RUBIN vs.JUDGE CORPUS-CABOCHAN OCAI.P.I.NO.11-3589-RTJ July29,2013 PEREZ, J.

In People v. Hon. Ma. Theresa L. Dela Torre-Yadao et al.,15 this Court held that voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since
he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his
attitude towards the parties or their cases.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule on inhibition and disqualification of
judges, to wit:
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The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified
from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in
the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is
conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant
is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements
of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would
come from a partial and biased judge.16
Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of
faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative
but to inhibit himself from the case.17 The better course for the judge under the circumstances
is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood; his reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserved.
XXX
Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere
errors of judgment in the
absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a
deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part.19
Complainants should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous.
Should they disagree with the ruling, there are judicial remedies available for them under the
Rules of Court. As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would
be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.20
Moreover, we have explained that administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous
orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial
review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved
parties and the cases not yet been resolved with finality.21
XXX
The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.23 The penalty to be
imposed on the judge varies depending on the attending circumstances of the case. In deciding
the penalty to be imposed, the Court takes into consideration, among others, the period of
delay; the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; the number of years the
judge has been in the service; the health and age of the judge; and the case load of the court
presided over by the judge.
SAMSON, vs.ATTY. ERA A.C.No.6664 July16,2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still
needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the
criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also
relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not
ipso facto cause the termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise
by the trial court was still required, but also because the compromise would have applied only
to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil
Code.24
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:
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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 2013-2014

x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided
loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling
such confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the
lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the
client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information
xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of confidential client information against the interests of the client,
either to benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an
assumed public purpose is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for
such abuse.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a
client to make a gift to the
lawyer xxx.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining
adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might
appear on both sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise
adversary argumentation x x x.29