Territorial disputes in the South China Sea

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and

maritime claims among several sovereign states within the
region, namely Brunei, the People's Republic of China
(PRC), Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam. An estimated US $5 trillion worth
of global trade passes through the South China Sea
annually[1] and many non-claimant states want the South
China Sea to remain international waters. To promote this,
several states, including the United States, conduct "freedom
of navigation" operations.[2]

The disputes include the islands, reefs, banks, and other

features of the South China Sea, including the Spratly
Islands, Paracel Islands, and various boundaries in the Gulf
of Tonkin. There are further disputes, including the waters
near the Indonesian Natuna Islands, which many do not
regard as part of the South China Sea.[3] Claimant states are
interested in retaining or acquiring the rights to fishing
areas, the exploration and potential exploitation of crude oil
and natural gas in the seabed of various parts of the South
China Sea, and the strategic control of important shipping
lanes.

In July 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under Territorial claims in the South China Sea on (based on outdated /
Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of unofficial documents / maps)
the Sea (UNCLOS) ruled against the PRC's maritime claims
in Philippines v. China.[4] The People's Republic of China
and the Republic of China (Taiwan) stated that they did not recognise the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through
bilateral negotiations with other claimants.[5] However, the tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime
boundaries.[6][7]

Contents
Disputes
South China Sea
2011 agreement
Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration
Chinese policy on the South China Sea
Oil development
Incidents involving fishermen
Security summits
Non-claimant views
Independent analysis
Japan
Cambodia
East Timor
Indonesia
 Laos
Singapore
Thailand
United States
See also
References
Citations
Sources
Further reading
External links

Disputes
The disputes involve both maritime boundaries and
islands.[8] There are several disputes, each of which involves
a different collection of countries:

1. The nine-dash line area claimed by the Republic of

China, later the People's Republic of China (PRC),
which covers most of the South China Sea and overlaps
the exclusive economic zone claims of Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Vietnam. South China Sea claims and agreements
2. Maritime boundary along the Vietnamese coast
between the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
3. Maritime boundary north of Borneo between the PRC, Malaysia,
Brunei, Philippines, and Taiwan.
4. Islands, reefs, banks and shoals in the South China Sea, including
the Paracel Islands, the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank,
Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands between the PRC,
Taiwan, and Vietnam, and parts of the area also contested by
Malaysia and the Philippines.
5. Maritime boundary in the waters north of the Natuna Islands
between the PRC, Indonesia and Taiwan[9]
6. Maritime boundary off the coast of Palawan and Luzon between the
PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
7. Maritime boundary, land territory, and the islands of Sabah,
including Ambalat, between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines.
8. Maritime boundary and islands in the Luzon Strait between the
PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

South China Sea Map of various national outposts in the Spratly Islands

Chinese claims in the South China sea are delineated in part by the nine-
dash line. It was originally an "eleven-dashed-line," first indicated by the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947, for its
claims to the South China Sea. When the Communist Party of China took over mainland China and formed the People's Republic of China
in 1949, the line was adopted and revised to nine dashes/dots, as endorsed by Zhou Enlai.[10] The legacy of the nine-dash line is viewed by
some PRC government officials, and by the PRC military, as providing historical support for their claims to the South China Sea.[11]

In the 1970s, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries began referring to the Spratly Islands as included in their own territory. On 11
June 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the north-western part of the
Spratly Islands (referred to therein as the Kalayaan Island Group) as Philippine territory.[12]

The once abundant fishing opportunities within the region are another motivation for claims. In 2012, the South China Sea was believed
to have accounted for 12% of world fishing catches worth $21.8 billion.[13] There have been many clashes in the Philippines with foreign
fishing vessels (including those of the PRC) in disputed areas. According to some commentators, the PRC believes that the value in fishing
and oil from the sea has risen to a trillion dollars.[14]
The area is also one of the busiest shipping routes in the world.
In the 1980s, at least 270 merchant ships used the route each Summary of disputes

