European Journal of Cultural and Politic

European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology
ISSN: 2325-4823 (Print) 2325-4815 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/recp20
The performance of subject positions, power, and

identity: a case of refugee recognition
Jennifer Dagg & Mark Haugaard
To cite this article: Jennifer Dagg & Mark Haugaard (2016): The performance of subject
positions, power, and identity: a case of refugee recognition, European Journal of Cultural and
Political Sociology, DOI: 10.1080/23254823.2016.1202524
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2016.1202524
Published online: 06 Jul 2016.
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Download by: [Maynooth University Library], [Jenny Dagg] Date: 12 July 2016, At: 01:29
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2016.1202524
The performance of subject positions, power, and

identity: a case of refugee recognition
Jennifer Dagga and Mark Haugaardb
a
Sociology Department, Maynooth University Social Science Institute, National University of
Downloaded by [Maynooth University Library], [Jenny Dagg] at 01:29 12 July 2016
Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland; bSchool of Political Science and Sociology, National University of
Ireland, Galway, Ireland
ABSTRACT
This article explores the negotiation of subject positions, identities, and their
recognition. It develops a theoretical model of identity and recognition, which
is applied to the exemplar of a young Palestinian woman negotiating the
refugee recognition process in Ireland. The paper is divided into five parts, as
follows: (1) methodology; (2) a theorisation of subject positions, identity, and
recognition based upon the work of Austin, Barnes, Davies and Harré, Butler,
Foucault, Giddens, Goffman, Heidegger, Jenkins, and Searle; (3) the
application of these perspectives to the complex performance of identity in a
cross-cultural context; (4) the negotiation of the subject position asylum
seeker; and (5) short conclusion-cum-epilogue. What emerges is that social
actors occupy multiple conflicting subject positions; they are structurally
constrained by others’ perceptions and refusals of recognition, thus frequently
affirming subject positions that are contrary to their own desired identity-
construction.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 8 March 2015; Accepted 12 June 2016
KEYWORDS Agency; identity; power; refugee; asylum
1. Introduction
The UN special envoy on migration, Peter Sutherland, recently asserted
that ‘morally, politically, and economically, migration is the defining
issue of the 21st century’ (Sutherland, 2015). Indeed the ‘current refugee
crisis’ is frequently, and perhaps more appropriately, referred to as a
global humanitarian crisis. Hannah Arendt used the term ‘worldlessness’
to ‘define those conditions where a person doesn’t belong to a world in
which they matter as human beings’ (Evans & Bauman, 2016). Daily
drownings in the Mediterranean and appalling conditions in camps
across Europe, from Calais to Idomeni, have become all too familiar.
CONTACT Jennifer Dagg jennifer.dagg@nuim.ie

© 2016 European Sociological Association
2 J. DAGG AND M. HAUGAARD
We acknowledge the need to contribute to policy debate on such complex

matters; however, this article focuses on human agency and subjectivity
through the lens of just one refugee applicant, on the difficulties of
being recognised and acknowledged by others for who you are and wish
to be. This is a process that is heightened in this case by the asymmetrical
power dynamic and bureaucratic nature of the refugee recognition
process. We intend our article to highlight the human face of refugees,
everyday people negotiating multitudes of identities, a refugee being one
of them. This article explores power relations associated with the social
reproduction of subject positions and identities. It concentrates upon a
female, Muslim, Gazan, Palestinian subject who moved to Ireland from
Gaza in pursuit of education, and who then found herself needing
refugee status. Firstly, she negotiates basic cultural differences. These
include the tension between Irish preconceptions about female Muslim
identity that are at variance with this subject’s attempt to create an identity
for herself as an educated, liberated woman, who is also Gazan, Palesti-
nian, and Muslim. Secondly, she is confronted with the asymmetries of
power between the refugee applicant (asylum-seeker) and bureaucrats
managing the application process. This asymmetrical relationship gives
the latter the power to create her phenomenal reality. The social subject
does not have full control of what meanings count and which identities
are considered felicitous. In particular, we see a tension between being a
student and an asylum seeker. This process and tension constitutes a para-
digm instance of the difficulties that social subjects have in projecting
identity in a culturally contested and highly bureaucratic terrain.
The empirical part of the analysis in this paper appears, at times, like a
contest between ‘heartless bureaucrats’ and a ‘deserving subject,’ or as cri-
tique of the Irish asylum process. Neither is the intention nor the focus of
this paper. Indeed, if we were to interview the bureaucrats we would not
find deliberate acts of subjection or domination. Rather, the bureaucrats
are sense-making within a complex set of rules and regulations, which
are not of their own making. They have to ‘fit’ an asylum seeker into
certain pre-established identity categories. This includes separating
genuine refugees from bogus asylum seekers, which entails a structurally
constituted position of distrust.
The objective of our exploration is to analyse the difficulties and mul-
tiple tensions that a social subject is exposed to when she has to shift socio-
cultural context, and how she must negotiate an organisational
bureaucracy that entails inequalities of power. Thus we offer an account
of a subjective phenomenological social ontology of subject identity
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 3
creation. This negotiation of social ontology takes place within a complex

sociocultural context, in which power differentials are high.
The article formulates a four-dimensional power-theoretical analysis of
the reproduction of social subjects and then examines in detail the way in
which a particular asylum-seeker, Hannah A., transitions into the system.
The empirical data come from a larger study of the Irish asylum process
(Dagg, 2012). In contrast to that larger study, this article does not seek to
generalise about the particulars of the Irish asylum process. Rather, it is a
micro-study of one person confronting a culturally complex terrain and

an unequal power relationship. This entails projecting a multitude of iden-
tities that revolve around a singular bureaucratic identity, that of a genuine
refugee. Hannah’s account has been chosen to show the complexity of
identity creation: how the subject is pulled in several directions at once,
and how difficult it is for her to make her account and self-perception
of herself count as valid. This is a journey inside the complex phenomen-
ology of the evolution of self in a contested terrain. While the particulars
of this journey are different for everyone, the constant tension between
identities, and the difficulty that a social subject has of making their
story of themselves count, is a universal one.
The article is divided into five parts. First there is a short account of its
methodology. Second is a theoretical section that sets out a model of
power and subject/identity creation, based upon the work of Austin,
Barnes, Davies and Harré, Foucault, Giddens, Goffman, Haugaard,
Jenkins, Butler, and Searle. The third part applies this model to an empiri-
cal analysis, showing how identity is contested in a cross-cultural context.
In the fourth part, we shift emphasis to explore how Hannah A. negotiates
the subject position of asylum-seeker, which entails inequality of power.
Analysis and discussion of the data are combined within the two empirical
sections. In these sections we demonstrate how the rules that constitute a
felicitous performance of subject position are far from clear, and entail a
complex set of negotiated, often contradictory, strategies. Lastly we offer a
short conclusion-cum-epilogue, which does not aim to summarise the
paper; we feel that any attempt to do so would do symbolic violence to
the nuance of the argument and material.
2. Methodology
This article is based upon part of a wider and more comprehensive study
of the refugee recognition process in Ireland (Dagg, 2012). In that study,
the interpretative research approach was used for the qualitative study of
asylum-seekers and refugees living in Ireland. The approach to sampling,

data collection, and analysis employed some of the methods utilised in the
interpretative paradigm, notably, ethnography, phenomenological
research, and discourse analysis (Rabinow, 1987). Although somewhat
eclectic, the interpretative paradigm informed the larger investigation
which adhered to judgement criteria from a post-positivistic perspective
– triangulation, research reflexivity, and thick description (Creswell &
Miller, 2000, p. 126). Ultimately, interpretation foregrounded the
context of subjectivity and agency.

For this article, we were interested in the interaction between the
context in which asylum seekers live their lives and the wider refugee rec-
ognition process, and whether, or how, this gives rise to the reproduction
of particular subject positions. This led us to ask the following questions of
the data:
. How do asylum-seekers living in direct provision centres understand

their subject position and identity?
. How do they negotiate these positions within the asylum system and
beyond?
. What helps or hinders their progress towards recognition of their
subject position and identity?
In the larger study, fieldwork was undertaken in 2011–2012 through a

combination of ethnographic and participant-observation methods at a
local Refugee Support Group. The primary purpose was to explore the
experiences of asylum-seekers as they interacted with the refugee recog-
nition process (particularly those living in direct provision centres).
Attempts to contact those who administer and support the refugee recog-
nition process were made; however, they proved unobtainable in some
cases, and silent in others.
Participants were identified and recruited through face-to-face contact
with the researcher at the local Refugee Support Group, or through a gate-
keeper who worked on a voluntary basis in the direct provision centre. In
selecting participants it was sought to represent a balanced gender and
ethnic representation. A diversity of participants were interviewed in
terms of their length of time in the refugee recognition process, as well
as those who had succeeded in gaining status positions such as Leave to
Remain or Refugee status, thus encapsulating the experiences of contesta-
tion, negotiation, and recognition. Eight participants were interviewed
who had spent between one month and seven years living as asylum
seekers in direct provision centres in Ireland, as well as two participants

