1. BABCOCK v. JACKSON – Reyes
WILLIAMS – Solomon
FACTS: Miss Babcock (as guest) went with Mr. and Mrs. Jackson (as hosts) to
Canada for a weekend trip using the Jackson’s car. (All are residents of
Rochester, New York). Mr. Jackson was driving along Ontario, Canada when he
lost control of the car and went off the highway. Babcock was seriously injured
and consequently sued Mr. Jackson for Tort/ Damages in NY court. Jackson
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the law of the place where the
accident occurred should govern. The law of Canada states that any owner or
driver of a vehicle is not liable for any bodily injury (except if in the business of
common carrier).
ISSUE: What law should be applied in this case?
HELD: New York law should apply.
 The traditional view of Lex Loci Delicti (“Law of the place where the tort
was committed”) or the Vested Rights Doctrine has already been
discredited because it fails to take account underlying policy
considerations. It affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities
which do not state the practical considerations involved. More
particularly, as applied to torts, the theory ignores the interest which
jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may have in the
resolution of particular issues.
 Citing Auten v. Auten (1953), the traditional view has been abandoned
and has applied what has been termed the "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts" theory of the conflict of laws.
 This is applied by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the
parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation.
 In this case, New York has the greater and more direct concern than
Ontario. The present action involves (1) injuries sustained by a New
York guest (2) as a result of the negligence of a New York host (3) in the
operation of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured
in New York. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the
occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident
occurred there.
 New York's policy of requiring a tortfeasor to compensate his guest for
injuries caused by his negligence cannot be doubted. This is attested by
the fact that the State Legislature has repeatedly refused to enact a
statute denying or limiting recovery in such cases.
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2. GEORGIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL ASSISTANCE COMPANY v.
DOCTRINE: According to previous cases, Wilkinson v. Vigilant Ins. Co. and
Tinsley v. Worldwide Ins. Co., uninsured motorist insurance is available where it
is impossible for the plaintiff to obtain judgment against an insured motorist for
reasons unrelated to the facts of the accident.
FACTS: On October 4, 2000, Natalie Williams was involved in a car accident with
a vehicle operated by Megan Habel in Tallahassee, Florida. The car driven by
Mabel was insured by Cincinnati Insurance Company. Following the accident,
Williams made a demand on Cincinnati for damages she sustained in the
accident, which it declined to pay because Williams did not present evidence
sufficient to satisfy the tort threshold of Florida’s no-fault statute.1
On July 12, 2002, since Williams cannot sue Habel because Florida’s statute2
precluded her from doing so, Williams filed a personal injury action and served
Farm Bureau as her uninsured motorist carrier, contending that since Cincinnati
“legally denied coverage” under its liability policy, she is entitled to uninsured
motorist benefits from Farm Bureau. At no time however has Cincinnati claimed
that it did not provide liability coverage to Habel in connection with the accident.
Farm Bureau in turn filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams
could not recover uninsured motorist benefits as a matter of law because she
failed to prove that she was legally entitled to recover damages from the alleged
uninsured motorist. (TC denied the motion.)
1
In car accident cases only, Florida follows a no-fault insurance system, which
means that after most traffic accidents, an injured person's own insurance policy
(specifically, their "personal injury protection" coverage) will provide compensation
for certain out-of-pocket losses like medical expenses and lost income, no matter
who was at fault for the accident.
You can't hold the other driver liable after a car accident in Florida (via a third-party
insurance claim or personal injury lawsuit) unless the crash resulted in "serious
injury" to you. (Case didn’t specify the degree of William’s injury, but presumably it
is not serious since it falls under the no-fault statute.)
2
Which precludes bodily injury claims arising out of the ownership, use, and
maintenance of an automobile unless the injury consists in whole or in part of (a)
significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function; (b) permanent injury
within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or
disfigurement; (c) significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement; or (d) death.
ISSUE: Whether the uninsured motorist coverage issued in Georgia can benefit
the policyholder (Williams) when she cannot recover against a motorist (Habel)
who is granted immunity by the law of the jurisdiction (Florida) where the accident
occurred? – Yes, Williams can recover uninsured benefits from Farm Bureau.
