Impact File

CCP Collapse
 CCP Collapse Good
The CCP will inevitably collapse – trying to save it makes it worse – breeds
corruption and leads to economic disaster
Pei 12
Minxin, Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies
at Claremont McKenna College., “is ccp rule fragile or resilient?” Journal of Democracy, Volume 23, Number 1, January 2012
There is a sharp and intriguing discrepancy between how strong autocracies seem to outsiders
and how insecure the rulers themselves feel. Autocrats are constantly on guard against forces that pose even the slightest
threat to their rule, expending tremendous resources and taking excessively harsh and repressive measures in the process. But if
authoritarian regimes really were so strong, then such costly measures motivated by insecurity
would be self-defeating and counterproductive: They would be unnecessary and, by wasting a
regime’s scarce resources, would undermine its long-term survival. So why is there this discrepancy? The
answer is quite simple: The authoritarian strength that outsiders perceive is merely an illusion. Insiders
—the authoritarians themselves—possess information about the regime’s weaknesses that
outsiders know little about. These weaknesses make authoritarians feel insecure and prompt them to act accordingly.¶ The
resilience of China’s authoritarian regime may be a temporary phenomenon, fated to succumb eventually
to autocracy’s institutional and systemic defects. These defects are inherent features of autocratic systems and therefore uncorrectable. Thus the
measures that the CCP has taken since the early 1990s to strengthen its rule (regardless of how effective they may have been) merely serve to offset
somewhat the deleterious effects that these flaws have on regime survival. In the long run, China’s
authoritarian regime is likely
to lose its resilience.¶ Ironically, an authoritarian regime’s short-term success can imperil its long-
term survival and effectiveness. Success, defined in terms of suppressing political opposition
and defending a political monopoly, makes it more likely that authoritarians, unrestrained by
political opposition, free media, and the rule of law, will engage in looting and theft, inevitably
weakening the regime’s capacity for survival.¶ Authoritarian regimes tend to breed corruption for a variety of reasons. A
principal cause is the relatively short time horizon of autocrats, whose hold on power is tenuous, uncertain, and insecure. Even where the rules of
succession and promotion have improved, as they have in China, such improvement is only relative to the previous state of affairs. Succession at the top
remains opaque and unpredictable in China. Although the top leadership has managed to reach compromises through bargaining, thereby avoiding
destabilizing power struggles, succession politics continues to be mired in intrigue and factionalism. In the case of promotion, the only objective rule
appears to be an age requirement; all the other factors that are supposedly merit-based can be gamed. The fact that many officials resort to bribery to
gain promotions indicates that personal favoritism continues to play an important role in internal Party promotions.21 ¶ All
this renders
uncertain the political future of members of the CCP hierarchy and thus encourages predatory
behavior. There is evidence that corruption has worsened in China in recent years despite periodic
anticorruption campaigns launched by the CCP.22 More important, because of the deep and extensive involvement of
the Chinese party-state in the economy, the combination of motives (driven by uncertainty) and
opportunity (access to economic rents) can create an ideal environment for regime insiders to engage in
collusion, looting, and theft.¶ Corruption endangers the long-term survival of authoritarian regimes in
several ways. It can hinder economic growth, thus reducing the regime’s political legitimacy and capacity to underwrite a costly patronage system and
maintain its repressive apparatus. Corruption
also contributes to rising inequality by benefiting a small
number of wellconnected elites at the expense of public welfare , thus further fueling antiregime sentiments and
social tensions. Corruption creates a highrisk environment, making it difficult to enforce regulations
governing the workplace, food and drugs, traffic, and environmental safety, thereby increasing
the risks of accidents and disasters and the likelihood of mismanaged government responses
to them.23

A transition to democracy solves problems with collapse and saves the

environment
Zhang et al. 14
(Dongyong Zhang 1,2, Junjuan Liu 1 and Bingjun Li 1,* College of Information and Management Science, Henan Agricultural
University, Center for International Earth Science Information Network, The Earth Institute, Columbia University, Tackling Air Pollution
in China—What do We Learn from the Great Smog of 1950s in LONDON http://www.mdpi.com/2071-
1050/6/8/5322/htm#sthash.wA3LOoHc.dpuf
Environmental degradation is the result of the single-minded pursuit of economic strength
without democratic accountability [29]. The development of Taiwan’s environmentalism is
closely synchronized with successive stages in transition to democracy, and environmental
protests in Taiwan in the 1980s over pollution caused by the island’s industrialization improved people’s sense of political efficacy and pushed Chiang Ching-Kuo to lift
martial law in 1987, which ushered in Taiwan’s process of democratization [30]. Although it is bold to say mainland China will follow Taiwan’s step and the social unrest caused by

it is evident that high profile protests against various polluting

mainland China’s pollution could bring about democracy,

industries and the recent shocking air quality in mainland Chinese cities have helped place the
environment at the center stage in Chinese politics. Chinese official media used to describe the country’s pollution problem as a
necessary but temporary consequence of its economic transformation, but the heavy smog in early 2013 has made poisonous air the become lead item in the prime-time news,

Leaders are
broadcast continuously by the state broadcaster China Central Television. The report was not just extensive, but also critical.Why the change of tone? “

aware that people can wait 20 years or more for democracy but they cannot wait that long for
clean air,” says the editor of China Dialogue, which covers environmental issues in China [31]. Companies in China often ignore the
environmental laws because of loose enforcement, weak penalties and a prevailing attitude of
“I have money hence I can do anything”. However, several successful public protests in recent years
against polluting projects give China the hope of achieving democracy through environmental
issues . The new Environment Protection Law proposed the mechanism of transparency promotion, which includes requiring companies to monitor and report real-time
pollution data, clearly specifying criminal penalties for those who evade such monitoring systems or forge monitoring data [32]. In addition, the new law forbids improperly
operating pollution prevention equipment and holds government agencies responsible for disseminating information publicly [33]. The new Law also moves close to democracy
by permitting civil society organizations to initiate public interest lawsuits on behalf of citizens.
 CCP Stability High
CCP collapse isn’t coming anytime soon – the party is improving and the
alternative is chaos – predictions of collapse are historically wrong
Heath 15
Tim Heath is a Senior Defense and International Analyst at the RAND Corporation. Mr. Heath has
over fifteen years of experience as a China analyst in the US government March 13, 2015 No,
China’s Not About to Collapse http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-chinas-not-about-to-
collapse/
The CCP’s liabilities are well known. These include an antiquated political identity,
cumbersome ideology, and widespread disenchantment with Marxism among the public (and
among more than a few party members). CCP-led government has failed to provide adequate services, ensure rule

of law, and has long tolerated corruption, malfeasance, and widening inequality. Many of these
vulnerabilities have persisted for years, and some have worsened over time.¶ The party’s advantages are less often discussed , but

these bear reviewing if one is to evaluate the viability of CCP rule. One of the most
overlooked, but important, assets is a lack of any credible alternative. The party’s repressive politics prevent the
formation of potential candidates, so the alternative to CCP rule for now is anarchy. For a country still traumatized by its historic

experience with national breakdown, this grants the party no small advantage. To truly imperil its authority, the

CCP would need to behave in so damaging a manner as to make the certainty of political
chaos and economic collapse preferable to the continuation of CCP rule . A party that attempted to return to
extreme Mao-era policies such as the catastrophic Great Leap Forward could perhaps meet that threshold. But despite the numerous superficial comparisons in Western media,

The second major political advantage lies in

little about the current administration policy agenda resembles classic Maoism.¶

improvements to the party’s effectiveness in recent years. In a major paradigm shift, the CCP redefined itself as a “governing
party” whose primary responsibility rests in addressing the myriad economic, political, cultural, ecological, and social welfare demands of the people. It has carried out

The Xi administration has refined, but upheld,

ideological and political reforms to improve its competence and effectiveness accordingly.

the focus on increasing the nation’s standard of living and realizing national revitalization,
objectives embodied in the vision of the “Chinese dream.” Although the party has rightly come in for criticism for moving
slowly and inadequately on these issues, the policy agenda nevertheless appears to resonate with the majority of Chinese citizens. Independent polls consistently show that the

When weighing the party’s political liabilities against its

party has in recent years enjoyed surprisingly strong public support.¶

assets, therefore, the evidence suggests that the CCP faces little danger of imminent collapse.
Improvements to its cohesion, competence, and responsiveness, combined with a policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese and the lack of a compelling alternative
outweigh the persistent political liabilities. The party’s overall political stability throughout the 2000s, despite massive political unrest generated by breakneck economic growth,
underscores this point.¶ The Insecure CCP¶ If the party does indeed a measure of political support and security, why does it behave in so insecure a manner? This is perhaps the
most puzzling aspect of CCP behavior today and a major driver of speculation about the possibilities of political exhaustion and collapse.¶ There is no question that China is
experiencing tumult of a degree unusual even for a country habituated to pervasive discontent. Amid the unrelenting anti-corruption drive, officials throughout the country
appear to be operating in an atmosphere of pervasive fear and distrust. The intensifying political crackdown against critics, liberal thinkers, and supposedly pernicious, malignant
Western influences evoke the paranoid witch-hunts of the Mao era. The oppressive atmosphere and political insecurity (not to mention choking pollution and problems such as
toxic water and food) have motivated an astonishing number of China’s elite to seek a way out of the country.¶ While it is tempting to read such behavior as symptomatic of a

For one, signs of systemic breakdown are

desperate regime fending off the inevitable, there are reasons to doubt such an interpretation.

hard to find. There is little evidence of the open political warfare that has typified previous
periods of political weakness and disarray. For now, at least, the central leadership appears united behind Xi’s policy agenda. The economy
continues to grow, with PRC officials anticipating an annual rate at a slowing, but still healthy, 7 percent. Government policy and operations continue without the kinds of
abnormal interruptions or breakdowns that one would expect of a nation in serious crisis.¶ A more plausible reading is that China’s leadership is determined to do whatever it
takes to achieve national development and establish the conditions for long-term rule. The CCP aims to do this primarily by undertaking political reforms to improve the
effectiveness and competence of government administration and by overseeing the sustained growth that can enable a steady increase in the standard of living. These objectives
are so important to the party’s long-term survival that the Xi administration has shown a willingness to crush whomever gets in the way, regardless of political party affiliation.¶
The severity of the myriad challenges impeding the realization of these policy objectives deserves emphasis. The old export- and investment-driven model of growth that
powered China’s rise for three decades has exhausted itself. Rebalancing the economy to accommodate a greater role for consumer-driven growth remains a politically
contentious process that has historically proven extremely difficult and destabilizing for any country. China also continues to face persistent problems of pollution, injustice,
corruption, adverse demographics, and other difficulties. Party leaders increasingly recognize that progress on any single issue depends on progress on all issues. A more stable
model of economic growth depends on a greater reliance on markets, law-abiding government, and the spending power of educated consumers who will expect more of
government. Improvements to the quality of government services, meanwhile, depend in part on access to resources that can only come from sustained growth. Nor can China’s
leaders focus exclusively on domestic policy to address these issues. Deep integration with the global economy means domestic growth and stability depends in part on the
safeguarding of distant developmental interests and a restructuring of the Asia-Pacific region’s political economy.¶ The centralization of power and focus on structural, top-down
reforms that have defined the policy agenda of the Xi administration reflect a realistic recognition of the complexity and magnitude of the problems confronting the nation. The
Central Leading Group for the Deepening of Comprehensive Reform, National Security Commission, and similar central leading groups design and oversee the systemic policies
needed to maintain long-term growth and improve the government’s operations. Many officials and powerful interests stand to lose from these reforms. The anti-corruption
campaign, political crackdown on potential critics, and destruction of the careers of thousands of party officials reflects a ruthlessly pragmatic calculation that the sacrifice many
 Perhaps it is not
party members is a worthwhile price to pay for the greater gains of long term political stability that would come from successful reform.¶

coincidental that predictions of the party’s impending collapse have traditionally surged at
major inflection points in the history of the PRC. The last major wave of pessimism occurred at the turn of the century, when China also
faced economic slowdown, political demoralization, widespread unrest, and bitter factional infighting. The symptoms may have been correctly perceived, but the prognosis

proved faulty. The party’s adaptation and resilience surprised observers and disproved the gloomy
predictions. China has similarly reached a key inflection point , one in which the policy challenges possibly surpass those of
the turn of the century.¶ Beijing will continue to face massive political, economic, ecological, and other

challenges. The party could well fail to carry out needed reforms and ultimately collapse at
some point. But with China on the cusp of achieving a centuries-long ambition of national
revitalization, observers would be well served to exercise caution in once again assuming the
nation’s leadership and people would so readily scuttle such an historic opportunity in favor of
a return to the humiliations and agonies of national dissolution that the country has struggled
for so long to escape.

CCP authoritarian regime will continue for years to come

Chen 2015
Chen. March 10, 2015. Chen Dingding is an assistant professor of Government and Public
Administration at the University of Macau, and a weekly columnist at The Diplomat. The
Diplomat. Sorry, America: China Is NOT Going to Collapse.
Do the Chinese also desire liberty, democracy, human rights, and so on? Of course they do. My own research, which will be
presented in a forthcoming article based on survey data, shows that even among the most liberal Chinese, the desire for liberty
and democracy quickly weakens as long as the Chinese government does a good job of tackling corruption, environmental
pollution, and inequality. Democracy is seen as a means, rather than as an end. For one, Shambaugh rightly reminds us that
China’s political system can be quite unstable despite the appearance of stability on the surface and efforts at reform. China’s
political system does need to be more open, more inclusive, and more democratic; and it will
someday. The ultimate outcome of Xi’s ongoing reforms remains to be seen . Nonetheless, all
existing indicators point to the development of a stronger and more effective system of
governance within China. Instead of a quick collapse, a mighty, confident, assertive, and
authoritarian China will be around for quite a while. As such, discussion about China should
take this reality into account, rather than imagining the victory of the West’s vision for China,
however uncomfortable this may be.