with refugee status, and one with Leave to Remain status. The data were
examined for descriptions of experiences in which the participants experi-
enced their identity as contested.
A further twelve interviews were held with a particular participant,
Hannah A., who transitioned into the refugee recognition process at the
end of her Master’s programme in Ireland. To begin with she was one
month in the system. Hannah was keen to document her transition and
saw the interviews as an opportunity to reflect on the process as she

was experiencing it. Interviews with Hannah lasted between one and a
half and three hours, whilst the others lasted between 30 minutes and
an hour and a half. All interviews with participants were audio recorded
and transcribed. Data analysis took the form of discourse analysis (Fou-
cault, 1972, 1980).
For the purposes of this paper, we concentrate on Hannah’s experi-
ences of the system. We study her attempt to grapple with, negotiate
and perform her sense of self, and for this to be recognised by the
wider social world. In the larger study, Hannah’s series of interviews
were chosen as a critical case with which to compare the interviews of
our other participants. Hannah was interviewed over the period of a
year, from one month in the system to over a year in the system. Her
experiences are corroborated as representative by the evidence of other
participants. However, unlike our other participants who were far
longer in the process and usually looking back, Hannah was detailing
current changes and transitions as they were taking place. Consequently,
her experiences are phenomenologically more immediate, rather than
retrospectively interpreted. This rich material forms the focus of this
article.
3. Theorising subject positions

The creation of subject positions constitutes a complex process in which
power and identity overlap. It entails an overlap of power, truth, and
meaning with the process of self-creation. As a theoretical starting-point
we will begin with Foucault’s observation on the relationship between
social subject creation and power. Foucault writes as follows:
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which
others have to recognize in him. It’s a form of power which makes individuals
subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else
by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and
makes subject to (Foucault, 1982, p. 212).
There are many elements that have to be unpacked in this short para-
graph. Foucault is observing that the process of subjectification is
mundane and constitutive of everyday life (‘This form of power applies
itself to immediate everyday life … .’). While we are examining this
process through an unusual instance, which is rife with cultural and

power tensions, it is important to understand that these processes are
part of everyday interactions, albeit normally less visible. Foucault
argues that subjectification constitutes a process that categorises the indi-
vidual (‘which categorizes the individual … ’); the individual becomes a
carrier of meaning in much the same way as the rest of the furniture of
the world. This meaning marks the person’s individuality, making
them a particular being-in the-world. This does not just situate them
for others, but is also constitutive of their own sense of identity (‘ …
attaches him to his own identity … ’). This meaning is not just an arbi-
trary social construction, but is represented as part of a regime of truth
(‘ … imposes a law of truth … ’). Truth is used this way because it is con-
sidered by social actors to exist beyond convention (Haugaard, 2012a).
This is not a process of solipsistic self-discovery in which the individual
‘discovers themselves’ as a self-creative act. Rather, it constitutes an inter-
active process in which the individual recognises their subject position as
perceived by others (‘ … which he must recognize and which others have
to recognize in him … ’). In this act of recognition they become subject to
someone else’s normalising judgement, which constitutes a form of
dependence upon another as a validator of that subject identity and, con-
sequently, that other imposes upon them a form of control (‘ … subject to
someone else by control and dependence … ’). Because the meaning
imposed by another is not external, but rather integral to identity, this
act of knowing becomes a form of self-knowledge which comes to
define the person’s perception of self (‘ … and tied to his own identity
by a conscience or self-knowledge.’). These overlapping elements consti-
tute a form of power relationship in which the person becomes both a
subject and an object of knowledge. As an object, they are subjected to
the evaluation of others, and in so doing, thus constitute their subject pos-
ition in society (‘Both meanings suggest a form of power which subju-
gates and makes subject to’).
The Foucauldian image of the re-creation of subject position emerges as

one that is inherently tied to the reproduction of systems of meaning and
relations of power. It is implicitly interactive, but does not theorise agency
sufficiently. In this regard Davies and Harre’s (1990) account of position-
ing is a useful corrective. They argue that ‘conversation unfolds through
the joint action of all the participants as they make (or attempt to
make) their own and each other’s actions socially determinate’ (Davies
& Harre, 1990, p. 45). As they argue, subject positions are different
from social roles in that they are the product of interaction, in which
some accounts of subject position are made to count and others are inva-
lidated. Sometimes certain perceptions of a subject position have more
illocutionary force than others (Davies & Harre, 1990). In this regard
Davies and Harré emphasise the significance of pre-existing discourses
that exist as dynamic frames of reference. As we will emphasise in this
case, the power relations of bureaucratic context are significant, as well
as the contingent will and resistance of the social actor in question.
Subject positions are constructed within contexts of social power.
Power is a complex phenomenon that is not inherently negative. Power
is a capacity for action that includes both power-to and power-over (Allen,
1998, 1999; Haugaard, 1997, 2012b). As argued elsewhere (Haugaard,
2012b), the first dimension of power is simple agency. The everyday
image of power is as domination. However, power also includes power-
to, which is agency, and power-over is a subset of power-to. Actors find
themselves negotiating their subject positions in contexts where others
exercise power-over them and, simultaneously, where these subject pos-
itions give them power-to. If you wish to be recognised as a refugee,
those in authority will exercise power-over you telling you how to act.
Once recognition is bestowed, a capacity for action is conferred, or
power-to. What emerges is a complex relationship entailing both
power-over, as domination, but also power-to.
This power-over and power-to take place within a set of structural con-
straints, which are both limiting and enabling. For example, the bureau-
cratic structures of the refugee recognition process that differentiate
between bogus and genuine applicants limit the actions of the officials
that staff this bureaucratic structure, while also constraining the actions
of applicants. However, the second dimension of power is both constrain-
ing and enabling, in the sense that these constraining structures also offer
a process whereby people fleeing persecution can find sanctuary, and ulti-
mately gain citizenship in Ireland. The latter constitutes agency and
power-to.
The third dimension of power concerns the epistemic context of

meaning, which shapes conditions of possibility. The structural constraint
of the second dimension of power is nested within an episteme (Foucault,
1971). An asylum-seeker is a specific type of agent (with meaning) who, by
virtue of being like this or that, can do this or that (power-to). Translated
into the everyday, a person who is a citizen (agent with meaning) has, for
instance, the right to vote, work, or claim unemployment assistance
(power-to). This epistemic horizon defines what is locally considered
reasonable. It is considered reasonable that citizens can vote and work.

Conversely, it would be unreasonable that foreign non-citizens, or bogus
asylum-seekers, should have these rights, which is a form of exclusion.
Of course, this reasoning presupposes social constructions, which could
in principle be constructed otherwise. It is part of genealogical deconstruc-
tion to make this contingency manifest (Foucault, 1988, p. 37). However,
this form of deconstruction is not usually visible to the actors involved,
especially those representing the status quo, because they adopt what phe-
nomenologists call the natural attitude (Schutz, 1967). When adopting the
natural attitude social actors forget that it is they who impose meaning
upon the world. Instead, they assume that the world comes with
meaning given. As we shall see, for someone outside the system negotiat-
ing it for the first time, many of these meanings appear constructed, thus
in a sense arbitrary, as they do for the genealogist. These are points of
resistance (Scott, 1990) that render three- and four-dimensional power
visible. As argued by Davies (2008), those resisting in this way are at an
intrinsic epistemic disadvantage as they are contesting that which is con-
sidered the natural order of things, one which, as a consequence, is con-
sidered to have greater moral worth. This is further reinforced if
bureaucratic authority is involved – be this in a school (as in one of
Davies examples [2008]) or Irish asylum bureaucracy, as in this case. In
terms of the four dimensions of power, this form of resistance contests
not only at the overt A versus B (first dimension) but also deeper
within the other dimensions, which include the systemic structuring of
social life that confers differences in structured authority (second dimen-
sion), tacit epistemic frame (third dimension), and social ontology (fourth
dimension). We agree with Davies (2008) that this kind of power conflict
is a potentially insurrectionary act because this form of contestation cuts
right across all four dimensions. Thus, it is what can be termed deep con-
flict (see Haugaard, 1997, pp. 136–162).
As argued by the social theorist Barnes (1988), the meaning of things is
created by groups of social actors who constitute a ring of reference for
meaning. If we elect someone President, or interpret a piece of paper as a

