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SUNGA v LACSON
GR No. L-26055
April 29, 1968

FACTS
- The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to G.R. No. L-26055 April 29, 1968
stop the respondents from demolishing their houses in Tondo Manila. The
court ordered summons to be served on the respondents ONLY after the
petitioners have paid the corresponding Sherriff’s fees. 10 days later, the FELIPE SUNGA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
court ordered the issuance of the preliminary injunction ONLY after the
petitioners filing of 1,000 to be approved by the court. vs.
o The bond was paid by the petitioners; however, they did not ask the HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
court to APPROVE the bond. Jurisdiction over the respondents
were therefore not acquired since no summons were formally sent
to them.
Martin B. Isidro for petitioners-appellants.
- After four months, the respondents asked the court to dismiss the case
which the court granted. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Asst. City Fiscal Melecio M. Aguayo for respondents-appellees.
ISSUE: Does respondents can cause dismissal of court action?
RULING
- Yes, the respondents can cause the dismissal of the action. CASTRO, J.:
- Petitioners base their claim on Section 1 of Rule 17 which provides that an
action may be dismissed only by the plaintiff at ANY TIME BEFORE the
service of answer.
On November 11, 1948 the appellants Felipe Sunga, et al., filed a petition for
- Petitioners did not take into consideration that although no summons were
prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila
served to the respondents, their voluntary appearance in court is equivalent
to stop the two appellees — the mayor and engineer, respectively, of the City
to the service of summons. The respondents act of filing the motion to
of Manila — from demolishing the appellant's houses along the Estero de
dismiss the case was an act of submission by the respondent to submit itself
Vitas in Tondo, Manila. The court ordered summons to be served on the
to the jurisdiction of the court.
appellees "upon payment by the petitioners [the appellants herein] of the
- Illicit major: where the major premise is distributed in the conclusion, but not
corresponding Sheriff's fees." Ten days later, or on November 24, 1958, the
in the major premise. court, after hearing both parties, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
o Illicit major: Section 1 of Rule 17 injunction upon the filing by the appellants of a bond in the amount of P1,000,
o Minor premise: It does not preclude the respondents from filing the "to be approved by this court."
motion to dismiss, considering how it has taken the petitioners a
long time to act. It is a right
Neither order was complied with by the appellants. Thus although the
appellants appear to have filed a bond, they never asked the court to
approve it, nor did they pay the sheriff's fees. The result was that after four
long months from the filing of the suit had elapsed, summons was yet to be
served on the appellees and an injunction was yet to be served. On March
20, 1959 the appellees asked the court to dismiss the case. Although no
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copy of their motion was served on the appellants, it appears nevertheless
that the latter were notified by the court that the motion would be heard on
June 13, 1959.
On June 13, 1959 the court dismissed the case. The appellants asked for a
reconsideration but the court stood pat on its order. Hence this appeal,
originally taken to the Court of Appeals but certified by the latter to this Court
on the ground that the issue involved is one purely of law.
1. It is first of all contended that the lower court could not act on the motion to
dismiss filed by the appellees because the former had not acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the latter. The claim of lack of jurisdiction is
predicated on the fact that no summons was served on the appellees. The
appellants argue that before summons is issued to the appellees only they
(the appellants) can dismiss the action under section 1 of Rule 17 (formerly
Rule 30) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Dismissal by the plaintiff . — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates
as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same
claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court.
The appellants overlook the fact that while it is true that no summons was
served on the appellees (because of the appellants' own failure to pay the
sheriff's fees), the appellees appeared in court and were in fact required by it
to file a memorandum at the hearing held on November 17 on the appellants'
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. A defendant's voluntary
appearance in an action is equivalent to the service of summons upon him.1
Nor was that the only time the appellees voluntarily submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the lower court. Their filing of a motion to dismiss (not
because of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, but because of the
appellants' failure to prosecute their action) was an act of submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.2 This bears strong emphasis because jurisdiction
over the person, unlike that over the subject-matter, is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of the party who has the right to question the court's
jurisdiction, namely, the defendant.
2. Nor is there merit in the claim that until the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, a defendant has no standing to move for the dismissal of an
action. Applied to this case this proposition means that the appellants own
neglect to pay the sheriff's fees can be the very means by which they can
maintain in perpetuity an action they have neglected to prosecute.
Nothing in the language of section 1 of Rule 17 supports the view that before
the defendant has answered, the action can be dismissed only at the
instance of the plaintiff. To paraphrase Frankfurter, only literary perversity or
jaundiced partisanship can sponsor such a particular rendering of the law.3
For what the rule says is that before the defendant has answered the plaintiff
can withdraw his action by merely giving notice to the court,4 but that after
the defendant has answered the plaintiff may do so only with prior leave of
the court.5 In other words, the rule governs the conditions under which the
plaintiff may dismiss his action; it does not purport to deny thereby to the
defendant the right to seek the dismissal of the action, in much the same way
that to say that all men are mortal does not mean that all women are not.6
Such implication rests on a fallacy and is possible only through the use of the
"illicit major."
3. It is finally contended that as no notice of the motion to dismiss was served
on the appellant as required by the Rules of Court7 the motion was nothing
but a "useless piece of paper," which the court should have disregarded. For
this purpose the case of Manakil vs. Revilla8 is cited.
Again the appellants are in error. In Manakil the plaintiff, after having been
notified on April 12, 1921 that his case had been dismissed, filed a motion for
new trial on April 15, without giving notice thereof to the defendant. As the
court took no action on his motion, the plaintiff filed another motion in which
he asked that his motion for new trial "be set down for hearing on the 28th
day of May, 1921." The court ruled that the motion for new trial was filed out
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of time with the result that the order dismissing the case became final. On
appeal this Court sustained the lower court and held:

We are of the opinion, and so decide . . . that the alleged motion, copied
above, was not in fact a motion at all, for the reason that it did not comply
with the requirements of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court of First Instance. It
was nothing but a piece of paper filed with the court. It presented no question
which the court could decide. The court had no right to consider it, nor had
the clerk any right to receive it without compliance with Rule 10 . . . It did not
become a motion until the 23d day of May, 1921, when the petitioners herein
fixed a time for hearing of said alleged motion.

It follows, therefore, that no motion for a new trial was presented until the 23d
day of May, 1921, or forty-one days after they had received notice of the
decision . . . A motion for a new trial having been presented outside of the
period prescribed by law, the judge of the lower court was fully justified in his
order . . . 9

In the case at bar, when the court learned that no notice of the motion was
served on the appellants, it promptly reset the hearing for another day (June
13, 1959) "with due notice to all the parties." Hence, whatever defect there
was initially was later cured with no adverse effect on the running of any
period, with the result that, when the court dismissed the case, it had before
it a motion and not a "useless piece of paper."1äwphï1.ñët

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is affirmed, at appellant's cost.