CHAPTER FOUR

SAB DA PRAM ANA

Though Sabda or Verbal Testimony i s p la c e d after

Pra ty ak sa and Anumana yet i t s importance i n comparison

t

to these i s not l e s s i n any r e s p e c t . A major p o rtio n of

a p e r s o n 's stock o f knowledge about t h e world i s a cq u ir­

ed from the oral or w ritten testimony o f other persons.

The importance of testimony becomes obvious when we

im agine a perso n deprived o f a l l connection w ith other

persons and books in which case he would simply be

reduced to the le v e l o f a b r u t e . C om paratively, we learn

more by r ead in g books th en what we know from p ercep tio n

or In fe r e n c e . So, the importance of Verbal Testimony as

a source of knowledge i s g reat in d e e d .

I n th e l i s t of Pramanas Upamana (com parison) is

precedeed by In fe r e n c e i . e . , th e p o s it io n o f Upamana is

th ird . But it i s to be n o ticed that Upamana i s not

accepted as an independent pramana by the Sim khyas.

V acasp ati s p l it s i t up into p e r c e p tio n , In fe r e n c e and

Verbal Testim ony. And, according to Simkhya, Perception

Inference and Verbal Testimony are th e only three

sources of V a lid knowledge. The present chapter deals

with Verbal Testimony. The Carvakas, the Bauddhas and

th e V aisesikas have not recognised Verbal Testimony as

a source o f V alid knowledge. According to th e C a r v a k a s ,

Perception i s the only means of cognition whereas to

’ Bauddhas and to V aisesikas, Perception and Inference

are th e two sources o f v a l i d knowledge. Verbal Testimony^

as a source o f v a l i d knowledge i s accepted by the Jainas,

Samkhyaits, V ed ant in s , Mimamsakas as well as by the

N aiyayikas. Verbal Testimony i s designated in various

ways by th e d i f f e r e n t schools o f Indian system.Thus it

0 „ t
is ’ Sabda’ according to th e N aiyayikas, .Sastra* to the

Mimamsakas, ’ Aptavacana* to th e Samkhyayits, ’ Agama' to

Vedanta, Yoga and to Jainas also and 'Nigama' to t h e

Bhagavata .1 Except the Carvaka, th e Buddhists and the

V a is e s ik a s , a l l Indian philosophers have recognised

Verbal Testimony as an independent source o f knowledge.

The Ciurvaka r e j e c t s Testimony in general, because,accord­

ing to him, i t does not g i v e r i s e t o v a l i d knowledge and

s c rip tu ra l testimony lie* p a r t ic u l a r , because Vedic know­

le d g e in h is opinion i s ’ a l l fraud, a device o f t h e

cunning p r i e s t s t o earn t h e i r liv e lih o o d by c h e a t i n g the

1 . pratyaksenanumanena nigamenatmasamvida /
adyantavadasaj Jnatva nihsamgo vicare d ih a / /
B h agavatam ,ll. 2 8 .9 .
 p
ignorant persons'. The Buddhists and the Vais^sikas
recognise testimony but not as an independent source of
knowledge. They reduce testimony to Inference.

Testimony may be Verbal or Non-Verbal .Non-Verbal

testimony consists o f gestures. But i t is not important
because i t lacks in precision. Valid Testimony consists
o f Verbal statements of people intended to express
certain fa c ts .

The Denial o f the validity o f the Vedas by the Carvakas:

The carvakas reject the validity of the Vedas,

because they are vitiated by falsehood, contradiction and
tautology. They are incapable o f being the means of
valid knowledge. They are fa lse because they make state­
ments which are fa ls e . Theyuare contradictory because
they make statements, which are incompatible with one
another. They are tautologous because they repeat the
same statement several times. A vedic text declares ’ one
who desires a son should perform the Putresti sa crifice .
Yet we find that a son is not born after the sa crifice
has been performed. The text i s fa lse . Another Vedic
text declares ’ one who desires to go to heaven should

2. trayo vedasya kartarah

bhanda-dhurtah- nisacarah
SDS, p .14.
 245

perform the Agnihotra o b la t io n '. I f a text is fa ls e

with regard to p erce p tib le re s u lts , one with regard

to im perceptible re s u lts ©ust be f a l s e . In regard to

the Agnihotra oblation th ere are the Vedic

injunctions: ( l ) 'The oblation should be offered

before s u n rise ', (2 ) 'The oblation should be o f f e r * 1!

a fte r s u n -ris e ’ , (3 ) 'The oblation should be o f f e r e d

before sunrise a ft e r the sta rs have become i n v i s i b l e '.

These injunctions are incompatible with one another.

So at le a s t some o f them must be fa ls e . There is

a vedic text 'one should repeat the fir s t

verse th ric e and the la s t verse t h r ic e ’ . But a tauto­

lo g ic a l assertion is made by a demented person.

There i s want of agreement among some Vedic tex ts.

There i s incom patibility among others. There i s co n tr a ­

d iction among others. So the Vedas have no v a lid ity as

a source of knowledge. The three Vedas are in v en t ion s

o f cheats, knaves and demons. Their in junctions are

meaningless t a lk . The r i t e s and ceremonies enjoined

by the Vedas are the inventions o f the Brahmanas, who

cheat the other castes to earn th e ir liv e lih o o d . They

are devoid of in te llig e n c e and manliness, and cannot

earn th e ir liv in g by honest means. The Vedas are mere

incoherent ramblings o f knaves. The r e lig io u s rites

enjoined by them are intended to be the means of their

 246

4
subsistence. R eligion i s p r ie s t c r a ft . If a beast

k ille d in a s a c r ific e goes to heaven, why does not the

person s a c r ific e h is own fath er ? I f the food offered

at the Sraddha ceremony appease the hunger of the

departed souls, what i s the need o f supplying t r a v e ll ­

e rs with food fo r the journey ? Their hunger may as

w e ll be appeased by the o ffe rin g o f food at home. If

the departed souls are g r a t ifi e d with the food offered

on earth, why are not persons on the f i r s t f lo o r g r a t i­

fie d with the food o ffere d on the ground flo o r ? I f the

soul issuing out o f i t s body, goes to the next world,

why does i t not return to t h is world out o f a ffe c tio n

fo r the dear ones ? When the body i s burnt to ashes ,

how can i t come back again ? The soul i s id e n tic a l with

the body. The r i t e s are the inventions of impostors for

th e ir liv e lih o o d .^

Bauddha view o f §abda:

I t has already been stated that .the Buddhist and

the V aisesika do not recognise Verbal Testimony as an

independent source o f knowledge. Both of them reduce

Testimony to In ference. The Buddhist maintains that the

intention o f a speaker fin d s expression in h is statement.