50-euro note, we constitute a ring of reference that makes these things
what they are. This ring of reference is not necessarily society as a
whole, but a set of relevant others, an audience. It is a specifically desig-
nated set of officials who are the relevant others that decide whether an
applicant is a bogus asylum-seeker or genuine refugee. They have the
power to create social reality, or social facts, in this context.
Social facts are recreated as constitutive rules (Searle, 1996, pp. 31–58).
In everyday speech, when we think of rules we tend to think of regulative

rules, which are discursively set out rules that tell us what we should do. It
is a regulative rule that we should stop at a red traffic light, or that we can
use money in certain ways and not others. While money, marriage, and
the Presidency of the United States are surrounded by regulative rules,
what constitute the essence of these social institutions are constitutive
rules whereby the piece of paper, a marriage certificate, and the office of
the President count as particular signifiers. Constitutive rules take the
form ‘X counts as Y in context C’ – a piece of paper with the number 5
and the symbol $ counts as a five dollar bill in the United States (Searle,
1996, pp. 26–29). With constitutive rules, we count something as having
certain status, and with that status, a certain function.
Bringing Foucault, Barnes, Searle and, Davies and Harré together, a
subject position is one that has a ring of reference around it. In that
case the person becomes an X that counts as Y in circumstances C. For
an individual, an X, to become a Y is not purely in their own power.
Both for Presidents and refugees there are exact procedures (circum-
stances C) that Xs have to go through to become Ys. Xs cannot simply
will themselves to be Ys.
From the perspective of the person wishing to occupy a subject pos-
ition, the recreation of their status and meaning is essentially performative
(Austin, 1975). They have to act in a way that is deemed felicitous by rel-
evant others. The fourth dimension of power concerns this ontological
shaping of subject position. As argued by Jenkins (2008), the world-out-
there is full of social things: chairs, tables, and so on, but it also contains
subject positions, or identities, including, for instance: the Queen, teachers,
women, student, delinquents, and refugees. Each of these subject positions
constitutes a signifier that actors perform – an X performing Y. If their
actions are considered inappropriate by others (as in the label ‘bogus
asylum-seeker’), they are deemed infelicitous. In contrast, if their
actions are considered reasonable, by relevant others in a specific ring of
reference, then their actions are deemed felicitous (as in the case of
genuine refugees). A felicitous action gives the performer of that action

certain powers (power-to), while an infelicitous reaction renders that
actor powerless. The audience has quasi-panoptical (Foucault, 1979)
power-over the performer.
Subject positions constitute a complementary duality of both empow-
erment and disempowerment. A sovereign state, such as Ireland, is popu-
lated by social actors most of whom are citizens, which entitles them to all
sorts of rights and services. However, there are those who are not born
with those rights, who wish to access them (asylum-seekers). Thus, the
position of citizen becomes a closely guarded entity, which has complex
governmental procedures to protect it. The refugee recognition process
contains within it endless demands for performances from applicants.
Once the applicant achieves a performance which is considered felicitous,
then they are declared a refugee, and the process opens up to citizenship.
What counts as a felicitous performance is at the behest of officials who
operate as a ring of reference (four-dimensional power). The system has
a bureaucratic structure that operates as the appropriate ring of reference
deciding who is a genuine refugee, which is the first step to becoming inte-
grated into the social system, as an Irish citizen.
No one is simply one kind of a subject. As social actors we are consist-
ently creating and recreating our identities. Each action of identity consti-
tutes a performance, which is carried out for an audience (Goffman, 1961).
In the morning someone may perform the identity of a mother, in the
afternoon a teacher, then a citizen, consumer, and mother again, simul-
taneously remaining all these identities. However, subject positions rep-
resent institutionalised forms of identification allowing for successful
interaction in particular contexts. They are fluctuant and processual, over-
lapping social categories of self-perception and societal structures (Davies,
2008; Jenkins, 2008). Sometimes there is tension between these subject
positions, especially where they overlap. For the social actor, subject pos-
itions situate them in a meaningful universe. Using Giddens (1984) voca-
bulary, these acts are moments of structuration that, when well received by
the audience, form part of the natural order of things and bestow ontologi-
cal security. As such, subject positions provide us with the content of our
subjectivity, with a particular, limited set of concepts, images, metaphors,
ways of speaking and self-narratives that we adopt as our own to make us
ontologically secure as social-beings-in-the-world.
Ontological security constitutes a sense of being at ease with one’s
being-in-the-world. Being a Y in circumstances C can be ontologically
rewarding, especially when the projected sense of self is an unproblematic
part of the furniture of the world. Nonetheless, as argued by Butler (1997),

sometimes these apparently unproblematic identifications that provide
ontological security actually entail the reproduction of inequalities in
power relations that may be normatively problematic. However, if we
are an X wanting to be a Y, but the external ring of reference tells us
that our performance of Yness is inappropriate (consequently, that we
are really a Z), then our being-in-the-world is contested and we become
ontologically insecure.
These subject positions are often emotionally charged for social sub-
jects. Identifying with a subject position frequently has more than instru-
mental value. As argued by Lacan, ‘What I seek in speech is the response of
the other’ (Lacan, 1953, p. 86 – quoted in Peters & Appel, 1996, p. 128).
When social actors present a self-identity, it is more than a strategic pos-
ition. They desire above all their self-perception to be validated by others
(Peters & Appel, 1996, p. 128). In this sense subject positions imply some-
thing deeper than simple positioning (Davies & Harre, 1990), they also
entail profound ontological identity-claims (Jenkins, 2008).
As emphasised by Butler (1997), in many instances those in a subject
position come to be attached to their subject position. With regard to
gender, a woman who has been brought up to be ‘polite,’ which is con-
sidered a ‘female’ virtue in many societies, will become attached to the
praise and recognition she achieves when being ‘polite,’ even though
this form of gendered ‘politeness’ can be disempowering. This form of
four-dimensional power however takes time to reflexively process, in
order to configure the socially ontological formative psychic force
within the individual (Butler, 1997). In the case under examination we
see a social actor being forced into a subject position, which is, at first,
objectionable to her and so there is significant resistance. At the outset,
compliance to four-dimensional power is purely strategic (Scott, 1990)
for the sake of gaining power-to. However, over time, that is, during
and beyond this study (see Epilogue), there may well be psychic internal-
isation as contestation to the enforced subject position generates reflec-
tion, transformation, and ultimately the stability of the self.
If acting were just a question of recognition at all costs, the obvious
rational action is to perform what the more powerful ring of reference
demands. However, that may not represent the being-in-the-world the
social actor wishes, or what gives ontological security. Being recognised
for who you want to be is far from a straightforward process. This
applies to all social agency, but most acutely to cases involving cross-
cultural interaction and formal entry into a system with official guardians,
such as the refugee recognition process.
4. Learning to negotiate complex cross-cultural identities

Hannah begins her interviews with a self-definition:
My name is Hannah [not her real name], Hannah A. [not the first letter of her
real surname], that [A.] is my father’s name and I like to say my father’s name
rather than my family name. I am from Gaza, Palestine.
Her subject position is in terms of her family, her father’s name, making
her proud. We can see that she is from Gaza, Palestine. In other words, her
being-in-the-world is tied to family and situatedness in Gaza, Palestine, all
of which confer ontological security. This point is reinforced later in the
interview when she discusses her decision to become a refugee:
I am not a refugee in my country, I am a refugee here or I would be … My
grandfather is a citizen of Gaza, he did all his best to keep himself citizen
and to keep his children citizens but my grandfather’s plan didn’t work in
our day due to the political situation and so I had to give up being a citizen.
And you know as an Irish person what being a citizen means and to claim
for this status in another country. When I first heard that my brother got
refugee status in Sweden I thought ‘poor Grandfather.’
Relative to ‘X counts as Y in circumstances C,’ note the assertion I am not

a refugee in my country, I am a refugee here. I am not a subject Y (refugee)
in my country (C), with regard to that ring of reference, but I am a Y in the
context of this country (different C), as a ring of reference. This social
actor is reflexively conscious of the local, socially constructed, nature of
the category refugee (Y).
Hannah A. explicitly compares giving up the claim to Gazan citizen-
ship as equivalent to an Irish person giving up their citizenship. In other
words, unlike the refugee category, this identity is something deeper,
more ontologically significant, which is consistent with Butler’s (1997)
claim that subject positions have significant psychic force. Consequently,
she thinks that attempting to claim the citizenship of another country
constitutes an act of betrayal to her family and, by implication, to her
own self. She defines her subject position Y in terms of her family
lineage – Gaza and Palestine. In regard to this strong Gazan identifi-
cation, it is relevant to note that Hannah’s grandfather was not a
refugee of the 1948 war – when 700,000 Palestinians were displaced
from Israel, 200,000 of whom wound up in Gaza under Egyptian
occupation (see Morris, 2003 for more detail on the origins of Palesti-
nian refugees). Her grandfather and his family are indigenous inhabi-
tants of Gaza, hence the identification with Gaza city, which is then
layered with ‘Palestinian’ as an overlapping identity. It is reasonable to
infer, following Elias’ work on insiders and outsiders (Elias & Scotson,
1994), that being a true Gazan carries higher status than being a 1948
refugee to Gaza. Gazan is a Y status to be proud of.
Identity is rarely singular, even though it is often talked about that way
in everyday discourse. Those trying to fight for the recognition of Yness
against opposition from dominant groups, be that based upon national

