevail (Ermita-Malate, etc. v. Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 19567).
Further, to declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional
rights must be clear, categorical, and undeniable
FACTS:
1. 1960- Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practice Act to
deter public officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty
and improve the tone of morality in public service.
2. Section 7 of the said Act states that every public officer, either within thirty
(30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within
the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office
to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income,
the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: xx.”
3. January 31 1962. An action filed for declaratory relief by the plaintiff,
Judge Morfe, with the CFI of Panganasinan stating that Section 7 of RA
2019 is oppressive and unconstitutional. This specific provision was
challenged for being violative of due process by the appellee as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable
search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination.
4. February 14, 1962. An Answer came from the then Executive Secretary
and the then Secretary of Justice affirming the facts of the appeal, but
declaring the erroneous conclusion by the plaintiff ascertaining that: i)
when a government official, like the plaintiff, accepts a public position, he
is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information
on his personal affair, and ii) that there was no violation of his
constitutional rights.
5. February 27, 1962. Plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings
as in his opinion all his material allegation were admitted.
6. March 10, 1962. An order was issued giving the parties thirty days within
which to submit memoranda, but even without them, the case was deemed
submitted for decision to the lower with the belief that there is not question
of facts.
7. July 19, 1962. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan ruled that the
periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to
the due process clause. Hence, Section 7 of RA 3019 us null and void.
8. Thus, the petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. WON Section 7 of RA 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the
following:
a. Oppressive exercise of police power
b. Unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy
c. Implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
d. Violation of the right against self-incrimination
DECISION: The Court reversed the ruling of the Lower Court. Section 7 stands
and remains valid.
RATIO:
1. On the overall issue of presumption of validity/constitutionality.
a. Citing Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. The Mayor
of Manila that the Court, in the absence of a factual foundation,
the lower court deciding the matter purely “on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail.” In the present case, likewise, there was not factual
foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute
could be based. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut such
presumption of validity.
b. Further, Ermita-Malate Hotel case showed that “What cannot be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom
of the mind or of the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible cope of regulatory measure is wider.”
2. On the issue of the oppressive exercise of police power and defense
through due process
a. It is that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it
to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. (Rubi v. Prov. Board, 39 Phil. 600). Earlier Philippine
cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general
welfare and public interest (U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85) ; to enact
such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote
public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare
of each inhabitant (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218); to
preserve public order and to prevent of against the state and to
establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of
good manner and good neighborhood calculated to prevent
conflict of rights (U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245). Any public
official may invoke due process if it sees any form of violation
against his liberty or property.
1. On the unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy.
a. It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a persion
to privacy. This is not to say that the public officer, by virtue of
position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only
to emphasize that in subjecting him to such further compulsory
revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of
the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is
no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a
private sphere.
2. On being implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
a. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure “does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.”
Every man is under obligation to give testimony, but that
obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions and just
because these documents are available does not meant that police
officers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them.
3. On the violation of the right against self-incrimination
a. There is no constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s
conduct against judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from
justice.
 Villena VS Spouses Chavez
November 10, 2003 | Justice Panganiban | Stare Decisis
PETITIONER: George Villena, Carlos Villena, Aurora Bondoc and Ronnie
Fernandez, and their respective spouses
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Antonio Chavez and Noemi Marcos-Chavez and
Carlita Chavez
SUMMARY: The case is about the petition for review on certiorari on the
decision of the CA, which reversed the decision made by the MTC and RTC of
Angeles City. On October 15, 1998, Spouses Chavez filed a Complaint for
Illegal/Unlawful Detainer with Damages at the MTC of Angeles alleging that
they are the owners of the 4 parcels of land, which are collectively designated as
Bagong Silang Phase III-C. The said action was filed because George Villena
and the other petitioners were deemed illegally occupying the mentioned four
parcels of land as they failed and refused to pay, despite formal demand letters,
the necessary equity payments. However, in the counter-claim filed by the
petitioners on November 3, 1998, the Villenas argued that Spouses Chavez had
no basis to file for the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer because the properties
mentioned are under the community mortgage program and they are considered
lawful tenants of the properties as they have been paying equity to their
originator Urban Land and Development, Inc. However, the MTC dismissed
both the complaints of the petitioners and the respondents as the case is beyond
its jurisdiction. Spouses Chavez then appealed such judgment to the RTC of
Angeles, but it affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto. Then, Spouses Chavez
appealed to the CA. The appellate court held that the Villenas have no right to
continue occupying the subject properties as they were not able to continue their
equity payments to Spouses Chavez. Accordingly, despite formal demand letters,
the Villenas did not make any effort render their equity payments, which would
have protected their right to continue occupying the said lots. Hence, the petition
was made by the Villenas to contend the decision made by the CA.
DOCTRINE: Stare Decisis
Stare Decisis means that a judgment reached in one case should be applied to
successive ones, in which the facts are SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL, even
though the parties may be different. Hence, like cases ought to be decided alike.
FACTS:
1. Illegal/Unlawful Detainer:
2. The community mortgage program is implemented by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
3. Petitioner Villena claimed that they have been paying their equity to
Urban Land and Development, Inc. However, no corresponding receipts
evidencing payment, as well as the copy of the contract, were provided.
4. Other arguments raised by the Villenas to counter the Complaint for
Illegal/Unlawful Detainer: (A) raised that they are qualified beneficiaries
under RA 7279 (i.e. Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992),
hence they cannot be evicted of their dwelling houses until they have
been relocated and; (B) argued they are builders of good faith and should
be indemnified for the improvements they constructed on the properties
in question.
5. Rescission: one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation in a contract.
This seeks the specific performance of the duty required of the debtor. In
the case at bar, the specific performance being asked is the equity
payments required from the petitioners.
6. The CA also rejected the claim of the Villenas tha they are protected by
RA 7279 as there was no express declration by the local government unit
that the subject parcels of land were considered as a socialized housing
project.
ISSUE:
1. W/N unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve the case at bar.
RATIO:
1. The proper action should have been a complaint for rescission or specific
performance, not a complaint for unlawful detainer. By the facts
established during the trials, it was confirmed that the Villenas had a
contract with the Spouses Chavez to acquire, with the capacity as buyers,
the subject parcels of land. A complaint for unlawful detainer is is not
possible since the Villenas are legally occupying the parcels of land in
their capacity as buyers. The doctrine of stare decisis comes to play
because a prior ruling was adopted by the SC to render this judgment.
Accordingly, a previous case held, similar to the decision made in this
case, that the proper remedy should be a complaint for rescission, and not
complaint for unlawful detainer.

