Kimberly Independent Labor Union v.

Drilon

FACTS:
On June 30, 1986, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) executed by and between Kimberly-Clark
(Phils.), Inc., (Kimberly), a Philippine-registered corporation engaged in the manufacture, distribution,
sale and exportation of paper products, and United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union-Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization (UKCEO-PTGWO) expired.

Within the freedom period, on April 21, 1986, KILUSAN-OLALIA, then a newly-formed labor organization,
challenged the incumbency of UKCEO-PTGWO, by filing a petition for certification election with the
Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment (MOLE), Regional Office No. IV, Quezon City.

A certification election was subsequently conducted on July 1, 1986 with UKCEO-PTGWO winning by a
margin of 20 votes over KILUSAN-OLALIA. Remaining as uncounted were 64 challenged ballots cast by 64
casual workers whose regularization was in question. KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a protest.

On November 13, 1986, MOLE issued an Order stating, among others, that the casual workers not
performing janitorial and yard maintenance services had attained regular status on even date.

UKCEO-PTGWO was then declared as the exclusive bargaining representative of Kimberlys employees,
having garnered the highest number of votes in the certification election.

On March 16, 1987, KILUSAN-OLALIA filed with this Court a petition for certiorari which was docketed as
G.R. No. 77629 assailing the Order of the MOLE with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO).

During the pendency of G.R. No. 77629, Kimberly dismissed from service several employees and refused
to heed the workers grievances, impelling KILUSAN-OLALIA to stage a strike on May 17, 1987. Kimberly
filed an injunction case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which prompted the latter
to issue temporary restraining orders (TROs). The propriety of the issuance of the TROs was again
brought by KILUSAN-OLALIA to this Court via a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was
docketed as G.R. No. 78791.

G.R. Nos. 77629 and 78791 were eventually consolidated by this Court and decided on May 9, 1990. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in G.R. No. 77629:

1. Ordering the med-arbiter in Case No. R04-OD-M-4-15-86 to open and count the 64 challenged votes, and that the union with
the highest number of votes be thereafter declared as the duly elected certified bargaining representative of the regular
employees of KIMBERLY;

2. Ordering KIMBERLY to pay the workers who have been regularized their differential pay with respect to minimum wage, cost
of living allowance, 13th month pay, and benefits provided for under the applicable collective bargaining agreement from the
time they became regular employees.

All other aspects of the decision appealed from, which are not so modified or affected thereby, are hereby AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No. 77629 is hereby made permanent.

The petition filed in G.R. No. 78791 is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
xxxx

On the Decision of the Court dated May 9, 1990, KILUSAN-OLALIA and 76 individual complainants filed a motion for execution
with the DOLE (formerly MOLE). In an Order issued on June 29, 2000, the DOLE considered as physically impossible, and moot
and academic the opening and counting of the 64 challenged ballots because they could no longer be located despite diligent
efforts, and KILUSAN-OLALIA no longer actively participated when the company went through another CBA cycle. However, the
DOLE ordered the payment of the differential wages and other benefits of the regularized workers, to wit:

ACCORDINGLY, let a partial writ of execution issue to enforce payment of the sum of (sic) P576,510.57 to the 22 individual
workers listed in ANNEX A of Kimberlys Comment/Reply dated 31 October 1991 representing their differential pay with respect
to the minimum wage, cost of living allowance, 13th month pay and benefits provided under the applicable collective bargaining
agreement from the time they became regular employees as above-indicated.

Further, the Bureau of Working Conditions is hereby directed to submit, within twenty (20) days from receipt of this Order, a list
of workers who have been regularized and the corresponding benefits owing to them from the time they became regular
employees.

SO ORDERED.

Pursuant thereto, on August 1, 2000, the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) submitted its report
finding 47 out of the 76 complainants as entitled to be regularized.

Kimberly filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOLE Order as well as the BWC Report, arguing in the
main that the decision in G.R. Nos. 77629 and 78791 only pertained to casuals who had rendered one
year of service as of April 21, 1986, the filing date of KILUSAN-OLALIAs petition for certification election.
On December 6, 2000, however, the DOLE denied the motion, disposing of it as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by the COMPANY is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No further motion of the
same nature shall be entertained. Further, the Report of computation submitted by the Bureau of Working Conditions is hereby
APPROVED and made an integral part of this Order.