4. N .Bh. NV, i i , 1, 56, NM, p . 273

SDS, Ch.I, UNC x v ii, 63-64 and 67
5. SDS, Carvaka, SDSM, p . 83.
 247

The intention i s the cause and the statement it s effect

When a speaker utters a word, the hearer infers his
intention as he infers the presence o f f ir e from it s
e ffe c t, v iz ., smoke. In th is inferential process the
speaker is the minor term, his intention is the major
term and the word is the middle term.^ ^rldhai'a also
remarks.

Just as the inferential process functions

through invariable concomitance, so do words a lso ...........
As a matter of fa c t, we know that a word never denotes
anything until i t i s known for certain that i t never
f a ils in it s concomitance with such denotation,and when
i t does denote an object after the unfailing concomitance
has been ascertained, i t becomes an inferential sign
7
pure and simple.

The Buddhist maintains that when a word is heard

the hearer in fers the intention o f the speaker. But how
can one infer the said intention unless he has already
understood what the word means ? Whatever the intention
o f the speaker may be, the meaning of the uttered word
has already been cognised by the hearer without the help
of sy llo g istic reasoning.

6 . TH., 1512-22
7. NX, pp.213-14.
 2^8

/ /
V a is e s ik a view o f Sabda:

The V a is e s ik a b rin g s comparison (Upamana),

t r a d it io n (A it ih y a ) and Verbal knowledge (§ ab d a) undo?

In fe re n c e . The v a li d i t y o f s c rip tu ra l statements i s an

In ference from the a u th o rita tiv e character o f the

speakers. Like the Nyaya, the V a ise sik a re p u d ia te s the

Mimamsa theory o f the etern ity o f sound and the absolute

a u th o rita tiv e n e ss o f the Vedas. The V a is e s ik a in fe r s

the v a li d i t y o f Vedas from theu unimpeachable v e ra c ity

o f the in sp ire d se e rs. The s c rip tu re s giv e us r e a l know­

le d g e and not mere specu lation . I t i s knowledge of

th in gs as they a re , and in t h is sense has no beginning,

though i t i s always d ire c t ly known and r e a lis e d by some

b e in g s in i t s e n tire ly and by others in p a r t . A bler

minds re a lis e d the tru th s and communicated them t o us.

The Vedas, as c o lle c tio n o f sentences, presuppose

in t e llig e n t authors, and they must be possessors o f com­

p le t e and accurate knowledge o f heaven and unseen

destiny (adrstam ) . G radually t h i s authorship was a s s ig ­

ned to God. ’ The meaning o f words and sentences must be

understood b e fo re they g iv e us knowledge. Since the

understanding o f meanings depends on the re co gn itio n o f

u n iv e rsa l concomitance, v e rb a l knowledge i s a case of

In fe re n c e. The V a is e s ik a holds th at the meaning of a

word i s cognised through In fe re n c e, because ju s t as the

 249

cognition o f f i r e from smoke depends on a p o s it iv e and

n egative experience o f sm oke-fire r e la tio n s h ip , so the

cognition o f the meaning o f a word too depends on the

experience of a p o s it iv e and n egativ e experience of

w ord-object r e la t io n s h ip . This experience we have in

childhood when ad u lts u tter the word 1cow’ and a cow

i s present and they do not u t t e r t h is word and the cow

i s absent.

Kumarila c r i t i c i s e s the views o f Bauddhas and

V a is e s ik a s and contends that when we have already

le a rn t the meaning o f a word in the said manner and

then afterw ards hear th at word, the cognition of its

meaning a r is e s in our mind through memory and not

through In feren ce. Thus the understanding o f the word

being o f the nature o f r e c o lle c t io n , which i s not a

pramana at a l l . The Buddhists and V aisesik a s attempt

to reduce our cognition o f meaning on hearing a word to

In feren ce i s f u t i l e , because what c on stitu tes the

Pramana c a lle d v e rb a l testimony i s not a word but a

sentence. Even i f the meaning o f a word be cognised

through In fe re n c e, the knowledge o f a fa c t on hearing

a sentence i s not in fe r e n t ia l and hence the Buddhist

and V a isesik a arguments are ir r e le v e n t .

8. SV., Sabda, 60 and 104-108

 250

The knowledge o f the meaning o f a sentence arises

through the meaning o f words whose rela tion was not
apprehended b efore. Therefore, even the suspicion that
the meaning o f a sentence is known through inference is
ille g itim a te . An inference presupposes a knowledge ol'
the invariable relation between the probans and the
probandura. In the cognition o f sentence- meaning the
constituent words may be said to serve as the probans, out
there is no Vyapti. The re la tion s between words are
in fin it e . I t is not possible to know in advance the
in fin ite rela tion s between words. It i s an indubitable
fa c t that when someone talks of distant countries, the
particular meaning o f the sentences uttered by him are
comprehended through word-meaning even though they refer
to entirely new and strange things. It shows that
sentgnce-meaning does not depend on a previously known
rela tion between the utterance o f a sentence and a fa c t .
Therefore, our knowledge o f a fa ct from a sentence is not
c
in fe r e n tia l.

Some people argue that verbal Testimony is of the

nature o f inference, because the v a lid ity o f a sentence
i s inferred from the trustworthy character o f the speaker.

9. SD, p. 73.
 251

I t may be tru e , but i t does not make the knowledge of

a fa c t on hearing a sentence in fe r e n t ia l, because the

in feren ce of v a li d i t y takes p la c e only a f t e r the

meaning o f the sentence has already been comprehended.

The meaning o f a sentence i s grasped exactly a ft e r i t

i s heard, f o r which no knowledge o f the trustworthy or

untrustworthy character o f the speaker i s needed.Sven

when the speaker o f a sentence i s not known at a l l , th e

meaning o f the sentence i s immediately grasped and it

i s only la t e r th a t we have a recourse to in feren ce

when the v a lid it y o f h is a s s e rtio n i s doubted. Thus

v e rb a l testimony i s independent o f in fe re n c e .'1

’^

✓
D e fin itio n s of Sabda according to d i f f e r e n t

Schools o f Indian Philosophy

Among the N astika school o f Indian system

Carvaka refu sed a l l other Pramanas except Perception .

According to them perception or Pratyaksa i s the only

Pramana.
% Bauddha included i t in in feren ce. Jainas

accepted i t and regarded i t as Mediate knowledge or

Paroksa Jnana.

Jaina view o f V e rb a l Testimony; Verbal Testimony goes

by the name o f Agama in Jaina philosophy. Verbal

10. SV, Vakya, 243-46.

 252

Testimony i s the knowledge of objects de r iv e d from the

words o f r e lia b le persons. For example, ' the north

pole e x i s t s '. Every word denotes a p a rtic u la r object

by i t s natural denotative power and convention. A

r e lia b le person i s one who knows objects as they r e a l l y

are, and can express h is ideas c o rre c tly . He is free

from attachment and aversion. His words are in

harmony with th eir denoted o b je cts. They do not c o n ­

tra d ic t the nature o f t h e ir o b jects. Testimony in of

two v a r ie t ie s - secular (Laukika ) and non-secular

(Lokottara) . Testimony o f Janaka and others are secular,

while the Testimony of the Tlrthamkaras i s non-secular.