Philippines
day. Currently, more than half the tonnage of the world's crude

Indonesia

Malaysia
oil transported by sea passes through the South China Sea, a

Vietnam
Taiwan
Brunei

China
figure rising steadily with the growth of the PRC consumption
of oil. This traffic is three times greater than that passing Area of dispute
through the Suez Canal and five times more than the Panama The nine-dash line ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Canal.
Vietnamese coast ✔ ✔ ✔
Since 1996, Vietnam and the Philippines, and to a lesser degree Sea area north of Borneo
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Malaysia and Brunei, have asserted claims within the area
South China Sea islands ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
covered by the Chinese (PRC & ROC) nine-dotted line.[15]
Sea area north of the Natuna Islands ✔ ✔ ✔
Since 1974, when PRC troops confronted and expelled
Sea area west of Palawan and Luzon ✔ ✔ ✔
Vietnamese troops, most of the Paracel Islands have been
occupied by the PRC, and all have been under PRC control. Sabah area ✔ ✔ ✔

Similarly, although there have been a small number of notable

Luzon Strait ✔ ✔ ✔

changes in influence or occupation, the occupation and/or

control of most parts of the Spratly Islands has not changed significantly since the mid 1990s -
see List of maritime features in the Spratly Islands for details. Vietnamese troops control the
greatest number of islands, reefs, etc. (approx 29.) Eight islands are controlled by the
Philippines, five by Malaysia, one by Taiwan, and all of those mentioned have various degrees
of "control" over other features. Although the Paracels are completely under PRC control, the
PRC has control of only five "rocks" naturally above water at high tide.[17][16] The significance
of this situation has changed dramatically since 2014 whence the PRC embarked on a program
of land reclamation - see Great wall of sand and List of maritime features in the Spratly Islands
South-east facing aerial view of
for details.
PRC-settled Woody Island. The
In 2012 the Indian Ambassador to Vietnam, while expressing concern over rising tension in island is also claimed by Taiwan and
Vietnam.
the area, said that 50 per cent of its trade passes through the area and called for peaceful
resolution of the disputes in accordance with international law.[18]

On 17 March 2016, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 94 s. 2016, President

Aquino of the Philippines created the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, to
secure the State's sovereignty and national territory and preserve marine wealth in its
waters and exclusive economic zone, reserving use and enjoyment of the West Philippine
Sea exclusively for Filipino citizens.[19]

Fiery Cross Reef being transformed by

2011 agreement
the PRC in May 2015
On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to a set of
preliminary guidelines which would help resolve the dispute.[20] The agreement was
described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an important milestone document for cooperation among China and
ASEAN countries".[20] Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety
of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime", although the issue of oil and natural gas
drilling remains unresolved.

Chinese objection to Indian naval presence and oil exploration

On 22 July 2011, the INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam, was reportedly contacted 45 nautical
miles from the Vietnamese coast in the disputed South China Sea by a party identifying itself as the PLA Navy and stating that the ship
was entering PRC waters.[21][22] A spokesperson for the Indian Navy explained that as no ship or aircraft was visible, the INS Airavat
proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled. The Indian Navy further clarified that "[t]here was no confrontation involving the INS
Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in
accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all."[21]

In September 2011, shortly after the PRC and Vietnam signed an agreement seeking to contain a dispute over the South China Sea, India's
state-run explorer, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) said that its overseas investment arm, ONGC Videsh Limited, had signed a
three-year agreement with PetroVietnam for developing long-term co-operation in the oil sector, and that it had accepted Vietnam's offer
of exploration in certain specified blocks in the South China Sea.[23] In response, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu, without
referring to India by name, stated:

"China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island. China's stand is based on historical facts
and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the course of history and this position has been
held by Chinese Government for long. On the basis of this China is ready to engage in peaceful negotiations and friendly
consultations to peacefully solve the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights so as to positively contribute
to peace and tranquillity in the South China Sea area. We hope that the relevant countries respect China's position and
refrain from taking unilateral action to complicate and expand the issue. We hope they will respect and support countries in
the region to solve the bilateral disputes through bilateral channels. As for oil and gas exploration activities, our consistent
position is that we are opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters
under China's jurisdiction. We hope the foreign countries do not get involved in South China Sea dispute."[24][25]

