Professional Documents
Culture Documents
NO. 56
Editor-in-Chief: Bela Kiraly Associate Editor-in-Chief: Peter Pastor
EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS NO. CCLV
by Geza Perjes
Translated by Maria D. Fenyo with a Foreword by Janos M. Bak
TABLE OF CONTENTS
• Cover Page
• Preface to the Series
• About This Book
• Preface to the American Edition
• Preface to the Hungarian Edition (1977)
• PART I
STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICSOF THE HUNGARIAN-TURKISH WARS
• CHAPTER I
METHODOLOGY
• The Model of War
• Rationality of Ottoman Politics
• The Ottoman Leadership and Intelligence
• Economic Strategy
• Ottoman Diplomacy
• CHAPTER II
THE MILITARY POWER OF THE OTTOMANSTATE IN THE 1520s
• The Makeup and Resources of the State
• The Strength of the Ottoman Army in 1526
• Estimates in the Sources and Studies: the Supply Side
• Calculation from the 1526 Column of March
• Mobilization and Aufmarsch
• Provisions and Transport of Foodstuff
• Strategy
• First Phase: from 1356 to 1453.
• Second Phase: from 1463 to 1521
• Third Phase: from the Capture of Belgrade e to the Peace of Adrianople, 1521-1568.
• Tactics
• CHAPTER III
HUNGARYS MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE JAGELLONIAN PERIOD
• The Economic Background
• The Army
• Supreme Command and Strategy
• Branches of Service, Tactics, and Morale
• Domestic Affairs and Government
• CHAPTER IV
SULEYMAN'S PROPOSAL:AN OUTLINE OF OTTOMAN AND HUNGARIAN POLICIES BETWEEN 1520
AND 1541
• Historiography
• Suleymans Peace Offer of 1520 and His Attack in 1521
• Suleymans Second Peace Offer, Its Rejection, and the "Punitive Expedition of 1526
• The Apparent Realization of Suleymans Concept in 1529
• Events From Late 1529 to 1538
• The Peace of Nagyvarad
• The Death of King John
• The Fall of Buda and the Withdrawal of "Suleymans Proposal
• Conclusion
• PART II
THE BATTLE OF MOHACS
• CHAPTER V
OBJECTIVES AND PLANS OF THE TWO SIDES
• Sources
• Military Planning.The Question of River Defense in Southern Hungary
• Timing and Planning
• Plans for an Advance into the Balkans
• CHAPTER VI
PREPARATIONS ON THE HUNGARIAN SIDE.OTTOMAN ADVANCE
• Hungarian Reconnaissance and Assessment of Ottoman Intentions
• Peace Plans, the Financial Situation, and Preparations
• The Ottoman Armies March Across the Balkans
• CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE
• The Fall of Petervarad and Ujlak.The Ottoman Army Reaches the Drava
• Where to Fight the Battle? Conflict between Court and Notability
• Strength of the Hungarian Forces on the Eve of the Battle
• CHAPTER VIII
THE HUNGARIAN BATTLE PLAN AND THEDEPLOYMENT OF THE OTTOMAN FORCES
• The Battlefield at Mohacs
• Difficulties of the Ottoman Deployment
• The Deployment of the Hungarian Army
• The Advance of the Ottoman Army to the Battlefield. Disorientation of the Supreme Command
• The First Hungarian Attack. Tomoris Battle Plan: A Reconstruction
• CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE
• The First Phase
• The Second Phase and Conclusion
• CHAPTER X
END OF THE 1526 CAMPAIGN
• Ottoman Advance to Buda
• The Ottomans Leave the Country
• The Death of Louis II
• Mohacs from the Ottoman Point of View: Triumph or Failure?
• GLOSSARY
• GLOSSARY OF PERSONS
• REFERENCES
• Endnotes
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., conducts research,organizes conferences, and publishes scholarly books in
historyand related fields. The Open Society Fund helped us incompleting research and holding conferences. The
editorial work for this volume was done by Professor JanosM. Bak with the assistance of Professors Gustav Bayerle
andMarjorie Sinel and Dr. Gabriele P. Scardellato. The preparationof the manuscript for publication was
administered by PatriciaStracquatanio of Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc. Themaps were prepared by Mrs.
Ida Etelka Romann. To all these institutions and persons I wish to express my mostsincere appreciation and thanks.
Bela K. Kiraly
Highland Lakes, N.J. Professor Emeritus of
March 15, 1988 HistoryEditor-in-Chief
As to income distribution, Marsigli's figures provide some orientation. At the end of the seventeenth century,
the total income of thetimar estates in Anatolia and Rumelia might have been distributedas follows:
hass estates: 7.2%zeamet estates: 40.6%small timar estates: 52.2%
A rounded-out calculation using the figures of Marsigli is presentedin Table 2:
Table 2.
The Probable Distribution of Timar Estate Ownersof Their Income and of the Soldiery Provided
Zeamet Timar
Hass
Estates Total
In 1526, as on other occasions, some provinces of the eastern portionof the Empire did not participate in the
Hungarian campaign. According to the chronicler Lufti, although they were mobilized, thetroops of Diakbekr,
Caraman, Rum, Syria, and of the Egyptianeyalets remained at their peacetime stations. If we assume theyrepresented
about a third of the total forces, we must subtractroughly 25,000, leaving us with about 57,000 sipahis, the figure
given by Kochu Bey for the eyalets of Anatolia and Rumelia.[49]
The probability of these estimates is enhanced by the data provided in Table 3, which contains the figures given by
Kochu Bey,Ayni Ali, Ali Chaus, and Rycaut.[50] The most important fact, for ourpurposes, is the similarity of the
figures in Table 3 for the ratio oftimariot soldiers to those of Table 2.
Table 3.
Number and Proportion of Timar Owners and SoldiersAccording to Various Authors
Number of
Author Period Area Owners Sipahis Ratio
Such are the data that can be puzzled out from the sources and the literature. As we can see, the number of timar
soldiers must havebeen around 57,000. This figure, however, is only theoretical, because in practice a number of
circumstances come into play. It islikely that as long as the Empire kept expanding--that is, roughlyspeaking, down
to the end of Suleyman's reign--the timar ownersprovided more soldiers than the kanun prescribed, because thetimar
estates established in recently conquered areas were given tosoldiers who distinguished themselves in the campaign.
It alsofrequently happened that the income of the timars was raised evenif the size of their estates did not increase as
a reward for meritsearned in the campaign. Thus it was largely in the interest of thebejlerbeyilik and sanjak beyi
owning hass estates, as well as of thesub-begs and subasis owning zeamets, to participate in the war withas many
soldiers as possible, for victory and rewards were far morelikely with large numbers. Hence Kochu Bey's words, that
in thetime of Suleyman, the timar owners participated in the campaignswith considerably more soldiers than
prescribed, do not sound at allexaggerated.
On the other hand, the number of fighters may have been negatively affected by the owner's illness or financial
problems. Moreover, disobedience may also have played a part: some timars mayhave simply disregarded the draft.
Finally, there were cases ofcheating: for instance, the landowners might show up for the musterwith a complete
contingent, but then decide to send some home toavoid having to provide for them. However, such instances
wereunlikely under Suleyman. On the contrary, the chroniclers write ofperfect discipline and enthusiasm, and report
how well the prescriptions of the kanuns were observed at the muster. For instance,Kemal Pashazade writes
regarding the muster held at Belgrade in1526:
The beys competed with one another each of them striving to outdo theothers, and each of them striving to present
troops as well equipped aspossible.... The number of cavalry and infantry were like the blades ofgrass in the field
and their armament was found to conform perfectlywith the official roster determined by the kanun.[51]
It is relatively simple to determine the number of professionalsoldiers. The janissaries must have numbered around
10-12,000, the Porte's sipahis around 54,000, and the number of artillerymenis known to have been 695.[52]
It is far more difficult to estimate the size of the irregular troops.Among them were the akindjis, the gonuluk, the
assab, the musellem,the voinuks, etc. Their total may have been 5040,000. While theywere of limited value in open
battle-comparable to the Hungariannoble levy and local militia--the akindjis in particular were veryhelpful from the
strategic point of view, because they carried outlong-range raids with unusual cruelty, terrorizing and paralyzingthe
enemy's hinterland. The Tartars performed similar roles; theynumbered 10,000 in the campaign of 1532; hence we
may assumethere were about as many of them in 1526.
All told, the data provided by Ferdi and Kochu Bey, presented inTable 4, must be close to reality. Although the
numbers given byFerdi pertain to the troops who participated in the campaign of 1529,while Kochu Bey gives
information regarding Süleyman's reign ingeneral, the situation in 1526 could not have been radically different.
Table 4.
Effectives according to Ferdi and Kochu Bey [53]
Kochu Bey
Ferdi
Professional soldiers 32,000 36,000
Table 5.
Probable Distribution of the Ottoman Artillery in 1526
Distribution of a field artillery of 54 cannon as recommended by R. Solms
24 lb. 12 lb. 6 lb. 3 lb.
Piece 6 8 10 10 20 54
Carts 2 2 2 1 1
Horses 16 16 1 12 6 4
length of 40 40 25 25 20
Min. length of column (km) 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.3 8.2
shot(kg)
On the basis of this calculation the artillery's column of march,without the carts and camels carrying ammunition,
but addingappropriate distance between carts (330 X 8m = ca. 2.5 km), can beassumed to have been 11-12 km.
A calculation of the total length of the army's column of march and the time required for their crossing the bridge
gives the following figures:
Table 6.
Length of Column of March and Time Required for Crossing
Time in hours
Length in km
Cavalry 100 20-22
To these lengths and times for the crossing of the troops, we haveto add the train. The factors determining its size
are the weight ofthe ammunition, of food, and of forage. Five to six hundred cartswere needed to transport the
ammunition for the artillery and about300 carts to haul the cannons. While these numbers may appearexaggerated,
other fragmentary data enhance their probability. [61]
In computing the weight of the food transported we start from thefact that, similarly to European armies, the daily
ration of bread andrice of each soldier was 1 kg. Although we have found no relevantdata, we may take it for
granted that the logistics of food supplyamong the Turks was the same as with European armies. The grainmust have
been ground and stored in magazines erected well beforethe start of the campaign, while bread was baked on the
spot andbrought to the troops by cart or beasts of burden. It is also probablethat there were four daily distributions of
bread among the troops. Itmay be assumed, however, that a larger quantity had been accumulated for the crossing at
Eszek and the subsequent stages, becausethe swampy terrain cut the troops off from the supplies on board thebarges
on the Danube. Assuming the rations of bread in possessionof the troops to be sufficient for eight days, we may
calculate 1,200tons for the 150,000 soldiers.
Finally we must compute the necessary amount of forage. If thehorses were given forage cereal, their daily ration
would be 15 kg,but if they received only green fodder, they would need 25 kg. The number of riding horses and
draft animals can be conservativelyestimated at 200,000; hence the daily ration of forage must haveamounted to
3,000 tons. Since a supply of four days of forage wascollected each time, as was the practice in the European armies,
thetotal can be estimated at 12,000 tons. Although we do not haveprecise information pertaining to any of this, we
do know, for instance, that in 1526, 20 of the 77 days needed to cross the Balkanswere days of rest, and we may
assume that forage was collected oneach of those days. Süleyman's diary mentions foraging on twooccasions, each
time because the soldiers assigned to the detail wereattacked by the "Vlachs." [62]
All things considered, the weight to be transported included: 240tons of ammunition, 1,200 tons of food, 1>12,000
tons of forageadding up to a total of 11,300-13,400 tons. [63]
In summary, if we count 130 km for the troops and 17s230 km forthe train, the length of the column of the army as a
whole must havebeen 300430 km. A column of such length would have required6>70 hours to cross the bridge--a
figure that corresponds, by andlarge, to the reports from Ottoman sources about the time it took.
Contemporary data also support these estimates. Tomori's intelligence deserves particular attention since he was
well acquaintedwith the Ottoman army; moreover, his excellent reconnaissanceservice provided news regarding the
enemy from the moment itstarted to assemble at Adrianople. What seems confusing, primafacie, is that on one
occasion he gave the strength of the Ottomanforces as 300,000, at another time as 70,ooo.[64] If we look at
thematter more closely, however, both statements may be valid. WhenTomori was referring to 300,000 troops, he
was also including theirregulars of lesser combat value, the drivers, the leaders of thebeasts of burden, and the
servants. On the other hand, when he cited70,000, he must have been referring only to the soldiers provided bythe
timars and to the regulars of high combat value. Of course, thelower estimate was not entirely fair, because the
county nobles of the levy and the peasant soldiers in the Hungarian army did not fightany better than the Ottoman
irregulars. From the point of view ofpsychology, however, the underestimation of the forces of the enemywas in fact
appropriate at the moment of the report: just before thedecisive battle. Indeed, the news about 300,000 enemies had
elicitedan enormous consternation in the Hungarian war council, andthe knowledge of overwhelming superiority of
the foe would haveundermined the self-confidence of the army. I shall return to thismatter in some detail later.
Table 5.
Probable Distribution of the Ottoman Artillery in 1526
Distribution of a field artillery of 54 cannon as recommended by R. Solms
24 lb. 12 lb. 6 lb. 3 lb.
Carts 2 2 2 1 1
Horses 16 16 1 12 6 4
length of 40 40 25 25 20
Min. length of column (km) 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.3 8.2
shot(kg)
On the basis of this calculation the artillery's column of march,without the carts and camels carrying ammunition,
but addingappropriate distance between carts (330 X 8m = ca. 2.5 km), can beassumed to have been 11-12 km.
A calculation of the total length of the army's column of march and the time required for their crossing the bridge
gives the following figures:
Table 6.
Length of Column of March and Time Required for Crossing
Time in hours
Length in km
Cavalry 100 20-22
To these lengths and times for the crossing of the troops, we haveto add the train. The factors determining its size
are the weight ofthe ammunition, of food, and of forage. Five to six hundred cartswere needed to transport the
ammunition for the artillery and about300 carts to haul the cannons. While these numbers may appearexaggerated,
other fragmentary data enhance their probability. [61]
In computing the weight of the food transported we start from thefact that, similarly to European armies, the daily
ration of bread andrice of each soldier was 1 kg. Although we have found no relevantdata, we may take it for
granted that the logistics of food supplyamong the Turks was the same as with European armies. The grainmust have
been ground and stored in magazines erected well beforethe start of the campaign, while bread was baked on the
spot andbrought to the troops by cart or beasts of burden. It is also probablethat there were four daily distributions of
bread among the troops. Itmay be assumed, however, that a larger quantity had been accumulated for the crossing at
Eszek and the subsequent stages, becausethe swampy terrain cut the troops off from the supplies on board thebarges
on the Danube. Assuming the rations of bread in possessionof the troops to be sufficient for eight days, we may
calculate 1,200tons for the 150,000 soldiers.
Finally we must compute the necessary amount of forage. If thehorses were given forage cereal, their daily ration
would be 15 kg,but if they received only green fodder, they would need 25 kg. The number of riding horses and
draft animals can be conservativelyestimated at 200,000; hence the daily ration of forage must haveamounted to
3,000 tons. Since a supply of four days of forage wascollected each time, as was the practice in the European armies,
thetotal can be estimated at 12,000 tons. Although we do not haveprecise information pertaining to any of this, we
do know, for instance, that in 1526, 20 of the 77 days needed to cross the Balkanswere days of rest, and we may
assume that forage was collected oneach of those days. Süleyman's diary mentions foraging on twooccasions, each
time because the soldiers assigned to the detail wereattacked by the "Vlachs." [62]
All things considered, the weight to be transported included: 240tons of ammunition, 1,200 tons of food, 1>12,000
tons of forageadding up to a total of 11,300-13,400 tons. [63]
In summary, if we count 130 km for the troops and 17s230 km forthe train, the length of the column of the army as a
whole must havebeen 300430 km. A column of such length would have required6>70 hours to cross the bridge--a
figure that corresponds, by andlarge, to the reports from Ottoman sources about the time it took.
Contemporary data also support these estimates. Tomori's intelligence deserves particular attention since he was
well acquaintedwith the Ottoman army; moreover, his excellent reconnaissanceservice provided news regarding the
enemy from the moment itstarted to assemble at Adrianople. What seems confusing, primafacie, is that on one
occasion he gave the strength of the Ottomanforces as 300,000, at another time as 70,ooo.[64] If we look at
thematter more closely, however, both statements may be valid. WhenTomori was referring to 300,000 troops, he
was also including theirregulars of lesser combat value, the drivers, the leaders of thebeasts of burden, and the
servants. On the other hand, when he cited70,000, he must have been referring only to the soldiers provided bythe
timars and to the regulars of high combat value. Of course, thelower estimate was not entirely fair, because the
county nobles of the levy and the peasant soldiers in the Hungarian army did not fightany better than the Ottoman
irregulars. From the point of view ofpsychology, however, the underestimation of the forces of the enemywas in fact
appropriate at the moment of the report: just before thedecisive battle. Indeed, the news about 300,000 enemies had
elicitedan enormous consternation in the Hungarian war council, andthe knowledge of overwhelming superiority of
the foe would haveundermined the self-confidence of the army. I shall return to thismatter in some detail later.
Strategy
[72]
The strategy applied depends on the relations of power, on spaceand time, but first and foremost, on the political
objective of the war.As these factors changed in the course of time, the Ottoman leadership resorted to different
strategies in its wars against the Hungarians. For the period from the fourteenth century, to the mid-
fifteenth,precisely until the peace of Adrianople (1568), three clearly distinctphases in Ottoman strategy can be
distinguished.
First Phase: from 1356 to 1453.
The occupation of Gallipoli in 1356 was a decisive event in thehistory of the Ottomans: they acquired a safe
crossover point toEurope. In the following years, the Turks occupied the Byzantinepossessions in Eastern Rumelia,
Thrace, and Eastern Macedonia,took the passes across the Balkan mountains, and, in 1383, set footin Bulgaria with
the occupation of Sofia. The occupied territories,designated as Rumelia, were attached to the Empire, and, as a
resultof the most thorough work of organization, they soon became, inSead-Eddin's words, "safety itself, and the
permanent abode of peaceof mind in harmony", where the sultan "was most mindful of maintaining religious peace
and organizing a Muslim state, as well as ofpreparing the fight to spread the faith."[73]
In the 1390s the Ottoman forces reached the line of the Danube, and, with the capture of Vidin, Nicopolis, Sistov,
and Silistra, established important bridgeheads for their advance into Wallachia. Inthis period they also took Uskub
in Serbia; the city became the seatof the sanjak. The Mongolian attack of 1402 put a temporary halt tothe expansion,
but it soon started up again with the capture ofGiuirgevo in 1416, of Saloniki in 1430, Janina in 1431, and
Krusevacin 1434. By the end of the period the borders of the Ottoman Empirein the Balkans ran along the Danube
as far upstream as Orsova.
The speed of conquest was spectacular. The bulk of the occupiedarea fell into Ottoman hands in less than a
generation, a significantachievement, even if we know that it was attained at the expense ofthe weak Byzantine
Empire and of a Bulgaria and Serbia undermined by internal strife. The systematic nature of the conquest wasreadily
apparent as well. To cite Johann Zinkeisen's simile, theacquisitions grew around Gallipoli like annual rings of a tree.
Itseems that each step forward was the consequence of careful andrational assessments giving equal weight to
political and strategicconsiderations. Except for Galamboc and Szendro the conquestsproved to be lasting during this
phase. The Turks undertook nounplanned ventures and, except for the raids designed to obtainbooty and
information, they engaged in no large-scale campaignsother than the siege of Belgrade in 1440.
From the strategic point of view the Ottoman state was in a betterposition than the Christian powers during this
phase. First of all, itslines of operation were much shorter, which gave them considerableadvantage in concentrating
troops and in logistics. In 1389 at thebattle of Kosovo the Ottoman armies were 200 km from their operational base,
Philippopolis, as the crow flies, whereas the Hungarianand Wallachian contingents of the Christian host were 400 to
600km from their home. The strategic superiority of the Ottoman forceswas enhanced by the fact that they stood on
the interior line vis-a-visEurope or Asia and the Balkan states. Being in the center, they hadlittle difficulty in
transferring forces from one trouble spot to another, whereas their adversaries were either unable to unite
theirforces--as in the case of Hungary or the principality of Karaman--orcould do so only by lengthy, exhausting,
and time-consumingmarches, as in the case of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia.
While its geographical position offered the Ottoman state considerable advantages already at this early stage, in the
fifteenth century, these advantages became even more marked and providedalmost total protection. The Ottomans
were able to halt all attacksat the borders, whereas the Christians had to negotiate long marches beyond their
frontiers. They had to move more than 400 to600 km to the battle of Nicopolis, the second Kosovo campaign,
orduring the ~long campaign,' of 1444; during the campaign of Varna,800 km. Under these circumstances, even if
the Christian forces hadscored a victory in one campaign or another, even if the Europeanpowers could have acted
jointly, it is still doubtful whether theycould have found the means to carry on a protracted war consistingof several
campaigns--on account of the extreme distances and thedifficulty of the terrain--and nothing short of such a war
could haveoverthrown the Ottoman Empire.
Partly because of the distance to the theater of operations, butmostly because of delays at the outset, the campaigns
of the Christian forces started in the fall and more than once dragged on into thewinter. This late start was due to the
slowly grinding mill of thefeudal administration and the need to await the harvest in order toprovide the troops with
food and fodder.
Already in this period the significance of the Danube as a meansof transport and communication was apparent. Even
though theHungarian fleet on the Danube was still superior to the Ottomanone, by 1440 the latter succeeded in
blockading the river at Belgradewith one hundred ships.
