Political Sludies (1987), XXXV, 239-255

Class and Nation: Problems of

Socialist Nationalism
J. J. SCHWARZMANTEL
University of Leeds

The strength of nationalism can be explained in terms of the malleability of the

concept of the nation, which can be defined in very different ways, with consequently
varying political implications. Socialism, in theory and practice, has had to respond
to the appeal and force of nationalism. One possible response has been t o take over
and develop a form of left-wing nationalism, and this is illustrated by examples taken
primarily from French socialist thought in the period before 1914. Such a form of
socialist nationalism has its strengths, both theoretical and practical; but it also
involves problems, notably the difficulty of maintaining the separation of a
nationalism of the left from a right-wing nationalism with its anti-socialist and anti-
democratic appeals.

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to re-examine from an historical and political
perspective the relationship between nationalism and socialism; to show, with
special reference to France, the development of an attempt to reconcile the two
through a position of ‘left nationalism’; and finally to give a brief indication of
the significance of such a position for contemporary socialism. ‘Left
nationalism’ or ‘socialist nationalism’ is here used to mean the socialist
development of a democratic or radical nationalism whose origins go back to
the French Revolution. Clearly, such democratic and socialist forms of
nationalism need to be distinguished from right-wing variants of the nationalist
idea. The multiplicity and variety of nationalisms is in itself of course no new
discovery. This article seeks to explain and develop further the political implica-
tions of the different types of nationalism, based on a broad distinction
between nationalisms of the left and those of the right.
There has been plenty of discussion and analysis of the relationship between
nationalism and socialism, particularly Marxist socialism.’ There has also been
I See, for example, H. B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism (London and New York, Monthly
Review Press, 1967); H. B. Davis, Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism (London and New
York, Monthly Review Press, 1978); I. Cummins, Marx, Engefs, and Nafional Movements
(London, Croom Helm, 1980); A. W. Wright, ‘Socialism and nationalism’, in L. Tivey (ed.), The
Nation-State(Oxford,Martin Robertson, 1981); M. Lowy, ‘Marxism and thenational question’, in
R. Blackburn (ed.), Revolution and Class Struggle: A Reader in Marxisf Politics (London,
Fontana, 1977); G. Haupt, M. Lbwy, CI. Weill, LesMarxisteset la Quesrion Nafionale, 1848-1914
(Paris, Maspero, 1974); R. Debray, ‘Marxism and the national question’, New Left Review, 105
(1977), 25-42.

0032-3217/87/02/0239-17/$03.00 0 1987 Political Studies

240 Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism

no lack of attention paid to the alleged deficiencies of socialist thought in

developing a theoretical response to the phenomenon of nationalism .2
However, such discussion is often pitched at too abstract a level, and may fail to
explain exactly why nationalism poses such problems for socialist thought and
for the practice of the socialist and working-class movement. The answer to this
question lies partly, it can be argued, in recognizing the strength and power of
nationalism. The force of nationalism and its ability to capture popular support
derive to a large extent from the flexibility or malleability of the nationalist
idea. The idea of ‘the nation’ can mean different things, and have varied
appeals, according to the way in which it is defined and its implications
developed.3 While the malleability of nationalism has been acknowledged, it
too has been recognized in somewhat abstract terms. It needs to be exemplified
and applied in particular cases, and the consequences of this malleability of
. ~ development of nationalist ideas in
nationalism need to be e ~ p l a i n e d The
France in the first half of the Third Republic (to 1914) clearly illustrates the
different types of nationalism. A nationalism of democratic and revolutionary
origin was there confronted with an anti-democratic nationalism. This latter
type of nationalism, a nationalism of the right, defined the nation in quite
different terms, and envisaged its unity and security as depending on the over-
throw of the democratic regime and its replacement by an authoritarian system.
Two forms of nationalism confronted each other, each appealing to a different
conceptualization of the n a t i ~ n . ~
The French case is exemplary not only in showing the adaptability or flexi-
bility of the nationalist idea. As far as socialist thought is concerned, there was
in the pre-1914 period a sustained debate amongst French socialists on the
question of the socialist attitude to the nation. This debate was in part a
response to the variegated nature of nationalism. It was also, however, an
attempt to reconcile some concept of socialist internationalism with an
acceptance of the reality and legitimacy of the nation-state, an attempt which
was vigorously challenged from some quarters of socialist (and especially
anarchist) thought. This debate has general implications for the whole theme of
nationalism and socialism. Within French socialism, an attempt was made to
develop a form of ‘left nationalism’. This attempt exemplifies a wider strand of
what one recent writer has called ‘an integration of class and national loyalty
which conflicted with prevailing nationalist sentiments’, an integration
involving ‘a view of the nation which does not deny class divisions but insists,
Notablyin thecourseof thediscussionoverT. Nairn, The Break-UpofBritain: CrisisandNeo-
Nationalism (2nd edition) (London, Verso, 1981) and his statement (p. 329) that ‘the theory o f ,
nationalism represents Marxism’s great historical failure’. For a critique of Nairn, see E. J .
Hobsbawrn, ‘On the “Break-up of Britain”’, New Leff Review, 105 (1977), 3-23.
For an excellent presentation of this point in the case of France, see C. Nicolet, L’idee
republicaineen France (1789-1924): Essaid’Histoirecritique(Paris,Gallimard, 1982), pp. 16-18.
Nicolet notes that ‘comme d’autres mots, Nation est donc, en matiere politique, un mot voyageur’.
See also R. Girardet, ‘Pour une introduction a I’histoire du nationalisme francais’, RevueFrayaise
de Science Politique, 8 (1958), 505-28.
A. D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1979), p. 4
and p. 13.
J . Droz, ‘Der Nationalismus der Linken und der Nationalismus der Rechten in Frankreich
(1871-1914)’, Historisehe Zeirschrift, 210 (1970), 1-13; M. RebCrioux, La republique radicale?
1898-1914(Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1975). p. 22, whereshe pointsout that each side in the Dreyfus
case was convinced that it alone was the true and only representative of the French nation.
 J. J . SCHWARZMANTEL 24 1

