G.R. No.

131512 January 20, 2000

LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE [LTO], represented by Assistant Secretary

Manuel F. Bruan, LTO Regional Office, Region X represented by its Regional
Director, Timoteo A. Garcia; and LTO Butuan represented by Rosita G.
Sadiaga, its Registrar, petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF BUTUAN, represented in this case by Democrito D. Plaza II, City
Mayor,respondents.

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panglungsod ("SP") of Butuan, on 16 August 1992, passed SP

Ordinance No. 916-92 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-
for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and
Permit, and imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The
ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the
grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and
fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof.

Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that,
indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority
over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles
and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

The City of Butuan, represented by its City Mayor Democrito D. Plaza, with the trial
court a petition for "prohibition, mandamus, injunction with a prayer for preliminary
restraining order ex-parte" seeking the declaration of the validity of SP Ordinance
No. 962-93 and the prohibition of the registration of tricycles-for-hire and the
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof by the LTO.

The Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City held3 that the authority to register
tricycles, the grant of the corresponding franchise, the issuance of tricycle drivers'
license, and the collection of fees therefor had all been vested in the Local
Government Units ("LGUs"). Accordingly, it decreed the issuance of a permanent
writ of injunction against LTO, prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its
employees and other persons acting in its behalf, from (a) registering tricycles and
(b) issuing licenses to drivers of tricycles. The Court of Appeals, on appeal to it,
sustained the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether under the present set up the power of the Land Registration Office ("LTO")
to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof,
has likewise devolved to local government units.
HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Department of Transportation and Communications9 ("DOTC"), through the LTO

and the LTFRB, has since been tasked with implementing laws pertaining to land
transportation. The LTO is a line agency under the DOTC whose powers and
functions, pursuant to Article III, Section 4 (d) [1],10 of R.A. No. 4136, otherwise
known as Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as amended, deal primarily with the
registration of all motor vehicles and the licensing of drivers thereof. The LTFRB,
upon the other hand, is the governing body tasked by E.O. No. 202, dated 19 June
1987, to regulate the operation of public utility or "for hire" vehicles and to grant
franchises or certificates of public convenience ("CPC").11 Finely put, registration and
licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory
responsibilities had been vested in the LTFRB.

Under the Local Government Code, certain functions of the DOTC were transferred
to the LGUs, thusly:

Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. —

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, enact ordinances granting
franchises and authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, upon such
conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the city and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(VI) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation

and Communications, regulate the operation of tricycles and grant franchises
for the operation thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the city. (Emphasis
supplied).

The reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government
units, specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential.
Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of
sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by delegation
given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a
public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The
basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses
the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry
out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the
grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers
are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their
respective concepts, character, scopes and limitations.

To construe the tax provisions of Section 133(1) indistinctively would result in the
repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been
intended. If it were otherwise, the law could have just said so in Section 447 and 458
of Book III of the Local Government Code in the same manner that the specific
devolution of LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal
by implication is not favored.20 The power over tricycles granted under Section
458(8)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their
operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause
contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government Code
must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to
cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the
driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature,
exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to
achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the
competence of drivers prescribed by R.A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a
statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the
extant body of laws.21

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision which enjoins the Land Transportation Office
from requiring the due registration of tricycles and a license for the driving thereof is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 [G.R. No. 143076. June 10, 2003]

PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC.

(PHILRECA); AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(ANECO); ILOILO I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ILECO I); and
ISABELA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ISELCO I), petitioners, vs.
THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, respondents.

FACTS:
On May 23, 2000, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf
of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who are
members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA). Petitioner PHILRECA is an association of 119 electric cooperatives
throughout the country. Petitioners Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(ANECO), Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I) and Isabela I Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO I) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized
and existing under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and registered with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA).
From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by P.D.
No. 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National
Economic Council (now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA,
entered into six (6) loan agreements with the government of the United States of
America through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
with electric cooperatives, including petitioners ANECO, ILECO I and ISELCO I, as
beneficiaries. The six (6) loan agreements involved a total amount of approximately
US$86,000,000.00. These loan agreements are existing until today.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, as amended, and
the above-mentioned provision in the loan agreements, they are exempt from payment
of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local
Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly
withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code on the ground that the said provisions discriminate against them,
in violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they submit that the said provisions
are unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between the
Philippine Government and the United States Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to annul as unconstitutional
sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code be
granted?
HELD:
No.
We hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to
justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No.
269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as
amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in
at least two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by
R.A. No. 6938 and which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative
associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended.