Before the capture of Constantinople the Ottoman Empire wasnever quite secure because its European and Asian
provinces wereseparated by the sea. The Ottoman fleet was still too weak toguarantee safe crossing from one
continent to the other. Even thefortification at Gallipoli could not fully compensate for this weakness. In contrast,
Christian fleets could easily sail into the Black Seaand bolster an army which, avoiding the cumbersome
mountainroutes of the Balkans, would have reached the coast. All this wastrue in theory only, however, because
under the given circumstancesthe maritime powers were unable to conclude an alliance amongthemselves and with a
continental power, namely Hungary, whichwould have enabled them to carry out combined military operations.In
1444 it did seem that such a fortunate conjuncture had comeabout, and this was the main reason for launching the
Varna campaign in the first place; but the fleet provided by the maritimepowers was not up to the task by a long
shot. It was unable toprevent the Ottoman army from crossing the straits, nor could itgive support to the Christian
forces at the decisive encounter.
Second Phase: from 1463 to 1521
The capture of Constantinople in 1453 was an epochal date for theOttoman Empire just as it was for all Europe. It
put an end to thegeographic division of the Empire and to the defence problems whichthis division entailed.
Constantinople itself was an ideal center foran empire which was soon to extend from the River Sava to the Nile.The
very position of the city granted considerable economic advantages: the master of the Bosporus controlled the
significant commerce in the Black Sea. No wonder that after the shock and consternation caused by the fall of
Byzantium, Venice was the first toconclude an economic agreement with the Porte.
From a military perspective Constantinople was an ideal capital.In addition to the fact that its capture unified the
Empire, the city,surrounded as it is by the sea on three sides, was very nearlyimpregnable. The only reason the
Byzantine Empire, moribund andcompletely unable to defend itself, survived as long as it did, was theexceptionally
advantageous strategic location of its capital.
Following the capture of Constantinople, the talented and dynamic Sultan Mehmet II, known in history as the
"World Conqueror", kept the machinery of the Ottoman state in high gear,adding huge areas to the Empire: Albania,
Greece, Serbia, Bosnia,and Karamania. But the machinery did not slow down even after hisdeath; Selim I extended
Ottoman power to Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. The economic, political, and military power of all otherstates
paled in comparison. The two most directly concerned andrelatively strongest powers, Venice and Hungary under
MatthiasCorvinus, were forced into the defensive.
The direction of Ottoman expansion in Europe became clearlyvisible: while Serbia and Bosnia were absorbed into
the Empire,Wallachia, the Tartar Khanate of Crimea, and eventually Moldaviawere merely converted into vassal
states. It is not clear why thesultan did not attack Hungary and why he gave up the idea ofadvancing in that direction
after his unsuccessful siege of Belgrade.Perhaps the mishap at Belgrade indicated that the Empire could notexpand
further until Serbia and Bosnia were transformed into asecure base of operations. After these two countries were
occupiedand converted into military bases, further expansion was hamperedby Ottoman involvement in the Near
East. Furthermore, the significant political and military power of Hungary under Matthias Corvinus no doubt had
something to do with this hesitation.
Recently Inalcik has expressed the view, very probably true, that Mehmet II was not in the least interested in
occupying Hungary andregarded the Danube and the Sava as the definitive boundary line ofhis Empire. [74] I
believe that Mehmet's objective was merely to convert the Balkans into an organic part of the Empire, which
naturallyled him to strive to limit Hungarian and Venetian influence in thearea. From this perspective the siege of
Belgrade in 1456 cannot beregarded as the first stage of a grand design on Hungary; it wasmeant merely to deprive
the Hungarians of this essential base forattacks against the Balkans. At the same time, the fortress was alsothe most
appropriate base for attacks against Hungary: its lossrendered the country altogether defenseless. Whatever the case,
onething was certain: the balance of power had tipped definitely in favorof the Ottomans; to expel them from
Europe had now become ahopeless endeavor. This realization determined the policies of theEuropean powers. Even
Matthias gave up the concept of a great waragainst the Turks because he felt his own strength insufficient andhe
could hardly count on outside help.
A memorandum addressed by Pope Leo X to the European powersillustrates well the impossibility of a great
European cooperativewar aimed at the expulsion of the Ottomans. [75] It is worth dealingwith this text in some
detail, for it contains much more militaryrealism than the fantastic projects put forth time and again in thisperiod.
The memorandum also sheds light on the political difficultieswhich needed to be overcome in order to launch such a
majorundertaking. The pope raised several questions: Should a war belaunched against the Turks? If yes, should it
be an offensive or adefensive war? What were the obstacles to the war and how couldthese be overcome? Should all
rulers participate, or only some--andwho would those be? By what means and modes should the war bewaged?
The answer to the first question was a definite yes. According tothe authors of the memorandum there was no doubt
regarding thesecond question either: the war had to be an offensive one. The thirdquestion raised the greatest
number of problems, because the primeobstacle to the war was the disharmony and jealousy among theChristian
countries. A general peace, or at least an armistice, wouldhave to be declared, and the sources of disagreement
would have tobe entrusted to arbitration by the pope and the college of cardinals.It would be most advisable to bring
about a Holy Alliance, the members of which would obligate themselves to intervene againstthose who disturbed the
peace. The answer to the fourth questionwas that the emperor and the king of France should bear the majorpart of
the burdens of war, and all other rulers should participate inthe joint effort in an appropriate manner.
The bulk of the memorandum was taken up with a discussion ofthe means and manner of conducting the hostilities.
Most importantwas to raise adequate funds. Eight hundred thousand ducats wouldbe needed, and its provision was
regarded by the authors withsomewhat excessive optimism: one part of the sum would come fromthe personal
income of the rulers, another part from the nobility andthe clergy, and a third part from the commoners. One third of
themoney would be earmarked for fielding and equipping the army,two-thirds for its upkeep. As regards the army
itself, 60,000 infantry, 4,000 heavy cavalry, and 12,000 light cavalry would be required.The infantry would be
supplied by Switzerland, Germany, Spain,and Bohemia, the heavy cavalry by France and Italy, the lightcavalry by
Spain, Italy, Albania, and Greece. Venice, Naples, Genoa,France, Portugal and Spain would contribute to the fleet.
Since theOttomans had 300 warships, the Christian states would need atleast 150.
The authors of the memorandum believed that results could onlybe obtained by forces operating under a joint
command; dissipationof the forces must be prevented at all cost. The direction and objective of the attack would be
Constantinople. Three routes of deployment came under consideration: through Hungary along the Danube, along
the coasts of Dalmatia and Illyria, or from Italy toGreece by sea, then on foot along the coast, through Macedonia,
toConstantinople It would be advisable if Hungary and Poland undertook diversionary attacks against the border
provinces of the Ottoman state while the army was marching on Constantinople. Finally,the memorandum
mentioned the issue of the division of the reconquered territories, but stopped short of making specific
recommendations, entrusting the solution to meetings following the hostilities.
The project met with cool reception at the courts of Europe. Theking of France replied after almost a year's silence,
and even thenonly at the prompting of the pope. In his reply he greeted the planwith enthusiasm, yet he essential]y
rejected it. In particular, heexpressed doubts about the financial aspects. He felt it would beentirely hopeless to
extort money from the people because they nolonger trusted their governments: they had been fooled by
referencesto a campaign against the Turk on so many previous occasions. Nor was the king in favor of using the
forces jointly because, according tohim, this would inevitably lead to rivalry between the nations.
The emperor took even longer to answer. Then the reply wasprepared with typical German thoroughness; it included
what practically amounted to a counter-proposal. This proposal was motivatedprimarily by envy of the king of
France. The emperor proposed thatthe English and French rulers be omitted from the venture, at leastin the first
year, because they would need all that time to cope withthe unrest provoked by the proclamation of the war-tax. His
ownplan was just the opposite of the one the pope had suggested andconsidered primarily the interests of the Holy
Roman Empire. Rather than a one-time blow, he proposed the division of the war intofour campaigns with the
following objectives: in the first year thereconquest of the lands held by the Ottoman Empire in Africa andSyria; in
the second year the recovery of its holdings in Europe; inthe third year the siege of Constantinople; in the fourth
year theoccupation of the Asian territories.
All this demonstrates how impossible it was, already at that time,to block the expansion of the Ottoman Empire and
consequently howinevitable was the fall of Hungary in the following period.
Third Phase: from the Capture of Belgrade e to the Peace of Adrianople, 1521-1568.
The capture of Belgrade was in every way a prerequisite for thedecisive Ottoman attack against Hungary, since the
army could nothave by-passed such a powerful fortress. Furthermore, the fall of thecastle entailed the collapse of the
system of fortifications along thesouthern border of Hungary, as a result of which the country becamepractically
defenseless. [76]
Considering that the fall of medieval Hungary, the main subject ofthis book, was the central event in this period,
Ottoman strategy andits relationship to politics will be discussed in some detail in subsequent chapters. Therefore,
only, a few theoretical issues should beraised here, as a background for the strategic decisions of thisperiod.
On the relationship between politics and war we should readClausewitz. It was he who established the maxim that
"war is...acontinuation of political activity by other means. The political objectis the goal, war is the means of
reaching it, and means can never beconsidered in isolation from their purpose." [77] There can be no doubtthat the
Ottoman leadership acted according to this principle. Thegreat wars, normally led by the sultan in person, were
alwayslaunched for the sake of well defined political objectives. Of course,the troops in the border provinces carried
out steady forays into theneighboring lands to obtain booty, but even in these political objectives were not entirely
absent: the exhaustion of the adversary, byforcing him to military, hence economic efforts, which tired him tothe
point at which he became unable to defend himself. This wasexactly what happened in the case of Hungary, as we
shall see inmore detail.
We may also detect in the application of Ottoman military strategy those propositions which, according to
Clausewitz, form thescientific foundation for the art of war. Thus it can be asserted thatOttoman military leaders
knew that "defense is the stronger form offighting with negative purpose, attack the weaker form with thenegative
purpose; that major successes help bring about minor ones,so that strategic results can be traced back to certain
centers ofgravity." [78] While the Turks did not put all this in writing--nor didthe Europeans, for that matter, before
Clausewitz--from a survey ofthe episodes of individual wars and campaigns we may conclude thatthey did follow
these principles in practice. As regards specific strategic planning, the. Ottoman leadership, as I have argued earlier,
made their decisions on the basis of accurate information. Theytook good care to assess the principal factors--force,
space andtime--correctly. It seems that in all cases they had an accuratepicture of the military strength and potential
of the army of theiradversary. They also had fair knowledge of the battlegrounds thatmight come into consideration.
Finally, they usually timed theiraction well, and knew well how to make time their ally.
The strategic leadership techniques of the Ottomans were quitesophisticated, enabling them to carry out victorious
campaigns intheaters of operation as far removed from the center of the Empire asPersia, Egypt, or Hungary. No
army in Europe at this time couldhave done the same. Such distant campaigns required, of course,precise yet
flexible coordination of military and logistical operations,the prerequisite for which was their outstanding logistical
servicedescribed above. The Ottoman military leaders were masters of theart of moving large masses to the area of
concentration and to thetheater of war. We have seen how painstakingly they organized themarch of their army
across the Balkans. Their numerous cavalrywas likewise directed with considerable ease, before and during
thebattle, to the side or the rear of the foe.
We can obtain a clear outline of the dynamics and structure of theHungarian wars from the more important Ottoman
campaigns ofthis period, as well as of the range beyond which they could notextend themselves. It seems that it was
precisely in Hungary thatthe sphere of the Ottoman machinery of conquest reached its outerlimit; the frontiers in the
process of definition at this time did notvary essentially until the Ottoman collapse in the late seventeenthcentury.
The capture of Eger (1596), Kanizsa (1600), Varad (1660),and Ersekujvar (1663) in the following period, albeit
significantadditions, amounted to an extension of conquests in width withoutreally transcending the radius of
operation.
It was this radius that explains why the Ottomans waged onlylimited warfare against Hungary. [79] The restrictions
on the military
objective in turn entailed a reduction of the political objective,namely, the initial delay of conquering Hungary. It is
precisely thisself-control, and the description of the considerations which finallyled Suleyman to launch an all-out
war against Hungary that constitutes the subject matter of this book. The radius of effective action,the significance
of which exceeds the merely military aspects, deserves treatment in some detail.
The radius or range of action is the limit of operation of an army,determined by its speed of advance, the logistical
service, as well asthe time allotted to the campaign. In the early modern period armieswere able to march an average
of 20 km a day. Since, however, thetroops and the draft animals required rest periods, and time for thedistribution of
food and foraging, it was necessary to halt everyfourth or fifth day; hence the average length of march was no
morethan 15 km a day. Because of the difficulties of transport, foodsupplies, and quartering, the campaigns seldom
continued into thewinter; the campaigning season stretched from spring to fall. If wetake 180 days and multiply this
number by the number of kilometersadvanced by the troops, we obtain 2,700 km, the radius of the army'soperation.
If, however, the army had to return to its own countrybefore the coming of winter, as was usually the case, then the
radiusof action is half of that, that is, 1,350 km. But even this distance isexcessive since we have counted only the
days of actual advance,disregarding the days spent on maneuvers and fighting battles. Aminimum of 30 days had to
be allotted for such purposes, whichmeans that we have to deduct 30 X 15 = 450 km from the total. Thereremains
approximately 950 km.
Obviously, exceeding this distance would be most risky, because ifthe decisive battle did not take place within the
aforementioned 30days then the army would have to return without accomplishing itstask, to avoid the onset of
winter. If an open and decisive battle didtake place late in this time-span, no matter what the outcome, thearmy
would have been in a difficult position. If victorious, it couldnot exploit its victory, being unable to pursue the
enemy beyond itsrange. If defeated, it would be threatened with almost complete *annihilation, since it would have
to cover considerable ground to finda haven within its own boundaries, while demoralized and with theenemy at its
heels. The logistical difficulties increased in proportionto the distance.
Let us apply these considerations to the Turkish-Hungarian wars.n begin with, it should be noted first, that the
Ottomans wereunable to take the entire country; had they been able to occupy it,there can be no doubt that they
would have done so. Second, once thecampaign season was over, only part of the Turkish forces spent thewinter in
Hungary, for two reasons: (1) it was impossible to find food,forage, and lodging for such a large mass of people
during the wintermonths; and (2) as landowners and administrators the timar landowners could not be absent from
their residence over such a longperiod. Finally, it is obvious that while the Ottoman Turks could notannex or absorb
Hungary, neither could they allow the Habsburgs totake over--hence they did have to occupy as much of the land as
possible. [80]
The occupied zone had to include Buda because of its strategicsignificance. The possession of Buda was essential to
the OttomanEmpire for three reasons: it enabled them to control the Danube; itprevented the Habsburgs from
launching an attack against theEmpire along the Danube; and, being midway between Vienna and Transylvania, it
was an obstacle to Habsburg designs on the latter.But no matter what advantages the Ottoman forces may
havederived from possessing Buda these could not make up for theoverwhelming disadvantage of being beyond
their range of effectiveness and lying far closer to Vienna than to Constantinople. Thedistance of Vienna-Buda is
240 km, which can be covered in 16 days,march; Constantinople-Buda is, however, 1,460 km, 97 days' march(of
which Belgrade-Buda is about a third, 460 km, 31 days, march).From these figures it follows that holding on to
Buda was almost amatter of accident for the Turks. No fortification can withstand asiege beyond a certain period if
relief does not arrive. It was highlyunlikely that an Ottoman relief army would be able to reach Buda intime.
Assuming they set off at the same time, the Habsburg forceswere hardly more than two weeks away, the Ottomans
more thanthree months. The imperial forces would have had about 80 days tocarry out their siege which, under
normal circumstances, would bemore than sufficient to take the castle.
The reasons why the Ottoman Turks were able to hold on to Budafor a century and a half--and, with it the central
portions of thecountry, in spite of unfavorable strategic conditions--were notstrictly military Rather, it was the fact
that under the prevailingeconomic, social, and political conditions the Habsburg provincesand the Holy Roman
Empire could not field an army powerfulenough to challenge the Turks, nor was it possible for them to beginthe
campaign in the spring or early summer early enough to initiateand to complete the siege before the arrival of the
Ottoman reliefforce. When, however, these conditions changed, the situation of theOttomans in Hungary became
untenable.
A survey of the sieges undertaken in the period of the Ottomandomination provides clear evidence for the foregoing.
The Christianforces besieged Buda seven times in vain: in 1530, 1540, 1541, 1598,1602, 1603, and 168-not
counting 1542, when their campaignbogged down as early as the siege of Pest, across the river. Thus thesiege was
attempted eight times, but only twice, in 1541 and 1684,were the assailants able to initiate the siege in May or July;
sixtimes they reached Buda as late as September or October. Evenwhen the siege was launched early enough it still
had to be abandoned because of inadequate preparations and organization; whenthey started in autumn the besiegers
were turned away either by theappearance of the relief expedition or by the coming of bad weather.
Buda was recaptured only in 1686. On this occasion the Austrian,Hungarian, and Imperial forces reached Pest or
Buda on June 17
and 18 and launched the siege in a matter of days. The Ottomanrelief expedition showed up near the castle only on
August 13, thatis, on the 57th day of the siege, but did not venture to attack thebesieging Christian forces. The castle
fell on September 2, on the77th day. Had the Christian host not delayed its departure, butstarted off in May, it could
have embarked on the siege a monthearlier and completed it even before the arrival of the relief force.After the fall
of Buda the theater of operations shifted to the southern regions of the country; in spite of repeated efforts, the
Ottomanswere unable to recapture Buda, or even to get near it. Once the castlewas lost, the Turkish army was no
longer able to confront theChristian forces in pitched battle. It was forced out of Hungary aftera further series of
defeats.
From that time on, however, the law of range of effective actionworked against the Christians. The overly extended
supply line puta brake on military operations and made it practically impossible forthe Christians to operate beyond
the River Sava. Their main objective was to capture and hold Belgrade, but in this they failed.
Tactics
[81]
At the time of the occupation of Gallipoli the nomadic tacticsfamiliar from warfare on the steppes still prevailed in
the Ottomanarmy. It is hard to say whether these tactics were the same as thoseused by the Huns and Mongols. On
the basis of logic and sparse data,it seems, however, that the Turks used a degenerate, no longereffective version of
nomadic warfare. It may also be assumed that, asa result of the change in the mode of production and the
introductionof feudal arrangements, this kind of warfare lost its economic andsocial base. Two facts support this
assumption. The formation of thebody of janissaries was to complement the easily panicked mass oflight cavalry
which was predominant in the classical form of nomadic warfare. The janissaries provided a solid, unshakable
nucleuswhich the classical application of nomadic warfare did not require.Furthermore, barely half a century after
the capture of Gallipoli in1402, the masters of nomadic warfare, the Mongols, administeredthe Ottoman army a
crushing defeat. The process must have beensimilar to the one experienced by the Hungarians after they settledin the
Carpathian basin. When they abandoned nomadic animal husbandry and adopted settled agriculture, the framework
and organization of the feudal Hungarian state evolved, including, ofcourse, radical transformations of warfare as
well. And they, too,were beaten by the Mongols some two to three centuries after thesetransformations.
Nevertheless, Ottoman tactics were generally superior to thetactics employed by the European knights in the
fourteenth andfifteenth centuries. The speed of their light cavalry, their mobility,as well as the solidity of leadership
deriving from strict disciplineand a despotic administration gave the Ottomans decisive superiority in tactical
maneuvering over the individualistic, undisciplined,hence almost unmanageable knights, incapable of varying
theirbattle formation. It followed that enveloping and turning attacks, aswell as feints and ambushes, acquired a
decisive importance inOttoman fighting. At the same time the unshakable stonewall of thejanissaries provided much
security to the continuously milling, nowattacking, now retreating, mass of cavalry which was inclined topanic
precisely because of its loose style of fighting.
It would seem, then, that these tactics left nothing to be desired;taking a closer look, however, one may discover
weaknesses which,though covered up by the strong points, eventually spelled catastrophe. First of all, the combat
formation did not have a closed, massive,thrusting nucleus capable of shock attacks, like that of the armoredknights
in European armies. The light cavalry was not fit for shock;it could do no more than harass, tire out, and finally
disperse theenemy on the verge of disintegration. A closed attack could havebeen the task of the janissaries, but they
were reserved for defense.Yet the defensive attitude of the janissaries was no solution to thedefense of the army as a
whole either, because the light cavalry wasby its very nature entirely useless for defense. To use a simile,
theOttoman combat formation was like a castle where the janissariesrepresented the citadel that makes a last stand
possible, but whichhas no bastions, curtines, or forward positions. The Ottoman troopswere never able to withstand
the assault of the armored knights.But, since the western cavalry was unable to carry out any othermaneuver, they
could not exploit their initial success in battle. Howeffective the assault of the Christian cavalry was and how
defenseless the Ottoman army facing it becomes obvious not only fromthe course of specific battles, as
reconstructed from the sources, butalso from the candid admissions of Turkish historians regarding thefear which
seized the Ottoman troops in the face of the massive cavalry assault. [82] Ottoman military leaders, recognizing the
dangerof the assaults by armored knights, attempted to break up the solidranks of the Christian forces. One means
employed was the archercavalry, which sent a shower of arrows on the enemy from all sides.Another, even more
effective device was suddenly to open up theranks, so that the shock assault would hit nothing but air. [83]
The balance was somewhat restored when with the passing offeudalism the \Western armored cavalry began to
decline and theknights could not well withstand the fire of the janissaries who, inthe meantime, had acquired
muskets. But then, the fighting potential of the timariot sipahis and their ability for maneuvers derivingfrom
nomadic tactics and requiring quick, precise execution, greatdiscipline, and thorough training, decreased as well.
