DEPOSIT CASE DIGEST

CHAN VS MACEDA

FACTS:

RESPONDENT MACEDA obtained 7.3M loan from DBP for the construction of his Nee Gran Hotel in Tacloban
City.

respondent entered into a building contruction contract with Moreman Builders, agrred to finish not later than
Dec 22, 1977.

Respondent purchased materials and equipment in Manila. Moreman depostited the equipment in the
warehouse of Wilson and Lily Chan, petitioners and free of charge.

unfortunately, moreman failed to finish the contruction of the hotel at the stipulated time.

Respondent filed wirth the CFI, now RTC, for the rescission and damages against Moreman, ruled in favor of
respondent.

Moreman appealed but was dismissed. He elevated the case to this court, petition for review on certiorari.

Meanwhile, respondent ordered petitioners to return to him construction materials and equipment which
Moreman deposited in their warehouse. Petitioners, however, told them that Moreman withdrew those
construction materials in 1977.

Respondent filed for damages against the petitioners.

Witnesses of respondent, Leornardo Conge, labor contractor, testified that on Dec 14-24 1977, he was
contracted by Lily Chan to get bags of cement from New Gran Hotel contruction site and store the same in the
latter's warehouse. deponent Conge also hauled 400 bundles of steel bars from the same construction site.

Deponent Maceda testified - while conducting inventory, he found that the approximate total value of materials
kept in petitioners warehouse was 214K. the amount reflected in the certification signed by Mario Ramos, store
clerk of Moreman present during inventory.

Trial Court: the inventory of other materials, steel bars, and cement is found highly reliable in the affidavit of
Edralin, personnel officer of Moreman the he was assigned to guard the warehouse.

ISSUE: WON procedural infirmities should is a ground for the dismissal of the case.

YES.

At the outset, the case should have been dismissed outright by the trial court because of patent procedural
infirmities. It bears stressing that the case was originally filed on December 11, 1985. Four (4) years thereafter,
or on August 25, 1989, the case was dismissed for respondents failure to prosecute.Five (5) years after, or on
September 6, 1994, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration. From here, the trial court already erred in its
ruling because it should have dismissed the motion for reconsideration outright as it was filed far beyond the
fifteen-day reglementary period.[37] Worse, when respondent filed his second motion for reconsideration on
October 14, 1994, a prohibited pleading, [38] the trial court still granted the same and reinstated the case on
January 10, 1995. This is a glaring gross procedural error committed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE: WON there is a contract of deposit between Chan and Maceda, hence the latter has a right to
demand for the delivery of the deposited equipment

When there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no obligation or liability to speak about and thus no
cause of action arises. Specifically, in an action against the depositary, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
the bailment or deposit and the performance of conditions precedent to the right of action. A depositary is obliged
to return the thing to the depositor, or to his heirs or successors, or to the person who may have been
designated in the contract.

In the present case, the record is bereft of any contract of deposit, oral or written, between petitioners
and respondent. If at all, it was only between petitioners and Moreman. And granting arguendo that there
was indeed a contract of deposit between petitioners and Moreman, it is still incumbent upon respondent to
prove its existence and that it was executed in his favor. However, respondent miserably failed to do so. The only
pieces of evidence respondent presented to prove the contract of deposit were the delivery receipts.
[41]
Significantly, they are unsigned and not duly received or authenticated by either Moreman, petitioners
or respondent or any of their authorized representatives.

Considering that respondent failed to prove (1) the existence of any contract of deposit between him
and petitioners, nor between the latter and Moreman in his favor, and (2) that there were construction
materials in petitioners warehouse at the time of respondents demand to return the same, we hold that
petitioners have no corresponding obligation or liability to respondent with respect to those
construction materials.

Anent the issue of damages, petitioners are still not liable because, as expressly provided for in Article
2199 of the Civil Code,[43] actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party
and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.

Considering our findings that there was no contract of deposit between petitioners and
respondent or Moreman and that actually there were no more construction materials or equipment in
petitioners warehouse when respondent made a demand for their return, we hold that he has no right
whatsoever to claim for damages.