Let a writ of execution be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Kimberly, steadfast in its stand, filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62257 alleging that the employees who were dismissed due to the illegal
strike staged on May 17, 1987 (the subject of G.R. Nos. 149158-59) should not be awarded
regularization differentials.

On June 27, 2002, the CA dismissed Kimberlys petition, and disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion. The questioned orders dated June
29, 2000 and December 6, 2000 of the Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ISSUES:
1. The Court of Appeals committed serious error in affirming the ruling of the Secretary of Labor
that even casual employees who had not rendered one year of service were considered regular
employees, thereby nullifying and disregarding the Honorable Courts Decision dated May 9,
 1990 that only casual employees who had rendered at least one (1) year of service were
considered regular employees.
2. The Court of Appeals also gravely erred in upholding the ruling of Labor Secretary that persons
not party to the petition in G.R. No. 77629 were entitled to regularization differentials, thereby
amending the Honorable Courts decision.[4]

HELD:
Kimberly, in this case, contends that the reckoning point in determining who among its casual
employees are entitled to regularization should be April 21, 1986, the date KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a
petition for certification election to challenge the incumbency of UKCEO-PTGWO. It posits that in the
implementation of the May 9, 1990 Decision in G.R. No. 77629,[5] the DOLE should then exclude the
employees who had not rendered at least one (1) year of service from the said date.[6]

Kimberly also argues that the employees who are not parties in G.R. No. 77629 should not be included in
the implementation orders. For DOLE to declare this group of employees as regular and to order the
payment of differential pay to them is to amend a final and executory decision of this Court.[7]

We do not agree. In G.R. No. 77629, we ruled as follows:

The law [thus] provides for two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or
broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. The individual petitioners herein who
have been adjudged to be regular employees fall under the second category. These are the mechanics,
electricians, machinists, machine shop helpers, warehouse helpers, painters, carpenters, pipefitters
and masons. It is not disputed that these workers have been in the employ of KIMBERLY for more
than one year at the time of the filing of the petition for certification election by KILUSAN-OLALIA.

Owing to their length of service with the company, these workers became regular employees, by
operation of law, one year after they were employed by KIMBERLY through RANK. While the actual
regularization of these employees entails the mechanical act of issuing regular appointment papers and
compliance with such other operating procedures as may be adopted by the employer, it is more in
keeping with the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular employment attaches to
the casual worker on the day immediately after the end of his first year of service. To rule otherwise,
and to instead make their regularization dependent on the happening of some contingency or the
fulfillment of certain requirements, is to impose a burden on the employee which is not sanctioned by
law.

That the first stated position is the situation contemplated and sanctioned by law is further enhanced by
the absence of a statutory limitation before regular status can be acquired by a casual employee. The
law is explicit. As long as the employee has rendered at least one year of service, he becomes a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed. The law does not provide the
qualification that the employee must first be issued a regular appointment or must first be formally
declared as such before he can acquire a regular status. Obviously, where the law does not distinguish,
no distinction should be drawn.
Considering that an employee becomes regular with respect to the activity in which he is employed one
year after he is employed, the reckoning date for determining his regularization is his hiring date.
Therefore, it is error for petitioner Kimberly to claim that it is from April 21, 1986 that the one-year
period should be counted. While it is a fact that the issue of regularization came about only when
KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification election, the concerned employees attained regular
status by operation of law.[9]

Further, the grant of the benefit of regularization should not be limited to the employees who
questioned their status before the labor tribunal/court and asserted their rights; it should also extend to
those similarly situated.[10] There is, thus, no merit in petitioner's contention that only those who
presented their circumstances of employment to the courts are entitled to regularization.[11]

As to Kimberlys assertions that some of the employees were already recalled, reassigned or replaced by
the RANK Manpower Services, and that some did not return to work, the Court notes that these are
questions of fact. Basic is the rule that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised,[12] except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are
mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or
contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin,[13] which is not so in the instant case. The DOLE and
the appellate court herein are uniform in their findings.

