CONSTI 2 FINALS CASE DOCTRINE REVIEWER
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
SEC 2
SJS v DDB
(mandatory drug testing; requirement of a valid search)
Facts: Petitions emerged assailing the constitutionality of RA 9165 of
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act insofar as it required the
mandatory drug testing of different persons.
On candidates for public office, the SC held that it was unconstitutional
because it added qualifications for senators beyond the mandate of the
constitution. On students of secondary and tertiary schools, constitutional
because schools and their administrators stand in locus parentis with their
students and have the duty to safeguard their health and well-being.(schools
have the right to impose conditions on applications for admission).On
employees of public and private offices, valid because of compelling state
interest. On persons charged, the SC held that the mandatory drug testing is
unconstitutional as the law’s mandate of randomness and suspicionless is not
present for the accused.
DOCTRINE: The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
randomness and suspicionless. As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art 3 of
the Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT
PEOPLE v. VELOSO (John Doe warrant, description personae)
Facts: Petitioner’s contention was, the search warrant indicated ―John Doe‖,
instead of ―Jose M. Veloso‖ and hence he shall not be apprehended.
The SC ruled that the search warrant was valid insofar as it described in
detail the premises, and the person, despite it having ―John Doe‖ as its name
DOCTRINE: A warrant for apprehension of a person whose true name is
unknown, by the name of John or Richard Doe, is void, without other and
further descriptions to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the
officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must contain the BEST description
personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended.
STONHILL v. DIOKNO (general warrants, rule on exclusion)
Facts: Officers of the government issued 42 search warrants against Stonehill
et al. and their corporations. The application alleged that the things to be
seized are books, records, vouchers, all adverted to be in relation to the
violation of the Central Bank Laws, RPC, Internal Revenue Code, and Tariff
and Customs Laws.
The SC ruled that the issued warrants were general and does not particularly
describe the things to be seized, much more the crime for which they were
alleged. The SC further exclaimed that it was possible for the judge, upon
probable cause, to issue warrants because of there was no particular crime
alleged.
As regards the first group, Stonehill et al have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from their personality, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.
DOCTRINE: Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
CENTRAL BANK v. MORFE (general pattern of business)
Petitionersextends financial assistance in the forms of loans. Central Bank
filed for a search warrant alleging that the Organization is engaging in illegal
banking activities without having first complied with the provisions RA 337.
The municipal judge granted such. Respondent judge, granted an injunction
against the previous order, reasoning that the warrant is roving commission
for not specifying specific transactions of specific persons.
Respondent reasoned out that since the complainant knows that the bank is
engaged in illegal activities, the warrant should have covered only the
specific illegal transactions of the Organization with specific persons. To
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authorize and seize all the records listed would be to harass the Organization,
and would be a roving commission or fishing expedition.
The SC ruled that the injunction must be lifted because it does not necessarily
mean that there is no personal knowledge by the witness if specific names
were not enumerated in the complaint. There is no law also which limits
search warrants to things which cannot be secured otherwise
An illegal banking transaction complaint must not always connote the
existence of a victim. The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might
perhaps be justified if the acts imputed to the Organization are isolated
transactions. However, such is not the case at bar. The records suggest clearly
that the transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of
the business of the Organization. 
 probable cause.
BACHE & CO v. RUIZ (depositions made by clerk)
Petitioners are assailing such warrant’s validity, because the judge did not
personally examine the complainant and his witness. The asked his clerk to
do the examination because he is hearing a case.
The examination of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, should
be conducted by the judge himself and not the others. Such personal
examination by the judge is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause
In the present case, NO personal examination at all was conducted by
respondent Judge of the complainant and his witness.
While it is true that the
complaint’s application for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form
deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter
did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly
be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause.
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR( judge not required to personally examine)
Soliven questions the manner in which the judge issued the warrant of arrest.
His understanding of Section 2 Article III was that judges should personally
examine the complainant and his witness.
The Court ruled that this was a wrong interpretation, as judges will be
burdened with examination and investigation if it were so. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
his witnesses.
DOCTRINE: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. Following established doctrines and procedure, he shall:
1.Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest or 

2.If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of


Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges will be unduly laden
with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

LIM SR. v. JUDGE (certification used by judge)
Information of murder was filed against respondent Lim with the Masbate
RTC. Lim filed a petition for change of venue. The records of the preliminary
investigation were still in Masbate when Judge Felix issued warrants of
arrest. There was no basis for him to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of probable cause.
The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by
the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper is the function of the
Prosecutor. 

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case
where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. Because of this, the Court ruled that constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied.
DOCTRINE: In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible
officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
and is subject to the Judge’s sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses
that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of
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arrest.
PEOPLE v. FRANCISO (different address of house)
SPO2 Teneros together with police officers conducted a search and seizure
operation in Apartment no. 120 of Annabelle Francisco. There they
confiscated several drug paraphernalia which was used as evidence in the
prosecution of Annabelle. The validity of the search is being questioned as it
conducted the search in a different place rather than that written in the
warrant (Apartment no. 122).
the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched is to the
end that no unreasonable search warrant and seizure may not be made and
abuses may not be committed. However, this is not without exception. A
description of the place is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted was invalid as the
officers, although familiar with the place to be searched, acted outside the
authority granted by the warrant.
DOCTRINE: The place to be searched, as set in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the
premises. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched
may properly be done only by the judge and only in the warrant itself. It
cannot be led to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search
MICROSOFT v. FARAJALLAH
Police officers went to the office of respondents to obtain information
regarding the said unauthorized use of Microsoft and adobe software. They
then filed for a search warrant and computers were seized containing copies
of software. RTC ruled that petitioner should have identified which specific
computer had the pirated software.
SC ruled that initial hearsay info. from confidential informant could serve as
a basis for the issuance of a search warrant since the officers were able to
verify the tip. Thus the requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant
and witness was satisfied in this case.
OGAYON v. PEOPLE
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
Members of the police went at Ogayon’s house. They found
shabuparaphernalia in the bathroom 5 meters away from his home. He
questions the validity of the warrant claiming it was defective for lack of
transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted examinations of applicant
and his witness.
SC ruled that failure to attach to the records the depositions of the
complainant/witness or transcript of the judge’s examination does not nullify
the warrant. However, in this case there is no record that the issuing judge
personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses. SPO4
Caritos was among those who conducted the surveillance but he was not the
one who applied for the warrant and he did not know who applied for it.
DOCTRINE: A search warrant is a nullity if there is no evidence that an
examination was made for the determination of a probable cause
MHP v. CA (boy scout, enough time to secure a warrant)
MHP Garments was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute
scout uniforms. Petitioner de Guzman, employee of MHP Garments, raided
respondents in their stores for selling scout uniforms without a search
warrant.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure was invalid. Such search and seizure
did not fall under any of the exceptions There was ample time for petitioners
to secure a judicial warrant but they deliberately failed to do so. There was
also no probably cause and the arrest was against the mandate of the LOI.
DOCTRINE: Under the Rules of Court, a warrantless search can only be
undertaken under the following circumstance: Sec. 12. Search incidental to a
lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
PEOPLE v. CFI (moving vehicle)
RASAC agents were informed of a shipment of highly dutiable goods from
Angeles City to Manila. When they spotted the car, the agents stopped them
for questioning and introduced themselves as RASAC agents. Hope and
Medina were brought to Camp Aguinaldo. In their presence and of agents of
BOC, BIR, and PC, a total of 11 boxes of highly dutiable watches and
bracelets were retrieved and seized. When a case was being filed against
them in violation of Tariff and customs laws, Hope and Medina contend that
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the evidence is inadmissible because there was no warrant.
The SC ruled that there are certain cases wherein a warrant may be
indispensable. One of those is the case at bar, the authorized agents were
simply performing their duties under the Tariff and Customs laws. Under the
law on Tariff and customs, authorized agents may enforce the law without
need of warrant.
DOCTRINE: ―Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and
seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.‖
ROAN v. GONZALES (custodial legis)
Gonzales issued a search warrant following the application of Quillosa. Two
days later, Roan’s house was searched and none of those listed articles were
seized; except when they discovered a revolver. Roan contends that the
search warrant is invalid because there were no depositions and the judge did
not follow rule 26 of the Rules of Court requiring personal examination.
The SC ruled that Gonzales did not conduct a personal examination on
Quillosa. In this case, Gonzales did not ask his own searching questions. And
limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant’s
deposition in writing and attach them to the record together with the affidavit
presented to him.
Seeing that there were defects in determination of probable cause, the warrant
is invalid. Following that, although the pistol is necessarily illegal, a valid
warrant is still required. Thus, the pistol and bullets were confiscated
illegally.
DOCTRINE: To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable
cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after
examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
PAPA v. MAGO (Bureau of Customs)
Facts: Alagao, head of the counter intelligence unit of Manila Police
Department, received information of illegal goods to be released in the
customs zone in the port of Manila. His team intercepted two trucks and
seized the goods inside. Respondent Mago claims that the seizure was
invalid.
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
The SC ruled that the seizure was legal as Manila Police Department is given
authority to conduct such search pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require warrant in the instant case.
DOCTRINE: The Code authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through, or search
any land, enclosure; warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house
and also to inspect search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.

