ALCANTARA v.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR – Tayaban
Facts:
Petitioners are confinees at the Culion Leper Colony in Culion, Palawan,
having voted in previous decisions in the Philippine Islands. That after a public
meeting, they adopted a resolution demanding a right to vote in the upcoming
Plebiscite and requesting the electoral precincts be established within the radius of
the colony so that qualified voters therein could register. The resolution was sent to
the Governor-General who referred the same to the Secretary of Interior, and through
its legal division ruled that no new electorate precincts could be created because the
Plebiscite was considered a special election.
Because of the ruling, Petitioners requested by telegram, the Interior
Department to authorize the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors to register the
qualified voters of the colony. The request was denied on the ground that Petitioners
were not bona fide residents of Culion Palawan, not having been residents of Culion
for six months next preceding the day of the plebiscite, for they have not acquired
residence in Culion as they are confined as lepers against their will and having no
intention to reside therein as provided in Secs. 430-431 of the Administrative Code, as
amended.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan, and as such,
qualified to register and vote therein in the upcoming plebiscite.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that, in the United States, the Constitution limits the right of
the States to discriminate against person by reason of race, color or previous
condition of servitude in their exercise of the right of suffrage.
That at present, the closest thing the Philippines to a Constitution is the Jones
Law which only provision contained in that law as to the qualification of voters are
found under Sec. 15.
Also, the Philippine Legislature has prescribed the qualifications and
disqualifications of voters in Sec. 431 and 432, respectively, of the Revised
Administrative Code.
There being nothing in the above-mentioned provisions which could provide a
definite answer to the issue at hand, the Court resorted to law and jurisprudence of
similar issue from the different States of the limited States. The Court found that in
one State, it held that 'for the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence while a student at any seminary of learning.
In other jurisdictions, a contrary conclusion was reached upon the theory that
under such a constitutional provision, an inmate of such institution may acquire a
residence at the home. In another case, it was held that 'in the absence of such
constitutional prohibition, the rule in is that a permanent member of a soldier's home
has a residence at such home for the purpose of voting'.
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
After comparing such, the Court ruled that under our liberal, petitioners are
residents of Culion, Palawan, and entitled to register and vote in the upcoming
plebiscite, but the case must be remanded to the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors
to determine if petitioners have the prescribed qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under Sec. 431 and 432 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Xxx
IN RE ROBERT CU, CU v. REPUBLIC – Abueg
DOCTRINE: As to a statute adopted from another country, A rational rule of
statutory construction is that a statute adopted from another state or country will be
presumed to be adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that
state or country before its adoption. Such construction is regarded as of great weight,
or at least persuasive, and will generally be followed if found reasonable, and in
harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction
on the subject.
As to the nationality (according to the law when this petition was filed), Section
7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) provides that the
petition for citizenship, must state the following:
1. petitioner's qualifications as enumerated in the Act,
2. petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting; and
3. be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that
they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a
person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner
has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Act.
4. The petition shall also set forth the names and post office addresses of such
witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the
case."
FACTS: Robert Cu filed a petition for naturalization. During the hearing, he stated that
he was a citizen of the Philippines. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal found
him to be “a Filipino citizen, both by right of birth and by right of selection," and
dismissed the petition for naturalization. It impliedly held that being already a
Philippine citizen he did not have to be naturalized.
According to his testimony, he is a Filipino born of a Filipina mother. But when his
mother died when he was about 5 months old, he was brought to China by his father.
When he was 5 years old, he and his father left China and then was given to the care
of Doña Mangahas.
The counsel for the Government opposed Cu’s claim that he is a Filipino. Cu
continued with this testimony: “I consider myself a Filipino citizen on account of the
fact that my mother is (was) a Filipina and I was born in the Philippines. My only fault
1
was that I failed to file my application to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am
application to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am now asking this Court to
make a judgment on that."
Consequently, he was asked by the court whether he knew if his parents were legally
married but he was unsure thereof.
ISSUE: WON Cu is entitled to be admitted to Philippine citizenship under the law at
the time of his application?
