G.R. No.

175842

NILO MACAYAN, JR. y MALANA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

Facts: Annie Uy Jao filed a complaint against Nilo Macayan for Robbery. Jao is the owner of
Lanero Garments Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a sample cutter and to undertake
materials purchasing for her garments business. In 2000, when her business was doing poorly,
she allowed her employees to engage on other engagements to extend their income; provided
that the Lanero would still be their main priority. Upon learning that Macayan and his wife is
working on a rival company, she confronted the latter and despite demands, Macayan took for
granted his work at Lanero. Later on, Macayan voluntarily stopped reporting to work. He latter
on filed an illegal dismissal case against Jao.

During the pendency of the illegal dismissal case, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her
family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give him P200,000.00. The following
day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to reiterate his threat and to specify the time and place —
February 16, 2001, sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at McDonald's Banawe Branch — in
which the P200,000.00 should be handed to him. Jao claimed that she was sure it was Macayan
speaking to her, as the person on the phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he
customarily called her. Jao sought the help of NBI for entrapment operation. The latter asked
her to prepare P4,000 to be marked and used at the operation. Upon handling of the marked
money by Macayan, the NBI immediately proceeded the arrest.

According to Macayan’s testimony, he was boxed on the right side of Macayan's face and told
him, "Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me [sic] kaso."He
was also physically abused by an NBI operative.

The Information charging him with robbery dated February 20, 2001 was then prepared, and the
criminal case was filed and raffled to Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City

RTC convicted him of robbery.

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines at the appellate
stage, did not file an appellee's brief. Instead, it filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Appellee's Brief recommending that Macayan be acquitted. It asserted that his guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.

CA AFFIRMED Macayan's conviction and increasing the duration of the penalty imposed. It
reasoned that Jao's sole, uncorroborated testimony was nevertheless positive and credible.
Macayan filed for Motion of Reconsideration- DENIED.
Issue: Whether the guilt of Macayan was established beyond reasonable.

Held: Macayan is acquitted. Decision of CA is reversed.

Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the requisite quantum of evidence in criminal
cases, and in light of the points highlighted by both Macayan and the Office of the Solicitor
General, we find that the prosecution failed to establish Macayan's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, a reversal of the rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals is in order. Macayan
must be acquitted.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the resolution of this case hinges
on whether Jao was indeed threatened and/or intimidated by Macayan into giving him money,
that is, whether he extorted money from Jao. Per Jao's own testimony, there were two (2)
instances in which she was threatened and/or intimidated: first, immediately after the
postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case; and second,
when Macayan called her on February 13, 2001 and set a rendezvous for handing over the
extorted money. It was proven by the records that Jao was absent in any of the 11 conference
for illegal dismissal, it casts doubt whether Macayan threaten her after the conference. The
prosecution could have addressed the deficiency in Jao’s allegation that she was threatened on
February 12, 2001 by presenting as witness the other person who was supposedly present in the
incident: Angel, Jao’s secretary. However, she was never presented as a witness. Furthermore,
The prosecution itself acknowledged that there is no basis for ascertaining the identity of
Macayan as the caller other than the caller’s use of "Madam" in addressing Jao.

Jurisprudence has established the standard for appreciating the credibility of a witness' claim:

For evidence to be believed, however, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve under the circumstances. The test to determine the value of the testimony
of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience
of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of
judicial cognizance.61

Jao's inconsistent conduct, coupled with flimsy justifications for acting as she did, betrays the
absurdity and unreliability of her claims and ultimately, of her as a witness.
SILKAIR (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD., G.R. No. 184398

Petitioner, Promulgated: February 25, 2010

- versus -

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent.

Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts: SilkAir PTE, LTD. a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Singapore with a
Philippine representative office in Cebu City, is an online international carrier plying the
Singapore-Cebu-Singapore and Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes. On June 24, 2002,
petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for the refund of Three Million Nine
Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Pesos and Forty-Nine Centavos
(P3,983,590.49) in excise taxes which it allegedly erroneously paid on its purchases of aviation
jet fuel from Petron Corporation (Petron) from June to December 2000.

Since the BIR took no action on petitioners claim for refund, petitioner sought judicial recourse
and filed on June 27, 2002, a petition for review with the CTA to prevent the lapse of the two-
year prescriptive period within which to judicially claim a refund under Section 229 of the
NIRC. Petitioner invoked its exemption from payment of excise taxes in accordance with the
provisions of Section 135(b) of the NIRC, which exempts from excise taxes the entities covered
by tax treaties, conventions and other international agreements; provided that the country of
said carrier or exempt entity likewise exempts from similar taxes the petroleum products sold to
Philippine carriers or entities. In this regard, petitioner relied on the reciprocity clause under
Article 4(2) of the Air Transport Agreement entered between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Republic of Singapore.

July 27, 2006, the CTA First Division found that petitioner was qualified for tax exemption under
Section 135(b) of the NIRC, as long as the Republic of Singapore exempts from similar taxes
petroleum products sold to Philippine carriers, entities or agencies under Article 4(2) of the Air
Transport Agreement quoted above. However, it ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the
excise tax exemption for failure to present proof that it was authorized to operate in the
Philippines during the period material to the case due to the non-admission of some of its
exhibits, which were merely photocopies, including Exhibit A which was petitioners Certificate of
Registration with the SEC and Exhibits P, Q and R which were its operating permits issued by the
CAB to fly the Singapore-Cebu-Singapore and Singapore-Cebu-Davao-Singapore routes for the
period October 1999 to October 2000.

Petitioner also asserts that despite its failure to present the original copy of its SEC Registration
during the hearings, the CTA should take judicial notice of its SEC Registration since the same
was already offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases pending before the CTA

Issue: Whether the CTA should have taken judicial notice of SilkAir’s SEC registration.

Held: No, as quoted by the SC from the CTA en banc: Each and every case is distinct and
separate in character and matter although similar parties may have been involved. Thus, in a
pending case, it is not mandatory upon the courts to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence
which have been offered in other cases even when such cases have been tried or pending in the
same court. Evidence already presented and admitted by the court in a previous case cannot be
adopted in a separate case pending before the same court without the same being offered and
identified anew.

The cases cited by petitioner concerned similar parties before the same court but do not cover
the same claim. A court is not compelled to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence offered and
admitted in a previous case unless the same are properly offered or have accordingly complied
with the requirements on the rules of evidence. In other words, the evidence presented in the
previous cases cannot be considered in this instant case without being offered in evidence.

Furthermore, documents are not among the matters which the law mandatorily requires the
Court to take judicial notice of, without any introduction of evidence, as petitioner would have
the CTA do. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court .
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181036

Plaintiff-Appellee, Promulgated: July 6, 2010

- versus -

ADRIANO LEONARDO y DANTES,

Accused-Appellant.