HELD: Yes, Williams can recover uninsured benefits from Farm Bureau.
At first glance, it may seem that Williams may not be able to recover because to
recover under uninsured motorist provisions in Georgia, the injured party has to
prove two things: (1) that the tortfeasor was uninsured; and (2) that the tortfeasor
was liable. In the instant case, the affidavit of Cincinnati’s Dean Deloach plainly
states that the alleged tortfeasor was insured and that Cincinnati never denied
coverage. Moreover, under Florida law, the alleged tortfeasor cannot be sued
and found liable because of the no-fault provisions of the Florida Statute.
Williams admitted that she did not sue Habel because the Florida statute
precluded her from doing so. Hence, presumably, Williams cannot recover under
the uninsured motorist provisions in Georgia.
However, according to previous cases, Wilkinson v. Vigilant Ins. Co3. and Tinsley
v. Worldwide Ins. Co4., uninsured motorist insurance is available where it is
impossible for the plaintiff to obtain judgment against an insured motorist for
reasons unrelated to the facts of the accident.
In the case at bar, the reason no judgment can be obtained is not because of the
facts of the accident, but because of the public policy and statutes of the place
where the accident occurred (Florida’s No-Fault Act).
One of the goals of uninsured motorist legislation is to protect innocent victims
from the negligence of irresponsible drivers. Because uninsured motorist statutes
are remedial in nature, they must be broadly construed to accomplish the
legislative purpose. In light of this purpose, the Court is unwilling to allow Farm
Bureau to escape liability based on considerations unrelated to the incident.
Therefore, Williams must be allowed the opportunity to establish all sums which
she shall be legally entitled to recover as damages, caused by the uninsured
motorist.
3. HATAWAY v. MCKINLEY – Umangay
FACTS: Grady Hataway died as a result of injuries he sustained during a scuba
dive in a North Little Rock, Arkansas, rock quarry. The dive was supervised by
3 Tennessee: allows recovery for the mental and physical suffering, loss of time,
In this case, uninsured coverage was made available where the alleged tortfeasor is
insured, but for some reason no recovery can be obtained against her insurance
carrier.
4
In this case, following Wilkinson, the plaintiffs were not barred from seeking
damages from their uninsured motorist carrier where the tortfeasor was protected by
sovereign immunity.
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Robert McKinley and conducted as part of a scuba class taught at Memphis
State University (Tennessee). Hataway’s parents filed wrongful death action in
the Shelby Country Circuit Court.
The case was tried before a jury on the basis of Arkansas’s wrongful
death statute. The jury’s verdict is for the defendant. The trial court used
Arkansas law, pursuant to the doctrine le loci delicti, although both the deceased
and the Mckinley were Tennessee residents and the diving trip was part of a
diving class taught at the Tennessee.
SC granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal limited to the issue
of whether the trial court correctly applied Arkansas law to this case.
ISSUE 1: Whether there is a conflict between Arkansas and Tennessee law?
YES
DIFFERENCE: Both Arkansas or Tennessee law is predicated on negligence,
which is the failure to use reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances
which proximately causes the plaintiff’s injuries. However, once the negligence of
a defendant has been demonstrated, there is a major difference between the
defenses that can be asserted by a defendant under Arkansas and Tennessee
tort law.
NEGLIGENCE LAW:
Arkansas is a comparative fault state meaning that an Arkansas plaintiff’s
recovery is reduced by the amount of his fault. A plaintiff is not barred from
recovering damages from a defendant unless his fault is equal to or greater than
the defendant’s fault.
Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff is completely barred from recovering damages if
he was contributorially negligent, even if his negligence was of a lesser degree
than the defendant’s. The only way to recover is if a jury finds that his conduct
was too remote in time and place to be considered a proximate cause of his
injuries.
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES:
Arkansas: recovery for the pecuniary injuries and mental anguish resulting from
death, to the surviving spouse and net of kin of the deceased person.
and necessary expenses resulting to the deceased from the personal injuries,
and also the damages resulting to the parties for whose use and benefit the right
of action survives from the death consequent upon the injuries received.