HELD: No, he is not entitled to be admitted Philippine Citizenship.
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) provides
that the witnesses must be citizens of the Philippines and "personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act.
If petitioner is born in the Philippines, time required is 5 years and if not, 10 years.
The witness provided by Cu did not meet these qualifications.
Witness Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng admitted that his father was a Chinese national and
his mother a Filipina but he did not actually elect Philippine citizenship.
The other witness, Dr. Pastor Gomez, he testified that "he had known Mr. Cu since
liberation, about August, 1945." Dr. Pastor Gomez was eventually withdrawn as
witness upon the objection of the counsel for the Government.
In United States vs. Martorana, “a petition not so verified by at least two persons who
are citizen is not merely voidable but void."
In the case of In re Kornstain, A witness who is incompetent renders an application
void. The question of a witness' qualifications in naturalization proceedings is
therefore a matter of more than usual importance.
The above decisions are not binding upon Philippine Courts, but it is a rational rule of
statutory construction that a statute adopted from another state or country will be
presumed to be adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that
state or country before its adoption. Such construction is regarded as of great weight,
or at least persuasive, and will generally be followed if found reasonable, and in
harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction
on the subject. The Supreme Court finds the United States courts' reasoning to be
sound and reasonable and we make it our own.
LAO CHAY v. GALANG – Bacani
FACTS:
 Ng Siu Luan and her three children, who are all of minor age, came to the
Philippines on January 19, 1960 as temporary visitors, having been allowed
to stay in this country until January 26, 1961.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
 Instead of departing on that date, however, appellees asked the Bureau of
Immigration for the cancellation of their alien certificates of registration as
well as those of their children on the basis of Lao Chay's admission to
Philippine citizenship on December 12, 1960.
 On January 20, 1961, appellant Commissioner of Immigration granted the
petition as far as Lao Chay and the three children were concerned, but
denied the same with respect to Ng Siu Luan on the ground that "she is not
qualified to acquire Philippine citizenship of her husband under the provision
of paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as she lacks the
requirements provided for under paragraph 2 of the same Act." He therefore
asked her to leave the country on January 26, 1961.
 The Immigration Commissioner denied a subsequent motion for
reconsideration, although he gave Ng Siu Luan a five-day extension within
which to arrange for her departure.
 To stop the threatened deportation of Ng Siu Luan appellees filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila and
secured from it a writ of preliminary injunction.
 After trial, the court granted the petition, and held that the law does not
require that an alien wife should have the same qualifications as those
required of applicants for naturalization, it being enough that she is not
otherwise disqualified.
 From this decision, the Commissioner of Immigration appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the wife of a Chinese who obtained papers of Philippine citizenship,
automatically follows the citizenship of her husband if not otherwise disqualified under
the Naturalization Law.
HELD: YES.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended) provides in part as.
Effect of the naturalization on wife and Any woman who is now or may here-after be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
It is now settled that under this provision, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen
of the Philippines acquires the citizenship of her husband only if he has all the
qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications provided in
Section 4 of the law.
Since Ng Siu Luan admittedly does not possess the qualifications for naturalization,
her marriage to Lao Chay be deemed as automatically vesting in her Filipino
citizenship.
LIM YAO v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION – Baldonado
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She
was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country
or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up
to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half
years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak
either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and
procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her
own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to
prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is
not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial
or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau
Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.
NGO BURCA v. REPUBLIC – Carloman
FACTS: On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca — "as
possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the
Bureau of Immigration".1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to Florencio
Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her
marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China; that she was born
on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao.
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino
citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a
Filipino citizen.
Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the
Philippines, Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization
Law legislated the following:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino citizen in accordance to the
provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis-à-vis the Constitution of the
Philippines?
HELD: No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements specified in the Revised
Naturalization Law. The petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention
the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, such as,
among others, petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence of the
affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to
be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section
2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance
where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the
petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official,
administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice
— certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino
citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that her
former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal
St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she also resided in Junquera St.,
Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the
Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's
"present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where
petitioner actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu, where she studied for one year,
perforce comes within the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the
petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding
petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his
actual, physical surrounding". And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make
inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do
not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is
fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the
affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and
post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at
the hearing of the case". 16
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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important
to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to
check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the
community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and who could serve as
"good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should indeed
prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of
this, the petition must fail.