from a distinct class viewpoint, upon greater justice and equality between
classes’.6 Such a socialist nationalism has arisen at other times and in other
places than pre-First World War France. The French case sheds light on the
strengths and weaknesses of the more general position of left nationalism, and
thus contributes to the discussion of the whole question of the relationship
between socialism and nationalism.
Before explaining in more detail the different types of nationalism, two basic
points should be made, which are crucial to understanding the power of
nationalism in the modern world and the problems it posed for socialist thought
and practice. First, nationalism came into the world, so to speak, in an
explosive and revolutionary association with the democratic idea of popular
sovereignty. The conventional association of nationalism with right-wing ideas
brings with it the risk of neglecting the revolutionary origins of European
nationalism. Article 3 of the French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of
Man and Citizen stated that ‘sovereignty resides essentially in the nation’.’ This
idea may have received its earliest formulation in France, which was the first
country to witness its revolutionary impact. Yet everywhere throughout Europe
and, later on, well beyond Europe, the demand arose for the formation of
independent sovereign nation-states, for each nation (however defined) to have
its own democratically constituted state. At the time of the Revolution, to be
called ‘un patriote’ in France was synonymous with being a revolutionary, a
friend of the people. It meant being an enemy of the emigres and aristocrats
who from their position of exile attacked France and threatened the revolu-
tion.8 Nationalism, then, in France as elsewhere, was part of the revolutionary
tradition; the nation was defined in democratic terms, as consisting of the
whole people.’
Secondly, while both nationalism and socialism are doctrines of the modern
period, nationalism, historically speaking, preceded socialism. Socialism
developed in a world of nation-states where the legitimacy and apparent
‘naturalness’ of the nation-state as the basic political unit had already been
established. The prior existence of the nation-state as the context within which
the class struggle developed meant that patriotic loyalty to this national unit
was built up over a long period of time. Loyalty to the nation-state, the
emotional attachment to the nation and its history (the sentiment of
patriotism), the symbolic representation of the nation through the flag, the
national anthem and so on, and last but not least, the growing national
consciousness instilled through a common national educational system, all built
up the strength or grip of nationalism. Nationalism had established itself in
these ways before socialism with its idea of internationalism came on the
scene. Where the unity and independence of the nation-state had not yet been
achieved, socialists had to work out their attitude to nationalist movements
making such goals their priority.

6 J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1982).
p. 321.
J. Godechot (ed.), La Pensee Rkvolurionnaire en France et en Europe 1780-1799 (Paris, A.
Colin, 1964), p. 116.
8 T. Zeldin, France 1848-1945: Intellecr and Pride (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980),
p. 4.
9 Nicolet, L’idee republicaine, pp. 400-7.
242 Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism

Left and Right Nationalism

Nationalism can mean very different things, and have different political
implications, depending on how the concept of the nation is defined. Two
forms of nationalism, which bring out this diversity well, will be presented here.
They will be illustrated chiefly, though not exclusively, with reference to
France. First, there is a nationalism of the left with the following features. The
nation is defined as a democratic community. The concept of the nation refers
to the association of all citizens inhabiting a particular geographical area. This
community does indeed have its own distinguishing characteristics-a par-
ticular history, language, and culture. This particular history involves a
common past of resistance to oppression and tyranny, whether internal or
external t o the nation. In this perspective, the nation is the context within which
all citizens can participate in exercising their democratic rights and in that way
shape their own destiny. The idea of the nation is associated with the
democratic idea of popular sovereignty, and hence with democratic, that is
republican, institutions through which individual citizens can make their will
felt and their views known. Clearly, this concept of the nation is based on an
idea of consenf:it involves what Gellner has called a ‘voluntaristic’ as opposed
to a ‘cultural’ definition of the nation.I0 Such a voluntaristic definition of the
nation is explained by Gellner in the following terms:
A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers
of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the
members of the category firmly recognise certain mutual rights and duties to
each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition
of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not
the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that
category from non-members.lI
What this means in political terms is that the bond uniting a nation is the shared
recognition of individuals as having the ‘mutual rights and duties’ of citizen-
ship, exercised through a political structure of democratic institutions. These
individuals may indeed have a shared culture and language which distinguish
them from other national groups, but that is not the main point. The existence
of the nation depends on will or consent, the will to join together in a national
community which involves the protection and defence of democratic rights.
Such a definition of the nation is classically exemplified in Renan’s famous
(1882) definition of the nation as a ‘permanent plebiscite’. The nation,
according to Renan, presupposes a past, but its essential feature is ‘the agree-
ment, the clearly expressed wish to continue living together. A nation’s
existence is . . . a daily plebiscite’.12 In more general political terms, this
connection of the idea of nationalism with the theme of consent or will is the
foundation of the liberal idea of ‘national self-determination’. N o group can be
considered part of a nation unless it wishes to be part of that nation. If a group,
conscious of its identity and wishing to preserve it, wants to form its own

10 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 7.

Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 7.
I* R. Girardet (ed.), Le nationalisme francais 1871-1914 (Paris, A. Colin, 1966), p. 66.
 J. J. SCHWARZMANTEL 243

nation-state, then it should be free to d o so. Historically, such arguments were

deployed to claim, for example, that the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine
belonged to France, not Germany, in the period after the Franco-Prussian war.
Germany’s claim was couched in terms of language and race. The French claim,
by contrast, was defended in terms of will, choice, and consent: in the words of
Fustel de Coulanges,
the principle to which we adhere is that a population can be governed only
through institutions which it freely accepts, and furthermore that only
through its will and freely given consent must it form part of a state. That is
the principle of modern times.’)
In short, this is a form of nationalism that is both liberal and democratic. It is
liberal because it emphasizes the idea of choice and consent, and is also based
on the principle of individualism, one of the core values of 1iberali~m.l~ The
nation provides the geographical and political framework within which the
rights of the individual are secured, and for that reason (among others) the
autonomy and integrity of the nation need to be defended. Some of these issues
were raised in the debates on the Dreyfus case: the defenders of Dreyfus argued
that there was no contradiction between on the one hand a patriotic love of the
nation and desire to maintain its integrity, and on the other the desire to protect
the rights of the individual. This was because the very existence and cohesion of
the national unit depended on the preservation of individual rights and freedom
within the nation.15 This was the argument presented, for example, by the
socialist de Pressense in a lecture called L’ldee de Patrie (given on 9 February
1899), in which he claimed that the Dreyfusards were the true patriots.I6 This
was because the French nation owed its reputation and international influence
to its defence of the principles of the French Revolution. To deny those
principles by an act of injustice against an individual (Dreyfus) would lead to
the decline of the French nation and of the esteem in which it was held
throughout the world. The interests of justice, of preserving the rights of
individuals, and the interests of the nation and of patriotic love of that nation
went t0gether.I’ Such nationalism of the left was also democratic, because the
nation was the terrain within which popular sovereignty was exercised.
An entirely different form of nationalism can be called the nationalism of the
right. One initial important point of contrast can be made. All forms of
nationalism have an emotional or ‘affective’ element, which can be labelled
‘patriotism’ (love of one’s country) rather than ‘nationalism’. Patriotism, as
the term is used here, refers to a feeling of attachment to one’s native land, its
customs, traditions, and other features. Nationalism is more of an explicit