a. Capital Contributions by Members

A cooperative under R.A. No. 6938 is defined as:

[A] duly registered association of persons with a common bond of interest, who
have voluntarily joined together to achieve a lawful common or social economic
end, making equitable contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair
share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking in accordance with universally
accepted cooperative principles.[10]

The classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane

to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local government
unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power by local
governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government unit is
granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its
broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing
powers of local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy.

Section 193 of the Local Government Code is indicative of the legislative intent to
vest broad taxing powers upon local government units and to limit exemptions from
local taxation to entities specifically provided therein. Section 193 provides:

Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this
Code.[24]

The above provision effectively withdraws exemptions from local taxation enjoyed
by various entities and organizations upon effectivity of the Local Government
Code except for a) local water districts; b) cooperatives duly registered under
R.A. No. 6938; and c) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions. Further, with respect to real property taxes, the Local Government Code
again specifically enumerates entities which are exempt therefrom and withdraws
exemptions enjoyed by all other entities upon the effectivity of the code. Thus, Section
234 provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment
of the real property tax:

(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof had been granted for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person;

(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,

nonprofit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes;

(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local
water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and
distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;

(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A.
No. 6938; and

(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.

Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all
government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of
this Code.[25]

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,[26] this Court held

that the limited and restrictive nature of the tax exemption privileges under the Local
Government Code is consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy of local
governments and the objective of the Local Government Code to grant genuine and
meaningful autonomy to enable local government units to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. The obvious intention of the law is to broaden the tax
base of local government units to assure them of substantial sources of revenue.
While we understand petitioners predicament brought about by the withdrawal of
their local tax exemption privileges under the Local Government Code, it is not the
province of this Court to go into the wisdom of legislative enactments. Courts can only
interpret laws. The principle of separation of powers prevents them from re-inventing
the laws.
Finally, Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code permit reasonable
classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply
equally to all members of the same class. Exemptions from local taxation, including
real property tax, are granted to all cooperatives covered by R.A. No. 6938 and such
exemptions exist for as long as the Local Government Code and the provisions therein
on local taxation remain good law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining order
heretofore issued is LIFTED.
G.R. No. 181845 August 4, 2009

THE CITY OF MANILA, LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as THE

TREASURER OF MANILA and JOSEPH SANTIAGO, in his capacity as the
CHIEF OF THE LICENSE DIVISION OF CITY OF MANILA, petitioners,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

Prior to 25 February 2000, respondent had been paying the City of Manila local
business tax only under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794,6 being expressly
exempted from the business tax under Section 21 of the same tax ordinance.
Pertinent provisions of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 provide:

Section 14. – Tax on Manufacturers, Assemblers and Other Processors. – There is

hereby imposed a graduated tax on manufacturers, assemblers, repackers,
processors, brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits,
and wines or manufacturers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, in
accordance with any of the following schedule:

xxxx

over ₱6,500,000.00 up to

₱25,000,000.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ₱36,000.00 plus 50% of 1%

in excess of ₱6,500,000.00

xxxx

Section 21. – Tax on Businesses Subject to the Excise, Value-Added or Percentage

Taxes under the NIRC. – On any of the following businesses and articles of
commerce subject to excise, value-added or percentage taxes under the National
Internal Revenue Code hereinafter referred to as NIRC, as amended, a tax of FIFTY
PERCENT (50%) of ONE PERCENT (1%) per annum on the gross sales or receipts
of the preceding calendar year is hereby imposed:

(A) On persons who sell goods and services in the course of trade or business; and
those who import goods whether for business or otherwise; as provided for in
Sections 100 to 103 of the NIRC as administered and determined by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the said Code.
 xxxx

(D) Excisable goods subject to VAT

(1) Distilled spirits

(2) Wines

xxxx

(8) Coal and coke

(9) Fermented liquor, brewers’ wholesale price, excluding the ad valorem tax

xxxx

PROVIDED, that all registered businesses in the City of Manila that are already
paying the aforementioned tax shall be exempted from payment thereof.