VELLILLA v. POSADAS – Custodio
DOCTRINE: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate
and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place
chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent
place of abode, one's home.
FACTS:
 This case arose from the death of one Arthur Graydon Moody, who died in
Calacutta, India on February 18, 1931.
 He executed in the Philippines a will where he bequeathed all his property to
his only sister, Ida M. Palmer (Palmer), who is a citizen and resident of New
York, USA.
 On July 14, 1931, Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of
Moody.
 Moody’s estate consisted of bonds and shares of stock corporations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, bank deposits, and other
personal properties shown in the inventory.
 BIR prepared an inheritance tax return and income tax return for the estate
of Moody.
 The estate of Moody paid under protest.
 Both parties introduced evidence which appears that Moody, an American
citizen came to the Philippines and engaged in business here up to the time
of his death in Calcutta, India.
 That he had no business elsewhere, and all of said property at the time of
his death was located and had its situs within the Philippines.
 Plaintiff now contends that that there is no valid law or regulation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any
inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected upon transfer, by death
and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled
in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of
inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and
other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking
and deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of
Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands…
 Plaintiff alleged that Moody, at the time of his death, was a non-resident of
the Philippine Islands under the following circumstances:
 Moody was never married and was in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or
1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business
here.
  He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to
the date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928.
 Moody was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had been
informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine authorities
for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law.
 He promised Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion.
 But distressed at the thought of being segregated, he left the Philippines
under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance
certificate.
 In March and April of 1929, he lived with a friend in Paris, France where he
was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute.
 On November 26, 1930, the latter date when he wrote a letter to Harry
Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the Camera Supply
Company, a Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603
shares.
 He stated in the letter: “Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter
business again…”
 Defendant answered that Moody, was and prior to the date of his death, was
a resident in the Manila, Philippines where he was engaged actively in
business.
ISSUE: Whether or not Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippines on the day of
his death?
HELD: YES, Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of
his death.
 As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after the letters were written,
there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in
the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands.
 Therefore, he was a fugitive from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in
accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands, not from justice.
 There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had
adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila.
 Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the
date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had
domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and
cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no
intention to live there again.
 Thus, the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February
1929 is much less plausible.
 The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris.
 There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he
intended to be his permanent home; no evidence that he acquired any
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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account
there.
 There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment
of a legal domicile there; the negative evidence that he told Cooley that he
did not intend to return to Manila does not prove that he had established a
domicile in Paris.
 His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view
that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the
Pasteur Institute.
 The evidence indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence from his
legal domicile in the Philippines was due to evade confinement in the Culion
Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be
immediately confined, because his affliction became graver while he was
absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure.
 And also, he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well
known, as he might do in foreign parts.
 Our [then] Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the
place of their usual residence".
 The record leaves no doubt that the "usual residence" of Moody, who was
described as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived
and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign
country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in
Calcutta.
 To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and
provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the
place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed
and permanent place of abode, one's home.
 There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever
established a new domicile in a foreign country.
VILLAHERMOSA V. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION – Cristobal
DOCTRINE: Mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother
does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that Jus Sanguinis instead of Jus
Soli is the predominating factor on questions of citizenship.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that upon repatriation of a
Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship
FACTS:
 Florentina Villahermosa married a Chinese National named Co
Suy. They had a child named Delfin who was born in Paniqui,
Tarlac.
 In 1946, Delfin left the Philippines for China on board S/S Cushman
as a Chinese repatriate, in company with his relative.
 Due to financial difficulties in China, Delfin took steps to return to
the Philippines. He met a Chinese who informed him of a plan to
smuggle their compatriots into this country, thus, he agreed to lead
 the party (69 Chinese) to Ilocos Sur where his mother had relatives
who could render valuable assistance.
 The immigrants were discovered and apprehended immediately
after arrival.