or sexual orientation, often use phrases like ‘I am Palestinian’ or ‘I am
gay.’ These statements misrepresent the complexity of identity, although
their singularity makes sense in context where a particular identity is con-
tested. Like most social actors Hannah’s Gazan-cum-Palestinianess is not
her only subject position of Yness:
First time I came to Ireland was in 2008/2009 to do my Master’s. I came as a
student. I was always interested to see, not only to have a degree and all this,
a certificate, we say it in our language – cartoon of certificate which is a
paper – I wanted the journey …
So anyway I came here as a student, why I am mentioning this is because I will
go back to this in sometimes of my story as an asylum-seeker now. (emphasis
author’s own)
She came to Ireland initially on an Irish Aid fellowship to do a Master’s

degree. After completing her MA, Hannah decided to apply for refugee
status in Ireland as a consequence of deteriorating circumstances for
Fatah supporters in Gaza (her family is strongly associated with Fatah),
brought about by Hamas’ intolerance of political opposition inside
Gaza. Later, conflict with Israel added to these reasons for asylum. As a
student Hannah lived in student accommodation, called Ranelagh
Manor (name changed). She describes how she became friends with
many Irish people there. Even now, as an asylum seeker, when she
visits she still feels the Yness of a student.
I was lucky to have friends. I am still a student of Ranelagh Manor. I love
[Ranelagh], I just want to say that because it was the perfect place … (emphasis
author’s own)
We later learn that this student identity is, together with her Gazan-Pales-
tinian identity, one of her preferred identities. However, as a student,
before her asylum application, she already felt certain tensions between
her student identity and the demands of her identities from Gaza, Pales-
tine, and Muslim.
Relative to a perceived wider ring of reference of Irish society in general,
subject position student Yness entails tension with her Gazan-Palestinian
identity. To be clear, this Irish society ring of reference is different from
the rings of reference of individual Irish people, such as the interviewer
or other Irish students. ‘Gazan-Palestinian’ is linked, in her mind, to the
subject position of female Muslim, which, relative to this general Irish
ring of reference, is in tension with student. This becomes manifest in

her discussion of the hijab. When she came to Ireland she wore a head-
scarf, or hijab, which identified her:
This is me with a scarf, this is me a Muslim, this is me Hannah A., this is me
Palestine, Gaza all these, you have all these identities that are with you so you
just want to show the world who are you with all these identities.
So the scarf signifies her Gazan-Palestinian-Muslim, identity and serves to

give her a clear identity.
By using the general word scarf she is suggesting that this piece of cloth
could have a dual role. It could be a hijab for Hannah as the Gazan-Pales-
tinian-Muslim, but it could also just be a scarf, which anyone might wear,
relative to the Irish ring of reference. Here, ambiguity has the potential for
a certain freedom of self-definition. However, while that ambiguity or
duality was reproduced in the house with her friends as a ring of reference,
this was not so in Irish society in general. In the student house they saw
her as an individual, as she considered herself to be: ‘I find it easier
with the Irish friends, inside Ranelagh, to look inside me rather than
my appearance.’ ‘Appearance’ here is code for being identified as a
female Muslim. As suggested by the concept of a ring of reference, you
are not in control of how others perceive you. While she liked the
subject position Gazan-Palestinian-Muslim, at the same time she rejected
many of the preconceptions that went with female Muslim, as defined by
the ring of reference of Irish society. To the wider Irish interpretative
horizon, female Muslim excluded being a reflective, educated being, the
essence of being a student. This reading of what it is to be a female
Muslim is based upon clichés derived from a Western Orientalist
reading of what it is to be a Muslim (Said, 2004).
Based upon encouragement from her grandfather, from the age of six,
Hannah desired an education and what she considered the kind of normal
life that went with that:
… It all happened since I was 6 years old. And my grandfather was very sup-
portive of that, like he understands, but he knows that I wanted more than a
normal life and he saw that and encouraged that and my education.
When she came to Ireland as a student, she ‘found the scarf as an obstacle’
because Irish people could not see past the scarf to the self-educating
person she considered herself to be.
… When I came here I started to think about change, real change, not just
about attitudes. I was afraid of being misjudged to be honest, with my
friends, that you wear a scarf, now you are wearing … actually it took me, I
did that in degrees. I used to wear a scarf and then I replaced it with a hat
and now when I came to Western City I thought ok now I want to take it off.
In my religion this is wrong. In my culture this is wrong [but] I want to be
integrated.
This is a particularly interesting piece as she is expressing the conflict

between the subject position defined by her religion and her culture, yet
there was the draw of her average (Irish) student identity, equivalent to
social integration and power-to. Note that she continues to use the
word scarf, not hijab, and then tries to substitute a hat. The hat has
even greater ambiguity than would a scarf. To Hannah it could suggest
continuing to conform to her Muslim identity. Hats would not normally
be recognised as substitute hijabs, so she could escape the signifier of
Muslim relative to the Irish ring of reference, while remaining a Muslim
to herself. However, even for her, the signifier hat was stretching the sig-
nified equivalence of hijab too far. When she was dispersed from Dublin
to a direct provision centre in a Western City, the latter was a new ring of
reference. Here was a chance to dispense with a misunderstood aspect of
her identity so that she could integrate.
People look at you. Sometimes people just give you a look. That look of I am
different. I don’t want to be seen as different, that’s the thing. I don’t want to
be seen as someone who is not from this society. Like you will look at me …
I won’t be having the conversation with you to see whether you really like
me the way I am, or you don’t. I care about that because I am here with no
family so I need to establish what works.
The significance of the phrase they look at you stands for the perception of
Irish society as a whole, which constitutes a ring of reference that defines
her, irrespective of her desires. She is here without a family, her normal
ring of reference and mode of social integration. With family removed
she was open to ontological insecurity, and so decided to socially integrate
when she moved to Western City.
Agency entails improvisation, and so Hannah finds a way to square the

apparent incompatibility of removing the hijab with remaining loyal to
her family ring of reference. The ontological security of her family, even
if not physically co-present, provided stability. Her grandfather is the
paterfamilias and, as such, has high status authority within the family-
Gazan ring of reference. Her grandfather wanted her to be educated.
Therefore, implicitly, by projecting student in Ireland, she is receiving
the approval of her grandfather, even if the actual performance conflicts
with her Gazan-Palestinian-Muslim identity. True, her grandfather

would disapprove of her not being a good Muslim, but he would
approve of her being an educated student. Consequently, if she cannot
be both, by being an educated student, she is not rejecting her grand-
father’s desires. Thus, in his physical absence, Grandfather can be recon-
structed as a referent or ring of reference for her identity and ontological
security.
In the passage on subject positions referred to earlier, Foucault refers to
subject positions as subjection, or as being subjected to another. A con-
stant theme of Madness and civilization (Foucault, 1971) is the idea that
modern domination entails monologue by reason upon madness. By
this he means that reason, as a ring of reference, has the singular right
to define reality, including the meaning identity (subject position) of the
other. In normative terms, this is a non-reciprocal or one-way action
(not interaction) upon an abject other. This same theme reappears in Fou-
cault’s account of the Panopticon. The observing official at the centre of
the device observes the other, classifies them, but is never themselves
observed by that other (Foucault, 1979). We would argue that this consti-
tutes the opposite of what Habermas designates as ideal speech (Haber-
mas, 1984). The other is no longer considered a reasoning agent with
whom to co-define social action, rather that other is acted upon. We
would add that this is also what Honneth has in mind with the normative
significance of the politics of recognition (Honneth, 1995).
As we can see in Austin, performativity of subject position is never
entirely in the gift, or power, of the performer because she cannot
control her audience. That said, there is a difference between an audience
that defines you in advance, and one that responds to the cues that the
actor gives off. By using the words ‘Like you will look at me’ Hannah is
making a distinction between the wider Irish ring of reference and the
interviewer, even though the former and the latter overlap – both are
Irish. Unlike the wider Irish ring of reference, Hannah is reflexively
careful to observe the particularities of an interaction. In this regard,
Hannah is making the point that she herself, the interviewer, and fellow
students are all responsive to the interacting other. What is key is that a
subject position can be negotiated interactively between social subject
and the ring of reference. This approaches ideal speech and recognition
of the other. Alternatively, the ring of reference can constitute a mono-
logue that is deaf to the other. In this form of domination the social
actor is judged in advance of her actions. The audience decides that an
X, who is attempting to perform Y, is really a Z. This constitutes
fourth-dimensional power as domination. The more equal interactive

negotiation of subject identity referred to earlier (friends and interviewer)
is also four-dimensional power but with significant emancipating poten-
tial – it is important to remember that all dimensions of power, including
that of subject formation, have dominating and enabling emancipatory
aspects (Butler, 1997; Haugaard, 2015).
Relative to a different Jordanian-Muslim ring of reference, Hannah also
experiences incapacity to define herself. Her Irish MA research was upon
the lives of Palestinians in Jordan, which necessitated a visit to Jordan. In
Jordan she did not fit with expectations either. Despite wearing a hijab, her
Jordanian ring of reference saw her as an educated female in her 30s, pur-
suing her own independent identity. However, that ring of reference
demanded a different identity: ‘ … In Jordan I was supposed to be seen
with a husband or a father or with a brother, or with a man.’ She was
different to the average Jordanian and Palestinian female. ‘It was about
my attitudes and personal plans. I have different plans and I am not
married and for someone my age … ’
Her perceived Yness in Jordan elicited negative reactions from both
Jordanian men and women. Women did not welcome Hannah as a pur-
veyor of liberating feminist potentials. Rather, she ‘created a question
mark for a lot of women, like ok she’s dangerous for me she’s going to
take my husband because we have, in Islam a man can marry four
wives but … .’ These women saw beyond the scarf/hijab to a socially con-
structed image of her as the threatening female. Relative to the general
Irish ring of reference, the scarf made her an uneducated devout
Muslim, while to Jordanians she was an autonomous threatening other.
These definitions are at variance, however the process is the same. Both
groups create rings of reference that define subject positions for her,
thus operating a monologue of four-dimensional domination. Hannah
brings that lesson with her, as she comments: ‘I was really tired in
Jordan to have that integration. I do not want to have that same story
here.’
In conclusion, before the refugee recognition process starts, Hannah is

a social actor who has to negotiate complex subject positions within cross-
cultural contexts. She has to renegotiate between various roles, not all of
which are in her control, because it is not she who decides the conditions
of felicity and infelicity for her various subject positions. She is already
subject to four-dimensional power because of cultural difference.
5. Hannah A. negotiates the asylum process

