RULE 6 Compulsory or Permissive

.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016 - ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS, Petitioner, v. THE ESTATE OF
ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. AND ROLANDO OGSOS, JR., Respondent.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016

ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS, Petitioner, v. THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. AND

ROLANDO OGSOS, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated February 28, 2014
and the Resolution3 dated October 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No.
03710, which affirmed with modification the Decision4 dated July 2, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 12708, thereby: (a) ordering
petitioner Elizabeth Sy-Vargas (petitioner) and her sister, Kathryn T. Sy (Kathryn), to pay
respondents the Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. (Ogsos, Sr.) and Rolando Ogsos, Jr., (Ogsos,
Jr.; collectively, respondents) the amount of P10,391,981.76, representing the value of the
sugar and molasses that could have been produced from 1999 to 2004, if only respondents
were not deprived by petitioner and Kathryn of possession and enjoyment of the leased
agricultural farm; and (b) deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
the attorney's fees and costs of suit against respondents.

The Facts
On February 10, 1994, Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico (Fermina), represented by
their Attorney-in-Fact, Catalino V. Noel, entered into a Contract of Lease5 (lease contract)
covering five (5) parcels of agricultural land owned by the latter, with an aggregate area of 23
hectares, more or less, situated in Maaslum Manjuyod, Negros Oriental (leased premises).
Based on the contract, Ogsos, Sr. agreed to pay the Heirs of Fermina 230 piculs or 290.95
liquid-kilogram (lkg.) of centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from crop year 1994-1995
to crop year 2000-2001, as lease rental.6chanrobleslaw

On June 5, 1996, the term of the lease contract was extended for three (3) years, or until the
end of crop year 2004, due to Ogsos, Sr.'s introduction of improvements on the leased
premises.7 Thereafter, or on December 30, 1996, the said contract was amended, modifying
the lease rental from 230 piculs or 290.95 lkg. of centrifugal sugar every crop year to
P150,000.00 cash, beginning the crop year 1996-1997.8chanrobleslaw

Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed that the lease rentals
from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 1998-1999 were not paid. Thus, on April 27, 2000,9 they
filed a Complaint10 for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents, before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 12708, to recover the unpaid lease rentals. Pertinently, they
did not include in their claim the lease rental for crop year 1999-2000 because respondents
had already abandoned the leased premises since the said crop year.11chanrobleslaw

Summons was served in May 2000, but respondent Ogsos, Jr. only filed a motion to admit
answer12 and answer13 to the complaint after more than two (2) years, or on December 17,
2002.14 Thus, petitioner and Kathryn filed on January 28, 2003, an opposition thereto, and
moved to declare respondents in default, which the RTC granted in an Order dated March 7,
2003.15chanrobleslaw

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the RTC, respondents, then, elevated
the matter via a petition for certiorari to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79463, wherein
the CA granted respondents petition and remanded the case to the RTC. The CA ordered the
RTC to admit respondents' answer so as to give them the opportunity to be heard and to
present their side on the merits of the case.16chanrobleslaw

In their answer,17 respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied with their obligations
as embodied in the lease contract and its subsequent amendments.18 They denied
abandoning the leased premises and claimed that sometime in December 1998, petitioner and
Kathryn unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and appropriated for themselves
the sugarcane ready for harvest under the pretext that they would apply the proceeds thereof
to the unpaid rent.19 They likewise alleged that in the same year, Ogsos, Sr. and his wife fell
ill, which incidents forced respondents to obtain loans from several businessmen, namely:
Emiliano "Nonette" Bacang, Zaldy Roleda, and Pastor Domocol.20 The arrangement
regarding the foregoing loans was that the said creditors would be allowed to harvest the
sugarcane from the leased premises and apply the proceeds thereof to the loans.21 However,
when the creditors were about to harvest the sugarcane, they were prevented by petitioner
and Kathryn; resulting in respondents' default in the payment of their debts.22 On March 22,
2000, Ogsos, Sr. died.23chanrobleslaw

Respondents also averred that since crop years 1994 to 1997-1998, the average production of
sugarcane is 1,308.68 lkg. of sugar and 30.409 tons of molasses per year, as computed on the
basis of the Planter's Production Reports. Thus, when petitioner and Kathryn took
possession of the leased premises, respondents lost their profits equivalent to the aforesaid
production starting from crop year 1999-2000 until the termination of the lease contract on
crop year 2003-2004.24 Accordingly, respondents filed a counterclaim for these lost profits
plus damages.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

On June 6, 2005, respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint in view of the
absence of the required Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. In a Resolution dated November
9, 2005, the RTC dismissed the case without prejudice.26chanrobleslaw

On December 15, 2005, respondents moved for the hearing of their counterclaim, to which the
RTC required petitioner and Kathryn to submit a comment, but none was filed. Hence, in an
Order dated February 9, 2006, the RTC set the case for reception of evidence on respondents'
counterclaim.27chanrobleslaw