An Indian foreign ministry spokesman responded, "The Chinese had concerns, but we are going by what the Vietnamese authorities have
told us and [we] have conveyed this to the Chinese."[24] The Indo-Vietnamese deal was also denounced by the Chinese state-run
newspaper Global Times.[23][25]

Chinese policy on the South China Sea

In Spring 2010, PRC officials reportedly communicated to US officials that the South China Sea was "an area of 'core interest' that is as
non-negotiable" and on par with Taiwan and Tibet on the national agenda. However, Beijing appears to have backed away from that
assertion in 2011.[26][27][28]

In October 2011, the PRC's Global Times newspaper, published by the Communist Party People's Daily group, editorialised on South
China Sea territorial disputes under the banner "Don't take peaceful approach for granted". The article referenced recent incidents
involving the Philippines and South Korea detaining PRC fishing boats in the region. "If these countries don't want to change their ways
with China, they will need to prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in
the sea to be resolved."[29] Responding to questions about whether this reflected official policy, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman
stated the country's commitment "to resolving the maritime dispute through peaceful means."[30]

In July 2014, Professor Alan Dupont of the University of New South Wales was reported as saying that the Chinese government appeared
to be directing its fishing fleet into disputed waters as a matter of policy.[31]

Oil development
The area is said to be rich in oil and natural gas deposits; however, the estimates are highly varied. The Ministry of Geological Resources
and Mining of the People's Republic of China estimated that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil,[32] whereas the
oil rich country of Kuwait has 13 billion tons. In the years following the announcement by the PRC ministry, the claims regarding the
South China Sea islands intensified. However, other sources claim that the proven reserves of oil in the South China Sea may only be
7.5 billion barrels, or about 1.1 billion tons.[33] According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s profile of the South China
Sea region, a US Geological Survey estimate puts the region's discovered and undiscovered oil reserves at 11 billion barrels, as opposed to
a PRC figure of 125 billion barrels.[34] The same EIA report also points to the wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging
from 190 trillion cubic feet to 500 trillion cubic feet, likely located in the contested Reed Bank".[34]
The South China Sea is dubbed by the PRC as the "second Persian Sea."[35] The state-owned China Offshore Exploration Corp. planned to
spend 200 billion RMB (US$30 billion) in the next 20 years to exploit oil in the region, with the estimated production of 25 million metric
tons of crude oil and natural gas per annum, at a depth of 2000 meters within the next five years.[36]

The Philippines began exploring the areas west of Palawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount.[37] In
1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a well.[38] However, the PRC's complaints halted the exploration. On 27 March 1984, the
first Philippine oil company discovered an oil field off Palawan, which is an island province bordering the South China Sea and the Sulu
Sea.[39] These oil fields supply 15% of annual oil consumption in the Philippines.

Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement early in 1978 on the development of oil in the South China Sea. By 2012 Vietnam had
concluded some 60 oil and gas exploration and production contracts with various foreign companies.[40] In 1986, the "White Tiger" oil
field in the South China Sea came into operation, producing over 2,000 tons of crude oil per year, followed by "The Bear" and "Dragon" oil
fields.[41] Offshore exploration activities in 2011 increased Vietnam's proven oil reserves to be the third largest in the Asia-Pacific
region.[42] However, the country is a net importer of oil products.[43] In 2009 petroleum accounted for 14 percent of Vietnamese
government income, down from 24 percent in 2004.[44]