JUDGMENT: The petition was GRANTED. The assailed decision of the CA

was overturned.
Veloso vsCourt of Appeals(Syllabus: Court Decisions: ResJudicata)

NICOLAS VELOSO, JR., CONCEPCION VELOSO PATALINGHUG, EDUARDO

VELOSO, LIGAYA VELOSO ROA, RAFAEL VELOSO, EMERENCIANA VELOSO
CABIGON, DOMINGO VELOSO and EMMANUEL VELOSO, petitioners vs.
COURT OF APPEALS REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 14, BAYBAY, LEYTE,
CORSINI MIRAFLOR AVELLANA, AUREO PEÑALOSA MIRAFLOR, EDDIE
PENALOSA MIRAFLOR and DOUGLASPEÑALOSA MIRAFLOR, respondents

PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.

G.R. 116680

August 28, 1996

FACTS:

Thisis a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA which dismissed their petition
to annul the RTC decision. Petitioners claim that decision of the trial court is inherently
flawed because the issues raised therein had already been resolved earlier in another case
involving the same parties and subject matter, and that a trial court has no power to
countermand a decision of a co-equal court.

Petitioner argument: CA erred in not annulling RTC decision because 2 previousdecisions

already upheld the possession and ownership of the lot by the parentsof the petitioners:

Jan 9, 1951, Civil Case R-205, CFI Leyte: the great grandmother of respondents Filomena
Bermoy sought the recovery of L ot 8422 but it was dismissed because the L ot was not part
of the estate of Bermoy. I t was sold and involved in a civil case which gave absolute
ownership of the lot to N icolas V eloso, Sr., Emerenciana V eloso, L ourdes Bibas, Proculo
Pealosa, and C rispin Miraflor.

July 29, 1969, Civil Case B-122, CFI Leyte: Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance (a
legal and equitableremedy granted totherightful owner of land which hasbeen wrongfully or
erroneously registered in thenameof another for thepurposeof compelling thelatter to transfer
 or reconvey the land to him) of a portion of the Lot against Proculo Pealosa and L ourdes
Bibas, and the C ourt ruled in favor of petitioners.