Petitioner City of Manila subsequently approved on 25 February 2000, Tax

Ordinance No. 7988,7 amending certain sections of Tax Ordinance No. 7794.
Petitioner City of Manila assessed respondent on the basis of Section 21 of Tax
Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by the aforementioned tax ordinances, for
deficiency local business taxes, penalties, and interest, in the total amount of
₱18,583,932.04, for the third and fourth quarters of the year 2000.

Respondent filed a protest with petitioner Toledo on the ground that the said
assessment amounted to double taxation, as respondent was taxed twice, i.e., under
Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by Tax Ordinances No.
7988 and No. 8011. Petitioner Toledo did not respond to the protest of respondent.

Consequently, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 47, an action for the cancellation of the assessment against respondent for
business taxes, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107088.

On 14 July 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision9 dismissing Civil Case No. 03-
107088. The CTA En Banc rendered its Decision on 18 January 2008, dismissing
the Petition for Review of petitioners and affirming the Resolutions dated 24 May
2007, 8 June 2007, and 26 July 2007 of the CTA First Division.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ENFORCEMENT OF [SECTION] 21 OF THE [TAX

ORDINANCE NO. 7794, AS AMENDED] CONSTITUTES DOUBLE TAXATION.

HELD:

Petitioners obstinately ignore the exempting proviso in Section 21 of Tax Ordinance

No. 7794, to their own detriment. Said exempting proviso was precisely included in
said section so as to avoid double taxation.
Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only
once; that is, "taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same
thing." It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once.
Otherwise described as "direct duplicate taxation," the two taxes must be imposed
on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority,
within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes must be of
the same kind or character.18

The Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the
taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are
being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter – the privilege of doing business in
the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose – to make persons conducting business
within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority
– petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction – within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods – per
calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character – a local business tax imposed
on gross sales or receipts of the business.

The distinction petitioners attempt to make between the taxes under Sections 14 and
21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 is specious. The Court revisits Section 143 of the
LGC, the very source of the power of municipalities and cities to impose a local
business tax, and to which any local business tax imposed by petitioner City of
Manila must conform. It is apparent from a perusal thereof that when a municipality
or city has already imposed a business tax on manufacturers, etc. of liquors, distilled
spirits, wines, and any other article of commerce, pursuant to Section 143(a) of the
LGC, said municipality or city may no longer subject the same manufacturers, etc. to
a business tax under Section 143(h) of the same Code. Section 143(h) may be
imposed only on businesses that are subject to excise tax, VAT, or percentage tax
under the NIRC, and that are "not otherwise specified in preceding paragraphs." In
the same way, businesses such as respondent’s, already subject to a local business
tax under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 [which is based on Section 143(a)
of the LGC], can no longer be made liable for local business tax under Section 21 of
the same Tax Ordinance [which is based on Section 143(h) of the LGC].

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is

hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31156 February 27, 1976

PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-

appellant,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN, LEYTE, THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, ET
AL., defendant appellees.

FACTS:

On February 14, 1963, the plaintiff-appellant, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the

Philippines, Inc., commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte for that court to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No.
2264.1otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an undue
delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27,
series of 1962, of the municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void.

On July 23, 1963, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, the material portions
of which state that, first, both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 embrace or cover the
same subject matter and the production tax rates imposed therein are practically the
same, and second, that on January 17, 1963, the acting Municipal Treasurer of
Tanauan, Leyte, as per his letter addressed to the Manager of the Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Plant in said municipality, sought to enforce compliance by the latter of the
provisions of said Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962.

On October 7, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered judgment

"dismissing the complaint and upholding the constitutionality of [Section 2, Republic
Act No. 2264] declaring Ordinance Nos. 23 and 27 legal and constitutional; ordering
the plaintiff to pay the taxes due under the oft the said Ordinances; and to pay the
costs."

From this judgment, the plaintiff Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which, in turn, elevated the case to Us pursuant to Section 31 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

ISSUE:

Do Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or

specific taxes?