l3 Girardet (ed.), Le nationalisme francais, p. 65.

l4 A. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984),
p. 15.
I5 Cf. the argument presented by Durkheim in his pro-Dreyfusard commitment that individualism
was ‘henceforth the only system of beliefs which can ensure the moral unity of thecountry’. Quoted
in S . Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work(London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 1973), p. 342. See
also E. Durkheim. ‘Individualism and the intellectuals’, Political Siudies, XVll (1969). 14-30.
16 F. de Pressensk, L ’idee depatrie, conference faiie a Paris le 9fevrier 1899 (Paris, Librairie P.
Ollendorff, 1899).
1’ de Pressense. L’ideedepairie, p. 31.
244 Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism

doctrine than an emotional attitude. It provides a definition of what the nation

is, and on the basis of such a conceptualization of the nation seeks to show
reasons for its defence, and the relationship of the nation to other social and
political units. Nationalism need not be, and usually is not, incompatible with
patriotism. Yet it seeks t o go beyond the emotional feeling of patriotism.
There is a further distinction to be made, crucial to the understanding of the
difference between right- and left-wing nationalism. This is the distinction
between a rational and an irrational definition of the nation. Left-wing
nationalism is indeed emotional, or involves an emotional element. That does
not make it irrational. Right-wing nationalism defines the nation in terms of
mystical non-rational or irrational concepts, such as that of race, or blood, or
what Barres called ‘la terre et les morts’, the soil and the dead, anticipating Nazi
ideas of ‘Blut und Boden’.l* Indeed, this right-wing nationalism, to be more
fully explained below, developed as part of the ‘revolt against reason’ of the
latter part of the 19th century. Its concept of the nation was a ‘myth’, in Sorel’s
sense of the word, a body of images appealing to intuition alone. Such a myth
could not be proclaimed true or false; the important point to ask was whether it
was effective in stirring people to action. This irrational myth-like aspect of
right-wing nationalism reached its culmination in fascist and Nazi nationalism,
or manipulation of nationalism. It was Mussolini who declared, in a speech
given in Naples in October 1922, that
We have created a Myth, a Myth that is Faith, a passion. It does not need
to be a reality, it is a stimulus and a hope, belief and courage. Our myth is
the Nation, the grandeur of the Nation, which we will make a concrete
‘reality’.I9
By contrast, left-wing nationalism, whether in its democratic or its socialist
form, certainly had an emotional element, expressed in attachment to the
symbols of the nation, the flag or anthem. In the French case, this emotional
element expressed itself in attachment to the republic, in a view of the nation as
a democratic community to which citizens owed loyalty and which they must
love and be prepared to defend, if need be at the expense of their lives.20 This
was the message of a sentimental and emotional republican patriotism,
propagated in the textbooks of the secular schools of the Third Republic.2’ The
schoolteacher was supposed to instil into the young citizens of the republic a
‘religion of the fatherland’, which one of its most ardent propagators, the
education minister Paul Bert, defined as ‘a worship and love which is
passionate yet at the same time based on reason’.22 France was the land of
democracy and of the Revolution, the leading representative among nations of
I * For Barres’s ideas on ‘la terre et les morts’, see M. Barres, Sceneset Doctrinesdu Nationalisme
(Paris, Emile-Paul, 1902), especially pp. 8,IO. For a study emphasizing Barres’s links with later
fascist and Nazi theories, see R . Soucy, Fascism in France: the Case of Maurice Barres (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1972).
l 9 Quoted in J. J . Roth, The Cult of Violence: Sore1 and the Sorelians (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1980), p. 21 1.
2o Nicolet, L ’idee republicaine, especially Chapter 10.
21 J . and M. Ozouf, ‘Le theme du patriotisme dans les manuels primaires’, Le Mouvement
Social, 49 ( 1964), 5 -3 I .
22 Paul Bert, ‘De I’education civique’ (1882). in P. Barral (ed.), Les Fondateursdela Troisieme
Republique (Paris, A. Colin, 1968), p. 208.
 J . J. SCHWARZMANTEL 245