On February 28, 2006, respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial, which
was granted by the RTC on March 1, 2006, setting the pre-trial on March 30, 2006. Petitioner,
Kathryn, and their counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial and to file their pre-trial brief. Thus,
respondents filed a manifestation with motion to present evidence ex-parte on June 7, 2006,
praying that petitioner and Kathryn be declared in default, and that respondents be allowed to
present evidence on their counterclaim ex-parte, which the RTC granted in an Order dated
June 28,2006.28chanrobleslaw

Thereafter, or on August 16, 2006, petitioner and Kathryn moved to quash the June 28, 2006
Order, which was, however, denied on September 1, 2006 on the ground that the period to
ask for reconsideration or for the lifting of the order had already lapsed.29chanrobleslaw

On October 17, 2006, petitioner and Kathryn filed a motion to dismiss respondents'
counterclaim arguing that the same were permissive and that respondents had not paid the
appropriate docket fees.30 However, the RTC, in its November 16, 2006 Order,31 denied the
said motion, declaring respondents' counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that the
payment of the required docket fees was no longer necessary.32chanrobleslaw
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision33 dated July 2, 2007, the RTC granted respondents' counterclaim, and
consequently, ordered petitioner and Kathryn to pay respondents the following amounts: (a)
P10,391,981.76 worth of sugar and molasses produced representing the value of 1,308.68 lkg.
of sugar and 30.409 tons of molasses for each crop year that defendant and Ogsos, Sr. were
deprived of possession and enjoyment of the leased premises; (b) P500,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; (d) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P1,000.00 for each personal appearance of respondents' counsel before the RTC; and (e)
P50,000.00 as costs of suit.34 In so ruling, it found that Ogsos, Sr. faithfully paid the lease
rentals during the crop years 1994 to 199735 but eventually stopped their payments when
petitioner and Kathryn took possession and harvested the sugarcane in the leased premises
sometime in December 1998, despite respondents' objection.36 Accordingly, petitioner and
Kathryn reneged on their obligation to maintain respondents' peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the leased premises when the former forcibly and unlawfully deprived the latter
of possession thereof in December 1998, despite payment of the lease rentals. Due to this,
petitioner and Kathryn were held liable for breach of the lease contract.37chanrobleslaw

Dissatisfied, petitioner and Kathryn appealed to the CA.38chanrobleslaw

The CA Ruling

In a Decision39 dated February 28, 2014 (CA Decision), the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC
but deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages, as well as the attorney's fees and
costs of suit due to the absence of proof that petitioner and Kathryn acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.40chanrobleslaw

The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in ruling that respondents' counterclaim is not
permissive but compulsory; hence, payment of docket fees was not necessary.41 Further, the
CA ruled that even though the counterclaim was compulsory, the same would not be
automatically dismissed upon the dismissal of the action if the dismissal was caused by the
fault of the plaintiff, as in this case.42chanrobleslaw

The counsel of petitioner and Kathryn received the CA Decision on March 14, 2014.43 On
March 31, 2014, petitioner and Kathryn filed their motion for reconsideration,44 which was
denied in the Resolution45 dated October 1, 2015 for being filed out of time; hence, the
instant petition solely filed by petitioner.46chanrobleslaw
The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues for resolution in this case are whether or not the CA correctly ruled that:
(a) petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; (b) respondents'
counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not permissive in nature, and thus, no payment
of docket fees is required; and (c) respondents are entitled to such counterclaim.

The Court's Ruling

I.

Records bear out that in the assailed October 1, 2015 Resolution, the CA denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for being purportedly filed out of time. The CA explained that
since the registry return receipt showed that petitioner and Kathryn's counsel received the
assailed March 14, 2014 Decision, it only had until March 29, 2014 to file a motion for
reconsideration. However, they only filed such motion on March 31, 2014, thus, rendering the
assailed CA Decision final and executory.

Notably, however, the CA failed to take into consideration that March 29, 2014 fell on a
Saturday. In these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court provides
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section. 1. How to compute time. - In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event
from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day.

Since March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were completely justified in
filing their motion for reconsideration on the next working day: Monday, March 31, 2014.
Accordingly, the CA should not have considered it filed out of time, and instead, resolved
such motion on the merits. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case
be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits. However, when there is already enough
basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had - as in this case - the Court may
dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in
the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of justice.47 In view of the foregoing -
as well as the fact that petitioner prayed for the resolution of the substantive issues on the
merits48 - the Court finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
II.

Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the

counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that
for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed
docket fees.49 On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory
counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter.50chanrobleslaw

In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an
opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory
counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action.51chanrobleslaw

On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially
an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.52chanrobleslaw

In Spouses Mendiola v. CA,53 the Court had devised tests m determining whether or not a
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to
wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by
the parties and the court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the
logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such
relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the
multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of
the same basic controversy between the parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers,
the counterclaim is compulsory.54 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Based on the abovementioned standards, the Court finds that the counterclaim of
respondents is permissive in nature. This is because: (a) the issue in the main case, i.e.,
whether or not respondents are liable to pay lease rentals, is entirely different from the issue
in the counterclaim, i.e., whether or not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for
taking over the possession of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating
respondents' crops planted therein; (b) since petitioner and respondents' respective causes
of action arose from completely different occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res
judicata had they opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence
required to prove petitioner's claim that respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise
different from the evidence required to prove respondents' counterclaim that petitioner and
Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith; and (d) the recovery of
petitioner's claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents' counterclaim,
such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time
and effort of the court and the parties.

In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the
courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that
respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to
the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its
dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no
intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.55chanrobleslaw

Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their
counterclaim, primarily because as early as November 16, 2006, the RTC had already found
such counterclaim to be compulsory in nature.56 Such finding was then upheld in the July 2,
2007 RTC Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its assailed Decision. As such, the
lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to rule on
their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents' reliance on the findings of the courts a quo,
albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their
intention not to defraud the government. Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for
non-payment of docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment
lien on the monetary awards in respondents' favor. In Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation v. Legasto,57 citing, Section 2, Rule 14158 of the Rules of Court, the Court held
that in instances where a litigant's non-payment of docket fees was made in good faith and
without any intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo
should be ordered to assess the amount of deficient docket fees due from such litigant,
which will constitute a judgment lien on the amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien,59
as in this case.

That being said, the Court now resolves whether or not respondents are indeed entitled to
their counterclaim.

III.
In this case, the RTC found that under the lease contract, petitioner and Kathryn were bound
to keep respondents in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises for the
entire duration of the lease and that respondents faithfully paid their lease rentals for a period
of four (4) years, or until crop year 1998. Despite the foregoing, petitioner and Kathryn
unlawfully took possession (sometime in December 1998) and harvested respondents' crops
over their objections. The RTC further found that due to such unlawful dispossession of the
leased premises, respondents were deprived of profits for six (6) crop years (i.e., from crop
year 1999 to crop year 2004, which was the last crop year of the lease) in the amount of
P1,731,996.96 per year, or a grand total of P10,391,987.76.60 Such factual findings were then
affirmed by the CA in its assailed ruling. It has long been settled that factual findings of the
trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal,61
save for certain exceptions,62 which petitioner failed to show in this case. As such, the grant
of said counterclaim is upheld.

Nonetheless, the Court finds it proper to deduct from the counterclaim award of
P10,391,987.76 the amount of P900,000.00, which represents the lease rentals that should
have been paid by the lessee, i.e., respondents, during the six (6) crop years (i.e., crop years
1999 to 2004) that they were deprived possession of the leased premises. As the Court's
counterclaim award of lost profits during the said period stems from the recognition that the
lessor, i.e., petitioner and Kathryn, should have complied with their obligations to keep
respondents in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises for the entire
duration of the lease, it is but fair and just that respondents be also held to their obligations
thereunder that is, to pay the lease rentals for the entire duration of the contract. Perceptibly,
respondents' gain of profits during such period presupposes a valid and subsisting lease
contract, which is rendered legally possible if only they themselves discharged their own
obligation to pay the lease rentals therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 28, 2014 and the
Resolution dated October 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 03710 are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deducting from the counterclaim award of P10,391,987.76 in
favor of the Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. and Rolando Ogsos, Jr. (respondents) the amount
of P900,000.00, which represents the unpaid lease rentals for the crop years 1999 to 2004 as
above-discussed. Moreover, a judgment lien shall be imposed on the monetary award given
to respondents corresponding to the unpaid docket fees on the permissive counterclaim.
Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36, or
his duly authorized deputy, is hereby ordered to enforce the judgment lien and to assess and
collect the appropriate docket fees from respondents.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RULE 7 verifivcation and certificastion

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200191 August 20, 2014

LOURDES C. FERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
NORMA VILLEGAS and any person acting in her behalf including her family, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated June 22, 20112 and
December 28, 20113of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116143 which dismissed the
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court4 (CA petition) due to defective verification and
certification against forum shopping.

The Facts

On August 21, 2008, petitioner Lourdes C. Fernandez (Lourdes) and her sister, Cecilia Siapno
(Cecilia), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Imelda S. Slater (Imelda), filed a Complaint for
Ejectment5 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Dagupan City(MTCC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 15980, against respondent Norma Villegas (Norma) and any person acting in her
behalf including her family (respondents), seeking to recover possession of a parcel of land situated
in Guilig Street, Dagupan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 191706 (subject
property).