PEOPLE v. LO HO WING (drug case-Hongkong)
Facts: Tia was recruited as a deep penetration agent by the Philippine
Constabulary to bust his co-accused. Peter Lo bought tin cans of tea bags
from a local store. The tea bags then contained meth. Upon their arrival in the
Philippines, their taxi cabs were searched by the officers without a valid
warrant.
The SC affirmed the warrantless search. SC held that a search of a moving
vehicle without a warrant is permissible because the vehicle can quickly
move out of the locality.
DOCTRINE: Warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought 

PEOPLE v. MALMSTEDT (bus to sagada)
The bus was searched during a checkpoint.Police officer asked for the
presentation of identification/passport but Malmstedt refused. He then
noticed a bulge on Malmstedt waist, which he asked to reveal. It contained
suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packaging tape. It was later
identified as hashish.
Malmstedt was asked to alight the bus, in his travel bags was found two teddy
bears. Inside the bears were also hashish.
The SC held that, as an exemption to the general rule, the warrantless search
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ALEEZAH GERTRUDE

is legal. He was caught in flagrante delicto. (also falls under search of a SC held that due to the circumstances surrounding the case, there being a
moving vehicle) coup, simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity and in the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces, courts in the
The Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was surrounding areas were obviously closed, a warrantless search is valid to
a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer 
 protect the society, government and its authorities.

Malmstedt was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A There was more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Under
crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully
flagrante delicto. 
 be dispensed with.

Under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for
officers to believe that the accused was then and there committing a crime. 

POSADAS v. CA
ANIAG v. COMELEC (gun ban, checkpoint)
Aniag then instructed his driver Arellano to deliver said firearms to Congress.
The car was searched in a PNP checkpoint. There the PNP found the firearms
and detained Arellano.

The petitioner was arrested for illegal possession of firearms. Police officers, SC ruled that since there was no reasonable or probable cause to search the
spotted petitioner Posadas carrying a ―buri‖ bag and they noticed him to be car, the search was illegal and violative of the right against unlawful searches
acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner Posadas, and identified and seizures. Arellano did not have the firearms tucked in his waist, nor did
themselves as members of the INP, which led for Posadas to flee but was the package evince that it contained firearms, and there was no unnatural
eventually caught. 
 reaction from Arellano when they flagged the car down.

The SC ruled that the arrest was valid, there being a probable cause as far as
his suspicious acts and bag was concerned. That even if the policemen did
not catch him in the act of the commission of the crime, probable cause is
present when they checked his bag.
The probable is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to
flee, there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to do inspection. It
is too much to require the police to only search the bag after obtaining a
warrant. 
 ―stop and frisk‖ where a ―warrant and seizure can be effected without
DOCTRINE: A peace officer or a private person may without a warrant
arrest a person: (1) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
PEOPLE v. DE GRACIA
The incidents of the present case took place during a coup d’etat . De Gracia
was arrested during a raid conducted by military officers. During said raid,
they found numerous ammunitions and explosives, which was confiscated.
DOCTRINE: An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to
if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission
of a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
MALACAT v. CA (fast moving eyes)
RTC ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a
necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer sees to obtain more
information.‖
SC held not a valid stop and frisk. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made –
the process cannot be reversed. Here, no valid in flagrante delicto preceding
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat a muslim,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed. Moving your eyes fast from side to side is not a

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crime.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and
frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police office’s experience
and surrounding conditions to warrant the belief that the person has weapons
concealed about him. 
 Vic Vargas, is charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. His car was
DOCTRINE: A stop and frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, in which a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; (2) the pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could be used against him.
PADILLA v. CA
The policeman’s warrantless arrest of the petitioner is justified under exigent
circumstances of hot pursuit because he just committed an offense of hit and
run and he was committing an offense of illegal possession of firearms in the
presence of the police. (caught in flagrante delicto)
The seizure of the revolver and rifle was justified because they were in plain
view. Warrantless search of a moving vehicle also applies.
PEOPLE v. ARUTA
Aruta was arrested and charged for transporting drugs. She was arrested right
after she was dropped off by a bus. Basically the respondent’s contention is
that the search is invalid, it being issued without probable cause and that
there was no warrant presented upon her arrest.
The SC ruled that the search and arrest was invalid. There was an absence of
probable cause (only the furtive finger of informant), there was no warrant of
arrest presented (hence the drugs recovered are inadmissible).
The search and seizure of the respondent’s bag would not be justified as
seizure of evidence in ―plain view‖. The marijuana was obviously not
immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the policemen had to request
the respondent to open her bag. 
 For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
Neither will it be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, as in the
instant case she was apprehended after going down the bus. She was literally
in the middle of the street. 

ASCUNCION v. CA
flagged down, where the authorities found a plastic packet of shabu in his
possession. He consented to the search of the vehicle. he operatives had to act
quickly. Since the Nissan car was already identified as that which sells shabu,
upon sight, the authorities do not have enough time to secure a search
warrant. 

Vic is assailing the admissibility of the evidence as the search was made
without warrant.
SC ruled that the shabu was admissible, for the reason that: he consented to
the search of his car, and that search of moving vehicles is one of the
exceptions that allow admissibility of evidence found through warrantless
searches.
DOCTRINE: No arrest, search, and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issue by competent judicial authority. However, this rule is not
absolute. One of the exceptions provided by law is that of a search in a
moving vehicle.
PEOPLE v. VALDEZ (plain view)
Law enforcers received a tip from an unidentified informant that a certain
Dela Cruz had cannabis planted near his nipa hut. They caught Dela Cruz and
took photos of him with the marijuana plants.Dela Cruz contended that there
was unlawful search because the records show that the law enforcers had
ample time to secure a search warrant.
SC held that ―plain view‖ doctrine cannot be applied, because it was evident
that the discovery of the cannabis was not inadvertent.
DOCTRINE: The seizure of evidence in ―plain view‖ applies only where the
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
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1.A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties 
 followed the requirements of a valid stop and frisk. Thus arrest without a
2.Theevidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have 
the
right to be where they are 
 DOCTRINE: In a stop and frisk, genuine reason must exist to warrant the
3.The evidence must be immediately apparent

PEOPLE v. CANTON (airport search)
Susan Canton was departing the country Upon entry, the metal detector
beeped, which lead to the attending employee to conduct a search on Susan.
There they found a bulge which turned out to be shabu. She appealed to the
SC, claiming that the arrest was not valid due to it being warrantless, and that
the search was invalid as well since it was not incidental to an arrest.
SC ruled that, the search and seizure was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
Susan’s arrest did not precede the search. 
 SC ruled as well that, Susan,
having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
The search conducted on Susan resulted in the discovery of the packages
containing shabu.
The search made pursuant to airport security procedure is not that of the
Terry search, which is only limited to weapons, as it also is a search for
prohibited materials or substances. 

The search was made in pursuant to a routine airport security procedure. This
constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures.
DOCTRINE: Ordinary constitutional protection against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures
ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE (stop and frisk)
Police officer saw Esquillo placing inside a plastic sachet in a cigarette case.
When the officers inquired about it, she tried to flee. She was caught and the
plastic containing shabu was confiscated. She argues that the arrest was
invalid.
SC: Regarding her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
distance, plain view doctrine was applied. During the search, the officers
warrant was valid.
belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons
or contraband concealed about him
LUZ v. PEOPLE
PO2 Alteza flagged down Luz for violating an ordinance because he is not
wearing a helmet. He invited Luz to the sub-station since it’s almost in front
of the place where Luz was flagged down. While issuing a ticket he noticed
Luz’s uneasy behavior and asked him to open the tin can which turned out to
be containing shabu. Luz claimed there was no lawful search and seizure
because there was no lawful arrest.
SC ruled that there was no valid arrest. First there was no intention for the
officer to arrest Luz, deprive him of his liberty or take him into custody. The
period inside the station was merely a waiting time.
DOCTRINE: NO valid arrest = NO valid search and seizure = items seized
during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.
DISINI v. SOJ
Section 12 that authorizes collection or recording of traffic data in real-time
is unconstitutional. Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities ―with
due cause‖ to collect or record data in real-time. The authority that this
Section gives is too sweeping and lacks restraint.