The Jainas do not believe in the authority o f the Vpdas.

They recognise the authority of the Tlrthamkaras only

who attained perfection and became omniscient .Testimony

i s a proposition composed o f sentences, words and l e t t e r s .

A sentence i s a c o lle c tio n o f interdependent words. A

word denotes an object by v irtu e of i t s natural denota­

t iv e power and convention. Like a lamp illum inating an

object, a word manifests an object by i t s natural power.

The only d iffe re n c e from lamp i s that word depends upon

convention to produce knowledge o f an o b je c t. But the

truth or f a l s i t y of a word depends upon the e x c e lle n c e

or imperfection of the speaker.1^"

11. PNT, iv , 1, 4-12.

 253

Nyaya view o f Sabda:

Sabda i s the l a s t pramana accepted by the N y a y a .

L i t e r a lly sabda means v e rb a l knowledge. I t i s the know­

led ge o f o b je c ts derived from words o r sentences. A ll

v e rb a l knowledge, however, i s not v a li d . Hence Sabda,

as a pramana, i s defined in the Nyaya as v a li d v e rb a l

testim ony. The Nyaya accepts Sabda or Testimony a s a

d is t in c t source o f knowledge. A l l our knowledge i s not

d erived from perception and in fe re n c e . Many o f our know­

le d g e depends on w ritten documents — books, paper etc.

a s w e ll as on the saying o f o th e rs. Sabda, when used

a s a source o f knowledge, means the a sse rtio n o f a r e l i a -

b l e person or a trustw orthy person. The Apta or the

r e l i a b l e person ^ i s the s p e c ia lis t in a c e r t a in f i e l d ,

’ One who, having had d ire c t p ro o f o f a c e rta in matter,

d e s ire s to communicate i t to others who thereby unders­

tand i t . ’

Gautama d efin es testimony as the in stru c tio n o f a

trustworthy person, who has immediate knowledge of the

Moral Law, and who i s competent to guide oth ers in the

performance o f th e ir duties and abstention from sins fo r

th e attainment o f good and the avoidance o f e v i l . lZ+

12. aptopadesah sabdah - NS, 1 .1 .7

13. aptastu yatharthavakta - TS, p. 3^-6

14. TR, pp. 94-95.

 254

Trustworthy persons are those who p erceiv e o b je c ts as

they e xist in th e ir r e a l nature, and communicate th.>ir*

rig h t knowledge to others fo r t h e ir b e n e fit out o f com­

passion fo r them, 'they are fre e from attachment and

aversion, and have immediate knowledge o f eternal

v e r i t i e s th at e x ist in a l l tim es. Sages are the seers

o f tru th . The a sse rtio n s o f those who know tru th s but

speak falseh o o d s are not v a l i d . The a s s e rtio n s o f those

who are ignorant o f tru th s , but speak what they know are

not v a li d . The a sse rtio n s of trustw orthy persons,

which are not fit fo r guiding persons in th<>

performance o f rig h t action s and the non-commission

of sins a re not testim ony. Untrustworthy persons

are ta in te d with d elu sion , mendacity and frau d u le rc e

Testimony is an in s tru c tio n which is expressed

in a sentence or p ro p o sitio n . The knowledge of a

p rop o sition i s testimony, and the knowledge of its

meaning is the r e s u lt . Testimony is due to the

knowledge of a sentence or words, w h ile perception i

due to the se n se -o b je c t-in te rc o u rse , in fe re n c e , to the

knowledge o f vyap ti, and comparison to the knowledge

15
o f s im ila r it y . But it is a matter o f common obser­

vation th at a sentence or statement i s not by it s e lf

s u ffic ie n t to give us any knowledge o f th in g s. Nor

again does the mere perception of the words of a

15. NS, NBh, i , 1.7, NM, p p . 150-152, NVTT, 135-36

SM, p p .360-61.
 255

sentence le a d to any knowledge about o b je c ts . It is

only when one p erce iv e s the words and understands

t h e ir meanings th a t he acquires any knowledge from a

v e rb a l statement. Hence w h ile the v a li d i t y o f v e rb a l

knowledge depends on i t s being based on therj statement

o f a trustworthy person, i t s p o s s i b i l i t y depends • on

th e understanding o f the meaning o f that statement.

✓
Hence Sabda or testimony, as a source o f v a li d know­

led g e, c o n sists in understanding the meaning o f the

statement o f a trustworthy person.'*'0

There are two ways o f c la s s ify in g Sabda or

v e rb a l knowledge. According to the one, th ere are two

kinds o f Sabda, v i z . , knowledge re la tin g to p e rc e p tib le

o b je c t s or the v i s i b l e world (d rs ta rth a ),a n d knowledge

r e la t in g to im perceptible o b je c t s (a d r s t a r t h a ). The

testimony of r e l i a b l e persons and o f the s c rip tu re s with

regard to p e rc e p tib le o b je c ts o f the world, such as

crops, r a i n f a l l , r i t e s , medicines e tc . come under the

firs t . The testimony o f the sc rip tu re s, s a in ts and

seers with regard to im perceptible o b je c ts l i k e fu tu re

life , heaven, God and the l i k e comes under the second

head.

16. TS, p . 72, Bhap and M uktavail, 81.

 236

According to another c la s s if ic a t io n , th ere are

two kinds o f testim ony. Of course, i t i s the v i ew of

the modern N aiyayikas. The two kinds o f testimony

according to them are ( i ) a r is in g from the words o f a

person and ( i i ) a r is in g from the words o f impersonal

17
o r ig in according a s the testimony i s secu lar or

s c r ip t u r a l. Secular testimony i s the statement of a

trustworthy person and s c rip tu ra l testimony i s the

statement o f the Vedas. The se c u lar testimony i s

f a l l i b l e , because man i s l i a b l e to e rro r. Again,it is

v a l i d or i n f a l l i b l e i f i t i s u ttered by a trustw orthy

person. As Vedas are created by impersonal b e in g , hence

they are p e rfe c t and i n f a l l i b l e . The N aiyayikas are

unanimous that testimony always proceeds from persons «—

human o r d iv in e . Testimony i s always p e rso n a l.

The i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f a sentence according to

the Naiyayikas, depends on the fo llo w in g fo u r conditions

These are ( l ) akanksa or expectancy, ( 2 ) yogyata

or fit n e s s , (3 ) sannidhi or proxim ity and (4 ) tatparya

or knowledge o f the intention o f the speaker. Their

d e fin it io n and i llu s t r a t i o n s in s e r ia l order are as

fo llo w s :

[l] In the f i r s t p lac e, a sentence must c o n sis ts of

words which imply one another. This mutual implication

17. laukikam vaidikam ca — TS, p . 490.