ISSUE 2: Whether the lex loci delicti conflicts-of-law doctrine should continue to
be followed in tort cases in Tennessee.
NO. The doctrine of lex loci is outmoded because of changes in society, causing
a consequential development of modern law.
The court adopted the “most significant relationship” approach of the
Restatement (Second).
Under this approach, a court applies the “law of the state where the injury
occurred unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”
ISSUE 3: Whether Arkansas or Tennessee law should be applied?
The Tennessee law should apply. The only contact the parties had with the State
of Arkansas was that the injury occurred in that state. Both the decedent and the
defendant were life-long residents of Tennessee and neither owned any property
in Arkansas. The parties’ relationship was centered in Tennessee because the
relationship was formed and continued as a result of the decedent’s participation
in the scuba class taught at Memphis State by the defendant. The Court thinks
that the fact that the injury occurred in Arkansas was merely a fortuitous
circumstance and that the State of Arkansas has no interest in applying its laws
to this dispute between Tennessee residents. Under the facts presented, the
Court concludes that although the injury occurred in Arkansas the State of
Tennessee has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the factors and contacts set out in Section 6 and 145 of Restatement
(Second).
4. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE v. HEFFERNAN – Uson
DOCTRINE: Depecage refers to the process that different substantive issues
could be properly decided under the laws of different states, when the choice-
influencing considerations differ as they apply to the different issues.
FACTS: Mallory Heffernan and Curtis Jones had been passengers in a vehicle
driven by John McMahon, Jr., also a minor, and owned by his mother, Angela
McMahon. The accident occurred when John McMahon, Jr. apparently fell asleep
at the wheel and collided with a tractor-trailer. At the time of the accident, the
Decedent resided with her parents, Edmund and Diane Heffernan, in
Queenstown, Maryland. The driver, John McMahon, Jr., and the other
passenger, Curtis Jones, were step-brothers who resided with Mr. McMahon's
father and Mr. Jones's mother in Ingleside, Maryland. At the time of the accident,
the Decedent's parents, Edmund and Diane Heffernan, carried a Pioneer Family
Auto Policy and a Personal Catastrophe Policy with [Erie]. These are Maryland
policies, designed to comply with Maryland mandatory insurance requirements,
which were issued, sold and delivered in Maryland to Maryland residents,
Edmund and Diane Heffernan. The Heffernans (parents) seek damages pursuant
3 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
to the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage provisions in two insurance
policies issued by Erie. The auto policy provides uninsured/ underinsured
motorists benefits in the amount of $300,000 per person/$300,000 per accident.
A second policy, the personal catastrophe policy, provides an additional
$1,000,000 in uninsured/underinsured motorists benefits. The parties were
unable to come to an agreement on issues of liability and damages. As a result,
the Heffernans filed suit against Erie in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Erie
removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
ISSUE: Whether Maryland law or Delaware law shall govern the claim of the
Heffernans?
HELD: Delaware law shall govern.
Maryland law is clear that in a conflict of law situation, such as the one presented
in the case sub judice, “where the events giving rise to a tort action occur in more
than one State, we apply the law of the State where the injury-the last event
required to constitute the tort occurred”. This principle is lex loci delicti.
Consistent with the principle of lex loci delicti, because the automobile collision
occurred in Delaware, under Maryland law, a Maryland Court would apply the
substantive tort law of Delaware to determine what the claimants are “entitled to
recover” in an action for uninsured motorist benefits. We conclude, pursuant to
Maryland law, that an action by an insured against his insurance company for
uninsured motorist benefits is a contract action. Although principles of lex loci
contractus apply to contract disputes, because the uninsured motorist statute and
the insurance policies, by the incorporation of the phrase “entitled to recover,”
references tort law, the substantive tort law of where the accident occurred
applies, generally, to the issues of fault and damages.
We concluded, therefore, as we do in the case sub judice, that Delaware law
should apply to certain aspects and Maryland law to other aspects, depending
upon the issues raised in the proceedings.