Section 14 that authorizes disclosure of computer data under a court-issued
warrant is constitutional because it follows the same process as subpoena,
and it envisions the enforcement of a duly-issued court warrant.
Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure and examination of computer
data under a court-issued warrant is constitutional because it merely
supplements existing laws on searches and seizures.
Section 19 that authorizes the DOJ to restrict or block access to suspected
Computer Data when it is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act is unconstitutional because the DOJ order cannot
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substitute a court warrant.
DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE
Dela Cruz was at the port. When He placed his bag on the x-ray scanning
machine, the operator saw a firearm inside the bag. The bag was then
inspected and Dela Cruz was charged with illegal possession of firearm. He
contends that there was no voluntary waiver against the warrantless search
because he knew that there was nothing incriminating in the bag.
SC held that port authorities are public persons because actions of port
personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-
related function. However, there is a reduced expectation of privacy when
coming into airports or ports of travel. The search conducted on petitioner’s
bag is valid. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of
probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of
reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through
ports or terminals
DOCTRINE: Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities,
although done without search warrants are not unreasonable per se. These are
done to safeguard and ensure the safety of the travelling public
LOPEZ v COMMISION ON CUSTOMS
Members of the police entered the hotel room of Velasco. Velasco was not
present at that time but a certain Mrs. Tomas Velasco allowed the police to
enter and volunteered to open the suitcase and luggage of Velasco. The police
did not search the room nor forcible opened the luggage. Respondents
contended that there was consent since Ibañes who appeared to be the wife of
Velasco voluntarily gave the documents and invited the officers to enter.
SC ruled that under the circumstances it can readily be concluded that there
was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for search warrant.
The officers in law cannot be blamed if they would act on appearances.
DOCTRINE: a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized as unreasonable and
offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. Immunity from
unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which may be waived either
expressly or impliedly.
PEOPLE v. DAMASO
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
The Court ruled that the warrantless search in his home was illegal. The
consent was given by a certain Luzviminda and Damaso’s maid, and not by
Damaso. The PC Officers had no right to invade Damaso’s home, especially
since Damaso was not around when this occurred. There is no evidence that
would establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper, or if it were
true, that Damaso had given her the authority to open his house in his
absence.
DOCTRINE: The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person
whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or
her behalf.
MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS v. NATIVIDAD (Rules of Court-
production of documents)
Material Distributors is contesting the orders issued by JudgeNatividad which
allowed for the production and inspection of books and documents by said
corporation. Material Distributors contend that the orders violate their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and guarantee of privacy of
communication and correspondence.
The SC ruled that courts, upon lawful order, may request the disclosure of
communications and correspondence. The provisions of Rule 21 pertain to a
civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution.
CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT (housing inspector)
A housing inspector conducted a routinary inspection of the building,
wherein Camara was living. Camara refused to allow the search by the
inspector because of lack of warrant. After a few more refusals, a complaint
by the inspector was charged against for violation of a lawful inspection.
Camara contends that such search is unconstitutional because it allows
warrantless search of a private property without probable cause.
The SC ruled that a warrantless search by the housing inspector is
unconstitutional. Because (1) it leaves the discretion to the inspector to
conduct the search without knowing whether there is proper authority, or the
lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search; and (2) that although public
safety may warrant it, it was not urged that the inspection programs could not
achieve their goal within the confines of a reasonable search warrant
requirement.
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HARVEY v. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO (pedophilia)
Harvey and Sherman contend the validity of the arrest and seizure made by
agents of CID for they were done without warrant.
Arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three months during which period their activities are
monitored
 was being committed, nor was there evidence that a crime has actually been
The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does
not extend to deportation proceedings.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported, that affair hearing be conducted.
Therefore, the seizure of the phot negatives and photographs without a
warrant were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest, therefore admissible in
evidence.
DOCTRINE: Deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action,
they are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings.
PEOPLE v. AMINUDIN (disembarking from ship)
PC officers received a tip that a certain IdelAminudin was on board the M/V
Wilcon and was carrying with him marijuana. He was only descending the
gangplank, and to all appearances he was like any of the other innocent
passengers. It was only when the informer pointed to him that he suddenly
became the suspect and subject to apprehension. The identification by the
informer was the probable cause.
 anchored on ideological base which compels repetition of the same acts of
SC ruled that his case did not fall under those exceptions wherein a
warrantless search was allowed. The PC officers knew all the details about
Idel: his name, the vessel he rode, hi arrival two days prior to its happening.
They had time to procure a search warrant and they could have convinced the
judge that there was probable cause but they didn’t. Moreover, the present
case presented no such urgency. The search was not incidental to a lawful
arrest as there was no warrant, and the warrantless arrest did not come under
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE v. BURGOS (seditious materials; arrested while plowing)
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
Masalmok made testimonies that Burgos is a member of the NPA who is in
possession of firearms. Police members, acting on the information, went to
the house of Burgos; he was plowing that time. They then arrested and seized
the firearms buried in house of Burgos. He was charged with illegal
possession in furtherance of subversion.
The SC ruled in favor of Burgos saying that at the time of the arrest no crime
committed.
At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any ―subversive‖
act for he was plowing his field 

DOCTRINE: It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An
essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or actually have
been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been
committed.
UMIL v. RAMOS (continuing offense)
the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that
within the contemplation of Sec. 5a Rule 113, Dural was committing an
offense when arrested, for being a member of the New People’s Army and
for subversion. 

Subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived as a continuing
offense. Unlike other so-called common offenses such murder, arson, etc.
which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
lawlessness and violence until the objective of overthrowing the government
is attained.
DOCTRINE: Given the ideological content of membership in the CCP/NPA
which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government,
one does not cease to be, or become less of a subversive, for purposes of
arrest even under confinement.
The absence of a judicial warrant is of no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces because such arrest is justified by the exigencies of the situation.
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GO v. CA (arrested without warrant six days after commission)
Go and Maguan nearly bumped each other. Go alighted from his car and shot
Maguan. A security guard was able to get a photo of the plate. When a
manhunt was launched against Go, he submitted himself to the Police station
6 days later and was then arrested. Go contends that he was unlawfully
arrested without warrant.
The SC ruled that the arrest was unlawful because: (1) it does not fall within
the exception of Sec 5(a) because the alleged offense was not committed in
the presence of the arresting officer; (2) in relation with 5(b), the offense does
not fall within the purview of ―just committed‖ and that since the information
was based on eyewitnesses, arresting officers had no personal knowledge.
Nonetheless, he is still guilty of murder based on the evidence presented.
PEOPLE v. MENGOTE (looking side to side)
An informant called the police about three suspicious looking persons in an
area in Tondo, Manila. Surveillance team was dispatched and upon seeing
two men who were ―looking side to side‖ and one man holding his abdomen,
officers approached them and identified themselves as policemen. They tried
to escape but because they were unable to, they were searched. The person
holding his abdomen turned out to be Mengote, in his possession a revolver
with live bullets was found. An information for violation of Illegal
Possession of Firearmswas filed.
SolGen stated that the case fell under one of a valid warrantless search. SC
ruled that it was not justified. There was no crime being committed / about to
be committed. Nor did the policemen have personal knowledge of the fact
that a crime had just been committed. Moreover,Mengote’s action of
―looking side to side‖ and holding his abdomen could not have created
reasonable suspicion to induce the law enforcers that Mengote committed an
offense.
DOCTRINE: A warrantless search cannot be justified if it does not fall
under Rule 113 Section 5 of the Rules of Court which states that a peace
officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1.When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense 
 held responsible of the shooting incident in the vicinity of the nightclub
2.When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
committed it 

3.When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment... 

MANALILI v. CA
Petitioner Manalili was charged of illegal possession of marijuana residue, a
prohibited drug. RTC convicted him, which was affirmed by the CA. Hence,
a petition was filed by Manalili, assailing the validity of the search and arrest.
SC ruled that the search was valid, as he was wandering with red eyes and
was swaying (he was high), hence there was probable cause for the
policemen to perform a stop-and-frisk search.
Besides him being high, the SC noted as well that Manalili essentially waived

the inadmissibility when he did not raise the violation of his right to a valid
search in the RTC. 