 257

- - • -18
i s c a lle d expectancy or akanksa e .g ., * 'B rin g the

um brella1' . The word ’b r i n g 1 r a is e s the question

’ b rin g what 7 1 ( 2 ) In the second p lac e, a sentence

c o n sists o f words which have f it n e s s or Yogyata fo r

one another. As fo r example, ''Quench your t h ir s t

by drinking w a t e r . " A ll the words in t h i s sentence

have mutual f it n e s s . (3 ) In the t h ir d p la c e , a

sentence in order to be i n t e l l i g i b l e must c o n s is ts o f

words which are in clo se proxim ity or sannidhi t o one

another. For example, i f the words 'b r i n g ', 'a 1 ,

’ h o rse' are u ttered at long in t e r v a ls , they do not

convey any meaning. (4 ) In the fourth p lac e, the

i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f a sentence depends upon the know­

le d g e o f the in ten tion or ta tp a ry a o f the speaker.

Thus " B r i n g sa in d h a v a " may mean 'B rin g s a l t ' i f it

i s uttered w h ile taking meal, but i t means ' h o r s e ' i f

i t i s uttered w h ile startin g on a journey.The i n t e n t i o n

o f the speaker should be gathered from the c o n t e x t . I t

has d iffe r e n t meanings in d iffe r e n t contexts a cco rd in g

to the in ten tion s o f the speakers. Some opine th a t the

context, which determines the in te n tio n o f th e speaker,

i s a cause o f understanding the meaning o f a sentence.

18. padasya padantaravyatirekaprayuktanvayananubhavak-

atvamakariksa. TS, p . 486
19. arthabadho yogyata - Ib id , p. 486
20. padanam avilambena uccaranam sannidhih - I b i d , o. 486.
 2 58

But i t i s wrong, since th e re i s no common property in

the contexts o f d iffe r e n t sentences. Some opine that

the knowledge o f the sp e ak er's in ten tion i s a cause

when some word in a sentence is equ iv o cal. Hence a

sentence, in order to be i n t e l l i g i b l e , must consist of

words,which are interdependent on, com patible with, and

jextaposed t o , one another, and convey a meaning in

conformity with the speaker’ s, in te n tio n . .C om patibility

im p lies form al consistency, w h ile the knowledge o f the

speaker’ s in ten tion im p lie s m aterial consistency. Phis

i s the sy n tac tic al a n a ly sis o f a sentence.

The Nyaya holds th at a word denotes an i n d i v i d u a l

bearing a genus and with a p a r t ic u la r form or c o n f i g u r a ­

t io n . The word 'cow' denotes an in d iv id u a l cow b e ar in g

the genus ( j a t i ) o f cow and with a p a r t ic u la r c o n f i g u r a ­

tio n or arrangement of p a r ts , e .g ., a haunch,horns and

a dewlap. An in d iv id u a l i s a p e rc e p tib le substance

endued with q u a lit ie s and movements. It i s a corporeal

body composed o f p a rts which are united with one anot her.

A genus su b sis ts i n many in d iv id u a ls , produces a common

concept o f them, and b rin g s many in d iv id u a l under one

c la s s . A con figu ration i s a d e fin it e arrangement o f

p a rts which i s the p e c u lia r mark o f a g e n u s .^

21. NVTT, p . 139; NM., pp. 390-401, Bhap, pp. 83-84

SM, pp. 389-394
22. NS, i i . 2,68, NS, NBh, i i . 2, 69-71.
 — I ^
Mimamsa View oTSabda:

The Mimamsa pays the g re a te st a tte n tio n to th is

✓

source o f knowledge i . e . , Sab da, because i t has to

j u s t i f y the auth ority o f the Vedas. Testimony is

v e rb a l a u th o rity .

According to ^abarasvsmin, the d e fin it io n of

Sabda i s the knowledge o f an o b je c t, not p resen t t o the

senses, produced by the knowledge o f words. Kumarila,

founder o f the Bhatta school o f Mimamsa, d e fin e s

testimony as the knowledge of o b je c ts , which are super­

se n sib le , derived from sentences by comprehending the

meanings o f the constituent words. These words may be

u ttere d by men or may belong to the Vedas. The former

i s the testimony o f the trustw orthy persons ( A p t a - V a k y a ).

The la t t e r i s the testimony o f the Vedas (Ved a-V ak ya) .

The former i s v a li d , i f we are sure th at i t i s t h e

utterance o f a trustw orthy person. The l a t t e r ( Veda-

Vakya) i s v a li d in i t s e l f and e te rn a l, having no human

or d ivin e authorship. But the former i . e . apt a-v akya i n

i t s e l f i s not v a l i d . I t ’ s v a li d i t y depends on t h e t r u s t ­

worthy character o f the speaker. Thus, Kumarila d e vi d es

testimony in to personal o r human and impersonal or

superhuman. ^ Prabhakara, founder of Prabhakara school

23. pauruseyam apauruseyam ca. ^

SV, Sabda 51.
 260

o f Mimamsa and author o f the B r h a t i, admits only Ved ic

testimony as r e a l testimony and reduces human test imony

to inference because i t s v a li d i t y i s in fe rre d from the

trustworthy character o f the person concerned.

Again, testimony may be o f two types one

which expresses some e x istin g th in g (Siddhartha-Vakya)

and the other which expresses something to be done

( Vidheyaka-Vakya). The former i s the statement of a

fa c t and the l a t t e r i s that of a command or o rd e r. The

former r e f e r s to such fa c t s as ’ t h is i s a j a r 1 and the

l a t t e r to commands such as ’ do t h i s ’ , ’ avoid t h i s ' etc.

In the opinion o f Kumarila, a word d ir e c t ly denotes a

u n ive rsa l or c la s s concept when a word i s not used in

a sentence, i t means the u n iv e rsa l fo r which i t stands,

and i t does not r t f e r to the existence o f the u n iv e rsa l,

f o r a u n iversal i s etern al and no question of i t s

existence a r is e s . An a ffirm a tiv e fa c tu a l statement,

which contains the verb ’ i s * , r e f e r s to the existence

o f something. But t h is something i s not the universal

d ir e c t ly denoted by the su bject-w ord. I t ra th er i s the

in d iv id u a l q u a lifie d by the u n iv e rs a l. Regarding

n egative fa c tu a l sentences, Kumarila says th at they

r e fe r to non-existence which a lso i s a f a c t l i k e exis­

ten ce. The word* not'* occurring in a fa c tu a l sentence

sometimes serves the purpose o f d if fe r e n t ia t in g one

 261

existing thing from another existing thing. ’ A cow is

not a horse’ means ’ a cow i s differen t from a horse1.
The function o f the word 'n o t1 occuring in a factual
statement i s to remove ignorance or doubt or to reject
a fa ls e idea (ajfiata sandigdhaviparltarthavaranam).
When a person i s in doubt about something, as when one
i s not sure whether a thing i s a man or a post, his
doubt is removed on hearing a statement negating one
o f the affirm atives.

