Japan's "anti-nuclear" culture has been posited as the main obstacle to its development of nuclear weapons. Public opinion polls show that even after North Korea's nuclear test approximately 80 percent of Japanese do not want their country to acquire nuclear weapons. The plethora of domestic and international legal and other barriers to any deviation from civilian nuclear programmes.
Japan's "anti-nuclear" culture has been posited as the main obstacle to its development of nuclear weapons. Public opinion polls show that even after North Korea's nuclear test approximately 80 percent of Japanese do not want their country to acquire nuclear weapons. The plethora of domestic and international legal and other barriers to any deviation from civilian nuclear programmes.
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
Japan's "anti-nuclear" culture has been posited as the main obstacle to its development of nuclear weapons. Public opinion polls show that even after North Korea's nuclear test approximately 80 percent of Japanese do not want their country to acquire nuclear weapons. The plethora of domestic and international legal and other barriers to any deviation from civilian nuclear programmes.
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
Japan Nuclearization Answers................................................................2 Extensions – Nuclear Aversion Prevents Japanese Proliferation.............2 Ext – Public Blocks..................................................................................3 Ext – Public Opinion Stops......................................................................3 Japan Rearmament Link NU....................................................................4 General Rearmament Answers...............................................................5 General Rearmament Answers...............................................................6 Ext – Popular Opposition.........................................................................7 Planet Debate 2010-11 2 Japanese Rearmament Answers
Japan Nuclearization Answers
Japanese aversion to nuclear weapons will prevent Japan prolif Michael Green, (Prof., Foreign Service, Georgetown U.), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 347. Japan's "anti-nuclear" culture, rooted in the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the institutionalization of postwar pacifist norms, has been posited as the main obstacle to Japan's development of nuclear weapons. Public opinion polls show that even after North Korea's nuclear test approximately 80 percent of Japanese do not want their country to acquire nuclear weapons.
Many legal restraints on Japanese nuclearization
Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 108. Japan's nuclear thinking and freedom of action is further complicated by the plethora of domestic and international legal and other barriers to any deviation from civilian nuclear programmes. Japan imposed constraints on its nuclear policy with the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955, which limits nuclear research, development and usage to peaceful purposes. Sato's Three Non-Nuclear Principles were followed in 1968 by the enunciation of the Four Nuclear Policies: the promotion of peaceful nuclear energy, global disarmament, reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrent and support for the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan's nuclear programmes have been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring since 1957, reinforced by Japan's signing of the NPT in 1970 and its ratification in 1976. Japan's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee means that it cooperates closely with other countries on nonproliferation measures.
Extensions – Nuclear Aversion Prevents Japanese Proliferation
Nuclear aversion remains strong in Japan Michael Green, (Prof., Foreign Service, Georgetown U.), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 357. The current public debate about nuclear weapons reveals several important trends. First, while the debate is less taboo--as measured by pages in print and the willingness of senior politicians to speak out on the subject--there is still a public reaction against those who actually advocate nuclear weapons. Japan's so-called "nuclear allergy" is still quite strong. Asahi Shimbun's opinion poll in 2005 found that 86 percent of the public opposed Japan's possession of nuclear weapons, and those numbers have not diminished even in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test.
Nuclear aversion will prevent Japanese prolif
Michael Green, (Prof., Foreign Service, Georgetown U.), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 364. In addition to technical restraints, Japan would face organizational and bureaucratic obstacles as well. For many decades, engineers and especially nuclear physicists have been socialized against nuclear weapons. A lack of secrecy laws and intrusive IAEA inspections would make a clandestine program impossible. An overt program would be prohibitively expensive without the kind of international collaboration Japan receives for peaceful nuclear use. Planet Debate 2010-11 3 Japanese Rearmament Answers Nuclear aversion will prevent Japan nukes Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 146. Japan is unlikely ever to retread the path of remilitarisation to the point that it tips into militarism akin to that of the pre-war period. Democratic institutions are far too well developed for that, and Japan is likely to be content with eroding and breaching a certain number of anti-militaristic principles to allow it to perform as a more reliable US ally. It is improbable that Japan would ever seek to breach the anti-nuclear principle, for instance.
Ext – Public Blocks
No public support for nuclear acquisition in Japan Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS, 2009, 267. There is little public support for a combat role for the SDF, but there does appear to be a growing acceptance of the need for Japan to be able to provide for its own defense. Support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons is, however, practically nonexistent. As far as the U.S. military presence is concerned, the Japanese public is generally supportive but has little confidence in the reliability of the United States in the event of war.
Ext – Public Opinion Stops
Popular opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan Yuri Kageyama, (Staff), ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 10, 2010. Retrieved Feb. 15, 2010 from Nexis. Japanese today are more shocked by the cover-up than by the deed itself, but they remain attached to the non-nuclear principle. A survey by the Mainichi newspaper, which interviewed more than 4,500 people, found 72 percent of the 2,600 respondents want to stick with the principles, and the number rose to about 80 percent among Japanese in their 20s and 30s. No margin of error was given. Shoji Niihara, a scholar of U.S.-Japan relations, said Japanese are hoping their new reformist prime minister will redefine Japan's relationship with the U.S. and work with President Barack Obama in his call for a world free of nuclear weapons.
Japanese bases are exclusively for American soldiers
Alexander Cooley, (Prof., Political Science, Barnard College), BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, 40. Most U.S. bases in Japan have been designated as exclusively American facilities, in part because the Japanese government, for political reasons, has wanted to distinguish between U.S. forces and the constitutionally restricted activities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.