China’s political stability is strong – citizens believe in the government and

demands are narrow
Fisher 2012
(Max Fisher, Jan 5, 2012, former writer and editor for The Atlantic, The Atlantic, “How China
Stays Stable Dispite 500 Protests Every Day,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/how-china-stays-stable-despite-500-
protests-every-day/250940/)
Wukan's movement in December was not as unusual as it might have seemed. China saw
180,000 protests, riots, and mass demonstrations in 2010 alone -- on average about 500 every
day -- a number that has likely since increased. The villagers' complaints were common ones: local
officials exploiting land sales for personal gain and violently repressing dissent (a village advocate had died while in police
custody). That the protesters won some real concessions from the authorities was also not unheard of, although the one-sidedness
of their victory was rare, as was the international media attention they garnered (that media attention likely secured the victory, for
now). But what is perhaps most remarkable, and remarkably typical, of the Wukan movement was the protesters' insistence on
declaring fealty to the Chinese Communist Party. Though
China's 2011 could have possibly seen more mass
demonstrations than the entire Arab world, this is one reason that China probably remains
far away from an Arab Spring-style revolutionary movement . Popular movements here seem
to express relatively narrow complaints, want to work within the system rather than topple
it, and treat the Communist Party as legitimate. Protests appear to be part of the system, not
a challenge to it -- a sort of release valve for popular anger that, if anything, could have
actually strengthened the Party by giving them a way to address that anger while maintaining
autocratic rule. In the absence of real democracy, this give-and-take between state and society
could actually help maintain political stability in China -- for now.
 CCP Stability Low
CCP stability low – 5 reasons
SHAMBAUGH 15
David, March 6, WSJ, “The Coming Chinese Crackup” https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-
content/uploads-001/2016/03/The-Coming-Chinese-Crackup-WSJ.pdf
First , China’s economic elites have one foot out the door, and they are ready to flee en masse
if the system really begins to crumble. In 2014, Shanghai’s Hurun Research Institute, which studies China’s wealthy,
found that 64% of the “high net worth individuals” whom it polled—393 millionaires and billionaires
—were either emigrating or planning to do so. Rich Chinese are sending their children to study
abroad in record numbers (in itself, an indictment of the quality of the Chinese higher-education system). Just this week,
the Journal reported, federal agents searched several Southern California locations that U.S. authorities allege are linked to
“multimilliondollar birth-tourism businesses that enabled thousands of Chinese women to travel here and return home with infants
born as U.S. citizens.” Wealthy
Chinese are also buying property abroad at record levels and prices,
and they are parking their financial assets overseas, often in well-shielded tax havens and shell
companies. Meanwhile, Beijing is trying to extradite back to China a large number of alleged
financial fugitives living abroad. When a country’s elites—many of them party members— flee
in such large numbers , it is a telling sign of lack of confidence in the regime and the country’s
future. Second , since taking office in 2012, Mr. Xi has greatly intensified the political repression that has
blanketed China since 2009. The targets include the press, social media, film, arts and literature,
religious groups, the Internet, intellectuals, Tibetans and Uighurs, dissidents, lawyers, NGOs,
university students and textbooks. The Central Committee sent a draconian order known as Document No. 9
down through the party hierarchy in 2013, ordering all units to ferret out any seeming endorsement of
the West’s “universal values” —including constitutional democracy, civil society, a free press
and neoliberal economics. A more secure and confident government would not institute such a severe crackdown. It is
a symptom of the party leadership’s deep anxiety and insecurity . Third , even many regime
loyalists are just going through the motions. It is hard to miss the theater of false pretense that has permeated the
Chinese body politic for the past few years. Last summer, I was one of a handful of foreigners (and the only American) who attended
a conference about the “China Dream,” Mr. Xi’s signature concept, at a party-affiliated think tank in Beijing. We sat through two days
of mind-numbing, nonstop presentations by two dozen party
scholars—but their faces were frozen, their body language was
wooden, and their boredom was palpable. They feigned compliance with the party and their leader’s latest
mantra. But it was evident that the propaganda had lost its power , and the emperor had no clothes. In
December, I was back in Beijing for a conference at the Central Party School, the party’s highest institution of doctrinal instruction,
and once again, the country’s top officials and foreign policy experts recited their stock slogans verbatim. During lunch one day, I
went to the campus bookstore—always an important stop so that I can update myself on what China’s leading cadres are being
taught. Tomes on the store’s shelves ranged from Lenin’s “Selected Works” to Condoleezza Rice’s memoirs, and a table at the
entrance was piled high with copies of a pamphlet by Mr. Xi on his campaign to promote the “mass line”—that is, the party’s
connection to the masses. “How is this selling?” I asked the clerk. “Oh, it’s not,” she replied. “We give it away.” The size of the stack
Fourth , the corruption that riddles the party-state and the military
suggested it was hardly a hot item.
also pervades Chinese society as a whole. Mr. Xi’s anticorruption campaign is more sustained and severe than any
previous one, but no campaign can eliminate the problem . It is stubbornly rooted in the single-party
system, patron-client networks, an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled
media and the absence of the rule of law. Moreover, Mr. Xi’s campaign is turning out to be at least as much a
selective purge as an antigraft campaign. Many of its targets to date have been political clients and allies of former Chinese leader
Jiang Zemin. Now 88, Mr. Jiang is still the godfather figure of Chinese politics. Going after Mr. Jiang’s patronage network while he is
still alive is highly risky for Mr. Xi, particularly since Mr. Xi doesn’t seem to have brought along his own coterie of
loyal clients to promote into positions of power . Another problem: Mr. Xi, a child of China’s first generation
revolutionary elites, is one of the party’s “princelings,” and his political ties largely extend to other princelings.
This silver-spoon generation is widely reviled in Chinese society at large. Finally , China’s
economy—for all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut—is stuck in a series of systemic traps
from which there is no easy exit . In November 2013, Mr. Xi presided over the party’s Third Plenum, which unveiled a
huge package of proposed economic reforms, but so far, they are sputtering on the launchpad. Yes, consumer spending has
been rising, red tape has been reduced, and some fiscal reforms have been introduced, but
overall, Mr. Xi’s ambitious goals have been stillborn. The reform package challenges powerful,
deeply entrenched interest groups—such as state-owned enterprises and local party cadres—
and they are plainly blocking its implementation . These five increasingly evident cracks in the regime’s control
can be fixed only through political reform. Until and unless China relaxes its draconian political controls, it will never become an
innovative society and a “knowledge economy”—a main goal of the Third Plenum reforms. The political system has
become the primary impediment to China’s needed social and economic reforms. If Mr. Xi and
party leaders don’t relax their grip, they may be summoning precisely the fate they hope to avoid.

CCP collapse coming now – Xi unwilling to make reforms; crackdown is hurting

party cred
SHAMBAUGH 15
David, March 6, WSJ, “The Coming Chinese Crackup” https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-
content/uploads-001/2016/03/The-Coming-Chinese-Crackup-WSJ.pdf
In effect, for a while Mr. Jiang and Mr. Hu sought to manage change, not to resist it. But Mr. Xi
wants none of this . Since 2009 (when even the heretofore open-minded Mr. Hu changed
course and started to clamp down), an increasingly anxious regime has rolled back every
single one of these political reforms (with the exception of the cadre-training system). These
reforms were masterminded by Mr. Jiang’s political acolyte and former vice president, Zeng
Qinghong, who retired in 2008 and is now under suspicion in Mr. Xi’s anticorruption campaign
—another symbol of Mr. Xi’s hostility to the measures that might ease the ills of a crumbling
system . Some experts think that Mr. Xi’s harsh tactics may actually presage a more open and
reformist direction later in his term. I don’t buy it. This leader and regime see politics in zero-
sum terms: Relaxing control, in their view, is a sure step toward the demise of the system and
their own downfall . They also take the conspiratorial view that the U.S. is actively working to
subvert Communist Party rule. None of this suggests that sweeping reforms are just around
the corner. We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to
conclude that we are witnessing its final phase. The CCP is the world’s second longest ruling
regime (behind only North Korea), and no party can rule forever .

Weak leadership will lead to CCP collapse

Pei 2012
Minxin. Dec 19,2012. Minxin Pei is an expert on governance in the People's Republic of China,
U.S.-Asia relations, and democratization in developing nations. Tipei Times. The collapse of the
CCP inevitable. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2012/12/18/2003550403
While the future of China is unpredictable, the durability of its post-totalitarian regime can be
estimated with some confidence. China may be unique in many ways, but its one-party rule is hardly exceptional. Its
political order suffers from the same self-destructive dynamics that have sent countless
autocratic regimes to their graves. Among many of the systemic flaws of autocracy, degeneration at the top,
epitomized by ever-weaker leaders, is progressive and incurable. The exclusive and closed nature of autocracy
bars many talented individuals from rising to senior government positions, owing to a pattern
of succession that rewards political loyalty over capabilities. Savvy autocratic rulers favor less
talented successors, because they are easier to groom and control. Leadership degeneration accelerates
as the autocratic regime ages and grows more bureaucratic. As individuals in such regimes ascend the hierarchy, patronage and risk
aversion become the most critical factors in determining their chances for promotion. Consequently, such regimes grow increasingly
sclerotic as they select leaders with stellar resumes, but mediocre records. The
most lethal strain of leadership
degeneration is escalating predation among the ruling elites. The most visible symptom is corruption, but
the cause is intrinsic to autocratic rule. Typically, first-generation revolutionaries have a strong emotional and ideological attachment
to certain ideals, however misguided.
The post-revolutionary elites are ideologically cynical and
opportunistic. They view their work for the regime merely as a form of investment and so seek
ever-higher returns. As each preceding generation of rulers cashes in its illicit gains from
holding power, the successors are motivated by both the desire to loot more and the fear that
there may not be much left by the time they get their turn. This is the underlying dynamic
driving corruption in China today. The consequences of leadership degeneration are easy to
see: faltering economic dynamism and growth, rising social tensions and loss of government
credibility.

The Chinese political situation is not stable and is starting to cause unrest in
China’s people.
Rogan 2012
(Josh Rogan, Jan 18,2012, Josh covers national security and foreign policy for The Cable,” U.S.
ambassador: Political situation in China ‘very, very delicate’”
there is a growing frustration among the
"I do believe that there is a power of the people, and
people over the operations of government, corruption, lack of
transparency, and issues that affect the Chinese people on a daily basis that
they feel are being neglected," Locke told NPR‘s Steve Inskeep During a Wednesday interview, part of a
media blitz Locke is conducting during his visit to Washington. "Do you think that the situation is
fundamentally stable in China right now?" Inskeep asked Locke."I think,
very delicate — very, very delicate," Locke responded. "But there were calls earlier this
year for a Jasmine Revolution and nothing came of it. I think it would take something very significant, internal to China,
to cause any type of major upheaval."Locke said that since he took over the ambassadorship from former GOP presidential
candidate Jon Huntsman, he has become aware of public demonstrations large and
small throughout China that ordinary people were using to pressure the
government to address their grievances. He singled out a recent protest in
the southern Chinese city of Wukan over the confiscation of land without
reasonable compensation."[The people] basically prevented anybody from
the outside from coming in and brought the city to a halt and forced the
Chinese government communist leaders to send people to address their
grievances," Locke said.The discord inside China is partly a result of the income and wealth disparity between
China’s growing middle class and the masses of poor, rural residents, Locke said. He also said the Chinese
government’s human rights record was worsening."[It's very clear that in
the run up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and since then, there’s been a
greater intolerance of dissent — and the human rights record of China has
been going in the wrong direction," said Locke.Asked for comment at today’s State Department
press briefing, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland backed up Locke’s comments on human rights and
the rule of law in China."[Locke] obviously speaks for the administration in
expressing continued concern that we seem to have an increasing trend of
crackdowns, forced disappearances, extralegal detentions, arrests and
convictions of human rights activists, lawyers, religious leaders, ethnic
minorities in China," she said.But Nuland declined to repeat Locke’s assertion that the Chinese government
was potentially unstable."I think our message to the Chinese government on these
issues is the same message that we give around the world when we have
human rights concerns, that governments are stronger when they protect
the human rights of their people and when they allow for peaceful dissent,"
she said.
US China Relations
 US China Relations High
Cooperation strong as China and the US are interdependent
BEAPA 15
(Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Fact Sheet. 1/21/15. Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs. US Department of State. “US Relations With China”.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm)
The U.S. approach to its economic relations with China has two main elements: integrating China into the global, rules-
based economic and trading system and expanding U.S. exporters' and investors' access to the Chinese market. Two-way trade
between Chinaand the United States has grown from $33 billion in 1992 to over $562 billion in goods in 2013.
China is currently the third largest export market for U.S. goods (after Canada and Mexico), and the United
States is China’s largest export market. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in China was $61 billion in 2013, up from
$54 billion in 2012, and remained primarily in the manufacturing sector. During the economic track of the July 2014 S&ED, the
two countries announced measures to strengthen macroeconomic cooperation, promote open
trade and investment, enhance global cooperation and international rules, and foster financial
stability and reform.

China-US trade relations strengthened under Obama Administration

Mohsin and Mayeda 16
(Saleha Mohsin. Bloomberg News reporter covering the U.S. Treasury. Andrew Mayeda. Global
economy reporter for Bloomberg News in Washington, D.C. IMF, World Bank, Treasury.
“Complicated US-China Dance Could Be Headed for Rough Turn”. BloombergPolitics.
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-23/complicated-u-s-china-dance-could-
be-headed-for-rough-turn)

Adeyemo said the China relationship during the Obama administration “has been one where we have seen
a great deal done that has improved access for our firms and our workers to the Chinese economy.” Relations have deepened in
ways that make them more impervious to the winds of U.S. politics. Last year, China unseated Canada for the
first time as the U.S’s biggest trading partner. Trade between the U.S. and China has risen 43 percent to $626.8
billion since Obama took office in early 2009. The boost in trade is “a clear recognition on both sides that
they have something to gain from each other,” said Eswar Prasad, a former chief of the International Monetary
Fund’s China division and now a professor at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. Some of the headway is even more tangible.
Starbucks Corp. is planning on boosting expansion in China, while Apple Inc. just invested $1 billion in the largest ride-hailing service
in the Asian nation. Chinese companies invested a record $15.7 billion in the U.S. in 2015, up 30 percent from
the previous year, according to Rhodium Group.

US engaging China now – Obama Administration pushes for further cooperation

Hopkins 16
(Brian Hopkins. 4/27/16. Democratic Alderman of the city of Chicago representing
the 2nd ward. “The Future of U.S.-China Relations”. The Chronicle.
http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2016/04/the-future-of-u-s-china-
relations)
The relationship between the United States and China has always been tenuous at best . Like
members of a class project group forced to interact with one another against their will,
China and the United States find themselves forced to cooperate. Since his inauguration in
2009, President Obama has attempted to develop a new strategic outlook toward the
emerging superpower—one that engages them and incorporates them into the international
system through the US strategic lens. To date, his strategy has been marginally effective
and offers his successor a solid foundation off of which they will (hopefully) build a new
and effective strategic partnership.

Chinese relations are high – Obama continues to increase ties

Webster 16 (Graham Webster, 3/3/16, Mr. Webster is a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s
China Center and publisher of the U.S.–China Week e-mail brief. “How to Move Beyond the
Status Quo with China” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-03/making-
good-rebalance-asia)
Over the past few decades, as China’s economic and military power have increased, the world has faced the possibility that power in
the Asia-Pacific will shift decisively away from the United States. Since
his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack
Obama has acknowledged the region’s importance to the United States’ global position , and since
2011, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the United States’ “pivot” to Asia, it has been enshrined as a
central focus of U.S. foreign policy. “In the Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century,” as Obama
put it in a speech to the Australian parliament in 2011, “the United States of America is all in.”
As Obama’s presidency approaches its close, it is time to take measure o f what has come to be
known as the “rebalance” to Asia. On the one hand, the United States has successfully
redirected official attention to important, overlooked issues in a region that is both potentially
unstable and crucial to the world economy. Washington has strengthened its relationships
with regional allies and partners; expanded the United States’ engagement with regional
institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and developed a
broader and deeper relationship with China. This increased attention, however, has not been accompanied by a
new, forward-looking U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific. Instead, the United States has sought to maintain elements of a status quo
that has already passed into history. During Obama’s last year in office and as the next administration takes shape, the U.S.
government needs to put the resources of the rebalance to work toward policies that meet the challenge of the changes already
under way in East Asia. MEASURING UP The United States’ attention to the Asia-Pacific has dramatically
increased over the course of Obama’s presidency, not least with regard to China. Over the past
seven years, Beijing and Washington have woven a thick web of bureaucratic contacts around
the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the high-level bilateral forum enlarged by
Obama and then-Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2009. Bilateral military contacts have been resilient and
productive, establishing new crisis prevention mechanisms despite political speedbumps. The U.S. government also took
the initiative to cultivate ties with Xi Jinping, both when he was China’s vice president, from
2008 to 2013, and after he took power as the country’s president in 2013. And after butting heads with
their Chinese counterparts at the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009, Obama administration officials managed to
work with the Xi government to co-champion the deal that negotiators reached at the Paris
climate conference last year—all while U.S.–Chinese disagreements over the South China Sea and cyberspace surged. A
Japanese P-3C Orion aircraft near Perth, Australia, April 2014. The Obama administration’s policy toward East Asia has been only a
partial success.

Relations high now – recent summit proves, both sides want to increase
bilateral ties, and are willing to solve differences
Xinhua 6/7
Xinhua. 2016-06-07. Xi pledges to promote China, U.S. relations, expand cooperation. The Xinhua News Agency is the official press
agency of the People's Republic of China. Xinhua is the biggest and most influential media organization in China.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/07/c_135420097.htm
BEIJING, June 7 (Xinhua) -- President
Xi Jinping on Tuesday called on his country and the United States to
promote the healthy and stable development of ties through increased exchanges and
cooperation. Xi made the remarks here while meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and
Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, who attended the eighth round of China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues and the
seventh round of China-U.S. High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange. Xi stressed that three years ago, he and U.S.
President Barack Obama agreed to work together to build a new model of major-country relations between the two sides. The
development of bilateral ties over the following three years indicates that the path is in line with
the fundamental interests of the two peoples and the world, he said. The president called on
both sides to focus on cooperation, manage their differences properly and promote the healthy
and stable development of China-U.S. relations. On macro-economic policies, Xi suggested the two countries
strengthen policy coordination, strive for more positive outcomes at the G20 Hangzhou summit, and inject new impetus into the
world economy. He suggested that both countries make the most of cooperation potential in the
areas of trade and investment, clean energy, and environmental protection, adding that they
should strengthen communication and coordination on major global and regional issues.
Referring to divergence, Xi said the two countries should respect each other's core interests and major
concerns, and settle problems through dialogue and consultation . Kerry and Lew said the
United States would like to work with China to ensure the G20 Hangzhou summit is a success,
adding that Obama welcomes a stable and prosperous China. Effective cooperation between
the two nations on major issues such as climate change indicated the significance of the U.S.-
China relationship, they said. The two U.S. officials agreed the United States and China have
extensive cooperation potential, and could solve differences properly.