Testimony i s verbal knowledge and i s derived

from the meanings of words which construct sentences.To
upholds the eternality and the authorlessness of the
Veda, the Mrmamsaka puts forward the view that words
and meanings as w ell as th eir rela tion are a ll natural
24
and eternal. A word composed of two or more l o i t e r s

(Varna) and i s a mere aggregate o f the le tte r s and not

a whole (avayavi), though the le tte r s must occur in a
particular order. A varna i s eternal (n ity a ),
omnipresent ( sarva-gata) and integral (nirvayava). It
i s d ifferen t from i t s sound (dhvani) i f t t i s spoken
and also differen t from i t s symbolic form (rupa) i f it
i s written. A varna is eternal and immutable, while it s

24. autpattikastu sabdasya arthena sambandhah, MS.1.1.5

 262

Dhvani and Rupa are momentary and changing. If many

varnas are spoken, they are manifested through a
temporal series o f utterances, i f they are written,they
are manifested through a spatial series o f written
symbols. The sound and the symbol are only the vehicles
o f the manifestation o f the eternal varna. When a
varna i s pronounced or written in ten d ifferen t ways,
there are not ten d ifferen t varnas, but only ten
d ifferen t manifestations o f the same varna. Therefore,
a word which is an aggregate o f two or more eternal
varnas is i t s e l f eternal. A word does not sign ify the
particular things which came into existence and pass
away, but the eternal universals underlying these
particu la rs. Hence the meanings or the ob jects denoted
by words, being universals, are eternal and unchanging.
And the relation between a word and i t s meaning also ,
being natural, necessary, inseparable and internal, is
eternal and unchanging. This rela tion i s not conventio­
n a l. It i s natural and eternal. Language i s not a
creation of the human or even the divine mind. The con­
ventional element in language i s secondary (Sahakari'
and helps the manifestation o f the eternal words and
th eir meanings, ju st as lig h t helps the manifestation of
of sight. The Mlmamsaka points out that sounds and the
symbols are created and destroyed, while the real words
are eternal. Words are manifested through human e ffo r ts .
The sounds and the symbols are the vehicles of the
manifestation o f the eternal words. The main object
o f the Mimamsaka i s to establish the authority o f the
Veda.

But even the permanance o f the word and it s

meaning and the rela tion between the two does noi
make the Veda eternal. The Veda i s a lite ra ry monument
consisting o f sounds and symbols. According to the
Mlmamsa view, a ll the uttered and written words are
rea lly permanent, though the sounds and the symbols
through which they are manifested may be quickly
fading and changing. Then what i s the d ifferen ce
between the Veda and any other lite ra ry work 7 The
Mfmamsaka re p lie s that the Veda i s authorless. While
a ll other works are the creation o f th eir authors. The
order in which the words occur in the lite ra ry works
i s determined by th eir authors and th erefore,the works
are subject to d efects, doubts and errors. But the
order in which the words occur in the Veda i s s e lf -
determined and th erefore, in tr in s ic a lly v a lid . The
Veda i s neither created by God nor any human being. It
i s self-proved and self-m anifesting. The particular
order in which the words occur in the Veda (Anupurvi)
i s self-determined and eternal. The permanance o f the
tex t of the Veda i s emphasized by the Mlrrfamsaka. The
 26^

Veda along with, i t s te x t i s etern al and au th orless

because the words, t h e ir meanings and th e ir r e la t io n are

a l l eternal and because lo n g -s ta n d in g -tra d itio n i s silent

on the authorship o f the Veda. Vedic testimony g i v e s us

the knowledge o f d u tie s (Dharma). Dharma i s supersensi­

b le , and cannot be perceived through the sense-organs.

The aim o f the Mimamsa i s to asc ertain the nature o f

Dharma. In ference, comparison, presumption and non­

apprehension a lso cannot y ie ld the knowledge o f Dharma,

since they presuppose p ercep tion . The knowledge that the

perform er o f Agnistoma s a c r if ic e w i l l go to heaven cannot

be given by them. Vedic testimony i s the only source of

our knowledge o f d u ties r e la t in g to su persen sible e n t it ie s .

The vedic te x ts which e n jo in us to perform c e rta in

action s which lead to b e n e fic ia l r e s u lt s are a u th orita­

t iv e . In ju n c tiv e sentences (v i d h i) in the Vedas are

a u th o rita tiv e , and p ro h ib itio n s are in ju n c tio n s in

d is g u is e . The other Vedic te x ts are a u th o rita tiv e in no

f a r as they help persons to perform t h e ir d u tie s. The

Vedas are looked upon by the Mimamsa as the book o f

commandments, and in these l i e s the v a lu e o f the Vedas.

The Vedic in junctions are never con tradicted by an)

subsequent v a lid knowledge. The o b je c ts denoted by them

can never be known by p e rc e p tio n } In fe re n c e and o t h e r

means o f v a li d knowledge. Hence vedic testimony i s v a l i d

in i t s e l f . 25 Another argument i s support o f the theory

25. SV., Sabda, 109; SD., pp. 72, 87-88.

 263

that the Vedas are not the works o f any person is that
they enjoin some ritu a l duties and declare th e ir
fr u it s (lik e attainment o f heaven). The connection
between the actions and such fr u it s i s not such as car:
be said to have been observed by any person ( lik e the
connection between the taking o f a prescribed medicine
and the cure o f a disease). So no person can be said
to be the author o f Vedas. I t i s not also reasonable
to hold that the author may be a cunning deceiver ( as
the Carvakas suggest). For had i t been so, no one
would care to study such deceptive works and hand them
down to p o ste rity . The i n f a l l i b i l i t y o f the authority
o f the Vedas re sts on the fa c t that they are not
v itia te d by any defects to which the work o f imperfect
persons i s subject.

But in addition to the impersonal Vedic authority,

the testimony o f a re lia b le person (Apta) also is accep-
ted by the Bhattas '
p •
as a v a lid source o f knowledge.
There is , however, a special value attached to Vedic
authority, because the knowledge o f the commandments
(Dharma) which we have from i t i s not to be obtained
from any other source, such as perception and Inference.
While the knowledge that personal authority may impact

26. SD, sabda-nityata-dhikaranam (pp. 138 f ) and

PP, sabda-pariccheda (pp. 87 f )
27. SD, sabda-pariccheda, p. 72.
 /.(>C

to ur, can bo sometimes obtainod otherwise by perception,

inference e t c ., and i s i t s e l f based on such previous

knowledge, the knowledge derived from the Vedas i s nei­
ther obtainable otherwise nor dependent on any previous
knowledge, the Vedas being eternal. But the
no .
Pr&bhakaras, lik e the Vaisesikas, hold that the state-
ment of a non-Vedic authority y ield s knowledge through
inference based on the r e lia b ilit y of the authority .