5.1. Background
Ireland’s refugee recognition process was established in 1996 with the

passing of the Refugee Act, 1996. This Act, as amended, established two
independent bodies, the Office of the Refugee Applications Commission
(ORAC) and the Refugee Applications Tribunal (RAT), who have the
responsibility to make recommendations to the Minister for Justice,
Equality, and Law Reform as to whether someone applying for asylum
should be declared a refugee. The process is that an application is first con-
sidered by ORAC and, if rejected, it normally proceeds on appeal to the
RAT. In 2011, 135 people were accepted as refugees in Ireland, 5% (half
the European average) of the applications that were decided that year
by ORAC and RAT (Conlon, Waters, & Berg, 2012, p. 1). Ireland’s
system remains unique in Europe as it operates a two-tier legal process.
An applicant must first be granted or denied refugee status before being
considered for subsidiary protection, carrying over any negative impli-
cations their denial of refugee status may have on their case. Although
Ireland is part of the Common European Asylum System, many directives
that would enable ORAC and RAT to operate more efficiently have not
been introduced to legislation, or Ireland has opted out. Since 2000,
asylum-seekers are dispersed to Direct Provision centres pending
decisions on their cases (often taking between three and seven years).
They are provided with full board accommodation and subsistence of
€19.10 per adult per week and €9.60 per child per week.
5.2. Hannah A.’s experience
When entering the refugee recognition process as an asylum seeker

Hannah feels well equipped from her experience as a student in Ireland.
She has Irish friends, but the social and cultural capital she has
accumulated does not prepare her for the harsh reality of the system. She
is aware that it is a highly significant move, but not quite how big:
Things really got very bad in Gaza and the decision to take asylum is just very
huge, it’s very very very huge. And you know what, every step in being an
asylum you just realise how huge it is, it is not just (clicks her fingers) and
that’s it.
How significant a move it is only dawns on her as she becomes involved

in the process, which is because her Yness as a Gazan-Palestinian is an
ontologically deep Yness, not shallow like her asylum seeker Yness.
Once she adopts the Yness of asylum-seeker, the Irish ring of reference
changes from being friendly to being largely hostile and distrusting:
‘Then after claiming asylum I saw the other image of Ireland, which is a
sad image, just away from … that I learnt in Ranelagh. It’s different.’
The changing ring of reference entailed a fundamental shift in everyday
interaction:
… . In Ranelagh, among my Irish friends they were always kind to me, when
they ask you, when they say well, sorry you can’t do this, you know the
polite way of saying things. But as an asylum seeker I was seen as different
by the Irish government.
The ring of reference that defines a subject position includes the material
world, not just the interaction of other social actors. For instance, the
Direct Provision centre (Hostel), in Western City, where she lives is
encoded with a different language than the student hostel of Ranelagh:
I mean look at the signs inside the hostel – NO FOOD HERE – the language is
different. The language is harsh, it is coming from up there to down there.
There is no communication at all between them.
She emphasises the one-way nature of the communication. The building

speaks in a one-way judgmental view that defines the subject positions
of the inhabitants. There is no communication as an interactive process
– no ideal speech, no recognition of otherness. This constitutes the
subject position of subjection. However, Hannah does not suddenly
forget what it was like to interact in Ireland before. In fact, the sharp con-
trast shocks her.
Now being aware of all this, and having friends and seeing that warm picture of
Ireland, it just actually shocked me, shocked me to the extreme extent. The
other image of Ireland – Oh my God.
Unlike some other asylum-seekers, Hannah has a strong sense of what a

big decision she is making in seeking refugee status. This is compounded
primarily by an official demand to reject her student subject position,
which she has proudly cultivated since her departure from Gaza. What
makes the process so traumatic is that the bureaucratic rules of the
game defining student and asylum-seeker are incompatible subject pos-
itions. Furthermore, every interaction is defined by mistrust on the part
of the official bureaucratic ring of reference. Upon interpreting this it is
always important to remember that this is not random domination, there-

fore we must not read this as a Manichean story of oppressive (evil) dom-
inators and their victims. The bureaucrats are acting within two-
dimensional structural constraints that limit their conditions of
possibility.
Hannah encounters the pervasive atmosphere of mistrust in one of her
first encounters with bureaucratic officials: registering as an asylum-seeker
with ORAC. In this registration procedure the applicant fills out a general
form containing biographical details and hands over any official identifi-
cation documents for verification, that is, one’s passport or birth certifi-
cate. On the registration form, she is asked to fill in her mother’s
maiden name:
The first thing, for example. You know of course your mother’s name but some-
times you don’t really spell it correctly. You know your sibling’s birthday but it’s
not everyday conversation that you recall them, but you have to be very careful
in your first interview because if you miss saying that of course you are lying …
So in the application I was asked to write my mother’s name and I was con-
cerned that I didn’t want to have, to be conflicting with the spelling in my pass-
port, so I asked for the passport again to see how my mother’s name was
spelled … So the woman held the passport, she had an attitude now, she
was scared or I don’t know what she was thinking, assuming that I would
take the passport? That’s why I just said can I have a look at MY passport?
(emphasis author’s own)
Hannah begins to feel the authoritative positions of those who discipline

what it means to act as an asylum seeker. Her passport is no longer for her
own sole possession. She is under the authority of those who determine
whether she is a Y, as a genuine refugee or a Z as bogus asylum seeker. Ulti-
mately, in this action of authority, or indeed symbolic violence (the
woman held the passport), she begins to feel subjection by the other
(she had an attitude now).
This incident is followed by another similar scenario, when Hannah
meets the Community Welfare Officer (CWO) in Western City. It is
necessary for all asylum-seekers, once they have been dispersed to a direct
provision centre, to meet with a CWO to ascertain their details within the
locality, and register for their subsistence payment. The encounter proves
controversial for Hannah as she presents herself to the CWO as a student
and an asylum seeker.
I said I was a student doing my MA and I was in a room. I didn’t come from a
hostel.
‘Oh this is very strange,’ she said.
Now we need to write on the paper [the application] and say that … well you
are going to have to write a paper [letter] to show that your parents can’t
pay your money and to explain why you were in a room on your own in
Dublin because your case is different. (emphasis author’s own)
At these initial stages of Hannah’s entry into the refugee recognition

process she is unaware of the way in which the asylum-seeker subject Y
position is to be articulated and performed. Identifying oneself as a
student, coming from another residence, with means and independence,
is not considered the ‘normal’ condition of a refugee. Refugees are con-
sidered to have fled their homeland in often drastic and violent persecu-
tory conditions and are in need of fundamental assistance. Therefore, in
essentialised terms, they are expected to be miserable, poor, and destitute.
As indicated by the CWO above, her case is different. The two-dimen-
sional bureaucratic rules of the game begin to rearticulate Hannah’s
four-dimensional subject position. They begin to hone her identity as
one of an asylum seeker, one in which she must show that ‘I am poor,
that I am miserably poor. I need your money, I need your €19.10.’ In
the same encounter she sought travel money to visit her solicitor in
Dublin for advice now that she had been dispersed to a Western City:
I asked her I meant to go to Dublin to see my lawyer and I was told that I could
get my travelling money from social welfare officer so I asked her about the pro-
cedure … so she said, show me a letter of appointment, then you fill the appli-
cation and give it to me and I give you money. And this is actually what I did. I
asked the lawyer to send me a fax with that and I just put some pressure on the
lawyer because I wanted to do that very quickly and very soon because it was on
Thursday I learned of this so I had only Friday because the appointment was on
Monday … She said, you have to be in a way moved to [Western City] and you
have to be interested in the Refugee Legal Services in [Western City].
I said, this is what I did three days ago and now that’s why I am meeting my
solicitor in Dublin to see what I have to do next so I need the money for that.
She said, ‘I can’t pay.’
She was rude and she even gave me her back. And she said ‘sorry’ but she didn’t
mean it …
… She didn’t give me the money. I was so angry and I said that’s it, this lady is
sick, really sick and I hate her now and I am sorry to say that but this is my
feeling for her.
In the above we see the enforced transition to asylum-seeker subject. The