PEREZ, J.

Facts: Adriano Leonardo y Dantes was charged with 13 separate Information with the crime of
rape, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, committed against AAA. The appellant is the brother-
in-law of her foster mother, DDD, and the brother of her foster father, EEE. AAA and Leonardo
were neighbours, whenever AAA was alone, Leonardo seized every opportunity to rape and
molest the AAA, he fondled and inserted his finger inside the vagina of AAA multiple times and
he also successfully inserted his penis on AAA’s vagina several times through intimation by
showing AAA his knife. The last sexual advances of the appellant to AAA happened on 11 May
2002 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening near the well located at the back of the house of the
appellant. During that time AAA was removing their washed clothes from the clothesline at the
back of the house of the appellant. Leonardo ordered AAA to buy packed of cigarette, after
handing over the cigarette, appellant showed AAA his knife preventing her from leaving and
ordering her to undress. When AAA was totally naked, the appellant touched her private parts
and told her to lie down on the grassy ground. She felt itchy as she was lying on the grassy
ground. While in that position, the appellant went on top of AAA, inserted his penis into her
vagina and made push and pull movements. AAA felt pain.

When AAA went home, her aunt, CCC, who was there cooking, asked her why she was pale and
uneasy. Her aunt also wondered why she was scratching her back. AAA did not immediately tell
CCC what truly happened. However, when CCC became so persistent to know what really
happened to her, AAA began to cry. She then disclosed to CCC what happened to her on that
day, as well as all her harrowing experiences in the hands of the appellant. CCC instantly called
up AAAs biological mother, BBB, whose house was only three meters away from CCC and
informed her of AAAs ordeal. Thereafter, BBB came to accompany AAA in going to the police
station to report what the appellant did to her. At the police station, AAA gave her written
statements against the appellant.

In the RTC, Leonardo was found guilty of 6 counts of rape. CA affirmed the conviction,

Appellant tried to argue that AAA’s testimony was uncorroborated hence, insufficient to convict
him.

Issue: Whether AAA’s testimony is enough to convict Leonardo.

Held: Yes, while it is true that aside from AAA herself, the prosecution did not present any other
witness who actually saw that the appellant raped and sexually abused AAA, such fact was not
fatal to the prosecutions cause. There is no claim that other witnesses saw or could have seen
the crime but were not presented in court. Indeed, credibility does not go with numbers. The
testimony of a single witness, if categorical and candid, suffices.

It is of judicial notice that the crime of rape is usually committed in a private place where only
the aggressor and the rape victim are present. Further, AAA has positively identified the
appellant as the person who raped and sexually abused her and this negates the theory
proffered by the appellant that the laceration found on AAAs vagina could have been caused by
AAAs sexual intercourse with either of her two boyfriends.

G.R. No. 165168 July 9, 2010

SPS. NONILON (MANOY) and IRENE MONTECALVO, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS (Substitutes) OF EUGENIA T. PRIMERO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, ALFREDO
T. PRIMERO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: The property involved in this case is a portion of a parcel of land (860 sqm) registered in
the name of Eugenia Primero. In the early 1980s she leased the lot to Irene Montecalvo, she
eventually entered into an un-notarized Agreement with Irene with the following stipulations:

o Irene would deposit the amount of P40,000.00 which shall form part of the down
payment equivalent to 50% of the purchase price.
 o During the term of negotiation of 30 to 45 days from receipt of said deposit, Irene would
pay the balance of the down payment.

o In case of default in the payment of the down payment, the deposit would be returned
within 10 days from the lapse of said negotiation period and the Agreement deemed
terminated.

o If the negotiations pushed through, the balance would be paid in 10 equal monthly
installments from receipt of the down payment, with interest

Irene failed to pay the full down payment within the stipulated negotiation period. Nonetheless,
she continued to stay on the disputed property, and still made several payments. On the other
hand, Eugenia did not return the deposit and refused to accept further payments only in 1992.
Irene caused a survey of lot and the segregation of a portion but Eugenia opposed her claim and
asked her to vacate the property. Eugenia and the heirs of her deceased husband filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Irene and her husband before the MTC of Iligan City.
Parties stipulated that the issue to be resolved was whether their Agreement had been
rescinded and novated.

MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the issue is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation. MTC's Decision dismissing the ejectment case became final as Eugenia and her
children did not appeal therefrom. Irene and Nonilon retaliated by instituting Civil Case with the
RTC of Lanao del Norte for specific performance, to compel Eugenia to convey the lot in
question. RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of legal and
factual bases; ordered petitioners to pay rentals due, and 12% legal interest

Petitioners appealed to the CA, CA rendered affirmed the RTC Decision.

Motion for Reconsideration was filed but CA denied the same for lack of merit

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in fixing the legal interest rate at 12%.

Held: Yes. Lastly, petitioners argue that the courts below erred in imposing a P2,500.00 monthly
rental from 1985 onwards, since said amount is far greater than the last agreed monthly rental
(December 1984) of P500.00.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC "that the trial court had authority to fix a
reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the
termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the
contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the contract of
lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the premises as a result of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial court
can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate especially of business
establishments". The appellate court likewise held that the petitioners failed to discharge their
burden to show that the said price was exorbitant or unconscionable. Hence, the CA found no
reason to disturb the trial court's decision ordering the petitioners to pay P2,500.00 as monthly
rentals. The appellate court further held that "to deprive Eugenia of the rentals due her as the
owner-lessor of the subject property would result to unjust enrichment on the part of Irene."

The courts below correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased property subject of
the case at bench based on its location and commercial viability. As described in the
Agreement, the property is immediately in front of St. Peter's College. More significantly, it is
stated in the Declaration of Real Property submitted by the petitioners as evidence in the trial
court, that the property is used predominantly for commercial purposes. The assessment by the
trial court of the area where the property is located is therefore fairly grounded.

631 SCRA 652, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010, 3RD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V JUANITO CABIGQUEZ ALASTRA

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: In 2001, the victim AAA,widowed mother of ten children, was robbed of P3,000 cash and
P7,000 worth of grocery items at gun point inside their store by Romula Grondiano. After such
act, the look out Juanito Alastra entered the store and rape AAA in front of three of her minor
children. The trial court found Cabigquez and his co-accused guilty of qualified rape and
robbery. They were also ordered to pay indemnity, moral damages and actual damages in the
sum of P10,000 for the stolen items and cash. For the actual damages the trial court took
judicial notice of the value of the stolen goods.

The appellant questioned the amount of actual damages insisting there was no basis for the
actual cost of the items taken from the store. The Court of Appeals sustained such award.

ISSUE: WON the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of the stolen
goods?