universal values of progress and democracy and also, in the republican perspec-
tive, of freedom from the reactionary grip of the Church. Therefore, the citizen
had, from childhood on, to be emotionally attached to the nation and aware of
its glorious past history.
However, the propagators of this republican patriotism insisted on its
rational and reasonable character. Such an attachment to one’s nation, seeing it
in terms of universal values, was emotional and ardent, but in no way
irrational. It was based or justified on the grounds of rational values, those of
democracy, liberalism, and individualism. This form of pahotism or love of
one’s country was distinguished by its adherents from an irrational ‘mystical
and blood-thirsty patriotism’, full of ideas of hate, aggression, revenge and
conquest. This latter form of patriotism was in no way in the tradition of the
French Revolution, but was nothing other than an ‘archaic chauvinism’, anti-
democratic and hence anti-republican, which wanted to replace the democratic
republic by authoritarian forms of r ~ l e . ~Exactly
3 the same distinction between
a rational, though emotional, patriotism and a patriotism of a mystical and
irrational sort was made by the socialist leader Jaures. His whole perspective, as
has been noted by Reberioux, depended on a rational approach to the concept
of the nation.24It was rational in that it sought to provide rationally defensible
reasons for love of one’s country and attachment to it, as opposed to blind
unreasoning patriotism (‘my country right or wrong’). Such reasons were
couched in terms of defending a national community which gave its citizens
certain advantages, primarily a structure of democratic rights and institutions
in which they could participate. The need to defend the nation was something
which had to be justified through argument and criticism; it could not be taken
for granted and accepted without question. In the course of a polemic against
the Radical leader Clemenceau, Jaures warned against any attempt ‘to let the
fatherland escape the control of reason and plunge it into the obscurity of
instinct’.25The nation could not and should not be defined in terms of race, nor
of instinct. Similarly Jaures ridiculed the attempts of those who wanted to
prevent any rational discussion of the concept of the nation and who tried to
‘define’ it as something which could not be analysed, but only adored in silence,
by prostration before the flag, as something sacred and divine.z6
We thus have a contrast between a rational nationalism, with an affective or
emotional element of patriotism, and an irrational ‘instinctual’ nationalism,
characteristic of the nationalism of the right. Clearly, this right-wing
nationalism was also anti-democratic and anti-republican. It offered an
authoritarian alternative to what it saw as the divisive and degenerate regime of
a democratic political system. This alternative could be couched in populist and
plebiscitary terms, which aimed at demagogically building up mass support for
a dictatorial movement. Clear examples of this were the Boulangist movement,
at least certain elements within it, and Barres’s combination of nationalism and

23 A. Aulard, Le Patriotisme selon la Revolution francaise (Paris, Edouard Cornely, 1904).

p. 11.
24 M. Reberioux, ‘Jaures el la Nation’, in Acres du Colloque ‘Jaures er la Nation’ (Toulouse,
Faculte des Lettres de Toulouse, 1965), p. 10.
25 Jean Jaures, Oeuvres, Pour la Paix “(edited by M. Bonnafous) (Paris, Rieder, 1931). p. 288.
26 Jean Jaures, ‘La Patrie de M. de Mun’, Oeuvres, Pour la Paix I / , pp. 349-53.
246 Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism

a populist pseudo-socialism aimed at the workers.27The means used to build up

such mass support included the use of racism, notably anti-Semitism, and the
identification of scapegoats (the Jew, the foreigner, in general the idea of ‘The
Other’) who were held responsible for the ills of the nation; their expulsion
would restore the harmony of the nation and ensure that its work and wealth
were used to benefit only those who were ‘really’ members of the nation.
Barres’s Nancy programme of 1898 is a good example of such a populist or even
‘socialist’ nationalism, claiming that only a purge of Jews and foreigners would
benefit all classes of France and solve the social problem.28 Such themes were
taken up by ‘le parti national’, a broad mass movement aiming at the over-
throw of the democratic republic. It is clear that such a form of populist and
authoritarian nationalism anticipated the more explosive combinations of
nationalism and ‘socialism’ which found expression in 20th-century fascism
and national-socialism.
As well as taking such populist or demagogic socialist forms, there existed
also a more traditionalist and less plebiscitarian type of right-wing nationalism.
This was typified by Maurras and the organization of the Action Frunfaise.
This offered a vision of a traditional hierarchy, presided over by the monarch,
in which the different groups of the community, organized on corporatist lines,
would coexist harmoniously, once the illusions of democratic equality and
individualism had been eradicated. What characterizes this form of right-wing
nationalism (and also, though to a lesser extent, the populist form treated
above) is its anti-progressivism. Progress, at least democratic progress, was
bad, and had brought with it the decline of the nation. There had been a Golden
Age of the nation, to which it should return in order t o preserve itself from
corruption and decay. According to Maurras, this Golden Age of France had
lasted until the evil days of 1789. Then the disastrous ideas of individualism and
democratic equality had erupted, destroying the Catholic national hierarchy of
pre-revolutionary France. Jews and Protestants had been the chief carriers of
these false ideas which had brought with them a century and more of
democratic decline for France.29
These ideas exemplify what a recent survey of theories and typologies of
nationalism has called ‘renewal nationalism’, seen as arising in nations which
have long been independent and sovereign nation-states, and wish to preserve
their threatened independence. In the words of A. D. Smith, those adhering to
this ‘renewal nationalism’ feel that the homogeneity and independence of the
nation are endangered; ‘the social dislocations produced by the onset of
capitalism, and later industrialism, combined with the rulers’ policies of
concessions and privileges for foreigners’ have paralysed the nation. There is
thus a need for national renewal and the ‘innovations felt to be necessary by
nationalists are legitimated in terms of an ideal pristine Golden Age, or ancient
model (Sparta), and the latter serves as a standard and goad against the

27 See Barres, Scenes et Doctrines du Nationalisme, and the discussion in 2.Sternhell, Maurice
Barrb el le Nationalismefranqais (Paris, A. Colin, 1972).
28 The 1898 Nancy programme is reprinted in Barres, Scenes et Doctrines du Nationalisme, pp.
429-40.
29 See M . Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism, and Catholicism:the Politicsof CharlesMaurrasand
French Catholics 1890-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), especially Chapter 2.
 J. J . SCHWARZMANTEL 247