China's first independently designed and constructed oil drilling platform in the South China Sea is the Ocean Oil 981 (海洋石油981). The
major shareholders are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (19%), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (14%), T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and
affiliates (6%), and BlackRock, Inc. (5%).[45] It began operation on 9 May 2012 in the South China Sea, 320 kilometres (200 mi) southeast
of Hong Kong, at a depth of 1,500 m and employing 160 people.[46] On 2 May 2014 the platform was moved near to the Paracel Islands,[47]
a move Vietnam stated violated their territorial claims.[48] Chinese officials said it was legal, stating the area lies in waters surrounding the
Paracel Islands which China occupies and militarily controls.[49]

Incidents involving fishermen

Prior to the dispute around the sea areas involved, fishermen from involved countries tended to enter each other's controlled islands and
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) leading to conflicts with the authorities that controlled the areas as they were unaware of the exact
borders. As well, due to the depletion of the fishing resources in their maritime areas they were forced to fish in the neighbouring
countries' areas.[50][51][52]

A Taiwanese fisherman was machine gunned to death by the coast guard of the Philippines in May 2013.[53][54]

In the spring of 2014, China and Vietnam clashed again over China's Haiyang Shiyou oil rig in Vietnam's EEZ. The incident left seventeen
Vietnamese injured and damaged both China's and Vietnam's ships.[55]

Although Indonesia is not part of claims in the South China Sea dispute, after Joko Widodo became President of the country in 2014, he
instituted a policy in 2015 that, if any foreign fishermen were caught illegally fishing in Indonesian waters, their vessels would be
destroyed. The president wanted to make maritime resources, especially fisheries, a key component of his administration's economic
policy.[56][57] Since the policy's initiation, fishing vessels drawing from many neighbouring countries were destroyed by Indonesian
authorities. On 21 May 2015, around 41 fishing vessels from China, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines were destroyed.[58] On 19
March 2016, the China Coast Guard prevented the detention of Chinese fishermen by Indonesian authorities after Chinese fishermen were
caught fishing near the waters around Natuna, leading to a protest by Indonesian authorities; the Chinese ambassador was subsequently
summonsed as China had considered the areas to be "Chinese traditional fishing grounds".[59][60] Further Indonesian campaigns against
foreign fishermen resulted in the destruction of 23 fishing boats from Malaysia and Vietnam on 5 April 2016.[61]

Until late 2016, most fishing vessels blown up by Indonesian authorities were Vietnamese fishing vessels.[62][63] Although Indonesian
authorities increased their patrols to detect foreign fishing vessels, the areas in the South China Sea had already become known for
Indonesian pirates, with frequent attacks on Malaysian, Singaporean and Vietnamese vessels as well as leading to hijacking such as the
MT Orkim Harmony and MT Zafirah hijacking incidents. The continuing war against foreign fishermen by Indonesia led to protests by
Vietnam in late 2016, when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed after being shot by Indonesian authorities.[51][52] Beside that, Filipino
pirates of Moro Pirates from the Sulu Sea also reaching South China Sea when a Vietnamese fisherman was killed by Filipino pirates in
late 2015.[64]

Security summits
The Shangri-La Dialogue serves as the "Track One" exchange forum on security issues surrounding the Asia-Pacific region. The South
China Sea territorial disputes has dominated proceedings at the conference in recent years.[65][66][67] The Council for Security Cooperation
in the Asia Pacific is the "Track Two" forum for dialogue on security issues.[68][69]

In February 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama initiated the US-ASEAN Summit at Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California for closer
engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea were a major topic, but its joint
statement, the "Sunnylands Declaration", did not name the South China Sea, instead calling for "respect of each nation's sovereignty and
for international law". Analysts believe it indicates divisions within the group on how to respond to China's maritime strategy.[70][71]

Non-claimant views

Independent analysis
The vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China's claims based on historical claims are invalid.[72] Many
ambiguities also arise from the notion of historical claims as a basis for claiming sovereignty; China's position is essentially
ambiguous.[73][72][74]