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court cited the case of People v Martinez wherein the court ruled that
the trial court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen goods because these
are matters of public knowledge or capable of unquestionable demonstration. Judicial
cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence
since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.
Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably
within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration. Here, what is
involved are common goods for everyday use and ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores
like private complainants store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor and cigarettes. The RTC was
thus correct in granting the reasonable amount of P10,000.00 as computed by the private
complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her store.

CARLOS DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 165153

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LIBERTY BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. and BRION,
*
EDGARDO QUIOGUE, ABAD, and
**
Respondents. PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 25, 2010
BRION, J.:

Facts: Carlos C. de Castro, worked as a chief building administrator at LBNI. On May 31, 1996,
LBNI dismissed de Castro on the grounds of serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of the
trust reposed in him as a managerial employee. Allegedly, de Castro committed theft, diversion
of company funds, receiving money from suppliers, disrespect and disorderly behavior. He filed
a case in the NLRC . The Labor Arbiter found the affidavits of LBNIs witnesses to be devoid of
merit, noting that (1) witnesses Niguidula and Balais had altercations with de Castro prior to the
execution of their respective affidavits; (2) the affidavit of Cristino Samarita, one of the suppliers
from whom de Castro allegedly asked for commissions, stated that it was not de Castro, but
Balais, who personally asked for money; and (3) Jose Aying, another supplier, recanted his
earlier affidavit. LBNI appealed the Labor Arbiters ruling to the NLRC. Initially, the NLRC reversed
the Labor Arbiters decision but on de Castros motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reinstated
the Labor Arbiters decision. CA reversed the decision. SC ruled in favor of De Castro.
In a motion for reconsideration, LBNI argues that it is currently under rehabilitation; hence, the
proceedings in this case must be suspended.

Issue: Whether the court should suspend the execution of the decision due to the on-going
rehabilitation.

Held: Yes. LBNIs motion was denied in our Resolution of December 12, 2005 for being
premature, as de Castro then had yet to file his reply to LBNIs comment on the
petition.Thereafter, nothing was heard from LBNI regarding the Stay Order or the rehabilitation
proceedings it instituted before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138. Even the memorandum, dated
May 4, 2006, that LBNI filed with the Court contained no reference to the rehabilitation
proceedings.

The filing of a memorandum before the Court is not an empty requirement, devoid of legal
significance. In A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC, the Court declared that issues raised in previous pleadings
but not included in the memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Being a
summation of the parties previous pleadings, the memoranda alone may be considered by the
Court in deciding or resolving the petition. Thus, on account of LBNIs omission, only the issues
raised in the parties memoranda principally, the validity of de Castros dismissal from LBNI were
considered by the Court in resolving the case.

The Court does not take judicial notice of proceedings in the various courts of justice in the
Philippines. At the time we decided the present case, we were thus not bound to take note of
and consider the pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings, as the matter had not been
properly brought to our attention. Nevertheless, with LBNIs manifestation that it is still
undergoing rehabilitation, the Court resolves to suspend the execution of our September 23,
2008 Decision. The suspension shall last up to the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings,
as provided in Section 11, in relation to Section 27, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules.

The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings does not affect the Courts jurisdiction to
resolve the case, but merely suspends the execution of the September 23, 2008 Decision.

G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
SERENO, CJ.
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. On 3 April 2009 Arnado took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Respondent cites Section 349 of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of expatriation
when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and
thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship.
ISSUE:
WON the Court can take judicial notice of foreign law. No.
RULING:
If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was
still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this
claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication thereof.”
Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding
a case.

G.R. No. 182864 January 12, 2015

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., & MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO., LTD., Respondents.

PEREZ, J.

FACTS:

Sumitomo Corporation shipped on board ESLI’s vessel 22 coils of various Steel Sheet for
transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila, Philippines in favor of consignee Calamba
Steel Center, Inc. (Calamba Steel) located in Saimsim, Calamba, Laguna as evidenced by a Bill of
Lading. The declared value of the shipment was US$83,857.59 as shown by an Invoice. The
shipment was insured with the respondents BPI/MS and Mitsui against all risks.

The shipment arrived at the port of Manila and was turned over to ATI for safekeeping. Upon
withdrawal of the shipment by the Calamba Steel’s representative, it was found out that part of
the shipment was damaged and was in bad order condition. It was found out that the damage
amounted to US$4,598.85 prompting Calamba Steel to reject the damaged shipment for being
unfit for the intended purpose.

The parties admitted the existence and due execution of the Bill of Lading as well as the
existence of the Invoice in a Pre-Trial Order issued by the court.
ISSUE:

Is the pre-trial admission binding on the parties? Yes.

RULING:

Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in
civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
admission requires no proof.

G.R. No. 191710 January 14, 2015

DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS OLGA C. BARBASO AND NOLI G.

CEMENTTNA;* LOLITA A. DE GUZMAN; ESTHER G.MILAN; BANAAG A. DE GUZMAN; AMOR G.
APOLO, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS ALBERTO T. APOLO, MARK APOLO AND GEORGE
APOLO;* HERMINIO A. DE GUZMAN; LEONOR G. VTVENCIO; NORMA A. DE GUZMAN; AND
JOSEFINA G. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. FBLINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners were co-owners in fee simple of a parcel of land measuring 15,063 square meters
and situated in Barrio Bulao, Cainta, Rizal, which was later subdivided among them and for
which individual titles were issued. The property is enclosed and surrounded by other real
properties belonging to various owners. One of its adjoining properties is Filinvest Home
Subdivision Phase IV-A, a subdivision owned and developed by respondent Filinvest
Development Corporation (respondent) which, coming from petitioners' property, has a
potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such, petitioners a
Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo.

ISSUE:

What is the extent of the right of way granted to petitioners?

RULING:
The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of roads within respondent's
subdivision and not merely Road Lot 15.

Petitioners already admitted during the remand proceedings that that the right of way granted
to them affects several road lots within respondent's subdivision. As borne out by the records,
respondent formally offered as part of its exhibits a scale map of its subdivision for the purpose
of proving the identity of the road lots affected by the right of way.In their Comment on the
Formal Offer of Exhibits, petitioners did not proffer any objection to the said exhibit, but merely
averred that they find irrelevant respondent's submission of the fair market value of the said
roads and that the same were also being used in common by the subdivision dwellers.

Since petitioners already judicially admitted that the right of way affects a number of road lots,
they cannot not now claim that it only comprises Road Lot 15. Their admission is binding on
them.
G.R. No. 202181 August 19, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES -versus- CAROLINA BOQUECOSA

PEREZ, J.