In reply to those who try to reduce a ll know­

ledge derived from testimony to Inference on the ground
that the v a lid ity of such knowledge i s ascertained by
Inference based on the r e lia b ilit y o f authority, the
Mimamsa makes an important rep ly . I t asserts that the
v a lid ity of every knowledge i s assured by the conditions
which generate that knowledge, so that the knowledge
imparted by authority, lik e every other knowledge,
ca rries with i t s e l f such assurance o f i t s own truth.

Both Prabhakara and Kumarila maintain that a

word denotes a cla ss , and in d ire ctly refers to an
individual through i t . A ll injunctions would be meaning­
le s s , i f words did not re fe r to cla sses. The word ’ cow*
denotes the cla ss ’ cow*. The generic idea o f (cow '
represents the cla ss ’ cow*. A word cannot denote a

28. PP, p. 95.

 267

s in g le in d iv id u a l , an aggregate o f in d iv id u a l s, o r a l l

in d iv id u a ls . I f a sin g le in d iv id u a l only were denoted

by i t , th ere could be no e te rn a l r e la t io n between it

and i t s o b je c t, and no a c tio n would be p o s s ib le , since

one could not make sure which in d iv id u a l was meant by

th e word. Nor can i t denote an aggregate of in d iv i­

d u a ls, since a l l the in d iv id u a ls cannot be known, and ,

consequently, t h e ir aggregate cannot be knov/n. Even i f

i t could be known, the meaning o f the word would

constantly change, since some in d iv id u a ls are born and

others p e rish . Nor can a word denote a l l in d iv id u a ls ^

since they can never be known, and, consequently, its

meaning can never be f u l l y comprehended. Hence a word

denotes a c la s s at f i r s t , then an in d iv id u a l through

i t . 29

✓
Advaita view o f Sabda;

Agama or s c rip tu ra l testimony, i s accepted by

the Advaitins as an independent source o f knowledge. A

sentence r e fe r s to an o b je c tiv e r e la t io n . A sentence

i s v a lid i f the re la tio n im plied by i t s meaning i s not

f a l s i f i e d by any other means o f knowledge. A sentence

29. NRM, p. 121, NYR, p . 123

30 . yasya vakyasya tatparyavisayifohutasamssrgo mananta
rena na badhyate tad vakyam pramanam - a s r e f e r r e d
to in the footnote o f I P , o f Radhakrsnan, p. 494.
 268

51
must f u l f i l fo u r conditions^ in order to convey a mean­

in g . I t must have sy n tactical connection among i t s

e sse n tia l p a r t s . The verb must demand a su b je c t, a

t r a n s it iv e verb an o bje ct, and the l i k e . A sentence

must have f it n e s s or c o m p atib ility of meaning among it s

p a rts (Y o gy ata)* The o b je c tiv e r e la t io n conveyed by a

sentence must be fr e e from c o n trad ictio n . I t must be

harmonious. 'He wets the ground with f i r e ' , t h is

sentence i s m eaningless. The o b je c tiv e r e la t io n conveyed

by i t i s s e lf-c o n t r a d ic t o r y . A sentence must have

proximity of i t s p arts i . e . , Sannidhi or A s a t t i. If the

words 'b r i n g ', 'a ', 'cow' are uttered at the in te rv a l of

one hour each, they do not form a sentence, and convey

any meaning. They must be uttered in close succession to

form a sentence. A sentence must have an o b je c t iv e

intention (T a tp a ry a ). ' Saindhavam anaya*. I t means

eith er 'b rin g a horse* or 'b r in g s a l t '. I f a person

u tt e rs the sentence w h ile ta k in g , h is meal, i t obviously

means 'b rin g s a l t ', but i t means 'horse* i f i t i s uttered

w h ile sta rtin g on a journey. F itn ess i s the formal

com patibility o f meaning. I n t u it i o n .i s co m p atib ility in

a m aterial sentence. I t i s correspondence o f the

su bjective in tu itio n o f the speaker with the o b je c tiv e

re la t io n conveyed by the sentence.

3SB. c a tv a ri karanani syuh vakyajanyadhiyaiin p r a t i /

akamksa y o g y a ta -s a tti-ta tp a ry a n i yathayatham //
Vedanta sa n jn a v a li, 118.
 A sentence i s composed o f words. The Nyayn

m aintains th at words denote in d iv id u a ls , connote the

genus, and suggest c o n fig u ra tio n , or that words denote

in d iv id u a ls endued with the genus and c o n fig u ra tio n .

But the Advaita Vedanta m aintains th at a word denotes

a genus, and not in d iv id u a ls , since in d iv id u a ls a re

i n f i n i t e in number. How, then, can i t denote an i n d i ­

v id u a l ? The genus and the in d iv id u a l are apprehended

by the same cogn ition produced by a word at the same

time.

Yoga view o f Sabda;

The knowledge o f an o b ject seen or i n f e r r e d by

a trustworthy person may be communicated to others by

means o f words. This i s the t h ir d means o f knowledge,

i.e., Agama. V erbal cognition i s based on r e l i a b l e

v e rb a l testim ony. For instance, one may not have

a c tu a lly been to Newzealand, but s t i l l he b e lie v e s ther

is such a country, fo r he i s r e l i a b l y taught so in

geography, and may have le a rn t about i t s e x i s t e n c e

through someone who has a c tu a lly been th e re . The object

seen or in fe rre d by a competent man, i s p r e s c r i b e d by

words fo r tra n s fe r r in g h is knowledge to another. The

mental operation concerning the object derived from the

word, i s the v e rb a l cognition to the h earer. The Veroal

cognition , - with referen ce to the object which i s n e i ­

th er seen nor in fe rre d by the speaker, the meaning of

whose words i s not worthy o f regard , - remains unsteady

But in the case o f the O rig in a l Speaker-' the

v e rb a l cognition i s undoubtedly steady with referen ce

to the object whether perceived or in fe rre d .

/
Samkhya view o f Sabda:

According to Samkhya , there are th ree Premanas

only - they are Perception, In feren ce and i s Sabda or

testim ony. V a lid testimony (Aptavacana) i s reckoned by

Samkhya as a separate source o f knowledge. Sabda is

32. The o r ig in a l speaker i s Is v a r a . By t h is , the author

strengthens the authority o f the Vedic s c r i p t u r e .
Hereby we are authorised to reduce the con trad ic­
tory th e o rie s o f our modern teachers - as re fe rre d
to tn the YB o f YS. 1 .1 .7 .