criteria are unclear, and she is caught in a double bind. Although she suc-
cessfully acts on the directions given by gaining proof of her appointment
with her solicitor in Dublin, her performance is deemed infelicitous
because implicitly you cannot be an asylum seeker and be someone (a Y)
who travels. The broader context is an institutional rule for the subject
position asylum-seeker, precluding movement beyond locality. The
system is so structured that asylum seekers are isolated through dispersal
into a direct provision system with a minimal weekly subsistence payment
that is insufficient for travel, so they remain where they are dispersed. The
inability to meet the demands of these incompatible rules: being allowed
to apply for travel assistance because one is entitled to legal representation,
but being denied this assistance as one should not have the means to
travel, ultimately angers Hannah (I was so angry … I hate her now … )
because she feels her powerlessness, her lack of agency.
The encounter between Hannah and the system illustrates the uni-
linear nature and asymmetrical power relation of asylum-seekers’ inter-
actions with authoritative positions. They figuratively turn their backs,
rendering many of their performances infelicitous and powerless. Thus
the contesting other is rendered speechless and, by implication, ignorant
(Davies, 2008). This form of abjection initiates the search for a degree
of ontological security. In this guise, Hannah returns to the direct pro-
vision centre and retells her encounter with the CWO above to the
other girls in her room, seeking them as a ring of reference:
You know, people talk. I came back to the hostel, the girls – my roommates,
asked me:
‘Well, how was your day?’
‘Ok, it was ok, but that lady didn’t give me the money,’ I said.
‘Why?’ they said.
‘I don’t know … I don’t know,’ I said.
‘Ok, she definitely likes you!’ as in the cynical – oh she likes you!
‘Well … if you met her as a student all her attitude will be different,’ they said.
I believe them because I was a student and I know how people deal with stu-
dents, now I am an asylum seeker.
Hannah is presenting herself within the asylum system, to immigration

authorities, social welfare authorities and other asylum seekers as a
student, as an individualised identity, which is different from the collective
identity of asylum-seekers. What her roommates display in the comment –

‘If you met her as a student all her attitude will be different’ –
demonstrates awareness that the subject position student and that of
asylum-seeker elicit entirely different reactions from those within the
bureaucratic ring of reference. Significantly, her roommates point out to
her that being a student is not commensurate with being an asylum-
seeker, within the three-dimensional dominant discourse. These subject
positions constitute an either/or choice, not both/and, hence you cannot
be an asylum seeker and be a student.

Interestingly, in observing the difference ‘a latent conceptual agree-
ment’ among the participants in the interaction is taking place. They
are developing mutual trust, and Hannah moves towards the collective
identity with the assertion ‘I believe them … now I am an asylum
seeker.’ Recognising herself in the same position as other confers some
ontological security.
As Hannah becomes more knowledgeable about the process, she begins
to strip away her previous positions. She becomes cognisant and reflective
of her changing self-perception as she interacts with events around her in
the direct provision centre, and from her interactions with fellow asylum-
seekers. What emerges as her self-perception aligns to the Yness of an
asylum-seeker: the powerless, miserable, victim-type status that she is
expected to perform, leads to fluctuations in the stability of her sense of
self. This is compounded with a realisation of the passing of time, and
the inevitability of that duration.
It is a temporary place that you stay in … there is no belonging here …
… From the stories that you hear, you feel like it is going to be very long and it’s
very silly and stupid to think that your story is going to be quicker than others
or that your case is going to be quicker than others … It’s very easy to get fru-
strated, it’s very hard not to be frustrated. Sometimes you feel like it’s a single
word, only one single word that can make you up, and one single word that
make you down. I don’t feel like my education helps me here.
… I am like anybody else here.
Hannah has moved from the position of ‘I am not like them’ to one of ‘I
am like them.’ Saying ‘I am like anybody else here’ reveals a strategy to
create an autonomy that is aligned to the collective identity of asylum-
seekers. The assertion ‘I don’t feel like my education helps me here’ is
curious in that it can be interpreted as part of her new collective identity:
she is not setting herself apart from the rest based upon her education. Is
this the beginning of a psychic attachment (Butler, 1997) to a fourth-
dimensional subject position? To echo the title and recurrent theme of
Said’s Memoir (Said, 1999), maybe Hannah is seeking to overcome con-

stantly feeling ‘out of place’ whatever she does.
There is also another aspect to this shift. Education is usually seen as a
source of agency – as a form of cultural capital in Bourdieu’s sense.
However, this resource is rendered useless relative to her new ring of refer-
ence and subject position. This is a further manifestation of her lack of
power as an asylum seeker, reinforced in the following:
The sense that you take is that they know whatever the asylum-seeker is doing
in this process [he/she] is still an asylum-seeker. It is not going to help him or

her if she is doing, or I am doing a thesis but still you are an asylum-seeker by
the end of the day.
Writing a thesis does not change her powerlessness as an asylum seeker,

because that is what she is. It is not about your past Yness, your past
experiences, but who you are now and will be in the future in light of
the common goal of refugee status. Hannah also acknowledges the idea
of asylum-seeker as an objective subject position, as something that is in
the world, like apples and oranges, which is the force of three-dimensional
power – although we know from previous dialogue that she is aware of its
social constructedness. The above speech-act is an acknowledgement of a
harsh reality of structural constraint (two-dimensional power), which
points toward an instability and loss of control of her sense of being-in-
the-world. She has little four-dimensional power over her own social
subject formation. This tension is apparent in the following quotation:
I’m sorry, you know what because I have nice friends, and I have been in
Ireland before I claimed asylum. I feel really guilty and I don’t like what I
say sometimes about the Irish government or the Irish process and all this,
because it’s not … I feel like I have a double face and I am not this way. But
to be honest, I feel like very very [she shrugs and sighs] … not myself …
These utterances reflect how she is made insecure by the shifting relation-
ship with her Irish friends brought about by her own move of subject pos-
ition. As a student they were simply, and straightforwardly, her friends.
They were collective ‘we’ subjects. Now, as an asylum seeker she also
has a new ‘we,’ which makes her Irish friends ‘them.’ Facets of identity
are constantly adjusted and reworked in response to one’s interaction
with others and the environment within which others are encountered.
Hannah is deeply uncomfortable with the subject position asylum-
seeker because she knows what it means relative to the Irish ring of refer-
ence. It suggests someone to be pitied, who is disempowered, without
agency. In contrast, she sees herself as an agent trying to get her life
together. As she explains:
I can tell you as to why I don’t use ‘asylum-seeker’ – because I feel sorry for
myself. I can’t guarantee what is in people’s minds about, or the image in
people’s mind about asylum-seeker so I don’t want to represent myself in
this. I can’t guarantee how much they can respect me or appreciate what I
am going through. That is the first thing, the second thing I don’t want to
make them feel that they should feel sorry for me and this really makes me
feel not empowered because all I am doing now is empowering myself,
putting myself together, learning new skills all this so I don’t want to sound
this as a reaction for my situation, of course I am an asylum-seeker I will
talk about this and this and this, but I don’t want to show myself as vulnerable
all the time.
Hannah’s speech is evident of attempted emancipatory four-dimensional

self-subjectification of self, in the context of dominating four-dimen-
sional objectification by other people. She does not want to present
herself as an asylum-seeker in everyday life to her Irish friends
because she does not want to deal with preconceptions, including a
certain pitying condescension. Said describes this condescension in his
account of Orientalism, whereby even compliments, given by the power-
ful, can have a deeply objectionable condescending quality that is often
invisible to the powerful, but highly visible to the less powerful (Said,
1985, p. 7).
Hannah’s reflexive awareness of the effects of her asylum-seeker status
upon other people inadvertently creates a relationship of uncertainty,
although the uncertainty felt within this dyadic relationship can be alle-
viated to a certain extent by a shared notion of friendship. At the same
time, these performatives point toward the instability of her sense of
being-in-the-world: Hannah displays fluctuations between an ontologi-
cally secure sense of self and an unstable sense of self. As Hannah
moves through the refugee recognition process she struggles to perform
the miserable victim status of an asylum-seeker. Significantly, this struggle
emerges in her discussion of her preparation for her official interview with
ORAC:
The 20th of May I was really worried. That was the day for the interview. I was
told you have to be very careful; you have to be … I was very tired, and you
want to talk about anything in the world except for your interview. I went
for the interview and I actually, my attitude was, and I don’t know how that
seemed but I didn’t want to look miserable, in fact, I bought new clothes for
that. I wanted to look good. I don’t know how that seemed, they might have
thought, oh right she’s lying. But why should I just look miserable, for again just
enjoying my right? I think the interview went well, and I’m saying I think
because you didn’t know, because the person who asks, it was a woman who
asked me, she was either really smiling or it was a fake smile and the attitude
you have is that, unfortunately, those people are just there to tell you that
you are lying so you can’t just avoid this and you can’t have a friendly relation-
ship with this person, and you just want to finish.
Hannah is not only worried and nervous, but also has a low level of motiv-
ation for the outcome of the interview. She experiences conflict between
her prior knowledge of what an interview entails in ‘normal’ circum-