TRIPLE V FOOD SERVICES VS FILIPINO MERCHANTS INSURANCE, GR NO. 160544

FACTS:
 March 2, 1997, certain De Asis dined at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant in QC. De Asis was using a
Mitsubishi Gallant 1995 with a plate number of UBU 955, assigned to her by her employer Crispa Textile. on the
said date, De Asis availed of the valet parking of petitioner and entrusted her keys to petitioner's parking
attendant. a parking ticket was issued as receipt for the car. the car was parked by the attendant Madridano at
the designated parking. few minutes later, madridano noticed that the car was not parked in its area and its key
is no longer in the box of where valet attendant usually keep the keys of car.

car was never returned. Crispa filed a complaint against its insurer, the FIlipino Merchant Insurance
Company. Having indemnified Crispa of 669, 500 for the loss, FMICI as subrogee to Crispa's rights, filed with the
RTC an action for damages against the petitioner Triple V Food Services.

Petitioner contention: that in accepting the complimentary valet parking service, De Asis received a
parking ticket whereunder it is so provided that "[Management and staff will not be responsible for any loss
of or damage incurred on the vehicle nor of valuables contained therein", a provision which, to petitioner's
mind, is an explicit waiver of any right to claim indemnity for the loss of the car; and that De Asis knowingly
assumed the risk of loss when she allowed petitioner to park her vehicle, adding that its valet parking service
did not include extending a contract of insurance or warranty for the loss of the vehicle.

Petitioner challenged FMICI's subrogation to Crispa's right to file a claim for the loss of the car, arguing that
theft is not a risk insured against under FMICI's Insurance Policy No. PC-5975 for the subject vehicle.

Trial court ruled in favor of FMICI, asks Triple V to indemnify the FMICI.

Obviously displeased, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating its argument that it was not a
depositary of the subject car and that it exercised due diligence and prudence in the safe keeping of the
vehicle, in handling the car-napping incident and in the supervision of its employees. It further argued that
there was no valid subrogation of rights between Crispa and respondent FMICI.

ISSUE: WON there exists a contract of deposit in the valet parking

HELD:

When De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet attendant while eating at petitioner's Kamayan
Restaurant, the former expected the car's safe return at the end of her meal. Thus, petitioner was constituted
as a depositary of the same car. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a contract of deposit
nor that of insurance, guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was constituted when De Asis availed of its free
valet parking service.

In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with the obligation of safely
keeping it and returning the same.[3]cralaw A deposit may be constituted even without any consideration.
It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted for
safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor.
The parking claim stub embodying the terms and conditions of the parking, including that of relieving petitioner
from any loss or damage to the car, is essentially a contract of adhesion, drafted and prepared as it is by
the petitioner alone with no participation whatsoever on the part of the customers, like De Asis, who
merely adheres to the printed stipulations therein appearing. While contracts of adhesion are not void in
themselves, yet this Court will not hesitate to rule out blind adherence thereto if they prove to be one-sided under
the attendant facts and circumstances.[4]cralaw

Hence, and as aptly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner must not be allowed to use its parking claim
stub's exclusionary stipulation as a shield from any responsibility for any loss or damage to vehicles or to the
valuables contained therein. Here, it is evident that De Asis deposited the car in question with the
petitioner as part of the latter's enticement for customers by providing them a safe parking space within
the vicinity of its restaurant. In a very real sense, a safe parking space is an added attraction to petitioner's
restaurant business because customers are thereby somehow assured that their vehicle are safely kept, rather
than parking them elsewhere at their own risk. Having entrusted the subject car to petitioner's valet attendant,
customer De Asis, like all of petitioner's customers, fully expects the security of her car while at petitioner's
premises/designated parking areas and its safe return at the end of her visit at petitioner's restaurant.

Besides, Crispa paid a premium of P10,304 to cover theft. This is clearly shown in the breakdown of premiums in
the same policy.[6]cralaw Thus, having indemnified CRISPA for the stolen car, FMICI, as correctly ruled by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, was properly subrogated to Crispa's rights against petitioner, pursuant
to Article 2207 of the New Civil Code[7].