The position of China on its maritime claims based on UNCLOS and history has been ambiguous, particularly with the nine dash line
map.[75][73] For example, in its notes verbales in 2011, the first phrase stated that China has undisputed sovereignty over the islands and
the adjacent waters, suggesting China is claiming sovereignty over its territorial waters, a position consistent with UNCLOS.[75] However,
the second phrase in its notes verbales stated that China enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters along with the
seabed and subsoil contained in this region, suggesting that China is claiming sovereignty over all of the maritime space (includes all the
geographic features and the waters within the nine dash line).[75] The third phrase indicates support for basing their claims on historical
basis as well.[75] Recently in its notes verbales in 2011, China has explicitly stated that it claims the territorial waters and all of the islands
in which each island has its own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.[73] A major problem with this claim is that it fails to
distinguish between geographic features considered as "islands" or "rocks" under UNCLOS.[73]

Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji criticised Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for trying to falsely portray China as a threat to Japan and
that China was invading neighbours such as the Philippines. He pointed out that the Spratly Islands were not part of the Philippines when
the US acquired the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1898 and that Japanese-ruled Taiwan itself had annexed the Spratly
Islands in 1938 in a move that was never challenged by the US-ruled Philippines, which never asserted that it was their territory. He also
pointed out that other countries did not need to do full land reclamation since they already controlled islands and that the reason China
engaged in extensive land reclamation is because they needed it to build airfields since China only has control over reefs.[76]

Japan
Japan has no claims in the South China Sea, but argues against its militarization. On 13 September 2018 a Maritime Self-Defense Force
submarine took part in an antisubmarine drill in the South China Sea for the first time in its history. The submarine Kuroshio, the
helicopter carrier Kaga and two other destroyers, the Inazuma and Suzutsuki, took part in warfare exercise. The exercise was conducted
away from the island bases China has been building to push its claims in the strategic sea. However, it could still anger Beijing because
submarines represent a greater potential menace to shipping than surface vessels. This drill signals Tokyo’s intention to keep in check
Beijing’s muscle-flexing in the area.[77] Some have also noted out Japan's use of "normative power" via strategic foreign aid to certain
claimants in the dispute such as The Philippines and Vietnam in order to assert its presence in the region as promoting the "rule of law at
sea." [78]

Cambodia
Cambodia has backed China over the dispute in ASEAN meetings, preventing consensus over unified ASEAN action.[79] Anti-Vietnamese
sentiment due to Vietnam's conquest of previously Cambodian lands, giving the Vietnamese a privileged status and encouragement of
Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia during French colonial rule, and the occupation of Cambodia after the ouster of the Khmer Rouge has
led to anti-Vietnamese feelings against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and against Vietnam, and in turn has led to pro-China sentiment
among the Cambodian government and the Cambodian opposition, including in the South China Sea.[80]
East Timor
The sweeping maritime claims of gas and oil rich territory maintained and disputed by Australia against the tiny country of East Timor
and flouting of international law have been compared to the situation in the South China Sea, causing the East Timorese government to
deprecate China's claims and stance.[81]

Indonesia
Since early in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia has repeatedly asserted its position as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea
dispute,[82] and often positioned itself as an "honest broker".[83] However, parts of China's unilaterally claimed nine-dash line overlap
Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near the Natuna islands. Although China has acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna
islands,[84] the PRC has argued that the waters around the Natuna islands are Chinese "traditional fishing grounds". Indonesia quickly
dismissed China's claim, asserting that China's nine-dash line claim over parts of the Natuna islands has no legal basis.[85] In November
2015, Indonesia's security chief Luhut Panjaitan said Indonesia could take China before an international court.[86] Indonesia filed a
comment with the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding China's claim in the case of Philippines v. China.