lamentable present social divisions and political lethargy’.30 This renewal

would restore cohesion and harmony to the nation. Yet it could be achieved
only by an authoritarian leader who would incarnate the spirit and traditions of
the nation. This leader, whether plebiscitary demagogue or traditional
monarch, would represent the nation, but not in any democratic o r parlia-
mentary sense. He would embody the spirit of the people in a way superior to
the purely ‘numerical’ and inherently divisive way of parliamentary politics.
The idea of the nation would find expression in mystical and non-rational
entities such as blood, soil, tradition, race, common ancestry, the spirit of the
people. The national leader symbolized these entities, tolerating no opposition
or diversity. Such pluralism and dispersion would spell the ruin and downfall of
the
Finally, two other feature of right-wing nationalism should be noted, both
relating to international affairs and t o other nations. Right-wing nationalism
may have been socialistic or pseudo-socialistic in some of its forms, but it was
hostile to internationalism, whether of a socialist or of a liberal free-trade kind.
It denied that the nation-state would cease t o be the main focus of people’s
loyalty, and saw internationalism as a force of no strength or significance. The
national community had to be defended and its cohesion strengthened. While
this might mean paying attention to the lot of the less privileged members of the
national community, whatever ‘socialism’ this entailed was a strictly national
socialism, involving explicit opposition to doctrines of socialist inter-
nationalism. As Corradini wrote in his report to the first (Italian) Nationalist
Congress, held in Florence in December 1910, ‘We must drum it into the
workers’ heads that it is in their best interests t o maintain solidarity with their
employers and, above all, with their own country and to hell with solidarity
with their comrades in Paraguay or C ~ c h i n - C h i n a ’ . ~ ~
Secondly, related to this rejection of internationalism was a hostile attitude to
other nations in foreign affairs and international relations, a rejection of the
idea (so strong in 1848) of fraternity and peace between nations. This
opposition to the idea of pacifism involved acceptance of war as a means of
settling international conflicts, even a welcoming of war as a means of stirring
up patriotic feeling and national loyalty and of cementing national cohesion.
War, wrote Corradini, was ‘a means of creating an overwhelming and
inevitable reason for the need for national discipline’. The nationalists, he
wrote, proposed ‘a means of national redemption which we sum up, extremely
concisely, in the expression, “the need for war”’.33 Similarly, the French right-
wing nationalists welcomed force as a means for ‘La Revanche’ against
Germany: the ‘lost provinces’ of Alsace and Lorraine had to be recovered by
war. Everything must be done t o keep in French hearts and minds the memory

3” A. D. Smith, Theoriesof Naiionalism (London, Duckworth, 1971), pp. 224-5.

3’ This was the argument put forward in, for example, Maurras’s attack on the changing foreign
policy of the Republic in his book Kiel el Tanger, 1895-1905: La Republique franqaise devani
/’Europe (Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1913), and also in his L’Enqu@tesur la Monarchie
(2nd edition) (Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924). See also Barres’s arguments ‘Contre les
Etrangers’ in Scenes ei Doctrines du Nationalisme, pp. 457-77 and against Zola, pp. 40-43.
32 E. Corradini, ‘The principles of nationalism’, in A. Lyttelton (ed.), Iialian Fascisms, from
Pareio io Geniile (London, Jonathan Cape, 1973). p. 148.
33 Lyttelton, lialian Fascisms, p. 147.
248 Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism

of the wrong done to the French nation, to insist on the need to restore French
honour, and to build up the standing army to prepare for the eventuality of war
with Thus a definition of the nation couched in terms of race,
tradition, blood and the soil, more generally in terms of opposition to
democracy, laid the basis for a set of attitudes on international relations which
were anti-pacifist and pro-war. On this point, as on all the others, there were
basic differences between the two forms of nationalism, which derived from the
contrasting ways in which the concept of the nation was defined and the criteria
of nationhood were laid down.

Socialism and Nationalism

Socialism has had to come t o terms with the force and malleability of
nationalism and has had to recognize the national context within which the
working-class movement has developed. The remainder of this article explores
the strengths and weaknesses of one possible general response within socialist
thought to the phenomenon of nationalism. Such a response gives socialist
content to the democratic nationalism originating in the French Revolution. It
asserts that socialist nationalism is compatible with the internationalism with
which socialism is, at least in theory, intrinsically connected. A developed and
theoretically sophisticated form of such socialist nationalism was put forward
by the French socialists in their discussions of nationalism and patriotism in the
period before 1914, though this left nationalism did not go unchallenged from
within their own ranks. This position on the nation was not, however, unique to
France. For instance, the views of Otto Bauer, the Austro-Marxist, on the
working class taking over the nation and becoming properly part of the nation,
are very similar, as we shall see, to what the French socialist Jaures had to say
on the subject.35Yet the chances of sustaining a n effective socialist nationalism
were greater where, for historical reasons, the idea of the nation had from its
origins democratic and revolutionary associations. Such an historical back-
ground made it easier t o maintain a concept of the nation and a view of national
cohesion which were both democratic and socialist. In the history of European
thought, the idea of the nation, with its implications of community and social
cohesion, was taken over by the right. In France the socialists inherited an
earlier and opposed idea of the nation which defined the nation in democratic
terms. Socialists did not need, so it appeared, to hand over the idea of the
nation t o their anti-democratic opponents. They could identify themselves with

34 Hence the commitment of the right-wing nationalists (though by no means only them) in
France in 1913 to support the ‘Three Years Law’, which extended the length of compulsory military
service from two to three years and built up the numbers of the standing army, as opposed to the
reserves or militia army which the left wanted to rely on for the purpose of national defence. See
G . Michon, L a Preparation u la Guerre: L a Loi de Trois Ans (Paris, Marcel Riviere, 1935); G.
Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War: the Introduction
of Conscription 1913-14(Leamington Spa, Berg, 1984); R . D. Challener, TheFrench Theoryof the
Nation in Arms (New York. Russell & Russell, 1965); D. B. Ralston, The Army of the Republic:
The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France 1871-1914 (Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press, 1967).
35 Cf. Jaures’s articles on ‘Le proletariat, la patrie, et la paix’ (1902), in Jaures, Oeuvres, Pour la
Paix I , especially p. 278.
 J . J . SCHWARZMANTEL 249