In their complaint, Lourdes and Cecilia(plaintiffs) averred that they are the registered owners of the
subject property on which both Lourdes and respondents previously lived under oneroof. However,
when their house was destroyed by typhoon "Cosme," Lourdes transferred to a nipahut on the same
lot, while Norma, Cecilia’s daughter-in-law, and her family were advised to relocate but, in the
meantime, allowed to use a portion thereof.7 Instead, respondents erecteda house thereon over
plaintiffs’ objections and, despite demands, refused to vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property.8 The dispute was referred to the Barangay Office of Pugo9 Chico and the Public
Attorney’s Office, both of Dagupan City, but no settlement was reached.10

For their part, respondents, in their Answer,11 averred that the complaint stated no cause of
action,considering that Lourdes has no standing to question their possession ofthe subject property
as she had already donated her portion in favor of Cecilia,12 adding too that the latter is bound by her
declaration that"the house and lot belong[s] to Eddie," who is Norma’s late husband.13 Respondents
further asserted that there was no compliance with the required conciliation and mediation under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law14 as no Certificate to File Action was attached to the
complaint,15 thereby rendering the complaint dismissible.

The MTCC Ruling

In a Decision16 dated September 30, 2009,the MTCC found that respondents failed to impugn the
validity of plaintiffs’ ownership over the subject property. As owners, plaintiffs therefore have the right
to enjoy the use and receive the fruits from the saidproperty, as well as to exclude one from its
enjoyment pursuant to Articles 428 and 429 of the Civil Code.17 Accordingly, the MTCC ordered
respondents to: (a) vacate the subject property and pay plaintiffs the amount of ₱1,000.00 per month
as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the portion of the lot occupied by them,
reckoned from the filing of the complaint; (b) pay plaintiffs ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (c) pay
the cost of suit.18

Dissatisfied with the MTCC’s ruling, respondents filed an appeal19 before the Regional Trial Court
ofDagupan City (RTC), Branch 40, docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-0224-D.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision20 dated March 16, 2010, the RTC, Branch 40 granted respondents’ appeal and ordered
the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint based on the following grounds: (a) there was no substantial
compliance with the mandatory conciliation and mediation process before the barangay, especially
considering that the parties are very close relatives;21 and (b) respondents are builders in good faith
and cannot be summarily ejected from the subject property without compliance with the provisions of
Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code.22

The RTC, Branch 40 further ordered plaintiffs to jointly and severally pay respondents the amount of
₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.23

Aggrieved, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration24 which was denied by the RTC, Branch 4425 in
a Resolution26 dated August 18, 2010, prompting the filing of the CA petition.

The CA Proceedings

In response to plaintiffs’ CA petition, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the grounds
that: (a) Cecilia failed to personally verify the petition; and (b) the appeal is dilatory.27 In their
comment, plaintiffs maintained that Lourdes, as co-owner of the subject property, has the right tofile
an ejectment case by herself, without joining her co-owner, Cecilia, as provided under Article 487 of
the Civil Code. Moreover, Lourdes was specially authorized by Imelda to file the CA petition.28

In a Resolution29 dated June 22, 2011, the CA granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal,
holding that the verification and certification30 against forum shopping attached to the CA petition was
defective since it was signed only by Lourdes, one of the plaintiffs in the case, in violation of Section
5,31 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which requires all the plaintiffs to sign the same.32 There was also no
showing that Lourdes was authorized by her co-plaintiff, Cecilia, to represent the latter and to sign
the said certification, and neither did the submission of the special powers of attorney of Cecilia and
Imelda to that effect constitute substantial compliance with the rules.33The CA further noted that
plaintiffs failed to comply with its prior Resolution dated October 11, 2010 requiring the submission of
an amended verification/certification against forum shopping within five (5) days from notice,
warranting the dismissal of the CA petition on this score.34

At odds with the CA’s resolution, plaintiffs sought reconsideration35 but the same was denied in a
Resolution36dated December 28, 2011, hence, the instant petition filed by Lourdes alone.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing outright the CA petition
due to a defective verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the CA petition.

The Court’s Ruling

The present petition has merit.

The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the requirements on
or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping, viz.:

1) A distinction must be madebetween non-compliance with the requirement on or

submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily

render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act
on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strictcompliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the endsof justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially compliedwith when one who has ample knowledge to
swear tothe truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in goodfaith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission orcorrection
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interestand invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.37 (Emphases supplied)

Applying these guidelines to the caseat bar, particularly, those stated in paragraphs 3 and 5
highlighted above, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the CA
petition due to a defective verification and certification against forum shopping.

A. Substantial Compliance with the Verification Requirement.

It is undisputed that Lourdes is not only a resident of the subject property but is a co-owner thereof
together with her co-plaintiff/sister, Cecilia. As such, she is "one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the x x x [CA] petition" and is therefore qualified to "sign x x x the
verification" attached thereto in view of paragraph 3 of the above-said guidelines. 1âw phi 1
In fact, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action
for ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit
is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.38 To reiterate, both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-
plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of interest and cause of action as
against respondents. Notably, even the petition for review filed before the CA indicated that they are
the petitioners therein and that the same was filed on their behalf. Hence, the lone signature of
Lourdes on the verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial compliance with the
rules.39 As held in the case of Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing:40

[W]here the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interestin the property subject
of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum
shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.41 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Besides, it is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and
correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the correction of the pleadings oract on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules,42 as in this case.

