Mendoza v.

Arrieta

G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by petitioner Edgardo
Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent rodolfosalazar, and a gravel and sand truck
owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven byfreddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap,
two separate Informations for recklessimprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against
Rodolfo Salazar and freddiemontoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver
Salazar of anyliability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar’s
jeepand petitioner’s car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by thetruck
driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not acomplainant against truck-
driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. Afterthe termination of the criminal cases,
petitioner filed a civil case against respondentssalazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car
as a result of the collision involvingtheir vehicles.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for damagesbased on quasi-delict
against private respondents

Held:

Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfully sustained Timbol’s
allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him,
wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively
participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action
against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error
when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that,
“When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the actor omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.” Timbol’s submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action of his right to file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of
Court, bars the institution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in
relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and different from the
civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is
required to be made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed against Timbol is not
barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent
civil action based on quasi-delict. But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil
liability co-exists withcriminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option
between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177
of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneouslyinstituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for separate

Application by the offended party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yieldsthe
conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against Salazar on culpacriminal and not
on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and interventionin the prosecution of the
criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liabilitycontinued to be involved in the criminal action
until its termination. Such being the case,there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to
file a separate civil action ashis action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case.Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioner’s car forconsidering that
the collision between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and drivenby Mendoza was the result of
the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven bymontoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at
fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to claimdamages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch
as petitioner's cause of action asagainst jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100
of the Revised penalcode, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with
Section3(c) which provides that, “Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the factfrom which the

Civil right arise did not exist

…”

Perez vs Pomar 2 Phil. 682 (1903)

March 12, 2016
FACTS

Perez filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint asking the Court to
determine the amount due him for services rendered as an interpreter for Pomar and for
judgement to be rendered in his favor.

Pomar, on his part, denied having sought the services of Perez, contending that, Perez
being his friend, he only accepted the services for they were rendered in a spontaneous,
voluntary and officious manner.

ISSUE

Whether or not consent has been given by the other party.

HELD
Yes. It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the parties for
the employment of the plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other innominate contract was
entered into, but whether the plaintiff’s services were solicited or whether they were
offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted
and made use of by the latter, there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of
services. This gives rise to the delegation upon the person benefited by the services to
make compensation thereof, since the bilateral obligation to render services as
interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services rendered is thereby
incurred.

As was held in the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1889, it stated
that “not only is there an express and tacit consent which produces real contract but there
is also a presumptive consent which is the basis of quasi-contracts this giving rise to the
multiple judicial relations which result in obligations for the delivery of a thing or the
rendition of a service.

Barredo vs Garcia and Almario

G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
Bocobo, J.

July 17, 2011

73 Phil 607
Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” killing 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit,
Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The
suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of
their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that
the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to
file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome
during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would
have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising
from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).
G.R. No. L-27239 August 20, 1986

ROYAL LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL
CORPORATION, respondents.

Regino Hermosisimo for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner and the National Shipyards and Steel Corporation (NASSCO) entered into a
written contract for the conversion of the M/V Sea Belle, into a passenger and cargo vessel for the
stipulated price of P121,980.00.1 NASSCO demanded the sum of P196,245.37 for the additional
work done on the ship, for which, Petitioner rejected the demand, claiming it had not authorized the
additional work in writing as required under Article 1724 of the Civil Code. The trial court sustained
NASSCO, and petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the court a quo, holding that the
said article was not applicable in the instant case as it referred only to structures on land and did not
include vessels.
ISSUE: The lone assignment of error is the refusal of the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1724 of
the Civil Code (Whether or not the refusal of the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1724 of the Civil
Code was correct)

RULING: There is no ambiguity in the language of Article 1724. Plainly, it refers to a structure or any
other work to be built on land by agreement between the contractor and the landowner. It cannot
apply to work done upon a vessel which is not erected on land or owned by a landowner. Hence, the
said article is not controlling in this case.

However, it does not follow that petitioner is absolved of liability for the work done upon its vessel
which, to repeat, it does not deny. Regarding this matter, the applicable rules are the general rules
on contracts.

A contract is a meeting of minds between the parties and is perfected by mere consent10 except in
the case of certain agreements like deposit, pledge and commodatum. 11 It may be entered into in
whatever form 12 save where the law requires a document or other special form as in the contract
enumerated in Article 1388 of the Civil Code. As a general rule , therefore, the contract may be oral
or written.

In the case at bar, the original contract of services was in writing. It does not follow, however, that all
supplements of that written contract should also be written.

In stipulating that "any modification, change and/or extra work" shall be "subject of another contract,"
the contracting parties did not necessarily or explicitly agree that the second contract should be in
writing. The second contract could be merely verbal, as in fact it was, and was binding on the parties
as long as it represented a meeting of minds between them.

We are satisfied with the finding of the Court of Appeals that Victorino Estrella and Steve Pierre were
sent by petitioner to the NASSCO shipyard in Mariveles while the M/V Sea Belle was being repaired
and that they represented said petitioner when they requested the extra work that was subsequently
done on the vessel.13 This second contract was not reduced to writing, but it was nonetheless as
binding between the parties as the first written contract.
Juntilla vs Fontanar Case Digest

Juntilla vs Fontanar

(136 SCRA 624)

Facts: Herein plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course from Danao City to
Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by driven by defendant Berfol Camoro and registered under the
franchise of Clemente Fontanar. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire
exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front
seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from
the injuries he suffered on his left arm, right thigh, and on his back.

Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu City.
Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the tire blow out was beyond their control, taking into
account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew
up.

Issue: Whether or not the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event?

Held: No. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver
or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach drivers not to overload
their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take
when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all tines.
LASAM VS. SMITH 45 PHIL 657

FACTS: The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San Fernando, La Union,
and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from one point to another in the
Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. Defendant undertook to trasnport the plaintiffs
from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the
automobile was operated by a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan,
the chauffeur allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver’s license, but had
some experience in driving. The car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in
Tagudin, when, according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in
the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of
about half kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep embankment. The automobile was
overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a
dislocated rib, but his wife, Joaquina, received serious injuries, among which was a compound
fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. She also suffered nervous breakdown from which she
has not fully recovered at the time of trial. The complaint was filed about a year and a half after and
alleges that the accident was due to defects in the automobile as well as to the incompetence and
negligence of the chauffeur. The trial court held, however, that the cause of action rests on the
defendant’s breach of the contract of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of the Civil
Code, and not article 1903, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of contract was
not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the defendant was liable in damages
ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in its findings that the breach of contract was not due to a fortuitous
event?
RULING: Yes. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability is the
contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely
and securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he
shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
“No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were
inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those
in which the obligation itself imposes such liability.”
As will be seen, some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of the obligor, or of his
employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. In the present case, this element is lacking. It
is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road
conditions which could have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused
either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso
fortuito.