the nation, accept the legitimacy of patriotism, a n d view left nationalism as

compatible with internationalism. Even so, such a position, whether in
France or anywhere else, had its weaknesses as well as its strengths; both need to
be examined in any assessment of left nationalism.
Left nationalism interpreted the statement of Marx and Engels in The
Comtnunist Manifesto that ‘the working men have n o country, we cannot take
from them what they have not got’ as a lament over a regrettable state o f affairs
which should be remedied. As the working class became more organized and
class conscious, it would take over the nation, it would cease t o be a class apart,
excluded from the national community; it would then have a n interest in
defending and protecting the nation. There are three elements in such a position
of socialist nationalism.
(1) Workers and socialists are the genuine patriots; they speak for the nation,
while the property-owning classes are only patriots when it suits their economic
interests. The patriotism of the property-owning classes will always take second
place to their class economic interests, and they will always be prepared to
betray their compatriots when it is in their class interest t o d o so. T h e French
socialists, for their part, made much o f this line of argument. For example, in
his pamphlet Le Putriotisme de la Bourgeoisie, Paul Lafargue, Marx’s son-in-
law, pointed t o the way in which the French bourgeoisie had been willing to
make peace with the Prussians in 1871 even at the cost of losing the provinces of
Alsace and Lorraine. H e argued that the possessing classes had been afraid that
the continuation of the war with Prussia would have led t o the arming of the
workers, thus endangering their own class privileges. In addition, the French
bourgeoisie could cope economically with the loss of those two provinces, in
which advanced industry predominated, because they could erect tariff barriers
against the threat of competition from Alsace a n d Lorraine.36 T h e literature of
French socialism is full of denunciations of the sham patriotism of the
bourgeoisie. The army, which was supposed to defend the nation and to protect
the national frontiers, was chiefly a n institution for protecting capitalist power
and p r i ~ i l e g e . ~Capitalists
’ were quite happy t o invest their money in foreign
countries if that would bring them a greater rate of return, even though their
investment was in war industries (such as those of Germany) which could be
turned against their own country.3s They were happy t o hire foreign labour
rather than give work to their own compatriots i f foreign labour could be
employed more cheaply.39 By contrast, socialists were the only genuine
patriots, concerned with the well-being of the nation, since they spoke for the
interests of the masses, the workers who formed the majority of the national
community.
(2) To the French Revolutionary idea of the nation a s a democratic

36 P. Lafargue, Le Patriotisme de la Bourgeoisie (Paris, Librairie du Parti Socialiste, 1906).

37 See, for example, Charles Albert, Pafrie,Cuerre, Caserne(Paris, Temps Nouveaux, 191 I); R .
Verfeuil, Pourquoi Nous sornmes Aniimilitarisfes (Paris, 1913); and, for the way in which anti-
militarism was perceived by the state, J . - J . Becker, Le Curnet B. Les Pouvoirs Publics ei I’Anii-
miliiaristne avant la Guerre de 1914 (Paris, Klincksieck, 1973).
38 P. Lafargue, ‘Socialisme et Patriotisme’, Le Socialisre (20 August 1887). reprinted in J .
Girault (ed.), Paul Lafargue: Texies Choisis (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1970), p. 252.
39 See M. Perrot, ‘Les rapports entre ouvriers franfais et ouvriers etrangers (1871-1893)’.
Bulleiin de la Socieie d’Histoire Moderne, 1 (l960), 4-9.
250 Class and Nation: Problems of”Socialist Nationalism

community, socialist thought added the idea of social reforms, which would
give the working class a stake and position in the nation. French socialist
thought referred back to Saint-Just’s dictum that a people which is not happy
has no fatherland.40 The ‘anti-patriotism’ of the workers was a sign that they
had no share of the national wealth, the nation’s culture, or the nation’s
productive resources. As Sembat warned, those who regretted the anti-
patriotism of the working class should concede social reforms. If they made the
nation a community in which social welfare legislation created social as well as
democratic rights, then workers would have reason t o love their nation and be
prepared to defend it in time of war.41Or as Otto Bauer explained, in capitalist
society the working class remained outside the nation, they formed a sort of
backdrop to the nation. However, as the working class developed its organiza-
tion and progressed towards a socialist society, workers would come to share in
the national culture. The victory of socialism would mean that the workers
would become for the first time properly part of the nation.42This was the same
line of argument as that put forward by Jaures at the 1907 Nancy conference of
the French socialist party, the SFIO. The workers ‘had n o fatherland’ only so
long as they were a disorganized and ineffective mass. Once they became more
cohesive and able to secure reforms within the framework of the nation, they
would cease to feel or to be alien t o it; they would share in true membership of
the national community.43 Finally, the former leader of the Parti Ouvrier
Francais, Jules Guesde, stressed the significance of the fact of universal (male)
suffrage, of structures of republican democracy which gave the working class
the opportunity of taking over the nation, of coming t o power within the
framework of the democratically organized nation.44
(3) Finally, the conclusion was drawn that, once the working class and
socialists had a stake in the nation, they would be committed to defending its
independence and autonomy. The nation would be an historic, cultural and
political community in which the workers had conquered their place, and so
they must protect it. This led then to the view that, in the event of a war,
socialists had to defend the nation if it was the victim of a g g r e ~ s i o nThis
. ~ ~ ran
parallel, in the French case as elsewhere, t o a particular view of the army. The
army should be reformed along the lines of a popular militia, or citizens’ army,
so that it would be a suitable means of national defence, yet would not be used
for aggressive purposes against the independence of any other nation, nor for
threatening democratic liberties and republican institutions at h0me.~6 The
army would be transformed into a democratic and popular institution for
protecting a national territory, which itself furnished the terrain for socialist
advance. Such socialist progress was made possible through the political

40 Jaures, Ouevres, Pour la Paix I I , p. 239 [reprinted from L’Humanite (29 June 1905)l.
41 M . Sembat, L’Ouvrier et la Patrie (Paris, Librairie du Parti Socialiste, 1905).
42 0. Bauer, Die Nationalitatenfrage unddie Sozialdemokratie (2nd edition) (Vienna, Verlag der
Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1924), p. 101.
43 Parti Socialiste (SFIO), 4-ieme Congres National, Nancy (1907), pp. 271-2.
Parti Socialiste (SFIO), 3-;$me Congres National, Litnoges (1906), p. 243.
45 The French Socialist Party committed itself to this position at the Limoges congress of 1906,
and again at the Nancy congress the following year.
46 See Jean Jaures, L’Armee Nouveile (edited by M. Bonnafous) (Paris, Rieder, 1932);
E. Vaillant, Suppression de I’Armee Permanenle et des Conseils de Guerre (Paris, n.d.).
 J . J . SCHWARZMANTEL 25 I

institutions of republican democracy, which provided an added reason why the

workers could not be indifferent to the fate of the nation and could not adopt a
position of ‘revolutionary defeatism’.
Such then are the basic elements of left nationalism, which, while it has been
illustrated chiefly with reference to France, has been held by socialists in other
nations too. August 1914, although a complex series of events, can be said to
illustrate the pervasiveness and ubiquity of such nationalism of the left. In
Germany, for example, the social democrats could not claim, as in France, that
they were continuing and developing the legacy of 1789 which had been handed
down to them. Yet in Germany too not just those on the right of the party
(Noske, for example) but Bebel himself had for some time been saying that the
German socialists were the most ardent defenders of ‘their’ fatherland.47