Our decision in this case embraces the concept of “depecage.” Discussing
depecage, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that ‘[i]t has always been
understood that different substantive issues could be properly decided under the
laws of different states, when the choice-influencing considerations differ as they
apply to the different issues. Erie warns against this Court's adoption of
depecage. According to Erie, the depecage framework is inappropriate in this
case because it would act to “legitimize a smorgasbord approach which inures
only to the benefit” of the Heffernans. To the contrary, our holding today
presents a clear framework for resolving choice of law issues such as the one
presented in the instant case. This determination will allow insurers and insureds
to predict with reasonable certainty the law that will apply in a breach of contract
action against the insurer on the basis of an uninsured/ underinsured motorist
claim. Specifically, all parties to a contract which provides
uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits can anticipate that, absent a
contractual choice of law provision, any dispute as to the validity of the policy or
the meaning of its terms will be resolved based on the law of where the contract
was made, but that the substantive tort law of the place where the automobile
collision occurred will control what the claimants are “entitled to recover.”
5. BAUER v. CLUB MED SALES – Vargas
DOCTRINE: Governmental Interests Analysis. — California's choice of law
analysis involves a three-step process. In the first step of the analysis, the court
must determine whether the substantive laws of California and the foreign
jurisdiction differ on the issue before it. Second, if the laws do differ, then the
court must determine what interests, if any, the competing jurisdictions have in
the application of their respective laws. To determine what interest a jurisdiction
has in the application of its law, the forum court examines the particular law and
asks whether those policies will be served by applying that law in the action
before the forum. When only one of the jurisdictions has an interest in the
application of its law, then there is only a "false conflict" and the law of that
jurisdiction applies. It is only when both jurisdictions have a policy interest in the
application of their laws that a "true conflict" exists. California courts then proceed
to the third step in California's governmental interest analysis known as the
"comparative impairment" test. At this stage a court must determine which
jurisdiction's interest would be most impaired if its policies were subordinated to
those of the other jurisdiction.
Comparative Impairment Test. — Under the comparative impairment test, the
court must determine which jurisdiction's interest would be most impaired if its
policies were subordinated to those of the other jurisdiction. This analysis,
however, is very different from a "weighing process." The court does not weigh
the conflicting interests, but instead, attempts to determine the appropriate scope
of conflicting state policies.
FACTS: Rudolph James Bauer, decedent of plaintiffs, a California resident,
purchased a vacation package for the Club Med del Hotel Club located in
Mexico. On April 12, 1994, sometime after his arrival in the hotel, it was observed
by the Club Med Sales, Inc. (defendant) through its employees that Mr. Bauer
began consuming alcoholic beverages from at least 8:00 p.m. until the very early
morning hours of next day immediately preceding his death. Defendant avers that
Mr. Bauer was visibly intoxicated in the discotheque and was observed carrying a
"liquor bladder.”
On April 13, 1994, Mr. Bauer began ascending a staircase leading from the
discotheque to an elevated area where his accommodation was located.
According to plaintiffs, as Mr. Bauer ascended the staircase, he stumbled and
tried to recover his balance by grabbing onto a light post. Plaintiffs alleged that
because the staircase had no handrail or other protection and because the light
post was not firmly secured to the wall, Mr. Bauer fell from the top of the
4 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
staircase approximately six feet to the ground below. Mr. Bauer sustained injuries
which resulted in his death.
Hence, Decedent's mother Margaret E. Bauer, citizen of Florida; William, citizen
of South Carolina; and, Mary Kathleen, citizen of Virginia, (plaintiffs) filed an
action against defendant Club Med Sales, Inc., asserting therein negligence,
dangerous condition and breach of warranty in the Superior Court of the State of
California.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the staircase was in a dangerous and defective
condition and additionally, that the staircase was negligently designed and
maintained. The alleged deficiencies include the failure to provide a means of
prevention and assistance on the staircase to prevent a fall to the ground below,
and the failure to provide adequate lighting to prevent guests from falling over the
side.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWS OF MEXICO OR CALIFORNIA
GOVERN THE DETERMINATION OF LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PREMISES
AND WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES.
RULING: Mexico law shall govern the issue of liability for defective premises and
California law shall govern the issue of wrongful death damages.
