June Prill Brett vs.

IAC
Facts:
 The director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision
declaring and recognizing the preferential right of therein petitioner
June Prill Brett to explore, develop, exploit and lease an area covered
by “MAMAKAR” mining claims.
 The said decision was appealed by respondents to the then Ministry
of Natural Resources where the appeal was dismissed. Still the
respondents filed an appeal to the office of the president but failed to
prosecute the same. And yet again they filed motions for
reconsideration which were already late as the decision of the
Minister had become final and executory.
 But despite the finality of the decision, the minister reversed the
previous decision and rendered the “MAMAKAR” claims as null and
void ab initio which lead the petitioner to seek reconsideration.
 The sudden change in the minister of the Natural Resources lead to
an appeal by the petitioner to reinstate decision of the former minister
which then leads to a series of motions and petitions until it ultimately
leads to this petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
WON respondent court erred in dismissing petitioner’s original action for
certiorari on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling:
It is true that in the court’s jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by
law or required by public interest, before bringing an action in or resorting
to the courts of justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or
determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by
the aggrieved party.
In the case at bar it is our considered opinion that the decision in
question, is of such a defective nature. The decision it superseded was
already final and executory, the belated motions for reconsideration by the
private respondents being patently time-barred.
Although the respondents did file a timely appeal, they failed to
likewise prosecute the same. It is obvious that the respondent minister
gravely abused his discretion in reversing his original decision which
prompted petitioner to forthwith invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the assailed
decision. Also the assailed decision of respondent minister is also
reinstated without prejudice to the appeal in the Office of the President
taking its due course and the consequent adjudication thereof.
MOOMBA MINING EXPLORATION COMPANY, represented by Minimax Mineral
Exploration Corporation, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals
 On February 2, 1973, Messrs. Honorato Aparejado and Melanio Garcia, partners
of Moomba Mining Exploration Company (Moomba), registered with 'Rocky 1-
100' mining claims located at Jabuyoan, Aroroy, Masbate, pursuant to provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as Amended.
 On May 12, 1975, Moomba filed an availment application of the rights and
privileges over the said 'Rocky 1-100' claims pursuant to Section 100 of
Presidential Decree 463, as amended.
 In an Order dated November 6, 1979, the availment was rejected by the Director
of Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) for failure to comply with the call-
up letters of the BMGS requiring Moomba to submit affidavit of annual work
obligations and official receipts evidencing payment of occupation fees.
 Meanwhile, the 'Baby Jackie' mining claims of private respondent Teresa Corpus
was registered on March 27, 1981 while the Golden Bay 1 and Golden Bay-2
mining claims of private respondent Cornelio Tumulak were registered on August
28, 1987, covering the areas previously covered by the claim of Francisco de la
Fuente registered on March 20, 1980, after the rejection of Moomba's availment
application.
 On May 13, 1981, a request for reconsideration of the rejection order was filed by
Moomba. On August 12, 1981, an Order was issued by the Director of BMGS
partially granting the request for reconsideration insofar as the availment
application covering sixty-eight (68) Rocky claims, namely, Rocky 1 to 16, 23 to
27, 50 to 56, 71 to 78 and 81 to 100 was concerned but denied reconsideration
as to the remaining 32 claims covering Rocky 17 to 22, 28 to 37, 40 to 49, 67 to
70, 79 to 80, because the areas thereof had already been relocated and covered
by new intervening claims of the private respondents which were duly registered
pursuant to the provisions of P.D. 463.
 On December 2, 1987, the Director of BMGS issued another Order approving
availment on the Rocky claims of Moomba which were previously rejected in the
August 12, 1981 Order.
 On March 29, 1988, MINIMAX, representing itself as the operator of Moomba by
virtue of the Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase dated May 13 and 15,
1987, executed in its favor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 15,
1988 Order. The motion was, however, denied by the Director of BMGS in his
Order dated June 13, 1988.
 On June 24, 1988, Moomba filed a manifestation with the BMGS informing that it
had cancelled the Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase with Minimax; that
Minimax had no more authority to seek reconsideration of the March 15, 1988
Order;
  On June 23, 1988, Moomba, thru Minimax, appealed the case to the Secretary of
DENR. On February 17, 1989, Moomba filed a motion to withdraw appeal
reiterating the same grounds in its manifestation earlier filed. On June 1, 1989,
the DENR issued a Decision dismissing the appeal.
 On appeal by Minimax to (the) Office of the President, the same was dismissed
in a Decision dated December 29, 1989.