FACTS:

Boquecosa was a sales clerk and vault custodian of Gemmary Pawnshop and Jewellery. The
management summoned Boquecosa to explain about the missing pieces of jewelry, and the
unremitted class ring collections and cell card sales. Upon inquiry, Boquecosa broke down and
cried, and admitted that she used the missing class ring collections and cell card sales for her
own personal gain. Boquecosa also admitted that she took the missing pieces of jewelry
(necklace and bracelet), and pawned them at M. Lhuiller Pawnshop and H. Villarica Pawnshop
using fictitious names.

ISSUE:

Is the judicial admission of Boquecosa binding upon her? Yes.

RULING:

Boquecosa’s admission shall be binding upon her, which she cannot subsequently retract. By
Boquecosa’s judicial admission, the trial court could have adjudged the case sans the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence. In effect, Boquecosa’s contention that there is no direct
evidence, which may prove her guilt, is irrelevant.
G.R. No. 182534 September 2, 2015

ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

BRION, J.

FACTS:

PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) testified that their Chief ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy
(Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a
mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard.
They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area. The
petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the
recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner’s body
and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu.

ISSUE:

Is the seized drug admissible in evidence? No.

RULING:

The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the
corpus delicti of the crime - shabu- was obtained.

On this point, we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan, the prosecution did not proffer
any other proof to establish that the requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were
complied with. Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a
crime.
The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed.
Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place
not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the respondent failed to prove that the
portion of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area. The
petitioner was also not charged of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have
supported the conclusion that indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and
therefore, the subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.

G.R. No. 181683 October 07, 2015

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION,Respondent.

LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

Lorenzo Shipping is the owner and operator of the commercial vessel MV Lorcon Luzon.
National Power Corporation is the owner of Power Barge 104, "a non-propelled power plant
barge."

On March 20, 1993, Power Barge 104 was berthed and stationed at the Makar Wharf in General
Santos City when the MV Lorcon Luzon "hit and rammed Power Barge 104."

ISSUE:

WON National Power Corporation failed to establish the precise amount of pecuniary loss it
suffered. Yes.

RULING:

It is basic that any material presented as evidence will not be considered unless duly admitted
by the court before which it is presented. Just as basic is that a private document offered as
authentic evidence shall not be admitted unless its due execution and authenticity are
established in the manner specified by Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

A bill of expenses, such as National Power Corporation's Exhibit "F", is considered a private
document as it does not fall under what the Revised Rules on Evidence defines to be public
documents. Accordingly, for it to have been admitted by the Regional Trial Court as authentic,
Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules on Evidence must have been complied with. National
Power Corporation failed in this respect.
610 SCRA 222, January 15, 2010, 2nd Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. EDGARDO ESTRADA, APPELLANT.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: On November 19, 1997, two similarly-worded Informations were filed against Edgardo
Estrada charging him with two counts of Rape committed against his 12 year old niece. During
trial, AAA, the victim was presented as the first witness and she testified that her uncle raped
her in two separate occasions.

Estrada admitted that AAA is his niece but he denied the accusation. The defense witness was
Irene who is AAA’s grandmother and Estrada’s mother. She narrated that although "AAA" used
to live in her house, she was not aware of any rape incident having been committed thereat. She
admitted though that she loved her son more than she loved her granddaughter.

RTC: found Estrada guilty of two counts of qualified rape (it appreciated the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship)

C.A.: found Estrada guilty of two counts of simple rape (the information only alleged that Estrada
is the victim’s uncle and it did not specify that he is a relative within the 3rd degree of affinity or
consanguinity).

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime of rape?

HELD: YES. Estrada’s guilty is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimony of the victim credible.
According to the trial court, she "candidly, positively and categorically testified as to her
harrowing experiences". Thus, it was convinced that appellant "indeed raped ‘AAA’". It also
"keenly observed" that "‘AAA’ was emotionally affected as she recalled the harrowing
experiences she suffered from her uncle as she had to wipe the tears from time to time as she
testified". Likewise, both courts brushed aside Irene’s corroborative account for being incredible
and partial.

There is no showing at all that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied facts or
circumstances of weight which would have affected the outcome of the case. We therefore
defer and give highest respect to the findings of the trial court because it is in the best position
to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses. In addition, the Court of Appeals
adopted the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the more reason
for us not to disturb the said findings.

613 SCRA 291, Feb 18, 2010, 1st Division

People of the Philippines v Michael A. Hipona

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: In June 2000, the victim AAA was raped, physically manhandled and strangled, which
eventually led to her death. Her belongings were missing. During investigation, the mother of
the accused (and also the victim’s sister) declared that her son confessed to her that it was him
along with his friends who committed the crime. Based on information given by the accused
Hipona’s mother, Hipona was arrested by the police.A day after his arrest, Hipona, in an
interview which was broadcasted, when asked by a radio reporter Why did you do it to your
aunt?, answered Because of my friends and peers. When pressed if he was intoxicated or was on
drugs when he did it, appellant answered that he did it because of his friends and of poverty.

RTC: found him guilty of Rape with Homicide (and Robbery). The trial court admitted Hipona’s
confession to the media.

C.A: sustained his conviction

ISSUE: WON the trial properly admitted in evidence the accused’ confession to the
media?

HELD: YES. Not only does Hipona’s conviction rest on an unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence. It rests also on his unbridled admission to the media. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or
any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence.)

613 SCRA 366, Feb. 22, 2010, 2nd Division

People of the Philippines Wilson Suan Y Jolongon

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: On August 12, 2003, an Information was filed with the RTC of Lanao del Norte, Branch 6 against
appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. According to the prosecution’s version as culled
from its witnesses, Suan was apprehended while he is in the act of selling a plastic sachet containing
shabu to the poseur buyer of the police. The buy-bust money and the plastic sachet containing the stuff
they recovered were turned over to the evidence custodian. The Forensic Chemist then received the
written request for laboratory examination and she conducted the test and the result showed that it
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

RTC: found Suano guilty of the crime charged

C.A.: affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: WON the prosecution witnesses were able to properly identify the dangerous drug taken from
appellant?

HELD: NO. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the substance
recovered from the appellant. For while the drug may be admitted in evidence it does not necessarily
follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight. It must be stressed that admissibility should not
be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti.Records show that while the police
officers were able to prove the factuality of the buy-bust operation, the prosecution dismally failed to
prove the identity of the substance taken from appellant.

The apprehending officer made no mention that he placed some markings on the sachet for
purposes of future identification. However, in the Request for Laboratory Examination, the item being
subjected for laboratory examination was already referred to as Exhibit A. Next, in the Memorandum of
the Regional Chief of PNP, the item that was referred to the Forensic Chemist already had other markings.
From the foregoing, there is already doubt as to the identity of the substance being subjected for
laboratory examination. At this time, we are no longer sure whether the item allegedly seized from the
appellant was the same item referred to by the Provincial Chief and then the Regional Chief of PNP to the
Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination.