Under the government interest analysis, California will apply its own law unless it
is shown that there is a compelling reason to displace forum law. California's
choice of law analysis involves a three-step process: In the first step of the
analysis, the court must determine whether the substantive laws of California and
the foreign jurisdiction differ on the issue before it. Second, if the laws do differ,
the court must determine what interests the competing jurisdictions have in the
application of their respective laws. In determining the interest of the jurisdiction,
the forum court examines the particular law and asks whether those policies will
be served by applying that law in the action before the forum. It is deemed that
there exist a “true conflict” only when both jurisdictions have a policy interest in
the application of their laws. Third, the court must apply the "comparative
impairment" test. It is at this stage a court determines which jurisdiction's interest
would be most impaired if its policies were subordinated to those of the other
jurisdiction.
Liability for Defective Premises
It was asserted by the defendant that the stairwell had applicable building codes
for Mexico. It contended that under Mexico law no restraining handrail was
required at the point where Mr. Bauer fell over the stairwell. In contrast, California
law requires the construction of a handrail at the same point.
Defendant argued that the government of Mexico has set its own policy by virtue
of its building code standards and safety allowances with regard to stairwells, and
that this is a sovereign decision which "should not and cannot be" interfered with
by the State of California. Nonetheless, defendant also recognized the interests
of the State of California in applying its own building code standards in order to
protect California citizens travelling abroad. Hence, true conflict exists.
Although California may have cognizable interest in the application of its own
stringent building and construction standards to protect its citizens travelling
abroad, California's interests are subordinate to Mexico's sovereignty interest in
enforcing its own construction standards within its borders. At that, if Mexico’s
building and construction laws were subordinated, Mexico's interest would be
most impaired, it is henceforth necessary that Mexico law govern the issue of
defective premises liability.
Wrongful Death Damages
The parties agreed that a significant difference exists between the laws of
California and Mexico governing the recovery of damages for wrongful death.
California law allows recovery without limitation for all damages proximately
caused by a tort as well as for punitive damages. While, the law of Mexico
prescribes a maximum recovery limit for wrongful death.
Plaintiffs contend that Mexico has no interest in applying its wrongful death
statute restricting damages and therefore a "false conflict" exists. Accordingly,
plaintiffs assert that California law should control. In response, defendant submits
that Mexico has a legitimate interest in the application of its statute because the
accident giving rise to plaintiffs' wrongful death action occurred in Mexico and
because Mexico has an interest in promoting tourism within its borders.
While Mexico's tourism interest may be served by Club Med Sales' presence,
Club Med Sales, nevertheless is a United States corporation of which benefits
from that presence. Neither Mexico's nor California's interest is served by
limitations on damages for California citizens when a United States corporation is
found negligent. Since plaintiffs and the decedent are United States citizens and
Club Med Sales is an American corporation, Mexico has no interest in having its
damages rules apply.
6. GRIFFITH v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. – Bacani
DOTRINE: Ordinarily, the place of the injury may have an interest in the
compensation of those who render medical aid and other assistance to the
injured party. However, where death is immediate, as on the present facts, that
state has no such interest.
FACTS:
5 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
 George H. Hambrecht, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, purchased a ticket
from United Airlines, Inc. [United] in Philadelphia for a flight from
Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona, and return.
 United is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Chicago. It regularly does business and maintains operational facilities in
Pennsylvania.
 On July 11, 1961, he boarded a United DC-8 bound for Phoenix.
 In the course of landing at Denver, Colorado, a scheduled stop, the
plane crashed, causing Mr. Hambrecht's immediate death.
 Decedent's will was probated in Pennsylvania.
 In July, 1962, the executor of the Hambrecht estate commenced an
action in assumpsit against United and certain of its employees in the
Court of Common Pleas No. 6 of Philadelphia County.
 The complaint alleged, in substance,
1. That United had contracted to transport safely plaintiff's
decedent from Philadelphia to Phoenix and return;
2. That in breach of this contract, certain of United's named
employees, in the course of their employment, had
negligently operated, managed, maintained, inspected and
controlled the airplane, from which negligence the crash
and death resulted; that the action was brought pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Survival Act (contained in the Fiduciaries
Act) of April 18, 1949, P.L. 512, § 603, 20 P.S. § 320.603;
3. That as a result of said breach, decedent and his estate
have suffered substantial damages including loss of
accumulations of prospective earnings of the deceased.