33. aptena d r•s» t«o ’ numito barthah• p aratra svabodhasam-

krantaye sabdenopadisyate sabdattadarthavisaya
v r t t ih sroturagamah. yasyasraddheyartho vakta na
drsta numitarthah sa agamah p la v a te . m ulavakta ri t .
drstanumitarthe n is ip la v a s y a t . -Y B o f YS. 1 1 7...
34. trividham pramanam TSS, 2 3,
( a ) trividham pramanamistam - SK, Ka. 4 ,
(jb) t r i n i pramananiti Devala,
C c ) trividham pramanam - S S .I. 87.
 271

a u th o rita tiv e statement and i t g iv e s the knowledge o f

o b je c ts which cannot be known by Perception and t h r e e

^ s
-
kinds o f In feren ce v i z . , Purvavat, Sesavat and
- — 35
Samany at odr st a .

A statement i s a sentence composed o f words

arranged in a c e rt a in way. A word i s a sign which

denotes something (V acaka), and i t s meaning i s the

th in g denoted by i t (V a c y a ). The understanding of a

sentence re q u ire s the understanding o f the meahingr c f

th e words which composes i t . The knowledge of the

meaning o f the words can be had in three w ays.F i r s t l y ,

we may have i t from the statement o f a trustw orthy

person. A trustworthy person p o in ts to a th in g and

says, 'I t is a j a r '. From t h i s statement we get the

knowledge o f the thing denoted by the word ' j a r ' .

Secondly, conventional use o f a word also g iv e s us t h e

knowledge o f i t s meaning. Somebody says 'B ring the coiv^

and a man obeys the order by b rin g in g b e fo re us a

p a r tic u la r animal. From t h i s we d eriv e the knowledge

of the o b je ct denoted by the word 'c o w '. T h ird ly , we

may r e la t e a word to the thing denoted by i t , by

r e la t in g the d iffe r e n t words composing the sentence.

35. tasmadapi casiddham paroksamaptagamat siddham -

SK, Ka, 6.
 272

For example: I have not seen a mango, nor have I ever

tasted i t . A boy is eating a fr u it , and another
person says, 'The boy i s eating mango'. From th is 1
come to know the thing denoted by the word 'mango1.

Valid testimony includes a ll v a lid revelations

- such as the Vedas and the Brahmanas, the re lig io u s
codes o f Manu e t c ., and the utterings o f a person .vno

is free from any defect (Apta).-^ The utterings o f

Apta i s called Agama. A person who i s free from
attachment, envy etc. never u tters any falsehood
because due to attachment, envy e tc. a man t e l l s a l i e .
So, a person who is free from such defects, why he
should utter a falseh oodf The person who fallow s the
varnasramadharma thoroughly and properly, who has no
any type of attachment, envy etc. who is adorable even
to the high-souled persons, i s called Apta. According

to Vacaspati, AptatS ( r e l i a b i l i t y ) i s in a sentence, no c

in a purusa. But i t is quite opposite in Yogabhasya
i . e . , according to which 'Aptata' i s in a Purusa. A

purusa i s ca lled 'Apta' when he i s free

i
from error,

36 . agamo hi aptavacanam aptam dosaksayadviduh /

kslnadoso'nrtam vakyani na bruyat hetvasambhevat / /
• • • *

svakarmanyabhiyukto yah sanga dvesa-vivar j i t ah 7

• • i <

nirvairah pujitah satibhirapto jneyah sa tadrsah i t i , / /

- as referred to the words o f Jayamangala in Ka,5.
n eg lig en ce, d is a b i l it y o f th e sense-organs o r d e s ir e -
ness to d eceiv e o th e r s . The u tteran ce or a d v ice of
„ 37
such a person i s c a lle d Sabda-pramana.

In th e Y u k ti-D ip ik a, both th ese two op in ion s

are accepted . Apta means s r u ti and s r u ti o f Apt a -

both are Sabdapramana. In the f i r s t case the imperso­

nal vedas are Sabdapramana and in the second case the
u tteran ce o f Manu e t c . , Vedariga, Smrti e t c . are a ll
-
Sabdapramana. 38

In Matharabhasya, th ose who have known the

* «

c h a r a c t e r is t ic s o f Dharma - th e ad vice o f such p r^ c-p -

t o r s Brahma e t c . as w e ll as th e Vedas - both are

37. YB, 1.7

38 . sravanam sru tih , apta casau sru tih ap tasru tih
athava ap to*syS stityap tah , akaro m atvarthlyah.
aptebhyai} sru tira p ta sru t ih . apta sr u ti sc ap ta sru­
t i scapt a sru tih sarupanamity ekasesah. ta tra
purvenaptasrutigrahanenedam pratipS dayati —
apurusa buddhipurvaka amn"ayah, sa purusa -
nihsreyasartham pravartamano nihsamsayam prarrfann-
m it i. d v itly en a manvadinivandhananarh ca smrtlrfaT;
vedarigatarketihasapurananam sistanam n in a s ilp a -
bhijuktanam cadustamanasam yad vacastatpramana-
m ityetat siddham b h a v a ti.
YD, p . 46.
 274

Aptavacana. 39

A statement i s a sentence composed o f words

arranged in a c e r ta in way. A word i s a sign which
denotes something (Vacaka), and i t s meaning i s th e thing
denoted by i t (V a cya ). To understand a sen ten ce, the
knowledge o f th e meaning o f th e words which compose i t

i s e s s e n t ia l. The knowledge o f the meanings of the

words can be had in eigh t d iffe r e n t w a y s .^ (a ) Knowledge

o f v erb s, in d e c lin a b le s , s u ffix e s , compounds e t c . can

be had from Grammar i . e . , Vyakarana. Thus th e § a k ti

(meaning) o f th e r o o t ’bhu’ i s ’ to e x is t* , th e meaning

o f the r o o t ’ gam* i s ’ to go* . The in d e c lin a b le *ca’ is

used in the sense o f ’ and*. The s u ffix e s ’ su’ , ’au’,
’ jas* e t c . are used to denote a word in t h e ir resp ec­
t i v e ways, (b ) Knowledge o f s im ila r ity can be obtainpd

39 . apta Brahmadaya acaryah srutirvedastadetadubhaya-

maptavacanam. aptih saksadarthapraptiryathartho-
palambhah, taya v a rta te ityap tah saksatkrtadharma
yatharthaptya srutarthagrahl taduktamaptavacanom
—^ la th a ra v rttih , SK, Ka, 3