630 SCRA 42, September 7, 2010, EN BANC

LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: Appellants were accused of the ambush-slay of Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla. The
principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard near the place where
the ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the
fateful day, including the faces of the accused.

Appellants assail the out-of-court identification made by Alejo who pointed to appellant Joel de
Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos in a line-up at the police station together with police officers.
However, appellants claim that the police officers who joined the line-up were actually in their
police uniforms at the time, as to make the identification process suggestive and hence not
valid, was unsubstantiated.
ISSUE: WON the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the eyewitness
Alejo in a police line-up was reliable and admissible in evidence?

HELD: YES. Examining the records, we find nothing irregular in the identification made by Alejo
at the police station for which he executed the Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay during which
he positively identified Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos as those lookouts who had
pointed their guns at him demanding that he buck down at his guardhouse. In any case, the trial
court did not rely solely on said out-of-court identification considering that Alejo also positively
identified appellants during the trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Alejos out-of-court
identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw
that may have attended it. We have held that the inadmissibility of a police line-up identification
should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.

754 SCRA 594, March 25, 2015, 1st Division

THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CHARLIE SORIN y TAGAYLO, Accused-

Appellant.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS: Sorin was charged before the RTC for violating Sections 5 and 15, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, the PNP received a report that Sorin was selling illegal drugs at his
residence. They formed a buy-bust team and the latter proceeded to the target area. They
allegedly succeeded in catching Sorin in the act of selling Shabu and he was later brought to the
police station. During trial, the prosecution presented the police officers as witnesses who
testified how the buy-bust operation took place, where the seized items and the marked money
were recovered and marked, and that when the seized sachets were transmitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

RTC: found Sorin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

C.A.: affirmed Sorin’s conviction in toto

ISSUE: WON Sorin’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld?

HELD: No. The Court is unconvinced that the chain of custody rule had been substantially
complied with. Not only did the apprehending officer who had initial custody over the seized
drug fail to mark the same or even witness its alleged marking, but also the officer to which the
marking of the seized items was attributed to, himself disclaimed that he had done such
marking and admitted that he only marked a transparent plastic cellophane container. Thus,
there is no gainsaying that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.

It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the
drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with
moral certainty that they are the same seized items.The lack of conclusive identification of the
illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates against a finding of guilt, as in
this case.

680 SCRA 181, Sept. 5, 2012, 2nd Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CALEXTO DUQUE FUNDALES, JR., Accused-
Appellant.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Appellant was charged with violations of Section 5, 11 and 12 of Article II, RA No. 9165.
The trial court found him guilty for illegal sale of shabu and dismissed the cases for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, for insufficiency
of evidence. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision.

Appellant argues that the prosecution's failure to present the forensic chemist during trial was
fatal to its cause and thus the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti. He also avers
that the prosecution failed to prove that the police officers coordinated and reported the buy-
bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

ISSUE: WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II
of RA No. 9165?

HELD:YES. We have already ruled in a number of cases that non-presentation of the forensic
chemist in illegal drugs cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. Besides, corpus delicti has
nothing to do with the testimony of the laboratory analyst.

As to the second contention of the appellant, the court held that the failure of the law enforcers
to comply strictly with Section 21 was not fatal. It did not render the appellant's arrest illegal nor
the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.The danger of abuse that the provision seeks to
prevent is not present. We see no reason why the non-participation of the PDEA would render
the arrest illegal and the evidence obtained therein inadmissible considering that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited substances and dangerous drugs have been
properly preserved.

G.R. No. 183566 May 8, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BONIFACIO BADRIAGO, Accused-Appellant.

Facts: Two criminal charges were filed against Badriago for frustrated homicide to one Adrian
Quinto and murder to one Oliver Quinto respectively. Facts provided for by the prosecution
states that Adrian and Oliver while returning from their delivery of a letter was hack by a Bolo
(sundang) by Badriaga resulting to Adrian's hospitalization and oliver's death. On Badriaga's
defense, he stated the he committed self-defense when the two brothers are coming to him
with a knife. He received no injury from the alleged self-defense.

RTC ruled against the Accused.

CA sustained the ruling only denying in so far as the right criminal charge was for Frustrated
homicide not Frustrated murder.

Issue: W/N Badriago may be convicted by circumstantial evidence and without the presentation
of the murder weapon.

Ruling: Yes. We hold that the circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-
appellant. Circumstantial evidence may be competent to establish guilt as long as it is sufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, and not someone else, was
responsible for the killing. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction as long as there is
(1) more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

We go back to accused-appellants own admission that he indeed injured Adrian, causing him
near-fatal injuries. From this admission the rest of the evidence, albeit circumstantial, made out
a clear case for Olivers murder. First, the victims were together in Adrians pedicab when the
attack took place; second, accused-appellant hacked Adrian with a bolo; third, Adrians injuries
were caused by a bolo; fourth, Adrian tried to push Oliver to safety before he lost
unconsciousness; fifth, Olivers wounds were found to have been caused by a weapon that made
similar hacking wounds as the one made by accused-appellant when he assaulted Adrian; and
sixth, Oliver died on the same day Adrian sustained stab wounds. Although there is no direct
evidence of Olivers actual wounding, the circumstantial evidence presented sufficiently
established that it was accused-appellant who perpetrated the twin attacks on the brothers.

Accused-appellant, thus, cannot argue that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to convict
him. Furthermore, we have long ago held that the presentation of the murder weapon is not
even essential for a conviction.

G.R. No. 177164 June 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

- versus -

RAMON FRONDOZO y DALIDA, Appellant.

Facts: Criminal charge for violation of the Comprehensive dangerous drugs act was filed against
Frondozo after an alleged buy bust operation conducted by Caloocan Police. As narrated by the
Caloocan police, they have conducted a buy bust operation against frondozo through a tip by an
asset whereby one sachet of suspected drugs had been given in exchanged for a P100 buy bust
money. In his defense the accused stated that he was only doing their laundry when the police
caught him accusing him of stealing fighting cocks. In the police station he narrated that the
police even tried to extort him for some money and after sometime it was made known to him
that he was charged in the court for drug pushing.

RTC ruled against the accused.

CA ruled also against the accused.

Issue: W/N the procedures laid down in Rep. Act No. 9165 has been complied with in the case.

