Professional Documents
Culture Documents
STUDIES
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CONTENTS
Page
Serial No. Topic No.
I. What is Eurocurrency 3
II. Types of Instruments in Euro Market 4
III. Features of Euro-Currency Market: 6
IV. Effects of Euro Currency Market 7
V. The Eurobond Market 8
VI. Sectors of the International Money Markets 9
VII. Humble Beginnings of the Eurocurrency 9
VIII. Comparative Spreads Between Lending and Deposit Rates 11
IX. Creating Eurodollars 11
X. Growth of the Eurocurrency Market 14
XI. Pricing in the Case of One Currency & Two Financial Centres 14
XII. Pricing of Eurocurrency Deposits and Loans 16
XIII. Market Share and Pricing in Competing Offshore Centres 18
XIV. Legal Implications of Eurocurrency 20
XV. Conclusion 22
XVI. Bibliography 22
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What is 'Eurocurrency'
Eurocurrency is currency deposited by national governments or corporations in
banks outside their home market. This applies to any currency and to banks in
any country. For example, South Korean won deposited at a bank in South
Africa, is considered eurocurrency.
The Eurocurrency market and its offspring - the Eurobond, Euro commercial
paper, and Euro equity markets - comprise some of the most important financial
innovations of the last 40 years.
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• The market for deposits placed under a regulatory regime different than the
regulations applied to deposits used to execute domestic transactions.
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price. In case of put option, holder of bond has a right to sell back bonds
to the company. In this case usually, issuer company makes payment in
US dollars. Euro convertible bonds are also known as a deferred equity
issue.
5. Euro bonds with equity warrants in case of these bonds, equity warrants
are attached to the bonds. These equity warrant are detachable and can
be traded in market. These bonds carry a coupon rate which is
determined by the market rates.
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Features of Euro-Currency Market:
1. International Market:
The Euro-currency market is an international market which accepts deposits
and gives credit in currencies from throughout the world.
2. Independent Market:
It is a free and independent market which does not function under the control of
any monetary authority.
3. Wholesale Market:
It is a wholesale market in which different currencies are bought and sold usually
above $ 1 million.
4. Competitive Market:
It is a highly competitive market in which the supply and demand for currencies
depends on interest rate changes of Euro-banks.
5. Short-Term Market:
It is a short-term money market in which deposits in different currencies are
usually accepted for a period ranging from a few days to a year and interest is
paid on them.
6. Inter-Bank Market:
It is an inter-bank market in which the Euro-banks borrow and lend dollars and
other Euro-currencies from each other.
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1. The expansion of the Euro-currency market has greatly increased
international capital mobility and has helped in easing the global liquidity
problem.
2. It has helped in integrating international capital markets.
3. It has played an effective role in recycling funds from countries having surplus
balance of payments to those having deficit balance of payments.
4. International flows of Euro-currencies have improved economic efficiency by
reducing interest differential among nations.
5. The Euro-currency market has also resolved the problems of countries
whose policy objectives aim at controlling international capital movements by
transferring their currencies from and to Euro-banks.
6. It has helped in financing BOP deficits and surpluses of countries through
lending and borrowing their currencies in exchange for other currencies from
the Euro-currency market.
Adverse Effects:
However, these flows of Euro-currencies have three adverse effects:
First, when the monetary authority of a country is trying to curb inflation through
a restrictive monetary policy, an inflow of short-term capital defeats such a
policy. Again, when there is an outflow of capital and the country is following an
easy monetary policy to combat unemployment, such a policy again becomes
ineffective. This is because the Euro-currency market does not operate under
the regulations of any authority.
Second, Euro-currencies provide an enormous fund of liquid resources which
are used for speculative capital movements. These expose the economies of
the concerned countries to severe strains of sudden and large withdrawals of
credits. Such financial upheavals and disturbances also affect the international
monetary system, especially when the countries involved are not protected by
exchange controls or trade barriers.
Third, according to Milton Friedman, “The Euro-currency market has almost
surely raised the world’s nominal money supply (expressed in dollar
equivalents) and has thus made the world price level (expressed in dollar
equivalents) higher than otherwise it would be.”
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The Eurobond Market:
A Eurobond was once defined as a debt instrument-
(A) underwritten by an international syndicate,
(B) offered for sale simultaneously in many countries.
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Taxes and Cost factor:
(1) The offshore market is like a parallel market that offers bank
instruments and securities that compete with similar financial products
in the traditional, onshore market.