HELD:

Undoubtedly, the taxing authority conferred on local governments under Section 2,

Republic Act No. 2264, is broad enough as to extend to almost "everything,
accepting those which are mentioned therein." As long as the text levied under the
authority of a city or municipal ordinance is not within the exceptions and limitations
in the law, the same comes within the ambit of the general rule, pursuant to the rules
of exclucion attehus and exceptio firmat regulum in cabisus non excepti 19 The
limitation applies, particularly, to the prohibition against municipalities and municipal
districts to impose "any percentage tax or other taxes in any form based thereon nor
impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline, under the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code." For purposes of this particular limitation, a
municipal ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between the amount of the tax and
the volume of sale of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void for being
outside the power of the municipality to enact. 20 But, the imposition of "a tax of one
centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity" on all
soft drinks produced or manufactured under Ordinance No. 27 does not partake of
the nature of a percentage tax on sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon.
The tax is levied on the produce (whether sold or not) and not on the sales. The
volume capacity of the taxpayer's production of soft drinks is considered solely for
purposes of determining the tax rate on the products, but there is not set ratio
between the volume of sales and the amount of the tax.21

Nor can the tax levied be treated as a specific tax. Specific taxes are those imposed
on specified articles, such as distilled spirits, wines, fermented liquors, products of
tobacco other than cigars and cigarettes, matches firecrackers, manufactured oils
and other fuels, coal, bunker fuel oil, diesel fuel oil, cinematographic films, playing
cards, saccharine, opium and other habit-forming drugs. 22 Soft drink is not one of
those specified.

ACCORDINGLY, the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264,

otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, as amended, is hereby upheld and
M@unicipal Ordinance No. 27 of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, series of 1962,
re-pealing Municipal Ordinance No. 23, same series, is hereby declared of valid and
legal effect. Costs against petitioner-appellant.
 [G.R. No. 118900. February 27, 2003]

JARDINE DAVIES INSURANCE BROKERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ERNA

ALIPOSA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 150 of the Makati
Regional Trial Court, CITY (previously Municipality) OF MAKATI and
ROLANDO M. CARLOS, in his capacity as Acting Treasurer of
Makati, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers, Inc., a duly-organized corporation
with principal place of business at No. 222 Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila, was assessed and billed by Makati the amount of P63,822.47 for taxes, fees
and charges under the ordinance for the second quarter of 1993. It was again billed
by respondent Makati the same amount for the third quarter of 1993 and the same
amount for the fourth quarter of 1993. Petitioner did not protest the assessment for its
quarterly business taxes for the second, third and fourth quarters of 1993 based on
said ordinance effective April 1, 1993. Petitioner, in fact, paid the said amounts on
April 26, 1993 (for the second quarter), July 12, 1993 (for the third quarter) and October
19, 1993 (for the fourth quarter), respectively, without any protest. Respondent Makati
issued the corresponding receipts in favor of petitioner.[6]
On January 30, 1994, petitioner wrote the municipal treasurer of Makati requesting
that respondent Makati compute its business tax liabilities in accordance with the
Metro Manila Revenue Code and not under the ordinance considering that said
ordinance was already declared by the DOJ null and void. Petitioner likewise
requested that respondent Makati credit the overpayment in the total amount of
P27,854.91 for the second to fourth quarters of 1993 against its 1994 liabilities for
1994, or in the alternative, for Makati to refund the said amount to petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint on March 7, 1994 with the RTC of Makati against
respondents Makati and its Acting Municipal Treasurer.
On August 29, 1994, the RTC issued an order granting the motion to dismiss of
respondent and ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court ruled that
plaintiffs cause of action, if any, had prescribed. Citing Sections 187 and 195 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the trial court ratiocinated that petitioner failed to file
an opposition or protest to the written notice of assessment of Makati for taxes, fees
and charges at rates provided for in the ordinance within 60 days from the notice of
said assessment as required by Section 195 of the Local Government Code. Hence,
petitioner was barred from demanding a refund of its payment or that it be credited for
said amounts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE

GROUND OF PENDENCY OF ANOTHER ACTION CONTESTING THE LEGALITY OR
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MAKATI REVENUE CODE IS STILL BEING
DETERMINED IN BRANCH 148 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI.
HELD:

The petition has no merit.