Relations high – South China Sea disagreements don’t determine the

relationship – positive cooperation like climate change, Iran and North Korea
proves
Chen 6/10
Dingding Chen. June 10, 2016. Reality Check: The South China Sea Does Not Define the US-China Relationship. Dingding Chen is an
assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public
Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. He is also the Founding Director of 海国图智研究院 （Intellisia Institute）, a newly
established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China. http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/reality-check-the-
south-china-sea-does-not-define-the-us-china-relationship/
Over the last two years or so, the
South China Sea issue has been dominating Sino-U.S. relations, as
evidenced by endless newspaper headlines, regional summits, and think tank events. At the most recent Shangri-La
Dialogue in Singapore, for example, again the South China Sea issue dominated the agenda. So we cannot entirely blame general
readers and casual followers of international news for misunderstanding Sino-U.S. ties. The
reality is very different from
what you read in the headlines. For example, at the recently concluded Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing, a number of important agreements were moved along by both countries.
Among them, the Bilateral Investment Treaty is a major one. Both sides agreed to speed up the process and
exchange so-called negative lists soon. Renminbi trading will also soon head to the U.S. market, further
deepening the economic interdependence between China and the United States. And, of course, there are
major global and regional issues that have seen positive cooperation between China and the
United States during the last few years, including climate change, the Iranian nuclear issue,
and, most recently, UN sanctions on North Korea. All this just shows how global the Sino-U.S.
relationship really is, reminding us of the relative lack of importance of the South China Sea
issue. Given this, why is it the case the South China Sea issue tends to dominate newspaper headlines, not to mention private and
public conversations between the United States and its Asian allies? This is partly because the media has a tendency to report more
conflict-based and negative stories in global affairs. It is also partly because both the United States and China have failed to
effectively communicate their respective intentions toward each other.
It should be crystal clear to top leaders that
China has no intention or capability to push the United States out of Asia and the U.S. has no
intention or capability or block China’s rise in Asia and beyond. Despite all the debates that are ongoing
within both countries, this fundamental point should be emphasized and reemphasized again and again by officials on both sides.
Unfortunately, so far, we have not seen adequate efforts to this and.
 US China Relations Low
Relations low now – economic disputes and Trump rhetoric
Hu 6/6
Elise Hu. June 6, 2016. A Rocky Time In U.S.-China Relations As Leaders Meet In Beijing. Elise Hu International Correspondent, Seoul,
South Korea. NPR. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/06/06/480806146/a-rocky-time-in-u-s-china-relations-as-leaders-
meet-in-beijing
The U.S. and China are the two largest economies in the world — and interdependent in a host of ways. But as
leaders from both countries start annual high-level talks in Beijing, disagreements over how China does business
are creating some trust issues in the relationship. "You might want to think of the US China
relationship as kind of like an arranged marriage," says Arthur Kroeber, a Beijing-based economist and author of
China's Economy: What You Need to Know. "They're not in it because they fell in with each other , they're in it
because forces beyond them made it happen and now they're stuck with each other and now they have to deal with it,"
Kroeber says. One way of 'dealing with it' is through annual talks like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which got under way in
Beijing on Monday. Chinese president Xi Jinping kicked off the event with a call for more mutual trust. On the relationship with
America, he quoted a Song Dynasty Chinese poet who said, "Rivers always take meandering paths before reaching their destination."
For the U.S. side, Secretary of State John Kerry is handling security conversations, while U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew leads the
economic track. "Having grown to be one of the two largest economies in the world it's increasingly important for China to accept
the responsibilities of being a large and powerful economy," Lew said. U.S. Firms Want More Access American
companies
want more unfettered access to Chinese markets and its hundreds of millions of consumers. But China's first
priority is its own domestic economy and homegrown firms. It's led to new rules and
restrictions making it tougher for non-Chinese companies to compete . Especially on the tech front.
"Frankly the way the rules have been written appear to exclude American companies from being able to provide
technology," said Erin Ennis, senior vice president of the U.S. China Business Council. "Bringing more competition to the market
actually makes companies do a better job," she says. Then there's
the issue of overcapacity. To prop up its own
economy, China is keeping open dozens of industrial plants that pump out raw materials like
steel and aluminum, stuff the world already has enough of. "It's distorting their markets, it's an
impediment to medium and long-term growth. And it's distorting global markets," said Lew. At the
talks, the U.S. is encouraging China to let global markets act with less state intervention. But the Chinese have their own domestic
pressures to worry about. "It's not the best time for us," says Yienching Yang, of China's E-Cai Economic Research Institute. "Because
we don't have very good economic growth. And we don't have a very good political environment in the United
States." U.S. Politics The American political environment is a question, as anti-China sentiments get a
voice in Republican Presidential Nominee Donald Trump. "We've got enough problems in our country. We have to rebuild our
country. China and other countries have committed the greatest theft in the history of the United
States," Trump said, while campaigning in New Hampshire last August. Echoing his Chinese counterparts, Lew says ongoing
communication is far more effective than confrontation. "The U.S. China economic relationship is the most important economic
relationship in the world," Lew said. Shared interests are keeping the lines of communication going, even if no specific outcomes are
expected in this set of dialogues. And outcomes aren't the point, Kroeber says, of the dialogues. Just working through the tough stuff
can considered progress. "It's a lot like marriage counseling," Kroeber says. Relationship status? It's complicated.

Security issues like the South China Sea and arms sales to Vietnam are straining
US-China relations now – future agreements are not likely
Yong 6/5
Jeremy Au Yong. JUN 5, 2016. The Strait Times. Security issues expected to dominate US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
Jeremy was appointed the US bureau chief in November 2013 after nine years working in various desks in The Straits Times.
http://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/security-issues-expected-to-dominate-us-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue
WASHINGTON - Security issues like the South China Sea disputes and the lifting of US arms
embargo on Vietnam are expected to take precedence over economic ones at a US-China dialogue
starting in Beijing on Monday (June 6), with analysts expecting raised tensions between the two

countries . The annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue ( S&ED), co-chaired by Secretary of State
John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, as well as State Councillor Yang Jiechi and Vice-Premier Wang Yang, comes
at the
intersection of a series of events that shine a spotlight on differences between the two sides. In
the lead up to the S&ED, Taiwan's new president Tsai Ing-wen was sworn in, US President Barack Obama lifted a
long-standing arms embargo on Vietnam and officials from both sides sparred on the South
China Sea disputes at a security forum - the Shangri-la Dialogue - in Singapore. The S&ED meeting will be followed
soon by a ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a case against China's claims to the South China Sea
brought by the Philippines, a long-time US ally.
All that, plus the fact that the S&ED does not typically
produce any breakthrough, added up to a dialogue that will end with relatively little to shout
about. "Same old, same old" is how Mr Dean Cheng, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, described his expectations
for the dialogue. "I think you'll see a lot of the same issues get discussed, with both sides making the same pro-forma statements and
staking out the same positions," he said. At a strategic security meeting on Sunday held under the framework of the S&ED and
attended by US and Chinese military and foreign affairs officials, both sides reiterated their commitment to continue dialogue and
work towards a stable and cooperative strategic security relationship. Ms Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said although there may be efforts made to tee up agreements for US President Barack
Obama and President Xi Jinping to unveil when they meet later this year on the sidelines of the Group of 20 nations summit, those
will be hard to come by. "Can more be done on climate change? Will China provide a new negative list that could make a Bilateral
Investment Treaty possible? "I believe that the achievements
of the Obama administration in US-China
relations are largely completed; it will be challenging to produce additional agreements ," she told
The Straits Times. But even if the two countries continue to circle each other on the same issues, analysts stressed that the dialogue
will still be a valuable mechanism. For one thing, it will allow both sides to highlight those areas where they do have common ground
and ensure that engagement will continue into the next US presidency. " The Chinese are worried about the US-
China relationship and want it to remain on sound footing. The atmospherics of the S&ED will emphasize the positive:
shared interests and cooperation, while managing differences," said Ms Glaser.

Relations low – China blames the US for tensions in the SCS and is expanding its
foothold, US arms sales to Taiwan, DOD reports and US reconnaissance missions
are increasing tensions
Cheng 6/10
Dean Cheng. June 10, 2016. Flying the Unfriendly Skies: China’s Dangerous Behavior. Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center
Asian Studies Center The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation
http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/10/flying-the-unfriendly-skies-chinas-dangerous-behavior/
For the second time in a month, a Chinese fighter jet has made an unsafe approach to an
American military aircraft. This time, a Chinese air force J-10 fighter intercepted a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft in
international airspace over the East China Sea. The Chinese fighter approached at high speed at the same altitude, and reportedly
closed to within a hundred feet of the converted airliner. Not only did the Chinese intercept occur in the wake of last
September’s much-ballyhooed “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air-to-Air Encounters” between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of
China, but it also occurred even as Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of the Treasury Jack
Lew were in Beijing as part of the Strategic & Economic Dialogue talks . The Chinese are likely
stepping up their activities in expectation of a ruling in the coming months from the
Permanent Court of Arbitration on Chinese claims over the South China Sea. The Philippines has filed
with the Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding Chinese claims over almost the entire South China Sea; Beijing has
rejected the legitimacy of the court to rule, and made clear it will ignore any findings by the
court. In an interesting redefinition of “unilateral,” Beijing has condemned Manila’s filing with the international court as a
“unilateral act,” exacerbating tensions in the region. Beijing holds the U.S. responsible for the ongoing
tensions in the South China Sea. Gen. Fang Fenghui, head of the People’s Liberation Army
General Staff Department, stated in a 2013 joint press conference at the Pentagon with then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs Martin Dempsey, “the rebalancing strategy of the U.S. has stirred up some of the problems
which make the South China Sea and the East China Sea not so calm as before.” Madame Fu Ying,
spokeswoman of the Chinese National People’s Congress, China’s legislature, made similar accusations this past March. “The U.S. is
strengthening military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region together with its allies since its pivot to Asia,” Fu said. “Is it not
militarization?” She asked. In
the Chinese view, the Southeast Asian states would not dare challenge
China over its sovereignty claims, if the United States were not manipulating and encouraging
them. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, Chinese Adm. Sun Jianguo made the case even more explicitly . Stating
that some countries are: On one hand setting the example of implementing what is known as
freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea, openly flaunting its military force,
and on the other hand pulling in help from cliques, supporting their allies in antagonising
China, forcing China to accept and implement the result of the arbitration. Challenging
American reconnaissance operations off its shores (even if they are in international waters and
airspace) also highlights Chinese complaints about the obstacles to better U.S.-China relations.
The Chinese regularly recite complaints about arms sales to Taiwan, reconnaissance activities
off their shores, and the annual Department of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military
capabilities as limiting U.S.-Chinese relations. Ironically, the 2016 Department of Defense report
on China, which was released last month, highlighted the build-up of China’s air and naval
forces.

US security rhetoric and posturing has hurt US-China relations and improved
the Sino-Russian relationship
Babich 6/24
Dmitry Babich 24 Jun, 2016. Unwise Obama policy pushes China and Russia closer together. Dmitry Babich was born in Moscow, in
1970. He has worked for various media outlets for 25 years, including The Moscow News and RIA Novosti news agency. He is
currently working as a political analyst at Sputnik International, and is a frequent guest on BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN commenting on
international affairs and history. https://www.rt.com/op-edge/348210-china-putin-visit-russia-xi/
President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China on June 25 will continue the tradition of frequent high level Sino-Russian meetings that have
been going on since 2014. In 2015 Putin and China’s President Xi Jinping met four times. During their meeting in Beijing, Putin
and Xi are expected to discuss economic cooperation and the geopolitical issues – such as the
situation in Syria, the deployment of the American THAAD missile defense system in South Korea,
and the growing tension between China and local US allies in the South China Sea. According to the
Russian ambassador to China, Andrey Denisov, Chinese trade with Russia is still no match to its trade with America, but the gap has
been narrowing during the last 25 years. “If it had not been for the dramatic fall in oil prices, the volume of trade between Russia and
China in 2014 would have exceeded $100 billion,” Denisov told the Interfax news agency. Moscow and Beijing had to restart trading
in the early 1990s almost from scratch: as the frosty relations between Maoist China and the Soviet Union in 1960s-1970s had
brought trade almost to a standstill. The Soviet Union and China had ideological differences, which the pre-neocon US used with
great skill, reorienting the Chinese economy to cooperation with American companies in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, the opposite is
happening. In Denisov’s words, Russia
and China are now seeing eye to eye on Syria, US-inspired “regime
changes” in many countries and other important international political problems. Meanwhile, Sino-US
cooperation has been put under political pressure by Washington’s concern about China’s
“peaceful rise” (the favorite expression of the Chinese foreign ministry, describing China’s growth as devoid of imperial
ambitions). The new configuration of forces on the world stage reflects in the dynamic of Putin-Xi summits. At least two of the last
year’s meetings between the leaders had an important symbolic meaning. The BRICS’ summit in Ufa - the capital of an autonomous
region with a mostly Muslim population in central Russia - took place in July 2015. The Ufa summit is seen now as the most
productive in terms of BRICS’ development projects, with the creation of joint development banks and currency pools. Putin’s
attendance of the celebrations commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the World War II in China in September 2015 also
had an important symbolic meaning. The Chinese celebrations then were boycotted by US President Barak Obama and other
Western leaders, despite China being an ally of the US in that war, which by far lost the largest number of people among the
countries that fought Imperial Japan. “The Sino-Russian relations are given a special boost by the fact that they are currently based
on mutual respect,” said Professor Yang Xiyu, senior fellow at the China Institute of International Studies. “You don’t always see that
in China’s relations with Western countries.” Signs of respect for China from Washington have been
especially slow in coming. The absence of President Obama at the parade in Beijing in 2015,
which commemorated the victory of the Sino-Russian-American coalition in the war with
Japan, was unofficially explained by Obama’s unwillingness to support a show of China’s
military might. US Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, during her campaign in 2015-2016, was not particularly
sympathetic to China, describing President Xi as a "shameless". Descriptions of China as an aggressive power,
posing a threat to both its neighbors and the US, have been made this year by senior US
defense officials with connections to Clinton. The recent naval exercises in the South China Sea,
conducted by American warships with the navies of United States’ allies, had a specific goal of checking
Chinese ambitions in the area, i.e. showing Beijing its place. The US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter labeled China's
behavior in the South China Sea "self-isolating" and visited American aircraft carriers in the area. “I don’t think Russia needs to get
involved in the Sino-American rivalry in the South China Sea directly,” said Aleksandr Lukin, the director of the Center for East Asian
Studies at MGIMO University in Moscow. “But this rivalry creates an important part of context for Sino-Russian relations, making the
Chinese side to be more forthcoming to Russia’s needs and worries.” Experts agree that in May 2014 it was
Obama’s hostile policy towards both China and Russia that pushed the Chinese to agree to
higher prices for Russian natural gas. The natural gas will be supplied to China via the 2,500-mile Power of Siberia
pipeline – now under construction. The deal, worth $400 billion over 30 years, was helped by the fact that days
earlier Obama promised American support to just about all of China’s rivals in South-East Asia .

Relations low – SCS, campaign rhetoric, anti-missile systems

Shuli 6/8
Hu Shuli. 06.08.2016. China-U.S. Relations: Hostage to None. Hu Shuli (胡舒立; born 1953) is the editor-in-chief of Caixin Media. She
is also the professor of the School of Communication and Design at Sun Yat-sen University. http://english.caixin.com/2016-06-
08/100952795.html
The eighth session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing on June 6 and 7
received more than the usual attention amid signs of increased tension between the two countries. In
addition to tensions over disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea, friction has been
generated in recent months by China's attempt to be recognized as a "market economy" and
America's plan to deploy an anti-missile system in South Korea. Anti-China rhetoric spilling
over from the U.S. presidential campaign has also fueled tension.

SCS wrecks relationship

Nuechterlein 6/14
DONALD NUECHTERLEIN. June 14, 2016 Another ‘Great Wall’ Spells Trouble For China-U.S. Relations. Donald Nuechterlein is a
political scientist and writer who resides near Charlottesville, Virginia. He is the author of numerous books on American politics and
foreign policy http://www.dailyprogress.com/newsvirginian/another-great-wall-spells-trouble-for-china-u-s-
relations/article_5b7864f0-32a3-11e6-8f0e-dbd2d3ab3613.html
We may be on the verge of serious trouble with China in Southeast Asia if Beijing continues to
push its territorial claims in the South China Sea. While Secretary of State John Kerry was in Beijing last week
attending an economic conference, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter was in Singapore meeting with other defense chiefs at a
security conference known as the Shangri-La Dialogue. Both sought to warn China’s leaders that the South China Sea is a danger
zone. In Singapore, Carter directed criticism at China for its actions in Asia, charging that Beijing
risked erecting a “Great Wall of self-isolation” with its aggressive policies. The following day, China’s
deputy chief of the general staff, Adm. Sun Jianguo, leveled strong criticism at U.S. policies in East Asia,
asserting that the U.S. encouraged and enabled smaller states to “bully” China . Referring to Carter’s
speech, Sun declared: “We were not isolated in the past, we are not isolated now, and we will not be isolated in the future”
(“Maritime Spat Simmers as U.S., China Talk,” The Wall Street Journal, June 5 online).