Mercenarytroops might have offered an alternative, as they had in Europewhere they became a concomitant of the
new tactics that developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. [84] There are indications thatthe Ottoman leaders
were well aware of their army's tactical inferiority, and this was probably the explanation for the enormous increase
in the number of professional soldiers in the seventeenthcentury. [85] Yet this could only be a partial solution as
long as thetimariots remained a substantial proportion of the military setupwhile, in the rest of Europe, the role and
significance of the feudalforces dwindled drastically after the evolution of a standing army ofregular soldiers. But
social and political considerations seem to haveprecluded a thorough reform abolition of the timar system. [86]
The great transformations that changed military art in earlymodern Europe did not affect Ottoman tactics and
military organization. The synchronization of the various services and the mutuallycomplementing utilization of
shock and firepower, typical for thisrevolution, were never assimilated by the Ottoman army. Theyonly avoided
catastrophe because of the strategic deadlock whichcharacterized the wars between Austria and the Ottoman
Empireafter the fall of Hungary, when no more pitched battles were fought.
CHAPTER III
HUNGARYS MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE
JAGELLONIAN PERIOD
Since very little detailed information is available on the militaryconditions of Hungary in the decades preceding
Mohacs, the picturepresented in this chapter cannot but remain sketchy. Yet, I hope,this outline will reveal the
blatant disproportion between Turkishand Hungarian forces, as well as point to issues that demand
furtherinvestigation.
The Army
[95]
Feudal military arrangements do not in themselves preclude thepossibility of fielding professional troops as well.
Indeed, the basicdifference between the armies of Matthias Corvinus and those of hisJagiello successors was not in
their composition but in the fact thatthe former were solely under the control of the crown, while thelatter were
maintained mostly by the aristocracy. Professionalscould serve in the regular standing troops or as soldiers hired at
timeof great wars; they could be Magyars, non-Magyars from Hungary,or foreigners. In terms of social background
they were also quite amix: nobles and peasants, townsmen and marginalized vagrantscould all be found in their
ranks.
The two major sections of the army were the standing troops andthe forces mobilized for campaigns:
I. Troops permanently under the banners; mostly stationed at thefrontier castles or in border areas.
a. The royal banderium. Of its 1000 men, 600 served along theborders.
b. Banderia of the barons. The troops provided by the voivode ofTransylvania, the ban of Croatia, the comes of the
Szekely, andof Temes; 1600 all told.
c. Garrisons of the frontier castles. Some 6-10,000 troops.
d. Mercenaries hired by the towns in the vicinity of the borders andserving in the castles; their numbers are
unknown.
e. Sailors of the river flotilla. Their strength is unknown. At thetime of King Matthias they numbered 10,000 but a
record from1523 has merely 1,000.
f. The light cavalry of the Rac, that is, the Serbian hussars--soldiers who had fled from the Ottomans and served in
Hungary.
II. Troops mobilized in times of war. Most could be deployed withinthe country only.
a. The banderia of the queen, the prelates, and the barons. Theireffectives were 14-15,000.
b. Soldiers provided by the towns, from 10 to 100 per town; theirtotal strength is unknown.
c. Regulars from the counties. Their total number is also unknown.
d. Troops provided by the nations enjoying special status. TheJaszok, the Cumans, the Szekely, and the Vlach,
numbering4-5,000.
e. The noble levy. An army composed of those noblemen who did notserve as regulars at the court or under some
lord. They numbered 20-25,000.
f. Local levy (militia portalis). Soldiers supplied and equipped bylandowners. The rate of expected service varied
from district todistrict; the southern counties, closer to the Turkish threat,usually provided a larger number of such
soldiers. The militiawas levied according to servile holdings (porta), and since at thistime there were some 250,000
plots, with a rate between 3% and10%, the number of this militia must have been around 10-18,000.
In case of general mobilization the army could be complementedby mass levy and foreign mercenaries. The mass
levy was raisedonly in extreme danger and could include all men of arms-bearingage. The high ratio of Hungarian
cavalry in the armed forces,particularly the light cavalry, had to be balanced by foreign mercenaries with heavy
equipment; since their numbers depended onfunds available, there could not have been very many of them.
Thus, according to very rough estimates, the effectives of the armyin case of war might have been as follows:
I.Standing troops:
Banderia: 2,660
Total: 12-17,000
Banderia: 14-15,000
Total: 70-90,000
These numbers were, however, valid only under optimal circumstances, for the deteriorating economic conditions
and the steadyshortage of funds never allowed for this many troops. The size of theforces for a decisive battle was
limited by further circumstances.First, one must deduct the garrisons of the castles far removed fromthe actual
theater of operations, since they had to remain at theirpost even at time of general mobilization. Far more
constricting was the fact that the Ottomans could invade the country from anywherebetween Transylvania and the
Adriatic Sea; hence the forces fromthe outlying flanks could not be united with those from centralHungary until the
line of Turkish attack became clear. Since theOttomans could not do without the Danube as their main line ofsupply
and reinforcement, the probability of an attack from thedirection of Belgrade was high, but no one could be sure of it
until themain forces actually arrived there. Even then the danger remainedthat smaller contingents might be diverted
to attack Croatia orTransylvania to tie up at least parts of the forces in these provinces.On the other hand, if the
Hungarian government reached a decisionon where to concentrate its forces only after the Ottoman army
hadassembled at Belgrade and its intention of attacking Buda becameobvious, it was already too late to assemble all
forces somewhere near Tolna because the distance between Belgrade and Tolna wasmuch less than that between
Tolna and Transylvania or Croatia (ascan be seen on Map 2).
There were other problems with regard to mobilization and recruitment. The fairly limited military worth of the
noble levy isevident from a plethora of sources, and the leaders of the countrywere well aware of it. Hence on
several occasions the idea came upthat the nobles should pay a tax, in lieu of serving personally, andregulars be
hired. Although such a measure was never actuallyintroduced, the question does arise: what would taxing the
nobilityhave entailed, and to what extent would it have enhanced themilitary might of the country? The question is
all the more legitimate since Hungarian historians are inclined to find the panacea forall the country's problems in
the taxation of the nobility. What wasthe financial potential of the nobility? Since this issue has neverbeen explored
by Hungarian historians the best I can do is to makesome very vague estimates.
That agricultural production is less profitable than manufactureand commerce is true even in our days and more so
in times whentrade in grain and cattle was limited by poor transportation. Eventhough the percentage of the nobility
exceeded that of the burghersin the population of early sixteenth-centuly Hungary, the bulk of itsrevenues came
from agriculture; hence its income could scarcelyhave exceeded that of the cities. Still, let us assume that the
incomeof the two classes was equivalent--although it is likely that theincome of the urban sector was higher--and
make an estimate onthis basis. According to the annual budget of the kingdom under thetreasurers Elek Thurzo and
Pal Varadi, in 1523 the taxes of thetowns, the Saxons, and the Jews amounted to approximately 30,000florins. [97]
Following our earlier hypothesis, taxes that might havebeen collected from the nobility would have been at most of a
similarorder of magnitude. Thus, with an additional 30,000 florins, 1250regulars could have been hired for a whole
year, or 2500 for a half ayear. While there can be no doubt that these mercenaries wouldhave been, militarily
speaking, more valuable than the 12-14,000men of the noble levy, it is also certain that they--and by implication,
therefore, a hypothetical taxing of the nobility--would not havesolved the problem of the country's defense.
The other issue is that of the local levies, the militia portalis. Fora long time historians believed that these levies,
first decreed underKing Sigismund, had never been used, primarily because the rulingclass feared an armed
peasantry. Most recent research, however,has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that such levies
didfunction and often included peasants. [98] It is worth noting that whilein 1514, after the great rural uprising of
that year, the completedisarming of the peasantry had been decreed, a series of subsequentnational diets did in fact
call the peasants to arms.
It is difficult to determine the combat value of this local or peasantmilitia. More likely it was higher than that of the
noble levy; we cangather that much from the fact that diets considered using thembeyond the borders of the country,
which was not even mentionedregarding the noble levy. Yet we may argue, as a matter of logic, thatit was futile to
expect resounding military feats from these peasantsoldiers, for they were summoned on the spur of the moment
from their ploughs and could not have been up to the task of seriousfighting for lack of equipment and training. And
would the doubtfulmilitary contribution of the peasantry make up for the loss of theirabsence from production? The
contemporaries disagree on this scorewhich, essentially, is the debate between proponents of national usmercenary
armies. The enthusiastic dilettantes, with Machiavelliin the lead, observing the unruly, rootless mercenaries,
alwaysready to commit atrocities against civilians, advocated a nationalarmy in which all classes would serve. [99]
On the other hand, thespecialists, the technicians experienced in matters of war, emphasized the expertise of the
mercenaries and proposed a simple remedy: regular pay. The prescription was simple medicine, yet therewere not
many states which had the money to follow it. Hence therewere incessant complaints about the paid soldiery, even if
theirmilitary worth was obvious enough and even if they were everywhere preferred to soldier-peasants or to a
national army in general.Technically speaking, of course, mercenaries were the true carriersof military progress,
responsible for every innovation in the art ofwarfare. In late medieval Hungary the diet was in charge of
proclaimingmobilization but we know little about its procedure. It can be assumed that the banderia were mobilized
by those who provided andequipped them and were led by them to the point of assembly. As faras the noble levy,
the soldiers from the towns, and the local orpeasant militia were concerned, their organization was in the handsof the
county and municipal authorities. Mobilization took place onthe basis of rolls which included information regarding
the financialcondition of the nobles and of the towns and the numbers of servileplots. Most likely, the ordinances of
the diet which prohibited serfsfrom moving or from being moved by force from their village afterthe census was
taken were meant to ensure smooth recruitment incase of war. The troops from the counties and the local
militiamarched to battle under appointed captains.
The field army was headed by a commander-in-chief appointed bythe king. A military council was attached to assist
the commander.thus some sort of general staff came into being. Concurrently withmobilization the diet ordered the
placing of the castles on warfooting and the acquisition of war materials; regulated the circulation of money with an
eye to paying the soldiers in good currency; *prohibited the export of agricultural products in order to facilitatethe
provisioning of troops; and took measures to stock food andfodder for the campaign. [100] We have already
mentioned that theconstant lack of funds hampered the country's defense. In the Jagellonian period Hungary was
unable to wage war from her ownresources. The country had to rely on foreign aid, which was provided mainly by
the papacy and the Venetians. This dependence hadserious consequences. Preparations for war require time;
therefore,the Hungarian government would have preferred to obtain the fundslong before hostilities broke out. But
since it was not possible toknow in advance the exact intentions of the Ottomans, the popes anddoges usually paid
only when the war seemed a matter of certainty,for they suspected that the Hungarians would spend the
moneywhether war broke out or not. In his final report for 1523, LorenzoOrio, the Venetian ambassador, wrote that
the papal nuncio hadbrought:
50,000 ducats with him, to use for fielding an army against the Turksand in defense of Hungary.... When he reached
Buda, the primate, theking, and all the Hungarians did everything in their power to lay theirhands on this sum, but
he refused to hand it over saying that...he hadreceived instructions from the cardinals not to disburse the
moneyunless there is a need for it. Since there was no need for it at themoment, it was superfluous to spend it,
particularly since the newscame in that the Hungarians had defeated the Turks at that verytime. [101]
The secretary of the embassy, Massero, commented that theHungarian lords wanted to use the money to defray the
king's debtto the treasury. Funds, of course, were needed not only for a majorconfrontation; the garrisons of the
castles had to be paid even in timeof off"icial peace. The hesitations regarding financial aid could delaymobilization
even in case of all-out war and caused the country to beless well-prepared for the onslaught than it should and could
havebeen. Last, but not least, because of its dependence on foreign aid,Hungarian politics became an appendage of
the policies of others,and foreign interests weighed heavily in political and military decisions.
The Hungarian government made several attempts to procure thenecessary funds for war from within the country. A
sales tax wasintroduced and once again taxing the nobility was contemplated. As more effective measures, the
debasement of the coinage and the useof church treasures for minting money were planned. Debasement ofthe
coinage was decreed in 1521 when, after the fall of Belgrade, amajor attack by the sultan seemed imminent. By that
time thepractice of debasing the coinage had become accepted all acrossEurope; although a double-edged sword,
there were no other meansto secure funds at the moment. The leaders of the country cannot bereally blamed for it,
because, as Zsuzsanna Hermann demonstrated,it was "an emergency solution and the country's situation
wassufficient justification to resort to an emergency measure."
By debasing the coinage the treasury made a profit of about60,000 florins--a sum sufficient to hire 2-2500
mercenaries for ayear, or double that number for half a year. Assuming the strengthof Hungary's army to be around
5040,000, this difference was notinsignificant. The trouble was that this device, intended as a onetime remedy, had
to be used again and again because the Ottomansdid not attack in 1522, nor in 1523, but only in 1526. To
quoteHermann, "this decision had catastrophic consequences; by 1526 ithad rendered the long latent but growing
economic and politicalcrisis so deep and encompassing that the state seemed to disintegrate even without the
intervention of the Turks." [102] Moreover, inflation had reached such proportions that the troops were reluctant
toaccept the bad money. [103] The treasures of the Church were appropriated in 1526. Apparently, melting the gold
and silver vessels andminting them into money would have helped, but papal permissionarrived at the last minute,
the treasures were collected too late, andfinally nothing was minted at all. [104]
By "Suleyman's proposal", I mean that general policy of the sultanand, by implication, of the Ottoman leadership,
that Hungary'sterritorial and political integrity be preserved. Hungary would notbe absorbed into the empire as long
as no ruler from the house ofHabsburg was elected and foreign policy remained pro-Ottoman(that is, anti-
Habsburg). [134]
As I will show, some historians have acknowledged this policy ofSuleyman's, but have ignored its military aspects
or discussed themonly tangentially. In my studies precisely the military aspect is to beemphasized. In fact, this
aspect constitutes the gist of my explanation for the Porte's initial cautiousness vis-a-vis Hungary. In themodel I
have constructed of the Ottoman-Hungarian wars, the oft-mentioned range of action played a central role. As
discussed above,it did not extend far enough to include all of the territory of Hungary.And because Ottoman leaders
could not but include this model alongwith the notion of range of action in their image, their politicaldecision was
logical enough: Hungary must not be annexed! In myearlier study I had stated:
I had reached my interpretation on the basis of the study of theperiod 1526 to 1541; but, in the course, of examining
the eventspreceding 1526, I discovered that "Suleyman's offer" applied to thoseyears as well. [136]
Historiography
Several authors had reached the same conclusion. Mihaly Horvath wrote: "at that time (that is, in 1526) Suleyman
had no desireto conquer Hungary. He set the Danube and Sava rivers as theboundaries of his tremendous empire,
and did not intend to advancebeyond them." [137] In Jozsef Thury's study on Ottoman chronicles weread:
In the 1940s the internationally recognized Hungarian specialistof Ottoman history, Lajos Fekete, wrote:
even after his victory at Mohacs, Sultan Suleyman would have settled
for Hungarian integrity, as a state wedged between the Ottoman and
Habsburg dynasties, but preferably as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire....
With the death of King John...the Turkish view of the Hungarian issue
changed radically. The sultan could no longer expect Hungary
to preserve its independence vis-a-vis the German emperor, on the
contrary, he had to consider the possibility that the Holy Roman
Empire, in union with the Kingdom of Hungary, would be able to reach
the lower Danube, and challenge Turkish power somewhere in the
Balkans. If, on the other hand, his empire had to become contiguous
with that of the Holy Roman emperor, it would be to his advantage if
the Turkish border were not along the lower Danube, but to the north
of Buda. [139]
In our own days, on the basis of research conducted in Turkisharchives, Gyula Kaldy-Nagy was able to be more
specific:
The revenues [collected by the Turkish state] from Hungary. . .could cover barely one-third of the expenditures. The
deficit, an annual 17-18 million aspers. . .had to be brought to Buda from Istanbul in gold coins. Together with the
cost of outfitting and maintaining the fortresses the Hungarian base cost Suleyman 300,000 gold pieces annually.
Suleyman foresaw this burden in 1529, when he marched into Buda, and for the second time he refrained from
keeping it. The accounts cited bear witness to the fact that Suleyman occupied Buda and the regions on both sides of
the Danube not for the sake of increasing the size of his Empire. It was the unforeseen political situation that
prompted him to occupy Buda in order to secure a solid base against the Habsburgs, rather than the other way
around. [140]
This was also the view of Nicolae Jorga. [141] Similarly, Halil Inalcikdiscussing Mehemmed, writes:
The Ottomans established the Danube as the Empire's natural northern boundary. It became the Conqueror's policy
to prevent any foreign static from establishing itself in the Balkan peninsula south of the Danube from Belgrade to
the Black Sea as the northern limit of the Empire.
Elsewhere, in connection with 1526, he writes: "The Ottomanswithdrew from Hungary, occupying only Srem.... At
first the Ottomans tried to make Hungary a vassal state, like Moldavia, since itwas considered too difficult and too
expensive to establish directOttoman rule in a completely foreign country on the far side of theDanube." [142]
Hence, according to Inalcik, the Ottoman leadership observed theprinciple not to extend the boundaries of the
Empire beyond theDanube and the Sava already at the time of Mehmed II. Theevents of the Jagellonian period seem
to bear out this assertion.From 1490 to 1521, apart from the constant skirmishes along theborders, and from the
occasional siege of castles, there was but onegreat war, and in that Hungary was the aggressor. Strange as it
maysound, Hungarian policy was the more aggressive, and the repeatedly renewed truce usually came about on the
initiative of the Porte.
It is not particularly difficult to explain the paradoxical behaviorof the two parties. The reason for the peaceful
intent, or moreprecisely, the intention of avoiding a "great" war on the part of thelurks, was clear: not to engage in a
war on two or more fronts. From1490 on the Ottoman Empire waged wars against the Mamelukesultans (148~91);
Montenegro (1496); Poland (1497--99); Venice,France, and Hungary (148~91); the Persians and the internalenemy
instigated by them (150~1514); Dulkadir (1515); and againthe Mameluke sultans in the campaigns against Syria and
Egypt(1516--17). The stakes were indeed high in these wars: the conquestof areas of fabulous wealth, such as Syria
and Egypt, the strengthening of positions along the Mediterranean Sea, or the repression ofrebellions threatening the
very existence of the Empire. In comparison, the conflict with Hungary pales in significance; nor could therebe any
question of deriving economic benefits from its conquest.
The aggressiveness shown by the Hungarians seems almost beyond comprehension. What is more, considering the
conditions prevailing within the country, and the European situation which precluded effective foreign help, it may
even be qualified as foolhardy.But our stern judgment is bound to turn more lenient if we take acloser look at the
predicament of the country and the mentalityarising out of that predicament among the ruling class and amongthe
people as well. Even if the Ottomans refrained from launchingan all-out assault, the continuous fighting along the
borders, thedestruction caused by the raids, and the terrific burdens imposed bythe defense of the borders were
becoming less and less bearable. Theconclusion was obvious: by the time the Turks launched the greatattack aimed
at annihilating the country--and no one doubted that they eventually would--the strength of the country would have
beensapped to such an extent that it would simply drop like an overripeapple into the lap of the conqueror. To alter
this situation became,therefore, a necessity imposed by Realpolitik. As for psychologicalconditions, the intense
hatred and contempt felt for Islam, as well asthe consciousness of belonging to European Christian civilization,had
such deep roots in the makeup of the mind of the people, that thenotion of compromise, of peaceful coexistence,
could not even arise.
Let us observe the evolution of Turkish-Hungarian relations from1490 on. In the decade following the death of King
Matthias, official,formal peace prevailed between the two countries. Hungary was theone to denounce the peace
when a Turkish emissary came to Buda in1499 to offer to extend it. The Hungarian government rejected theoffer
because it saw a golden opportunity for a showdown such as ithad not seen for quite some time. Among France,
Poland, andVenice, an anti-Ottoman alliance, which Hungary was invited tojoin, emerged. Substantial financial help
was in the offing--a prerequisite, we know, for any serious undertaking. At the beginning ofthe war (in 1501 and in
1002), the Hungarian forces carried outbrilliant actions, penetrating deep into Ottoman territory; yet thesewere far
from sufficient to break the power of the foe. With thealliance itself about to dissolve, the Hungarian government
decidedto sign an armistice with the Turks for seven years.
Yet another opportunity for waging an all-out war came up in1510. In 1508 the king of France, the emperor, and the
pope formedthe League of Cambray, aimed against Venice. The League appealedto Hungary to join, offering
Dalmatia as a reward. The Hungariangovernment, however, knew full well that the Ottoman government,intent on
maintaining the balance of power in Europe, would nottolerate the destruction of Venice with which it had close
economicties; hence Hungary was liable to confront the Turks as well. Eventhough the allies offered to help if this
were to happen, the court,assessing the worth of such promises soberly, preferred not to enterthe alliance. The
common nobility, completely unfamiliar with thepolicies of the great European powers, vehemently attacked
thecourt for passing up the opportunity to regain Dalmatia. But theking, Count Palatine Imre Perenyi, and
Archbishop Bakocz remained adamant. The words Bakocz used to ally the fears of theVenetian ambassador were
indicative of their thinking: Hungarywould not be able to retain Dalmatia in any event, while drawing theire of the
Turks, and, by the time help could arrive--if it arrived atall--Hungary would be long lost. Thus the government, with
commendable common sense, kept the country out of adventurousundertakings; in fact, in 1511 it renewed the
armistice with theOttoman Empire for another five years.