 United and the individual defendants filed preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer, in which they asserted
1. That the complaint alleged a breach of warranty
without alleging a valid basis therefor,
2. That the complaint failed to allege any contractual
relationship between the decedent and the
individual defendants, and
 3. That although the complaint alleged crash and
death in Colorado, the action was brought under the
Pennsylvania survival statute.
 The court of common pleas sustained the cause of action as having
been brought under a valid contract of carriage but dismissed as to the
individual defendants.
 However, the court held that the law of the place of the injury, Colorado,
not the law of the forum, Pennsylvania, controlled on the matter of
damages, and granted leave to amend.
 No amendment having been filed, the complaint was dismissed.
 Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal as to United.
ISSUE/s:
1. W/N Strict Lex Loci Delicti Rule should be applied in favor of the
Pennsylvania Law?
2. W/N Colorado or Pennsylvania has greater governmental interest?
HELD: No. After careful review and consideration of the leading authorities and
cases, we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci delicti rule should be
abandoned in Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule which permits analysis
of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court. "The
merit of such a rule is that `it gives to the place "having the most interest in the
problem" paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular
factual context' and thereby allows the forum to apply `the policy of the
jurisdiction "most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular
litigation".'
It must be emphasized that this approach to choice of law will not be chaotic and
anti- rational. "The alternative to a hard and fast system of doctrinal formulae is
not anarchy. The difference is not between a system and no system, but between
two systems; between a system which purports to have, but lacks, complete
logical symmetry and one which affords latitude for the interplay and clash of
conflicting policy factors." Moreover, in evaluating qualitatively the policies
underlying the significant relationships to the controversy, our standard will be no
less clear than the concepts of "reasonableness" or "due process" which courts
have evolved over many years.
We are at the beginning of the development of a workable, fair and flexible
approach to choice of law which will become more certain as it is tested and
further refined when applied to specific cases before our courts.
6 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
2. The state in which injury occurred, as such, has relatively little interest in
the measure of damages to be recovered unless it can be said with
reasonable certainty that defendant acted in reliance on that state's rule.
Moreover, where the tort is unintentional, the reliance argument is almost
totally untenable.
Ordinarily, the place of the injury may have an interest in the compensation
of those who render medical aid and other assistance to the injured party.
However, where death is immediate, as on the present facts, that state has
no such interest.
The absence of Colorado's interest on the specific point is amply illustrated
by the statute which limits recovery to damages incurred prior to death.
An examination of the policies which apparently underlie that Colorado
statute tends to indicate that state's lack of interest in the amount of recovery
in a Pennsylvania court.
Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery, on the other hand, is
great.
From the foregoing analysis, we conclude that on the complaint before us
(the facts of which must be accepted as true on preliminary objections), a
valid cause of action in assumpsit has been stated and that the law of
Pennsylvania is properly applicable to the issue of damages.
Therefore, we must reverse the court below and remand for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
7. IN RE: AIR DISASTER AT LITTLE ROCK, SATTARI v. AMERICAN
AIRLINES INC. – Carloman
FACTS: On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca — "as
possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization
under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry
with the Bureau of Immigration".1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to
Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that
before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China; that
she was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao.
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino
citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a
Filipino citizen.
Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the
Philippines, Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law legislated the following:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino citizen in accordance to
the provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis-à-vis the Constitution of the
Philippines.
HELD: No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements specified in the Revised
Naturalization Law. The petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or
mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Naturalization
Law, such as, among others, petitioner's former places of residence, and the
absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who
desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a
petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set
forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both
of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of
First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency,
board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the
Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that
her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at
Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she also resided in
Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one
7 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301
year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization
should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence". Residence
encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu,
where she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The
reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of
residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to his application
are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding". And the
State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to
become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it
is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by
the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines
for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any
way disqualified under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set
forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". 16
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is
important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the
opportunity to check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good
standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and who
could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These
witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the
character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail.
8. QUINICHETT v. WAGGY’S TOWING, LLC – Manzo
DOCTRINE: Lex fori (law of the forum) governs procedural laws.