US-China relations are expected to decrease as US declines conflict solution

proposal
Pickrell 15
Ryan Pickrell (10/26/15. The Tipping Point: Has the US-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?. Ryan Pickrell graduated
from the Central China Normal University with a PhD degree in International Politics and Diplomacy. The National Interest.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168)

Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every
China and the United States are rapidly approaching this point.
relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and
As traditional diplomatic
outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently
affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly relying on
their military capabilities and hard power tactics . That’s especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of
the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific
that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the
U nited S tates remain unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful
concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer
to cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst . China’s
proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-
country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect
one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests —and
pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-
American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different
ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a
leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of
major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to
become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential
to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged
by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would
also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of
establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with
Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence
in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order. Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack
Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the
meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that
the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly
dismissed China’s proposal . As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by
dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a
strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence . Along those same lines,
acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the
impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.”
Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign
scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to
be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.”
In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its
territorial claims in Asia. The
United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country
relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive
territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic
partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-
led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security
Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a
concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed.

Tension rising between US and China

Pennington 15
(Matthew Pennington, 6/20/15, Mr. Pennington is a reporter on US – Asian affairs for the
Associated Press. “Relations between the US and China are getting tense.”
http://www.businessinsider.com/relations-between-the-us-and-china-are-getting-tense-2015-6)
Tensions between the U.S. and China are growing over its island-building in the South China
Sea and over suspicions that Beijing was behind a massive hack into a federal government
server that resulted in the theft of personnel and security clearance records of 14 million
employees and contractors. But both powers have incentives to calm the waters ahead of the Chinese leader's visit to
Washington in the fall. The two countries' top diplomats and finance officials meet here next week for the annual U.S.-China strategic
and economic dialogue. The Obama administration says the two governments won't be papering over their differences, but they are
expected to accentuate the positive, stressing areas of cooperation, like climate change. Civilian and military officials will meet
Monday to discuss thorny security issues. Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew kick off two days of talks
Tuesday with Vice Premier Wang Yang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi on a sprawling agenda, including plans for a bilateral
investment treaty. China, in particular, is presenting the dialogue as a prelude to Xi Jinping's visit to the White House slated for
September, his first since becoming China's president in 2013. Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang called it an opportunity to "push
for new progress in the building of a new model of major power relationship," the state-run Xinhua news agency reported Friday .
But it's a model with cracks in it. Relations between the world's two largest economies, with
their divergent political systems and priorities, rarely run smoothly. But recent months have
been particularly rocky

US-China conflict inevitable – regardless of military engagement

Kissinger 12
(Henry A. Kissinger. 2012. Chair of Kissinger Associates and a former U.S. Secretary of
State and National Security Adviser. Adaptation of book On China in Foreign Affairs
Magazine. The Future of US-Chinese Relations.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-03-01/future-us-chinese-relations)
Since then, the two governments have set about implementing the stated objectives. Top American and Chinese
officials have exchanged visits and institutionalized their exchanges on major strategic and economic issues. Military-to-

military contacts have been restarted, opening an important channel of communication. And at the
unofficial level, so-called track-two groups have explored possible evolutions of the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Yet as cooperation

has increased, so has controversy. Significant groups in both countries claim that a contest for supremacy between

China and the United States is inevitable and perhaps already under way. In
this perspective, appeals for U.S.-Chinese cooperation appear outmoded and

even naive.
 AT US-Vietnam Relations
Improved US-Vietnam relations are not meant to contain China and don’t affect
the US-China relationship
Tung 6/11
Nguyen Vu Tung June 11, 2016 Stronger US-Vietnam Relations Are Not At China’s Expense. Dr. Nguyen Vu Tung is acting president of
the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/stronger-us-vietnam-relations-are-not-at-chinas-expense/
U.S. President Barack Obama, the third consecutive American president to visit Vietnam since the normalization of Vietnam-US
relations, has concluded a trip that considerably deepens the bilateral relationship. But in an
evolving regional context characterized by a shifting Sino-U.S. relationship , the growing role of ASEAN
as a key player in the construction of regional security architecture, and recent developments related to the South China Sea, the
visit has raised questions whether Hanoi and Washington are “ganging up” to contain or to
counter China. I would argue that it is not the case. The efforts to boost Vietnam-U.S. relations
should be seen against the broader context of Vietnam’s diplomacy since the early 1990s. Since 1986,
Vietnam has been following a course of comprehensive reforms, part of which is an
independent, diversified and multi-directonal foreign policy with a view to constructing an
external peaceful and cooperative environment, favorable for pursuing its national interests
that include economic growth, domestic unity, national sovereignty, as well as the socialist
mode of political, social and economic development . In July 2013, Vietnam and the United
States agreed to elevate their relationship to a “comprehensive partnership” designed to
further promote bilateral ties in all fields. It is noteworthy that the enhancement of Vietnam-US relations
ran parallel with Vietnam’s forging of its relations with China , a big neighbor that is of increasing importance
to Vietnam’s peace, stability and prosperity. The two countries established a framework of “comprehensive strategic partnership” in
2008. Vietnam-U.S. relations are not developing at the expense of the links between Vietnam and China.
Instead of choosing sides, Hanoi
tries its best to promote relations with both China and the United
States and sees its relations with them in positive-sum terms . For industrialization and modernization,
Vietnam attaches greater importance to the United States as a main source of market,
investment, technology, and know-how. Other countries, including China, have consolidated
their relations with the United States for the same reason . Enhanced Vietnam-U.S. relations also provide
Vietnam with greater diplomatic and strategic resources. The United States supports ASEAN playing a central role in shaping the
regional security structures in the Asia-Pacific region and assists ASEAN members, including Vietnam, to build their capacities. That
includes improving their maritime domain awareness and maritime security capabilities. In September 2011, Vietnam and the United
States signed an MOU to advance bilateral defense cooperation in five areas including maritime security, search and rescue, U.N.
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, and collaboration between defense universities and research institutes.
During the just concluded visit, Obama
announced the full lift of the weapon ban against Vietnam. Yet,
the boosting of the Vietnam-U.S. partnership is not meant to contain and counter China. The
removal of the ban is mostly meant to facilitate Vietnam’s policy of diversifying sources of
military equipment and weapons. The independent posture of Vietnam’s foreign policy applies especially to Vietnam’s
defense policy where Vietnam strictly follows the principle of the “Three Nos” – Vietnam will not
enter any military pact and become a military ally of any country, will not allow any country to
set up a military base on its soil, and will not rely on any country to oppose any other country .
Recently, Hanoi has been under some domestic pressure to review this principle. Yet, adhering to it is still the policy mainstream. As
an ASEAN member, Vietnam has been more proactively joining ASEAN’s efforts in engaging all major powers through the ASEAN-led
cooperative schemes. The regional grouping’s track record suggests that ASEAN is not a military pact or under any big power’s
influence, but an organization that promotes diplomacy to settle differences. Besides, for
Vietnam, ttaking sides is
neither appropriate nor feasible, since both the United States and China, despite and because of their differences, are
working on a new relationship that attaches great importance to avoiding military confrontation, and at the same time boosting their
relations in all fields. As a relatively small country closely watching the Sino-US relationship, Vietnam is concerned about two
extreme scenarios: one where Beijing and Washington engage in direct confrontation, and another where the two sides compromise
at the expense of other countries. Hanoi’s concern is not unfounded, since historical records have suggested that Vietnam was
affected by the ups and downs in the Sino-US relationship during the Cold War. Therefore, the policy option that works best for
Vietnam is to befriend both the United States and China, to be proactive in ASEAN, and to adhere to the universal principles of
international laws and the regional well-established norms of behavior and codes of conduct. The improvement of Vietnam-U.S.
relations will reinforce these trends.
US China Trade
 US China Trade Good
We need more trade with China – creates jobs to revive the economy
Jensen and Azevêdo 6/22
Cooperation on trade, under globally-agreed rules, has helped the world become more peaceful, richer
and more developed, but we cannot just assume that the benefits of trade will simply
continue. Trade is under pressure in many places , both among politicians in the USA and Europe and in emerging
countries. And in many countries, people are also becoming more sceptical. We see protectionism
creeping forward in various places – in the form of barriers and regulations limiting trade . This is
bad for growth in the world and it is bad for a small, open economy like Denmark's. We believe the argument
that trade constitutes a threat and that it is therefore wisest to cut yourself off from the rest of
the world is wrong. It is also economically and politically risky. Trade has created growth and employment
and it has helped to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty . It also contributes to a
more peaceful coexistence between nations. We need to increase trade between countries, not
limit it. G20 trade-restrictive measures Image: WTO Secretariat. The notion that trade only favours
large companies is also misguided – all can benefit. It is true that exporting can be more costly and difficult for
small enterprises, so we need to respond to that and lower the barriers for SMEs , particularly as
they are such huge job creators. We also need to respond to the claim that trade is the major
cause of job-losses. In fact, the majority of jobs disappear because of new technology and
increased productivity – not because of increased imports or trade.
 US China Trade Bad
Free Trade with China hurts US economy
Smith 1/26 (Noal, 1/26/2016, Noah Smith is an assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook
University and a freelance writer for a number of finance and business publications. He
maintains a personal blog, called Noahpinion, Bloomberg View, “Free Trade With China Wasn't
Such a Great Idea for the U.S.”, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-01-26/free-
trade-with-china-wasn-t-such-a-great-idea)
But look at actual economics research, and you will find a very different picture. The most recent example is a paper by celebrated
labor economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, titled“The China Shock: Learning from Labor
Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade.” The study shows that increased trade with
China caused severe and permanent harm to many American workers : Adjustment in local
labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining
depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the
China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced
lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to
import competition...but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to
materialize. Autor, et al. show powerful evidence that industries and regions that have been more exposed to Chinese import
competition since 2000 -- the year China joined the World Trade Organization -- have been hit hard and have not recovered. Workers
in these industries and regions don't go on to better jobs, or even similar jobs in different industries. Instead, they
shuffle from
low-paid job to low-paid job, never recovering the prosperity they had before Chinese
competition hit. Many of them end up on welfare. This is very different from earlier decades, when workers who lost their jobs
to import competition usually went into higher-productivity industries, to the benefit of almost everyone.
 US China Trade Low
China Trade Low Now
Morrison, 13
Wayne M. Morrison January 28, 2013 Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance “Chine,U.S. Trade Issues”,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf

Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become
increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U.S. perspective, many trade tensions
stem from China’s incomplete transition to a free market economy . While China has
significantly liberalized its economic and trade regimes over the past three decades, it
continues to maintain (or has recently imposed) a number of state-directed policies that
appear to distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern expressed by U.S.
policymakers and stakeholders include China’s alleged widespread cyber economic
espionage against U.S. firms; relatively poor record of intellectual property rights (IPR)
enforcement; discriminatory innovation policies; mixed record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO)
obligations; extensive use of industrial policies (such as financial support of state-owned firms and trade and investment barriers) in
order to promote and protect industries favored by the government; and interventionist policies to control the value of its currency.
Many U.S. policymakers argue that such policies negatively impact U.S. economic interests and have contributed to U.S. job losses.
There are a number of U.S. views on how to better address commercial disputes with China:
Chinese Growth
 Chinese Econ Growth Good
Economic Growth K2 End World Poverty – China’s Growth Empirical Proof
The Economist 13, 6/1/13, The Economist is an English-language weekly newspaper owned by the
Economist Group and edited in offices based in London. “The World’s Next Great Leap Forward Towards
the End of Poverty” http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21578665-nearly-1-billion-people-have-
been-taken-out-extreme-poverty-20-years-world-should-aim AK
The world’s achievement in the field of poverty reduction is, by almost any measure,
impressive. Although many of the original MDGs—such as cutting maternal mortality by three-quarters and child mortality
by two-thirds—will not be met, the aim of halving global poverty between 1990 and 2015 was achieved five years early. The MDGs
may have helped marginally, by creating a yardstick for measuring progress, and by focusing minds on the evil of poverty. Most of the
and it was growth,
credit, however, must go to capitalism and free trade, for they enable economies to grow—

principally, that has eased destitution. Poverty rates started to collapse towards

the end of the 20th century largely because developing-country growth

accelerated, from an average annual rate of 4.3% in 1960-2000 to 6% in 2000-10. Around two-thirds of
poverty reduction within a country comes from growth. Greater equality also helps,
contributing the other third. A 1% increase in incomes in the most unequal countries produces a mere 0.6% reduction in poverty; in
China (which has never shown any interest in MDGs) is responsible for
the most equal countries, it yields a 4.3% cut.

three-quarters of the achievement. Its economy has been growing so fast

that, even though inequality is rising fast, extreme poverty is disappearing. China pulled 680m
people out of misery in 1981-2010, and reduced its extreme-poverty rate from 84% in 1980 to

10% now. That is one reason why (as the briefing explains) it will be harder to take a billion more people out of extreme poverty
in the next 20 years than it was to take almost a billion out in the past 20. Poorer governance in India and Africa, the next two
targets, means that China’s experience is unlikely to be swiftly replicated there. Another reason is that the bare achievement of
pulling people over the $1.25-a-day line has been relatively easy in the past few years because so many people were just below it.
When growth makes them even slightly better off, it hauls them over the line. With fewer people just below the official misery limit,
If developing
it will be more difficult to push large numbers over it. So caution is justified, but the goal can still be achieved.

countries maintain the impressive growth they have managed since 2000; if
the poorest countries are not left behind by faster-growing middle-income ones; and if inequality does not widen so that the rich lap
then developing countries would cut extreme poverty from
up all the cream of growth—

16% of their populations now to 3% by 2030. That would reduce the absolute numbers by 1 billion.
If growth is a little faster and income more equal, extreme poverty could fall to just 1.5%—as near to zero as is realistically possible.
The number of the destitute would then be about 100m, most of them in intractable countries in Africa. Misery’s billions would be
consigned to the annals of history.

China’s Economic Growth Good for US –They Buy Our Debt

Rugy 13, 7/25/13, Veronique de Rugy is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George
Mason University. New York Times, “Growth In China is Good for the U.S.”,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/07/25/if-china-rises-will-the-us-fall/growth-in-china-is-
good-for-the-us AK

Reports of renewed growth in China have sparked questions about the impact on the United States of a healthier Chinese economy.
Specifically, if China does better, do we in the U.S. do worse? I don’t think so. I’ll first note there are signs the Chinese economy may
actually be slowing down. As the Financial Times’ Kate MacKenzie wrote on China’s economy last week: “Double-digit growth is long
forgotten and even high single-digit growth is above the consensus.” She adds that talk of “an outright economic contraction” isn’t
unreasonable. Rather than fearing growth in any nation’s economy, the U.S. should welcome it and the healthy competition it
 the
generates. However, even if China were about to experience a renewed economic boom, it wouldn’t necessarily be bad for

United States. For one thing, we rely quite heavily on China buying U.S. Treasuries. A
Chinese recession could lead to a slowdown in their lending abilities, which
could raise our borrowing costs. Second, while the U.S. government is on an unsustainable long-term fiscal
path, our economy is showing signs of resilience and modest growth. Better days may be ahead, set off by serious growth in
industries like energy production (brought about in part by an impressive fracking revolution) and technology. Finally, investors rate
investment possibilities on a curve. So while the United States may not be in great shape and our government may be running large
deficits, as long as buying our debt appears less risky than buying that of other nations (who may seem to be in better relative
position on paper — think about China running a surplus), investors will likely continue to invest here. This is particularly true in the
current global environment, where European countries are struggling, China isn’t growing as fast as it used to, and most of the
world’s economies remain depressed. Even after the 2011 credit downgrade, the U.S. bond market remains the largest in the world
the United States should
and our treasury market is still the most liquid and transparent. The bottom line is that

not worry about the potential of a strong Chinese economy. In fact, rather than
fearing harm from growth in any nation’s economy, we should welcome the
innovation, lower prices and better quality goods and services that healthy
competition generates.