In the following years, however, the Hungarian government tookthe above-mentioned plans of Pope Leo's crusade
quite seriously,and this led, as we know, to the great peasant war of 1514. At theend of that very year, in a letter to
King Wladislas the pope painteda rosy picture of the preparations for the large-scale campaign inorder to dissuade
the Hungarian government from extending thearmistice. He was so concerned about a possible extension of
theHungarian-Turkish armistice that he wrote a letter appealing to therulers of Europe to dissuade the King of
Hungary from reaching anagreement, even warning the king, in the form of a veiled threat, ofthe grave
consequences such a move might entail. To Francis I ofFrance he wrote: "Write to the King of Hungary not to
concludepeace or armistice with the Turks under any circumstance...becausehis country would not be able to
withstand their attack anywaywithout support from us and from the Christian rulers." He evenissued a direct
warning to Wladislas: "I warn you against signing apeace or armistice with the Turks." Nevertheless, the
Hungariangovernment did extend the armistice in 1516, and again in 1519.[144]
Thus the Hungarian leaders had to walk a tightrope: they had tomanifest extreme caution every time the West came
forth with theidea of crusade; but they also had to mind the image of the country,that it remain, in the eyes of the
West, "the bastion of Christianity",for this was the only way it could obtain the indispensable, if notparticularly
generous, financial help without which it would havebeen altogether unable to protect its borders.
The armistice agreement concluded with the Porte in 1519 lost itsvalidity long before it would have expired. In
September 1520 SultanSelim died, and, according to Ottoman legal tradition, an agreementconcluded by the
deceased sultan did not oblige his successor. Hence,in December 1520, a Turkish emissary arrived in Buda, offering
toextend the armistice. While the gesture appeared to be routine, fromcertain data, as well as from the
circumstances, one might concludethat this time the conditions were different, for the stakes weremuch higher than
the ones involved in the agreement concludedwith Selim.
In his final report for the year 1523 the secretary to the Venetianambassador to Hungary, Massaro, wrote:
The Hungarians, had they not been hoping for a general campaign,
could have made peace with the Turk. With this hope in mind they sent
out the Bishop of Scardona, as their own ambassador, to all the
Christian rulers, and especially to our Signer. The message was that
they would conclude separate peace with the Turk, granting them the
right of free transit, not concerned with the damages they cause and the
danger they constitute to anyone whose territory they are crossing. [145]
According to another source, (and asserted by the sixteenthcentury Italian historian Sagundino), [146] the treaty
proposed did notconcern the right of transit, but merely the payment of a tribute.
The following passage, found in a vernacular document from thecollection of the historian Verancsics, is
particularly relevant:
In this year [1520] the emperor Selim died, and his son Suleyman was
elected emperor to succeed him .... Suleyman immediately sent a distinguished
emissary to the Hungarian King Louis in order to conclude a
treaty of eternal armistice with him. Indeed, King Louis would have
agreed, had not the pope from Rome objected that he [Louis] should not
conclude an armistice with the Turk under any circumstance, because
even if the Turk should invade Hungary, he [the pope] would provide
enough funds and contribute enough soldiers to enable him [Louis] to
confront the Turk. Consequently, the king was misled. [147]
The Ottoman chronicler, Djeladzade, though he makes no mention of the conditions stipulated, refers not to an
armistice, but to"peace", and even "friendship":
Only one author, Ludovico Tubero, claims that the conditions ofpeace were the same as in the time of Selim. [149]
The first four sources, though they provide differing versions,agree on one thing: namely, that the conditions
stipulated by Süleyman differed fundamentally from those of Selim. In trying to makesense of the details provided
by the four sources, it would appearthey point to some kind of offer of alliance. While Massaro is the onlyone to
mention the right of transit, the "eternal armistice" referredto in the Hungarian source, as well as the "peace and
friendship"mentioned by Djeladzade, may easily be reconciled with that interpretation. Nor does the tribute
mentioned by Sagundino contradictthis interpretation, since the issue of tribute frequently came up inagreements
concluded with the Porte. [150]
All this, of course, does not have the strength of incontrovertibleevidence. Absolute certainty could only be obtained
if the contemporary diplomatic records testified that Suleyman had stipulated suchconditions. Since such records do
not exist, we must have recourse tothe methodology outlined in the first chapter; that is, basing ourconclusions on
the model of war and on the perception the participants may have had of it, let us make sense of the data available
andreconstruct the decisions taken by the Ottoman and Hungarianstatesmen.
The evidence according to which the leaders of the powers mostdirectly concerned--Austria, the Holy Roman
Empire, Venice, andRome--got excited by any report intimating that the Hungarianswere about to reach an
agreement with the Ottomans and wouldallow Ottoman armies to cross Hungarian territory, now acquiresspecial
significance. Their concern becomes all the more understandable since, under the reign of Matthias Corvinus, the
plunderingOttoman armies crossing Hungary caused havoc in Stir and Corinthian. It is hardly imaginable that the
Ottomans crossed the country without obtaining permission from the Hungarian government.[151]
As we have seen, Massaro had already referred to the possibilityof the Ottomans being granted right of transit, a
possibility even theHoly Roman Empire expected might come true. In 1521, at theimperial diet in Worms, it was
agreed that the Hungarians should beallowed to sign an armistice with the Ottomans, but it was alsostipulated that
no harm should befall the Empire--which could only mean that the agreement should not include granting the
Ottomansright of transit through Hungary. [152] At the Imperial diet in Nurnbergin 1522 a proposal was made to the
effect that, even if the HolyRoman Empire could not provide Hungary with substantial aid,something should,
nevertheless, be provided; otherwise the Hungarians would be forced to reach an agreement with the Ottomans.
[153]
The Hungarian government, however, did not accept the offer ofpeace; instead, it urgently sent out emissaries to all
the powersconcerned with requests for help. Considering that the Hungariangovernments had extended the armistice
with the Porte over thepreceding twenty years precisely because they could not count onany substantial assistance
from the West, this decision seems incomprehensible, especially since under the existing conjuncture inEurope the
cause of a general war against the Ottomans appearedless likely than ever. Charles had concluded a peace with the
sultan,while carrying on war in Africa. Venice continued to cultivate goodrelations with the Porte. Last, but not
least, the emperor and theking of France were on the verge of a major conflict. Certainly theleaders in Buda were
aware of this state of affairs and the rebellionof Djambedri Ghazali, and the difficulties encountered by the Ottoman
state in Syria, produced no improvement from the Hungarianpoint of view. [154] We must assume, therefore, that
the Hungariangovernment refused to sign a peace treaty because the cost wasconsidered too high. Indeed, the price
could only have been authorization for the transit of troops and the payment of tribute.
Although we regard it almost certain that the Hungarian government rejected the offer of peace because of the high
price tag,nevertheless we must also consider another possibility. DomokosKosary asserts that Suleyman's conditions
were the same as those ofSelim earlier; hence the government simply made a mistake when itopted "for delay and
lengthy missions" and "failed to reflect that itwas unnecessary to provoke the Sultan on a relatively minor issue";in
other words they should have accepted the proposal. [155] The root ofthe problem, continues Kosary, lay in a faulty
assessment of thesituation, in particular, that the government overlooked two basicfactors: first, that the Ottoman
Empire, which had concluded itsconquests in the east and had grown even stronger as a result, was now turning
westwards; and second, the drastic reduction of thechances of securing assistance from the European powers.
Kosarydeclares that we cannot achieve much by indulging in the usualmoralizing tone, because the mistaken
measures adopted by thegovernment "derived rather from assimilated reflexes, the routinemeasures which the
managers of Hungarian policy had been applying over a long period apparently without running into
majordifficulties, and which went unpunished. Now it was suddenly discovered, however, that these measures
entailed a mortal danger, onaccount of the international conjuncture." [156]
Referring to the methodological concepts outlined in Chapter I,lets us consider the Hungarian state an
"organization', and, consequently, propose that the decision-making process went throughthree hierarchical levels--
that is, the political, the administrative,and the operative. If we also assume that at its highest, the political,level,
only creative, innovative decisions are possible, then the use ofthe term "routine" is misplaced. Routine or
"programmed" decisionscan only occur at the administrative and especially at the operativelevels. [157]
Suleymans Second Peace Offer, Its Rejection, and the "Punitive Expedition of
1526
[184]
The assault on Rhodes, planned already in 1520, but delayedbecause of the urgency of the Hungarian problem, was
launched bythe Ottoman army and fleet in the summer of 1522. The Knights ofSaint John waged their heroic battle
by themselves, abandoned bythe Europeans, and had to give up the hopeless struggle in December. Thus this
extremely important island, of key strategic value forthe domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, fell under
Ottomansovereignty.
Now Suleyman was definitely determined to settle conditions inSyria and Egypt; he probably contracted peace with
Persia in orderto ensure his rear. The objective, to restore the spice trade, whichhad been interrupted by the
Portuguese, was supposed to be the taskof Ahmed Pasha, appointed governor of Egypt in 1523. The
Ottomanleadership had probably drawn up the rough outlines of a plan; itwas elaborated shortly thereafter in detail
by Selman Reis andsubmitted to the sultan, via the Grand Vezir Ibrahim, in 1525.Selman Reis proposed tough
intervention against the Portuguese,but, because of the already discussed shortcomings of the fleet,warned against a
clash on the open seas. Instead, he proposed tostrengthen the base at Jiddah and increase the size of the fleet.
Wehave seen that the construction of vessels ran into difficulties because of the lack of raw materials; hence the
execution of the planwas postponed.
The realization of the plan was also impeded when Ahmed Pasharebelled and proclaimed himself the ruler of Egypt.
Although thisrebellion was suppressed in the spring of 1524, the sultan had tosend his favorite courtier, the very
talented Ibrahim, recently appointed Grand Vezir, to settle matters once and for all. Ibrahim setout for Egypt in
December 1524 and disarmed the restless withextremely clever measures. Having consolidated Ottoman rule,
hereturned to Constantinople in September 1525.
In the meantime, in 1524, disturbances broke out once again in Syria; hence the Ottoman leaders had every reason to
focus theirattention and energies on the affairs of the East, yet were preventedfrom doing so by the European
situation. The war between theemperor and the king of France continued, but, while it was notpossible to predict the
outcome, the balance seemed to tip in favor ofthe emperor. Ottoman policy was now stymied: in order to
preventCharles V's hegemony over Europe--first of all, of course, overHungary--it would have to intervene swiftly,
but could not do sobecause of Eastern affairs. In the East it should have reestablishedthe spice trade, which
guaranteed a fabulous income, but it wasprevented in this endeavor by developments in Europe. This explains the
respite of five years granted Hungary after 1521, eventhough the Ottomans had voiced their designs against
Hungaryopenly, as we know from the report of Marco Minio. [185]
Consequently, the Ottoman leaders could do no better than towear down Hungary's resistance by constant raids and
at the sametime prepare the attack against Hungary by politically and strategically significant campaigns in such
direction where they could expect the least resistance. Two states came under consideration:Wallachia and Poland.
To obtain firm control over Wallachia wouldserve the double purpose of applying political pressure againstHungary
and of obtaining a base for military operations. Hungary'sinfluence over the area had to be short-circuited. From the
manyvoivodes and voivode nominees competing against one another, theOttomans had to promote the one who
would be capable of reestablishing order in the country and also willing to accept the sultan'ssovereignty. In 1522
the Empire struggled almost continuouslyagainst a rapid succession of voivodes, yet was unable to achieveresults, to
large extent because of Szapolyai, who intervened in thestruggle with his Transylvanian forces. Since it was a
principle ofOttoman policy vis-a-vis Wallachia not to annex the country, butmerely to draw it into a relationship of
vassalage, when Radulfinally emerged victorious among the voivode nominees in 1523, hewas allowed to retain his
office.
The conquest of Poland was never a political objective of the Porte.The Porte merely wanted to neutralize the
country in view of thefinal confrontation with Hungary. The Ottomans waged a war withthis limited aim against
Poland, and not with their own forces, butby proxy, with the forces of the Khanate of Crimean Tartars who were
their vassals. As a consequence of their destructive raids, KingSigismund himself initiated peace in 1525.
The Hungarian government was fully aware that the intermissionmerely provided a breathing space; it entertained
no illusions regarding the ultimate goals of the sultan. Louis II wrote to the king ofPoland in that vein in March
1522: having received reports of thevast preparations undertaken by the Turks, he requested that Sigismund meet
with him personally in order to discuss the matter or, ifthat were not possible, that Sigismund also send delegates to
theImperial council, about to meet in Nurnberg, and at which theOttoman threat was on the agenda. Louis had
already sent twoemissaries: "Both are quite familiar with the border counties andtheir state of alert; in fact, one of
them has even fought against thefoe." According to reports the Ottomans were preparing to attackalong three
directions: in Transylvania; from Belgrade, "since, without doubt, they cannot advance anywhere except along the
Danubebecause of their enormous fleet; and towards Slavonia." [186]
We have seen that Hungary could not do without foreign aid. Butwhat kind of aid could Hungary count on in this
period? Charles V,given his war against the French, could provide nothing. He madethis clear already in 1521 when
he advised Louis II to sign anarmistice with the Ottomans. Ferdinand of Habsburg could givesupport only to the
extent of intervening at the Imperial diet onbehalf of Hungary. Moreover, he assumed some of the burden of
thedefense of the Croatian castles by sending funds and troops there,which, of course, enhanced his political
influence in the area as well.Hungary expected help from Rome, more than from any other sourcebecause first of all,
the precondition of foreign aid was that theEuropean powers cease waging wars against one another: the Hungarian
government might have hoped that an appeal by the pope,head of the Christian world, who was at the moment not
directlyinvolved in the conflicts, would be heeded by the warring states. Ofcourse, while this was mere illusion on
its part, there is no doubtthat the popes were motivated by idealistic considerations. Furthermore, the papacy had
helped before, and with not inconsiderablefunds, and it would be blindness on our part to disregard the factthat the
Ottoman menace was a threat to Italy itself, includingRome. Pope Adrian was no less frightened by an Ottoman
attackthan his predecessor, Leo X, was. When, in 1523, reports to the effect that the Hungarian to compromise with
the Turks reached Rome,the pope and his entourage were seized by outright panic.
The Hungarian emissaries also continuously lobbied for assistance at the Imperial diets. At the diets of 1522 and
1523, as well asat the meeting of Wiener Neustadt in 1523, where military expertsdelegated by the Imperial diet
negotiated with the Hungarians, thefollowing was made crystal clear: the empire could not contributebecause of the
emperor's war; there could be no question of regularhelp, only of occasional assistance; but even occasional help
wasbound to arrive late in a given crisis, because the specific unit ofassistance--the so-called "Romzug" or
"Turkenhilfe"--was grantedfor only six months. Deducting the month and a half or two monthsrequired for marching
to the area of conflict and back, this impliedonly four months of actual fighting. The bond uniting the Imperiallands,
never strong to begin with, was becoming increasingly looserbecause of the progress of Protestantism. Luther
himself, while hedid not reject the notion of an anti-Turkish war outright, wasagainst the idea of such a war being
led by the emperor or pope. TheGerman troops refused to accept their salary in Hungarian coinssince their intrinsic
value had diminished by one half as a result ofthe debasement of the currency. The estates within the Empiretotally
distrusted the Hungarian government on account of theanarachy prevailing in the country. Ferdinand of Habsburg
himselfdid not expect much to come out of Imperial assistance. In May 1523he wrote to Louis II: "both of us are
lost, because it is impossible toresist such a powerful enemy as the Turk.... As for the assistancefrom the Empire,
well, it is not worth a wooden penny." [187]
Poland, whose ruler was tied to the king of Hungary by closekinship relations, would have been the most natural
ally, all themore so since Sigismund was just as worried about Habsburg ruleover Hungary as Suleyman was. On
one occasion he averred: "Wewill take care not to allow anyone [but specifically Ferdinand ofHabsburg] to usurp
the rule of our cousin [Louis II], especially notsomeone of whom we disapprove." [188] We have seen, however,
whatpressure the Ottomans had applied to Poland, pressure compoundedby the kings confrontations with the
Teutonic Knights and theRussians.
The interests of Venice and the Ottoman Empire were not at odds;in fact, they coincided entirely. Both were directly
concerned when the European balance was upset by Charles V. Moreover, only theOttomans could help Venice
displace the Portuguese from the spicetrade, whereas the Ottomans could not do without the expertise ofthe
Republic's experienced merchants. Venice, which until then hadmade considerable sacrifices to help defend the
castles of Dalmatiaand Croatia, was now contributing, but only reluctantly, whereasmore than once she had
provided the Turks with outright support forone or another of their undertakings.
Thus the diplomatic situation was at its very worst from theHungarian point of view, and it was made worse still by
the economic depression within the country. The losses of territory merelyincreased the expense of maintaining the
castles and the alreadylopsided imbalance in state revenues.
The royal council briefed Bishop Brodarics, Hungary's ambassador to Rome, as follows:
We have lost Osztrovica, and more losses are to come; the troubles aregetting progressively worse. Hungary's
meager revenues are insufficient for the defense of such an extensive line of border castles. TheCrown had
enjoyed large incomes from Bosnia, sizable tax returnscame to fill the treasury, from Croatia and Dalmatia,
even under KingMatthias; the lower region--Temes, Srem, Pozsega, and Valko--werestill intact, and the enemy
far less strong, now those areas are exposedto destruction, to such an extent that the defense of the scattered
fortsin the areas that are still in our hands require frightful investments.Thirty-two thousand pieces of gold are
needed every year to pay thebans of Croatia and to supply the country's castles, even in time ofpeace. In the
Jajce, surrounded by the enemy...food and arms may beintroduced only under strong escort; hence it costs
almost as much.Temesvar, Szoreny [Severin], and recently also Petervarad and Titelabsorb incredible sums
each year. If we take all this into considerationit becomes evident that Osztrovica and the castles lost earlier
fell not asa result of neglect on our part t, but because of our poverty You writethat His Holiness would be more
favorably disposed towards us if Hebegins to hear more encouraging news about the state of our country.We
wish we could write to him of better fortune in the future! But,knowing our situation, we fear that the contents of
our letters arebound to become increasingly grim, unless His Holiness and the Christian rulers come to our
help with deeds and not with words alone. [189]
In this hopeless situation, negotiations with a Turkish emissarywere renewed in Buda in February 1524. It is not
possible to deter-mine whether the emissary had arrived just recently, or whetherthis was the same person who had
arrived in 1520 and who might have been kept captive every since. [190] We do know, however, that
thenegotiations were conducted in secret and that the emissary wasunder guard, presumably to prevent him from
communicating withthe uninitiated. [191] Secrecy was so well maintained that only one ofthe diplomats stationed in
Buda, the nimble Venetian ambassador,well endowed in funds, and an expert in such matters, got wind ofthe
negotiations. He reported the matter to Venice, whence the newsspread, via the court in Rome, to Ferdinand of
Habsburg. Ferdinandfelt hurt and wrote to Louis II in an unusually tough tone: "According to my information the
secret peace negotiations" had advanced toa point where "they say they are near conclusion", but let Louis noteven
think of signing peace because, even if there were no treaty ofalliance between them, kinship would suffice in itself
to oblige himnot to reach agreements without consulting the other. Let him,therefore, refrain from taking this step
"as a result of which he[Louis] would get into a predicament from which there was noreturn. If it was a matter of
those conditions that have been reportedto us by the Pope, then it would merely prepare for your and yourcountry's
demise." [192]
Furthermore, Ferdinand rudely admonished Schneidpock, hisambassador in Buda, for not having obtained
knowledge of theaffair. [193] Schneidpock defended himself, and it is thanks to his replies, discovered only
recently, that historians have been able togain some insight on the negotiations. Towards the end of
AprilSchneidpock wrote a letter to justify himself to Salamanca, Ferdinand's chief minister; in it he described the
information that theHungarians wanted to sign a treaty of alliance with the Porte as"empty prattle." In the following
days he reported directly to Ferdinand, informing him that he had made inquiries of the Hungarianking, the queen,
as well as the papal nuncio, yet none of them knewanything about the matter. In a further letter to Ferdinand, dated
May 4, he reported that: the papal nuncio refused to disburse themoneys allocated to the Hungarians by Rome
whereupon theythreatened to accept the stipulations of the Porte, which includedpaying tribute and allowing the
Ottoman armies the right of transit.But the same false rumors were spread by the Hungarians atNurnberg, in order to
extort as much money as possible from thediet. Schneidpock concluded his letter: "From all this Your Majestywill
understand how this rumor arose. I get along well with theKing, Queen, and some of the secret councilors as regards
theaffairs that are settled here, but none of them knows anything aboutthe matter; finally, an individual told me
about the origins of therumor, just as I had described it here." [194]
However, Schneidpock's information about the negotiations ishard to believe in its entirety. I am skeptical when he
writes thatneither king nor queen knew anything about the matter; the issuebeing top secret, they had to deny
everything by virtue of their office.To say that the royal couple was ignorant of the matter provesnothing. It is
obvious that the ambassador was quite uninformedand irresponsibly concocted false stories regarding the
extortionindulged in by the Hungarians in order to mislead his superior(s)and to cover up his mistake.[195]
I am of the opinion that the secret negotiations did indeed includethe topic of tribute and the right of free passage for
the Ottomanforces. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that, on June 19,Burgio appealed to the Hungarian
grandees not to conclude a peacetreaty. On December 29 the nuncio informed Rome that, according toTomori, the
Hungarians could obtain peace if they would only allowthe Ottomans to cross Hungarian territory. [196]
Edgar Artner writes, apparently on the basis of a document in theVatican archives, that Tomori went to Buda in
January 1525 topersuade the government to conclude a peace, even at the expense ofallowing the right of transit.
The following year, a month before thebattle of Mohacs, he again appealed to the king to conclude a peacetreaty.