Finally, oft-repeated is the rule that appellate courts accord the factual findings of the labor tribunal not
only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence,[14]unless there is showing that the
labor tribunal arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such nature as
to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[15] Likewise, the appellate court cannot
substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the labor tribunal in determining wherein lies the
weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.[16]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED DUE COURSE.

Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa-Pinagbuklod ng Manggawang Promo ng

Burlingame (LIKHA-PMPB) v. Burlingame Corporation

Facts:
LIKHA-PMB sought to represent all rank-and-file employees for the 70 employees of Burlingame
Corporation. The petition is filed with DOLE. The Burlingame Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the
petition as they aver that there was no employer-employee relationship. The corporation further
alleged that the petitioners are employees of F. Garil Manpower Services (F. Garil), a duly licensed
employment agency. Arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of employer-employee relationship. LIKHA-
PMPB filed an appeal before Secretary of Labor and Employment, which ordered the immediate conduct
of a certification election. MR was filed by the corporation but was denied. The corporation further
appealed to CA, and the CA reversed the decision of the Secretary of Labor. Thus, this petition before
SC.

Issue:
1. Whether there is an employer-employee relationship between Burlingame Corporation and
LIKHA-PMPB. Yes there is an employer-employee relationship.
 2. Whether F. Garil is an independent contractor (labor-only contractor). No, F. Garil is not an
independent contractor

Rationale
1. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d)
the employers power to control the employees conduct. The most important element is the
employers control of the employees conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done,
but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.

A perusal of the contractual stipulations between Burlingame and F. Garil shows that (1) F. Garil
provides with sufficient number of screened, tested and pre-selected personnel to Burlingame, (2) F.
Garil shall be the responsible in paying its workers, (3) It is expressly understood and agreed that the
worker(s) supplied shall be considered or treated as employee(s) of F. Garil. Consequently, there shall be
no employer-employee relationship between the worker(s) and the BURLINGAME CORPORATION and as
such, the F. Garil shall be responsible to the benefits mandated by law.(4) For and in consideration of
the service to be rendered, Burlingame shall pay P7,500 per month per worker on the basis of Eight (8)
hours work payable up-to-date, semi-monthly, every 15th and 30th of each calendar month.

However, the conduct of the said elements are proven as follows: (1) Although the hiring process was
done by F. Garil, the actual hiring itself was done through the deployment of personnel to
establishments by Burlingame., (2) The contract states that Burlingame would pay the workers through
F. Garil, stipulating that Burlingame shall pay F. Garil a certain sum per worker on the basis of eight-hour
work every 15th and 30th of each calendar month. This evinces the fact that F. Garil merely served as
conduit in the payment of wages to the deployed personnel. The interpretation would have been
different if the payment was for the job, project, or services rendered during the month and not on a
per worker basis. (3) The contract also provides that any personnel found to be inefficient, troublesome,
uncooperative and not observing the rules and regulations set forth by Burlingame shall be reported to
F. Garil and may be replaced upon request. Thus, the exercise of control and supervision by Burlingame
over workers supplied by F. Garil in order to establish the inefficient, troublesome, and uncooperative
nature of undesirable personnel. Also implied in the provision on replacement of personnel carried upon
request by Burlingame is the power to fire personnel. These are indications that F. Garil was not left
alone in the supervision and control of its alleged employees. Consequently, it can be concluded that F.
Garil was not an independent contractor since it did not carry a distinct business free from the control
and supervision of Burlingame.

It goes without saying that the contractual stipulation on the nonexistence of an employer-employee
relationship between Burlingame and the personnel provided by F. Garil has no legal effect.

2. According to a decided case, Job contracting is permissible only if the following conditions are
met: 1) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on
his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free
from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the
performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and 2) the contractor has substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other
materials which are necessary in the conduct of the business. Furthermore, Section 5 of the
DOLE Department Order No. 18-02, Series of 2002 provides that The contractor or sub-
contractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or
 service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or
subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the
principal; or the contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the
work of the contractual employee. As such, F. Garil is not an independent contractor due to the
following facts: (1) F. Garil does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials, to qualify as an
independent contractor. No proof was adduced to show F. Garil’s capitalization. (2) the work of
the promo-girls was directly related to the principal business or operation of Burlingame.
Marketing and selling of products is an essential activity to the main business of the principal,
and lastly (3) F. Garil did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of
its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and
supervision of its principal, Burlingame.