stances ( … I bought new clothes for that. I wanted to look good) and
what is expected of her in an interview as an asylum-seeker; someone
who is abject (Why should I just look miserable?). She is conscious of
self-representation: how to manage the impressions that will be formed
of her, how she will be interpreted or objectified by the interviewer. By
‘looking good’ she is reverting to a normal ‘front stage’ which in turn
may reduce her proximity for psychological penetration and lessen her
vulnerability given ‘the situation’ (Goffman, 1971). However, she is
unsure whether or not the front stage smile of the interviewer is
genuine. It could mask a ‘backstage’ rejection (Goffman, 1971). The per-
ception that the interviewer may be false is reinforced by the fact that the
normal state of being-in-the-world for an asylum seeker is relative to a
ring of disbelief from officialdom (Conlon et al., 2012). Perhaps there is
also an expectation of disbelief because Hannah knew that she should
have acted miserable, like an asylum-seeker, not as an everyday person
going to a normal interview.
Deception is often prevalent among asylum-seekers. This is not necess-
arily because they want to be deliberately deceptive, or are ‘bogus,’ but
because they have to perform relative to official expectations, which are
often out of sync with the reality refugees come from. While dissimulation
is necessary, even among asylum-seekers themselves, this fact is still
largely kept backstage, rather than openly acknowledged. Yet it is tacitly
known and common in certain backstage moments shared amongst
asylum-seekers.
Registered letters bring official communication to the direct provision
centres. These letters are usually either a positive or negative determi-
nation of some point in their case. Following the interview above, a regis-
tered letter brings Hannah a refusal of refugee status at first instance. She
is annoyed and perceives the reasons for refusal as constructing her as a
liar. This is a common perception by asylum-seekers and, arguably, one

derived from the official legal process. She reacts:
It is a clear accusation of being a liar. And after being in the hostel, maybe
someone lied for this, but I don’t think so. After being in the hostel and experi-
encing what has gone in the hostel, though it was a short time you can under-
stand how bad or how difficult the living situation is in there. You just can’t
realise that someone is lying. Even if someone is lying, but you can’t think
that this is logical because it is horrible in the hostel. It is not horrible
because you are taking food. It is about the isolation. It is how people think
about you, you are literally thrown away. Yes, I was lucky to be in [Western
City] near the beach, but these nice views, they don’t do anything for you
when it comes to this decision.
The above reaction alludes to the attributes of the collectivity of asylum-

seekers, both of a collectivity whose members recognise their own mem-
bership and norms (After being in the hostel … You can’t just realise that
someone is lying), while it is also a collectivity that is identified and defined
by others (It is how people think about you). Hannah then states that this
definition/rejection means ‘You are literally thrown away.’ The idea of
being thrown means infelicity and abjection. The actor performs Yness,
yet the ring of reference rejects it – you are not a Y but a liar. The audience
deems the performance bogus relative to the actor’s performative being-in-
the-world. It renders the actor powerless, a non-social agent (thrown
away). Metaphorically this constitutes social death (Patterson, 1982).
As a qualifier, it must be remembered that from the perspective of the
bureaucrats, they have been tasked with distinguishing between bogus
asylum-seekers and genuine refugees. If they are not perceived to accom-
plish that, their own performance is infelicitous, relative to their ring of
reference, which includes the Minister for Justice, Equality, and Law
Reform. Everyone, including the more powerful, is structurally con-
strained to some extent. Nonetheless, they also have some responsibility
for how the structures are interpreted (Davies, 2008)
As argued by Jenkins (2000, p. 9), authoritative categorisation produces
the consequential ‘identity effects’ of both internal and external labelling,
which in turn can evoke resistance. In this instance, the refusal determi-
nation instigates a reflection upon the attempted subjectification of the
asylum process – being deemed a liar, in a harsh and difficult living situ-
ation, being a subject and object that is disposable. This reflection upon
the authoritatively generated external definition in turn provides reaction
and need for reinforcement of group identification (Jenkins, 2000). The
view and seaside of Western City is not sufficient, Hannah requires the
reinforcement of others, now that the authorities have refused to give her a
status and ring of reference. She retells her personal experiences, which
generates and reinforces we-relations, or the collective action of the group.
Basically a lot of people in the hostel have started to cheer me up – you still have
a chance, you still have the appeal. They have started to tell me stories about
people who get it from the appeal.
I found a lot of people from the hostel cheered me up saying – it’s going to be
ok. One of the girls in the room said I’m even worse – she got a deportation
letter … I don’t know what to do. I feel like I regretted, like I trapped myself
in the whole thing. It is not about how many years I am going to spend, it’s
what am I going to do during these years.
The collaboration and sense of camaraderie from other asylum-seekers is a

ring of reference that moves Hannah towards ontological security.
However, it is not enough, she desires the assurance of the student ring
of reference, of her friends from Dublin. In this we see that her Yness
of student trumps the Yness of asylum-seeker, which is instrumentally
counterproductive, yet ontologically logical. As a ring of reference the
other asylum-seekers are perceived as only capable of reflecting the
Yness of asylum seeker. Hannah needs more.
I felt I couldn’t stay in the hostel because I will keep thinking about it and keep
crying over it and I don’t have energy for that. I said, that’s it, I will go to Dublin
and stay with my friend and distract myself from that and that is what I did …
It’s not because I couldn’t make friends or I don’t like people in the hostel.
People in the hostel are just like me.
As argued by Giddens (1984) and Jenkins (2008), identity, ontological

security, and agency are tied. The lack of satisfactory identity, through
non-recognition of desired identity and recognition of undesired identity,
leads to a sense of powerlessness. Power in this sense is power-to, the
capacity for action, which makes it possible to control the world around
one. As she observes: ‘What am I supposed to say, and what am I supposed
to do? It’s basically, I felt like I am stuck.’
The performance of social roles for recognition takes place within sys-
temic constraints. In the direct provision centre there is a sheet at recep-
tion with their name and room number, which residents must sign. It is
tolerated to be absent two out of five nights in any one week; being
absent more than this incurs disciplinary action by the management. In
order to overcome this restraint, collaboration with others is required:
they sign secretly on each other’s behalf.
Do people have to sign in everyday?
‘Yes, but I don’t.’

… Yes. To be very honest my roommate, her name is just before me so she can
just sign for me … So a lot of people saying you have to sign, you can’t go to
Dublin regularly bla bla bla – you can go to Dublin whenever you want, just
make sure to come and collect your money.
While it is possible to cover for one another, Hannah was not careful
enough in the case of this visit to Dublin. Consequently, she was subject
to disciplinary action: her subsistence payment was cut off. She goes to
the Post Office with her ID card to collect her €19.10, but there is
nothing for her to collect. She assumes it is a mistake and so calls the
Social Welfare office to speak to the CWO in charge of her case file,
whom she would have registered with. The CWO responds:
‘I get a report, Hannah about your absence, that you are frequently absent from
the hostel,’ she said.
‘But this is not true,’ I said.
‘But the report is from the hostel, from the management in the hostel, that you
are not in the hostel all the time,’ she said. ‘Who is sponsoring your trip?’
‘The €19.10 that I get,’ I said.
‘This could not be possible that you could sponsor yourself with the €19.10,’ she
said.
But this is what happened. She raised the issue about me studying – who is
sponsoring you? I said that I was [past tense: i.e. before this exchange took
place] on a scholarship and you have all that on my file.
‘I need a paper from your college to say that you have finished your studies. I
need a paper to say that you don’t have any money. I need to speak to the man-
agement of the hostel.’
Of course I shouted: ‘You could have come to me first.’
‘But the management told me. And this is all that I have so you have to verify
the opposite.’
From the perspective of the official interpretative horizon, an asylum-

seeker position presupposes a performance that excludes travelling, as
we saw previously. This is not only ontologically the case, but is structu-
rally the case, as an asylum-seeker does not have the material resources to
travel (‘This could not be possible that you are funding yourself’). So
Hannah has to prove that she is no longer a student, because she is per-
forming like one. As she prefers the role of student, this is humiliating
for her. It is not so much the necessity for the money that bothers her:
They wanted me to not say I was a student … well I did a lot of things to be a
student, and to get that scholarship, so I am not just going to waste it for the
sake of the papers here.
Instead of going to the college for proof that she is no longer a student, she
decides to confront the bureaucracy. In other words, she tries to confront
those in power. She returns to the hostel to confront management:
So I told P I was so angry and she said you can’t make a scene here. Oh, I said, I
need to speak to Mr. K [centre manager], I need to speak to Mrs. A. She said,
Mr. K is not here, Mrs. A is not here. I said well, why the management here and
the reception here are saying to CWO that I am absent – how come? I am not
absent. She said you can’t make a scene here, you can’t attack me. I said I am
not attacking you and I am sorry if I am so loud but I am so angry and I am
following the house rules here and what am I supposed to do?
Hannah then attempts a strategy to divide the bureaucracy against itself.