B. Substantial Compliance with the Certification Against Forum Shopping Requirement.

Following paragraph 5 of the guidelinesas aforestated, there was also substantial compliance with
the certification against forum shopping requirement, notwithstanding the fact that only Lourdes
signed the same.

It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances - as in this case where the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense -
the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping may
be relaxed.43 Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the petition on this score.

Similar to the rules on verification, the rules on forum shopping are designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice; hence, it should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions on certification against forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature to the effect that the certification cannot altogether be dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. It does not prohibit substantial compliance with the rules
under justifiable circumstances,44 as also in this case.

As there was substantial compliance with the above-discussed procedural requirements at the
onset, plaintiffs' subsequent failure to file an amended verification and certification, as directed by
the October 11, 2010 CA Resolution, should not have warranted the dismissal of the CA petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 22, 2011 and December
28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116143 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the case is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the CA for proper and immediate
disposition.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
RULE 11

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88586 April 27, 1990

CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY, respondents.

Gil Venerando R. Racho for petitioner.

Ponciano G. Hernandez for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The question involved in this case is quite simple and not even new. A little research could
have easily resolved it and avoided this litigation that has come up all the way to this Court. If
we are rendering a full-blown decision instead of disposing of the issue by a short resolution,
it is not only because we see the need to reiterate certain basic rules that should be well-
settled by now. What we especially intend is to impress upon bench and bar the value of
keeping abreast of the doctrines announced by the Court in the interpretation of its Rules.

The facts are easily recounted.

On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes
against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Before the expiration of
the 15-day reglementary period to answer, the petitioner filed two successive motions for
extension of time to file responsive pleadings, which were both granted. The last day of the
second extension was May 28, 1985. On May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of the plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of
action. The motion was denied on July 16, 1985, "both for lack of merit and for having been
improperly filed." On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff moved to declare the petitioner in default for
having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading during the extension
granted. This declaration was made on August 2, 1985, and evidence for the plaintiff was
thereafter received ex parte resulting in a judgment in its favor on February 4, 1986. The
judgment was affirmed by the respondent court in its decision dated April 7, 1989, 1 which is
the subject of the present petition.

Our ruling follows.

The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been sustained on appeal.
There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, within the period of the
second extension granted by the trial court. It is true that such a motion could not be
considered a responsive pleading as we have held in many cases. 2 Nevertheless, it is also
true that in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that "within the time for
pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may be made" on the grounds therein enumerated,
including the grounds invoked by the petitioner.

Moreover, it is clearly provided in Section 4 of the same Rule that:

Sec. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is

deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed
from the time he received notice of denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different
period.

The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before the expiration of the
second extension. Notice of its denial was served on the petitioner on July 29, 1985. From
that date, the petitioner had 15 days within which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It
was unable to do so, however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on
August 2, 1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration of the
15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was supposed to file his answer.
The respondents are reminded of our ruling in Barraza v. Campos, 3 to wit:

Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent judge had granted petitioners an extension of
fifteen (15) days to file their answer, or up to November 18, 1978. Instead of filing the answer,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on November 17, 1978, one (1) day before
the expiration of the period as extended by the court. This is clearly allowed under Section 1,
Rule 16, Rules of Court. A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method of
testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint. The issue raised by a motion to dismiss is similar
to that formerly raised by a demurrer under the Code of Civil Procedure. (Zobel v. Abreu, 98
Phil. 343). A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 8
(now Section 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of Court, must be filed within the time for pleading that
is, within the time to answer. (J.M. Tuason v. Rafor, L-15537, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 478.)

Private respondents' argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts the running of
the period within which to file an answer, this refers to the original period of fifteen (15) days
within which to file the responsive pleading and not to the extension of time within which to
file the answer, is without merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provides, directly or
indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer
when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers only to
the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as
granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is
denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the
time prescribed by Rule 11, computed, from the time he received notice of the denial or
deferment, unless the court provides a different period.

This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his
answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within "a different period
(as) fixed by the court." (Emphasis supplied.)

The above ruling was a reiteration of Mandac v. Gumarad, 4 where we also set aside a default
order upon a showing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the expiration of the
extension granted by the trial court for the filing of the answer.