Chinese fishing vessels – often escorted by Chinese coastguard ships – have repeatedly been reported to have breached Indonesian waters
near the Natuna islands. On 19 March 2016, for example, Indonesian authorities tried to capture a Chinese trawler accused of illegal
fishing in Indonesian waters, and arrested the Chinese crew. They were prevented from towing the boat to harbour by a Chinese coast
guard vessel which reportedly "rammed" the trawler in Indonesian waters. "To prevent anything else occurring, the Indonesian
authorities let go of the Chinese boat and then left toward Natuna, still with eight fishermen and the captain on board," said Arrmanatha
Nasir, a spokesman for Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry. Indonesia still has the Chinese crew in custody.[87] On March 21, 2016, minister for
fisheries and maritime affairs Susi Pudjiastuti summoned the Chinese ambassador, Xie Feng, and discussed this matter.[87] Indonesia
insists that they have the right to prosecute the Chinese trawler crew, despite Beijing's demand to release their eight fishermen. Arif Havas
Oegroseno, the government official of maritime security, said that the Chinese claim of "traditional fishing grounds" was not recognised
under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This incident prompted security minister Luhut Pandjaitan to deploy
more troops and patrol boats, and to strengthen the Ranai naval base in the area.[88]

Following the clashes, on 23 June 2016, Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited the Natuna islands on a warship to demonstrate
Indonesia's authority. He led a high-level delegation, which included the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and
state ministers. Security Minister Luhut Panjaitan said it was meant to send a "clear message" that Indonesia was "very serious in its effort
to protect its sovereignty".[89]

Following the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on 12 July 2016, Indonesia called on all parties involved in the territorial dispute to
exercise self-restraint and to respect applicable international laws.[90]

Indonesia challenged the Chinese nine-dash historical claim by arguing that if the historical claims can be used on presenting the
territorial naval claims, Indonesia might also use its historical claims on the South China Sea by referring to the ancient influence of the
Srivijaya and Majapahit empires.[91]

Laos
Laos has supported China by refusing to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on China's sovereignty claims in the South
China Sea.[92]

Singapore
Singapore has reiterated that it is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute and has offered to play a neutral role in being a
constructive conduit for dialogue among the claimant states. However, Singapore hopes that China will obey international laws.[93]

Thailand
In ASEAN, Thailand is neutral and is open to hearing both sides and will not push to consensus.[94]
United States
The United States and China are currently in disagreement over the South China Sea.[95] This disagreement is exacerbated by the fact that
the US is not a member of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[96] Nevertheless, the US has stood by its
manoeuvres, claiming that "peaceful surveillance activities and other military activities without permission in a country's Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ),"[97] is allowed under the convention. Additionally, a South China Sea free to access is in the US's economic and
geopolitical interests.[98] In relation to the dispute, Hillary Clinton, then United States Secretary of State, voiced her support for fair access
by reiterating that freedom of navigation and respect for international law is a matter of national interest to the United States.[99] Her
comments were countered by China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as "in effect an attack on China," who warned the United States against
making the South China Sea an international issue or multilateral issue.[100]

Clinton testified in support of congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen U.S. ability to support
countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the area.[101] On 29 May 2012, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry
expressed concern over this development, stating that "non-claimant Association of South East Asian Nations countries and countries
outside the region have adopted a position of not getting involved into territorial disputes."[102] In July 2012, the United States Senate
passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the
2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United States' commitment to assist the nations of Southeast
Asia to remain strong and independent, and supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the Western Pacific.[103]

In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other
nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international law
for these extensive maritime claims."[105] USN CNO Jonathan Greenert then pledged
American support to the Philippines in its territorial conflicts with the PRC.[106] The Chinese
Foreign Ministry asked the United States to maintain a neutral position on the issue.[107] In
2014 and 2015, the United States continued freedom of navigation operations, including in the
South China Sea.[108] Sources closer to the Pentagon have also said that the US administration
is planning to deploy some more naval assets within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands. In
In 2014, President Obama warned
response to this announcement, Beijing issued a strict warning and said that she would not
China: "We believe that international
allow any country to violate China's territorial waters in the name of "Freedom of
law must be upheld, that freedom of
Navigation".[109] In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter warned China to halt its navigation must be preserved and
rapid island-building.[110] On 27 October 2015, the US destroyer USS Lassen navigated within commerce must not be
12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of impeded."[104]
Navigation Operations".[111] This is the first time since 2012 that the US has directly
challenged China's claims of the island's territorial limit.[112] On 8–9 November 2015, two US
B-52 strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground
controllers but continued their mission undeterred.[113]