 Delfin Co was examined by the Commissioner of Immigration and
recommended that said Delfin Co be deported to China as a
Chinese citizen. They rendered a decision ordering the deportation
of Delfin Co.
 In 1947, Florentina Villahermosa after knowing the apprehension of
her son Delfin, filed in the civil registry of Tarlac under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 an oath of allegiance for the purpose of
resuming her Philippine Citizenship which she had lost upon her
marriage to Co Suy.
 On the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Florentina, it was contended before the Immigration authorities that
Delfin, being a minor, followed the citizenship of his mother, and
was a national NOT subject to deportation.
 These contentions were overruled.
ISSUEs: Whether the reacquisition of Villahermosa’s Philippine citizenship affects
Delfin’s citizenship as a minor, therefore, not subject for deportation?
Will we consider Delfin as Filipino citizen because his mother reacquired
Philippine Citizenship?
HELD: No. Delfin is not a Filipino citizen. Even granting that he is, at the time he
entered this (Phils.) country from China he was a Chinese subject to deportation, and
any subsequent change in his status cannot erase the taint of his unlawful,
surreptitious entry.
Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those who are citizens
of the Philippines, as follows:
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
adopstion of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands;
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
Delfin Co’s claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all, on Par. 4 of the above
section. But, being a minor, he has not had the opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship, and therefore he is yet an alien, his father being a Chinese.
The Court therefore held that, after the Constitution, mere birth in the Philippines of a
Chinese father and Filipino mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship
and that Jus Sanguinis instead of Jus Soli is the predominating factor on questions of
citizenship.
It is contended that Florentina Villahermosa being a Filipina, Delfin CO,
should likewise be a Filipino. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that upon
repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship. It would be illogical
to consider Delfin as repatriated like his mother, because he never was a Filipino
citizen and could not have reacquired such citizenship.
While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was not
a Filipina; she was Chinese. After death of such father, Villahermosa continued to be
a Chinese, until she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April 1947. After that
reacquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was a Filipina within the meaning of
Par. 4, Sec.1, Art. IV of the Constitution; but according to the same organic act, he
had to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his age of majority. Until he becomes
of age and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that he was at the time his
father’s demise. Hence, he is subject to deportation.
NOTTEBOHM – Castillo
Doctrine: Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical
expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by
the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected
with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.
Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis another
State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual's connection
with the State which has made him its national.
Facts. Nottebohm, a German by birth, lived in Guatemala for 34 years, retaining his
German citizenship and family and business ties with it. He however applied for
Liechtenstein citizenship a month after the outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm had
no ties with Liechtenstein but intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization
application was approved by Liechtenstein after submitting all the requirements uder
the law and impliedly waived its three-year residency requirement. After this approval,
Nottebohm travelled to Liechtenstein and upon his return to Guatemala, he was
refused entry because he was deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein
citizenship was not honored. Liechtenstein thereby filed a suit before the International
Court to compel Guatemala to recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala
challenged the validity of Nottebohm’s citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein to bring
the action and alleged its belief that Nottebohm remained a German national.
Issue: Whether Nottebohm, having acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein may
compel other State (Guatemala) to recognize it
Held: NO.
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted by Liechtenstein.
Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm vis-à-
vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be inadmissaible.
As general general rule, issues relating to citizenship are solely the concern of the
granting nation.
But it does not mean that other states will automatically accept the conferring state’s
designation unless it has acted in conformity with the general aim of forging a genuine
bond between it and its national aim. In this case, the naturalization of Nottelbohm
was an act performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction.
Moreover, there was no relationship between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm. The
change of nationality was merely a subterfuge mandated by the war and as such,
Guatemala was not forced to recognize it.
Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the
fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the
result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population
of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Conferred by a
State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it
constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual's connection with the
State which has made him its national.
International practice provides many examples of acts performed by States in the
exercise of their domestic jurisdiction which do not necessarily or automatically have
international effect, which are not necessarily and automatically binding on other
States or which are binding on them only subject to certain conditions.