China’s econ decline leads to global econ decline – China growth good for
world growth.
Best 16, 1/28/16, Richard Best is an advisor, a managing director, directors of training and marketing,
and currently as a consultant to the industry. Investopedia, “4 Ways China Influences Global Economics”,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/012816/4-ways-china-influences-global-economics.asp
AK

the financial markets went into a frenzy when China's Shanghai

At the start of 2016,

Stock Index plunged 7% in one day. The stock markets in Europe, Asia and
the United States quickly followed suit with steep declines. In the following days, while traders focused on
China's financial markets, economists were looking at the underlying problem – China's slowing economy. When the Chinese
government suspended trading, two critical economic indicators came to light that revealed that China's economy may be slowing
faster than most economists had thought: the decline in China's manufacturing sector appeared to be accelerating, and the
continued devaluation of its currency was an indication that there was no end in sight to the economic decline. China's economy has
been slowing for some time. Its double-digit, credit-fueled, investment-driven economic growth could only be sustained for so long.
The consumption-fueled economic growth China was counting on never materialized. The only question became whether China's
economic crash would be a soft or hard landing. The other issue, over which economists argue, is the extent to which China’s
economic downfall would affect the global economy. Would the world feel a gentle ripple, or
would it be engulfed in a giant tidal wave? Depressed oil prices, which are affecting the economies of Russia, the OPEC countries and
the U.S., are a result of oversupply. China's falling demand for oil has greatly contributed to that oversupply. The economies of
countries that have depended on China's unquenchable thirst for oil are contracting with no immediate sign of relief. Oil is a
commodity, but it is just one of many that are losing value as a result of falling demand. China is the world's largest consumer of iron
ore, lead, steel, copper and many other investment commodities. A slowdown in China's economic
growth has reduced its demand for all commodities, which has hurt commodity-
exporting countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia and South Africa – all major exporters to China.

The ensuing sharp decline in commodity prices threatens the global

economy with deflationary pressures. China may not be the world’s economic engine, but it may very well be its trade engine.
In 2014, China became the world’s leading trade nation, accounting for 10% of global trade. Its demand for imports has fallen nearly
Countries that are dependent on trade with China will feel
15% in the first half of 2015.

the impact on falling demand, which will spill over to countries that are not dependent on trade with China.
Even for countries for which trade with China is a small blip on their gross national products (GDPs), the domino effect of falling
demand will hit individual companies that have direct or indirect exposure to China. Some companies that sell products in China,
such as Apple and Microsoft, are more directly exposed. Other companies are indirectly exposed, but with a potentially severe
impact. For example, John Deere sells farm equipment to countries in South America that have relied heavily on agricultural exports
to China. When China's demand for imports decreases, the demand for farm equipment will decrease. This will impact John Deere’s
profits, which will ultimately impact the U.S. economy. The wild gyrations of China’s stock markets should not be a concern. They
have never been a good indicator of the state of the Chinese economy, and less than 1.5% of Chinese stocks are held by foreign
investors. Economists are more concerned with the weakening underpinnings of an economy built largely on the credit market and
government investment. Without intervention by Chinese consumers to fuel the economy, there can't be sustainable growth. The
larger concern is the possibility of a faltering Chinese economy leading to a loss of confidence in the global markets. If confidence
disappears, it could lead to a global financial crisis that would dwarf the one in 2008. Many economists believe China will be able to
implement some policies and controls that will stabilize the economy enough to stop its decline and continue to build a consumer-
driven foundation for future growth.

US and China on the brink of nuclear war – economic decline leads to nuclear
war
Symonds 5/30 (Peter, 5/30/2016, Peter Symonds is part of the WSWS (World Socialist Web
Site) international editor board and The World Socialist Web Site is published by the
International Committee of the Fourth International, the leadership of the world socialist
movement, the Fourth International founded by Leon Trotsky in 1938, World Socialist Web Site,
“The danger of nuclear war between the US and China”,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/30/pers-m30.html)
Last week’s G7 summit in Japan was dominated by two interconnected issues: the deepening crisis of global capitalism and the drive
to war, in particular the growing danger of a clash between China and the United States in the South China Sea. The inability of
the major powers to offer the slightest resolution of the economic breakdown is fuelling national
antagonisms and the slide toward conflict. The US and Japan pressed hard at the G7 gathering for a strong
communiqué critical of China that would justify the ramping up of provocative American military
incursions within the 12-nautical-mile territorial limit around Chinese-claimed islets. Earlier this month, the US
navy conducted a third so-called “freedom of navigation” operation near Fiery Cross Reef in the
South China Sea, producing an angry reaction from Beijing and declarations that it would beef up its
defences in the area. In the campaigns currently underway for the US presidency and the Australian federal election, a
conspiracy of silence reigns over the preparations for war, aimed at deadening the consciousness of
the population to the rising danger of nuclear conflict. Two nuclear-armed powers are facing off not only in the
South China Sea, but other dangerous flashpoints such as North Korea and Taiwan, each of which has been greatly
exacerbated by Washington’s “pivot to Asia” and aggressive military build-up throughout the region.
 Chinese Econ Growth Bad
China’s economic growth causes wealth gaps and corruption
Huang 13, 6/6/13, Yanzhong Huang is a senior fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign
Relations and an associate professor at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International
Relations. He is the editor of Global Health Governance and author of Governing Health in Contemporary
China. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, “China: The Dark Side of Growth”,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-dark-side-growth AK

Rapid growth has a price. Accompanying a recent economic boom is a

widening wealth gap. The economic boom in the past decades has also been associated with a widening wealth gap.
According to a report from China’s Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, the Gini coefficient – measured on a scale of 0
to 1 with higher figures associated with greater inequality – was 0.61 in 2010. While it’s not atypical for a fast developing economy to
experience increasing inequality, China’s level of inequality is comparable to that of the Philippines and Russia and much worse than
that of Japan, the United States and many countries in newly liberalized Eastern Europe. Based on the study of Wang Xiaolu, an
economist at the independent National Economic Research Institute in Beijing, analysts have estimated that
the wealthiest 10 percent of Chinese earned 65 times that of poorest 10
percent. High inequality has increased the danger for China to tumble into
the “middle-income trap” – getting stuck at a level of development that falls short of

that of more advanced economies. Worse, the government’s failure to address this social crisis may pit the
underprivileged against an entitled minority. The existing sociopolitical crises in China are exacerbated by entrenched corruption .

The market-oriented economic transition has created new opportunities

and made corruption more pervasive than in previous decades. More than 10 years ago, two eminent
Chinese scholars suggested that some 80 percent of the Chinese government officials were corrupt, and the situation has not
improved. A conservative estimate by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace put the cost of corruption in China at about 3
percent of GDP annually, or about $200 billion. Similar to a Greshamite system, which rewards bad behavior, making it rampant and
driving out good behavior, China’s corruption has reached a level that touches almost every sector and every member of the society.
According to a nationwide survey conducted in October 2011, about 82 percent of responders agreed that China has
experienced a significant moral decline over the past decade, and more than half of respondents
does not think that complying with ethical standards was a necessary
condition for success.
China’s economic growth leads to more air pollution
CFR 16, 1/18/16, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership
organization, think tank, and publisher. “China’s Environmental Crisis”, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-
environmental-crisis/p12608 AK
China’s environmental crisis is one of the most pressing challenges to emerge from the country’s rapid industrialization. Its
economic rise, in which GDP grew on average 10 percent each year for more than a decade, has come at the
expense of its environment and public health. China is the world’s largest
source of carbon emissions, and the air quality of many of its major cities fails to meet international health
standards. Life expectancy north of the Huai River is 5.5 years lower than in the south due to air pollution (life expectancy in China is
75.3 according to 2013 UN figures). Severe water contamination and scarcity have compounded land deterioration. Environmental
degradation threatens to undermine the country’s growth and exhausts public patience with the pace of reform. It has also bruised
China’s international standing and endangered domestic stability as the ruling party faces increasing scrutiny and public discontent.
 amid waning economic growth, leaders in Beijing appear more
More recently,

determined to institute changes to stem further degradation.

China’s economic growth leads to water and soil pollution
Wong 13, 3/29/13, Edward Wong is an American journalist and a foreign correspondent for The New
York Times. Wong reports on China's politics, economy, environment, military, foreign policy and culture.
Wong graduated from the University of Virginia in 1994 with a B.A. in English. In 1999, he earned dual
master's degrees in journalism and international studies at the University of California, Berkeley. “Cost of
Environmental Damage in China Growing Rapidly Amid Industrialization”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/world/asia/cost-of-environmental-degradation-in-china-is-
growing.html AK
The rapidly eroding environment across the country has become an issue of paramount concern to many Chinese. In January, outrage boiled over as air
pollution in north China reached record levels, well beyond what Western environmental agencies consider hazardous. The public fury forced

Chinese state-owned
propaganda officials to allow official Chinese news organizations to report more candidly on the pollution.

enterprises in the oil and power industries have consistently blocked efforts
by pro-environment government officials to impose policies that would alleviate the
pollution. There have also been constant concerns over water and soil pollution .

The discovery of at least 16,000 dead pigs in rivers that supply drinking water to
Shanghai has ignited alarm there. This week, China Central Television reported that farmers in a village in Henan Province
were using wastewater from a paper mill to grow wheat. But one farmer said they would not dare to eat the wheat themselves. It is sold outside the
village, perhaps ending up in cities, while the farmers grow their own wheat with well water. The Beijing government on Thursday released details of a
three-year plan that is aimed at curbing various forms of pollution, according to a report on Friday in China Daily, an official English-language newspaper.
The report quoted Wang Anshun, Beijing’s mayor, as saying that sewage treatment, garbage incineration and forestry development would cost at least
$16 billion. In 2006, the environmental ministry said the cost of environmental degradation in 2004 was more than $62 billion, or 3.05 percent of G.D.P.
In 2010, it released partial results for 2008 that totaled about $185 billion, or 3.9 percent of G.D.P. Several foreign scholars have criticized the methods
by which Chinese researchers have reached those numbers, saying some crucial measures of environmental degradation are not included in the

China’s decades of double-digit economic growth exacted an

calculations. There is consensus now that

enormous environmental cost. But growth remains the priority; the Communist Party’s legitimacy is based largely on
rapidly expanding the economy, and China officially estimates that its G.D.P., which was $8.3 trillion in 2012, will grow at a rate of 7.5 percent this year

the current
and at an average of 7 percent in the five-year plan that runs to 2015. A Deutsche Bank report released last month said

growth policies would lead to a continuing steep decline of the

environment for the next decade, especially given the expected coal
consumption and boom in automobile sales.
Chinese Econ Growth Sustainable
 Chinese Econ Growth Unsustainable
Chinese debt soars- economy unstable
Chan 06/6/2016
(Szu Ping Chan is a Business reporter. She writes about economics and helps to edit the Finance
channel. The Telegraph. China's debt explosion threatens financial stability, Fitch warns.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/04/06/chinas-debt-explosion-threatens-financial-
stability-fitch-warns/)
China's huge debt levels will weigh on growth over the next five years and could threaten the
country's financial stability unless policymakers rein in credit , Fitch has warned. The rating agency said a "remarkable
build-up in leverage across China's economy" since the 2008 financial crisis meant Beijing's ability to meet ambitious annual growth targets of 6.5pc to
7pc between 2016 and 2020 looked "extremely challenging". While
China's public debt ratio stood at 55pc of gross
domestic product (GDP) at the end of last year, total credit in the world's second largest
economy, excluding equity raising, climbed to almost 200pc of GDP in 2015, from 115pc in 2008,
according to official estimates. Fitch said the "true figure" was likely to be closer to 250pc . It expects
this to climb to 260pc of GDP by the end of this year as total debt continues to grow faster than
the economy. "High and rising leverage in the economy is a mounting source of systemic vulnerability," Fitch analysts wrote in a note. "The
longer the economy's indebtedness goes on rising, the greater the difficulty of unwinding it, and the higher the risk of a shock to economic and financial
stability." Fitch's warning came just days after the International Monetary Fund warned that negative growth surprises in China could trigger a global
market rout. The IMF said on Wednesday that emerging markets had broadly weathered a massive slowdown in capital inflows that usually associated
with debt crises. Net
capital inflows dropped by a massive $1.1 trillion between 2010 and the year
ending in the third quarter of 2015. However, greater exchange rate flexibility and foreign-currency reserves had helped to cushion
the impact, the IMF said in a pre-released chapter of its world economic outlook. The fund is expected to trim its global growth forecasts next week as it
urges policymakers to use fiscal and structural measures to boost growth. While most
economists expect Chinese growth to
slow in the years ahead, Fitch said a "hard landing", where growth slows to near-zero, was very unlikely. Analysts said they
believed China had the tools to engineer a successful transition towards consumption-led
growth and away from investment and exports. It noted that China's financial system was largely funded by retail deposits,
while many banks and borrowers were "either state-owned or heavily state-influenced". "These factors combine to suggest that the kind of collapse of
confidence among creditors that might precipitate a financial crisis is unlikely in China," Fitch said. The ratings agency expects Chinese growth to slow to
6.2pc this year, from 6.9pc in 2015. Growth in 2017 is expected to ease further, to 6pc. While Fitch currently has a "stable"
outlook on China's A+ rating, it warned that a "sharp and sustained rise in general government indebtedness
would be negative". Separate survey data showed activity in China's service sector strengthened last month. The Caixin services purchasing
managers' index (PMI), rose to 52.2 in March, from 51.2 in February. Economists said the moderate expansion suggested China's economy was
improving on the back of Beijing's supportive measures.