[197]
Also, we know that Tomori had negotiated with Bali Bey, thecommander of Belgrade, on two occasions. According
to Artner: "Thewhole thing was, in fact, a ruse concocted by Bali Beg, to obtainHungarian secrets, as Campeggio
had suspected all along." [198] It isdifficult to accept, albeit not impossible, that Campeggio saw matters in this
light, for it is unlikely that he would be kept informed ofthe nature of the negotiations. But the historian cannot be
satisfiedwith such an explanation. There are two things we cannot assumeabout Bali Bey, who happened to be one
of the most outstandingsoldiers of the Empire. One is that he had no recourse other than toobtain secrets from
Tomori, while he himself was in charge of anexcellent intelligence service collecting information about
Hungary.The other unbelievable notion is that Bali Bey should deem his greatand much-feared adversary Tomori,
the one so feared by soldiers, asthe kind or person who would blabber about state secrets. It is morelikely that the
two leaders were appointed by their respective governments to meet and to discuss some especially important
topic,and this topic could only have been peace. If these negotiations led tono results, the reason ought to be sought
in the fact that Bali Beg, oninstructions from his government, continued to demand the right offree transit,
something Tomori could not grant without royal authorization.
The dispatches from Bishop Brodarics for this period are highlyrelevant. Brodarics had been sent as ambassador to
Rome. Theobject of his mission was to convince the papal court to restore peacein Europe, as well as to solicit
financial assistance. Viewing mattersfrom closer up he noted, with growing pessimism, that there wasalmost no
hope of obtaining financial help. Brodarics related hisexperiences in several letters to the king of Poland, with whom
hewas on good terms. Thus, in the summer of 1523, he wrote: '"There isalmost nothing left of the hope of peace
among the Christian rulers,',whereas the financial assistance, although often discussed, wasnowhere in sight. The
news from Buda was that they intended toconclude peace with the Turks, something that considerably
worriedpeople in Rome. Papal envoys promised "heaven and earth", butgave nothing. Brodarics, therefore,
requested that Sigismund talk toLouis about seeking a solution "rather than count on peace [amongEuropean rulers]
or financial assistance, and lose the country as aresult, God forbid!" Indeed, it is amazing that Louis would not listen
to Sigismund, and "conclude peace or armistice especially since theChristian rulers are at war with one another, and
there is absolutelyno hope for help." And Brodarics formulated that great truth ofRealpolitik: he who gains time,
gains life. "It would be advisable toconclude an armistice, and both majesties [Sigismund and Louis]would then be
free to settle matters to their satisfaction....,[199]
Indeed, Poland was able to conclude peace with the Ottomansunder different circumstances; yet it appears that
Brodarics felt thatpeace was the only chance of survival for Hungary, even consideringthe far more burdensome
stipulations the Hungarians had to face.when, after Mohacs, peace was concluded between Suleyman andKing John
at the price of those very conditions, Brodarics wrote thathe stuck to his opinion, already expressed to the late King
Louis,that "Hungary's only refuge is friendship with the Turks." [200]
A serious imperative must have prompted Brodarics, one of themost honest figures of the generation of Mohacs, to
write such words.This imperative could have been nothing else than a wish to save thecountry from annihilation.
Szekfu did not recognize this--or refusedto recognize it--when he wrote: 'This respect for and inherited fearof the
Turks was derived from his south Slav lineage, for the Turkshad been torturing the Southern Slavs for two hundred
years; thiswas what clouded the lucidity of Brodarics' political judgment, andconverted him into the foremost
theoretical and practical advocate ofan alliance with the Turks." [201] Apart from the fact that such a thesisis
inadmissible from a methodological perspective because it makesuse of the vague motion of national character (not
to mention itsnationalist overtones), it is also vulnerable because it entirely disregards political reality, that is, the
fact that the Hungarians shouldindeed have explored every avenue for a modus vivendi with theTurks. Instead,
Szekfu seems to expect some romantic, unrealistic,almost Don Quixotesque attitude from the generation of
Mohacs.This perception has become practically the ideology of Hungarianhistoriography since the nineteenth
century. For example, accordingto one of Hungary's greatest historians, Laszlo Szalay:
Help was needed once again. And let the young reader not think thatthere was something humiliating for the nation
in this constantbegging for help. Far from it. The solution Venice, France, and KingSigismund had found, to
conclude peace and even an alliance with the Turk, and thus to be safe from his might, was likewise available to
theHungarians. Such overtures were indeed made to the court at Buda bySuleyman, as well as by his predecessors;
the haughtiness with whichthe ambassador of Wassily who, in the name of the tsar wanted toconclude close
friendship with the Sultan, was turned away, would nothave applied in the case of Hungary. But the proud nation
refused toturn unfaithful to its traditional policy, even in its decline and fall; evenin its misery, brought upon it by
the government and the oligarchy, itinsisted on continuing to serve the cause of Christianity and civilization. [202]
One is simply astonished; here we have a vision of the "proudHungarian nation" which, knowing no compromise or
humility,bares its chest and shouts to the world "thrust your dagger here!"This attitude--the oft-mentioned Mohacs
complex--has been passedon from generation to generation. It was the attitude of Pal Torok inhis discussion of the
peace proposal of 1524 and his refusal toconcede the possibility of a proposal from the Süleyman to Louis II. [203]
It is a fact that there is no record in writing of the conditionstipulated by the sultan, the right of transit. Yet, in the
knowledgeof the circumstances, I assert with conviction that the sultan couldnot have asked for less. As regards the
declaration, although warwas never declared formally, both times after the proposals of peacewere turned down the
Ottomans actually launched a war--in 1521after the proposal of 1520, and in 1526 after the proposal of 1524.
Pal Torok states correctly that Brodarics made no mention of theOttoman peace proposal in his description of the
battle of Mohacs.Istvanffy and other historians of the past 150 years also skirt aroundthe issue, and Szalay, as we
have seen, does not mention it explicitly.Fraknoi and Szekfu are totally silent about the matter. Since we arefamiliar
with Brodarics's attitude from his correspondence the question remains, why did he keep silent about the matter in
his Descriptio? (We shall see, further on, that this description is unreliable, fora number of reasons.) One reason is
that it was actually meant as adefensive response to the accusations Cuspinianus had raisedagainst the Hungarians.
[204] Moreover, the first representative of the"Mohacs complex" was precisely Brodarics. The tendency to seek
theexplanation of the demise of the powerful Hungarian state of theMiddle Ages in the personal weaknesses of its
rulers (unless he doesthis in spite of his personal convictions) is already manifest in his writings. He avoids the
notion that this demise might have been historically determined or produced by other factors.
As noted, Pal Torok states that the Ottomans asked for the rightof free passage only across Croatia. It is difficult to
see why theTurks would confine themselves to this request which, at best, mighthave facilitated a decisive assault on
Italy but not a campaignagainst Austria or the Holy Roman Empire. Because of the Alps theonly possible line of
attack against Austria led across the Hungarianplains, especially since the Turkish army could hardly have
donewithout the Danube as its main line of supply.
There are two other relevant developments in the period 1522 to1526. One of these was the peace treaty the Poles
signed with theTurks. King Sigismund wanted to include Hungary in the treaty; hewrote to the Primate of
Esztergom, in the summer of 1525: "We havebeen waiting rather a long time...for His Majesty King Louis
toconsider and conclude a peace with the emperor [Süleyman], butsince all this time we have been unable to obtain
assurances in thatregard from His Majesty we decided to send our own ambassador tothe Emperor of the Turks."
[205] He did instruct his ambassador, however, to represent the cause of the Hungarians as well and to try toinclude
them in the treaty. He informed the pope of the dispatch ofthe ambassador: '<Your Holiness may recall that your
predecessorshave promised, to me and to His Majesty King Louis that, bringingabout peace among the Christian
rulers, preparations would bemade for the great campaign; trusting in this promise I and mymajestic cousin [Louis]
have both suffered considerable damages...."Hence, he states, he had no choice but to conclude peace with theTurks.
[206]
Brodarics reported to Sigismund regarding the effect of this measure on diplomatic circles in Rome: everyone
understood his decisionand would not be surprised "if Hungary were to follow the exampleset by your Majesty."
[207] Indeed, the Polish emissary did bring up atthe Porte the matter of concluding peace with the
Hungarians,although we do not know whether he had authorization from theHungarian government. The Ottoman
leaders, however, insisted theHungarians sue for peace via its own emissary.
The other development closely related to the events precedingMohacs, while of an internal and economic nature,
transcended these to become a European affair. [208] The episode began as early as1495. At that time Janos Thurzo
signed a contract with the Fuggerfamily to exploit the country's richest copper ore resources atBesztercebanya and
vicinity. Implicit in this joint enterprise wasparticipation in the exploitation and minting of silver. This
"jointenterprise", however, was canceled temporarily by the Diet atRakos, held in the summer of 1525. This diet
declared, on the onehand, the cessation of minting the nova moneta, introduced in 1521,worth less than its face
value, and raised completely groundlessaccusations of fraud against a Christianized Jew, one Imre Szerencses. On
the other hand, the contract with the Fuggers (or theFukars--the "stingy ones" as they were called in Hungary)
regarding the exploitation of the mines was denounced. In fact, the Fuggerswere required to pay damages. The diet
went even further. Themasses were instigated, according to contemporary reports, by the"Hungarian lords and their
party followers," to plunder the house ofSzerencses. This was followed by an assault on the depots in Buda aswell
and the confiscation of the moneys found there, including thepapal aid which had been deposited by Burgio. A few
weeks later, atthe gathering of the lesser nobility in Hatvan, Imre Szerencsesturned from accused to plaintiff and,
citing figures out of the blue,enumerated the damages the Fuggers had caused the country. Theroyal court, and
probably some foreign entrepreneurs competingagainst the Fuggers, backed Szerencses. So it happened that theagent
of the Fuggers at Buda, now held captive, was forced to writea promissory note to the effect that his masters would
reimburse theHungarian government for the damages caused. Of course, thehouse of Fuggers, more precisely Jacob
Fugger, did not leave thematter at that. Denying the claims of Szerencses, he wrote his agentat Cracow: "I will
demand that everything taken from me be returned. Let them cover the debt owed by the king, as well as thesums I
had paid out to the Hungarians on the basis of the contract,and furthermore, [demand] that I be reinstated in the
business." [209]He added:
I have already arranged that Hungarian copper not be transportedacross Austrian lands, and I will try, and I hope
will succeed, inpreventing copper from crossing German lands as well.... Insofar asyou can, stop shipments of lead
to Hungary.... Production will soon haltin the gold mines; we have already ordered such a halt in our own mines. We
can see that not much more than half the previous rate isbeing produced in the silver mines. Thus, our business will
be increasingly missed, day after day, and the country of the Hungarians will seehow far it can get by its methods.
[210]
Jacob Fugger also resorted to political pressures. He solicitedmoral support from practically every court in Europe,
and indeed hegot some. Everyone from the German emperor to the pope took upthe Fuggers' cause; Charles V even
threatened to mobilize his wholeempire against the Hungarians. The pope warned Louis: "Demandand insist that
justice be done to the Fuggers." [211] Even Ferdinand ofHabsburg blamed his brother-in-law, Louis. Finally, the
Hungariangovernment was forced to back down. It restored the rights of theFuggers and paid damages, while the
government received a loan of50,000 forints. To quote Hermann: "Giving an account of this 50,000forint loan
Dernschwam [the agent of the Fuggers] observed: 'thiswas the small sum of money available to King Louis to
prepare forthe Turkish attack., Suleyman's army started out from Turkey theday after the contract was signed." [212]
We must consider, moreover, the political struggle waged withinthe country which had almost completely paralyzed
the government.At Hatvan the lesser nobility expelled Bathory from his office ascount palatine and placed Werboczi
in his stead, but the latter had toflee for his live in the summer of 1526, leaving the office once againin the hands of
Bathory. Thus, on the eve of Mohacs, Hungary wasleft to its own devices, struggling with a thousand political
andeconomic ills, militarily unprepared. The Ottomans, on the otherhand, had created a clear-cut situation,
diplomatically and militarily.They had concluded peace with all potential enemies: Persia, Venice,Poland, and
Wallachia. The army too had done good work. While itwas unable to capture Jajce and some other castles, it did
takeOrsova and Severin. These two castles were significant because theyhad provided the Hungarians with a base
for expeditions againstWallachia; moreover, they controlled Danubian shipping, not onlyfrom a military but also
from an engineering point of view.
The Ottomans had responded to the rejection of their first peaceproposal with the occupation of Belgrade; now, in
1524, no one,whether in Hungary or elsewhere in Europe, doubted that theHungarian reluctance to sign for peace
would elicit yet another
Turkish attack. This came only in 1526, the cause of the delay being,almost certainly, the need to consolidate control
over Egypt, economically so critical for the Empire. The importance Suleymanattached to this control was
demonstrated, as we have seen, by hisdispatch of the grand Vezir himself to Egypt. Having returned fromhis mission
in September 1525 Ibrahim reacted to the situation byimmediately presenting to Suleyman the plan against the
Portuguese elaborated by Selman Reis. The divan, however, decided thatthe Hungarian issue had to be resolved
first. [213]
Indeed, the resolution of the issue brooked no further delay. InFebruary 1525 Francis I suffered a decisive defeat at
Pavia, the kinghimself falling into the hands of the emperor. There can be no doubtthat Suleyman quickly learned of
the events and that he recognizedtheir implications. what he, along with several other Europeanrulers had feared
now came to pass: Charles V, having defeated theFrench, was absolute lord over Europe. However, we may take it
forgranted that the attack against Hungary was not decided on therequest of the king of France. The statement of
Kemal Pashazademust be given a broad interpretation: "One of the reasons, amongseveral, for this great campaign,
was the promise given the king ofFrance, who had shown inclination and friendship towards theexalted Porte,
regarding his liberation from the oppression of Hispania's ruler [Charles V]." [214] France had sent two emissaries
torequest assistance: one was killed while crossing Bosnia--hencethat request did not reach the Porte--while the
other arrived inDecember 1525, the campaign having been decided upon long ago; infact, the army was already
mobilizing. The mobilization before theemissary's arrival must be emphasized because the interpretation isoften
given that the policies of the Turks were strongly influenced byFrench diplomacy. My conviction is that this was not
the case. I tendto agree with those who claim that the Porte derived greater benefitsfrom Franco-Turkish
collaboration than did the French. [215]
Thus the campaign of 1526, leading to the Hungarian defeat atMohacs, got under way. A detailed account of the
campaign will befound in the second part of our work.
Table 7 provides indications of the political and military vicissitudes of the Near and Far East with almost
mathematical precision.In 1514, the initial year, the caravan routes of Syria and Egypt werestill under the control of
the Mameluke sultans. The total quantityof Levantine goods loaded at Tripoli or Alexandria and unloaded inVenice
was 2,140 tons. In order to get an idea of the damagessuffered by the Near Eastern trade as a result of the
Portugueseintervention, let us note that in the last years of peace, in 1495-98and 1501, an annual average of 6,600
tons was handled in Venice--that is, about three times as much as in 1514. In the period from1502 to 1513, however,
the total quantity of Eastern goods unloadedamounted to 6,334 tons. After 1514 the quantity was decreasing; infact,
in 1517 no merchandise reached Venice at all. The Ottomanshad occupied Syria in 1516 and Egypt in 1517;
obviously, the decrease in trade was caused by these campaigns. The exceptionallylarge figure for 1520--3,000 tons-
-is most likely due to some misinterpretation of the data, the figure being altogether at variance withthe general
trend; such a mass of goods could not have been shipped,if only because that was the year of the rebellion in Syria.
Apart fromthis, however, the decrease was precipitous, reaching a low point in1524~.7% of the quantity shipped in
1514. It is not difficult to findan explanation: these were the years of renewed rebellion in Syriaand Egypt. The
abuses of the thoroughly corrupt officials in theseprovinces fanned the flames of rebellion. Finally the Grand
VezirIbrahim restored order, and this no doubt explains why, from 1526on, the trade kept growing, exceeding the
trade in 1514 by almost17% by 1530. We do not know the reason for the sudden drop in 1529.By 1531, however,
the trade in Levantine goods was 41.4% greaterthan it had been in 1514. Undoubtedly, the rise in traffic was due in
part to the greater number of vessels involved in the fight against the Portuguese in the 1530s, as a result of the Red
Sea shipbuildingprogram. Last but not least, we must mention the extremely wisepolicies of the Porte vis-a-vis
Venice: encouragement and support forthe Republic in its efforts to revive the Near Eastern trade in everypossible
way.
Of course, the increasingly lively Near Eastern trade handled bythe Ottomans and Venetians was not well viewed by
the Portuguese;they sought an alliance with the Persians and Charles V against theTurks. [249] The alliance was
concluded only in the spring of 1532, butmost probably the Porte had an inkling of it beforehand. The strikeagainst
the Persians was carried out in 1534, but Suleyman first hadto disentangle himself in Europe, more precisely in
Hungary.
The sole objective of the campaign of 1532 was to gain recognitionfor the rule of John and to force the Habsburgs to
give up their claimsto Hungary. As early as February 1531 the French king wrote toRome that the Ottomans were
busily preparing for war and that thesultan's objective was "to attack all of Christendom if the Emperorand his
brother are not willing to reach some kind of an agreementwith King John." [250] A letter from Lyons giving an
account of thehappenings at the imperial diet in Regensburg was equally interesting. It related the following news:
If the Emperor and his brother forswear their claim to Hungary andleave the country in the hands of King John,
they can be granted thekind of peace they want from the Turks, and for as long as they like; but under no
circumstance would the Turk tolerate the brother of theEmperor [in Hungary], or accept him as neighbor. [251]
Thus Suleyman would have preferred a peaceful solution, all themore so, since French diplomacy, while it did not
expect him to giveup the idea of war altogether, nevertheless advised him to turnagainst Italy rather than the Holy
Roman Empire. [252] This desire onthe part of France was quite natural since she was also interested inItaly, but
most likely it did not make much of an impression on theOttoman leaders. Yet the argument the French
Ambassador, Rincon, presented in Constantinople to dissuade the Turks from attacking the Holy Roman Empire
must have made them reflect: thesultan would be merely playing into the hands of Charles V by suchan attack, since
the Imperial estates would surely not remain indifferent if the German lands were in jeopardy, in which case they
werebound to back the Emperor. Thus an Ottoman attack would bringabout precisely the kind of German unity that
would be detrimentalto both France and the Turks.
Nor did Süleyman fail to heed the warning, or rather request, ofKing John. The indications are that while John was
not convincedthat the sultan could defeat the Habsburgs, he knew perfectly wellthat it would be once again Hungary
that bore the brunt of the war,inasmuch as it would become the area of deployment for the Ottoman army. For this
reason he asked the sultan, back in the fall of1531, to give up the idea of war, explaining that his negotiationswith
Ferdinand were progressing well and that they were close to anagreement. The sultan responded that, as far as he
was concerned,there was nothing he would like better than peace in Hungary, buthe would also like some kind of
guarantee to the effect that CharlesV and Ferdinand would not intervene. If John could achieve what hepromised,
then Suleyman would refrain from launching a war, buthe had to have a final answer by March, presumably because
ifJohn's attempt bore no fruit, he would still have time to mobilize.John received the message in January 1532. His
task, therefore, wasto persuade Ferdinand and the emperor to accept peace promptly.He sent his ambassador,
Verancsics, to Rome posthaste to convincethe pope to intercede with the emperor. It would have been unpleasant for
the pope to comply with such a request since he had reachedan agreement with the emperor shortly beforehand;
instead, he advised John to send an ambassador to the German diet inRegensburg to try to convince them not to vote
in favor of theanti-Turkish aid. Heeding the advice, John sent Lasky to Regensburg. Lasky cleverly used the fact that
it would not be to theadvantage of the German states if Ferdinand were to rule overHungary in any case, partly
because they did not favor the extensionof Habsburg power in general, and partly because a connectionbetween
Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire in the person ofFerdinand would elicit the danger of Ottoman intervention
andwould require greater and greater efforts on their part. Lasky,taking advantage of this mood, argued that the
sultan would desistfrom his campaign if Ferdinand gave up his claim to Hungary. Since,however, reliable news
reached Regensburg regarding the sultan'sextensive war preparations, and finally about the launching of
thecampaign--for by then the deadline prescribed by Süleyman hadlong expired--all Lasky and the French diplomats
could achieve wasthat the estates voted for aid only as far as the borders of Austria. [253]
Such were the circumstances that explain the peculiarities of thecampaign of 1532. Even the choice of its line of
advance was curious:rather than advancing along the Danube, which would have madelogistics so much easier, the
army advanced towards Vienna bycutting across Transdanubia. According to one theory, the sultanchose this
direction because, in response to the French request, hewanted to retain the option of turning against Italy. This
theory,however, is not convincing. It is possible, however that Süleymanchose this line of advance on the request
and advice of John. TheHungarian king, as we have seen, was intent on saving the countryfrom the devastation
which inevitably ensued from the transit of theTurkish army. Naturally, he would urge the Turks to march
throughthe areas in Ferdinand's possession, that is, the western part of thecountry. Djeladzade's observation is
relevant: "When the land ofHungary had the honor of being kissed by the hoofs of the war-horseof the victorious
padishah, the conquering banners were turned inthe direction of that part of Hungary that owed allegiance not
toKing John but to the senseless enemy." [254]
Continued...
As for Charles V, he explicitly warned Ferdinand against war andwrote:
Bishop Frangepan, who usually did not mince his words, alsowarned Ferdinand against the senseless undertaking:
Your Majestic King, please do recall how many years you have spent
waging war against my Majestic royal lord and the portion of the
country under his power. Consider how much worry you have inflicted
upon yourself, how much exhaustion you have suffered, how much
money you have spent, and what you have achieved in exchange. The
antagonism of your majesties has achieved nothing except the devastation
of the rich country, driving so many souls into Turkish captivity for
ever, and has brought about the imminent danger that Hungary will
fall into the hands of the enemies of Jesus Christ, the Muslim unbelievers.