NAZARETH CANDY CO, LTD v. SHERWOOD GROUP, INC. – Dino
DOCTRINE: The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present in this case.
Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): "(1) to give protection to foreigners under
treaties that states may fail to recognize; and (2) to prevent entanglements with other
sovereigns that might ensue from failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a
national level."
FACTS: On November 4, 1987, Nazareth Candy Company, Ltd. (Nazareth) filed this
complaint against the defendants Sherwood Group, Inc. (Sherwood Group),
Sherwood Foods, Inc. (Sherwood Foods), and Uziel Frydman alleging that the
defendants failed to pay for chocolate and candies ordered from Nazareth.
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1987).
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Nazareth is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Israel, with its
principal place of business in Nazareth, Israel. Nazareth is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of "Elite" Israel Chocolate & Sweets Manufacturing Company, Ltd., which is also a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of Israel. Defendants Sherwood
Group and Sherwood Foods are North Carolina corporations whose principal place of
business is in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Defendant Frydman is president of
Sherwood Group and Sherwood Foods. He resides in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina. Frydman was born in Israel, and he became a naturalized citizen of the
United States in 1977. He claims both American and Israeli citizenship, and he travels
to Israel on an Israeli passport.
A dispute arose between the parties regarding the purchase of chocolates and
candies that plaintiff sold defendants. On 1982, the parties entered into an agreement
giving the defendants the exclusive right to market, sell, and distribute plaintiff's
goods. Sherwood Foods assumed all liabilities of Sherwood Group on July 28, 1983.
Plaintiff claims that from February 1984 to the present, the defendants have
repeatedly ordered chocolate from the plaintiff and that the defendants have
repeatedly failed or refused to pay the plaintiff pursuant to the October agreement.
Courts and commentators refer to these sections of the statutes as alienage
jurisdiction.
Plaintiff alleges that it falls within 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because it is an alien
corporation suing Frydman, an American citizen. It contends that the cases indicate
this court should ignore Frydman's dual citizenship and find that complete diversity
exists in this fact situation.
Defendants filed this motion alleging that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
since Frydman's dual citizenship defeats diversity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a citizen with dual citizenship (Frydman), could be sued under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)?
HELD: In its discussion of dual citizenship, the Sadat court, like the Raphael court,
determined that for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), it would only recognize the
American citizenship of the party claiming dual citizenship. That court only recognized
the American citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction since the rationale
behind alienage jurisdiction was not present in Sadat.
First, the Sadat court applied the dominant nationality theory where courts analyze
the citizen's conduct, residence, and his relationship in the countries in which he
claims dual citizenship. Although, it found that Egypt still recognized the plaintiff as an
Egyptian citizen, it held that his American citizenship defeated diversity jurisdiction
since:
(1) He retained his American passport, and he manifested his intent to return to the
United States even though he worked in the Middle East.
(2) He registered at the United States embassy in Cairo as a United States citizen.
(3) He voted in the 1976 presidential election.

This court agrees with the reasoning in Sadat and Raphael. Under the dominant
nationality theory, Frydman would be an American citizen for the purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. Although he travels to Israel on an Israeli passport, he has purchased a
home in Winston-Salem, North Carolina where his family resides, and he operates his
business in that city.

Second, the court agrees with the Raphael court noting that he took an oath
renouncing his allegiance to foreign states or sovereignties when he became an
American citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1987). Thus, his Israeli citizenship is irrelevant for
the purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.

The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present in this case. Congress
passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): "(1) to give protection to foreigners under treaties that
states may fail to recognize; and (2) to prevent entanglements with other sovereigns
that might ensue from failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national
level." Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1182. Nazareth may face severe prejudice in state court as
a result of the violent events taking place on the West Bank between the Palestinians
and the Israeli government.

The court disfavors Frydman's argument to defeat jurisdiction since that result would
allow American citizens with dual citizenship to control subject matter jurisdiction in
the federal courts. Congress did not intend for citizens with dual citizenship to have
the power to defeat or to gain access to the federal courts based upon their selection
of nationality.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants'

motion to dismiss is DENIED.

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CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301