Chinese Yuan unstable- economy suffers greatly

WEI 05/23/2016
(LINGLING; Lingling Wei covers Chinese finance from The Wall Street Journal's Beijing bureau.
She focuses on China's central bank, some of the country's -- and the world's -- largest
commercial banks and deepest pools of capital. A graduate of New York University, she has also
covered U.S. real estate and finance. The Wall Street Journal. A Rare Look Inside China’s Central
Bank Shows Slackening Resolve to Revamp Yuan. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-preferring-
stability-to-free-markets-loses-resolve-to-revamp-currency-1464022378)
BEIJING—Behind closed doors in March, some of China’s most prominent economists and bankers bluntly asked the People’s Bank of China to stop
fighting the financial markets and let the value of the nation’s currency fall. They got nowhere. “The primary task is to maintain stability,” said one
central-bank official, according to previously undisclosed minutes of the meeting reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The meeting left little doubt
China’s top leaders have lost interest in a major policy shift announced in a surprise move just nine months ago. In August 2015, the PBOC said it would
make the yuan’s value more market-based, an important step in liberalizing the world’s second-largest economy. In
reality, though, the
yuan’s daily exchange rate is now back under tight government control, according to meeting
minutes that detail private deliberations and interviews with Chinese officials and advisers who
spoke with The Wall Street Journal about the country’s currency policy. On Jan. 4, the central
bank behind closed doors ditched the market-based mechanism, according to people close to
the PBOC. The central bank hasn’t announced the reversal, but officials have essentially returned
to the old way of adjusting the yuan’s daily value higher or lower based on whatever suits Beijing
best. The flip-flop is a sign of policy makers’ deepening wariness about how much money is
fleeing China, a problem driven by its slowing economy . For now, at least, officials believe the benefits of freeing the
yuan are outnumbered by the number of threats. Re-emphasizing the yuan’s stability would also bring a sigh of relief to trading partners who worried a
weaker currency would boost Chinese exports at the expense of those produced elsewhere. Freeing
the yuan, the biggest
overhaul of China’s currency policy in a decade, was meant to empower consumers and help
invigorate the economy. The negative reaction, from financial markets world-wide and Chinese
who sped their efforts to take money out of the country, was so jarring that the top leadership,
headed by President Xi Jinping, began to have second thoughts. At a heavily guarded conclave of senior Communist
Party officials in December, Mr. Xi called China’s markets and regulatory system “immature” and said “the majority” of party officials hadn’t done
enough to guide the economy toward more sustainable growth, according to people who attended the meeting. To the central bank, there was only one
possible interpretation: Step on the brakes. Yi Gang, a deputy central-bank governor, said in April in Washington that “the market is still the No. 1 factor”
in determining the yuan’s value. Instead,
people close to the PBOC said, the bank guides the daily direction
of the currency by alternating between setting the yuan’s value against the dollar and a basket of
currencies. The central bank’s press office didn’t respond to requests for comment . Earlier this month,
Beijing staged what appeared to be a publicity blitz aimed at reaffirming its overall economic reform intentions while keeping the yuan basically stable.
That came after a wave of credit helped gross domestic product expand 6.7% in the first quarter,
still the slowest pace in seven years. Much of the $1 trillion in new credit flowed into the housing
market, spurring questions over the sustainability of China’s debt-fueled expansion and the
leadership’s resolve to restructure the economy . The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece newspaper,
published May 9 a lengthy article that cautioned against going back to old ways to stimulate growth. People familiar with the matter said top economic
advisers to Mr. Xi ordered up the article, which also stressed the need to keep the yuan “basically stable.” The information office of China’s State Council
didn’t respond to requests for comment. Mr. Xi, 62 years old, took power in late 2012 and has established himself as China’s most powerful leader in
decades. China’s economic policy was long the purview of the nation’s premier. That changed under Mr. Xi, who has concentrated controls in his own
hands. At the same time, he has been dismayed that his decisions on structural overhauls haven’t been effectively implemented by the government led
by Premier Li Keqiang, officials close to Mr. Xi say. People who are sympathetic to Mr. Li say the premier is in a bind because his job duties also include
hitting Mr. Xi’s economic growth targets. Those people say meeting the targets means the government has to dial back on closures of smokestack
factories, freer capital flow and other changes. The preference for stability in China’s currency policy rather than change reflects the jockeying that has
begun as party officials look ahead to next year’s reshuffling at the top. A majority of the seats on the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee will
open up. “No one wants to make mistakes at this juncture,” one senior Communist Party official says. The retreat from making the yuan more market-
based puts China’s central bank in the difficult position of having to battle continuing downward pressure on the currency, also known as the renminbi.
Since the end of April, the yuan’s value has dropped three weeks in a row. Keeping the currency
stable comes at the expense of China’s foreign-exchange reserves and restrains the PBOC’s
ability to protect the economy. China had $3.22 trillion in currency reserves in April, down from
nearly $4 trillion in June 2014. The U.S. Treasury Department estimates Beijing sold more than
$480 billion in foreign-currency assets from August through March to support the yuan. The
money flow out of China by companies and individuals slowed to $28 billion in April from more
than $100 billion in December and January, according to estimates from UBS Group AG . Chinese
authorities have stepped up controls aimed at discouraging outflows. “China’s underlying depreciation pressures remain
unaddressed, as restructuring and reform have so far advanced in fits and starts, ” says Harrison Hu, China
economist at Royal Bank of Scotland. “This leaves the risk of jolts to financial markets open.” Currency policy has been one of China’s most politically
charged economic issues. Those who are pushing the central bank to allow the market to take the yuan lower, as the PBOC indicated it would do in
August, include the Commerce Ministry, which watches out for exporters helped by a weak yuan. Such companies have found allies in economists at the
government think tank China Academy of Social Sciences, who argue the yuan has become overvalued as the economic slump drives capital to leave
China. On the other side are China’s giant state firms, which are generally ill-equipped to deal with market swings and hold large amounts of debt
denominated in U.S. dollars. As a result, they prefer that the yuan stay close to the dollar. The central bank has been a voice for a freer yuan as a way to
inject greater discipline into the economy. It ultimately answers to Mr. Xi, who initially promised to give market forces a “decisive” role in the economy
when he took power. The Chinese president set out to make the yuan more viable internationally, and one of his top economic priorities for 2015 was to
get the International Monetary Fund to include the yuan in its basket of reserve currencies. Achieving the milestone would show China’s growing
economic clout. The nation represents about 15% of the world’s output, nearly triple what it was a decade ago. Last year, Zhou Xiaochuan, China’s
longtime central-bank governor and a champion of market-oriented policies, saw an opportunity to accomplish two goals at once: give the market
bigger sway in setting the yuan’s value, which the IMF required, and let some air out of the currency. It had become increasingly
costly for the PBOC to keep the yuan close to the dollar. “It is the time to change the currency policy,” Mr. Zhou said in
March 2015. In August, the PBOC said it would base the yuan’s fix, or the value set each day by the central bank, on the previous day’s market close.
Until then, the value had been entirely determined by the central bank itself. The PBOC paired the policy shift with a devaluation of almost 2%. The
announcement came with few details and scant explanation. Investors saw the move as a suggestion that China’s economy was in such bad shape that
the central bank was taking extraordinary steps to help Chinese exporters. The yuan plummeted, and countries from Kazakhstan to Vietnam to Pakistan
quickly devalued their own currencies. The panicked response upset Chinese leaders. Within a day or two, a group on economic matters led by Mr. Xi
instructed the central bank to stabilize the yuan, which it did by dipping further into its foreign-exchange reserves. As early autumn winds dissipated the
summer heat in Beijing, the temperature was rising in the southern part of the walled Zhongnanhai compound where Mr. Xi works. The leader didn’t
like what he saw. The
attempt to make the yuan more market-driven , described by one economic
official as “depreciation disguised as reform,” was turning into a major cause of market
uncertainty and capital outflows. Chinese stocks tumbled nearly 25% in two weeks following the
currency move, and the country’s currency reserves fell $93.9 billion in August . In November, the IMF gave
its nod to the yuan’s inclusion with its reserve currencies. There was a sense of “mission accomplished” among many Chinese leaders, and the central
bank’s commitment to its new “fix” mechanism started to waver, according to the people close to the PBOC. At the party’s year-end economic
conference in December, Mr. Xi indicated that the turmoil in China’s financial markets had made him think twice about hurrying in reforms, according to
the officials with knowledge of the meeting. Mr. Xi talked about the need to guard against risks and said China’s international standing depended on
“whether we can mind our own business well.” About two weeks later, the PBOC abandoned the market-based mechanism. Eswar Prasad, a China
scholar at Cornell University and the IMF’s former top official in China, says the “uneven and haphazard approach to making the exchange rate more
flexible highlights the tensions between the government’s desire to free up markets and its tendency to override markets when they do not produce the
results it wants.” The powerful State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission was instrumental in convincing Chinese leaders to
backtrack. The more the yuan is allowed to weaken, officials said, the more expensive it will be for already struggling state firms to service their loans.
A 3% depreciation of the yuan could add $25.6 billion to Chinese companies’ annual interest
payments on dollar debts, according to estimates by analysts at BNP Paribas . “The exchange-rate policy is
being hijacked by state-owned enterprises, whose words carry a lot of weight with the leadership,” an official close to the state agency says. Companies
with high dollar-debt exposure include China’s three national airlines and its largest shipping firm, China Cosco Holdings Co. In the past few weeks, the
strengthening dollar has renewed pressure to steady the yuan. The
yuan is down 0.9% since the end of April, erasing
the currency’s gain of 1% during the previous two months. In late February, some central-bank
officials expressed frustration they had to retreat from yuan liberalization because of pressure
from the state sector. The comments were made during a meeting in Shanghai with economists, bankers and representatives from state-
owned and private companies. Central-bank officials defended the interventions again during the March closed-door meeting in Beijing, saying ordinary
Chinese might rush to dump yuan for foreign currencies if the yuan is allowed to weaken too much. The head of one of China’s largest brokerages
expressed dismay that all the emphasis was on stability. The chief economist at one of China’s top banks asked why the PBOC had been so quick to prop
up the yuan. An overvalued currency could drag down the economy further by forcing Chinese manufacturers to cut prices and lower wages, the
economist argued. “If we’re bent on stabilizing the yuan above what it’s really worth, how will that affect the economy?” the economist asked. The
frustration put PBOC officials on the defensive. “The comments all of you made are correct,” said one official. At least for now, though, he added, the
market’s influence on the yuan would be decided by Beijing.
China Rise
 China Rise Peaceful
China modernization and rise are peaceful
RUSS READ 02/25/2016 - Daily Caller “US Admiral Isn’t Buying China’s Attempts To Downplay
Militarization In The Pacific”- Russ Read National Security/Foreign Policy Reporter -
http://dailycaller.com/2016/02/25/us-admiral-isnt-buying-chinas-attempts-to-downplay-
militarization-in-the-pacific/
China’s foreign minister and the U.S. commander of the Pacific both spoke Thursday on military expansion in the South China Sea, yet their statements
made it clear the two nations continue to be at odds over China’s military build-up in the area. While
speaking at an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi downplayed
China’s military build up in the Pacific, emphasizing the idea that expansionism is
contradictory to Chinese identity. “Some friends in the United States are worried and view China as
the real major adversary of the US; they fear it will replace US. This argument has strategic
mistrust and suspicion behind it,” said Wang. “Confrontation [between the US and China]
would be a lose-lose situation; there is no reason to enter such a zero sum game.” Wang’s comments
focused on countering the idea that China will overtake the U.S. as a world superpower, and included a call for a peaceful solution to disputes over the
sovereignty of the South China Sea. “The general situation there is stable; no commercial vessel has complained that its freedom of navigation has been
jeopardized,” said Wang, assuring the audience that China’s build-up in the area is not an attempt to limit the freedom of navigation of international
vessels. “China’s position is that we want a peaceful resolution.”
 China Rise Violent
China’s rise is dangerous – military actions in SCS worries neighboring countries
Heydarian, 2015
(Richard Javad Heydarian , December 30 2015, Richard J. Heydarian teaches political science at
De La Salle University, and has been a consultant/policy adviser to a number of local and
international institutions. As an expert on current and international affairs, he has written for
or/and interviewed by Aljazeera English, ABC, Agence France Presse, , Bloomberg, BBC, CNN,
CNBC, Foreign Affairs, The Financial Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The
Economist, The Washington Post, The Nation, TIME, Reuters, South China Morning Post, NPR,
USA Today, , among many other leading publications. He is the author of How Capitalism
Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Arab Uprisings. He is
also the author of Asia's New Battlefield: US, China and the Struggle for Western Pacific State,
The World Post, “End of China’s “peaceful” rise?”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-
javad-heydarian/the-end-of-chinas-peacefu_b_8893222.html)
For decades, the world has been debating whether China’s rise will be peaceful or threatening,
or perhaps a combination of both. This is a relevant discourse, precisely because China’s rise is
perhaps the question of the century. “It’s not possible to pretend that [China] is just another big player,” Singapore’s
legendary leader Lee Kuan Yew argued in the early years of the post-Cold War period. “This is the biggest player in the history of
man.” In the economic realm, China has arguably been a net-positive force for Asia and the global
economy, reinforcing the ‘peaceful rise’ narrative forwarded by Beijing and its sympathizers.
Much of the world has accepted the fact that China , poised to become the largest economy in the near future and
already the world’s largest trading nation, is the new center of gravity in economic terms . This proud civilization can
once again credibly claim to be the Middle Kingdom. The Philippines’ 11th hour decision to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) is a poignant reminder of how even Beijing’s most alienated neighbors can’t ignore its economic pull. Despite
vigorous American lobbying against the fruition of the AIIB, all of its major allies, with the exception of Japan, have joined the China-
led multilateral institution.
But the ‘peaceful rise’ narrative is severely under question when one looks
at China’s behavior in the geopolitical realm, particularly with respect to its weaker neighbors. In
an effort to augment its sovereignty claims over what it considers as its national “blue soil,”
China has inadvertently encouraged a growing number of nations to coalesce against it. One
could argue that China has overplayed its hand, unleashing a dangerous strategic dynamic that
threatens the whole region. Throughout the early years of this decade, China rapidly and
inexorably altered the maritime status quo in East Asia, wresting control of Philippine-claimed
Scarborough Shoal and deploying a giant oil rig into Vietnamese-claimed waters in the South
China Sea. In possession of cutting-edge technology, and confidently overseeing decades of
relentless military modernization as well as paramilitary mobilization, China has transformed a
whole host of contested low-tide elevations (LTEs), atolls, shoals and rocks into full-fledged
islands. Within twenty months, it has reclaimed seventeen times more land than the other claimants combined over the past four
decades. While such a massive geoengineering project has strengthened its hand on the ground,
allowing Beijing to project power from these features across the South China Sea, it has angered
regional and external powers and gradually unleashed a robust countercurrent to its plans of
local domination. Beijing’s whiplash approach to regional territorial disputes is undermining its
own interests as well as that of the whole region , which desperately relies on stability in Sea
Lines of Communications (SLOCs) for uninterrupted and safe commerce. Beijing is now locked
between the rock of domestic hawks, who are vigorously pushing for greater Chinese strategic
grip on adjacent waters, and the hard place of growing international backlash, which is
undermining China’s soft power—and its claim to regional leadership. The Great Constrainment Strategy
Back in the mid-1990s, the Canadian political scientist Gerald Segal introduced the concept of “constrainment,” an arguably more
reasonable alternative to Cold War-style “containment strategy,” which provided diminishing utility vis-à-vis post-ideological and
highly economically integrated rising powers such as China. As Segal and other regional experts correctly assessed, China is not a
monolithic expansionist power, and is in fact too large and consequential to be contained. It was a timely strategic doctrine that was
not far from what George Kennan—who would come to lament the misappropriation of his concept of containment—had in mind
throughout the Cold War. In an influential article for the journal International Security, Segal underscored China’s strategic
opportunism. He argued that “China’s [foreign] policy will remain softer only if pressure is maintained,” so a constrainment strategy is
“intended to tell [China] that the outside world has interests that will be defended by means of incentives for good behavior,
deterrence of bad behavior, and punishment when deterrence fails.” Segal made it clear that a constrainment strategy can work if
“its neighbors and powers further afield. . . appreciate that they must act in a concerted fashion both to punish and to reward China.”
For him, an optimal strategy “must use elements from a strategy of engagement as well as the balance of power.” Today, we are
beginning to see the emergence of a “constrainment” strategy against China. Smaller powers like the Philippines have resorted to
lawfare (legal warfare) in order to leverage relevant provisions of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against
China’s blatant disregard for the very convention it has signed up to (see my analysis of the arbitration case here). For the Philippines,
China’s assertive maritime posturing—regarding its deployment of military and paramilitary patrols to contested features, coercive
occupation of contested features like the Scarborough Shoal and Mischief reef, harassment of Filipino fisherfolk, massive
construction and reclamation activities across the Spratly chain of islands and destruction of the area’s ecology—are in clear
contravention of regional principles such as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the
UNCLOS. More crucially, the Philippines is asking an arbitration panel (formed under Art. 287, Annex VII of UNCLOS) at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague to also nullify China’s sweeping territorial claims, namely the notorious “nine-
dashed line,” based on dubious claims of “historical rights.” This way, the Philippines hopes to use the moral force of international
law to embarrass China into better compliance with modern international law. While it is easy to dismiss the Philippines’s legal
maneuver as naïve and inconsequential, especially since arbitration bodies under UNCLOS lack compliance-enforcement
mechanisms, it would be shortsighted to overlook the strategic consequence of Manila’s bold move to take Beijing to court. Non-
claimant states such as Singapore, which has welcomed permanent American naval presence on its soil as a hedge against China,
have repeatedly called for the resolution of the South China Sea disputes in accordance with international law. This could be
interpreted as an implicit statement of support for the Philippines’s arbitration case against China. Even the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has grappled with internal divisions and institutional atrophy, has emphasized the necessity for the
rule-based resolution of the disputes. With the Philippines successfully overcoming the jurisdiction and admissibility hurdle, other
regional states are in a position to also threaten China with a similar suit. While Vietnam has been dangling such option for quite
some time, and is now carefully preparing its case, even non-claimant states such as Indonesia, which are fearful of China’s maritime
assertiveness and welcomed greater military cooperation with America, have threatened to take China to court. In effect, the
Philippines has unleashed a “legal multiplier,” which presents China with the prospect of multiple arbitration showdowns. If anything,
since other regional states can now more credibly threaten China with a similar legal action, they are in a position to, at the very
least, extract certain concessions in exchange for not filing a case per se. While China obviously has the option of rejecting any
unfavorable arbitration verdict, the prospect of multiple legal suits will seriously undermine the Middle Kingdom’s claim to regional
leadership and peaceful rise. Thanks to the Philippines’s lawfare, China could soon be branded as an international outlaw by a third-
party arbitration body composed of one of the world’s leading legal experts. During the latest ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation) summits, China was desperate to torpedo any serious discussion of maritime disputes and was clearly
isolated, especially as a whole host of regional countries and external powers ramped up their criticism of Chinese reclamation
activities in the South China Sea.
Taming the Juggernaut China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea—
embodied by its notorious “cabbage strategy” and various forms of “salami-slicing tactics”
against smaller claimant states—entered an intensified phase throughout the early years of the
Obama administration. But for long, President Barack Obama held back, relying instead on
diplomacy and bilateral engagement with China. Back in 2013, he held an intimate meeting at
the Sunnylands retreat center in California with his Chinese counterpart, President Xi Jinping, in
order to develop an element of great-power rapport. Framing Sino-American relations as “the most important
bilateral relationship in the world,” the Obama administration always emphasized engagement rather than deterrence. To be fair, Xi
tried to assuage fears of impending great power conflict by claiming, “The vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for two large
countries like the United States and China.” But, quite controversially, he ended up calling for a “new model of great power
relations,” which many interpreted as a demand for American recognition
of Chinese core interests such as the
Beijing’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. The Obama administration tried to double
down on the engagement track when the two leaders met in the White House earlier this year,
paving the way for the expansion of much-needed confidence-building measures between the
two powers’ armed forces, especially in light of growing incidents of Chinese harassment against
American aircrafts and vessels roaming the Western Pacific. Almost half a decade into the “Pivot
to Asia,” the Obama administration has gradually—but with delays and seeming reluctance—
stepped up its efforts to directly challenge Chinese expansionism in East Asia . After much hesitation, the
United States finally cleared the deployment of destroyers well into the twelve-nautical-mile radius of Chinese-claimed features in
the Spratly chain of islands. Whether intended or not, however, the Obama administration ended up
mismanaging the PR campaign around its more robust Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations
against China. By invoking the right for “innocent passage” as a legal justification for its FON operations, the Obama
administration inadvertently lent credence to China’s (implicit) sovereignty claims over LTEs like Subi Reef, which have been
artificially augmented in contravention of UNCLOS (see Article 60). A more accurate understanding of UNCLOS would suggest that the
principle of innocent passage presupposes the existence of a territorial sea, which could not be the case when one talks about land
features that are, in their natural state, invisible during high tide. Even if the United States chose to suspend the offensive military
capabilities of the USS Lassen, for instance, shutting down its fire control radar and not flying any helicopters in the area, the right for
innocent passage precludes activities (see Art. 18, Sec. 3, Part II of UNCLOS), which are “prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State,” including “collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State.” China
also didn’t occupy any nearby naturally formed islands in order to use Subi Reef as its baseline to project a bumped-out territorial
sea; Thitu Island is occupied by the Philippines. But one can’t deny that a storm is gathering against China’s revanchist maneuvers in
the South China Sea. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has joined maritime patrols in the area, and the Japanese Maritime Self
Defense Forces (JMSDF) could soon join the fray. The
United States Navy is poised to conduct its second
quarterly FON operations against China in the coming month, most likely targeting the Mischief
Reef, which, similar to the Fiery Cross and Subi reefs, has been artificially augmented into an
island with advanced military facilities and airstrips. Like never before, the Xi administration is
grappling not only with growing diplomatic pressure and legal backlash, but it is also confronting
an American-led maritime coalition of the willing, with little interest in Chinese domination of
one of the world’s most important SLOCs.
China Modernization
 China Modernization Good
China modernization is only defensive- k2 maintaining global peace
3-11-2016 Zhang Tao China Daily- associate researcher with the Institute of Strategic Studies
at the People's Liberation Army National Defense
University.http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-
03/11/content_6955823.htm
Budget guarantees advancement in capabilities and adheres to policy that has always been defensive
in nature China's military budget will rise 7 to 8 percent this year, it was announced on March 4. The increase has drawn worldwide attention, as
usual, although it will be less than in previous years. Foreign critics have been most concerned in recent years
about the modernization of China's military, which is basically guaranteed by the increase in
the defense budget. But what critics don't understand is that China's growing military capacity
will not pose a threat to regional peace and security. First, the increase in the defense budget is justified, especially as
the military's modernization has always been at an appropriate level. China needs its armed forces to protect its peaceful
development. This is important for maintaining peace and managing crises. China has to
safeguard its sovereignty, security and development interests, and to deal with both
traditional and nontraditional security threats. Given these facts, China has every reason to
develop its military's capabilities. Militaries of all countries need to develop, for that is the
global trend, and the Chinese military is no exception. As China's military is in the semimechanized/mechanized stage
of development, it still lags behind others in terms of capacity. And it will take a long time to become a fully modernized
force. The military's development is in proportion to China's economic development, with the latter being the national priority. Second, to
determine whether a country's military poses a threat to other countries, the key factor is not
defense expenditure or the size and capability of its armed forces; instead, it is its defense policy and military strategy. A
country with an aggressive policy could invade another country despite having a weaker
military. Another typical misconception about China's military is that, since its missiles can strike a certain country, it is capable of destroying that
country's satellites and thus poses a threat. But the fact is that many countries have developed long-range strategic missiles. The United States has the
greatest capability of destroying other countries' space assets, and its weapon systems can attack any country. So is the US the greatest threat to the
world? Also, let us not forget that the US has 11 aircraft carriers, while China has just one, which is not fully operational. It is therefore clear that it is a
country's defense policy that matters most in determining whether it poses a threat to other countries. China's
national defense
policy has always been defensive in nature, and its military strategy is to strike only when it is
struck. Third, as China has developed at an unprecedented pace because of a peaceful environment, it is committed to
maintaining peace. The nation plans to double the average income of its people by 2020 compared with 2010 and become a mid-level
developed country by 2050. All this can be achieved only in a peaceful environment - a conflict or war will disrupt the process. Today, we live in a world
of shared destinies and interdependence. In the 21st century, no
country, including China, can rise by using military
force. More importantly, China is dedicated to the path of peaceful development, a defensive
national defense policy and a military strategy of active defense. China at one time was
bullied, invaded and partially colonized. As a result, it will never pursue expansionism or
hegemonism. And fourth, with a reasonable increase in its budget, the Chinese military will develop steadily to fulfill its domestic and
international obligations and responsibilities. In addition, the military will continue to participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions and conduct
escort and anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, and other seas, as required, and work with other countries to maintain world peace. The Chinese
military is also committed to reducing risks, managing crises and controlling conflicts, so as to prevent untoward incidents from disrupting peace and
stability. With
the growth in China's national strength, its military will be better prepared to
shoulder more international responsibilities, provide more public-security services to the
international community, and contribute more to world peace and common development.
 China Modernization Bad
China’s recent military modernization threatens US military aims—the PLA will
only continue to improve with time.
Heginbotham and Chase 15
(Interview of Eric Heginbotham and Michael S. Chase. September 14 2015. Heginbotham is a RAND corporation senior political
scientist and author of U.S.-China Military Scorecards: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017. Chase is a
RAND corporation senior political scientist and author of China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weakness of the
People’s Liberation Army. Rand Corporation. “China’s Military Modernization: Eric Heginbotham and Michael Chase in Conversation.”
http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/09/chinas-military-modernization-eric-heginbotham-and.html
Heginbotham: The United States and China do indeed cooperate in many areas, and both countries want to build a positive political
agenda with one another. The United States has enormous economic and strategic interests in continued stability in Asia, and it has
made commitments to friends and allies to help maintain that stability. But we can't take stability for granted. Maintaining a balance
of military power and the right military posture are essential ingredients in deterring conflict. To be clear, we don't expect or hope for
conflict between the United States and China, but it's important to understand how the balance of power might be shifting.
Heginbotham: The short answer is that Chinese economic growth has enabled it to spend more on
defense, and the balance of power has shifted accordingly. After the Taiwan Strait Crisis of
1996, China began investing heavily in its defense capabilities. Defense spending has grown about 11
percent per year since then, adjusted for inflation. Much of that modernization has focused on developing air
and naval forces, conventionally armed ballistic missiles, and counterspace and cyber
capabilities. Recently announced cuts to the number of land forces are very much in keeping with that focus. Chase: In the
1980s and 1990s, the PLA was saddled with outdated equipment and poorly trained
personnel, as well as the distraction and corruption associated with its involvement in an array
of commercial activities. China reacted by pouring money into and reforming its military. The
PLA has made impressive progress in a relatively short time, and it is clearly becoming an
increasingly professional and capable fighting force. The United States has also invested a lot in its military
capabilities. Is there a concern that China could catch up? Heginbotham: No. System-for-system or at the level of the individual
service member,China is not even close to catching up to the United States. But it doesn't need to
catch up fully in order to challenge U.S. defense capabilities in Asia, especially in a conflict
close to the mainland, such as in Taiwan. And China has been investing in areas that leverage
its geographical advantage in the event of a conflict. Chase: The PLA is increasingly capable of
threatening its neighbors and holding U.S. bases and other high-value assets at risk, should the
Chinese Communist Party leadership order it to do so. Chinese capabilities aimed at deterring
or, if necessary, countering U.S. military intervention in the Asia-Pacific region—including
systems designed to hold U.S. military bases, aircraft carriers, space systems, and computer
networks at risk—are becoming an increasingly serious cause for concern among U.S. defense
analysts. Heginbotham: Looking at potential conflict scenarios and trends over time, we see that China has made
relative gains in its ability to contest U.S. air superiority, put U.S. bases at risk, and threaten
U.S. carriers. All of these improvements would make it harder for the United States to protect
its interests close to the Chinese mainland. China's ability to project power to more distant
locations is limited, but its reach is growing. If the United States and China remain on current
trajectories, the frontier for U.S. dominance in Asia will progressively recede. Chase: Our team relied
heavily on Chinese publications—such as defense white papers, books on military strategy and campaigns, and PLA media articles—
to look at PLA weaknesses from the perspective of the Chinese. We found that the PLA still suffers from several potentially serious
weaknesses. The first is institutional: The PLA faces shortcomings stemming from outdated command structures, quality of
personnel, and corruption. The second centers on combat capabilities, including logistical weaknesses, insufficient strategic airlift
capabilities, limited numbers of special-mission aircraft, and deficiencies in fleet air defense and antisubmarine warfare. These
weaknesses increase the risk that the PLA will fail to successfully perform some of the missions Chinese Communist Party leaders
may task it to execute, though the potential impact varies by mission. Heginbotham: Right. Many of the material weaknesses that
Mike mentions would have a particularly large impact on the PLA's ability to execute tasks or missions at greater distances from the
Chinese mainland, such as around the Spratly Islands. And of course the United States has not been standing still either. The United
States maintains a commanding technological lead in undersea warfare. And in long-range air strike, a combination of new
generations of U.S. air-launched cruise missiles and new stealth capabilities would enable the United States to hold Chinese targets
at risk despite the latter's improving air defense capability. Do you think China will be able to address areas of weakness? Chase: The
Chinese are keenly aware of these weaknesses and are working hard to correct them. The PLA is already addressing institutional
problems such as corruption and training deficiencies. Over
the next 10 years, the PLA is likely to concentrate
on improving weapon systems and equipment, particularly in high-priority areas such as naval,
air, missile, and space capabilities. All these developments are likely to improve the PLA's
overall combat capabilities. That's one of the reasons why it's so important for U.S.
policymakers to understand the PLA's current shortcomings—they indicate where China is
likely to focus its modernization efforts going forward. Heginbotham: Let's be clear: We don't desire or predict
a conflict with China. Nor do we think that China would win a war with the United States. But the trends we have been talking about
suggest that if there were a conflict, China may be able to gain an initial advantage (such as establishing temporary air and naval
superiority), lengthen the contest, and make it more costly for the United States to prevail. In certain regional contingencies, Beijing
might believe that these costs might dissuade U.S. intervention in a conflict. In the worst case, this could undermine U.S. deterrence
and encourage more adventurous behavior on the part of Beijing. What should the United States be doing now? Heginbotham: The
key thing is for the United States to take steps that will maintain its ability to defend its regional interests and deter China from using
force or coercion to achieve its objectives. The United States will probably not have the resources to restore all-aspects dominance or
prevent all further erosion of the balance of military power over the next few years, but it can adjust its operational concepts, force
structure, and diplomacy in ways that will slow the process and limit the impact on deterrence. That includes investing in capabilities
that offset Chinese advantages close to the mainland, strengthening ties with allies in the region to ensure access, and engaging the
Chinese on strategic stability and escalation management issues. You wrote separate reports on China's military modernization, one
that emphasizes weaknesses and one that emphasizes strengths. Chase: Yes, our analyses are two sides of the same coin. We set out
to look at different aspects of the issue, in order to give a comprehensive picture of where China is today and where it could be
heading. Understanding where the PLA falls short of its aspirations, or perhaps has not fully recognized the need for improvement, is
just as essential as understanding the PLA's strengths. So, while we asked different questions, looked at different scenarios, and
employed different analytical approaches, our findings are consistent and complementary. The
bottom line is that China
has made enormous gains in a short time, and even though the PLA still has some weaknesses,
we expect it will continue to improve in areas where it's currently lagging.