In this sense your majesties have achieved more than enough in
other regards, nothing.
Frangepan proposed that Ferdinand should give encouragementand arms to Hungary in order to unite the efforts for
liberating thecountry from the Turkish yoke, rather than devastate with theirforces even those parts of the country
hitherto untouched by thelurks. [281]
This wise advice, however, had no effect. Ferdinand's mind wasmade up; in fact, in his blindness he even believed
he could obtainthe sultan's backing for his plan. Therefore, he sent an emissary toConstantinople in the spring of
1537. When the emissary presentedhis request the grand vezir responded: "Yesterday I read the letteryour king had
written to me, in which he is making a not toohonorable request.... Not so much in my own name, but rather at
thecommand of the emperor [that is, the sultan], I say to you that he ismost amazed that King Ferdinand should lay
claim to territories which the emperor had acquired, by the grace and will of God, byforce of arms, and which he
regards as his own. In fact, the emperoris at a loss to understand on what grounds Ferdinand is claimingHungary."
The right of inheritance to which Ferdinand had madereference, continued the grand vezir, had lapsed the moment
thesultan occupied Hungary. [282] Ferdinand could have found out, beyondany reasonable doubt, that the sultan
insisted on backingJohn; furthermore, the Porte had decided that when John died theHungarians might elect anyone
they liked for their king, exceptFerdinand. Also, the general political predicament did not favorFerdinand. Hungary
under a Turkish protectorate was not only acceptablebut even desirable, to several European powers. In addition to
thesympathies of French diplomacy and, to some extent, of the Polesand the English, Ottoman domination was not
without its attractionseither in the Holy Roman Empire or even in the provincesunder Ferdinand. Ferenc Frangepan's
letter of 1537 to Elek Thurzois relevant; he explained that should the news spread that the Turkswere authorizing
free royal elections in Hungary, the Hungarianswould naturally prefer to survive under a ruler chosen from theirown
nation rather than perish under Ferdinand. The Bohemiansthe Moravians, and the Silesians would be most pleased
becausethen, instead of having to fight against so powerful an enemy as theTurks, on behalf of Ferdinand, they
"could spend their time fishingpeaceably in their ponds." The German estates also felt that theyhad been paying the
Turkish tax for the defense of Hungary entirelyunnecessarily since Hungary could fend for itself under a
Hungarianking just as well as under the protection of Ferdinand, and perhapsbetter. [283] The great Mediterranean
War broke out soon after these diplomaticpreliminaries. In July Ottoman forces invaded Italy fromsea, counting on
French support. However, the French did not liveup to their commitment as allies and the Turks had to give up
theirundertaking. Soon thereafter peace negotiations began betweenFrance and Emperor Charles V, and Venice
decided to join theImperial side. [284] In Hungary, too, the sounds of war carried the day. Towardsend of the
summer of 1537 Ferdinand dispatched not one but two armies into the country. The private armies of the aristocrats
tookpart in the ensuing conflict and inflicted a great deal of suffering onthe poor, but their depredations were far
exceeded by the havoccaused by Ferdinand's unpaid and starving German, Italian, andSpanish mercenaries. The
diets echoed the complaints of the population. Let me cite one of their complaints: if the army goes unpaid, "itis
forced to live from the tears shed by the population of the provinces, as has become the custom in our land. Indeed,
the troops leavenothing behind for the miserable masses except their naked andbattered bodies." [285]
It may be said that this unbridled abuse on the part of the troopswas inevitable, given the almost insoluble problems
of supply. Butthe horrors were exacerbated when the commander explicitlyauthorized the troops to wage war
without mercy to terrorize theenemy and to oblige it to sue quickly for peace. In 1537 Ferdinandinstructed his
commander, Lenart Fels: "You must carry out yourfeats with toughness and resolve, in order to cause confusion
andgreat fear in the Voivode [John] and among his leading men, andthus procure all the more favorable terms for an
honorable peace." [286]
At first the troops under the command of Fels, advancing towardsnorthern Hungary were successful, but the attack
soon bogged downand then came to a complete halt. The soldiers were not receivingtheir pay, and the army
disintegrated. Ferdinand's second army,advancing towards Eszek under Katzianer, was annihilated by theOttomans.
These failures convinced Ferdinand that his objectivewould be obtained only through peaceful means. He renewed
negotiations with John, and the resultant peace of Nagyvarad was signedon February 24, 1538.
The peace of Nagyvarad was in reality a compromise reached bytwo disenchanted kings: Ferdinand was frustrated
in his efforts toreach a military decision, whereas John was disappointed in hishopes for Ottoman protection. They
agreed, therefore, that Johnwould remain king of Hungary as long as he lived, but that after hisdeath the crown
would revert to Ferdinand regardless of whether John left a male heir. The two parties were committed to secrecy,
inorder to avoid Ottoman reprisals; but, in case the agreement came tolight, and the Turks took up arms against
John, Ferdinand committed himself to come to John's defense.
The treaty was based on the rather risky illusion that the militarypower of the Habsburgs was sufficient to withstand
the onslaught ofthe Ottomans and to preserve the territorial and administrativeintegrity of the country. This illusion
proved fateful, for it causedSuleyman to withdraw his proposal; in other words, the treatybrought about precisely the
situation which it was meant to preventand made matters worse by turning the country into a battlegroundfor a
century and a half.
The treaty of Nagyvarad was the first serious, specific warningSuleyman received that his "proposal", which had
been accepted byJohn and his supporters only with all kinds of reservations, and theresulting alliance could only
offer a temporary solution, ready to bedenounced at the first opportunity. In any case, both parties regarded the
treaty as little more than a scrap of paper almost from themoment of signature.
Yet, in the short term, the treaty of Nagyvarad did have significance; in fact, we may even assert that John derived
more than alittle benefit from it. Apart from the risk entailed by possible reprisals on the part of the sultan, the
contract provided him withsomething which had become a matter of survival: peace. We haveseen above that John
needed peace to consolidate his rule. Morethan once Ferdinand had launched campaigns that were bound tofail.
Nevertheless these efforts did succeed in weakening John'sposition.
Moreover, the contract made it possible for John to marry thePolish princess Isabella, whose parents had made it a
condition ofmarriage that Ferdinand recognize John's rule. A heir might wellresult from the marriage, and, the treaty
of Nagyvarad notwithstanding, the newborn had a far better chance of acquiring the crownthan Ferdinand, especially
since the Porte would never consent torecognize Ferdinand's rule. Thus we may rightly suspect that Johnhad
masterminded the treaty with political wisdom as well as a fairdose of guile. It may even be said that he had led
Ferdinand by thenose.
Incidentally, the events immediately following the conclusion ofthe treaty gave a tangible demonstration of its value.
The treatystipulated that, if revealed, and if the Ottomans should attack JohnFerdinand was obliged to come to his
assistance. Only a few weeks
after signing rumors spread that Suleyman, having found out aboutit, was getting ready to march against John. In
fact, shortly thereafter, specific information regarding the sultan's preparations arrivedalthough some of the
intelligence indicated that the attack was to bedirected against Moldavia.
Since John's conscience, and that of his followers, was not entirelyclear--after all, they had broken the treaty
concluded with thesultan--they assumed, in their fright, that the attack was aimed atHungary. Therefore they ordered
mobilization and, most importantas regards our issue, asked Ferdinand to send help. From thatmoment the
worthlessness of the treaty of Nagyvarad was madeabundantly clear because Ferdinand sent a ridiculously small
contingent, no more than a few thousand mercenaries. Fortunately forthe country, the intelligence regarding the
attack against Moldaviaproved to be correct. In August 1538 the Ottoman army invaded theprovince. The sultan
appointed a new voivode, added the southernparts of the province to his empire, then headed home with the
army.According to Ottoman sources, the attack was prompted by Moldavia's alliance with powers opposed to the
Porte. [288] This was indeed the situation since, as we have seen, the voivode of Moldaviahad entered into an
alliance with Ferdinand in 1536. Suleymanwanted to deprive the voivode of any opportunity to act against
theinterests of the Ottoman Empire.
Moreover, I must mention again, for the sake of a more realisticperspective of the relations of forces, that all the
happenings inHungary were of only secondary concern for the Porte. Far moreimportant events were taking place in
the Mediterranean and theNear East; all of which entailed a fair amount of danger. In February, the "Holy League",
the alliance of Charles V, the pope, andVenice, was born, with the express objective of breaking Ottomanpower in
the Mediterranean Sea. The allied fleet began to assembleat Corfu in the spring. In the summer Suleyman received
information to the effect that the emperor and the king of France hadconcluded the Peace of Nice.
The year 1539 brought no dramatic developments; but an incidentboded ill for John, as well as for the country as a
whole. Ferdinandonce again indulged in subversion at the Porte, going as far as toreveal the contents of the treaty of
Nagyvarad. Suleyman reacted tothe news: "Indeed, these two faithless kings do not deserve the crown!" [289]
Suleyman's indignation was entirely justified. After all,John did owe his crown to Suleyman, who refrained even
now fromdoing what he could have done already in 1526: annex the country,or any part of it.
The following year, 1540, was far more eventful. The rebellion ofIstvan Maylad in Transylvania threatened John's
rule from within.This most restless and unreliable grandee first turned to the Portefor help. He offered a yearly
tribute should the sultan agree to theseparation of Transylvania from Hungary. He attempted to gain thePorte's
support for his plan by hinting at the possibility that theestates of Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia would
excludeboth John and Ferdinand from the throne, and would offer theirloyalty to the sultan instead. Nothing reveals
the unreality of theplot better than the somewhat tongue-in-cheek reply from the Porte:the sultan could obtain
everything that Maylad now proposed betterand more securely from John directly.
Rejected by the Porte, the rebels now turned to Ferdinand. Theyrequested military assistance, offering that
Transylvania might joinFerdinand. King John immediately recognized the danger, and,though suffering bad health
and with his wife in an advanced stageof pregnancy, he nevertheless set out to restore order in the province. His
appearance on the scene was immediately effective: theSaxon towns--the main source of the rebellion--sent a
delegation tohim, and Maylad's co-commander, Imre Balassa, begged for mercy atJohn's feet.
An emissary arrived from Charles V while John was staying inTransylvania. He assured John of the emperor's
sincere good will,referring to Hungary as the "defensive bastion of Christianity."Since he had reliable information
regarding Ottoman preparationsagainst Hungary, he requested John's permission for an Imperialguard to occupy
Buda, its salary to be paid by Charles. If John didnot dare take this chance for fear of the Turk, let him reinforce
Budaand provide it with a strong Hungarian garrison at the emperor'sexpense. [291] In 1536 John himself had
requested that the emperoroccupy Buda and Temesvar. At that time Charles was unable to comply because of the
unfavorable diplomatic situation, but now,since he had been able to settle disputes with the king of France afew
months earlier, he had the freedom to act against the Ottomans.
John rejected the proposal for several reasons. On the one hand,when the emissary, dispatched in April, had reached
Gyulafehervar,the relationship between the emperor and the king of France haddeteriorated once again. On the other
hand, the extents since thetreaty of Nagyvarad proved clearly that the Habsburgs could not berelied on for protection
from the Ottomans. He decided that thetreaty of Nagyvarad itself had become moot on account of Ferdinand's
betrayal of it; using the betrayal as an excuse, he wanted tomake sure that the child soon to be born would received
the crown.Thus, he needed Suleyman's continued protection.
John left Gyulafehervar for Szaszsebes, where the good tidingsreached him: on July 7 Isabella had given birth to a
male heir.Heartened by the news the ailing prince mounted a horse in order toannounce the birth to the townspeople.
But soon he fell seriously ill.Feeling the approach of death, John willed the following: let hisfollowers protect his
wife and son and let them place the crown onthe child's head if they saw fit; but, no matter how things stood, letthem
not choose a king from the House of Habsburg, in order to avoideven more serious trials than what the country had
already undergone under his own rule. Let them remain under the protection ofthe sultan, for this was the only way
to preserve the integrity of thecountry, the only way to restore order, and the only way the fate ofhis wife and son
would be assured. His conviction was that "theycould expect the good of their country and of themselves only
fromSuleyman." He would not have come up with such an idea if thecountry could have expected salvation from
Christian rulers, butthere was absolutely no prospect for such an eventuality. [292]
John was a ruler with a tragic fate. We must recognize that he wasimbued with a sense of great responsibility
towards his country.Moreover, he assessed the situation with clear-sighted political acumen and used the limited
means at his disposal well, sometimesbrilliantly, on behalf of the country. He hit upon the only possiblesolution of
the problems resulting from Mohacs: the political andterritorial integrity of Hungary required the protection of
Suleyman.While his policies became indecisive in the mid-thirties, in the lastfew years of his life he once again
returned to the path he had embarked upon at the beginning. Death prevented him from achieving his ends. In the
fall of 1539 the papal nuncio, Rorario, wrote:
I am well acquainted with King John's methods, and know how clever]y
he maintains himself in the face of the Porte.... Many things he does
merely to convince the Turk that he is not on such good terms with the
King of the Romans and with the Emperor as he is reputed to be.... If
this be the case we must feel sorry for him because, no matter what,
there is no other way to preserve Hungary for Christendom. Without
him the country would have gone to the dogs long ago. [293]
Significantly, the same sentiment is reflected in poems of the age.A preacher in 1538 wrote: "Our good king saw
clearly/ The greatstrength of the pagans/ Wisely did he act then/ Making peace withthem."
After John's death opinion was divided three ways regardingHungary's fate. Those on Ferdinand's side felt that the
treaty ofNagyvarad should take immediate effect. Those on John's side, withFriar George in the lead, knowing well
that the observance of thetreaty would result in immediate intervention on the part of thesultan and that the
Habsburgs could not expect any help to withstand that intervention in the near future, felt that the right movewould
be to delay the execution of the treaty and elect the son ofJohn as king. The third camp, composed of Perenyi,
Frangepan, andothers, wanted the treaty to become effective, but only on the condition that Charles V and Ferdinand
provided serious military assistance forthwith.
The third party met at Eger, and they sent from there the following letter, dated August 30, to Charles V:
[with the death of king John] public affairs are in danger. We are afraid
that the emperor of the Turks will either take over the country directly
or grab the country under the guise of bringing help for the son of the
deceased. We are too weak to resist him. The deceased king reached an
agreement with your Imperial Majesty and your brother [Ferdinand]
main]y because of this menace. Your Majesty is our only hope, and for
this reason we are trying to sway our relatives and friends to our view,
hoping that your Imperial Majesty will take a determined stand. We
consider it absolutely necessary that Your Majesty and your brother
should deal with the issues firmly or give it up altogether. Half-hearted
handling of the issue will guarantee failure.... If Buda, the head of the
country. . should fall into Turkish hands, everything is lost ...
Hence Charles should strive to occupy the country, which could beaccomplished in one of two ways: by concluding
a treaty with theTurks in exchange for tribute or by waging war. For this purpose,however, it would be necessary to
sign peace with the king of France.
Although Your Majesty might have to sacrifice something for thebenefit of the Most Christian King you would gain
it back with usury[that is, with interest] if you could obtain Hungary freely and in whole.But if Your Majesty does
not wish to resort to either of those means--something we would most regret--then we beg him, for the love of
God,not to want our perdition, but rather persuade your brother to give upthat portion of the country he now holds;
and then we would attempt topreserve our country, by hook or crook, on our own... [294]
In this confused situation the onerous burden of the country'ssalvation fell on the shoulders of Friar George, who
already hadplayed a decisive role during John's lifetime. Though he was fullyaware that the lords looked askance at
his growing influence, he feltthat the best way to gain followers for his policy was to appeal to themost powerful to
assume the duties of governor next to the infantking and Isabella. He selected Perenyi over Werboczi, Balint
Torok,and Peter Petrovics, for he knew that Perenyi wanted the treaty ofNagyvarad to become immediately
effective. He hoped to win Perenyi over by such an offer, and others along with him. Since hisrelationship with
Perenyi was tense, he did not think it advisable toapproach him directly. He requested the beg of Belgrade, Bali, to
actas intermediary, since the latter had treated Perenyi well when hewas a captive and had maintained good relations
with him eversince. Though Bali Beg accepted the mission, Perenyi rejected theoffer; moreover, he passed Friar
George's letter to Bali Beg on toFerdinand. According to Mihaly Horvath, Perenyi rejected the offerbecause he was
convinced that it "would not be possible to defend thecause of the prince against Ferdinand." [295] No doubt Ferenc
Frangepan must have seen the situation in the same light because, in earlyAugust, he held discussions with several
magnates at Gyongyos andsided with Ferdinand, appealing to the estates of Transylvania to dolikewise. Friar
George not on]y saw matters clearly, but also tookaction with vigor and dispatch. The most urgent task was to
reassure the sultan that the death of John entailed no change. For thisvery reason the very young John Silismund was
quickly elected king. The coronation ceremony was omitted, since they did not wishto disregard the treaty of
Nagyvarad completely, and a coronationwould have implied the exclusion of Ferdinand from the inheritanceof the
throne, whereas an elected king could resign at any time. Theomission was intended to assuage Ferdinand and to
prevent armedintervention on his part.
The prerequisite for the success of this strategy, however, wasthat Friar George have Buda firmly in his hands. His
control of thecity was all the more essential since it was rumored that Ferdinandwas preparing to conquer it. In
August, therefore, Friar Georgedispatched his loyal follower, Gyorgy Horvath, the captain of Nagyvarad, to Buda,
with reliable troops, and adopted special safetymeasures for the castle's defense. Friar George himself traveled
withthe body of John and the treasury from Transylvania to Szekesfehervar, where burial took place in the tomb of
the kings. Shortlythereafter John Sigismund was proclaimed king on the field ofRakos. The estates assembled there
resolved that they would notelect a king from the House of Habsburg even if some evil shouldbefall John
Sigismund.
Furthermore, Friar George sent an emissary to the Polish kingSigismund, asking him to reassure Ferdinand that the
treaty ofNagyvarad was still valid and his right to the crown uncontested. headded a warning to the effect that
Ferdinand should not cause anytrouble and by trying to prevent the election of the king, in consideration of the
Turks. Far more important, however, was the delegation sent to the Porte, the task of which was to obtain the
sultan'sconsent to the election of John Sigismund.
The news of John's death had prompted Ferdinand to engage infeverish activity. He believed the time had come to
obtain all ofHungary As had occurred so many times in the past, however, hedid not assess the situation realistically;
he paid no heed to thedifficult situation of the country, in the shadow of the Ottomanmenace, and, continuing to
underestimate the power of the Ottomans in spite of his many bitter experiences, he once again began tochase the
"mirage of a settlement of accounts by arms." [296] Ferdinanddid all this despite the fact that, because of Charles `s
passivity andthe sorry state of his own finances, he should have expected lesssuccess than ever.
He also had an altogether mistaken view of the position of thePorte. He believed that the sultan would give in and
agree to hisrule. He refused to believe Friar George who had told Ferdinand'semissary that the treaty of Nagyvarad
was not timely and whobegged for patience. He was convinced that the sultan had droppedJohn already in his
lifetime; hence Isabella and the infant had noprospects in Hungary; furthermore, they would have to flee thecountry
for their lives (in which case he would have had the addedbenefit of not having to pay the widow the compensation
mentionedin the treaty). Prompted by such vain hopes Ferdinand caused FriarGeorge a great deal of trouble. He sent
an emissary to convinceIsabella who, in any case, was hesitant, capricious, and hated FriarGeorge passionately, to
abdicate the throne in the name of her son.Negotiations were conducted with the Hungarian lords, several ofwhom,
Frangepan and Perenyi included, went over to Ferdinand'sside. In the meantime, Maylad was once again growing
restless inTransylvania.
The most serious threat to Hungary was Ferdinand's militarymoves. His general, Fels, advanced upon Esztergom,
Visegrad, andthen Buda. It was the Hungarian councilors, more particularlyThurzo, Revay, Frangepan, and Perenyi,
who persuaded him toundertake this move, although it was not alien to his temperament.The stand taken by the
Hungarian lords was motivated to a largeextent by the consideration that with the loss of Buda the situationof
Isabella and John Sigismund would become altogether hopeless--as a consequence of which they would not even
have to return theSzapolyai estates in their possession.
The immediate excuse for launching the campaign was the election of John Sigismund and the decision not to elect a
king from theHouse of Habsburg even if some evil should befall him taken by theassembly at Rakos. The troops
under Fels began their maneuvers atthe beginning of October. Having taken Esztergom, Visegrad, andVac, they
marched under Buda and began its siege. But the undertaking, inadequately prepared in every respect, soon had to
beabandoned. The consequences of this poorly conceived move weresoon felt. Lasky, who was busy at
Constantinople at this time, wroteto Ferdinand as follows: "Your Majesty should know that neitherpeace nor
armistice can be obtained; that tomorrow the Sultan isalready heading to Adrianople [that is, the assembly point for
campaigns against Europe, usually launched in the spring].... He isheading there with the intention of securing
Hungary for himself.Your troops have spoilt everything, as I had predicted orally and in writing to Your Majesty,
but you preferred to follow a differentcounsel...." [297]
The delegation Friar George had dispatched to the Porte in October 1540 was received most courteously by the
sultan. The sultanratified the election of John Sigismund and gave him the country torule. At the same time he sent
Maylad and the Transylvanians awarning in no uncertain terms--for the latter had not given up theiradventurous
design--that they should put an end to their separatistaction and obey the government functioning by the side of
JohnSigismund. Yet Suleyman's recognition of John Sigismund's rulewas no longer sincere. He had given up his
original strategy and haddecided to annex the central portion of Hungary.