Subsequent motion for reconsideration by Minimax was again denied in an Order dated
April 10, 1980 issued by public respondent.[2]

Issue:
Whether or not Minimax had the legal personality and authority to represent Moomba.

Held:

We agree with private respondents.

In the petition, petitioner prays that judgment be rendered (R)eversing the decision of
the Court of Appeals declaring that the mining claims over Baby Jackie and the Golden
Bay 1 & 2 mining claims as invalid intervening rights, and ordering the Director of BMGS
to consider and approve petitioners availment applications.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal of herein petitioner because of its
finding that MINIMAX has no legal personality to bring the appeal in representation of
MOOMBA because the Royalty Agreement between them had been cancelled by
MOOMBA as early as October 2, 1987; that MOOMBA, through its General Manager,
Honorato Aparejado, had explicitly manifested that it recognizes Baby Jackie, Golden
Bay-1 and Golden Bay-2 as validly located intervening claims, which take precedence
over MOOMBAs Rocky claims, and that it is no longer interested in pursuing the case;
and that even without MOOMBAs recognition of the two Golden Bay claims and the
Baby Jackie claim, said claims are valid intervening rights because they were registered
after the rejection of MOOMBAs application for availment of the Rocky claims (see
Rollo, pp. 60-61).
Public respondents findings were based upon the manifestation filed by MOOMBA itself,
through its General Manager, Aparejado, with the Director of the DENR; and upon the
undisputed evidence on record showing the registration of herein private respondents
claims after petitioners Rocky claims were considered open for relocation by other
parties due to MOOMBAs failure to pay occupation fees for several years.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner submits that the Office of the President, acted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in relying upon the
manifestation filed by MOOMBA through Aparejado; petitioner impugning the validity of
the cancellation of the Royalty Agreement and the recognition by MOOMBA and/or
Aparejado of private respondents claims contained in said manifestation.[10]
In ruling that the conclusion of the Office of the President on the legal personality of
Minimax to represent Moomba is based on substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals
adopted the following ratiocination by the Office of the President:
Moreover, as stated earlier, the manifestations of MOOMBA which are on record plainly
reveal that it recognized the validity of appellees claim over the BABY JACKIE and the
two (2) GOLDEN BAY mining claims. Pursuant thereto, MOOMBA clearly manifested its
lack of interest to pursue further this case, thus constituting voluntary abandonment of
its ROCKY claims involved in this case. This Office subscribes to the appealed decision
which definitely states:
At any rate, records disclose that MOOMBA through Honorato Aparejado, had already
waived its rights and interests over the ROCKY claims involved in this controversy
and now recognizes the validity of appellees claims. In view thereof, MOOMBA has
manifested unequivocally its lack of interest to pursue further the instant appeal. Such
waiver of rights constitutes voluntary abandonment of the ROCKY mining claims herein
involved. (Undercoring supplied).
The declaration that the aforesaid BMGS orders, dated November 6, 1979, March 15
and June 13, 1988, have become final and executory, unequivocally render nugatory
appellants insistence that appellees claims over the BABY JACKIE and the two (2)
GOLDEN BABY mining claims are invalid intervening rights. Moreover, the records of
this case indubitably show that the BABY JACKIE claim of Teresa Corpuz was
registered on March 27, 1981 after the rejection of the availment application of
MOOMBA on November 6, 1979, while the GOLDEN BABY claims of Cornelio Tumulak
were registered on August 28, 1987. Likewise after the rejection of the availment
application of MOOMBA on November 6, 1979, and thus, the area covered thereby are
open for relocation after said rejection. Therefore, appellees claims are valid intervening
rights. (Rollo, pp. 60-61).[11]
The court further held that certiorari is the wrong remedy. It stated:
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
In attacking the decision of the Office of the President, petitioner would have this Court
review and re-evaluate the evidence on record, as well as determine whether or not
public respondent correctly interpreted such evidence. Manifestly, this is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari.Judicial review of this Court does not go so
far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion (PNOC-Energy Devt. Corp. vs. NLRC, 201 SCRA 487 [1991];
Filipinas Bank vs. NLRC, 182 SCRA 848 [1990].[12]
In this petition, this Court is asked to re-examine the probative value of the evidence
adduced below as to whether Moomba has indeed recognized the intervening claims of
private respondents over the subject Rocky claims. This is a question of fact and not of
law. The instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and the Court is
empowered to review only errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the
function of this Court to re-examine the evidence submitted by the parties or analyze or
weigh the evidence all over again.[13] This Court is definitely not the proper venue to
consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts.[14]
Moreover, petitioner failed to point out specifically the error/s committed by the Court of
Appeals.The errors which are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals are only those allegedly committed
by said court.[15]
Petitioner has assigned as error the reliance by the Office of the President on the
manifestations filed by Moomba recognizing respondents' mining claims, arguing that
Garcia, Aparejado's partner in Moomba, revoked Aparejado's power of attorney. We
find no cogent basis to review or disturb the resolution of the court affirming the findings
of the Office of the President, which are congruent with those of the Director of the
BMGS and the Secretary of the DENR.
We must point out that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies[16] and
that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but
finality[17] except when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to
support the findings,[18] a situation that does not obtain in this case.
NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE
FACTS:
 Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner
of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said
Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and
privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."