A valid waiver of right has the ff requirements:
1.Right to be waived existed 

2.Person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof 

3.He or she had an actual intention to relinquish that right
DOCTRINE: In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search
and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of such is rendered as
inadmissible evidence, being a ―fruit of the poisonous tree‖. But note, that
this right is not absolute. ex. Stop and frisk.
PEOPLE v. JAYSON
Jayson is being held as guilty of possession of unlicensed firearms, and is
where he works as a bouncer. He is contesting the validity of his arrest, it
being without a warrant.
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SC held that authorities possessed personal knowledge they being in the
crime scene shortly after the incident happened, so the warrantless arrest is
valid.
DOCTRINE: A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when: an offence has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
MICLAT v. PEOPLE
Police officers received an info about drug trading. So they went at the house
of Miclat. Thru a small opening in the curtain covered window, PO3 Antonio
peeped inside and saw Miclat arranging small plastic sachets believed to be
containing shabu. He gained entrance and told Miclat that he was a police.
Miclat voluntarily handed the shabu and was arrested after.
SC ruled that at the time of the petitioners arraignment there was no objection
raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. He actively participated in the trial
therefore is deemed to have waived any defect in his arrest.
Moreover, the accused was caught in flagrante delicto and the shabu found
falls within the ―plain view‖ doctrine.
DOCTRINE: Plain view doctrine applies when:
1.the law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an intrusion
2.the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
3.it is immediately apparent to the officer
PESTILLOS v. GENEROSO
An altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Generoso. Atty
called the police and pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. The
police ―invited‖ the petitioners in the Police station for investigation.
Petitioners argue that they were not lawfully arrested as they were merely
―invited‖ to the police station.
SC ruled that petitioners’ warrantless arrest was valid. In the case at hand the
offense has just been committed and the police have personal knowledge of
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
the facts that the persons to be arrested committed it. By the use of the word
―invited’ it is enough that the intention is to arrest. It is an authoritative
command. The police in this case had arrived at the scene of the crime in less
than one hour, it’s reasonable to conclude that they have personal knowledge
of the facts justifying petitioners warrantless arrest.
Reason for immediacy- as the time gap from the commission of the crime
widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to be contaminated and
subjected to external factors, interpretation and hearsay.
COMMENDIANTE v. PEOPLE
Police officers spotted at a distance of 10 meters and a speed of 30kp/hr two
men showing improper and unpleasant movements and one handing plastic
sachets to the other. They then introduced themselves as police officer and
arrested the two confiscating the sachets containing shabu. RTC ruled that the
warrantless search was valid invoking the plain view doctrine.
SC ruled that evidence is inadmissible as it was procured through an unlawful
search. The same should result in the acquittal. It is implausible to identify
the miniscule amounts of shabu from 10 meters. Moreover, no overt act could
properly have attributed to Commerciante to arouse suspicion of the officers.
The act standing around with a companion handing over something cannot be
considered as a criminal act.
HOMAR v. PEOPLE
Police officers saw Homar jaywalking. He was immediately accosted and
was told to use the pedestrian crossing. When Homar picked up something
from the ground this prompted the officers to frisk him. They found a knife
and shabu in his possession.Homar argue that the sahbu is inadmissible
because the arrest was unlawful. He was not committing any crime and no
criminal charge was filed against him. The sachet of shabu had nothing to do
with jaywalking.
SC ruled that no arrest preceded the search because they did not intend to
bring him under custody or restrain his liberty.The lack of intent was further
proven by the absence of criminal charges against him (he was not charged of
jaywalking). They merely accosted him and have no intent to arrest him.
Search is not subsequent to a lawful arrest therefore the shabu is inadmissible
in evidence.
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NOTE: the filing of a criminal charge is not required to prove a valid
warrantless arrest because the prosecution still has to prove the legality of the
warrantless arrest.
SEC 11
SEC 12
PEOPLE v. CAMAT
Camat and Del Rosario robbed Sinoy and Penalver, and in the occasion
thereof, killed Sinoy but Penalver survived. Del Rosario allegedly confessed
to the police his involvement in the crime. Camat and Del Rosario insist that
the lower court cannot rely on the extrajudicial confession of Del Rosario as a
basis for their conviction because such confession was obtained during
custodial investigation in violation of their constitutional rights.
The SC held that the lower court cannot rely on the extrajudicial confession
made as basis for the appellants’ conviction because there was no evidence
that it was made with the assistance of a counsel. However, the judgment of
conviction stands because the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt
of both
An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is
not admissible against his co-accused.
DOCTRINE: Even if the confession is gospel truth, if it was made without
the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA (Miranda rights)
Four cases are presented wherein in each of these cases, the defendant, while
in police custody, was questioned by authorities in intimidating situations.
None of these defendants was given full and effective warning of their right
to remain silent and right to counsel. Most were alleged to have waived such
rights even though they in fact did not.
SC reiterated that at the start of the custodial investigation or detention, the
defendants should have been informed of their rights. The SC also held that
waiver of such fundamental rights cannot be presumed.
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
DOCTRINE: When an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is
subjected to questioning,
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. After
such warnings have been given, the individual may knowingly waive these
rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and
until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
PEOPLE v. MALNGAN
Malngan confessed to the Barangay Chairman that she set her employers
house on fire. When Mercedita Mendoza asked she did the burning she
repeated what she confessed in the barangay hall. When interviewed by a
reporter from ABS-CBN she was heard by SFO4 Tulasan as having admitted
the crime. Tulasan likewise hear the same confession while watching tv
program ―True Crimes‖ by Gus Abelgas
When accused appellant was brought to the barangay hall she was already a
suspect. She was therefore under custodial investigation and the rights
guaranteed by Art.3 should have already been observed. Confession given to
the Barangay Chairman as well as the lighter found in her bag are
inadmissible.
The testimony to Mendoza recounting the admission is therefore admissible
in evidence.
Although the testimony of SFO4 Talusan is hearsay because he was not
present when Gus Abelgas interviewed the appellant it may be admitted in
evidence as an independently relevant statement to establish not the truth but
the tenor of the statement or fact
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statement, regardless of their
truth or falsity, the fact that such statement has been made is relevant.
Hearsay rule does not apply
DOCTRINE: the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigation do
not apply to those not elicited through questioning by police or their agents
but given in an ordinary manner where the accused verbally admits having
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committed the offense
PEOPLE v. LAUGA
Appellant argues that his confession to Banting, a bantaybayan was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer.
SC ruled that bantaybayan, are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level.Theduties and responsibilities delegated to a bantaybayan, to
conduct a custodial investigation has the color of a state-related function.
Thus, the evidence is inadmissible.
PEOPLE v. BOLANOS
When the police apprehended Bolanos, they found the firearm of the
deceased on the chair where Bolanos was seated. They boarded Bolanos in
the police vehicle to bring him to the police station. In the vehicle Bolanos
admitted that he killed the deceased when he was asked by the police. It was
clearly given without assistance of counsel as it was made while on board the
police vehicle.
SC ruled that being already under custodial investigation while on board the
police patrol jeep on the way to the police station where formal investigation
may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his
constitutional rights. Inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE v. LOVERIA
Loveria assails the manner in which he was identified by Driver Manzanero
at the headquarters of the PC, claiming violation of his constitutional right to
counsel.
Court held in Gamboa v. Cruz that in the police line-up conducted, it was
the complainant who was being investigated and who gave a statement to the
police while the accused was not questioned at all. Thus, the Court concluded
that the latter could not, during the line-up, invoke his right to counsel
because he was not under custodial interrogation. 

As in the Gamboa case, Loveria was not investigated when Manzanero
identified him in the police line-up. It was Manzanero who was being
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
questioned.Thus right to counsel was not violated.
DOCTRINE: During the Police line-up, accused cannot invoke his right to
counsel because he was not under custodial interrogation. (unless there are
questioning him that time.)
PEOPLE v. TAN
Lt. Santos then invited Tan in connection with the instant robbery and
homicide case. During their conversation, Tan allegedly gave an explicit
account of what actually transpired.
Lt. Carlos testifying: when he invited Tan to their headquarters, he had no
warrant for his arrest. He informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in
the instant case, but also in 2 other robbery cases.
In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he
admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed
confession to writing.
SC ruled that Tan wasn’t notified of his right to counsel nor afforded with
such.Tan’s constitutional rights were violated. Thus He should be acquitted
DOCTRINE: Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements:
1.it must be voluntary;
2.Made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. it must be express;
4.it must be in writing.
PEOPLE v. MACAM
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of
prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered a ―critical‖ stage
of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a
police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present
evidence regarding appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses
identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the
in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are
estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not
moved to quash the said information and therefore voluntarily submitted
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themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty
and participating in trial.
The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while
remaining outside the house served as a looked out.
Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. DaniloRoque and Ernesto
Roqueis guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of
the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.
Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes,
betamaxrewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA
Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry..22 gun and money.
TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE
In the case at hand, even if petitioner gave uncounseled written statement
regarding the anomaly in his branch (bank) he managed, (1) the questioning
was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal
affairs manager of the bank (2) he was not restrained nor arrested and cannot
be said to be under custodial investigation during the taking of the written
statement.
Right to counsel is applies only to admissions made in criminal investigation
but not to those made in administrative investigation. Admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE v. SUNGA (city legal officer)
The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of admission
before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty.
Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa. 
In the case at bar,
Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a
counsel, for the latter’s lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga’s rights,
he was virtually denied his right to counsel.
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a
lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a
simple perfunctory representation.
PEOPLE v. LUCERO
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
Atty. Peralta arrived on Lucero’s second day of detention and informed
Lucero of his constitutional rights. Lucero gave no reaction, but Atty. Peralta
believed Lucero understood. Atty. Peralta left for his friend’s wake when
interrogation started.
RTC convicted Lucero of robbery with homicide. The SC reversed, stating
that there was no substantial compliance with Lucero’s right to counsel. Atty.
Peralta was not present during the investigation, and it is most likely that
Lucero gave his confession under duress.
DOCTRINE: When the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not
mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel.
PEOPLE v. IBAÑEZ (duty of counsel to explain)
The SC ruled that Nabligas’ confession was not made with assistance of a
competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Go who acted in
Nabligas’ behalf, were provided by NBI, who was assigned despite Nabligas’
open declaration that he has a lawyer, Atty. Paglinawan.
Moreover, Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she assisted
him, and presented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. Nothing in
the records show that Atty. Go ascertained whether the confession of
Nabligas was voluntary, and whether he understood the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his
constitutional rights.