Sept 12, 1988 (Civil Case B-1043): respondents filed a complaints for quiet ing of t it le (a
lawsuit filed to establish ownership of real estate when ownership is in question; insuring that
once and for all, there is only one clear owner of the title) against petitioners with the RTC of
Leyte. They brought the 2 previous decisions to the court. The land was Lot No. 8422-F
covered by TCT No. 22393 in the name of Crispina Miraflor, deceased mother of respondents
(TCT - Transfer Certificateof Title).

Aug 31, 1990: RTC:

1. found the TCT authentic and valid

2. declared that respondentswere absolute co-ownersof the Lot
3. directed petitionersto deliver the Lot
4. ordered petitioners to pay respondents P5,000 as attorney’s fees and P2,000 as
reimbursement for litigation expenses
May 28, 1992: CA affirmed RTC decision. Petitionersappealed to SC.

Oct 12, 1992: SC denied the petition because the issues were factual, and the facts of the CA
were supported by substantial evidence.

Sept 20, 1993: petitionerssought annulment of RTC decision before the CA.

July 24, 1994: CA ruled against pet it ioners because t he cont roversy had already been
set t led by t he SC. The contention that the RTC did not have “any power or authority to
amend, alter, or modify the decision of a co-equal court” (CFI of Leyte Branch 3 and Branch
4) should have been raised in previousproceedings.

Hence, thispetition.
ISSUE:

W/n the C A erred in refusing to declare the decision of the R T C void for
having been rendered allegedly in violation of the doctrines of res judicat a and the law
of the case.

R ES JUDI C AT A (“a matter already judged”): C ourt cannot allow a petition for
annulment of judgment which in effect seeks a second cycle of review regarding a
subject matter which has already been fully and fairly adjudicated.

“Material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were there admitted
or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein and that
such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent
action between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in
the subsequent action, whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different form
of proceeding, or whether the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action,
subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action. I n such cases, it is also immaterial that
the two actions are based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or instituted
for different purposes, and seek different reliefs.”

DEC I SI ON :

Petition is DEN I ED.

H EL D:

T he C ourt held that the rulings in C ivil C ases N os. R -205 and B-122 do not constitute
res judicata or the law of the case to R T C case (C ivil C ase B-1043). T his is because the
2 cases are different and do not overlap the R T C case. I n R -205, the specific L ot was
not part of the decision because the L ot 8422 was not part of the Bermoy estate. I n B-
122, the defendants were different because it only involved Proculo Peñalosa and
L ourdes Bibas.

N ow under the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners in

effect are seeking a second cycle of review regarding a subject matter which has
already been fully and fairly adjudicated. T hat cannot be allowed.
Leovillo C. Agustin petitioner vs Court of Appeals and Filinvest Finance Corp. respondent
(Syllabus: Court Decisions) G.R No. 107846 April 18, 1997
Ponente: Francisco, J

Facts:
Petitioner Leovillo Agustin executed a promissory note on October 28, 1970 for the
amount of Php 43, 480.80. The amount was to be paid in monthly installments and was secured
by a chattel mortgage over an Isuzu diesel truck which were assigned to Filinvest Finance
Corporation. Petitioner failed to pay the amount. Agustin failed to comply with the demand of
Filinvest to pay the entire balance or surrender the vehicle. This prompted Filinvest to file a
complaint to RTC of Manila for the issuance of a writ of replevin* or the payment of Php 32,
723.97 plus 14% interest rate per annum from due date until fully paid. Writ of replevin was
issued by RTC and respondent acquired the vehicle. Respondent discovered that the vehicle was
no longer in a running condition and several parts were missing so they replaced it. Afterwards,
it was foreclosed and sold at public auction.
Respondent filed a supplemental complaint for the reimbursement of Php 8,852.76 for the
replacement of the missing parts and also for the expenses incurred in transporting the vehicle
from Cagayan to Manila. Agustin filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. RTC granted the
motion and case was dismissed. Respondent elevated the case to CA and CA set aside the order
of dismissal and ruled that the expenses should be reimbursed. This became final and executory
and was remanded to RTC for reception of evidence to determine the amount due.
Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration with regard to the payment of
repossession expenses but it was dismissed.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari from the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of
RTC regarding the payment of expenses.

Issue:
W/N the SC can review the assailed decision of CA
Decision: Petition is denied
Ruling
The ruling of CA has long acquired finality. CA had already settled the case by awarding
repossession expenses to respondent. Although CA remanded the case to RTC it was not to
relitigate the accuracy of the award but to determine the correct amount of expenses petitioner
has to pay. The issue passed upon by CA to RTC has become the law of the case*. The decision
in the former appeal is now the established and controlling rule hence, the petitioner may not be
allowed in a subsequent appeal. Petitioner cannot resuscitate and revive formerly settled issues.
Judgement of courts should attain finality at some point in time as in this case, otherwise, there
will be no end to litigation.