As for the period allowed the defendant to file its answer following the denial of the motion to
dismiss, the Court clearly held thus in Acosta-Ofalia v. Sundiam: 5

. . . the period for filing a responsive pleading commences to run all over again from the time
the defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the petitioners received the notice of the denial of their motion to dismiss
on September 24, 1975. Hence, they had fifteen (15) days from said date or up to October 9,
1975, within which to file their answer. The petitioners were declared in default on September
29, 1975, i.e., ten (10) days before the expiration of the time for filing their answer. Obviously,
the order of default made on September 19, 1975, was premature and is, therefore, null and
void as well as the reception of private respondents' evidence ex parte, the decision rendered
thereon, and the writ of execution, having been predicated on a void order of default.

Manifestly, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the
petitioners in default. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of the above doctrines, the Court recapitulates the rules as follows:

1. The trial court may in its discretion and on proper motion extend the 15-day reglementary
period for the filing of responsive pleadings.

2. During the original reglementary 15-day period, or any extension of such period, the
defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint.

3. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed another fifteen days from
notice of the denial to file the responsive pleading. The full 15-day reglementary period starts
all over again.

Accordingly, we hold that in issuing the order of default before the expiration of the period
for the filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be
heard in its defense. The judgment by default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the
evidence of the plaintiff, was therefore also invalid.

We do not agree with the respondent court that the petitioner should have first filed a motion
to set aside the default order before challenging the judgment by default on appeal. The
evidence that the default order was not served on the petitioner has not been refuted. It is not
explained why the default judgment was served on the correct counsel of the petitioner but
the default order was not. 6 At any rate, the default order was a total nullity and produced no
legal effect whatsoever because it was issued even before the petitioner could file its answer.
This was clearly a violation of due process.
We come finally to the timeliness of the present petition.

The private respondent contends that it was filed out of time on July 22, 1989, because the
appealed decision had already become final and executory before that date.

The record shows that the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered on April 7, 1989,
and notice thereof was served on the petitioner on April 17, 1989. On April 28, 1989, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on June 1, 1989. Notice of the
denial was served on June 8, 1989, and on June 21, 1989, the petitioner asked this Court for a
30-day extension within which to file the present petition. The extension was granted up to
July 23, 1989.

The private respondent contends that the petition was filed late because the 15-day
reglementary period should be counted from April 17, 1989, when the decision of the
respondent court was served on the petitioner. Its reason is that the motion for
reconsideration was pro forma and did not suspend the running of the said period, which
thus expired on May 3, 1989. The basis of this argument is the wording of the denial, which
ran as follows:

The issues raised and the arguments contended in the Motion for Reconsideration of
defendant-appellant are the same issues and arguments presented in the appellant's brief,
reply brief and supplemental reply brief, which have been discussed in plaintiff-appellee's
brief and resolved in the decision of this Court dated April 7, 1989.

After close scrutiny of the Motion for Reconsideration, We find no cogent reason to reverse
Our decision.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. 7

While mindful of the decision cited by the private respondent, 8 we call attention to our later
pronouncement on this matter, in the case of Siy v. Court of Appeals: 9
In the first place, the very purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to point out the findings
and conclusions of the decision which in the movant's view, are not supported by law or the
evidence. The movant, therefore, is very often confined to the amplification on further
discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the court. Otherwise, his remedy
would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.

Conformably, we must hold that the motion for reconsideration was not pro forma. Hence, it
did have the effect of suspending the reglementary period of appeal until the denial of the
motion was notified to the petitioner.

The rest of the petition deals with the substantive issue of whether the respondent
Municipality of Norzagaray has the power to impose business taxes on the petitioner as a
manufacturer and distributor of cement. This issue involves not only legal but also factual
considerations that have not been fully examined because the petitioner was not given its
day in court. A fair resolution of this issue requires a healing where both parties will be given
an opportunity to present their respective sides in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by the Rules of Court. No less than full compliance with procedural due process will suffice.
Hence, it is imperative that this case be remanded to the court a quo for a full trial on the
merits.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 7, 1989, the default order of
the trial court dated August 2, 1985, and the judgment by default dated February 4, 1986, are
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 7971-M is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, for further proceedings in accordance with the rules laid down in this decision.
Costs against respondent Municipality of Norzagaray.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

RULE 12

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015.

23

MAY

En Banc
[BRION, J.]

The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila
Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan.

The Information reads:

xxxx

In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s
jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator,
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public
officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one
another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:

by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others,
kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the
project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of
the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which
became the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-
funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;

by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,

relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he
filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at
the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).

The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.

ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is vague or indefinite
resulting in the serious violation of Enrile’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him?

HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a
valid Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague
terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal
amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court
should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the government to file a bill of
particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill
to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt
acts through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it
intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to
avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a
fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries
with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several
predicate criminal acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable
period of time. Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital
punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less. When a person’s life interest –
protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized in the due process clause – is
at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those
fundamental rights.

While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars
involved the right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in
Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the
prism of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the position that the
Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is void;
he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the
Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow
him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the
nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the
motion for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the
allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not
allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.That every
element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not preclude the
accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is
alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of
particulars. Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause
and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of
enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.