Ruling: No. To establish the identity of the shabu seized from Frondozo, the procedures laid
down in Rep. Act No. 9165 should be complied with. Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of
seized drugs. It states: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy therof.
 In this case, the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the procedures for the
custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs as prescribed by Rep. Act No. 9165. The
arresting officers did not mark the shabu immediately after they arrested Frondozo. Further,
while there was testimony regarding the marking of the shabu after it was turned over to the
police investigator, no evidence was presented to prove that the marking thereof was done in
the presence of Frondozo. Also, fatal in the prosecution’s case is the failure of the arresting
officers to take a photograph and make an inventory of the confiscated materials in the
presence of Frondozo. Likewise, there was no mention that any representative from the media,
DOJ or any elected public official had been present during the inventory or that any of these
persons had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.

Clearly, none of the statutory safeguards mandated by Rep. Act No. 9165 was observed.
Hence, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure in the custody of the
seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.

Nevertheless, while the seized drugs may be admitted in evidence, it does not
necessarily follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight if the procedures provided
by Rep. Act No. 9165 were not complied with. The admissibility of the seized dangerous drugs in
evidence should not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
G.R. No. 182924 December 24, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JOSE PEREZ @ DALEGDEG, accused-appellant.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts: A complaint had been filed in Palawan charging Jose Perez @ Dalegdeg with a crime of
statutory rape committed against AAA, a minor six years old. In AAA's narration of facts she
stated that Dalegdeg carried her against her will, struck her right eye with a stone, punched her
on the abdomen, and inserted his fingers in her vagina followed by his sexual organ outside of
the movie house where her father and brothers are in.

On his defense he narrated that he was not in the vicinity of the island which was not
corroborated by the testimony of his provided witness stating that he saw Dalegdeg give back
AAA to her father.

RTC ruled in favor of AAA.

CA affirmed the decision.

Issue/s: W/N the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt be proved by the use of leading
question in AAA's cross-examination.

W/N the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt be proved by the lack of eyewitnesses were
presented to pinpoint the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.

W/N the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt be proved when no seminal fluids were found
in AAA’s vaginal area.

Ruling: Yes. To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are
guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility
and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

After examining the testimony of the AAA, we find that it was neither made up nor coached. The
questions propounded to AAA were leading. A question that suggests to the witness the answer,
which the examining party wants, is a leading question. As a rule, leading questions are not
allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years,
as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading
questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.

Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert
herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain
justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the
world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true

The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears
to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to
convict the accused. It is of judicial notice that the crime of rape is usually committed in a
private place where only the aggressor and the rape victim are present. The testimony of the
hapless victim alone is sufficient to convict her offender. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.

AAA positively identified appellant as the person who sexually assaulted her. As explained
above, we find AAA to be a credible witness. As such, her sole testimony is sufficient to convict.
Moreover, no other person in the movie house witnessed the dastardly act, because the same
was committed not in the said place but in another place beyond the prying eyes of would-be
witnesses. As testified to by BBB, her daughter, AAA told her that she was brought by appellant
to the rear of the house of one Oring Ragote where she was violated.

As to the absence of semen in AAA’s vaginal area, such would not preclude the fact that rape
has been committed on AAA. The absence of spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The
presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which
constitutes the crime of rape. Besides, the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina could be due
to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of
the vagina, or the washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse.

In this case, the absence of sperm can be explained by the fact that AAA’s mother and the
midwife who assisted Dr. Gundayao in his examination of AAA, cleaned AAA’s private part. The
absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina is, therefore, not fatal to AAA’s cause. Her
credible testimony alone suffices to establish appellant's guilt. The medical report of Dr.
Gundayao further corroborated her claim that she was raped. The findings of multiple and deep
lacerations and other injuries in AAA's vagina indicated that AAA was no longer a virgin.
Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. And
when the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established.

G.R. No. 185710 January 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

- versus -

ROMULO TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN, Accused.

ABAD, J.:

Facts: In the morning of June 13 1992, police officer jaime tabucon was called to take the
statement of Alex Aleman who together with ROMULO TUNIACO and JEFFREY DATULAYTA killed
a certain Dondon Cortez. When taking the statement of Aleman he notes that Aleman was
assisted by PAO lawyer Atty. Ruperto Besinga. Officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in
Cebuano of his constitutional right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own
choice and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative.
When asked if he had any complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said
that he had no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all
the suspects in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he would say may be used
against him later in court. Afterwards, the police officer started taking down Alemans
statement.

Accused Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and Tuniaco
at around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992, Dondon Cortez threatened to report his drinking companions
illegal activities to the police unless they gave him money for his forthcoming marriage.

The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump site and, as they were walking,
accused Aleman turned on Cortez and stabbed him on the stomach. Accused Datulayta, on the
other hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16 pistol and shot Cortez on the head,
causing him to fall. Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who fired another shot on Cortezs
head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to pump some bullets into Cortezs body. Then they
covered him with rice husks.

After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused Aleman who
then signed it in the presence of Atty. Besinga.

On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to the
murder charge. After the prosecution rested its case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to
evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. On being
re-arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide.
The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of six years and one day and to pay P50,000.00
to the victims family.

For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at the Davao
Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had escaped. He was
later recaptured.

RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.

CA affirms

Issue: W/N the prosecution was able to present evidence of corpus delicti

W/N accused Alemans extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence

Ruling: YES to Both.

Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. The evidence
of a dead body with a gunshot wound on its back would be evidence that murder has been
committed. Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result has been established, for
example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it. The
prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.

The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not bother to
present a medical certificate identifying the remains found at the dump site and an autopsy
report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that resulted in death; and the
shells of the guns used in killing the victim.

But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victims body or even by
the testimony of the physician who examined such body. While such report or testimony is
useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered, they are not
indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death. Nor is the presentation of the
murder weapons also indispensable since the physical existence of such weapons is not an
element of the crime of murder.

Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place pointed to by accused
Aleman. That physical confirmation, coming after his testimony of the gruesome murder,
sufficiently establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that statement must be
admissible in evidence.

Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent

and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing. These requirements were met here. A
lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused
Aleman during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused
Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty.
Besinga did not dispute this claim.

Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans
confession and just forced him to sign it. The confession has details that only the person who
committed the crime could have possibly known. What is more, accused Datulaytas confession
corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions,
such corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.
GR. No. 221697 March 8,2016

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioner,

-versus -

COMMISSION. ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents,

Perez J.,

Facts: Grace Poe's certificate of candidacy in running for Presidency had been challenged in the
comelec. One of the issue in this case was if she completed the 10 year residency requirement
provided for by the constitution since her 2012 senatorial COC and previous cases ruled upon by
SC contains a conclusive presumption that she is still an American until July 7 2006.

Issue: W/N Grave Poe completed the 10 year residency requirement and if yes when shall it be
counted?