THIS is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial
investigation.

DOCTRINE: The court consistently held that for a confession to be
admissible, it must adhere to the ff: requirements: (b) Must be made with
assistance of a competent and independent counsel (preferably
confessant’s choice)
PEOPLE v. TALIMAN
Attorney Pardo was mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to the police
station upon invitation of police to assist accused during their custodial
investigation. Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the
commission of the crime.
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SC ruled that Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent
counsel for accused during their custodial investigation.
Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during custodial
investigation, still the defect was not cured. The Constitution expressly
provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel
This, accused-appellants did not do. CONFESSION OF TALIMAN IS
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
PEOPLE v. CALVO
Calvo contends that there was an irregularity when he made his extrajudicial
confession because Atty. Feraren advised him that if he really committed the
offense, it would be better for him to execute an Extra Judicial Confession;
otherwise if he will not execute an Extra Judicial Confession he might be
placed in a situation where the court will think that he fabricates the facts in
his confession.
SC ruled that a confession is not rendered involuntary merely because
defendant was told that he should tell the truth or that it would be better for
him to tell the truth. Telling the accused that it would be better for him to
speak or tell the truth does not furnish any Inducement, or a sufficient
inducement, to render objectionable a confession thereby obtained, unless
threats or promises are applied.
DOCTRINE:Confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four
fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in
writing.
PEOPLE v. LISING
Cochise and Beebom leave the Castanos residence riding a green lancer car.
They were killed. Confessions and extrajudicial statements were acquired
from each of the accused with counsel. The confessions of each person all
implicated each other in the commission of the crime.
SC held that as a rule, extrajudicial statements are admissible only against
their respective declarants. Such declaration may only be used as relevant
facts against the one who gave such declaration. The rule that extrajudicial
statements are evidence only against those who make it also has exceptions.
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
One such exception is the rule that where several extrajudicial statements had
been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have
been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the facts that the
statements are in all material respects identical, is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and admissible against others implicated.
DOCTRINE: Interlocking confessions – can be admissible as circumstantial
evidence against the person implicated therein to show the probability of the
latter’s participation in the crime
PEOPLE v. CHAVEZ
Chavez, with his mother voluntarily surrendered at the police station. Police
informed them of the consequences of executing written statement without
lawyer’s assistance but mother still gave statement. Chavez argued
admissibility of his mother’s statement because no lawyer informed her of the
consequences of her act of executing an affidavit
SC ruled that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer
must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a
custodial setting exist in this scenario. His Miranda rights were violated.
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST LYN MACEDA
Maceda has knowingly and voluntarily participated in the administrative
investigation conducted by Judge Falcotelo, by the OCA, and finally, by this
Court. The administrative investigation began as early as November 2010,
but it was only in Maceda’s Manifestation dated February 2012 that she
insisted on engaging the services of a legal counsel.Maceda’s request can no
longer be accommodated this far along into the proceedings. Being a court
employee and law student, Maceda is capable of understanding the charges
against her and adducing her defenses herself.
DOCTRINE: A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted
by counsel. Exclusionary ruleapplies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be
akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel,
The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees.
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GAMBOA v. JUDGE CRUZ
Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy and was detained in the Manila Precinct.
During the police-line up, Gamboa was identified by the complainant as a
companion in the crime of Robbery. After which, he was beingcharged
for such crime. In open court, instead of presenting evidence for the defense,
he filed a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence alleging that his
constitutional rights to counsel were violated.
The SC held that the right to counsel is only available during the start of the
investigation. It was observed that the police line-up was not a part of the
custodial inquest, and thus, not yet entitled to such right.
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation,
i.e. when the investigation officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused
PEOPLE v. ESCORDIAL
Here, Escordial was identified by Michelle in a show-up
andby others in a police line-up after his arrest. Having been made when
accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court
identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. (However since the
defense failed to bring the matter up it was deemed waived).
The Court however acquitted Escordial because his guilty was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: The court has thus ruled that any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that
matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as
evidence against him.
PEOPLE v. ORDOÑO
Accused went to the police station to confess that he committed the crime.
Police immediately conducted investigation and put the confession in writing.
Investigators however could not get the services of a lawyer to assist the
accused because there were no practicing lawyers in their remote area.
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
SC held that custodial investigation began when the accused voluntarily went
to the police station to confess and the police started asking questions. At
such point the right to counsel automatically attached to the accused. At that
stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing with the
interrogation. Their act of requesting the presence of the priest and mayor and
relatives of the accused to witness the confession did not cure the absence of
a lawyer during the investigation.Inadmissible in evidence.
Before the above-mentioned persons can appear 2 conditions must be met:
(1) counsel of the accused must be absent (2) a valid waiver must be
executed.
PEOPLE v. LINSANGAN
Linsangan alleges that when he signed the bills he was not assisted by
counsel therefore the bills are inadmissible as evidence. The Supreme Court
clarified that his conviction was not based on the P10 bills alone but on the
actual act of selling marijuana.
DOCTRINE: Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the
P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-
incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not
constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling
marijuana cigarettes.
PEOPLE v. ANG CHUNG KIT
The court held that the accused signature on the receipt of lists and items
confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that
he was then assisted by counsel (since merely unexplained possession of
drugs are punishable by law)
With regard to the Booking sheet and Arrest Report, when a person arrested
signed it he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any
incriminating circumstance. It is a police report and may be useful in charges
of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It cannot be a basis of a
judgment or conviction.
GUTING v. PEOPLE
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Guting, all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly
approached the police officers and told them that he had stabbed his
father.Guting appealed his conviction. He argues that his oral confession to
Torre &Macusi, without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in
evidence.
SC held that Guting was not under custodial investigation when he admitted,
without assistance of counsel, to the police that he stabbed his father to death.
His verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was
not elicited through questioning by the police authorities.He was arrested and
subjected to custodial investigation by the police officers only after his
confession.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime
Accused-appellant's declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae.
DOCTRINE: A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites
concur:
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise;
3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
MACASIRAY v. PEOPLE
Petitioners object the admissibility of their confessions on the ground that it
was given without assistance of counsel. RTC said it was inadmissible, CA
reversed.
SC ruled that Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is
formally offered. In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all
the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the
purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and
not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made
In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents when
they were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court,
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
petitioners did not waive objection to admissibility of the said documents by
their failure to object when these were marked, identified, and then
introduced during the trial.
SEC 13
RIGHT TO BAIL
YAP v. CA (excessive if equal to civil liability)
Yap was found guilty of ofEstafa. He filed for a motion to fix bail, to which
the OSG set at P5,500,000 – equivalent to the civil liability of Yap. He
contends that the amount fixed for bail is excessive, thus a violation of his
constitutional right against excessive bail.
SC held that indeed the amount fixed for bail is excessive and would render
the right to bail nugatory. However, the SC stated that courts have the
discretion to set the amount of bail at a certain amount for justified reasons.
In this case, Yap is a flight risk as admitted by him; hence, the amount of
P200,000 is reasonable enough to ensure the appearance of Yap during trial.
DOCTRINE: The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose
GOV’T HONKONG v. OLALIA (right to bail in extradition cases)
Muñoz is facing
criminal charges with the Government of Hong Kong.
When a petition for extradition was filed before the RTC, Munoz
applied for
bail. RTC granted bail. HK filed a motion to dismiss the grant.
SC explained that some jurisprudence dictate that bail applies solely to
criminal proceedings and since extradition proceedings are administrative
and does not render conviction or acquittal, such is not applicable. However,
due to international treaties and agreements the SC is bound to give
importance to the rights of the individual as extradition may entail a
deprivation of liberty.
Bail was allowed in deportation proceedings which are of the same situation
with extradition proceedings. both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.Likewise, Muñoz was
already deprived of his liberty for two years. He is entitled to bail. The SC set
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ALEEZAH GERTRUDE

a standard of ―clear and convincing evidence‖ for the courts to follow in
granting bail for extradition cases.
DOCTRINE: While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it entails
deprivation of liberty and the means employed to attain the purpose of
extradition is also ―the machinery of criminal law‖. A potential extraditee
may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the
length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such
right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Where,
however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. If there were no prohibition against
excessive bail, the right to bail becomes meaningless.
DOCTRINE: If the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered meaningless
by requiring such an excessive sum.

ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN The guidelines in the fixing of bail are as follows:

Enrile repeatedly forwarded his motions for bail but was perpetually denied 1.The ability of the accused to give bail; 

by the Sandiganbayan. Among others, he has indicated that the evidence was
not strong with regard his guilt, and that he is not a flight risk due to his 2.Nature of the offense; 

medical condition and his age.
3.Penalty for the offense charged; 

SC held that he must be granted the right to bail because of his health
condition. SC mentioned that the Sandiganbayan, in its denial of the motion
to bail, ignored the core purpose of bail, which is to secure the appearance of 4.Character and reputation of the accused; 

the accused. By denying bail, Sandiganbayan ignores the health issues faced
by Enrile which could be the purpose of a worse condition that might even 5.Health of the accused; 

prevent him to be present in the trial.
6. Character and strength of evidence; 

DOCTRINE: The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of
7.Probability of the accused appearing in trial; 

bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the 8.Forfeiture of other bonds; 

accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial 9.Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; 


EXCESSIVE BAIL 10.If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases 


DE LA CAMARA v. ENAGE (10 guidelines) SEC 14

Mayor De La Camara was arrested for his alleged participation in the killing PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
of laborers of the Tirador Logging Co.He filed a petition for bail. Respondent
Judge granted this and fixed the amount of bail at the excessive amount of US v. LULING
P1,195,200.