ORIENTAL TIN CAN LABOR UNION

VS
SECRETARY OF LABOR
294 SCRA 640
[August 28, 1998]

FACTS
 Company entered into CBA with OTCLU (Oriental Tin Can Labor Union). -248 rank
and file workers FFW to file a petition for certification election. However, this petition was
repudiated by waiver of 115 signatories who ratified the new CBA.
 OTCWU-FFW filed petition for certification election, accompanied by “authentic signatures” of
25% of employees.
 OTCLU filed motion for dismissal of the petition for certification election. It said the petition was
not endorsed by at least 25% as some of the employees allegedly withdrew their support.
 Company filed comment alleging that the new CBA was already ratified.
 OTCWU-FFW filed a reply, alleging that the employer has no legal personality to oppose petition
for certification election.
 DOLE issued certificate of registration of the CBA. It showed that the CBA between the OTCLU
and the company has the force and effect of law.
 OTCWU-FFW officers walked out of their jobs. The union filed notice of strike with
NCMB.grounded on alleged dismissal of union members/officers. Company directed the officers
to return to work. None of them did.
 Med-arbiter dismissed petition for certification election.
 OTCWU-FFW appealed to Sec of Labor. Pending appeal, they staged a strike. They prevented
free ingress and egress of non-striking employees, and vehicles. NLRC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.
 Labor Usec issued resolution granting the appeal and setting aside the order of Med-arbiter.
 After denial of their MFR, the company and OTCLU filed petitions for certiorari before SC.

ISSUE/S
1. WON the employer can challenge petitions for certification election
2. WON the DOLE correctly granted the petition for certification election
3. WON it is proper to dismiss a petition for certification election because a new CBA has already been
ratified.
4. WON the 25% support requirement has been met in this case

HELD
1. NO
 Certification elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the
legal personality to challenge the same.
 The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee representation activities
is when it has to file the petition for certification election because there is no existing CBA in the
unit and it was requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of Labor Code. After
filing the petition, the role of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. Company’s
interference in the certification election below by actively opposing the same is manifestly
uncalled-for and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends to establish a company union.

2. YES
 Since question of right of representation as between competing labor organizations in a
bargaining unit is imbued with public interest, law governs the choice of a collective
bargaining representative which shall be the duly certified agent of the employees concerned.
An official certification becomes necessary where the bargaining agent fails to present adequate
and reasonable proof of its majority authorization and where the employer demands it, or when
the employer honestly doubts the majority representation of several contending bargaining
groups. Article 255 of the Labor Code allows the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit to designate or select the labor organization which shall
be their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.
 The designation or selection of the bargaining representative without, however, going through
the process set out by law for the conduct of a certification election applies only when
representation is not in issue. There is no problem if a union is unanimously chosen by a
majority of the employees as their bargaining representative, but a question of representation
arising from the presence of more than one union in a bargaining unit aspiring to be the
employees’ representative, can only be resolved by holding a certification election under the
supervision of the proper government authority.

3. NO
 Petition for certification election was filed 28 days before expiration of existing CBA, well within
60-day period provided for.
 Filing of petition for certification election during 60-day freedom period gives rise to a
representation case that must be resolved even though a new CBA has been entered into within
that period. This is clearly provided for in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The reason behind this rule is obvious. A petition
for certification election is not necessary where the employees are one in their choice of a
representative in the bargaining process. Moreover, said provision manifests the intent of the
legislative authority to allow, if not encourage, the contending unions in a bargaining unit to
hold a certification election during the freedom period.

4. YES
  The support requirement is a mere technicality which should be employed in determining the
true will of the workers instead of frustrating the same.
 All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the holding of a certification
election should, therefore, be resolved by going through such procedure. It is judicially settled
that a certification election is the most effective and expeditious means of determining which
labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit.