We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen
(15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars
containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of
particulars shall specifically contain the following:

The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal
acts” charged in the Information.

A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received, stating

how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.

A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were

received.

The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks
and commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state
the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects were received.

The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged
“recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”

The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The particular
person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.

All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.
RULE 12

[G.R. No. 115748. August 7, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and LUCIO C. TAN, ET
AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Assailed in this petition are the Resolutions issued by respondent Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case No. 0005, dated January 25, 1994 and March 24, 1994, granting private respondents
motion for a bill of particulars and denying petitioner Philippine Commission on Good
Governments (PCGG) motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Initially, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the PCGG and assisted by
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed before the Sandiganbayan on July 17, 1987, a
complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting and Damages against Lucio Tan,
Ferdinand Marcos and some other individuals, docketed as Civil Case No. 0005.

The defendants filed their respective answers with the exception of Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda
Marcos and Federico Moreno. Subsequently however, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend and for Admission of Second Amended Complaint, dated August 19, 1991, impleading
three (3) more individuals and forty (40) other corporations as defendants and revising its
allegations in the complaint.

Despite the opposition filed by defendants Lucio Tan, et al., the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated April 2, 1992,[1] granted petitioners motion and admitted the Second
Amended Complaint dated September 5, 1991.[2]
Thereafter, Manufacturing Services and Trade Corporation and fourteen (14) other corporate
defendants filed a Motion For a More Definite Statement or a Bill of Particulars dated May 22,
1991, seeking the following particulars to wit:

1. As to Par. 6-a. Who are the Individual defendants referred to in the opening clause of Par.
6-a, which reads

6-a. Among the companies beneficially owned or controlled by Defendant Lucio Tan,
Defendant Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the individual Defendants were/are: x x x

(At p. 8)

In what particular manner does defendant Lucio C. Tan, Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos and/or the individual defendants each beneficially own or control the corporations
listed in Par. 6-a? Does each of these defendants own shares of stock in each corporations?
Or does each of these defendants control any of these corporations because of voting trust
agreement or similar corporate devices? If so, who of the registered shareholders have
executed such voting trust agreement or are parties to such corporate devices?

2. As to Par. 14-c. In what particular manner did the defendant-spouses Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos support the corporations enumerated therein?

3. As to Pars. 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20. Considering that defendants are juridical persons and not
natural persons and obviously have never held public office, is any act referred to in the
foregoing paragraphs imputed to any of these defendants? If there be any such acts, which
particular acts specifically alleged in the complaint are imputed to each of these defendants?

4. With reference to the complaint in general, the complaint alleges that each defendant had
acted singly or collectively with the other defendants and is sought to be held jointly and
severally liable. Each defendant should be informed as to the particular acts it is alleged to
have committed singly and those acts which it is alleged to have committed collectively with
the other defendants.

5. The complaint seeks to recover actual damages to be proven during the trial. Since actual
damages involve damages already sustained, these should be specified.[3]
The motion was in turn adopted by the other individual defendants except the Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Don Ferry, Federico Moreno, Panfilo O. Domingo,
Estate of Gregorio Licaros and Cesar Zalamea.

Petitioner opposed the motion arguing that contrary to the movants claims, the allegations in
the Second Amended Complaint are clear and sufficient for defendants-movants to know the
nature and scope of the causes of action upon which petitioner seeks relief. Moreover, it
maintained that the particulars sought to be obtained pertain to evidentiary matters and
therefore not the proper subject of a bill of particulars.

On January 25, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan issued the assailed resolution[4] granting
private respondents motion and ruled:

As aptly pointed out by the defendants-movants in their instant motion, Paragraph 6-a of the
Second Amended Complaint does not indicate in what particular manner does defendant
Lucio Tan, Ferdinand E. Marcos, and Imelda R. Marcos as well as the individual defendants
impleaded therein each beneficially own or control the corporations listed therein. Arrayed
against the Specific Averments of Defendants Illegal Acts (Par. 14-c) which constitute the
factual backdrop leading to the five(5) Causes of Action (Pars. 16-20 inclusive), We find the
details therein to be inadequate and insufficient, the particulars or specifications not having
been patently clear therein, hence defendants-movants would be unable to fully understand
and comprehend the hows, whys and wherefores by which they are being sued and held
liable. In other words, the allegations in the complaint are, therefore, deficient in that they
merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises.[5]

From the aforestated resolution, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent
Sandiganbayan denied the same in its Resolution dated March 24, 1994.[6] Hence, the instant
petition.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting private respondents Motion for a More Definite Statement or a
Bill of Particulars.

As to the object and function of a bill of particulars, the same has been declared as follows:
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify
or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and
pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite
party and the court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of
action or defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which
he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matter specified,
and in order that surprise at, and needless preparations for, the trial may be avoided, and that
the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering pleading and preparing for trial. It
has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify,
particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist
the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do
justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill.[7]

The issue before us is not one of first impression. Similar complaints commenced by
petitioner thru the PCGG have previously been the object of a motion for a bill of particulars
filed by the defendants.