Xi’s aggressive leadership is prompting military modernization—improved

abilities threatening peace in the South China Sea
McLeary 16
(Paul McLeary. May 13, 2016. McLeary is currently the Pentagon reporter for Foreign Policy, but previously worked as a senior writer
for Defense Technology International/Aviation Week Magazine. Foreign Policy. “Chinese Military Modernization Enters “New Phase”.”
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/pentagon-chinese-military-modernization-enters-new-phase/
China’s decades-long military modernization “entered a new phase” last year under the
aggressive leadership of President Xi Jinping, a new Pentagon report on Beijing’s military capabilities said today. The
“sweeping transformation” includes making the formerly mass army a nimbler, more balanced
force that is acquiring the kind of expeditionary capabilities the U.S. military already enjoys.
“China’s military modernization is producing capabilities that have the potential to reduce core
U.S. military technological advantages” on the sea and in the air, the report found. The most visible outward sign
of China’s military muscle-flexing can be seen in the 3,200 acres it has reclaimed on reefs and rocks in the South China Sea. Three of
those sites in the Spratly Islands now have port facilities and 10,000-foot runways that can handle any plane in the Chinese arsenal, the report found. Those territorial

claims, which clash with rival claims from other states in the region, are backed up with coast
guard and civilian ships. “It seems to us that these activities are designed to stay below the
threshold of conflict,” but demonstrate that China is willing to defend its territorial claims, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Abraham
Denmark said while unveiling the report at the Pentagon. The report, an annual update mandated by Congress, notes that the Chinese moves “have caused countries in the

these concerns are likely to

region to enhance their ties to the United States.” Given the still-growing Chinese defense budget, the report found, “

intensify as the PLA continues to modernize, especially in the absence of greater

transparency.” But the potentially more significant, long-term developments are found closer to home. Xi is pushing through a series of
deep reforms in the People’s Liberation Army, including a massive reorganization of the
historically unwieldy institution, moving it from a collection of distinct regional units to a more
rigidly top-down organization. The Chinese leader is also purging the military’s officer corps, arresting dozens on charges of corruption over the past
year while cutting some 300,000 troops from the army’s bloated ranks. The reforms are rebalancing China’s military, making the
army smaller while the navy and the air force grow; the report noted that Chinese aviation
technology is “rapidly closing the gap with western air forces.” At the same time, China’s nuclear and missile forces have
been reorganized as an independent service and have been bolstered with a new array of weapons that push China’s potential reach farther out into the Pacific. The moves come

Xi is widely seen as attempting to consolidate his control over China’s institutions. The
at a time when

military has always been seen as a political institution in China, and it exists to protect, and
carry out the orders of the Communist party. Given China’s emphasis on being able to operate farther from home — as outlined in last
year’s defense white paper — the Chinese navy continues to get preferential treatment. The Pentagon report noted that the 300-ship PLAN “now possesses the largest number of
vessels in Asia,” boasting a growing number of advanced surface ships, new submarines, amphibious ships, and its first aircraft carrier. The report also stressed Beijing’s use of the
so-called Chinese Maritime Militia, a paramilitary organization of hundreds of civilian fishing boats which acts as a virtual picket line, sailing hundreds of miles outside of Chinese
territorial waters to keep an eye on other vessels and harass any that stray too close to Chinese claims. In many ways, this year’s report echoes previous studies. The lack of
transparency in Chinese military developments has long been a concern for the Pentagon, and Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has been a source of tension for several
years. In addition to tensions in the South China Sea, Chinese defense planners have remained very focused on being able to project power against Taiwan, if needed. But this
year’s report highlighted ways in which the Chinese military is slowing shedding much of its doctrinal baggage. Traditionally, the Chinese eschewed overseas bases and
deployments, and focused on close defense. This year’s report stresses Chinese deployments overseas for peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions, a growing network of logistical
support bases in the Indian Ocean — including China’s first-ever overseas base in Djibouti — and technological developments that make it easier for Chinese ships to operate
farther from home, including better air defenses on new frigates and destroyers and the country’s first operational aircraft carrier. On Thursday, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Joseph Dunford and his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Fang Fenghui, spoke for the first time since Dunford took office in October, according to a statement released by the Pentagon.
Dunford “acknowledged the areas of cooperation” between the two militaries, while delivering “messages regarding U.S. commitment to uphold the rules-based international
order, defend U.S. allies and interests in the South China Sea, while affirming a desire to avoid confrontation,” the statement said.

