Honorable members of the Tribunal, esteemed Colleagues, in what follows, I will refer to the

procedural issues on behalf of CLAIMANT.

The first issue that shall be approached relates to A the law applicable to the Arbitration
Agreement, and B Tribunal’s powers and/or jurisdiction on adaptation.

As to the first questions, we will prove that the Law of Mediterraneo applies to the Arbitration
Agreement, based on the following 3 submissions:
● First, there is express an express designation of law to govern the Arbitration Agreement.
● Second, the Tribunal can ascertain an implied choice of law in favor of Mediterraneo law.
● Third, the law of Mediterraneo shall be applied as a result of conflict of laws rules test.

As to my first submission, The Tribunal shall find that there is express an express designation of
law to govern the Arbitration Agreement.

The starting point in determining the law applicable to the Arbitration Agreement should be the
“terms of the particular clause and the contract in question” [Klöckner case, para. 26]. The law
of Mediterraneo is the only express choice of law clause contained in the Sales Agreement, a
clause which was considered all throughout the negotiation process and finally agreed on by
both parties. It seems natural for this law to apply indiscriminately to the whole contract, for such
decision (i) is to be aligned with consistent case law ​[Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty
Construction Ltd, Sumitomo Heavy Industries v Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Enercon India
v Enercon GMBH, Hitachi Ltd. V. Rupali Polyester, ICC Case No 2626 (1977), ICC Award No.
6840 (1991)]​ and doctrine​ [Schwenzer/Yeşim, p. 91; Moses, p. 87] , ​(ii) would ”reinforce party
autonomy and give the law chosen by the parties the widest scope of application” [Hague
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts] and finally (iii) ease this
Tribunal’s task, since the search for an implied intention is something of a ‘will o'the wisp’
(chimeric ), producing lengthy debate (​Moore-Bick LJ in the Sulamerica case)​ . Extending the
law of the matrix to the Arbitration Agreement doesn’t defy the separability doctrine, applicable
only to issues relating to the existence or validity of the contract [​Born, p. 157​]. As so, the
Arbitration Agreement is a clause among many other, and its supposed autonomy shouldn’t be
taken to the extreme.

As to the second submission, the Tribunal can ascertain an implied choice of law in favor of
Mediterraneo law.

If, however, the Tribunal finds that there is no express choice of law to govern the arbitration
agreement, CLAIMANT is to prove that parties have implicitly chosen the law of Mediterraneo. A
closer look at the negotiations would reveal firstly, that CLAIMANT never consented for another
law to apply, couldn’t have done so, by virtue of its internal policy [​Exhibit R2, para. 2, p. 34​],
and expressly stated that it should remain the law of Mediterraneo to be the one to govern the
contract [​Exhibit R2, para. 4, p. 34]​ . Secondly, RESPONDENT’s conduct was conclusive as to
the application of the law of Mediterraneo, by no means contesting this fact. Moreover, courts in
common law system countries, as is Danubia, consider the express choice of law to be a strong
indication of the parties’ intention to apply that law to the arbitration agreement [​NTPC v. Singer;
Sumimoto case; Arsanovia case; Sonatrach case​]. Finally, Danubian Contract Law doesn’t meet
parties’ need for neutrality [​R2, para. 2, p. 34 ;R3, para. 4, p. 35​], contrary to the Law of
Mediterraneo, which is an unaltered version of the PICC “present in the legal systems of both
parties” [ICC AWARD NO. 8817].

The third submission relates to the closest and most real connecting factor test.

When parties’ option as to the law governing the arbitration agreement isn’t deemed
transparent, arbitrators shall resort to conflict of laws rules. The internationally recognised (e.g.
Rome I Regulation) “closest and most real connection” test, is to be applied and will lead to the
designation of the Law of Mediterraneo. CLAIMANT argues that this would harmonize with vast
case-law [​Sumitomo Heavy Industries v Oil and Natural Gas Commission [1994], Sonatrach
Petroleum Corp v Ferrell International Ltd [2002], Enercon India v Enercon GMBH, ICC Case
No 6379 (1992), ICC Case No 6752 (1993)​], invoking as well, that the place of conclusion is
also Mediterraneo [​Fouchard]​ . On the contrary, the Arbitration Agreement has a weak
connection with the law of the place of arbitration, i.e. Danubia because of the rationale that
stood behind this designation - that of neutrality [Exhibit R2, para 2, p. 34], and not that of a
perceived superior legal system [​Fouchard​].