Strengths and Weaknesses of Left Nationalism

In the French case, left nationalism in the period before 1914 was challenged by
a strand of ‘anti-patriotism’, associated chiefly with the name of Gustave
Herve. He denied the compatibility of socialism and n a t i o n a l i ~ mThis
. ~ ~ ‘anti-
patriotic’ strand never got the support of anything more than a minority of
French socialists, although it was far from uninfluential among the ranks of the
CGT and the anarchist^.^^ The argument of those opposing the ‘anti-patriotic’
position was that to dismiss patriotism purely as a sham, a device of the
bourgeoisie, or as a form of false consciousness, was to neglect, or at least to
underestimate, the hold of patriotic sentiment and national loyalty on all
sections of the nation, including the working class. Such national sentiments
had been built up during the 19th century, in France as in other nations.
Throughout the history of the French nation the workers had contributed to
and shared in that history, securing the nation’s safety against foreign
aggression.50
More generally, such a perspective can be backed up by reference to more
recent experience. For example, socialist participation in European resistance
movements in the Second World War shows the power of the combination of
the idea of defence of the nation with themes of socialist transformation. In a
different context, the defence of the USSR in the ‘Great Patriotic War’ shows
the mobilizing power of the idea of defence of the ‘socialist fatherland’.
Furthermore, left nationalism takes seriously the concept of a democratic
national community which has to be defended, should the need arise, against
any attack leading to national oppression and the loss of national self-
determination. A position of outright rejection of the nation and of patriotism

4’ See, for example, Sinclair W . Armstrong, ‘The internationalism of the early Social
Democrats of Germany’, American Historical Review, 47 (1941-42), 245-58; D. Groh, ‘The
“Unpatriotic Socialists” and the state’, Journal of Conremporary History, 1 (1966), 151-77;
D. Groh, Negative lnregrarion und revolutionarer Attentismus. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am
Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Frankfurt, Prophylaen, 1973). especially pp. 49-55.
48 See G . Herve, Leur Patrie (2nd edition) (Paris, Aux Editions de ‘La Guerre Sociale’, 1910).
49 The C G T passed a ‘Herveist’ motion rejecting any commitment to national defence at its 1908
congress at Marseilles. For anarchist perspectives with regard t o patriotism, see J. Maitron, Le
Mouvement Anarchiste en France (Paris, Maspero, 1975). Vol. 1, pp. 368-79.
50 For example, in the period of the French Revolution and again in 1870-1871.
252 Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism

risks dismissing the theme of a democratic national heritage which the socialist
movement should continue and develop.51There have been plenty of examples
where the forces of the established order have claimed that the left is indifferent
to the fate of the national community, that it has been willing to neglect
national traditions and institutions in favour of abstract internationalist creeds.
The French taunt of the socialists being dessuns-putrie was the equivalent of the
German version that their socialists were vuferlundslose Gesellen, people
without a fatherland.52The assertion of a democratic and socialist concept of
the nation makes possible the claim that the left is the true defender of
national interests and the ‘bearer’ of the true values of the nation.
A further argument for a socialist form of nationalism involves questions of
economic nationalism and of capitalist internationalism. This aspect of the
question is of both historical and contemporary relevance. Capitalist inter-
nationalism takes the form of a cosmopolitan search for profit, irrespective of
the interests of the majority of the nation’s citizens.53This theme may have
increased relevance in the age of multinational corporations and international
currency transactions of unprecedented rapidity and volatility. Raymond
Williams makes the point that ‘the fiercest drives of the modern international
capitalist market are to extend and speed up these flows across nominal
frontiers’, a system in which ‘the frontiers are only there to be economically
dismantled and the flags, if the calculations come out that way, are quickly
exchanged for flags of c ~ n v e n i e n c e ’ .It~ ~could be argued that the best
opposition to such ‘capitalist cosmopolitanism’ would be a form of socialist
nationalism. The argument would be that the nation provides, in the present
world order, a unit within which effective popular control and a socialist
economic policy are possible. The nation is seen as a suitable framework for
democratic and socialist advance. There are national traditions which can be
mobilized for such purposes. Ideas of socialist internationalism might be too
abstract and ‘intellectualist’. The direct transition from the individual to
humanity, as a universal concept, remains an empty idea. Nations remain a
mediating stage through which a genuine socialist internationalism could be
built up. It is true, however, that the idea of a socialist nationalism has its
dangers. It might lead to isolationism and eventually to attitudes of hostility to
the foreigner, to those who are not members of the national community.
Left-wing nationalism attempts to work with a democratic conception of the
nation, held to be compatible with internationalism. The nationalism of the
1848 variety put forward the vision of an international community of demo-
cratically constituted nation-states, coexisting harmoniously with one another;
the patriotic love of one’s nation was a stage on the way to love of h ~ m a n i t y . 5 ~

5 1 For contemporary examples of such arguments, see R . Debray, ‘Marxism and the national
question’, p. 40: ‘there is nocontradiction, in either theory or practice, between the tricolore and the
Red Flag’. See also R . Williams, ‘Key words in the miners’ strike’, New Socialist, 25 (1989, 6-1 I ,
for a discussion of ‘community’ which implicitly raises similar issues.
s2 Groh, ‘The “Unpatriotic Socialists” and the state’.
53 For a pre-1914 criticism of such ‘capitalist cosmopolitanism’, see J . Walter-Jourde, ‘Inter-
nationalisme et patriotisme’, Revue Socialiste, 42 (1905). 676-705, and 43 (1906), 69-81.
j4 Raymond Williams, Towards 2000 (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985), p. 189.
55 For some illustrations of this perspective, see M. Merle (ed.), Pacifisme ef Infernationalisme
(Paris, A . Colin, 1966). for example, p. 214.
 J . J . SCHWARZMANTEL 25 3