 On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter

requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken
against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in
excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and
apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he
could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the
Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be
submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of
the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

 On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive

Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a
prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial
to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof,
pending investigation of the above charges."

 On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions
advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and
abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs.

 In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner
may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary
Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges
against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature
 may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation
of the principle of the separation of powers.

ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme
Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the
rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

HELD:

It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is
a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by
implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended
or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.

- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor
General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since
the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the
Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it
granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance.
Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure
prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that
effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.

- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or
"rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated
by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of
that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate
the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
Cuerdo vs Commission on Audit

FACTS:
 Petitioner is the Market Supervisor I of the Market Administration Office, Office of
the City Treasurer, Gingoog City.

 On August 1, 1986, the Market Administration Office or ticket booth, where the
petitioner holds office, together with neighboring market stalls, including A and E
Bakery, were destroyed by fire. Burned in the conflagration were the petitioner's
cash collection and the cash tickets. The petitioner filed a written request for
relief from money accountability for the loss of her cash collection and the cash
tickets with the Regional Office, Commission on Audit, Cagayan de Oro City.

 Acting on her request, the said office conducted an investigation and its finding is
"to the effect that there is positive showing of negligence on the part of the
applicant in not taking necessary precaution or zeal in returning the money in the
safe in order to safeguard it not only from fire but also from theft or robbery. Upon
indorsement to the COA Central Office, it affirmed the stand of the COA Regional
Office. he petitioner sought a reconsideration of the decision of the COA Central
Office which was denied.

 In disclaiming liability for negligence and in seeking relief from responsibility

therefor, the petitioner maintains that the money was not placed in the safe due
to the disappearance of the key to the safe. Moreover, she contends that the
money was due for remittance in the afternoon of that fateful day. She claims that
because the fire broke out, she did not have the time to retrieve the money from
the drawer of her table which was inside the Market Administration Office. She
deposits that the loss was not due to a wilful negligence on her part because the
immediate and direct cause of the loss was the unexpected and calamitous event
of a sudden fire that consumed the public market.

 She argues that the alleged disappearance of the key to the safe was not looked
into as no hearing was conducted in disregard of the doctrine of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the COA finding the petitioner liable is reversible

RULING: No. It is the general policy of this Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers
but also for their presumed knowledgeability and even expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce.

The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; and it is particularly
strong as regards administrative agencies vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial
in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of
activity, the proper regulations and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special
training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to
said field, obtaining in the nation.

The consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of
justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is
absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and
patently insubstantial.

Hence, courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a
clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when
they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may
amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The findings of facts must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence even if not
overwhelming or preponderant.