SAMAHAN
VS
SEC OF LABOR (FILSYSTEMS)
290 SCRA 680
[June 5, 1998]

NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari assailing the resolution and order of respondent Secretary dismissing
petitioner’s petition for certification election

FACTS
 Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFILNAFLU-KMU) is a registered
labor union. It filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
private respondent Filsystems, Inc. Filsystems opposed the petition, questioning petitioner’s
status as a legitimate labor organization on the ground of lack of proof that its contract
of affiliation with NAFLU-KMU has been submitted to the Bureauof Labor Relations within 30
days from its execution.
 The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioner has no legal personality for failure
to submit its contract of affiliation on time. Petitioner appealed to respondent Secretary,
contending that, as an independently registered union, it has the right to file a petition for
certification election regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation.
 Another union, the Filsystems Workers Union, filed a petition for certification election. It was
granted, and FWU won. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss appeal as it has become
moot & academic. Petitioner opposes the motion to dismiss on the ground that the certification
election was void for having been held during the pendency of the appeal.

ISSUE/S
1. WON petitioner had legal personality to file the petition
ART. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. -In organized establishments, when
a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed
before the Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an
election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of
all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of
the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the
unit. When an election which provides for three or more choices results in no choice receiving a
majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions
 receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided, that the total number of votes for all
contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.

At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed.
(As amended by Section 23, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).

2. WON the appeal was rendered moot and academic

HELD
1. YES
Ratio Petitioner is an independently registered labor union. As a legitimate labor organization, its right
to file a petition for certification election cannot be questioned. Reasoning Petitioner’s failure to prove
its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU will, at most, result in an ineffective affiliation. Despite affiliation, the
local union remains the basic unit free to serve the interests of its members independently of the
federation.

2. NO
Ratio The certification election and the CBA are void for having occured during the pendency of an
unresolved representation case with the Secretary. Reasoning Petitioner seasonably appealed the
dismissal of its petition. The appeal stopped the holding of any certification election.

Disposition
Petition is granted.
A. Organized Establishment
RA 9481 Sec. 10. Article 256 of the Labor Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
“ART. 256. Representation Issue in Organized Establishments. -In organized establishments, when a
verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed by any
legitimate labor organization including a national union or federation which has already issued
a charter certificate to its local chapter participating in the certification election or a local chapter which
has been issued a charter certificate by the national union or federation before the Department of
Labor and Employment within the sixty (60)-day period before the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the
verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit.

(RA 9481 continued)

To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes.
The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more
choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be
conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided, That the
total number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes
cast. In cases where the petition was filed by a national union or federation, it shall not be required to
disclose the names of the local chapter’s officers and members.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed.

HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL vs. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her official capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment, and PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG ANAKPAWIS – HOLY
CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS)
G.R. No. 179146, 23 July 2013

FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng
Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS). Holy
Child Parochial School raised that members of private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is
not only a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees – as three (3) are vice-
principals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinators – but also a
combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven (27) are non-teaching
personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 24510 of the Labor Code, private
respondent is an illegitimate labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification
election The Med-Arbiter denied the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor
organization’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.

RULING:
No. Before, when the 1989 Rules was still in application, mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate
and duly registered labor organization from exercising its right to file a petition for certification election.
But then, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by Department Order No. 9, series of
1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989
Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate that the bargaining unit of
rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees – was removed.

Petitioner argued that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel in
private respondent due to the absence of mutuality of interest among its members, the petition for
certification election should have been dismissed on the ground that private respondent is not qualified
to file such petition for its failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of
which is the representation of an appropriate bargaining unit. The Supreme Court disagreed and said
that the concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the
concept of a bargaining unit.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer
like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the
Labor Code, as amended. To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of
registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked
collaterally.
TAKATA (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION V. BLR G.R. No. 196276