Concerning the second question, CLAIMANT submits that even if the law of Danubia governs
the Arbitration Agreement and its interpretation, the Tribunal still has the jurisdiction and power
over adaptation
As such, we will base our argument on the following submissions:
(i) Four corners rule has no bearing on this case, by virtue of the applicable CISG
(ii) A broad interpretation of the negotiations shows this Tribunal’s jurisdiction and/or powers to
adapt the contract

The contract is governed entirely by the CISG, and the Arbitration Agreement makes no
exception [​Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Schmidt-Ahrendts, Koch, Ferrari​]. Extensive case law
[​MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D'Agostino, Shuttle Packaging Systems,
LLC v. Tsonakis, Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd, Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich International Corp]​
rejects Danubia’s courts understanding of separability [PO2, para. 36,pag. 60], and calls for a
uniform application and of the CISG. The Convention and its interpretation principles, being a
part of Danubian legal system, superseed its contract law, thus negating the four corners rule
[​CISG Advisory Council, Opinion no. 3]​ .

Applying the broad interpretation principles as stated in art. 8, will prove that not only
RESPONDENT didn’t contest the possibility for the arbitrators to adapt the contract [Exhibit R4,
para. 4], but also agreed to it [Exhibit C8, para. 4].
From a hardship clause it can be derived the authorization for the Tribunal to adapt the contract
[Berger, pp.1-18], since no other effect can be applied after the failed renegotiations [PO2, para.
35, pag 60]. Even more, ​ ​the conferral of power to adapt the Contract is confirmed because the
 applicable substantive law prescribes such measure. Contrary to RESPONDENT’s allegations,
the text of the Arbitration Agreement does not contain any restrictions as to which remedies the
Tribunal can grant, adaptation falling under its scope. Reaching a different conclusion would
come against the principle of effectiveness [​Fouchard​] and parties’ will to resolve any dispute by
arbitration.

With respect to the second procedural issue, we ask the tribunal to take into consideration the following
two submissions when deciding upon it:

First​. ​There is no special reason to protect this evidence

Second. This evidence is needed to reach a lawful and fair decision

I. As to the first submission, the parties did not establish any rules of evidence so the tribunal is free to
decide upon them. To help the tribunal in this regard, Claimant brings the following two findings:

Firstly,​ The confidentiality is not an absolute, indivisible asset of the arbitration award. Even if the
parties had a confidentiality agreement, they may not rely on its unqualified protection. Following this
logic, in the AEGIS case, the tribunal found that it is not bound by the confidentiality agreement on the
other arbitral proceedings.

The duty of confidentiality is limited by exceptions, including the protection of the legitimate interests of
a party to the arbitration. In the present dispute, the “Partial Interim Award” is a primary source that
prove the true intention of the respondent. Our opponent seems to have different opinions on the same
legal issues which are crucial for our dispute. This raises serious doubts about its arguments that could
mislead the honorable tribunal.

Secondly​, In the Corfu Chanel case, the tribunal established the that the fact that the evidence was
obtained through leakage is not enough to exclude it. The protection may be waived in case there were
not taken the reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure of the arbitral award [Glamis
Gold v United States of America, para. 51]. Respondent was fully aware that it had an outdated firewall
of its computer system which made it easy for the third parties to hack it [PO2, para. 42]. Therefore, it
was reasonable from it to expect a possible leakage, which finally happened.

At the moment Claimant heard about the other arbitration, the Award was already leaked. My client
was promised the Partial Interim Award by a third party which Claimant does not control. The leaked
evidence is admissible as it was obtained by claimant with clean hands and with good faith.

II. In regard to the second submission, we ask the tribunal to apply the rules that would not violate the
Claimants rights to defend its case properly and ensure a fair trial an equality of arms. Otherwise, the
winning party would risk to not being able to enforce the award under the art. V.(1) B of the NY
Convention as Claimant would was unable to present its case. The position of Claimant is that
respondent tries to be both pregnant and unpregnant on the same time and win from both positions.

In the other arbitration respondent had been negatively affected by the unforeseen tariff of 25%
imposed by the Mediterraneo. Being affected by the tariff, Respondent asked for an adaptation of the
price by invoking an unforeseeable change of circumstances [PO2, p.50]. That position not only goes in
the same direction that claimant’s position, but in fact it directly contradicts respondent’s current
position. Respondent is trying to obtain an unfair advantage over claimant despite its previous claims. In
that sense, in pursuance of protect the fairness of this proceedings, the evidence must be admitted,
since reveals RESPONDENT’s contradictory behavior.

In conclusion, we kindly ask the tribunal to first and second