The Court agrees with petitioner that as a general precept, a taxpayer may file a
complaint assailing the validity of the ordinance and praying for a refund of its
perceived overpayments without first filing a protest to the payment of taxes due under
the ordinance. In this case, petitioner, relying on the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice in The Philippine Racing Club, Inc. v. Municipality of Makati case, posited in
its complaint that the ordinance which was the basis of respondent Makati for the
collection of taxes from petitioner was null and void. However, the Court agrees with
the contention of respondents that petitioner was proscribed from filing its complaint
with the RTC of Makati for the reason that petitioner failed to appeal to the Secretary
of Justice within 30 days from the effectivity date of the ordinance as mandated by
Section 187 of the Local Government Code which reads:

Sec. 187-Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings.- The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[14] we ruled that failure of a taxpayer to interpose the

requisite appeal to the Secretary of Justice is fatal to its complaint for a refund:

Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality
of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from
effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is
allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after
the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to seek relief in court. These three
separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a
competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this reason the courts construe these
provisions of statutes as mandatory.

Moreover, petitioner even paid without any protest the amounts of taxes assessed
by respondents Makati and Acting Treasurer as provided for in the ordinance.
Evidently, the complaint of petitioner with the Regional Trial Court was merely an
afterthought. In view of our foregoing disquisitions, the Court no longer deems it
necessary to resolve other issues posed by petitioner.
 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The order of the
Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint of petitioner is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-24813 April 28, 1969

DR. HERMENEGILDO SERAFICA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC
CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS, as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC
CITY, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Plaintiff, Dr. Hermenegildo Serafica, seeks a declaration of nullity of Ordinance No.

13, Series of 1964, of Ormoc City, imposing a "tax of five pesos (P5.00) for every
one thousand (1,000) board feet of lumber sold at Ormoc City by any person,
partnership, firm, association, corporation, or entities", pursuant to which the
Treasurer of said City levied on and collected from said plaintiff, as owner of the
Serafica Sawmill, the aggregate sum of P1,837.84, as tax on 367,568 board feet of
lumber sold, in said City, during the third quarter of 1964. After appropriate
proceedings, the lower court rendered judgment upholding the validity of said
ordinance and denying the relief prayed for by Dr. Serafica. Hence, this appeal by
the latter.

ISSUE/S:

(1.) the ordinance in question imposes, in effect, double taxation, because the
business of lumberyard is already regulated under said Charter and the sale of
lumber is "a mere incident to the business of lumber yard";

(2.) the tax imposed is "unfair, unjust, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive and
contrary to the principles of taxation";

(3.) "the public was not heard and given a chance to air its views" thereon.

HELD:

1. Suffice it to say that regulation and taxation are two different things, the first
being an exercise of police power, whereas the latter is not, apart from the
fact that double taxation is not prohibited in the Philippines.

2. Upon the fact that the tax in question is imposed regardless of the class of
lumber sold, although there are several categories thereof, commanding
different prices. Plaintiff has not proven, however, or even alleged the prices
corresponding to each category, so that, like the lower court, We have no
means to ascertain the accuracy of the conclusion drawn by him, and must,
accordingly, rely upon the presumption that the City Council had merely
 complied with its duty and that the ordinance is valid, unless and until the
contrary has been duly established.

3. The last objection is based upon Provincial Circular No. 24 of the Department
of Finance, dated March 31, 1960, suggesting that, "in the enactment of tax
ordinances .. under the Local Autonomy Act ... where practicable, public
hearings be held wherein the views of the public ... may be heard." This is,
however, a mere suggestion, compliance with which is not obligatory, so that
failure to act in accordance therewith can not and does not affect the validity
of the tax ordinance.

Indeed, since local governments are subject, not to the control, but merely to the
general supervision of the President, it is to say the least, doubtful that the latter
could have made compliance with said circular obligatory. 6

We have not overlooked the fact that, pursuant to Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 2264
as amended "no city, municipality or municipal district may levy or impose. Neither
have We overlooked the proviso in Sec. 2 of said Act prohibiting the imposition of
"any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon," for this
injunction is directed exclusively to "municipalities and municipal districts," and does
not apply to cities.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with
costs against plaintiff herein. It is so ordered.
HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF
HAGONOY, BULACAN, respondent.