*Writ of replevin – action or writ issued to recover an item of personal property wrongfully
taken
*Law of the case – principle that is defined as a term applied to an established rule that when an
appellate court passes on a question and remands the cause to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal
(from the case)
>The principle that if the highest appellate court has determined a legal question and returned the case to
the court below foradditional proceedings, the question will not be determined differently on a subsequen
t appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.
 G.R. No. 159357 (Lexi)
April 28, 2004 | J. Panganiban | Main Topic- SPECIFIC TOPIC

PETITIONER: Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE

RESPONDENTS: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

SUMMARY:

Is a religious leader violating the constitutional provisions when they endorse the candidacies of electoral candidates or when
they urge or require members of their congregation to vote for a specified candidate? This case is a Petition for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision[2] and July 29, 2003 Order[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).[4] . The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief[5] filed
before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde,
together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother
Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents.

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a
Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a
separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:

This Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare
whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required
only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged should get. The
step that these movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the
Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court.

DOCTRINE:

A decision not conforming to the form and substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent
(Panganiban)

FACTS:
1. On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde
and his co-respondents Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie
Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.
2. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically
on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of
religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their
flock to vote for a specified candidate.
3. The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the
questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy.
4. The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
5. 1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether
the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the
petition has raised only a question of law.
 6. 2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church and
state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the
court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office
is a clear violation of the separation clause."
7. -The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this
aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to
these facts.
8. -The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.
9. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal
bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with
petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.
10. The said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral
Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for
Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked
the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the
rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.[99]
11. Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no
findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there
is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.
12. It is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a
constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed
upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.[100]
13. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June 12,
2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is
DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?
3. Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
4. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the
Rules of Court?
5. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates
for public office?
6. Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?

RATIO:

1. Petitioner alleges that in seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader
to endorse, or require the members of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein Respondent
SJS has no legal interest in the controversy. It has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered
question would benefit or injure it.
2. Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show not only that
the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in
some indefinite way.[40] They must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right
 or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
3. There was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as
registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question
at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due
to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied
the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.

SEPARATE OPINIONS: NA
CONCURRING: Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.
Marvin Mercado vs. People of the Philippines
GR No. 149375, Nov 26, 2002
Petitioner: Marvin Mercado
Respondents: People of the Philippines
Ponente: J Bellosillo
Summary:
Marvin Mercado, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques
and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or
The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, for which he and his co-accused were initially
sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to a minimum, and
amended by the CA, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to a maximum of
30 years of reclusion temporal.
This case is a petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado where the case should
have certified to the Supreme court as the penalty of 30 years was already reclusion
perpetua, this is pursuant to the last paragraph of sec. 13 rule 124 of the 2000 rules
of Criminal Procedure - Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the
court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment
imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment as the
circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and
forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court
for review.
Doctrine:
1. Sec. 5, Article VIII of the Constitution – Supreme Court entertains appeals
where the “penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher”
2. Parts of Statutes – does the statute provide clear terms of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law and its operations?
Facts:
• Sec. 13, Rule 124, is applicable only when the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at
least reclusion perpetua.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the penalty
imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to thirty (30) years
• Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or
force upon things.
Issue:
1. Should the case go to the Supreme court for decision pursuant to Sec. 13,
Rule 124 of the 2000 rules of criminal procedure, based on the amended
sentence held by the Court of Appeals?
2. Is the penalty that the CA sentenced pursuant to the defined sanctions in
R.A 6538?
Rationale:
1. The case does not need to be reviewed by the SC on the basis of:
a. The sentence imposed by CA was in accordance with sec. 14 of
RA 6538, which is not considered reclusion perpetua
b. While Article 27 of the RPC states that reclusion perpetua shall
be 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, while the 30 years maximum
prescribed falls into the said range, the crime committed is
penalized under a special penal law (RA 6538) where it has it’s
own specific penalties which are not taken from the those in the
RPC
2. That the CA erred in its imposition of the penalty
a. The evidence in this case shows that the accused broke a quarter
window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it, thus
demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle;
nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the imposition
of the full penalty.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the Motion and
Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to an indeterminate
prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years.
No costs.