Suleyman indicated his change of policy by making Peter Perenyi's son, whom he held as a hostage, into a renegade.
Lasky, stillambassador at Constantinople, gave the following account of thisevent: 'Yesterday the son of Peter
Perenyi was introduced to theGreat Lord and will undergo circumcision at Adrianople." [298] PeterPerenyi had been
in Turkish captivity on two occasions, and on bothoccasions the sultan had released him on condition he serve John.
Aswe know, the sultan was not prompted by humanitarian considerations,but by cogent political reasons: he meant
to consolidateJohn's rule. He retained Perenyi's son as hostage to ensure thefather's loyalty. Now, by making his son
a renegade, he gave incontrovertible evidence that he no longer attached importance to Perenyi's allegiance;
consequently, neither did he care whether themagnates of Hungary supported John Sigismund or not.
Moreover, we have far more direct proofs that Suleyman was nolonger speaking sincerely. The French ambassador
to Venice reported on September 25, 1540: 'The news we have is that theKingdom of Hungary has been divided into
three parts [by thesultan]."[299] In another letter, dated October 8, describing the extensive war preparations of
Charles V, the ambassador reported thatthe emperor was undertaking an expedition the like of which hadnever been
seen, and if Venice did not conclude peace with theTurks--something Venice had done already, by the way--the
emperor would corner the sultan, for "the sultan had never been in sucha tight spot, considering that the Persians are
restless, and he hadlost John." Ferdinand too was counting on the support of the Hungarian lords. Then followed a
section which contradicted the preceding ones to some extent, for the ambassador wrote that the
emperor'spredicament was not quite so favorable, but what really matteredwas the ambassador's statement "that the
promise the Emperor hadgiven to help the Hungarians serves only to incite the Turks to movein and enslave this
country [Hungary] and place a pasha at itshelm" [300]
It becomes clear from this report that the sultan had not onlydecided to occupy Buda, but also that he was in a
difficult positionbecause of the chaos in Hungary: the pro-Ottoman party had sidedwith Ferdinand, whose troops
were besieging Buda. Moreover, theforces of the emperor might also arrive on the scene. The probabilityof Friar
George coming out on top had diminished considerably,particularly since there were irreconcilable differences
betweenhim and Isabella to the point that the queen was negotiating withFerdinand and even contemplating handing
over Buda. Here thenotion of range of action enters into the political balance with all itsweight: regardless of the
danger, the Ottoman forces, with theexception of some smaller units, could not have reached and relievedBuda,
besieged by Ferdinand's forces, before July or August of thefollowing year. It was essential, therefore, that Friar
George be ableto hold out in Buda until the sultan's army reached the city, and, inorder to encourage him, the sultan
had to make him believe that his"proposal" was still valid.
In the spring of 1541 Roggendorf, Ferdinand's general, launchedthe siege of Buda. While the timid and vacillating
leadership of theold and ailing Roggendorf, as well as the usual lack of funds, did notaugur well for the success of
the undertaking, the situation of thedefenders was not rosy either. Several circumstances hamperedtheir efforts--lack
of unity, to begin with. The tension betweenIsabella and Friar George had reached a breaking point. The
queendowager, in despair, was negotiating with Ferdinand, and evenencouraged the citizens of Buda to seek
contacts with Roggendorf inorder to hand the castle over. It was only by chance that the designfailed.
The siege had to be abandoned after several fruitless assaultssince the grand army led by the sultan was approaching.
The troops,seized by panic, withdrew from under the castle in the greatestdisarray, forming an easy prey for the
Ottoman troops camped nearthe castle and the defenders sallying forth from it. Five days laterthe sultan arrived
under Buda and took the castle by subterfuge.
It is worth examining the account of the occupation of Buda aspresented in the contemporary and near-
contemporary Hungarianand Turkish sources. According to the contemporary Verancsics fourfactors prompted
Suleyman to take Buda: "The first factor militatingin favor of the capture of Buda by the Turkish emperor was
toprevent some prominent Hungarians acquiring the country." HereVerancsics was hinting at Maylad's rebellion and
his offer to thePorte. The second factor was the shift of Bishop Frangepan andPerenyi to Ferdinand's side. The third
factor was Ferdinand's attackon Buda, encouraged as he was by Elek Thurzo and Ferenc Revai: "Ifhe wanted to
become king of Hungary, now was the time." After thetroops of Ferdinand laid siege to Buda, and after the sultan
had beeninformed that Perenyi and Frangepan had shifted their allegianceand that Isabella was negotiating with
Ferdinand, he could hesitateno longer. The fourth factor were the quarrels between IsabellaFriar George, and Balint
Torok. "The latter two both secretly coveted regency over the prince and the country." [302]
Szeremi, the other contemporary, provides a remarkable accountof Buda's occupation by the Ottomans. He describes
the situation,beginning with the 1540 siege of the city, as follows:
King Ferdinand gave orders that his camp lay siege to Buda and not to
give up the undertaking under any circumstance until the Germans
captured the city. The queen would have preferred to leave Buda and go
over to the Germans, and the Hungarian lords were prepared to allow
it. But every generation is concerned about the fate of the next. The
Hungarians would have liked to hand over the castle of Buda to the
Germans, but three considerations prevented them from doing so.
First, if the Germans were to enter or were allowed in, they would, in
the long run, not be able to defend it against the Turkish emperor.
Secondly, the Germans would not favor the Hungarian lords nor even
the lesser nobility, but would exterminate them to the last man.
Thirdly, by handing over the castle the Hungarians would not be true
to their word given to the Turkish emperor, while the Turkish emperor
had the power to hold Buda against the Germans. [303]
Istvanffy's account is also interesting and provides a more or lessauthentic account of Buda's occupation. He also
refers to a discussion by the Ottoman leaders concerning Hungary's fate and that ofJohn Sigismund and his mother,
Isabella. After describing how thetroops of Roggendorf quit their siege of Buda in panic, Istvanffycontinues with a
description of how John Sigismund and the Hungarian lords who had been defending the castle were lured
intoSuleyman's camp. W}mile Suleyman entertained them he sent hisforces into the city on the pretext of a simple
visit. Once inside theyquickly took control of all its gates and other strategic points andthen commanded that the
inhabitants lay down their arms. WhenSuleyman had been told that the population had obeyed and that thecity was
in his control he sent the infant king back to his mother.After some delay all of the Hungarian lords who had
accompaniedJohn Sigismund were also allowed to return to the city with theexception of Balint Torok who was
detained by the sultan. Suleymanand his retinue then discussed Hungary's fate. Istvanffy reportedthat their
deliberations were lengthy, but in the end Suleymandecided to send Isabella and her son to Transylvania, which
theywould be allowed to hold together with "a part of southern Hungary,along with Lippa and Temesvar, and those
salt mines and goldmines which she held in the lifetime of John." Friar George would bethe infant's tutor and would
also be in charge of the affairs of thecountry. The sultan also promised, in a letter to Isabella, that assoon as her son
came of age, he would entrust Buda to him. [304]
There are three important points to note in Istvanffy's account ofthe fall of Buda. The first is his statement that the
Ottoman leadersonly reached a final decision regarding the occupation of the centralportions of the country, and the
separation of Transylvania, afterthey had occupied Buda. This conflicts with the information obtained from
Venetian sources that the Porte had decided to dividethe country as early as the Fall of 1540. Future research
mustdetermine which report is accurate.
The second important point is Istvanffy's report of the variousopinions expressed by the pashas in their discussion of
Hungary'sfuture. In particular the chronicler noted the argument made byMehmed that Buda might fall into
Habsburg hands because of thelimited range of action of the Ottoman forces. As we know, Viennawas much closer
to Buda than to Constantinople; hence the Habsburg menace could be neutralized only by extremely costly
campaignswhich could be mounted in response to attacks only a year after thelatter had occurred. These strategical
considerations were definitelythe reason why Suleyman opted for the occupation of the city and itscastle.
Finally, Istvanffy reported Suleyman's promise to Isabella andthe Hungarian lords to return the country to John
Sigismund whenhe came of age and the chronicler saw with his own eyes theilluminated manuscript in which the
promise was recorded. According to Thury, however, there was no such document. With thepresent state of research
it is not possible to determine whetherSuleyman meant his promise seriously or whether he made it merelyfor the
sake of avoiding complications and in order to reassure FriarGeorge.
At any rate, Ferenc Forgach, a great admirer of Suleyman, categorically asserted in his work, written around 1570,
that Suleymandid indeed intend to return Hungary to John Sigismund. He wrotethat "everything Suleyman had
agreed to with respect to John wasalso applicable to his son", and he added that Suleyman had promised to return all
territories belonging to the kingdom, except theSrem, and that John Sigismund need only pay a gift, but no
tribute.His only condition was that John Sigismund should not ally himselfwith the Habsburgs. "He [Suleyman]
decided that he would obtainthe hand of the daughter of the French king Francis for John IIwithout asking for
anything in return. These intentions are provenby the fact that he had returned Buda, Becse, and Becskerek to
Johnand had a golden crown prepared for John's son when he went toBelgrade at the time of the siege of Sziget in
1566." He not onlyencouraged Isabella to make peace with Ferdinand, "demonstratingthereby his generosity and
great love towards John Sigismund", butwould even have allowed John Sigismund to marry the daughter
ofFerdinand, or anyone else, provided "that not a single stone" ofTransylvania be handed over to the Habsburgs.
[305] Again, it will bethe task of further research to determine the accuracy of thesereports of Suleyman's intentions.
However, with regard to theevents preceding the death of John Sigismund in 1571, the possibility that Suleyman
really intended to reunify Hungary cannot be excluded.
Let me now discuss the Turkish sources. The fethname of thesultan regarding the occupation of Buda states:
In the preceding years I have conquered Hungary and its capital, Buda
by the grace of God, thanks to my victorious saber; but, since in those
times it was very far from the Moslem Empire, and hence it would have
been difficult to administer it, whereas King John agreed to pay tribute
for it, I transferred the kingdom of Hungary to him and to his son, King
Istefa [John Sigismund] after him. But the king of Germany, Hungary's
neighbor, the unbeliever named Ferandus [Ferdinand] who,
cursed djaur as he is continually at war with the followers of Islam
and has always been a vengeful rebel would have liked to become King
of Hungary. Therefore his unbelieving brother named Karlo [Charles
V], allied to the King of Ispania [Spain] and with the support of other
unbelievers of depraved lives, assembled a huge army from the provinces
that are hotbeds of error, and placed guns and weapons on his
innumerable boats on the Danube. The cursed one named Perenyi, one
of the Hungarian magnates, also joined him. Moving with all these
forces he took power for himself in Hungary and laid siege to the city of
Buda.
Giving an account of the siege of Buda and the retreat of Roggendorf's forces, the fethname explains that Buda had
to be occupied sothat it could be converted into "one of the homes of Islam" and thendescribes how Transylvania
was given to the son of John. [306]
Two important points in this account are to be noted. One is thatthe fethname justified bestowing Hungary to John
with the argument that "at that time it fell very far from the Moslem Empire", anargument also mentioned by
Istvanffy. However, since Buda wasjust as far from the Ottoman Empire in 1529 as in 1541, theargument makes
little sense. Perhaps it is the result of an error intranslation. There can be no doubt, however, that this statementbears
on the notion of range of action. The other noteworthy detail isthat the fethname is silent about the promise made to
John Sigismund or, more exactly, to Isabella.
According to the Ottoman chronicler Ferdi, Suleyman had spokento the Hungarian lords as follows: "The King of
Vienna Ferendianus[Ferdinand] will not allow you to hold Budim [Buda]; he is constantly disturbing you.
Therefore, it would be more appropriate if Igave you the country of Transylvania and its appurtenances, andyou go
thither to live." [307] Djeladzade, the other Ottoman historian,noted that the pashas had decided that Buda had to be
occupied.
Moreover, he also reported that Suleyman had a contract drafted inwhich John's infant son was granted a sandjak in
Transylvania and,when he came of age, the kingdom of Hungary, "in place of hisfather." According to Thury's
interpretation, Suleyman's contractwas merely a verbal commitment, adding that the contemporary ornear-
contemporary Hungarian writers were also unaware of a written promise or document. [308] But, as I have noted,
Istvanffy said thathe had seen the document. Finally, I also note that Evlia Chelebi,the great Turkish world traveler
and historian of the seventeenthcentury reported that Suleyman occupied Buda and placed it in thehands of a vezir
"in order to avoid so much trouble and worryresulting from the Islamic troops having to come to the help of thecity."
[309]
Conclusion
The true interests of the Ottoman Empire tied it to the Near andFar East and to the Black Sea area. The affairs of
Europe merelydepleted its energies without offering any significant compensation.
After the capture of Constantinople the Porte could not help butbecome involved in European politics, because the
necessary condition for retaining the city was control over the Balkans, which inturn unavoidably led them to
Hungary and eventually to confrontation with the Habsburg Empire. Hungary in the 1520s did notrepresent a threat
to the Ottoman Empire, nor did it constitute aprosperous area worth conquering; its significance derived simplyfrom
the fact that the country could be used as a buffer state vis-a-visthe Habsburgs. The leaders of the Empire saw
clearly that theycould not compel Hungary to assume this role, since it lay beyondtheir range of action. Therefore,
they sought peaceful means toachieve their end: a relationship of alliance in which Hungary wouldadjust its foreign
policy to that of the Empire, but would otherwiseretain its independence, its territorial and administrative
integrity.This was the essence of "Suleyman's proposal." If this concept couldhave been realized, the Ottoman
Empire could have avoided theHungarian wars which proved so expensive and involved so manycasualties. In the
long run these wars achieved nothing; on thecontrary, they contributed to the decline of the Empire.
The acceptance of the "proposal" would have certainly been advantageous to Hungary in the short term, because it
would have putan end to the war which exhausted and jeopardized its very existence, while preserving the unity of
the country. Hence, King John'spolicies are justified. The gist of the matter is not the eventualconsequence of the
alliance with the Turk, but rather what could beand had to be done at the moment for the country's survival.Perhaps
the acceptance of Suleyman's proposal also would havebeen advantageous in the longer term. With Transylvania as
anexample, we cannot disregard the possibility that Turkish sovereignty need not have entailed a separation from the
civilization ofWestern Christendom. It is not even possible to imagine a fate worsethan that which actually befell
Hungary as a consequence of therejection of that proposal.
Should we therefore raise the issue of who is to blame, andcontinue to point the finger at the generation of Mohacs,
albeit froman opposite point of view? To blame that generation either for havingrejected the proposal or for having
lost the battle of Mohacs would beequally anachronistic. Hungary, wedged between two great powers,was bound to
perish. All of Suleyman's wisdom and all of the powerof his empire were not sufficient to overrule certain objective
andsubjective factors. The range of action of Ottoman forces could not beextended; hence Suleyman could not
provide the defense the countryneeded to face up to the Habsburgs. Furthermore, he could notconquer the deeply
rooted Hungarian distrust and hatred of theTurks which contributed decisively to the rejection of the proOttoman
orientation in the Hungarian ruling class. Moreover, thefeudal lords living in the western part of the country could
not beprotected against the attacks of Ferdinand, either by John or bySuleyman; hence they became pro-Habsburg
by necessity.
Does this mean that there was no other option, that everythingwas predetermined? On the basis of the results of our
research I canonly answer yes, there was no other option. However, this does notmean that the individual plays no
role in history. It does mean,however, that the conclusion I have reached on the basis of historicalfacts, while not
completely excluding the role of the participants,places them in the background in relation to the elemental
forcesthat constitute the foundation of historical events. If I must call itfatalism, I still prefer that to the romantic
illusions implied in thenotion of the "stalwart Hungarian nation", or the concept of Szekfu,based as it is on
categories in the history of ideas and vague notionsof national character, which appeal to the crassest passions of
Hungarianconsciousness and which derive from the wounds inflicted by the Peace Treaty of Trianon. Moreover, I
also am not referring to theelegiac mood conjured by phrases like "site of mourning reddened bythe blood of
heroes." I risked to speak out about "Optimism Derivingfrom Mohacs" in my essay Az orszagut szelere vetett orszag
[A CountryCast to the Roadside], and I persist in that conviction: if a nationis capable of surviving such a disaster,
then it has every reason tocontemplate history with healthy self consciousness and look intothe future with
optimism. Both the interpretation of Hungarian-Turkish relations resultingfrom Mohacs and the issue raised in my
monograph titled Az orszagutszelere vetett orszag [A Country Cast to the Roadside] haveelicited intense reaction
and sharp debate among a considerableportion of Hungarian historians. [310] I expect, and welcome, furtherreaction
as a consequence of the present work. I await commentand even criticisms which are not too friendly, with pleasure
because,after all, there is an "issue" involved, and this issue cannot beclarified by one person proceeding alone. Even
from the discussionpresented here it is clear that we must try to visualize events farapart in space and time, with
broad ramifications, while individualproblems have yet to be resolved. We are facing an extremely
ambitiousresearch program in which the systematic analysis of archivalmaterials, from Madrid to Istanbul, from
London to Rome, will playdecisive roles. Also, as the present work demonstrates, the reinterpretation of published
sources is an equally urgent task. For bothtasks we need fresh perspectives, new hypotheses, and a completebreak
with rooted beliefs, a tabula rasa. At this moment it stillseems that "Suleyman's proposal" is the best working
hypothesisbecause, as I have proposed already some time ago: "Suleyman'sproposal acts like a magnet which
arranges and orients the datawhich at first sight appears unwieldy and even contradictory." [311]
The other important task is to uncover the nature and impactthe oft-mentioned "Mohacs complex." How was this
complex generated, how did it affect contemporaries, the chroniclers, and laterhistorians? Present-day researchers of
the Jagellonian period andthe period of Mohacs cannot help but observe, at every step, thattheir sources are biased.
Of course, political and other points of viewoften played a part, especially in the dispatches of foreign
ambassadors,but the distorting impact of the Mohacs complex is morepervasive. We should be able to determine the
direction of this bias, its angle of reflection, from case to case. Of course, this can be noeasy task, for reality can
probably be arrived at from a model basedon unquestionably authentic data and on logical considerations. Ifdubious
data were included some logical contradiction would inevitably develop and interfere with the otherwise reliable
functioningof the model. We can postulate several such models, but perhaps thisbook already has convinced the
reader that one of the most promising is the model based on the relationship between war and politics.
PART II
THE BATTLE OF MOHACS
CHAPTER V
OBJECTIVES AND PLANS OF THE TWO SIDES
To describe the course of the entire 1526 campaign would be auseful and necessary project, but the question is
whether it can bedone with the available sources. Considering the dearth of evidenceon the period, as already
discussed, it is rather doubtful. The sourceson the strictly military aspects of the battle of Mohacs are evenscantier
and less reliable than those relating to politics.
Sources
There are two important sources for the reconstruction of themilitary events on the Hungarian side. The dispatches
of the papalnuncio, Baron Burgio, [312] and the narrative of Bishop Stephen Brodarics, De conftictu Hungarorum
cum turcis ad Mohatz verissimadescriptio (The true description of the battle waged on the field ofMohacs by the
Hungarians against the Turks.) [313] Unfortunately,neither author was familiar with the military metier.
Moreover,both wrote about the events with bias, although each had a differentway to grind.
Burgio admitted that he "understood little', about the "militaryprofession." [314] We find specific evidence of his
ignorance everywherein his account. Even his data did not exceed the level of informationavailable to the run-of-
the-mill foreign diplomat. While he participated in many a deliberation of the government, naturally, he wasleft out
precisely from the most significant military discussion because of the necessary security measures. Thus he got his
militaryinformation second or third hand, perhaps from agents; there areindications that prominent persons more
than once deliberatelymisled him in private conversations, especially when there seemedthe opportunity of
extracting money from him. (And unfamiliar as hewas with military matters, he was unable to assess the reliability
ofsuch information.)Reportedly, Burgio had an impulsive temperament, lacking the most important qualification for
a successful diplomat, name]y, cooldetachment. However Hungarians may be moved by the degree ofhis empathy
with their cause, such feelings were not exactly advantageous in assessing the facts. Moreover, his dispatches were
affected by mood and emotion. He could write about a matter firstpessimistically and then optimistically. He was
quite aware of hisown moodiness; as he wrote in a letter to a prelate: "Please, Majestydo not be shocked by the
inconsistencies with which I judge thesituation of Hungary in my letters: I have depicted it as desperateearlier, and
now I am hopeful once again. These changes of mood arecaused by the events." [315] Of course, Burgio's
dispatches reflect hisposition: however sympathetic he may have been to the cause ofHungary, he naturally saw
issues and judged personalities primarily from the Vatican's point of view.
The reliability of Bishop Brodarics is also questionable. First ofall, he was the very first representative of the
"Mohacs complex:" theleitmotif of his entire account is that the disaster was the consequence of personal
weaknesses and errors. Furthermore, since hewas a courtier and an unwavering follower of the king, he shifted
theresponsibility for the failures onto those magnates and nobles of thearmy who had been opposed to the court or at
least critical of it. Hewas probably not a member of the military council, but, even if hehad been, the indications are
that he could not have participated inall deliberations. When he did participate in military discussions heoften
misunderstood or entirely missed what was debated, becauseof his unfamiliarity with military matters.
A description by Christopher Frangepan of the campaign and thebattle and a report of his deputy have also survived.
Although theywere military experts, they took no part in the campaign, wrote theirreports on the basis of hearsay--
hence their reliability may bequestioned. Moreover, Frangepan was not unbiased, for he hated theHungarians. [316]
As for his deputy, his reliability may be measured byhis stating that the Ottomans built three bridges across the
Drava,when, of course, we know that they had built but one.