FACTS:
On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an
ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28,[2] which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors
in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject
ordinance was posted from November 4-25, 1996.[3]
In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioners members were personally
given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in
January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioners President filed an appeal with
the Secretary of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner
claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance.
Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the ordinance took effect
on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by
law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioners appeal, made over a year later, was
already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out
of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October
1, 1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Unfortunately, its petition for review was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
for being formally deficient as it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the
assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal of the petitioner should be dismissed?
HELD:
We hold that the petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with
the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is Section 187
of the 1991 Local Government Code which provides:

SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for the approval of local tax
ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality
of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within
sixty (60) days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not
have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment
of the tax, fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days
after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of
Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings.

The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue

measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from
effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the
assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance
No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December
1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the
Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred. At this point, it
is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal
remedies before competent courts is not a mere technicality that can be easily brushed
aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory.[10] Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by
the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its
lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The
funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants
are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the
validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of
time.[11] Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality
of revenue measures and tax ordinances.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs.
G.R. No. 118233 December 10, 1999

ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P. OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGA-

SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN DRILON and
MAYOR JINGGOY ESTRADA (JOSE EJERCITO) OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated August 3, 1994 and its
resolution2 dated December 8, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32473. Said decision
dismissed the prohibition case brought by the petitioner against respondent officials
of the Municipality of San Juan to stop the enforcement of Tax Ordinance Nos. 87,
91, 95, 100 and 101.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax
ordinances as follows:

Ordinance No. Title

87 An ordinance imposing a
municipal tax of fifty percent (50%) of
one percent (1%) of the gross receipt
on business of printing and
publication

91 An ordinance imposing a transfer

tax equivalent to fifty percent (50%)
of one percent (1%) of the total
consideration on the sale, donation,
barter or any other mode of
transferring ownership or title of real
property situated in San Juan, Metro
Manila, or its fair market value,
whichever is higher

95 An ordinance imposing fifty

percent (50%) of one percent (1%)
 for social housing tax on the
assessed value of all real estate
property in San Juan, Metro Manila
in excess of P50,000.00 value as
provided in the New Urban Land
Reform Law, also known as R.A.
7279.

100 An ordinance imposing new

rates of business taxes of the
Municipality of San Juan Metro
Manila

101 An ordinance levying an annual

"Ad Valorem" tax on real property
and an additional tax accruing to the
special education fund (SEF)

On May 21, 1993, petitioners filed an appeal with the Department of Justice assailing
the constitutionality of these tax ordinances allegedly because they were
promulgated without previous public hearings thereby constituting deprivation of
property without due process of law.

On June 10, 1993, respondent Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal for having
been filed out of time. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Secretary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Secretary
of Justice who dismissed the prohibition suit, on the ground that it was filed out of
time?

HELD:

Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160, cited by respondent Secretary, provides as follows:

Sec. 187 — Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances

and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure
for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment
thereof: Provided further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days
from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such
appeal not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance
and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
 therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of
Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or
legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30
days from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeals, a period
also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary
does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to
seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as
a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods
are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial functions.5 For this reason the courts construct these provisions of statutes
as mandatory.6

A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The
power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance
and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of
peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. 7 Consequently, any delay in
implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this
reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time
frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of petitioners to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice within 30 days as required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to
their cause.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER
ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:

the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null
and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter
alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of
its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments
in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local governments.2

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that
the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for
the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-
compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified
true copy of the challenged decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional?

HELD:

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code,
but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not
pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He
did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was
illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of
control but of mere supervision.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act,
which provided in its Section 2 as follows:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its
passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided,
however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend
the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days
after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy,
and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of
such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a
period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may
either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an
appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax
ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be
considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not
reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the
suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.

That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise
of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of
control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this
Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under
Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of
the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact,
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with,
the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged

decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 166408 October 6, 2008

QUEZON CITY and THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,

vs.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, respondent.