40. saktigraham vyakaranopamanakosaptavakyat

vyavaharasca /
vakyasya s^esat v iv rte rv a d a n ti sammod^atah
sid^hapadasya vrddhah
• •
//
Bhap, p . 71.
 2 7d

through comparison i . e . , Upamana. Thus 'a gavaya i s

sim ila r to th a t o f a cow1, ( c ) Knowledge o f synonymous

terms e t c . can b e gathered by con su ltin g a d ic tio n a r y
i . e . , a Koga. Thus, Visnu, Narayana, Krsna, Radha-
kanta e t c . are a l l th e d iffe r e n t names o f the Lord
V isnu. (d ) The example o f knowledge d erived from
Aptavakya i s when a r e li a b le p erson , u tte r s th a t ’p ik a ’

means 'a cuckoo' the l is t e n e r gathers th e knowledge o f

cuckoo from th e word 'p ik a * . ( e) The example of the

knowledge o f Vakyasesa i s th a t i t i s la id down in the

sastra — 'yavamayah caruh b h a v a ti’ . Now, what i s tho

meaning o f th e word 'yava* ? D iffe r e n t p eop le gives

d if f e r e n t d e f in i t io n s . N atu rally, doubt a r is e s among

th e common p eop le as to .the c le a r con cep tion o f the

word yava. To remove the doubt one has t o depend on

sastra th en . I t i s l a i d down in the sa stra th a t when

a l l th e corns are decayed *yava' remains f r e s h . ( f ) To

express the meaning o f a word by another word i s
c a lle d V lvarana. Thus ’ p a c a t i' means 'pakam k a r o t i’ .
So, we can convert en glish 'c o o k s ' in Sanskrit
• p a ca ti' and 'p'akam k a r o t i* . Both are c o r r e c t .
(g ) Siddhapada sannidhya means th e knowledge o f a word
which i s very near t o a famous word i . e . , a Siddhapada.
Thus, fo r example, when somebody says, * 'ih a sahakara-
tarau madhuram r o u t i p ik a 1’ . Sahakara means *a mango

t r e e ', so, by the word 'p i k a ', i t i s to be understood

as 'cuckoo* because there is natural likeness of cuckoo
with that of a mango tree, (h ) V^ddhavyavahara means
usage of an elderly people, some knowledge which one
can derive from the usage of superiors.

According to Samkhyaits, Valid Assertion is

41 -
right revelatio n *. Valid Assertion i s Aptavacana and

Aptasruti means right revelation. In the definition the

word 'tu ' is for restriction ( tusabdo'vadharanarthah )
«*•

I t implies that according to Samkhya also, Aptavacana

i s a mode of proof, i s more re lia b le than the other two
methods. When an experienced person pointing another
experienced person, utters a few words (e .g . Bring the
cow)-— and the la tte r, thus being directed, does a

certain manner ( i . e . , brings the cow),— the third

person standing there having watched a ll these infers
that the action of the directed person was due to nis
understanding the sense of the words uttered by the
directing person,— and from th is he comes to recognise-
the connection between the words used and the action
performed,— moreover, a particular word is found to
express it s meaning i . e . a particular meaning only when
there is recognition of the connection between that word
and it s meaning— from these two facts i t follow s that

41. aptasrutiraptavacanam tu — SK, Ka, 5;

aptopadesah sabdah SS, I . 101.
 7/

Verbal cognition is led up to by Inf er^ncr* and that is

why, after having discussed Inference, the definition
of Valid Assertion is given by the author. Verbal
testimony cannot be included in Inference. I t being so,
automatically refutes the view stated by those belonging
to the other school i . e . , Buddhists that the word

Sinsipa (balbergia sisso), etc., are included in deter­

minate Inference (Nirvikalpaka Anumana), because they
are possessed of three characteristics. Sabda is
generally said to be of two kinds, namely, laukika and

vaidika. The f i r s t is the testimony of the ordinary

trustworthy persons. This, however, is not recognised in
the Seurikhya as a separate pramana. Since i t depends on

perception and Inference. I t i s the testimony of Sruti

or the Vedas that i s to be admitted as the third

independent pramSna.

The v a lid knowledge i s s e lf-s u ffic ie n t in its

authority , i . e . , i t i s always right, in asmuch as it is
brought about by the words of the Veda which is indepen­
dent as i t is not human-creation which i s lia b le to
error, doubt, defects etc. And i t is for the same
reason also that the knowledge derived from the Itihasa
and the Smrti, which are based on the Veda, is regarded
as right i . e . , "apta. The Vedas embody the intuitions of
enlightened seers ( r s i s ) .
♦ *
These intuitions being
 278

universal and eternal experiences are not dependent on

the w ill or consciousness o f individual persons. As
such the Vedas are impersonal ( apauruseya). Yet they
are not eternal since they arise out o f the spiritual
experiences o f seers and saints, and are conserved by a
continuous lin e of instruction from generation to gene­
ra tion .

According to sage Kapila, the propounder of

the Samkhya system of thought, i t i s possible that the
remembered the revealed te x ts that he had studied during
previous tim e-cycles just as things known on the
previous day are remembered on the next-day, after
waking from d e e p . That such remembrance i s possible is
indicated by the conversation between Svatya and
, 42
Jaigisavya,
•
where the revealed Jaigisavya speaks
«
of
h is remembering things that occured in past liv e s,e x te n ­
ding over ten Tim e-cycles— in the te x t— "W h ile I war-
evolving during ten Time-cycles e t c ., e t c . ’ *

The presentation o f the word 'Apta* i.e.,

'Right* in the term 'Right Revelation* (Aptavacana) is
used only to exclude a ll fa lse -re v e la tio n s, such as the

42. The conver sation between Avatya and jaigisavya ,

referred to by Vacaspati, occurs in Vyasabhasya on
YS, 3.18.
 279

scriptures o f the *£akya-Bhiksu' (Buddhist), the 'Nir-

granthaka* (Jaina), the 'Samsaramocaka' (M aterialist
who regards k illin g on animal i s a virtuous deed
because on the other hand, i t fre e s i t from the pains
o f existence) and others. That these scriptures are
not right i s to be inferred from (a) internal contra­
d iction s, (b) being devoid o f any sound basis,
( c ) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and
(d) being accepted by only a few low and b e a st-lik e
persons such as Mlecchas and others.

’ Valid A ssertion’ i s to ta lly d ifferen t from

'Inference* or 'Anunfana*. Inference depends on previou
connection. But in 'Valid Assertion* when the sentence
expresses i t s meaning i t does not stand in need of a
previous connection between i t s e l f and the meaning as
for example, i t i s found that in the case o f the work
o f a new poet, the sentence i s one never heard before
and i t , th erefore, expresses a meaning which has never
before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. In
Anumana, invariable concomitance between Major term
( f i r e ) and Middle term (smoke), as well as previous
experience is essential fo r the knowledge o f 'where the
is smoke, there i s f i r e . ' But in 'Valid A ssertion’ or
✓

Sabda such type o f previous experience and invariable

concomitance i s not necessary. So, i t has been proved
 280

that 'Valid A ssertion' i s to ta lly a differen t source

o f valid knowledge or Pramaria.

Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony

are the only three sources of v a lid knowledge as
supported by the Sanikhyaits. And a ll other pram anas
except the above-mentioned three may be included in
the three pramanas supported by the Sarnkhya. So
pramanas are not le s s than three or more than three
(na nyunam napyadbikam) .

In concluding chapter th is w ill be discussed

thoroughly as far as p o ssib le .