Emergency Digest: In this auto-accident case, a Prince William Circuit Court
recognizes a split of authority but declines to apply the Maryland cap on non-
economic damages because the court finds the cap does not affect substantive
rights in a wrongful death, but merely affects the remedy.
FACTS: Waggy’s Towing filed a motion to apply the Maryland non-economic cap
on damages in a wrongful death suit. The parties agreed in argument that no
further facts are required to decide the Motion, and that the substantive law of
Maryland applies. The issue is whether the Maryland cap on non-economic
damages is substantive or procedural.
In short, an accident happened in Maryland but the case was filed in Virginia.
Defendant wants to apply Maryland law (cap on damages) to put a limit to what it
has to pay.
(Facts weren't discussed in the case so this is mainly just a digest of the issue
and the court's decision.)
ISSUE: Whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages is substantive or
procedural.
(If it is procedural, then lex fori (procedural law of the forum) governs. If so, the
Virginia court will not be required to put a limit to the damages Waggy’s has to
pay. However, if it deemed substantive, lex loci (substantive law of the place of
the wrong) applies, putting a limit to what may be recovered from Waggy’s.)
HELD: Waggy's Towing's motion to apply the Maryland cap on non-economic
damages is DENIED. The Court held that the cap is procedural and according to
Virginia's well-settled conflict of law rules, lex fori governs the application of all
procedural rules.
The parties in this case correctly point out that the Virginia Supreme Court has
yet to address the issue of whether the cap on non-economic damages is
substantive or procedural in nature. However, two Virginia Circuit Courts have
considered it and have reached conflicting outcomes.
In Hoilett v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the lower court held that
Maryland's cap on non-economic damages was substantive while in Norwood v.
Henry's Wrecker Service, it was held that the same was procedural.
"test" referenced in this case is a mere dicta as the question did not actually
involve any cap on damages or limit on recovery but rather the determination of
who was entitled to distribution of wrongful death proceeds.
Furthermore, the court disagrees with Waggy's Towing as it held that the cap is
not so entwined with the action as it does not substantively affect one's right to
bring a wrongful death suit. Consequently, the cap does not act as a limit on the
right to recover; it only serves to lessen the amount recoverable, if and only if, the
cap is reached.
5. The Court also took notice that Maryland's sister state of Delaware has found
under its conflict rules that Maryland's fee cap is procedural, not substantive, and
refused to apply the cap in a case where all of the relevant acts occurred in
Maryland but the defendant was a Delaware entity. Although the Delaware
decision does not materially aid the decision in this case, it serves to point out
that different conflicts rules require different analysis which can lead to different
results.
For the foregoing reasons, Waggy's Towing's motion to apply the Maryland cap
on non-economic damages is denied because the court does not find that the
cap affects one's substantive rights in a wrongful death action, but rather merely
affects one's remedy, and as a result, it is merely procedural. Consequently,
because the cap is procedural, pursuant to Virginia's conflict of law rules, lex fori
governs and the Maryland cap does not apply to this action.

This Court agreed with the holding in the Norwood case, that the subject law
is procedural, for the following reasons:

1. The Maryland cap does not affect the basis of the right of actions. Application
of the cap does not prohibit any party from bringing a wrongful death action.
Thus, the substantive rights of the parties are not affected because the cap does
not affect the right to bring the action, or the trial's proceeding because the jury is
not to be instructed of the cap. Consequently, the cap does not affect the right to
bring the action, but simply affects the remedy as it "merely lessens the
maximum amount recoverable."

2. Had Maryland's Legislature intended to include the cap in the wrongful death
statute, they would not have included it in a separate title of the Maryland Code.

3. The test is not whether the cap is substantive or procedural under Maryland
law, but rather whether it is under Virginia Law, which is the forum of this case.

4. The Holiett decision is not persuasive because it relies in part on a dicta in

another case which the court does not find applicable here. The Holiett decision
cites a "test" for distinguishing substantive and procedural law under Virginia law,
which states that "while the right to recovery and the limits of recovery are
substantive law, the distribution of the recovery is remedial law." However, the

8 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – FEU JD4301