The SC held that Before conviction, every person is bailable except if

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Accused being a wharf watchman in the customs unlawfully solicit and
receive from Elord the sum of P100. He alleges that the provision Act No.
335 in so far as it requires accused to prove his innocence is unconstitutional.
―And evidence of such soliciting…shall be regarded as prima facie evidence
that such soliciting…was contrary to law and shall put upon the accuse the
burden of proving that such act was innocent and not with unlawful
intention”
SC held that in case of statutory crimes, no constitutional provision is
violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact/
facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guiltand that the burden is
shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such acts are
innocent and not committed with criminal intent
DOCTRINE: The state has the right to declare what acts are criminal, what
proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such acts are innocent and not done
with criminal intent
DUMLAO v. COMELEC
Dumlao, retired Governor of Nueva Vizcaya questions the first paragraph of
Sec 4 BP 52 which prohibits the running of retired elective official from
running the same office. Igot and Alfredo question another paragraph which
states that those charged (even not yet convicted) of crimes such as sedition,
rebellion etc. are also disqualified from running office.
The SC ruled that for the first paragraph, there is a rational basis for
classification hence making it valid. For the latter one, it is invalid because it
doesn’t differentiate between those convicted and just charged.
DOCTRINE: An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
heard.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
PEOPLE v. HOLGADO
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
During the trial the court asked the accused:― do you have an attorney or are
you going to plead guilty‖. The accused answered that he has no lawyer and
he will plead guilty.
SC ruled that in criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused
be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. It is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough
to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de officio if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
DOCTRINE: when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with:
1. inform the defendant his right to have attorney before being
arraigned;
2. the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must
assign attorney de officio to defend him; and
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the
court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
PEOPLE v. REGALA
The appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority because the information filed
against appellant did not allege the essential elementsof assault that the
accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an
agent of a person in authority.
Moreover, the fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence
of the prosecution without any objection on the part of the accused cannot
likewise cure the defect in the information so as to validly convict the
accused thereof; because to do so would be convicting the accused of a crime
not properly alleged in the body of the information in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
RELATIONSHIP
PEOPLE v. BEGINO
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In this case, apellantRemeiasBegino was found to be guilty of the crime of
rape the information states that the accused ―being the stepfather of AAA,
raped her when she was 8 years old‖.
SC ruled that what the prosecution proved was that the appellant was the
common law spouse of BB but it was not alleged in the Information.
Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the
same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating
circumstances.
It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against him and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is
charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although the
circumstance qualifying the offense was not alleged in the indictment on
which he was arraigned.
DOCTRINE: In a criminal prosecution, it is a fundamental rule that every
element of the crime charged must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to
properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense
DATE OF COMMISSION OF CRIME
PEOPLE v. CHING
In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes
occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face.
The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the
said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
through force and intimidation.
The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its
commission.
As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is
sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been
committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual
commission.
DOCTRINE: With respect to the date of the commission of the offense,
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically
provides that it is not necessary to state in the information the precise date the
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense,
and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near
as possible to the actual date of its commission.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
CONDE v. RIVERA
Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in
order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that
right. Because trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, it is unjust
to her and a detriment to the public.
By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have prepared the
case for a trial free from oppressive delays.
DOCTRINE: where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information,
or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL
MATEO JR. v. VILLALUZ
SC ruled that respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become
apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871 would be in the best
interest of justice, which he is bound to serve."
Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was
asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely
that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his
later declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted
on him.
DOCTRINE: Every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge. A judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons.
RIGHT TO PUBLIC TRIAL
IN RE OLIVER
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Petitioner appeared as a witness before a Michigan circuit judge who was
then conducting, in accordance with Michigan law, a "one-man grand jury"
investigation.
SC uphold petitioner's contention that the summary manner in which he had
been sentenced to jail in the secrecy of the grand jury chamber had deprived
him of his liberty without affording him the kind of notice, opportunity to
defend himself, and trial which the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
DOCTRINE: A criminal trial conducted in secret would violate the
procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
An accused is, at the very least, entitled to have his friends, relatives and
counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
TAMPAR v. USMAN
This case involves a dispute over the correct application the oath "yamin"
SC ruled that ―yamin‖ effectively deprives a litigant of his constitutional
right to due process. It denies a party his right to confront the witnesses
against him and to cross-examine them. It should have no place even in the
Special Rules of Procedure of the Shari'a courts of the country.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
CARREDO v. PEOPLE
The defense counsel claims that petitioner’s presence can no longer be
required as he already filed a written waiver of appearance.
SC ruled that in the present case petitioner only admits that he can be
identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence. He did not
unqualifiedly admit on open court that he is the very person named as
defendant in the case on trial. His admission is vague and far from
unqualified.
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
DOCTRINE: waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that
the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of
the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital
for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does
not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to
appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right
but not his duty or obligation to the court.
SEC 15 (HABEAS CORPUS)
SEC16
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
BINAY v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Binay contended that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed
in the OMB to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan
constituted a violation of his right to due process.
SC ruled that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject
cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and
later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the
delay.The prosecution is not bound by the findings of the (COA); it must rely
on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause. It
had to conduct its own review of the COA findings.The cases were
sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party
to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with
the administration of justice.
DOCTRINE: the right to a speedy disposition is violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for, or when without
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
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SEC 17
RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
US v. NAVARRO (rationale)
Article 483 of RPC states that “one who illegally detains another and
fails to give info on his whereabouts or does not prove that he set him at
liberty shall be punished.”
SC ruled that this provision has the effect of forcing a defendant to become
a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment.
DOCTRINE:No one is bound to criminate himself. Established on the
grounds of public policy and humanity — of policy, because if the party were
required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation
to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent
the extorting of confessions by duress.
US v. TAN TENG (substance emitted to prove STD)
Defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his
clothing and examined. The policeman took a portion of the substance
emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of
Science. Result showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
Defendant contended that the result was not admissible in evidence.
SC ruled that the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
as evidence, when it may be material.
DOCTRINE: An inspection of the bodily features by the court or by
witnesses, cannot violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill,
because it does not call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon
the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Evidence obtained in this way
from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself.
US v. ONG SIU HONG (discharge)
Accused was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. His
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
counsel avers that he was compelled to be a witness against himself.
SC ruled that to force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is
along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or
putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an
accused in his absence.
DOCTRINE:The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit
testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling
confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.
VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS (pregnancy test)
the court ordered Villaflorto submit her body to the examination of one or
two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not.
SC ruled that an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by
reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use
violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely
necessary.
BELTRAN v. SAMSON (writing)
Petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before
the fiscal and take the latter’s dictation in his own handwriting.
SC ruled that for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor it is the
removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that
the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier. Here the witness is compelled to write
and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist,
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CABAL v. KAPUNAN JR (forfeiture proceedings)
Maristela charged Manuel Cabal with ―corrupt practices‖. the committee
asked Cabal to take the witness stand and be a witness for Maristela. Cabal
refused and invoked his right against self-incrimination.
SC ruled that although said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question
that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner from his position.
The purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions (Anti-
Graft Law), which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a
public officer. Such for forfeiture is in the nature of a penalty. Proceedings
for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the
exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable.
DOCTRINE: The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish
evidence which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable
criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would
tend to expose him to a forfeiture.
This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness
against himself applied only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by
reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the
penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.
PASCUAL JR. v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS (revocation of
license)
Petitioner alleged that in t ruling to compel him to take the witness stand,
respondent failed to respect his constitutional right against self-incrimination,
since the administrative proceeding against him, could result in forfeiture or
loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character.
SC ruled that In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, respondent cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.
DOCTRINE: When a forfeiture proceeding while administrative in character
possesses a criminal or penal aspect, an accused cannot be compelled to take
the witness stand.
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
SEC 18 (POLITICAL BELIEFS, INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE)
SEC 19
CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT, EXCESSIVE
FINES
PEOPLE v. ESTOISTA (recommended executive clemency)
Defendant accidentally shot their laborer. Government alleged that he should
be prosecuted under RA 4 which imposes penalty of 5-10 years. Defendant
claims that this is cruel.
SC held that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying
firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions
which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness,
directly traceable to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons,
justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive.
PEOPLE v. ECHEGARAY (death penalty)
Death penalty is neither cruel, unjust or excessive.
SC ruled that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or lingering
death. It implies something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.
DOCTRINE: The constitutional exercise of the limited power to impose the
death penalty entails that:
1.Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous
2. Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition set in the death penalty bill
3. That congress in enacting this bill be motivated by ―compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.‖
CORPUZ v. PEOPLE
Here accused was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years
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and 2 months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of
7 years.
SC ruled that: There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the
range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against
property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the
value of money 80 years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify
the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation.
DOCTRINE: The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give
effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent
and purpose. Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the
Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty
emanates unconstitutional. It is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
SEC 20
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
LOZANO v. MARTINEZ (check)
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes.
SEC 21
ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
PEOPLE v. YLAGAN
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
A complaint for serious physical injuries was filed against Ylagan. Private
prosecutor, moved for the dismissal of the case. This was granted. Attorney
for defendant did not say anything about it. 11 days later, the provincial fiscal
filed another information in the same court, charging the same defendant with
the same offense. Defendant pleaded double jeopardy.
SC ruled there is double jeopardy. The rule on double jeopardy protects the
accused not against the peril of second punishment, BUT AGAINST being
tried again for the same offense.
If there was no such rule, the court said that the fortune, safety, and peace of
mind of the accused would be entirely at the mercy of the complainant who
might repeat the accusation anytime.
DOCTRINE: A defendant in a criminal procedure is in legal jeopardy when
placed on trial under the ff. circumstances:
○ In a court of competent jurisdiction
○ Upon a valid complaint or information
○ After he has been arraigned
○ After he has pleaded to the complaint or information
TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY
BULALONG v. PEOPLE
Bulaong and others were charged before the CFI Laguna with the crime of
rebellion.Another information was filed before the CFI Manila charging
Bulaong of the crime of subversion. The case for subversion is still pending
in the CFI Manila; while the case for rebellion has already been decided by
the CFI Laguna adversely against the accused.
SC ruled that the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only
where he was either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent. Such is not the
situation in this case. For accused has not been convicted or acquitted in the
case filed in the Court of First Instance against him for subversion. Neither
was the said case dismissed or terminated without his consent, for as stated, it
is still pending in said court
DOCTRINE: It is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense
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RULE ON SUPERVENING FACTS
MELO v. PEOPLE
Melo was charged in the CFI of Rizal, on December 27, with frustrated
homicide. Accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in
the evening of the same day Obillo died from his wounds. An amended
information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The
accused was alleging double jeopardy.
SC held that: This rule of identity does not apply, when the second offense
was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason
that there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused
was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person
dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him
twice in jeopardy.
PEOPLE v. BULING
Buling was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for having
inflicted wounds on Balaba, which according to the complaint would
"require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days‖. Accused
pleaded guilty. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully
served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated so the
Fiscal filed an information charging accused of serious physical injuries.
SC ruled: If the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on
Jan. 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was
made on Dec. 10, 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that
could be said to have developed since the filing of the original action.
For which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double
jeopardy.
DOCTRINE: Where there is no new supervening fact which changes the
character of the offense into one which was nonexistent at the time the first
case was filed, there can be no double jeopardy.
SAME OFFENSES
PEOPLE v. TIOZON
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to
separate prosecutions for violation of P.D. No. 1866 and violation of either
(Murder) or (Homicide) in the RPC
The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; stated otherwise, the rule
against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished
by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by
the Revised Penal Code.
DOCTRINE: where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of
the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
ORDINANCE AND STATUTE
PEOPLE v. RELOVA
Assistant City Fiscal filed before the City Court of Batangasan information
against Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1. The accused filed a
motion to dismiss the information on the ground of prescription. Granted. 14
days later, Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the CFI of
Batangas, another informationagainst Opulencia, this time for theft of
electric power under Article 308 of RPC. Opulencia pleads double jeopardy.
SC ruled that: Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry
relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between
the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while
the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the
acts which the accused is said to have committed. the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance
are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged
under a statute.
SEC 22
EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER
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PEOPLE v. FERRER (subversion act)
Congress passed the Anti-Subversion Act which Outlaws the Communist
Party of the Philippines. It punishes any person who ―knowingly and
willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes a member‖ of the
Party or other similar ―subversive organizations. SC ruled that it’s not a bill
of attainder.
The Anti-Subversion act does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines. The term ―Communist Party‖ is used solely for definitional
purposes (under section 4).
If the Anti-Subversion act really were a bill of attainder, then it would be
unnecessary to charge Communists in court. The fact remains that their guilt
still has to be judicially established. The statute specifically requires that the
membership must be knowing or active. Mere membership is not punishable,
there must be proof of direct participation in the organization’s unlawful
activities.
DOCTRINE: Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
VIRATA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (PCGG charter)
SC ruled that the PCGG Charter is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto
law. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
judicial trial. Nothing in the executive Orders can be reasonably construed as
a declaration of guilt. Also no punishment is inflicted by the EO. For both
civil and criminal cases covered by the PCGG, nothing has been altered in
terms of quantum of proof required for an adverse judgment against accused.
LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (jurisdiction of SB)
Accused claims that RA 8249 appears to have expanded the jurisdiction of
SB, and is an ex post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the
accused in the KuratongBaleleng case pending before SB. They further
argued that they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the SB, thus
violating their right to due process. SC ruled it’s not an ex post facto law.
Moreover, the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal
is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
DOCTRINE: An ex post facto law, generally prohibits restrospectivity of
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penal laws. RA 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Not being a penal law, retroactive application
ofthe statute cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP
SEC 1
CHILDREN OF FILIPINO fathers or mothers
TECSON v COMELEC (FPJ case, illegitimate son of a Filipino father)
The citizenship of Lorenzo Pou if acquired would extend to his son Allan
Poe, father of FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, the constitution during which FPJ
was born, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate
Paragraph (3)
CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Jose Ong filed an application for naturalization and took his oath of
allegiance in the PH. At the tie he took his oath Ong Jr. was a minor of 9
years old. His brother Emilio was recognized as a natural born Filipino
citizen.
SC ruled that: there is no dispute that respondent’s mother is a natural born
Filipina at the time of her marriage. To expect the respondent to elect
citizenship is unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was her mother
a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship from hismother not father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or notthe
respondent ―chose‖ to be a Filipino whe he came of age.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on the equal footing. They
were both considered as natural born citizens.
REPUBLIC v. SAGUN
Petitioner was born of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She did not
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elect Filipino citizen upon reaching the age of the majority. At the age of 33
she executed an oath of allegiance to PH. She applied for passport but was
denied bec. no annotation on her birth cert that she elected PH citizenship.
She then sought a judicial declaration of her election of PH citizenship. RTC
declared her a Filipino citizen.
SC ruled that it was erroneous for RTC to make a specific declaration of
respondent’s election of Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not
within the court’s competence.
Under the 1935 consti, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father unless upon
reaching the age of the majority, the child elected PH citizenship. 1973 and
1987 provision on election of citizenship cannot have a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship of those covered by the 1935
consti. If citizenship of a person was challenged in the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter.
Petitioner failed to comply with procedural requirements for a valid and
effective election of PH citizenship.
DOCTRINE: Under our laws there can be no action or proceeding for
judicial declaration of election of the citizenship of an individual
Paragraph (4)
SO v. REPUBLIC
So a Chinese citizen filed a petition for Naturalization. He presented two
witnesses.
SC ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were
competent to vouch for his good moral character and themselves possessed of
good moral character. The court was not convinced that they personally know
the petitioner well.
Moreover, since the petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, CA
473 will apply to him not RA 9139 even if it was already available at that
time.
DOCTRINE: In naturalization proceedings it is the burden of the applicant
to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral
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character of his witnesses who must be credible persons. Credible implies
that such a person must have a good standing in the community, honest and
upright and his word may be taken on its face value.
3 ways by which an alien may become a citizen through naturalization:
1. Administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139
2. Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 473
3. Legislative naturalization in the form of law enacted by Congress
bestowing PH citizenship to an alien
LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP
MAQUILING v COMELEC
Respondent was a natural born citizen who was naturalized as an American.
He applied for repatriation and took his oath of allegiance. His travel record
indicated that he has still been using his US passport.
SC ruled that the use of passport after renouncing one’s citizenship does not
divest Filipino Citizenship regained by repatriation but revokes the oath of
Renunciation required to run for office. By representing himself as an
American citizen, he voluntarily reverted to his status as a dual citizen.
DOCTRINE: renunciation requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of
foreign citizenship. US passport usage effectively negates an ―Affidavit of
renunciation‖.
SEC 2
BENGSON v. HRET
Cruz is a natural born citizen of PH. He enlisted on US Marine Corps and
took his oath of allegiance in the US. He reacquired his citizenship through
repatriation. Bengson contends that Cruz can no longer be considered as a
natural born citizen.
SC ruled that Cruz repatriation allows him to recover or return to his original
status before he lost his PH citizenship.
DAVID v. AGBAY
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David became a Canadian through naturalization. He filed an MLA over a
land in dispute. In the application he indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. He
then re acquired his Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225.Petitioner insist that
the courts should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in RA
9225.
SC ruled that the law makes a distinction between those natural born
Filipinos who became foreign citizen before and after the effectivity of RA
9225. Those who were naturalized in a foreign country shall be deemed to re-
acquire PH citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63. RA 9225 amends
CA 63 by doing away with the old law which takes away PH citizenship from
natural born Filipinos who became naturalized in a foreign country and
allowing dual citizenship (thus retained it).
While he reacquired his PH citizenship 6 months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar
as his dual citizenship status is concerned
POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC
Under international law foundlings are citizens. Generally accepted principles
of international law form part of the laws of the land. Hence there is a
generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born and a national of the country in which it is found.
SEC 4
REYES v. COMELEC
To reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the
law requires that she:
1. Take an oath of allegiance to the PH
2. Make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath. In this case there is no showing that respondent complied with
the requirements.
Moreover, her oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be
considered as an oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225.
SEC 5
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
AASJS-CALILUNG v. DATUMANONG
Petitioner contends that RA 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates the
constitutional provision which states that ―dual allegiance is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law‖
SC ruled that it would be premature for the judicial department to rule n
issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Congress was given a mandate to draft a
law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance.
On its face, the law does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship.
DOCTRINE: RA 9225 stayed cleared out of the problem of dual allegiance
and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country
ARTICLE V SUFFRAGE
SEC 1
SEC 2
MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
Petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of Overseas Absentee Voting Act
for violating the residency requirement in art 5 of consti. It allows for the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by mere execution of an affidavit expressing their intention to
return to PH.
SC ruled that the law was enacted pursuant to the constitutional mandate to
Congress to provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
Residence for election is used synonymously with domicile. The qualified
Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his
domicile in PH. He is presumed to have not lost his domicile by physical
absence from the country. His having become an immigrant or permanent
resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his
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intention to return to his domicile of origin.
NICOLAS-LEWIS v. COMELEC
COMELEC letter states that petitioners have no right to vote as absentee
voter owing to their lack of 1 year residence requirement prescribed by the
Constitution.
SC ruled that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA 9225)
requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the PH
first before they can exercise to vote. RA 9225 acknowledge that ―duals‖ are
granted the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter. Duals are
allowed to vote under the system of absentee voting.
KABATAAN PARTY LIST v. COMELEC
Petitioners are assailing that the biometrics validation requires additional
substantial qualification and is no different from the requirement of literacy
and property thus unconstitutional.
SC ruled that the requirement is not a qualification to the exercise to the right
of suffrage but a mere aspect of the registration procedure. Although one is a
―qualified elector‖ he must still comply with the registration procedure in
order to vote.
DOCTRINE: Qualification which is the possession of qualities, properties
legally necessary to make one eligible for office or to perform a public duty,
should be distinguished from registration which is the means by which a
person’s qualifications to vote is determined.
ARTICLE XII SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
SEC 1
POLICY TO REMOVE INEQUITIES
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v.
QUISUMBING (salary difference bet. Foreign and local hires)
In this case foreign hires are paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
SC ruled that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value.
It’s a principle that rest on fundamental notions of justice. There is no
evidence here that foreign hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively
than local hires. Both groups have similar function and responsibilities under
similar working condition. The point of hire classification is an invalid
classification
DOCTRINE: Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill,effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries. (equal pay for equal work)
SEC 3
LABOR
EAGLE SECURITY v. NLRC
SC ruled that NLRC acted correctly in ordering the two petitioners to jointly
and severally pay the wage and allowance increases to the security guards.
The joint and several liability of the contractor and principal is mandated by
the Labor Code to assure compliance with the provisions therein including
the statutory minimum wage.
The joint and several liability facilitates if not guarantees the payment of the
worker’s performance, thus giving workers ample protection as mandated by
the Constitution.
SEC 4
AGRARIAN REFORM
HACIENDA LUISITA v. PARC
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec 31 of RA 6657 in that it affords the
corporation the capacity to merely resort to stock distribution in lieu of actual
redistribution of agricultural land.
SC ruled that the words ―directly or collectively‖ found in Sec. 4 Art 13 of
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the constitution actually allows for the interpretation that ―collectively‖
means allowing indirect ownership of the land—in this case through stock-
through collective ownership by means of a workers’ cooperative. This law is
not executory hence RA 6657 a legislation needs to implement it.
SEC 9 URBAN LAND REFORM
Sec 10
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
MACASIANO v. NHA
Macasiano seeks to declare the Urban Development and Housing Act as
unconstitutional. He alleges that it serves as a drawback to his tasks and
duties regarding demolition of illegal structures.
SC ruled there is no actual case or controversy. (HAHAHA pahiya!)
PEOPLE v. LEACHON (just and humane manner)
According to the judge, conviction based on the Anti-Squatting law would be
unconstitutional because accused must be evicted in a humane manner, in
accordance with law—resettlement areas have to be established and the
accused consulted on such relocation first.
SC ruled that what is meant by ―humane manner‖ and ―in accordance with
law‖ is that accused be afforded due process. The Anti-Squatting law is
constitutional as it affords the alleged ―squatters‖ the opportunity to present
their case before a competent court.
SEC 17 (4)
BUDGET
CHR EMPLOYEES v. CHR (fiscal autonomy)
SC held that the ConCom had intended to grant the CHR the privilege of
having its approved annual appropriations automatically and regularly
released but nothing more. Fiscal autonomy means independence or freedom
regarding financial matters from outside control. It does not mean mere
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automatic and regular release of approved appropriations.
DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution expressly grants fiscal autonomy only
to the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions and the Office of the
Ombudsman.
SEC 18
POWERS OF THE CHR
CARINO v. CHR (no adjudicatory power, no contempt)
SC ruled that the CHR cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice or even
quasi-judicial bodies. It may only investigate and made fact findings as
regards claimed human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication.
SIMON v. CHR (no injunctive power)(see civil and political rights in the
case)
CHR issued an order directing the petitioner to stop demolishing the stores,
but petitioners carried out the demolition despite the said order. CHR directed
the petitioners to desist from further demolition with the warning that
violation of the said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.
SC ruled that the demolition of the stall does not fall within ―human right
violations involving civil and political rights.
On contempt powers, CHR is constitutionally authorized to ―adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof. The power to cite for contempt applies only to violations
of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to
carry out is investigatorial powers.
The “order to desist” is not investigatorial in character but adjudicative in
nature. CHR does not possess adjudicative power!
ARTICLE XIV EDUCATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS
CULTURE AND SPORTS
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SEC 1
QUALITY AND ACCESIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
DECS v. SAN DIEGO (failed NMAT thrice, power to regulate
admission)
SC ruled that the three flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be a
doctor. It is within the ambit of police power. The state has the right to ensure
that medical profession is not infiltrated with incompetents to whom the
patients may entrust their lives and health.
DOCTRINE: The right to quality education is not absolute. The constitution
also provides that ―every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course
of study subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements‖.
SEC 3
DUTY OF INSTITUTIONS
MIRIAM COLLEGE v. CA (obscene school paper)
Students published an obscene school paper. They were insisting that DECS
has jurisdiction over them and not the discipline board of the school and that
the Campus Journalism Act (RA 7079) which prohibits the expulsion or
suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles he haswritten
,shouldapply to them.
SC ruled that Art 14 of consti guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. Provisions of law should be construed in harmony with
those of the constitution. Thus the Campus journalism act should mean that
the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles
he has written except when such materially distrupt class work or involve
substantial disorder or invasion of right of others. Moreover, the power of to
suspend or expel is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
SEC 5
ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF “INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER
ALEEZAH GERTRUDE
LEARNING”
GARCIA v. FACULTY ADMISSION (denied admission to theology)
Loyola School of theology is a seminary for priesthood. They have no duty
on their part to admit her (or students) since the school has the discretion to
turn down even qualified applicants due to limitation of space, facilities,
professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations. What
a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right.
DOCTRINE: Institutions of higher learning enjoys academic freedom. It
decides for itself it aims and objectives and best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference and to determine for itself:
1.who may teach
2.what may be taught
3.how it shall be taught
4. and who may be admitted to study
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v. CA (freedom to give honors)
Petitioner is asking the court to compel her university to confer upon her
honors (cum laude) despite her failed subjects in architecture.
SC ruled that it is part of academic freedom for schools of learning to have
the discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in granting of honors for
purposes of graduation. Moreover, it is within the competence of universities
and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the
graduating students. It's discretion on academic matter may not be disturbed
by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Private
respondent should know the policies of the university and bound to comply
therewith.
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