She insists on seeing someone else.
Mrs. A came back and I talked to her. I said, I did this and this today and CWO
told me I was absent and this is why my allowance is cut. And she said, Yeah,
this is true you are absent. I said, Since when, since when am I absent? And she
said, she raised the whole issue of studying. I said, I finished studies in Novem-
ber, and she said I have spoken to you. I said you haven’t spoken to me about it,
this is our first time speaking about it and she kept saying, no, we have spoken
about it. I said – I am not insane, I could remember if I spoke to you. And she
said, well I am not insane either; thank you and I have spoken to you.
What is interesting here is that the authoritative role, or the subject pos-
ition, of the deputy manager of the hostel constitutes a signifier that entails
the capacity to create reality. As argued by Bourdieu (1991), this capacity
to create reality is experienced as symbolic violence by the subject. This
links to Foucault’s (1971) account of a one-way judgmental definition of
the world by reason, while the other, classified as unreason, remains agent-
less. Within this framework ‘madness’ constitutes a social construction,
which reflects one-way, or non-reciprocal, interaction. Interestingly
Hannah uses a signifier of madness in her comment upon the exchange,
as she continues: This is our first time speaking about it. She wouldn’t
believe it. For the first time I felt I had to defend even my sanity.
The position of being considered ‘insane’ is a reaction totally powerless
to make her version of reality count as felicitous. She is also caught in a
Catch 22-type double bind. Hannah’s conception of herself is as a
subject who attempts to socially integrate with Irish people. She really
values her Irish friends. In the official discourse, integration is considered
to be an advantage. However, it is precisely Hannah’s integration with
Irish students that makes her suspect. Her mistake is to consider inte-
gration in terms of interacting outside the asylum process. As she observes:
I went to Dublin because I want to integrate. At his stage I am supposed to show

some level of integration that could help me with my LTR case. The more I give
letters the more I show integration, the more I am successful in this stage.
Apparently not the social welfare is happy with this or the management can’t
cover this. It is not important whether I integrate or not. It was before supposi-
tion but now reality. They don’t care.
Social integration is what those wishing to enter the system should be

doing, even according to official discourse. However, social integration
is not something that agents can define for themselves. It must be vali-
dated by a ring of reference that counts in terms of the authoritative

power structures of the system. This is not a phenomenon of individual
blame. As individuals, those in power are not entirely hostile to
Hannah. One of the officials in the hostel becomes a confidante, giving
advice to Hannah that she should have lied about being a student to
begin with:
When I [Hannah A.] went back to the hostel, we talked and he [sympathetic
member of the official ring of reference] said that she [hostile member] wants
to find out about your Master’s, it’s all about my Master’s. But what is wrong
with my Master’s? She wants to know about, who funded this and who paid
me for this. But that was a long time ago – he said that doesn’t matter. He
said, who told her that you are a Master’s student? I said that I told, it’s
there in my statement, in my papers I gave her a letter to say that I am an
MA student … . He said that you should not have told her. But I said that I
was honest. He said you should have not been honest with her.
If social integration means being-in-the-world, or not speaking a socially

private language (Haugaard, 1992, p. 189), then Hannah is really facing an
ontological and existential crisis. She wants to integrate, become an ordin-
ary Irish person, which to her means being a student. However, from the
official perspective in order to become an Irish agent, she must deny being
a student, and perform correctly as an asylum-seeker. However, to Hannah
being an asylum-seeker means being abject, being pathetic, which is the
very definition of a non-agent. In response, she can, of course, reject all
expectations and make war on the whole system of meaning, giving her
a momentary feeling of agency by being true to herself, but such an act
would kill any chance of obtaining social agency (recognition of refugee
status). Thus, such a counter-hegemonic move or which means conflict
across all four dimensions of power, has the potential for (metaphorically
speaking) an interactive social death. In short, caught betwixt and between
identities, the predicament of Hannah A. is reminiscent of Hamlet’s
conundrum:
Hamlet: ‘To be, or not to be – that is the question;

Whether ‘tis nobler in mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing them? To die, to sleep’
(Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1).
6. Epilogue and conclusion

We ended this article with a Shakespearean existential choice, between

powerlessness while being who one wants to be, or empowerment by
playing the rules of the game but being who others want us to be. In con-
fronting the bureaucrats, Hannah was taking the resistant path of self-
subject-creation, coupled with powerlessness or social death. The sugges-
tion is that she would be deemed bogus, which she was at that point in
time. However, the story went another way after four years, as she
slowly learned how to renegotiate the successful performance of a
genuine refugee. This, however, is another story, a different story, of per-
sistence and contestation. In her own words, in a recent interview:
Each one of us, each asylum seeker has the right to keep asking and asking and
asking [questions]. It is not like I was told – that you cannot ask, that you must
wait. All this happened because I kept asking.
In conclusion, the object of this article has been to understand the

complex process of identity-cum-subject formation. In that story we can
see how social actors have some agency: they make choices. We also see
how they are limited by the conditions of possibility that surround
them. These constraints are not some force of nature, as envisaged in
structuralism, but a complex set of overlapping audiences who have the
power of legitimising social-world creation. The four dimensions of
power are not separate entities but nested within each other. The inter-
action of these levels is always a complex one of subtle nuance, which
we hope has been made manifest by our examination of the skilful,
although resistant, performance of a social actor, first acculturating to
Irish society as a Palestinian-Gazan-female-Muslim-student and then as
an asylum-seeker.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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The performance of subject positions, power, and

Jennifer Dagg & Mark Haugaard

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The performance of subject positions, power, and

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 8 March 2015; Accepted 12 June 2016

KEYWORDS Agency; identity; power; refugee; asylum

CONTACT Jennifer Dagg jennifer.dagg@nuim.ie

We acknowledge the need to contribute to policy debate on such complex

creation. This negotiation of social ontology takes place within a complex

micro-study of one person confronting a culturally complex terrain and

asylum-seekers and refugees living in Ireland. The approach to sampling,

context of subjectivity and agency.

. How do asylum-seekers living in direct provision centres understand

In the larger study, ﬁeldwork was undertaken in 2011–2012 through a

seekers in direct provision centres in Ireland, as well as two participants

saw the interviews as an opportunity to reﬂect on the process as she

3. Theorising subject positions

process through an unusual instance, which is rife with cultural and

The Foucauldian image of the re-creation of subject position emerges as

The third dimension of power concerns the epistemic context of

reasonable. It is considered reasonable that citizens can vote and work.

meaning. If we elect someone President, or interpret a piece of paper as a

In everyday speech, when we think of rules we tend to think of regulative

genuine refugees). A felicitous action gives the performer of that action

part of the furniture of the world. Nonetheless, as argued by Butler (1997),

4. Learning to negotiate complex cross-cultural identities

rather than my family name. I am from Gaza, Palestine.

Relative to ‘X counts as Y in circumstances C,’ note the assertion I am not

against opposition from dominant groups, be that based upon national

She came to Ireland initially on an Irish Aid fellowship to do a Master’s

ring of reference, is in tension with student. This becomes manifest in

So the scarf signiﬁes her Gazan-Palestinian-Muslim, identity and serves to

This is a particularly interesting piece as she is expressing the conﬂict

Agency entails improvisation, and so Hannah ﬁnds a way to square the

with her Gazan-Palestinian-Muslim identity. True, her grandfather

fourth-dimensional power as domination. The more equal interactive

In conclusion, before the refugee recognition process starts, Hannah is

5. Hannah A. negotiates the asylum process

Ireland’s refugee recognition process was established in 1996 with the

5.2. Hannah A.’s experience

When entering the refugee recognition process as an asylum seeker

How signiﬁcant a move it is only dawns on her as she becomes involved

She emphasises the one-way nature of the communication. The building

Unlike some other asylum-seekers, Hannah has a strong sense of what a

always important to remember that this is not random domination, there-

Hannah begins to feel the authoritative positions of those who discipline

At these initial stages of Hannah’s entry into the refugee recognition

In the above we see the enforced transition to asylum-seeker subject. The

Hannah is presenting herself within the asylum system, to immigration

identity of asylum-seekers. What her roommates display in the comment –

be an asylum seeker and be a student.

Said’s Memoir (Said, 1999), maybe Hannah is seeking to overcome con-

in this process [he/she] is still an asylum-seeker. It is not going to help him or

Writing a thesis does not change her powerlessness as an asylum seeker,

Hannah’s speech is evident of attempted emancipatory four-dimensional

her prior knowledge of what an interview entails in ‘normal’ circum-

liar. This is a common perception by asylum-seekers and, arguably, one

The above reaction alludes to the attributes of the collectivity of asylum-

The collaboration and sense of camaraderie from other asylum-seekers is a

As argued by Giddens (1984) and Jenkins (2008), identity, ontological