Facts: Petitioner City Government of Quezon City is a local government unit duly organized and existing
by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.537, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of Quezon City.
Petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City is primarily responsible for the imposition and collection of
taxes within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City. ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install and
operate radio and television broadcasting stations in the Philippines under R.A. No.7966. ABS-CBN
had been paying local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. However, in view of the provision in R.A.
No. 9766 that it “shall pay a franchise tax x x x in lieu of all taxes,” the corporation developed the opinion
that it is not liable to pay the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. ABS-CBN filed a written claim
for refund for local franchise tax paid to Quezon City for 1996and for the first quarter of 1997. For failure
to obtain any response from the Quezon City Treasurer, ABS-CBN filed a complaint before the RTC in
Quezon City seeking the declaration of nullity of the imposition of local franchise tax by the City
Government of Quezon City for being unconstitutional. The RTC rendered judgment declaring as invalid
the imposition on and collection from ABS-CBN of local franchise tax and ordered the refund of all
payments made. The City of Quezon and its Treasurer filed a motion for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied by the RTC. Thus, appeal was made to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition of
Quezon City and its Treasurer. According to the appellate court, the issues raised were purely legal
questions cognizable only by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" indicated in the franchise of the respondent
appellee (Section 8 of RA 7966) serves to exempt it from the payment of the local franchise tax imposed
by the petitioners-appellants.

HELD: NO

The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in its franchise does not exempt ABS-CBN from payment of
local franchise tax.

The present controversy essentially boils down to a dispute between the inherent taxing power of
Congress and the delegated authority to tax of local governments under the 1987 Constitution and
effected under the LGC of 1991. Petitioners argue that the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in ABS-CBN's
franchise does not expressly exempt it from payment of local franchise tax. They contend that a tax
exemption cannot be created by mere implication and that one who claims tax exemptions must be able
to justify his claim by clearest grant of organic law or statute.

Taxes are what civilized people pay for civilized society. They are the lifeblood of the nation. Thus,
statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. A claim of tax exemption must be clearly shown and based on language in
law too plain to be mistaken. Otherwise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception. The
burden of proof rests upon the party claiming the exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the
exemption so claimed. The basis for the rule on strict construction to statutory provisions granting tax
exemptions or deductions is to minimize differential treatment and foster impartiality, fairness and
equality of treatment among taxpayers. He who claims an exemption from his share of common burden
must justify his claim that the legislature intended to exempt him by unmistakable terms. For exemptions
from taxation are not favored in law, nor are they presumed. They must be expressed in the clearest
and most unambiguous language and not left to mere implications. It has been held that "exemptions
are never presumed, the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to exemption and cannot
be made out of inference or implications but must be laid beyond reasonable doubt. In other words,
since taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be
expressed in clear and unambiguous terms.

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7966 imposes on ABS-CBN a franchise tax equivalent to three (3) percent of all
gross receipts of the radio/television business transacted under the franchise and the franchise tax shall
be "in lieu of all taxes" on the franchise or earnings thereof. The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in the
franchise of ABS-CBN does not expressly provide what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from. It is
not clear whether the exemption would include both local, whether municipal, city or provincial, and
national tax. What is clear is that ABS-CBN shall be liable to pay three (3) percent franchise tax and
income taxes under Title II of the NIRC. But whether the "in lieu of all taxes provision" would include
exemption from local tax is not unequivocal.

As adverted to earlier, the right to exemption from local franchise tax must be clearly established and
cannot be made out of inference or implications but must be laid beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, the
uncertainty in the "in lieu of all taxes" provision should be construed against ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN has
the burden to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. ABS-CBN miserably failed in
this regard.

ABS-CBN cites several cases to support its claim that that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause includes
exemption from all taxes. However, a review of the case laws reveals that the grantees' respective
franchises expressly exempt them from municipal and provincial taxes and ABS-CBN's franchise did
not embody an exemption similar to those cases. Too, the franchise failed to specify the taxing authority
from whose jurisdiction the taxing power is withheld, whether municipal, provincial, or national. In fine,
since ABS-CBN failed to justify its claim for exemption from local franchise tax, by a grant expressed in
terms "too plain to be mistaken" its claim for exemption for local franchise tax must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED

AND SET ASIDE. The petition in the trial court for refund of local franchise tax
is DISMISSED