Economic limits block Japanese militarization
Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS Planet Debate 2010-11 4 Japanese Rearmament Answers REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 38. Japan's stagnating defence budget suggests continuing constraints on its remilitarisation. This impression is reinforced by the maintenance of the 1% of GNP limit on expenditure. Prime Minister Takeo Miki first introduced the principle in 1976 to limit criticism of the NDPO.
Japan Rearmament Link NU
Japan doesn’t think US security guarantees are credible Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS, 2009, 272. The Japanese have never been confident that the United States could be relied on to defend them. Administrations from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton took pains to define publicly the narrow limits within which U.S. troops would be used. And when they have been used, as in Somalia in 1992 and in Haiti in 1994, both efforts ultimately ending in failure there has been public clamor to bring them home. The Iraq War and the preemptive doctrine of the Bush administration have created an environment in which Japan's military role, as well as those of other countries, is transformed. Thus the Japanese have come to see the appropriateness of greater self-reliance. Planet Debate 2010-11 5 Japanese Rearmament Answers
General Rearmament Answers
Nuclear taboo stops Japanese nuclearization John Park, (Dir., Korea Working Group, U.S. Institute of Peace), THE LONG SHADOW: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY ASIA, 2008, 288. Some normative considerations stop nuclear dominos from falling. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 created a lingering aversion to nuclear weapons in Japanese society. This nuclear taboo has found firm expression in the widely accepted principles in Japan of not possessing, producing, or allowing nuclear weapons. A nationwide survey of Japanese conducted in November 2006 (shortly after the North Korean nuclear test) reported that 80 percent of respondents either supported or somewhat supported upholding the Three Non- Nuclear Principles despite the shock of the test. Such public sentiment is an important political obstacle on the path to a nuclear-armed Japan, although there are some signs of its gradual erosion and possibilities of political manipulation.
Extensive popular support for Japan’s peace Constitution
Andrew Oros, (Prof., International Studies, Washington College), NORMALIZING JAPAN: POLITICS, IDENTITY, AND THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY PRACTICE, 2008, 174. Importantly, despite a clear sense of perceived threat, the conclusions a majority of Japanese draw regarding an appropriate policy response to such threats differ markedly from the responses of Americans polled under the same SAGE study, and from the prescriptions of realist international relations scholarship as well, and hearken back to the central tenets of the security identity of domestic antimilitarism. According to the 2004 SAGE poll, nearly half (47.7 percent) of Japanese view war as illegitimate even if one's own state is attacked. Far less than one-quarter (21.5 percent) believe that a strong defense will result in peace, while almost twice as many (42.3 percent) believe that disarmament will. Strikingly, Japanese overwhelmingly (85.9 percent) believe that war can be avoided through international cooperation (versus 41.9 percent of Americans, who view war as inevitable). When asked what is the most effective way of dealing with terrorism, nearly two-thirds (64.4 percent) of Japanese point to the United Nations, followed by over a third (38.6 percent) who encourage the fostering of new alliances using diplomacy (multiple responses were permitted).
Article 9 blocks Japanese militarization
Louis Hayes, (Prof., Political Science, U. Montana), INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS, 2009, 268. A second major constraint on the growth of the military establishment is Article 9 of the constitution. A strictly literal reading of this provision would seem to preclude any military, no matter what it is called. The issue of the constitutionality of the SDF has severely tested the Supreme Court's concept of the nature and scope of judicial review. The first constitutional challenge to the SDF came in 1952, when the leader of the left-wing JSP asked for a declaratory judgment that the National Police Reserve (the predecessor of the SDF) was unconstitutional. The court held that constitutionality could not be determined in the abstract. A dispute in law between two parties in which the issue was present would have to be raised. Planet Debate 2010-11 6 Japanese Rearmament Answers
General Rearmament Answers
Japan fully demilitarized Christopher Hughes, (Prof., International Politics, U. of Warwick, UK), JAPANS REMILITARIZATION, 2009, 22. In the immediate post-war period, during the early phases of the Allied Occupation, Japan was pulled to the other extreme, becoming a fully demilitarised state. The Imperial Army and Navy were disbanded, the defence-production industry was broken up and the militarism of the pre-war period was rejected in the country's new, post-war constitution. The Preamble of the constitution states Japanese ideals with regard to security: We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace- loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. Planet Debate 2010-11 7 Japanese Rearmament Answers
Ext – Popular Opposition
Japanese Peace Constitution has overwhelming popular support Takashi Inoguchi, (Prof., Political Science, Chuo U., Tokyo). THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHEAST ASIA: DEBATES, ISSUES, AND THE NEW ORDER, 2009, 89. Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution forbids Japan from using force to settle international disputes. The preamble of the constitution also declares that Japan renounces war forever. The constitution has played a strong role in shaping Japanese politics, and the public has been tenaciously and overwhelmingly pacifist for more than half a century.
Unprecedented massive pacificism in Japan
David Cortright, (Fellow, Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame U.), PEACE: A HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS, 2008, 11. In Japan absolute pacifism is official national policy, as enshrined in Article 9 of the postwar Constitution: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerence of the state will not be recognized. This extraordinary and unequivocal rejection of war has no precedent in history. Other countries have renounced war in their constitutions but never with such totality.
Personal and moral commitment to peace in Japan
David Cortright, (Fellow, Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame U.), PEACE: A HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS, 2008, 12. Support for peace in Japan is understood as both a personal moral commitment and a social- political position that is linked to human rights, democracy, and economic well-being. The common term for peace advocacy is heiwa shugi, which is a combination of the Japanese words for "peace" and "ism." The ambiguity of the term makes it difficult to differentiate between absolute and conditional pacifism, and for many the meanings overlap and often coexist. The term heiwa shugi has no equivalent in English, although the original Glasgow definition of pacifism was intended precisely to convey the principled yet pragmatic commitment to peace conveyed by the Japanese term.