Topic: Labor Organization; Government Regulation; Requirements

FACTS:
1) Petitioner filed with the DOLE a Petition for Cancellation of the Certificate of Union Registration of
Respondent Samahang Lakas Manggagawa ng Takata (SALAMAT) on the ground that the latter is guilty
of misrepresentation, false statement and fraud with respect to the number of those who participated
in the organizational meeting, the adoption and ratification of its Constitution and By-Laws, and in the
election of its officers.
Ø contended that in the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting of respondent, only 68 attendees
signed the attendance sheet, and which number comprised only 17% of the total number of the
396 regular rank- and-file employees which respondent sought to represent, and hence,
respondent failed to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement.
Ø insisted that the document "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon" bore no signatures of the
alleged 119 union members; and that employees were not given sufficient information on the
documents they signed; that the document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was not
submitted at the time of the filing of respondent's application for union registration.
2) Respondent denied the charge and claimed that the 119 union members were more than the 20%
requirement for union registration. The document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi sa Unyon" which
it presented in its petition for certification election supported their claim of 119 members.
3) DOLE Regional Director granted the petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of
registration; finding that the 68 employees who attended the organizational meeting was obviously less
than 20% of the total number of 396 regular rank-and-file employees which respondent sought to
represent, hence, short of the union registration requirement.
4) BLR: reversed DOLE RD, finding that petitioner failed to prove that respondent deliberately and
maliciously misrepresented the number of rank-and-file employees; that the list of employees who
participated in the organizational meeting was a separate and distinct requirement from the list of the
names of members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit; and that there was
no requirement for signatures opposite the names of the union members.
5) CA affirmed the decision of the BLR.

ISSUES: WON respondent obtained the minimum required number of employees for purposes of
organization and registration.

RULING: YES. 119 (of 396) employees as union members is even beyond the 20% minimum
membership requirement.

Art. 234, Labor Code: Requirements of Registration. - A federation, national union or industry or trade
union center or an independent union shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights
and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration based on the following requirements:
a) Fifty pesos (P50.00)registration fee;
b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the
minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members comprising at least
twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial
reports; and
e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or
ratification, and the list of the members who participated in it."

And after the issuance of the certificate of registration, the labor organization's registration could be
assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and
239 of the Labor Code.

It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that the attendees in the organizational meeting
must comprise 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit. In fact, even the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code does not so provide. It is only under Article 234 (c) that requires the
names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the
employees’ membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated in the
organizational meeting. Indeed, Article 234 (b) and (c) provide for separate requirements, which must
be submitted for the union's registration, and which respondent did submit.

Here, the total number of employees in the bargaining unit was 396, and 20% of which was about 79.
Respondent submitted a document entitled "Pangalan ng Mga Kasapi ng Unyon" showing the names of
119 employees as union members, thus respondent sufficiently complied even beyond the 20%
minimum membership requirement. Respondent also submitted the attendance sheet of the
organizational meeting which contained the names and signatures of the 68 union members who
attended the meeting. Considering that there are 119 union members which are more than 20% of all
the employees of the bargaining unit, and since the law does not provide for the required number of
members to attend the organizational meeting, the 68 attendees which comprised at least the majority
of the 119 union members would already constitute a quorum for the meeting to proceed and to validly
ratify the Constitution and By-laws of the union. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner to contend
that grounds exist for the cancellation of respondent's union registration.

DISPOSITIVE: Respondent won.

DOCTRINE: It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that the attendees in the
organizational meeting must comprise 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit. It is only under
Article 234 (c) that requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all
the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement
pertains to the employees’ membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated in
the organizational meeting.

Bautista vs CA
GR No. 123375; February 28, 2005

FACTS:
  Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa MetropolitanWaterworks and
Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) is a union in the said public sector (MWSS) created and
registered pursuant to Executive Order No. 180.
 On May 7, 1993, a petition for election of officers was filed by Bonifacio de Guzman, former
auditor of KKMK-MWSS before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR);
 The BLR granted the petition and the Labor Organization Division of the Bureau shall supervise
the conduct of said elections;
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, led by its
president, Genaro Bautista, but was denied by BLR;
 An appeal was filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment where the order
of the BLR was assailed as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and without
jurisdiction, and so dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction;
 The then incumbent officers filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC,
QuezonCity, with the issuance of temporary restraining order, but the petition wasdismissed for
being insufficient in form and substance, and for want of genuine justiciable issue. The
resolution became final;
 However, on November 25, 1993, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer of Temporary Restrainin
g/Injunction was filed by Bautista, et al., before RTCQuezon City (Branch 87) to enjoin the
respondents (present officers, BLR, etc.) from proceeding with the election of officers scheduled
on December 2, 1993.The petition was granted;
 On December 2, 1993, the election proceeded in defiance to the order of the court. Hence, an
order was issued by the court to refrain from giving effect of the election and recognizing the
persons supposedly elected, and hereby ordering the latter to refrain from assuming office and
acting as officers of the KKMK-MWSS. The court subsequently issued a writ of preliminary
injunction;
 The case was re-raffled to Branch 220 of RTC Quezon. The respondents filed a Reiteration of
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift Writ Preliminary Injunction on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and that the injunction does not anymore served its purpose. The instant case was
dismissed;
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista, et al alleging that the RTC has jurisdiction
considering that the case before it is an action for prohibition, as a result of which, the said writ
was reinstated;
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents but was denied. Hence, they filed
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order, before the Court of Appeals;
 On October 9, 1995, a decision was rendered by the CA finding for the private respondents,
upholding that the BLR had jurisdiction over an intra-union dispute.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista, et al but the same was denied. Hence, a
petition for review on certiorari was now filed before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BLR has jurisdiction over the conduct of election of officers (intra-union conflict) of an
employee’s association in the public sector.