(2) A second dimension of competition exists in international financial
markets. Securities in the onshore market bear certain regulatory
costs and political risks. If these costs or risks become large, agents
have an incentive to cross into the offshore markets and devise new
securities and institutional structure. Any market can be characterized
by its supply and demand components, which is a useful way to think
about the origins of the Eurocurrency market.
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convertibility for the £. Private individuals could now hold their US $
earned through international trade rather than being required to sell them
to the central bank.
(3) Borrowers will always prefer to borrow cheaper funds because there is
no risk to them in doing so. The sterling crisis of 1957: The Bank of
England restricted the use of Sterling for financing foreign trade and
external loans. British merchant banks responded with a pragmatic
solution: Use the US $ which was not regulated by the Bank of England
to conduct these transactions from accounts based in London - the
advantage was evident and European banks began to actively solicit $
deposits.
Onshore Banking Regulations Boost the Offshore Market: Germany & Swiss
Examples (1970s)
German capital controls: the Bundesbank required foreigners with onshore DM
accounts to place a fraction of their funds in noninterest bearing accounts.
Objective: limit non-resident demand for DM. Result: agents deposited DM
offshore. The German capital controls expired in 1974. Swiss interest rate
penalties: impose heavy interest rates penalties on non-residents with onshore
Swiss franc accounts. The Swiss interest rate penalties were abolished in Dec.
1979.
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Comparative Spreads Between Lending and Deposit Rates in the Eurodollar
Market
Creating Eurodollars:
Adam Smith (an American) holds a $100 deposit with a New York Bank. Smith
decides to open an account in London. He does so by writing a check on his
New York bank, carrying it to London, and depositing it (2). The London bank
accepts the check, open an account for Smith (3), and sends the check for
collection to its New York correspondent. The New York bank deducts $100
from Smith’s account and credits that amount to the London Bank’s nostro (its
own) account (4).
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After Smith’s transaction, there are 100 Euro$ measured by the liabilities of the
London bank. Note also that US $ are cleared and settled in New York. The
London bank may wish to increase its earnings on the $100 above the interest
paid on its nostro account and it can do so by making a loan. Suppose that in
Round 2 David Hume (a Swiss) comes to the London bank for a $100 loan,
shown in Round 2 as the London bank’s asset and a liability for Hume (5).
The London bank issues a check to Hume, which he takes to a Zurich bank for
deposit (6). The Zurich bank accepts the check and sends it to New York for
collection (7). The New York bank debits the London bank’s nostro account and
credits the Zurich bank’s nostro account (8).
After Hume’s transaction, there are 200 Eurodollars - the $100 liability of the
London bank to Smith and the $100 liability of the Zurich bank to Hume. The
liabilities of the New York bank remain at $100. The process of lending and
redepositing could continue until Euromarkets deposits reached: D = R/r R=
initial injection of funds into the Euromarkets, r = fraction of reserves held
against deposits, 1/r = deposit-reserve multiplier
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How much Eurocurrency deposit is eventually created if funds are deposited,
lent, redeposited, relent? Let’s add them up: Original deposit = $ R First lending
= (1 - r) X $ R
Second lending = (1 - r) 2 X $ R
. . .
. . .
. . .
Total Euro$ supply = $ R/r
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recent years. Loans of more than 3 years now constitute a larger portion of total
loans than before.
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If these costs are summarized by amount X, then the onshore market will reach
an equilibrium with deposit rate R D, lending rate R L, and market size Q, as
shown in the previous Figure.
Where can a Euro$ market fit into this picture? Assume that a new market in
US$-denominated funds opens in London. Americans will supply dollars to the
offshore market only if they are compensated for bearing the extra costs and
risks associated with London. Since Americans can earn R D with minimum
inconvenience and no political risks in the onshore market, the supply curve to
the offshore market (S*) will begin at R D.
Similarly, in the absence of capital controls, no borrower would travel to London
to pay a higher price for funds. Therefore, the demand curve for offshore funds
(D*) must begin at R L, reflecting the unfunded projects along the onshore
demand curve D.
• In other words, for US$: New York lending rate (“Prime”)> London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) >London Interbank Bid Rate (LIBID)> New
York deposit rate
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The offshore $ market exists only if it can collect deposits and service loans at
a profit. We can see that if this cost remains at X, the Eurodollar market will not
exist. However, if the cost of collecting deposits and servicing loans in the
offshore market (X*) is less than in the onshore market, we can determine the
offshore deposit rate R D*, lending rate R L*, and market size Q*
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With X* << X, above Figure shows the normal relationship between onshore
and offshore interest rates. That is: RL > R L* > R D* > R D (9.1) In more familiar
terms, this inequality states that for US$, the New York lending rate (“Prime”) R
L exceeds the London Interbank Offered rate (LIBOR) R L*, which exceeds the
London Interbank Bid Rate (LIBID) R D*, which in turn exceeds the marginal
cost of funds RD (either a certificate of deposit rate or the Federal Funds rate)
of a New York bank.