Ruling:

Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from May 24, 2005 when she returned for
good from the US. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality 2. Intention to remain (animus manendi )and 3.Intention to abandon
the old domicile(animus non-revertendi). The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport
showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled
abroad, email correspondences with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household
items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her children showing enrolment in the
Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc.

SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court wherein residence was counted
only from the acquisition of permanent residence were decided as such because there is sparse
evidence on establishment of residence. These cases cannot be applied in the present case. In
the case at bar, there is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe
decided to permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May
24, 2005.

These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear
that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.

The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe an ordinary transient.

Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC was only a mistake in good faith.
Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her but it was by no means conclusive
considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe. Considering that the COMELEC failed
to take into consideration these overwhelming evidence, its decision is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is thus
declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9,
2016
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO alias PUKE, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM

FACTS: On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her
neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor,
helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child
wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of
Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was
one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the
police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for
the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were
submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At
the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo and
a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in
Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O.
Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial
came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the
cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy
(including his clothing – which in effect is an admission placing him in the crime scene – though
not discussed in the case) were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo
was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case.

The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the
first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code.
Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then
matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar
DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might
then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a
case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the Similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

DNA EVIDENCE

1. G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, Petitioner, - versus - Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ,

Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ, Respondent.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending
litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother
and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before RTC.

Jinky and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed
into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa
Katsuo.

They cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz was conceived and was born.

Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne,
falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.

RTC: rendered judgement declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of
defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz.

CA: remanded the case to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the
parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the
paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

ISSUE: WON DNA Analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio Ong. NO

HELD: Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of
any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.

It can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application
of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

The term biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body,
even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
 Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as
may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown
the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for
the conduct of DNA testing.

PARAFFIN TEST

1. GR. No. 212930 August 3, 2016

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff- Appellee, v. Angelo Buenafe, Accused- Appellant.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Kenneth dela Torre, (Kenneth) a 15 year old farmhand, went to Alpa Farm to
apologize to his employer, Rommel Alvarez (Rommel), who scolded him that day.
However, upon reaching the farm, he saw appellant and two (2) unidentified men alight
from a vehicle. Thereafter, while Rommel was unwarily texting inside the tent, the two
men suddenly restrained his arms behind his back. Subsequently, appellant approached
Rommel and delivered several blows to his abdomen until he crumpled to the ground.
After which, appellant walked towards a nearby hut while the two men dragged
Rommel.

Inside the hut, appellant shot the victim using a lead pipe ("sumpak"). After fixing
something, appellant and the two other men hurriedly proceeded to the car.

Kenneth revealed to Marissa what he saw.

The appellant was invited by the police and underwent fingerprinting analysis and
paraffin test. These tests resulted negative.

RTC: convicted the appellant of Murder.

CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the paraffin test conducted is conclusive. NO

HELD: The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses bears more weight
than the negative fingerprint analysis and paraffin tests results conducted the day after
the incident.

The absence of latent fingerprints does not immediately eliminate the possibility that
the appellant could have been at the scene of the crime.
 In this case, Kenneth testified in the trial court that it was indeed the appellant who
killed Rommel. It should also be considered that the fingerprint analysis and the paraffin
test were conducted the following day after the incident. Thus, it is possible for
appellant to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as when the
hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

1. G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ,Respondents.

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: The Republic, through PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance,

Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before
the Sandiganbayan. "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired
by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"

The Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it
terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the
filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the
Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of
action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute.

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to
Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of
evidence fail to persuade this Court.

SANDIGANBAYAN: denied the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit

Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. Granted the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to
Evidence. Dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion
to Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving
petitioner of its right to due process. YES
 HELD: The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.

Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays
petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on
recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the
Rules be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of
Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.

2. G.R. No. 190846 February 3, 2016

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

BRION,J.:

FACTS: Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) and bought a house
and lot which lot was covered by TCT.

Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as
evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose,
by virtue of an SPA executed by Jose in her favor.

Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and

Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds. In the complaint, Jose
averred that Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to
execute the SPA by forging Jose’s signature.

Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Before he paid the
full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend
who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in order.

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial
payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros
on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration
was lower than the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to
save on taxes.

RTC: decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas.
 CA: affirmed the RTC's decision and directed Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the
purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale. YES

HELD: While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is
deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to
prove matters that occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.

There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void
document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the
Rules for its admissibility.

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of
the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s consent. It does
not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein.

3. G.R. No. 204056, June 01, 2016

GIL MACALINO, JR., Petitioner, v. ARTEMIO PIS-AN, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: Emeterio Jumento (Emeterio) was the owner of the half portion, and his children
Hospicio Jumento (Hospicio) and Severina Jumento (Severina) of the other half in equal
shares, of Lot 3154. When Hospicio and Severina died, Emeterio inherited the portions
and thus became the owner of the whole lot. Subsequently, Emeterio also passed away.
The lot was divided into three portions (A, B, and C).

Artemio and the other heirs of Emeterio executed an Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate
and Absolute Sale adjudicating among themselves Lot 3154 and selling a 207-square
meter portion of the same to the spouses Wilfredo and Judith Sillero (spouses Sillero).
The document, did not, however, identify the portion being sold as Lot No. 3154-A but
simply stated as "a portion of Lot 3154 which is 207 square meters.

The spouses Sillero sold Lot 3154-A to petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. (Gil) by virtue of a
Deed of Sale.

Intending to have Lot 3154-A registered in his name, Gil caused the survey of the same
 by Engr. Dorado) sometime in 1998.14 Engr. Dorado, however, discovered that the
portion occupied by Gil consists of 140 square meters only and not 207.

The Land Management Bureau issued an approved Subdivision Plan wherein Lot 3154
was subdivided into four sub-lots, to wit: Notably, the Subdivision Plan which was based
on the survey conducted by Engr. Dorado refers not only to Lot 3154-A as Gil's property
but also to Lot 3154-C.

RTC: rendered a judgement in favor of Gil Macalino against Artemio, declaring Gil
Macalino the rightful owner of Lot 3154-A and Lot 3154-C.

CA: concluded that the sale between the spouses Sillero and Gil involved Lot 3154-A
only and not Lot 3154-C. Defendant-appellant Artemio Pis-an is declared as the true and
legal owner of Lot 1354-C.

ISSUE: WON the admitted contents of the said documents adequately and correctly
express the true intention of the parties.

HELD: It has been held that "[w]hen the parties admit the contents of written
documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express
the true intention of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these
instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in
order to determine such intent." In view of this and since the Parol Evidence Rule is
inapplicable in this case, an examination of the parties' respective parol evidence is in
order. Indeed, examination of evidence is necessarily factual and not within the
province of a petition for review on certiorari which only allows questions of law to be
raised. However, this case falls under one of the recognized exceptions to such rule, i.e.,
when the CA's findings are contrary to that of the trial court.