Once nations were each ruled internally according to the principle of popular
sovereignty, then wars between nations would be a thing of the past, since wars
stemmed from dynastic ambitions and the greed of tyrannical despots. The
socialist nationalism of the left took over this idea. The working class had to
defend the nation, yet this was not seen as in any way incompatible with
socialist internationalism. Internationalism involved strengthening the links
between workers of different nations. This would make war impossible whilst
still preserving the diversity of nation-states. National characteristics would
persist even in a socialist
The problem with such a perspective arises from the difficulty of maintaining
the distinction between a democratically based nationalism of the left and a
nationalism of an entirely different order, in which the themes of democracy
and class conflict get totally submerged. In theory, it is certainly possible to
distinguish between left nationalism and nationalism of the right. Yet, in
practice, the division between the two can get very blurred, and left nationalism
merges into nationalism tout court, at the expense of themes of socialist inter-
nationalism as well as of the ‘modified view of the national interest which
reflects a particular class vision’.57 The experience of August 1914 bears this
out. It has been argued that, in the French case, the working class did not accept
the war out of chauvinist exultation, a desire for La Revanche against
Germany, and other themes of right-wing n a t i o n a l i ~ mThe
. ~ ~war was accepted
because it was felt that republican and democratic France was under attack
from autocratic Prussian Germany. Overthrowing Hohenzollern Germany
would not only secure the national interest of France, but would be in the
interest of international socialist revolution, since the defeat of the German
Empire would remove one obstacle to the international progress of socialism.s9
However, it was possible for socialists of other nations to claim that their
nation too had, so to speak, a privileged position in the process of socialist
revolution: the German socialists could point to their r6le in defending Europe
from the menace of Tsarist autocracy and to the fact that the French Republic,
however democratic it might be, was in alliance with Russian Tsarism. They
could also stress the fact that the German socialist and trade union movement
was larger and better organized than the French. All these were reasons for
defending the (German) nation and for seeing that as equally compatible with
socialist internationalism.
The attempted reconciliation of nationalism and socialism may well lead to
nationalism emerging as the dominant partner. The need to preserve the
national community comes to be seen as the prime value. According to Breuilly,
a ‘nationalist argument’ involves three assertions:

56 Jaures, speech at Nancy congress (1907): Nancy congress report, p. 264.

5’ Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 321.
5 8 This is the argument presented in, for example, A. Kriegel et J.-J. Becker, 1914: L a Guerreet
le Mouvement ouvrierjranfais (Paris, A. Colin, 1964).
59 See Kriegel et Becker, 1914: La Guerreet le Mouvement ouvrier franqais; J.-J. Becker, 1914:
Comment les Franqais sont entres duns la Guerre (Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des
Sciences Politiques, 1977); J.-J. Becker, ‘L’appel de guerre en Dauphine’, Le Mouvement Social,
49 (1964), 32-41; L. Jouhaux, A Jean Jaures, Discoursprononce aux Obseques de Jean Jaures
(Paris, La Publication Sociale, 1914).
254 Class and Nation: Problems of Socialist Nationalism

(a) there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; (b) the
interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and
values; (c) the nation must be as independent as possible. This usually
requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.60
The French socialists attempted to give a democratic and socialist form to
element (a) by maintaining that the ‘explicit and peculiar character’ of the
French nation consisted precisely in its revolutionary and socialist traditions
and in the vitality of its working-class movements. Socialists could well accept
assertions (a) and (c), but clearly not (b). Yet it is not so easy to separate out
these elements of the ‘nationalist argument’ or to avoid slipping into acceptance
of (b). The attempt to develop a democratic nationalism of the left could easily
slip into a much vaguer and diffuse form of nationalism, which could be
exploited for purposes quite at odds with the socialist idea.

Conclusion
The conclusions and broader implications of this analysis can now be briefly
stated. There are three basic issues which emerge. First, one can take the
argument back to The Communist Manifesto and its famous statement that
‘the working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have
not got’. Capitalist development was seen as transcending the boundaries of the
nation-state. Socialism, as the heir to capitalism, would continue this develop-
ment; one of the ‘first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat’ was
‘united action, of the leading civilised countries at least’.61 However, and this is
the second concluding point, in the history of socialism since the Manifesto,
developments have taken a somewhat different course. Capitalist inter-
nationalism, or cosmopolitan profit-seeking, has certainly developed apace.
Yet socialist and working-class action has remained chiefly focused within the
framework of the nation. This was demonstrated by the experience of August
1914. This may be especially true of what Marx and Engels called ‘the leading
civilised countries’. The current of what has here been called left nationalism
accepted this. Its exponents built on a democratic and ‘voluntarist’ definition
of the nation, stemming from the French Revolution. They added to this
democratic nationalism an economic and class element. Using the democratic
rights and institutions of a republican system, the working class would take its
place within the nation and become ‘the leading class of the nation’, as the
Manifesto put it.62 This socialist nationalism was not seen as aggressive with
respect to other nations, nor as incompatible with internationalism.
Thirdly, and finally, the implication is that nationalism, explicitly linked to
its democratic and revolutionary origins, need not be inimical to socialist
purposes. This conclusion has to be stated carefully; it has been shown how the
malleability of nationalism can all too easily blur the distinction between a
nationalism of the left and one of an altogether different character. Yet the
above analysis has suggested the possibility of socialist thought developing and
60 Breuilly, Nationalism and ihe State, p. 3 .
61 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1962), Vol. I, p. 51.
62 Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 51.
 J . J . SCHWARZMANTEL 255

taking over a concept of the nation suited to socialist purposes. Given the
undoubted force of the nationalist idea and the still comparatively abstract
nature of ‘socialist internationalism’, not to mention the distortions imposed
on the idea of ‘proletarian internationalism’, this may be a fruitful vein for
contemporary socialist thought to develop, with due regard to both the political
and theoretical dangers and difficulties of the enterprise. Obviously, for
socialists, the nation cannot be the sole or overriding unit of action or focus of
loyalty in the way in which it is envisaged by nationalists. The argument is that
in the contemporary world it still provides a necessary framework for socialist
policy and action. One way of recognizing this within socialist thought may lie
along the lines of a development of a nationalism of the left, whose historical
and theoretical origins have been presented above.