The United States itself has not signed UNCLOS, but has accepted all but Part XI as customary international law.[114]

In response to Rex Tillerson's comments on blocking access to man-made islands in the South China Sea, the Communist Party-controlled
Global Times warned of a "large-scale war" between the U.S. and China, saying: "Unless Washington plans to wage a large-scale war in the
South China Sea, any other approaches to prevent Chinese access to the islands will be foolish."[115][116]

See also
East China Sea EEZ disputes
First island chain
Great wall of sand
Philippines v. China
Scarborough Shoal standoff
Spratly Islands dispute

References
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Further reading
Bautista, Lowell B. (December 2011). "PHILIPPINE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES: INTERNAL TENSIONS, COLONIAL BAGGAGE,
AMBIVALENT CONFORMITY" (https://web.archive.org/web/20130730103741/http://umrefjournal.um.edu.my/filebank/published_articl
e/3162/035-053%20Lowell%20B.%20Bautista-Philippine%20Territorial,%20JATI%20VOL16,%202011-%20new.pdf) (PDF). JATI –
 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 16: 35–53. Archived from the original (http://umrefjournal.um.edu.my/filebank/published_article/3
162/035-053%20Lowell%20B.%20Bautista-Philippine%20Territorial,%20JATI%20VOL16,%202011-%20new.pdf) (PDF) on 30 July
2013.
Bonnet, Francois-Xavier, "Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal", Irasec's Discussion Paper, No 14, November 2012,
www.irasec.com,Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal (http://www.irasec.com/components/com_irasec/media/upload/DP14-Scarborough
Shoal.pdf)
Corr, Anders. Great Powers, Grand Strategies: The New Game in the South China Sea (US Naval Institute Press, 2017)
Dupuy, Florian; Dupuy, Pierre-Marie (2013). "A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea" (https://doi.or
g/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.1.0124). American Journal of International Law. 107 (1): 121–141. doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.1.0124
(https://doi.org/10.5305%2Famerjintelaw.107.1.0124). Retrieved 25 November 2018.
Raine, Sarah; Le Miere, Christian (2013). Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. Routledge for IISS.
Rowan, Joshua P. (2005). "The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute" (https://web.archive.org/we
b/20100816112939/http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Rowan%2C%20US-Japan%2C%20ASEAN%2C%20%26%20SCS%
20Dispute%2C%20Asian%20Survey.pdf) (PDF). Asian Survey. 45 (3): 414–436. doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.3.414 (https://doi.org/10.15
25%2Fas.2005.45.3.414). Archived from the original (http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Rowan,%20US-Japan,%20ASEA
N,%20%26%20SCS%20Dispute,%20Asian%20Survey.pdf) (PDF) on 16 August 2010.
Clive Schofield et al., From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and
Southeast Asia (http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=522) (July 2011)
Rising Tensions in the South China Sea (http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=151), June 2011 Q&A with Ian J. Storey
Tupaz, Edsel (27 April 2012). "Sidebar Brief: The Law of the Seas and the Scarborough Shoal Dispute" (http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/
04/edsel-tupaz-scarborough.php). JURIST.
Weissmann, Mikael (2010). "The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A study in conflict prevention and peace
building" (https://web.archive.org/web/20140728154901/http://www.ui.se/upl/files/49747.pdf) (PDF). Asian Perspectives. 34 (3): 35–
69. Archived from the original (http://www.ui.se/upl/files/49747.pdf) (PDF) on 28 July 2014.

External links
Website of the Chinese National Institute for South China Sea Studies (https://web.archive.org/web/20131025120218/http://www.nan
hai.org.cn/en/)
Website of the Vietnamese Program for South China Sea Studies (http://southchinaseastudies.org/en/) Chương trình nghiên cứu
Biển Đông (http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/) (in Vietnamese)

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