AGRO- INDUSTRIAL DEVT CORP VS CA - 1993

FACTS:

CA Agro (through its President, Aguirre) and spouses Pugao entered into an agreement whereby the former
purchased two parcels of land for P350, 525 with a P75, 725 down payment while the balance was covered by
three (3) postdated checks. Among the terms embodied in a Memorandum of True and Actual Agreement of Sale
of Land were that titles to the lots shall be transferred to the petitioner upon full payment of the purchase price
and that the owner’s copies of the certificates of titles thereto shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of any
bank. The same could be withdrawn only upon the joint signatures of a representative of the petitioner upon full
payment of the purchase price. They then rented Safety Deposit box of private respondent Security Bank and
Trust Company (SBTC). For this purpose, both signed a contract of lease which contains the following
conditions:
13. The bank is not a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has neither the possession nor control of the
same.
14. The bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except herein expressly provided, and it assumes
absolutely no liability in connection therewith.

After the execution of the contract, two (2) renter’s key were given to Aguirre, and Pugaos. A key guard remained
with the bank. The safety deposit box has two key holes and can be opened with the use of both keys. Petitioner
claims that the CTC were placed inside the said box.
Thereafter, a certain Mrs. Ramos offered to buy from the petitioner the two (2) lots at a price of P225 per sqm.
Mrs. Ramose demanded the execution of a deed of sale which necessarily entailed the production of the CTC.
Aguirre and Pugaos then proceeded to the bank to open the safety deposit box. However, when opened in the
presence of bank’s representative, the box yielded no certificates. Because of the delay in reconstitution of title,
Mrs. Ramos withdrew her earlier offer and as a consequence petitioner failed to realize the expected profit of
P280 , 500. Hence, the latter filed a complaint for damages.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint
CA: Respondent Court affirmed the appealed decision principally on the theory that the contract (Exhibit "2")
executed by the petitioner and respondent Bank is in the nature of a contract of lease by virtue of which the
petitioner and its co-renter were given control over the safety deposit box and its contents while the Bank
retained no right to open the said box because it had neither the possession nor control over it and its contents.

ISSUE: WON THERE IS A CONTRACT OF DEPOSIT IN THIS CASE

HELD: YES

We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent of the safety deposit box is not an ordinary

contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. However, We do not fully subscribe to its view that

the same is a contract of deposit that is to be strictly governed by the provisions in the Civil Code on deposit;

[19] the contract in the case at bar is a special kind of deposit. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary

contract of lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit

box was not given to the joint renters -- the petitioner and the Pugaos. The guard key of the box remained

with the respondent Bank; without this key, neither of the renters could open the box. On the other hand,

the respondent Bank could not likewise open the box without the renter's key. In this case, the said key

had a duplicate which was made so that both renters could have access to the box.

We agree with the petitioner that under the latter, the prevailing rule is that the relation between a bank renting

out safe-deposit boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of a bailor and bailee, the

bailment being for hire and mutual benefit.

In the context of our laws which authorize banking institutions to rent out safety deposit boxes, it is clear that in

this jurisdiction, the prevailing rule in the United States has been adopted. Section 72 of the General Banking

Act[23] pertinently provides:

"SEC. 72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized elsewhere in this Act, banking institutions other

than building and loan associations may perform the following services:

(a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the

safeguarding of such effects.

xxx

The banks shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section

as depositories or as agents.

A contract of deposit may be entered into orally or in writing[25] and, pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil

Code, the parties thereto may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem

convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

Accordingly, the depositary would be liable if, in performing its obligation, it is found guilty of fraud, negligence,

delay or contravention of the tenor of the agreement.[26] In the absence of any stipulation prescribing the

degree of diligence required, that of a good father of a family is to be observed.

In the instant case, petitioner maintains that conditions 13 and 14 of the questioned contract of lease of the

safety deposit box, which read:

"13. The bank is not a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has neither the possession nor control of the

same.

14. The bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except herein expressly provided, and it assumes

absolutely no liability in connection therewith."[28]

are void as they are contrary to law and public policy.

It is not correct to assert that the Bank has neither the possession nor control of the contents of the box since in

fact, the safety deposit box itself is located in its premises and is under its absolute control; moreover, the

respondent Bank keeps the guard key to the said box. As stated earlier, renters cannot open their respective

boxes unless the Bank cooperates by presenting and using this guard key.
JAVELLANA VS LIM, GR NO. 4015, AUGUSR 24, 1908

FACTS:

It was then alleged, on the 26th of May, 1897, the defendants executed and subscribed a document in favor of
the plaintiff reading as follows:

We have received from Angel Javellana, as a deposit without interest, the sum of two thousand six
hundred and eighty-six cents of pesos fuertes, which we will return to the said gentleman, jointly and
severally, on the 20th of January, 1898. — Jaro, 26th of May, 1897. — Signed Jose Lim. — Signed: Ceferino
Domingo Lim.