While in contrast to previous historians, I have reduced considerably the value of the sources from the Hungarian
side, the oppositeoperation must be performed in regards to Ottoman sources. Previous research on Mohacs has
made little use of Ottoman sources, andeven that was badly done. As a consequence of their hypercritical attitude
some Hungarian historians have given no credence to thechronicles, whereas others have accepted only those parts
as truewhich are conspicuously not. They have hardly used the diary ofSuleyman, although it is an "operations
diary" in the modern senseof the term and is completely reliable. Less heed was paid to Luftiand Ferdi, who
understood military matters well, than to Djeladzade, who indulged in poetic license, did not understand
militarymatters, and deliberately distorted certain facts. In consulting Turkish sources scholars have entirely
overlooked the most essentialaspect of the battle of Mohacs, namely, the placement of the Ottoman armies onto the
field of battle. On the basis of this evidence it issafe to assert that deploying this enormous army entailed
extremedifficulties. Moreover, these difficulties could be foreseen by theHungarian side, and, as already mentioned,
Tomori and his companions had indeed taken them into consideration in their battle plans.
Let me stress once more that my reconstruction of the battle ofMohacs and of the preceding campaign is in many
aspects hypothetical. The gaps in our knowledge do not permit otherwise. Moreover,the area of Mohacs, including
the battlefield, has undergoneconsiderable change over time: villages vanished and new ones werebuilt, the bed of
the Danube and of the smaller rivers in the regionhave shifted as a result, causing the wet swampy areas, so
extensiveat one time, to disappear. Of course, modern agriculture and technological progress in general also have
produced much change.
Nevertheless, the probability of these hypotheses is quite high,first of all, because the available data fit even the
model establishedregarding military operations of the age. (Actually, the reliability ofspecific data can be judged by
whether they fit into the model or not.)The proposition about the Ottoman and Hungarian leaders, expertise in
military science is also based on our thinking in terms of themodel: these leaders mastered the routines, the
"methods", asClausewitz called them, which enabled them to reach correct decisions. If one discards the many
exaggerations and the almost mystical aura attached to the person of commander, one can easily seethat the
decisions faced by the leaders on both sides required littlemilitary "genius", but all the more mastery of routine
based onmilitary experience and practical knowledge.
Continued...
At this point messages from Szapolyai and Frangepan arrivedsimultaneously. The two commanders, as we read in
Brodarics:
disapproved of the advice of those who guided the king prematurely so close to the enemy; according to them the
king should have awaited the enemy either in Buda or at any other more distant place until all the forces of the
country and all outside help were assembled. They requested the king not to engage in battle at least until their
arrival. According to the voivode the troops from Transylvania were so excellent in numbers and military potential
that the king could have faith in them for victory. But the king remembered the decision of the council, and
considering that the enemy was so close, and the troops so eager to fight he knew that if he did not listen they would
accuse him personally of bad leadership for missing the opportunity. Hesitating amidst these thoughts he finally
decided to attempt to convince at least the magnates to await the voivode and Count Kristof [Frangepan], and to
remove the camp to a safer location if hard pressed by the enemy....
When the king received the news of the Turks' crossing of the Drava,he sent Brodarics to the camp to convince the
magnates, and especially the commanders, the archbishop of Esztergom and the palatine, to postpone the battle, as
he knew that the other dignitaries and the masses were always inclined to follow the guidance of these two. He
enjoined the chancellor to convey every message the voivode and Kristof had sent to the king and to enlighten them
about the great danger threatening the country should the king and so many great lords, the cream of the Hungarian
nation, and its army be exposed to obvious danger. Because should the king happen to fall in battle (and, indeed,
given the strength and preparations of the enemy as compared with their own small numbers this was to be feared),
what would prevent [the enemy] from taking all Hungary with ease? Moreover, he mentioned that until the arrival of
others--the voivode with troops from Transylvania, the ban from Slavonia, Kristof from Croatia, the Czech,
Moravian and Silesian soldiers, and all the other auxiliaries expected--it would be better to bring the army into safe
positions or, if forced by the enemy, to retreat. Indeed, Hungary would suffer less damage even if the enemy were
allowed to roam freely and ravage the area between Mohacs and Pozsony than if this great host, including the king
and so many lords and soldiers, were to be wasted in a single battle.
In accordance with his orders, the chancellor communicated these arguments to the leaders, whom he visited in turns
during the night, and then to the whole council; but the effect was as if he had brought no message at a]l, so blinded
were the soldiers by their eagerness to fight in the vain expectation of victory and by their leaders not daring to
dissuade the troops, hell-bent on fighting, from waging battle The king visited the camp at dawn and once more
attempted what he had tried to achieve through the chancel]or. The advisers of all estates and nationalities were
summoned to the king for this purpose. [424]
Brodarics gives the following dramatic account of this last important meeting:
The king discussed with the advisors and the military men in detail what to do since none of those expected from
Transylvania, Slavonia, Croatia, Bohemia, and Germany had arrived. It is certain that most of these will show up
soon. On the other hand, the enemy is near, at most two miles from the royal camp, and most likely wants to fight as
soon as possible. What do they advise the king to do? Should he relocate the camp to another site with a view to
postponing the battle until the arrival of others, or should they test their fortune in battle against the enemy?
Pal Tomori had been called away from the other camp, especially for the purpose of taking part in this meeting.
Since it seemed that he also favored fighting the enemy right away, the king asked him, in surprise, in what did he
place his hopes? In order to dissuade Tomori from his plan, the king called upon him to report to the whole
assembly the number of troops under his command and those of the enemy, for the king knew right well that Tomori
had better information than anyone else, since he had many spies in his service and deserters kept reporting to him.
In answer to the first question Tomori said that in his opinion there were no more than 20,000 troops in his camp and
in that of the king together (for the two were separate, as mentioned earlier). In answer to the second question he
said that, according to the best of his knowledge, the enemy had about 300,000 soldiers. But when he noticed that
the number of our troops, negligible in comparison with those of the enemy, astounded everyone, he suddenly added
that we need not be so afraid of the enemy because this large mass w as mostly unarmed and unable to fight. When
the king once again urged him to estimate how many thousands of the enemy consisted of elite troops capable of
fighting, Tomori replied that he guessed at 70,000. But they found even this number exceeded our own strength by
far, especially when Tomori added that the Turks also had more than 300 major pieces of ordnance.
As they were debating these issues at length, the great majority, partly swayed by the advice of the friar, and partly
because of their own enthusiasm, believed the battle must take place, even though there were some who were afraid,
for some reason, to express their views openly. In the course of the discussion some delegates came as
representatives from the other camp. First they met with the king in a separate room and then, emerging with the
king, they advised the members of the assembly, in the name of the others, not to attempt to convince the king to
delay the battle, for they were correctly informed regarding the strength of the enemy: while their numbers were
great, victory was within reach, all they had to do is take advantage of the good fortune God had placed in their
hands. Let them therefore accompany the king and, with the help of God let the two camps unite since they were
closer to the enemy and in better position to attack. Should the assembly attempt to dissuade the king they would
expose themselves to great danger. Moreover they added that unless the king's troops set out towards the other camp
right away, they would turn against it instead of the enemy.
Once these matters regarding the battle had been presented to the members of the assembly even those who thought
in simple terms were so terrorized by this terrible betrayal that they unanimously opted for battle. [425]
For centuries public opinion on the subject of the battle of Mohacswas determined by this passage in Brodarics's
work, blaming thehotheaded nobility for the disaster and turning Tomori into a scapegoat. Brodarics knew and
respected Tomori and spoke kindly of him;in any case, being a gentle person, he related the events in gentleterms
and was far from pointing his finger at anyone. It is clear,however, that all the elements for an indictment are present
in hisaccount. A few decades later Istvanffy could go as far as stating:
Thus the king nevertheless came to the conclusion that Tomori as we]l as the council and a large fraction of the
commanders approved of the audacious and dubious encounter; the notion of battle gripped their soul with fateful
stubbornness.... But we must rather condemn the overconfidence and lack of sense of those who should have
considered how uneven the fight would be instead of underestimating or despising the power of the mighty enemy
and deluding themselves with hopes for victory. They should not have dragged the good and wise king who was
reluctant and had practically predicted defeat, into a position from which it became impossible to retreat without
obvious danger and great confusion....
This was the memorable yet unfortunate battle of Mohacs by which we lost the former glories of our nation. The
flower and elite of the nobility and of the soldiery and everything our country possessed, was annihilated in that
single tragic battle. This was the beginning of our inexpiable ignominy; we groaned under the unbearable yoke of
the barbarians, suffered servitude under the domination of foreign nations. We are correct and justified, therefore, in
condemning the audacious and foolhardy individuals who decided in favor of battle in spite of the unfavorable
omens, who threw the brave and gentle young king as prey to the enemy, and sent the fatherland into misfortune and
destruction, and in damning them with the most atrocious curses. [426]
Zrinyi, who relies heavily on Istvanffy and to whom the text ofBrodarics was probably also known, divides the
blame betweenLouis II and Tomori equally; in fact, he cites them as negativeexamples in his argument on military
science. [427] Apparently Zrinyidid not have the opportunity to study the battle of Mohacs in depth,and therefore he
accepted the accounts provided by Brodarics andIstvanffy. A more in-depth examination would have shown that
atthe military council it was not a clash between cool common senseand blind passion, but rather of two opposing
strategic concepts.Louis, concept, which he apparently advocated from the outset andexpressed clearly by declaring
that he would surrender the country even as far as Pozsony, was to avoid a battle that was bound to belost. On the
other hand, to Tomori and his companions, handing oversuch a large portion of the country as prey to the enemy
was anunacceptable alternative, especially if there was a chance of success.
Indeed, the choice was most difficult. It was extremely risky tofight the overwhelming might of the Ottomans
without the Transylvanian and Croatian forces and the mercenaries expected fromabroad. However, from the point
of view of strength, space, and time,we have seen that even if the battle had been postponed in time--hence in space-
-it was still most doubtful that additional troops, forinstance from Transylvania, would have been able to take
part.Then the battle could still not have been won, but the country wouldhave been ravaged by the Ottomans.
The above-quoted excerpt of Brodarics is one of the most beautifulsections of his work: the tone of the account is
exalted, his stylesoaring, and it is carefully composed--it is a dramatic and overpowering scene! No wonder that
these pages attracted readers, attentionand left an indelible mark in their memory. There is another section,however,
where the issue of responsibility comes up, and this one isfar from being as well written and convincing. There the
authorwants to defend the country against those ill-intentioned rumorsand charges which were disseminated
throughout Europe in theweeks immediately following the battle and which blamed the Hungarians for
irresponsibility, heedlessness, and lack of military competence. Here his style is bland, his whole argument weak.
There will be some who would blame the boldness of those who insisted on battle with so much passion, and will
qualify it as great foolhardiness; and indeed there are some who do so. But the accusers forget that there were m any
factors in operation which might have persuaded even the wisest and most powerful ruler to act this way--first of all,
the wonderful, unique, and almost fateful enthusiasm of the soldiers and the hope of assured victory which lived
unshakably in their souls. Added to this were the secret negotiations conducted by Pal Tomori with a significant
portion of the foe s army, i.e., with those who were born to Christian parents or were Christians themselves--
Germans and Italians employed to man the artillery.
And here Brodarics mentions an argument he had never mentioned before although it is of decisive relevance and
was probablybrought up by Tomori and his friends at the military council: "Moreover, a retreat did not seem
sufficiently safe because, the foe being sonear, they would have had to retreat from a force which, because ofthe
speed of its mounts, was able to do nothing better than carry out a chase." [428] Thus, while in the spirit of the
"Mohacs complex" he shiftsthe emphasis from the determining factors to the incidental andpersonal ones, he makes
no mention of this extremely importantfactor; but when he has to defend the Hungarians he brings up thisargument
from the realm of military science. Indeed, this argumentwas well founded: there can be no doubt that had the
Hungarianarmy pulled back, the Ottomans would have exhausted them,ground them up, and harassed them to death
with their extensivecavalry.
In any case, how far would they have had to retreat? Where wouldthe other forces been able to join the army of the
king? The only forcethat mattered from this aspect was that of Szapolyai, since thetroops of Frangepan and the
foreign units could hardly have exceeded 4-5,000.
We have seen that the king sent Bacsy to Szapolyai in late Julywith the final order to rejoin him. We know from
Szapolyai's letter,already quoted, that he was indeed on his way towards centralHungary and that he had requested
the king, by way of the emissary, to await his arrival; in fact, Szapolyai himself, "boarding alight vehicle", hurried
forward, to convince the king personally. Hewas late, however, because "of lack of time, the proximity of
theOttomans, and the fatally belligerent mood of the Hungarians...although he was not far away the night of the day
on which the kingwas defeated." [429] We do not know just what Szapolyai meant by being"not far away" from the
king: one day's march, or two? It hardlymatters. What matters is where his troops were at the time of themilitary
council, that is, on August 24-25. All we know is that onAugust 10 Szapolyai was still sending out orders for
mobilization,summoning all units to Torda for the 15th. [430] Let us assume, therefore, that Szapolyai left Torda the
day after the troops arrived there.In nine days--from August 16 to 25~ounting with a rate of marchof 20 km a day,
which, as we have mentioned, was almost a forcedmarch, he could cover a distance of 180 km, reaching the area
ofTotvarad in the valley of the Maros River, or the area of Kapolnas,40 to 50 km east of Lippa.
Had the Hungarian army initiated a retreat on August 25, andassuming the Ottomans did not interfere--indeed, a
most unlikely assumption--the probability of Szapolyai joining the main forcesmay be ascertained from Table 8
below:
Table 8.
Distances of Major Forces on August 26, 1526
Distance in km
Forces Location on August 25 to Tolna to Buda to Pozsony
The table indicates that Szapolyai could not have reached Tolna,Buda, or even Pozsony ahead of the Ottoman
forces. Nor can weoverlook the fact that even if his forces had been much closer, theDanube would have made
it difficult for him to join the king; anyattempt to cross would undoubtedly have been challenged by
theOttoman army and fleet. Nor could the king's army have crossed theDanube to unite with Szapolyai's
forces with the Ottoman pursuersat its heels.
We know that Szapolyai was a competent leader, but how could heassume he would be able to join forces
with the king? It is possiblethat around August 5 when he sent his emissary to the king? he washoping the
latter had not advanced beyond Tolna. Perhaps he evenbelieved the king was still in Buda. It is obvious from
his messagethat he disapproved of the king's leaving Buda. Moreover, he probably did not expect the
Ottoman forces to capture the castles of theSrem as fast as they had and to reach the Drava so soon. In any
case,one thing is certain: Szapolyai and Frangepan counted on surrendering the southern portions of the
country. This was a more naturaland far more bearable compromise for them than it was for the bulkof the
Hungarian nobility.
To sum up: Brodarics's almost incidental comment, to the effectthat it was too late to retreat, refers to a fact
that must have hadconsiderable weight in the discussions of the military council; hence,it was not simply out
of hotheadedness that the nobility opted forbattle.
There is another striking detail in Brodarics's account, namelyTomori's indecisive, almost unmanly behavior
This picture is instark contrast with everything we know about him. He might nothave been a great military
leader? but he was a brave man. It is inconceivable that he would have been frightened or that he lethimself
be influenced by some loud-mouth petty noblemen. Hencewe must assume that he decided that the battle had
to be fought onthe basis of a careful assessment of the situation as his sense andconscience dictated.
According to Brodarics's presentation the indecisive, disturbed, tongue-tied Tomori was confronting a
sensiblethoughtful king in the debates. But if we take a closer look at thequoted text, and take everything that
happened into considerationthe falseness of this presentation become obvious right away. Indeed, Tomori
must have felt a moment's hesitation when he had toanswer the kings queries regarding the relationship of
forces because the king was not playing fair. There must ha re been twodistinct versions of the strength of the
Ottomans--a real one, forofficial use " so to speak, and another which underestimated thestrength of the
Ottomans considerably, for the benefit of the troops.When Tomori proposed peace he must have resorted to
the officialversion, but the king must have known the other version as wellincluding the function that it
played. Thus it was not altogether fairon the part of the king to force Tomori to reveal the actual situationin
front of the military council, which, according to Brodarics, included soldiers of lower ranks. The king did
not behave wisely onthis occasion. The main issue was whether or not there was apossibility for withdrawal.
Since there was not, and the fight had totake place, then, by obliging Tomori to reveal the actual situation,the
cat was let out of the bag. The only advantage enjoyed by thesmall Hungarian force was its self-confidence.
What good did it do totamper with that?
Another circumstance may also have weakened Tomori's positionin the debate. Perhaps he was in favor of
battle not only because ofnegative factors, i.e., the difficulties of carrying out a retreat, butalso because he had
a plan that raised the prospect of a victory butwhich he could not mention for the sake of secrecy. We will
deal withthis matter later.
Strength of the Hungarian Forces on the Eve of the Battle
After this dramatic war council Tomori hurried back to his troopsalong the Karasso and, as Brodarics
writes: managed to convince his troops, with great difficulty, to retreat a little and agree to join the troops of
the king. Thus the following day our camp was united with theirs at about half a mile from Mohacs, but in
such a way that the soldiers did not intermingle, because a small open space remained between the two
camps. [431]
This must have happened on August 25 or 26. By then the Ottomanvanguard had reached the Karasso and
from that time until the dayof the battle skirmishes were fought between the Hungarian andOttoman light
cavalries.
In the meantime troops were arriving from all corners of thecountry. One of the most significant of these was
the Croatian-Slavonian army led by Ferenc Batthyany, numbering about 4,000 to5,000. [432]
Let us now rehearse once more what the size of the army was onthe day of the battle. Brodarics wrote of 24-
25,000, but in one of hisletters written after the battle he mentions only 20,000. [433] We havewell-founded
doubts regarding the accuracy of these figures. On theone hand, his notion of figures was rather hazy. He
kept reportingdata such as: "Along with the troops of Queen Mary and of theArchbishop of Esztergom the
king had about 3,000 cavalry andinfantry as he left Buda." But at Tolna "the king had 4,000 cavalryor a little
more." The palatine arrived with a "few men"; GyorgySzapolyai arrived with "3,000 cavalry or a little
more"; Batthyany"brought approximately 3,000 cavalry and a much smaller numberof infantry", and so on.
[434]
The figure 25,000 seems to be a very low estimate; it would meanthat only half of the 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers
which, according toIstvanffy, central Hungary could muster, were actually mobilized. [435]There are no data
indicating that great lords or noblemen refusedservice in 1526; on the contrary, Burgio writes with great
appreciation of the enthusiasm with which the mobilization was carried out.In fact it seemed as if taking part
in the battle was a point of honor.For instance, Bishop Varday had a certificate issued stating that heleft the
army against his will." [436]
Another argument in favor of a larger number of troops is that theking had called the fifth of the peasantry
to arms rather than thecustomary tenth or less. Later he raised the proportion to "everyother man", and,
finally, he had the sword dipped in blood carried around in the villages signifying universal mobilization.
[437] In fact, hegave special instructions to mobilize the lepers and round them upinto a separate unit.
Naturally, not all peasants were actually underarms, but we have no reason to suppose that the southern
provincesdid not call a great number of them under the banners.
Even the losses would lead us to not believe the 25,000 figure.Brodarics himself estimated the casualties at
10,000 infantry and4,000 cavalry, [438] which would have meant that half the army remained on the
battlefield. Such a rate of casualties occurs mostrarely in history, mostly when the battle involves
encirclement orwhen the victors pursue the defeated relentlessly. Neither was thecase at Mohacs. The
Ottoman sources estimated Hungarian losseseven higher--at 40,000 to 50,000. This is obviously an
exaggeration.Suleyman's clerk writes of 50,000 Hungarian cavalry and 4,000infantry on the day of the battle,
but four days later he notes that"they buried 20,000 infantry and 4,000 armored Hungarians", including
"about 2,000 who had been captured alive" and beheaded. [439]The burial of the corpses was supervised by
the grand vezir, hissecretary, and the defterdar. Since they were the ones to report thesefigures to the sultan
these may be considered accurate. But if thisfigure is correct, and if we accept Brodarics's figure of 25,000,
thiswould imply that the entire Hungarian host remained on the battlefield, which is impossible.
All things considered, it seems likely that the effectives of theHungarian army were between 50,000 and
60,000, rather than25,000. Of course, one cannot help but shiver at the thought that theHungarian high
command itself had no idea how many soldiers wereunder its command. Did they not hold a muster, and did
the "quartermasters" of the army not figure out how many rations wereneeded for the men and the horses?
Or was Brodarics the only one toremain in ignorance? We have seen, however, that at the last military
council on August 24 or 25 Tomori also referred to 20,000 men.It is true that although by then he was
commander-in-chief, he wasstationed not with the main body of the army, but at the Karassocamp, where he
could not monitor the troops gathering at Mohacs.
CHAPTER VIII
THE HUNGARIAN BATTLE PLAN AND
THEDEPLOYMENT OF THE OTTOMAN FORCES
It is no longer possible to insist on what had become practically anaxiom of Hungarian interpretations, namely that
the Hungarianswent into battle without any plan or foresight. In my opinion Tomoriand his companions had a
brilliant idea; indeed, they played uponthe only chance of obtaining a victory or a tie. Of course, the chancesfor such
an outcome still remained small, but it was to their credit asmilitary experts that they recognized the opportunity.
To reconstruct the Hungarian battle plan one must start from thepremise that whatever side is compelled to remain
on the defensivebecause of its relative weakness may improve its chances by choosingthe right terrain; in other
words, the weaker side must meet the foeat the spot where the latter's attack would run into the greatestdifficulties.
This principle points to the first task: to become acquainted with the battlefield of Mohacs and the area where
theOttomans had to deploy for battle.