4. G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I.

OBEN,Petitioners,
vs.
CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.'s

motion for reconsideration of our April 10, 2013 decision, which reversed and set aside
the Court of Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA) dated April 7, 2006, including its annexes and/or
 attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect or photocopy the same.

The motion for reconsideration raises that the production of the LSPA would violate the
parol evidence rule.

ISSUE: WON the production of the LSPA would violate the parol evidence rule. NO

HELD: The parol evidence rule does not apply to petitioners who are not parties to the
deed of assignment and do not base a claim on it. Hence, they cannot be prevented
from seeking evidence to determine the complete terms of the deed of assignment.

Even assuming that Rule 130, Section 9 is applicable, an exception to the rule under the
second paragraph is when the party puts in issue the validity of the written agreement,
as in the case a quo.

Besides, what is forbidden under the parol evidence rule is the presentation of oral or
extrinsic evidence, not those expressly referred to in the written agreement.
"[D]ocuments can be read together when one refers to the other." By the express terms
of the deed of assignment, it is clear that the deed of assignment was meant to be read
in conjunction with the LSPA.

As we have stated in our decision, Rule 132, Section 1761 of the Rules of Court allows a
party to inquire into the whole of the writing or record when a part of it is given in
evidence by the other party. Since the deed of assignment was produced in court by
respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a
part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also
be inquired into by petitioners.

G.R. No. 207264/708 SCRA 197 June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO
B. TAN, Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Reyes filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent Tan, a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material
misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and
citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed on February
8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. Not agreeing with the resolution, petitioner Reyes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013.

The COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution on May 14, 2013 denying the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly-
discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to
due process of law.

RULING: No. It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny
due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly
discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration.
G.R. No. 203322/785 SCRA 71 February 24, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. REMAN SARIEGO, Appellant.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: In two separate informations, appellant Reman Sariego was charged with two counts of
the crime of rape, committed by having carnal knowledge of his own daughter, AAA, 3 a 17-
year-old girl, against her will and to her damage and prejudice.

In contrast, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant himself, who simply denied
the charges against him. While admitting that AAA was, indeed, his daughter, appellant refuted
any allegation of involvement in her pregnancy. Instead, he pointed out that it was AAA's
boyfriend who impregnated her. He conceded, however, that he may have mauled his daughter
in the past but such bodily harm was inflicted because she was fond of flirting with the opposite
sex.

RTC: found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two counts of qualfied rape

CA: affirmed the RTC judgment. The CA, appreciated the circumstance of relationship sufficient
to qualify the offense. However, deemed it necessary to point out that AAA's minority was not
duly established by the evidence on record.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Accused-Appellant is guilty for the crime of rape in its qualified form.

RULING: No. Article 266-B of the RPC provides that rape is qualified when certain circumstances
are present in its commission, such as when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The Court finds that not only did the prosecution fail to adduce competent documentary
evidence to prove AAA's minority such as her original or duly certified birth certificate (best
evidence to prove AAA’s age), baptismal certificate, school records, or any other authentic
documents as required by the case of People vs Pruna, it likewise failed to establish that said
documents were lost, destroyed, unavailable, or otherwise totally absent. There is also nothing
in the records to show that AAA's mother or any member of her family, by affinity or
consanguinity, testified on her age or date of birth. In like manner, while AAA may have testified
as to her age during the trial, it was not clearly shown that the same was expressly admitted by
appellant. Thus, AAA' s minority cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against
appellant herein.

G.R. No. 202514/798 SCRA 103 July 25, 2016

ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON, Petitioner vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent

BRION, J.:

FACTS: In 2001, Anna Marie, together with her mother Angeles and her siblings Anna Elena and
Santiago, (the Gumabons) deposited with the PNB Delta Branch $10,945.28 and $16,830.91, for
which they were issued FXCTD Nos. A-993902 and A-993992, respectively. They also maintained
eightsavings accounts in the same bank. Anna Marie decided to consolidate the eight savings
accounts and to withdraw ₱2,727,235.85 from the consolidated savings account to help her
sister’s financial needs.

Anna Marie called the PNB employee handling her accounts, Salvoro, to facilitate the
consolidation of the savings accounts and the withdrawal. When she went to the bank on April
14, 2003, she was informed that she could not withdraw from the savings accounts since her
bank records were missing and Salvoro could not be contacted and has not reported for work.
Thus, Anna Marie sent two demand letters to PNB.
On July 30, 2003, the PNB sent letters to Anna Marie to inform her that the PNB refused to
honor its obligation under FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992, and that the PNB withheld the
release of the balance of ₱250,741.82 in the consolidated savings account. According to the
PNB, Anna Marie pre-terminated, withdrew and/or debited sums against her deposits. Thus,
Anna Marie filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against the PNB
and Fernandez.

RTC: ruled in Anna Marie’s favor. The RTC held that the PNB had not yet paid the remaining
balance of $10,058.01 under FXCTD No. 993902. Anna Marie’s SOA, which the PNB relied upon,
is a mere photocopy and does not satisfy the best evidence rule.

CA: reversed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether the PNB presented sufficient evidence of payment to shift the burden of
evidence to Anna Marie.

RULING: No. PNB failed to establish the fact of payment to Anna Marie in FXCTD Nos. 993902
and 993992, and SA No. 6121200. The PNB cannot simply substitute the mere photocopies of
the subject documents for the original copies without showing the court that any of the
exceptions under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies. The PNB’s failure to give a
justifiable reason for the absence of the original documents and to maintain a record of Anna
Marie’s transactions only shows the PNB’s dismal failure to fulfill its fiduciary duty to Anna
Marie.

Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two qualifications: (a) relevance and (b)
competence. One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the competence of
evidence is the best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the
original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is
under inquiry. However, there are instances when the Court may allow the presentation of
secondary evidence in the absence of the original document.

G.R. No. 170604/704 SCRA 465 September 2, 2013

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS, vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND

VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.,RESPONDENTS.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: The respondent, the heirs of the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave
filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against petitioner Margarita Prodon, claiming
that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797 pertaining to the land
which they inherited from their parents; that the original copy of TCT No. 87497 on file with the
Register of Deeds of Manila contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to
defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously
done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not
exist.

Petitioner Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on September 9, 1975
the deed of sale with right to repurchase and this has been registered with the Register of Deeds
and duly annotated on the title. Petitioner had then become the absolute owner of the property
due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.

During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Prodon.

CA: reversed the RTC’s decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule is applicabe in this case.

RULING: No. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When
the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution
or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.

In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence
Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than
the original document.

Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine
whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary
evidence, had been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed and
determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had
been proved by preponderance of evidence.