RULING:
The court ruled in the affirmative. It is quite clear from the provision of Article 226of the Labor Code
that BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. An intra-
union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, and an inter-union controversy or
dispute, one occurring or carried on between or among unions. The subject of the case at bar, which is
the election of the officers and members of the board of KMKK-MWSS, is, clearly, an intra-union conflict,
being within or inside a labor union. It is well within the powers of the BLR to act upon. Executive Order
No. 180 (1987), particularly Section 16 thereof, is completely lucid as to the settlement of disputes
involving government employees,

AIM v. AIM FACULTY ASSOC.

Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association
G.R. No. 207971
January 23, 2017

Facts:
Respondent AFA is a duly registered labor organization composed of members of the AIM faculty. AFA
filed a petition for certification election seeking to represent a bargaining unit in AIM consisting of forty
(40) faculty members. AIM opposed the petition, claiming that respondent's members are neither rank-
and-file nor supervisory, but rather, and managerial employees.

Subsequently, AIM filed a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration on

the grounds of misrepresentation in registration and that respondent is composed of managerial
employees who are prohibited from organizing as a union.

On the first case, the Med-Arbiter of DOLE denied the petition for certification election on the ground
that AIM's faculty members are managerial employees. This Order was appealed by respondent before
the SOLE who reversed the same. Meanwhile, in the second case, the Regional Director of DOLE granted
AIM's petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration and ordering its delisting from
the roster of legitimate labor organizations.

This Order was appealed by AFA before the BLR which reversed the same and ordered AFA's retention in
the roster of legitimate labor organization. AIM insists that the members of its tenure-track faculty are
managerial employees, and therefore, ineligible to join, assist or form a labor organization. It
ascribes grave abuse of discretion on SOLE for its rash conclusion that the members of said tenure-track
faculty are not managerial employees solely because the faculty's actions are still subject to evaluation,
review or final approval by the board of trustees (BOT).
AIM argues that the BOT does not manage the day-to-day affairs, nor the making and implementing of
policies of the Institute, as such functions are vested with the tenure-track faculty. The first case remains
pending before the Supreme Court via Certiorari. As to the second case, the CA affirmed the decision of
the BLR to retain AFA in the list of legitimate labor organizations. This decision is what’s being assailed in
this case.

Issues:
Whether or not the members of AIMFA are managerial employees.

Held:
The Supreme Court finds the employees to be managerial employees.
Article 212 of the Labor Code defines managerial employees as:
ART. 212. Definitions.
Managerial employee' is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively
recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical
in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the
above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.'

There are, therefore, two kinds of managerial employees under Art. 212 of the Labor Code. Those who
'lay down management policies', such as the Board of Trustees, and those who 'execute management
policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees'.

AIM was therefore correct in filing a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration.
Petitioner's sole ground for seeking cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration - that its
members are managerial employees and for this reason, its registration is thus a patent nullity for being
an absolute violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code which declares that managerial employees are
ineligible to join any labor organization --- is, in a sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of
misrepresentation for registering under the claim that its members are not managerial employees.
However, the issue of whether respondent's members are managerial employees is still pending
resolution in the first case. To avoid conflicting decisions, this case cannot be resolved until the first case
is first resolved.