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In principle, each centre might have its own cost for collecting deposits and
servicing loans. For simplicity, assume that these costs are identical across
centres and equal to 0.25 percent. In Figure, this selection of X* results in a
London deposit rate of 8.00 percent and lending rate of 8.25 percent and a
London market size Q A. If a Frankfurt offshore centre is to develop, it must
offer loans at 8.25 percent to compete with the price charged in London. As a
result, Frankfurt can pay no more than 8 percent on deposits, and it must be
satisfied with a market size of Q B.
A similar story applies to Singapore with a resulting market size of Q C and
Beijing with a market size of Q D. In our example, once the most efficient and
least risky financial centre has set the price of loans, other centres must follow
suit, leaving quantity as the only other variable left to adjust.
If Germany or Singapore were saddled with higher operating cost, they might
be able to set a higher R L* and still attract borrowers. But their loan portfolios
would have higher credit risks than London. Figure also suggests that countries
which depositors view as riskier will need more favourable regulations to lower
their costs and reduce their lending rates.
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agreement to repay the deposits in New York, but that there was neither an
express agreement nor one that could be implied from custom or usage in the
Eurodollar market on the issue of where the deposits could be collected; that no
provision of Philippine law barred an agreement making WFAL's deposits
collectible outside Manila; that, in the absence of such an agreement, New York
law, rather than Philippine law, applied and required that Citibank be found liable
for WFAL's deposits with Citibank/Manila; and that WFAL could look to
Citibank's worldwide assets for satisfaction of its deposits. The Court of Appeals
affirmed on different grounds. It concluded that the District Court's finding that
the parties had agreed to repay WFAL's deposits in New York was not clearly
erroneous under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and reasoned that,
under general banking law principles, if parties agree that repayment of a
foreign bank deposit may occur at another location, they authorize demand and
collection of the deposit at that location. Thus, it held that WFAL was entitled to
collect its deposits out of Citibank's New York assets.
Court Verdict:
1. The Court of Appeals' factual premise that the parties agreed to permit
collection from Citibank's New York assets contradicts the District Court's
factual determinations, which are not clearly erroneous. o The District Court
distinguished an agreement on "repayment" from one respecting "collection"
and, in quite specific terms, found that the only agreement the parties made
referred to repayment. However, while saying that this finding was not clearly
erroneous, the Court of Appeals appears to have viewed repayment and
collection as interchangeable concepts, not divisible ones. In responding to an
argument that a bank's home office should not bear the risk of foreign
restrictions on the payment of assets from the foreign branch where a deposit
has been placed, unless it has an express agreement to do so, the Court of
Appeals stated that its affirmance of the District Court's order was based on just
such an agreement. Furthermore, to support its holding, the court relied on
authorities that all turned upon the existence, or nonexistence, of an agreement
for collection. o The District Court's findings - that the parties agreed on
repayment, but not collection - were not clearly erroneous. While the
confirmation slips are explicit that repayment would take place in New York,
they do not indicate an agreement that WFAL could collect its deposits from
Citibank's New York assets. In fact, their language seems to negate such an
agreement's existence. The money broker's telexes also speak in terms of
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repayment and do not indicate any agreement about where WFAL could collect
its deposits if Citibank/Manilla failed to remit repayment. Moreover, a fair
reading of the contradictory testimony at trial supports the conclusion that the
parties failed to establish a relevant custom or practice in the international
banking community from which it could be inferred that they had a tacit
understanding on this point.
Conclusion:
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Bibliography:
1. https://www.mbaknol.com/international-finance/eurocurrency-
marketcharacteristics/
2. https://web.stanford.edu/class/msande247s/2009/1103%202009%20po
sting/2009chap09a%20SLIDES%20NCCU.pdf
3. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://ww
w.google.co.in/&httpsredir=1&article=1304&context=djcil
4. http://www.indiaessays.com/essays/india/currency/essay-on-the-
eurocurrency-market/1383
5. https://rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=120#Q57
6. Prof Durgesh Tinaikar Notes July-Nov 2018
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