That, when the obligation became due, the defendants begged the plaintiff for an extension of time for the
payment thereof, building themselves to pay interest at the rate of 15 per cent.

On the 15th of May, 1902, the debtors paid on account of interest due the sum of P1,000 pesos, with the
exception of either capital or interest, had thereby been subjected to loss and damages.

ISSUE: WON THERE IS A CONTRACT OF DEPOSIT

HELD:

Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that —

The depository can not make use of the thing deposited without the express permission of the
depositor.

Otherwise he shall be liable for losses and damages.

Article 1768 also provides that —

When the depository has permission to make use of the thing deposited, the contract loses the
character of a deposit and becomes a loan or bailment.

When on one of the latter days of January, 1898, Jose Lim went to the office of the creditor asking for an
extension of one year, in view of the fact the money was scare, and because neither himself nor the other
defendant were able to return the amount deposited, for which reason he agreed to pay interest at the rate of 15
per cent per annum, it was because, as a matter of fact, he did not have in his possession the amount
deposited, he having made use of the same in his business and for his own profit; and the creditor, by
granting them the extension, evidently confirmed the express permission previously given to use and dispose
of the amount stated as having been deposited.

Moreover, for the reason above set forth it may, as a matter of course, be inferred that there was no renewal of
the contract deposited converted into a loan, because, as has already been stated, the defendants received said
amount by virtue of real loan contract under the name of a deposit, since the so-called bailees were forthwith
authorized to dispose of the amount deposited. This they have done, as has been clearly shown.

SILVESTRE BARON VS PABLO DAVID

FACTS:

In the first case, i. e., that in which Silvestra Baron is plaintiff, the court gave judgment for her to recover of the

defendant the sum of P5,238.51, with costs. From this judgment both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

In the second case, i. e., that in which Guillermo Baron is plaintiff, the court gave judgment for him to recover of

the defendant the sum of P5,734.60, with costs, from which judgment both the plaintiff and the defendant also

appealed

Prior to January 17,1921, the defendant Pablo David had been engaged in running a rice mill in the municipality

of Magalang, in the Province of Pampanga.

On the date stated a fire occurred that destroyed the mill and its contents, and it was some time before the mill

could be rebuilt and put in operation again. Silvestra Baron, the plaintiff in the first of the actions before us, is

an aunt of the defendant; while Guillermo Baron, the plaintiff in the other action, is his uncle in the months of

March, April, and May, 1920, Silvestra Baron placed a quantity of palay in the defendant's mill; and this, in

connection with some that she took over from Guillermo Baron, amounted to 1,012 cavans and 24 kilos. During

approximately the same period Guillermo Baron placed other 1,865 cavans and 43 kilos of palay in the mill.

No compensation has ever been received by Silvestra Baron upon account of the palay thus placed with the

defendant. As against the palay delivered by Guillermo Baron, he has received from the defendant

advancements amounting to P2,800; but apart from this he has not been compensated.

Both the plaintiffs claim that the palay which was delivered by them to the defendant was sold to the

defendant;

while the defendant, on the other hand, claims that the palay was deposited subject to future withdrawal by the

depositors or subject to some future sale which was never effected, HENCE RELIEVED FROM

RESPONSIBILITY BY VIRTUE OF THE FIRE OF JANUARY 17, 1921.

Plaintiffs say that in August of that year the defendant promised to pay them severally the price of P8.40 per

cavan, which was about the top of the market for the season, provided they would wait for payment until

December.

Under article 1768 of the Civil Code, when the depositary has permission to make use of the thing

deposited, the contract loses the character of mere deposit and becomes a loan or a commodatum; and

of course by appropriating the thing, the bailee becomes responsible for its value. In this connection we wholly

reject the defendant's pretense that the palay delivered by the plaintiffs or any part of it was actually consumed in

the fire of January, 1921. Nor is the liability of the defendant in any wise affected by the circumstance that, by a

custom prevailing among rice millers in this country, persons placing palay with them without special agreement

as to price are at liberty to withdraw it later, proper allowance being made for storage and shrinkage, a thing that

is sometimes done, though rarely.