In Tan et. al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al.,[8] therein petitioner Lucio Tan filed a motion for a bill
of particulars against PCGGs expanded complaint on the ground that PCGGs averments are
made up of bare allegations, presumptuous conclusions of fact and law, and plain
speculations. Upholding the denial of the motion, this Court ruled that the expanded
complaint, though confusingly put in print, is sufficient in form to support the charges
against Lucio Tan.[9]

Subsequently however, in the cases of Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic[10] and Virata vs.
Sandiganbayan,[11] the motions for a bill of particulars filed by Tantuico, Jr. and Virata were
granted upon finding that with respect to both petitioners, the allegations in PCGGs amended
complaints are couched in general terms, vague and mere conclusions of law.

But in Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan,[12] petitioner Romualdezs motion for a more definite
statement was struck down, with this Court ruling that the amended complaint was sufficient
and in fact too specific to enable the petitioner to make the proper admissions or denials and
set out his affirmative defenses. The Tantuico case was held to be inapplicable because there
was no strict similarity between the situation of Tantuico and petitioner Romualdez.

As expected, PCGG invokes in this petition the ruling in the case of Tan, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.[13] and Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan,[14] while private respondents
maintain that it is the decision in Tantuico, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan[15] and Virata vs.
Republic[16] that is controlling.
Upon careful scrutiny of the allegations in petitioners Second Amended Complaint, as well as
the particulars sought by private respondents in their motion for a bill of particulars, we find
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in granting private
respondents motion.

Under paragraph 6-A of the Amended Complaint, the Companies alleged to be beneficially
owned or controlled by defendants Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the other
individual defendants were identified and enumerated, including herein corporate
respondents.[17] But except for this bare allegation, the complaint provided no further
information with respect to the manner by which herein corporate respondents are
beneficially owned or controlled by the individual defendants. Clearly, the allegation is a
conclusion of law that is bereft of any factual basis.

In paragraph 14-C it is alleged that improper payments were given to Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos in the form of gifts, bribes, commissions and dividends in various sums in
consideration of the Marcoses continued support to defendant Lucio Tans diversified
business ventures and/or the formers ownership or interests in said business ventures.[18]
But in like manner, no factual allegation was made as to the form and extent of support given
by the Marcos spouses to the corporations alleged to be owned by Lucio Tan. Again the
allegation is a mere conclusion with no basis in fact.

Equally wanting in specificity is petitioners allegation that private respondents should be

held jointly and severally liable for actual damages respecting the pecuniary loss sustained
by petitioner as a result of private respondents unlawful acts. Without specifying the amount
and extent of damages suffered, private respondents cannot be expected to properly respond
to this allegation since there is no basis from which to determine whether petitioners claim
for actual damages is justified or not.

The aforementioned particulars sought by private respondents are material facts, which as
previously held, should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the
defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he
may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.[19]

There is no merit to the contention that the particulars sought by the private respondents in
their motion refer to mere details or evidentiary matters whose proper place is during the pre-
trial and trial proper. A partys right to move for a bill of particulars in accordance with Section
1 of Rule 12 when the allegations of the complaint are vague and uncertain is intended to
afford a party not only a chance to properly prepare a responsive pleading but also an
opportunity to prepare an intelligent answer. This is to avert the danger where the opposition
party will find difficulty in squarely meeting the issues raised against him and plead the
corresponding defenses which is not timely raised in the answer will be deemed waived.
Thus, it was pronounced in Virata vs. Sandiganbayan[20] that:
The proper preparation of an intelligent answer requires information as to the precise nature,
character, scope and extent of the cause of action in order that the pleader may be able to
squarely meet the issues raised, thereby circumscribing them within determined confines
and preventing surprises during the trial, and in order that he may set forth his defenses
which may not be so readily availed of if the allegations controverted are vague, indefinite,
uncertain or are mere general conclusions. The latter task assumes added significance
because defenses not pleaded (save those excepted in Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules
of Court and, whenever appropriate, the defense of prescription) in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. x x x.

With respect however to paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Amended Complaint, we do
not find it necessary for petitioner to specify whether any of the acts referred therein pertain
to herein corporate respondents on account of petitioners admission that by the very nature
of the causes of action, it is clear that the specified acts referred to in said paragraphs are
imputed to the individual defendants.[21]

In the same vein, the particular acts alleged to have been committed singly or collectively
with the other defendants are already laid out in detail under petitioners Specific Averments
of Defendants Illegal Acts in the Amended Complaint,[22] hence, need no further clarification.

ACCORDINGLY, subject to the foregoing modifications with respect to paragraphs 3 and 4 of

private respondents Motion for a More Definite Statement or a Bill of Particulars, the assailed
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.