China modernization is a dangerous threat to Asian region and US

Malcolm Davis October 22, 2015 - National Interest- The Buzz“Get Ready, Asia: China's
Military Is Rapidly Catching Up to America”- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-
ready-asia-chinas-military-rapidly-catching-america-14147?page=2
In considering Paul Dibb’s analysis on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), I’d recommend anyone interested in the state of China’s military start
by reading Roger Cliff’s China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities. Cliff argues that “…by 2020, the quality of China’s
military doctrine, equipment, personnel and training will likely be approaching, to varying
degrees, those of the US and other Western militaries.” Although prevailing weaknesses in organizational structure,
logistics and organizational culture will limit the effectiveness of PLA weapons and platforms, “defeating China in these scenarios
[Taiwan and South China Sea] could nonetheless be difficult and costly for the United States’
primarily as a result of the geographic advantages that China enjoys, as well as specific systems capabilities.” Finally, he suggests, “ the 2020s are
likely to be a time of power transition in East Asia , from a region in which the United States has had the capability to
defend its allies against virtually any form of aggression, to one where China has the capability to, at a minimum,
contest control of the seas and airspace and where an attempt to oppose a Chinese use of
force will be dangerous and costly for any country, including the United States.” Cliff’s conclusion is also
echoed in a recent RAND report, “The US China Military Scorecard,” which argues that China is catching up to the U.S., is becoming more assertive and
confident, and has geography on its side. The report notes that “China [has been able] to narrow the military gap in
almost every area and move ahead in some” and that the “overall capability trend lines are
moving against the United States.” The report also highlights the speed of change in China’s military: it’s pushing forward in key
capability areas and its modernization is occurring more rapidly than that of the U.S. China is
leapfrogging, whilst the U.S. is plodding. These two accounts suggest worrying trends and highlight that an analysis of the PLA
which is based on superficial glimpses of selected areas of capability misses the bigger picture. The speed of China’s military
modernization, its sustained investment in terms of double-digit spending levels, and the
types of capabilities it is acquiring highlight China’s strategic objective of eroding America’s
military–technological advantage so that Beijing may resolve territorial disputes and ensure
the success of the China Dream.
 China Modernizing Now
US is falling behind in offsetting Chinese naval militarization capabilities
Malcolm Davis October 22, 2015 - National Interest- The Buzz“Get Ready, Asia: China's
Military Is Rapidly Catching Up to America”- http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-
ready-asia-chinas-military-rapidly-catching-america-14147?page=2
Even though China does face real domestic challenges, so does the U.S. in the form of growing national debt and
destructive political partisanship in Washington that together reduces its ability to sustain
defence spending in coming years to offset Chinese capability growth . That’s occurring as security risks in
Europe and the Middle East multiply to impose greater burdens on shrinking forces. The end result is reduced U.S. readiness
and overall effectiveness at a critical time later this decade. Paul’s dismissal of PLA capabilities seems to lack
operational context and overlook PLA capabilities now in service. A key emerging issue is the survivability of naval surface forces in the face of PLA anti-
access-area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Here PLA ability to wage information warfare against vital U.S. C4ISR networks through counter-space
operations with ASATs, integrated network-electronic warfare (INEW), and cyber warfare need to be considered more deeply as winning the information
battle against China is vital to countering their A2/AD capabilities. The RAND report notes that Chinese
offensive counterspace
capability, for example, is growing faster than the U.S. defensive counter-space options . There may
be technological silver bullets to mitigate such developments but they must first be funded through to operational status, and then proven to work in
battle. While Paul is certainly correct to suggest that the U.S. isn’t ‘sitting on its hands’ as its ‘Third Offset’ strategy clearly demonstrates, this argument
can also be reversed. China
has flown hypersonic glide vehicles, is deploying counter-stealth radars,
and has the world’s largest unmanned air vehicle capability. China is catching up in anti-
submarine warfare, with the deployment of fixed acoustic arrays and Jingdao class ASW
corvettes, as well as new maritime patrol aircraft. In air defence, China will likely acquire the S-
400 SAM which is effective against stealth aircraft , and long-range air combat capabilities epitomised by the J-20 can
exploit the U.S. reliance on forward-deployed AEW&C and airborne refuelling aircraft to further reduce US ability to project airpower. In terms of
submarine quieting, nuclear submarines are always going to be noisier than conventional boats. China deploys both the Yuan and Kilo 636 conventional
submarines which are very quiet and difficult to detect in acoustically challenging waters in the South China Sea. The RAND report notes that
“China’s newer submarines are becoming quieter and better armed, and there is every reason
to believe that their capability to find and attack U.S. surface ships has vastly improved [since
1996].” It is the ability of these boats to fire long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), such as the new 290nm range YJ-18, that according
to Andrew Erickson allow China to “out-stick” the U.S. in long-range anti-surface warfare. This submarine-ASCM combination is quite deadly. Paul Dibb is
correct to caution against seeing the PLA as ten feet tall, but it would be equally unwise to dismiss China as inconsequential in military-technological
terms. China
is rapidly catching up, and what matters is where the PLA goes from here, and how
Beijing uses its growing military power across Asia .

Increasing defense budget proves china’s modernization

Bitzinger 2015
Richard, 19th march 2015, Richard A. Bitzinger is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military
Transformations Program at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies,Foreign Affairs,
“China’s double digit defense growth”
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/37423348/Bitz.ForAff.pdf?
AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1466645188&Signature=gd4f4pJwQjvrhB
NULex2Ba0IOs0%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename
%3DChinas_Double_Digit_Defense_Growth.pdf
China has done it again. In early March, it released its defense budget for 2015, and as in almost every year for
over almost two decades, it increased its military expenditure by double-digit percentages. This
year, the Chinese defense budget will rise by 10.1 percent, to roughly $145 billion. And it seems likely that
the trend will continue, much to the concern of Washington and regional capitals. Already, China is the second-biggest military
spender in the world, having surpassed the United Kingdom in 2008. China’s new budget for the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) is more than three times those of other big spenders such as France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom, and nearly four times that of its rising Asian rival, India. It is also the only country
besides the United States to have a triple-digit defense budget (in billions of U.S. dollars). This
level of spending is all the more remarkable given where China started. In 1997, Chinese military expenditures totaled only about $10 billion, roughly
on par with Taiwan and significantly less than that of Japan and South Korea. Beginning that year, however, China’s defense budget began to rise. There
were two economic factors that made this growth possible. First, the country’s economy soared; in 1997, defense spending made up less than two
percent of GDP, which remains roughly the same share today, at least according to Beijing. Second ,
low inflation rates over the
past two decades have meant that real growth in defense spending has nearly matched
nominal growth; even the most conservative estimate of actual growth rates (accounting for
inflation) reveal a five-fold real increase in military expenditures since 1997 . What is particularly striking
about the growth in defense spending over the last two decades is that it has almost always outpaced GDP growth. Between 1998 and
2007, China’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 12.5 percent, while its defense
spending increased at an average of 15.9 percent per annum. Given that the economy is likely
to grow by only seven percent in 2015, and its defense spending is growing at double digits, the
disconnect between economic performance and defense spending is becoming more
pronounced.

China modernization is happening now

Paul Mcleary, 5-13-2016, , the Pentagon reporter for Foreign Policy.,"Pentagon: Chinese
Military Modernization Enters “New Phase”," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/pentagon-chinese-military-modernization-enters-new-
phase/
China’s decades-long military modernization “entered a new phase” last year under the
aggressive leadership of President Xi Jinping, a new Pentagon report on Beijing’s military
capabilities said today. The “sweeping transformation” includes making the formerly mass army a nimbler, more balanced
force that is acquiring the kind of expeditionary capabilities the U.S. military already enjoys. “China’s military
modernization is producing capabilities that have the potential to reduce core U.S. military
technological advantages” on the sea and in the air , the report found. Beijing: Japanese Judge Means South
China Sea Tribunal Is… In a last-ditch effort to discredit an upcoming ruling, China plays the nationality card. The most visible
outward sign of China’s military muscle-flexing can be seen in the 3,200 acres it has reclaimed
on reefs and rocks in the South China Sea. Three of those sites in the Spratly Islands now have port facilities and
10,000-foot runways that can handle any plane in the Chinese arsenal, the report found. Those territorial claims, which
clash with rival claims from other states in the region, are backed up with coast guard and
civilian ships. “It seems to us that these activities are designed to stay below the threshold of conflict,” but demonstrate that
China is willing to defend its territorial claims, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Abraham Denmark said while
unveiling the report at the Pentagon. The report, an annual update mandated by Congress, notes that the Chinese
moves
“have caused countries in the region to enhance their ties to the United States.” Given the still-
growing Chinese defense budget, the report found, “these concerns are likely to intensify as
the PLA continues to modernize, especially in the absence of greater transparency.” But the potentially more significant,
long-term developments are found closer to home. Xi is pushing through a series of deep reforms in the
People’s Liberation Army, including a massive reorganization of the historically unwieldy
institution, moving it from a collection of distinct regional units to a more rigidly top-down
organization. The Chinese leader is also purging the military’s officer corps, arresting dozens on
charges of corruption over the past year while cutting some 300,000 troops from the army’s
bloated ranks. The reforms are rebalancing China’s military, making the army smaller while the
navy and the air force grow; the report noted that Chinese aviation technology is “rapidly
closing the gap with western air forces.” At the same time, China’s nuclear and missile forces
have been reorganized as an independent service and have been bolstered with a new array of
weapons that push China’s potential reach farther out into the Pacific. The moves come at a
time when Xi is widely seen as attempting to consolidate his control over China’s institutions.
The military has always been seen as a political institution in China, and it exists to protect, and carry out the orders of the
Communist party. Given China’s emphasis on being able to operate farther from home — as outlined in last year’s defense white
paper — the Chinese navy continues to get preferential treatment. The Pentagon report noted that the 300-ship PLAN “now
possesses the largest number of vessels in Asia,” boasting a growing number of advanced surface ships, new submarines, amphibious
ships, and its first aircraft carrier. The report also stressed Beijing’s use of the so-called Chinese Maritime Militia, a paramilitary
organization of hundreds of civilian fishing boats which acts as a virtual picket line, sailing hundreds of miles outside of Chinese
territorial waters to keep an eye on other vessels and harass any that stray too close to Chinese claims. In many ways, this year’s
report echoes previous studies. The lack of transparency in Chinese military developments has long been a concern for the Pentagon,
and Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has been a source of tension for several years. In addition to tensions in the South China
Sea, Chinese defense planners have remained very focused on being able to project power against Taiwan, if needed. But this year’s
report highlighted ways in which the Chinese military is slowing shedding much of its doctrinal baggage. Traditionally, the Chinese
eschewed overseas bases and deployments, and focused on close defense. This
year’s report stresses Chinese
deployments overseas for peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions, a growing network of
logistical support bases in the Indian Ocean — including China’s first-ever overseas base in
Djibouti — and technological developments that make it easier for Chinese ships to operate
farther from home, including better air defenses on new frigates and destroyers and the
country’s first operational aircraft carrier. On Thursday, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph Dunford and his
Chinese counterpart, Gen. Fang Fenghui, spoke for the first time since Dunford took office in October, according to a statement
released by the Pentagon. Dunford “acknowledged the areas of cooperation” between the two militaries, while delivering “messages
regarding U.S. commitment to uphold the rules-based international order, defend U.S. allies and interests in the South China Sea,
while affirming a desire to avoid confrontation,” the statement said.

China is making reforms now to modernize their military

Tiezzi ‘15
(Shannon Tiezzi, 12-1-2015, The Diplomat, "China's Plan for a New, Improved Military,"
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/chinas-plan-for-a-new-improved-military/ )
On November 26, Chinese President Xi Jinping – who also serves as chair of the Central Military
Commission – announced a sweeping long-term reform plan for the People’s Liberation Army.
The reforms, laid out at a meeting attended by over 200 military officials, will see streamlined command over China’s military, as well as a closer watch
on corruption and graft. China currently has seven separate military commands, headquartered in Shenyang, Beijing,
Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Lanzhou. That structure, and the relative independence enjoyed by each regional commander,
makes joint operations (particularly overseas) difficult to organize and execute. Under the
reform plan, China would reorganize the commands. Xi did not go into detail on the reform plan, but South China
Morning Posts expects the restricted military to have only four military commands. China will also move to create new “battle
zone commands” designed to streamline joint operations. And the entire military structure
would be overseen by a joint command, further emphasizing the necessity of interoperability
between China’s military branches. Defense Ministry spokesperson Yang Yujun told reporters
that the reforms “will focus on removing systematic barriers that had constrained military
development in order to boost modernization of the military as well as cultivate the fighting
capacity of troops.” In addition, the CMC (which Xi currently heads) will take on an even more prominent role in China’s military affairs. The
CMC will have “central and unified leadership,” Xi said, and will directly administer and command all military departments (including the PLA as well as
the Chinese People’s Armed Police and China’s militia and reserve forces). That effectively tightens Party control over the armed forces, while also
strengthening Xi’s already-prominent personal role in governing the military. In his remarks, Xi said the reforms were designed to strengthen the
principle that the “Communist Party of China has absolute leadership of the armed forces.” As part of its exercise of leadership, the CMC will set up a
new discipline inspection committee, which will send inspectors to the various departments and zone commands, Xi said. The anti-corruption campaign
has moved more slowly through China’s military than through its civilian bureaucracy, as the PLA has its own body responsible for discipline violations.
The new CMC discipline inspection committee will give Xi direct authority over the anti-corruption efforts in the military, as well as the ability to appoint
hand-picked leaders who are serious about the task of weeding out corruption (see, for example, the immense impact the selection of Wang Qishan to
head the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has had on the anti-corruption drive). Xi also spoke of creating a new separation in “decision
making, enforcement and supervision powers” in order to create a system of “checks and balances” in the military. At this time, it’s still unclear exactly
what that system would look like; the Party in general has been strongly resistant to the idea of any checks on power. Finally, as previously announced,
China will also cut its military forces by 300,000 troops, mostly focusing on administrative personnel. Xi also ordered the military to “resolutely
terminate all paid services,” which will both trim the fat from PLA payrolls while also discouraging the corruption that often accompanies military-run
business deals. This
announcement has been a long time coming – military analysts inside and
outside of China have long recommended a streamlined command system that allows for joint
command and control. But the plan itself is just the first step in what will be a long and slow
process. In making the announcement, Xi said the “breakthrough” should come by 2020, giving Beijing plenty of time to lay the groundwork. The
reforms will doubtless face resistance from those who have a vested interest in the current
system, but Xi is determined to carry through the restructuring – which will have important implications for China’s national security. “As the
country progresses from a large country to a large and powerful one, defense and military development stands at a new and historic starting line,” Xi
said. In
order to truly modernize its military, China will need not just new technology, but a
reorganized command structure that reflects how much China’s national security interests –
not to mention warfare itself – have changed since the last round of major reforms in the
1980s. By 2020, Xi wants a military that is more nimble and flexible, able to respond to diverse
threats around the world in a way the current military structure can’t accommodate. However,
Defense Ministry spokesperson Yang reassured reporters that the military reforms will not alter China’s basic defense policy, which is “defensive in
nature.”
 China Not Modernizing Now
Chinese military is weak – recent spending increases haven’t helped
Cheung 2015
Tai Ming, Feb 16, 2015, Tai Ming Cheung is Director of the Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation at the University of California, San Diego, where he also leads the institute's Study of
Technology and Innovation project. States News Service, “CHINA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION
EFFORTS FALL SHORT; SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESSES REMAIN”
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/retrieve.do?
sort=RELEVANCE&docType=Article&tabID=T004&prodId=EAIM&searchId=R1&resultListType=R
ESULT_LIST&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&contentSegment=&currentPosition=1&search
ResultsType=SingleTab&inPS=true&userGroupName=ksstate_ukans&docId=GALE
%7CA401853095&contentSet=GALE%7CA401853095
Although the drive by the People's Republic of China to modernize its military has been
underway for more than two decades, significant weaknesses remain, according to a new
RAND Corporation report. In the 1980s and 1990s, the People's Liberation Army was saddled with outdated equipment and poorly
trained personnel, as well as the distraction and corruption associated with its involvement in an array of commercial activities. China reacted by
many issues remain
pouring money into its military, resulting in double-digit increases in military spending in most years, but
unresolved. "Our research found that China's weaknesses fall in two broad categories:
institutional and combat capabilities," said Michael Chase, co-lead author of the study and a senior political
scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "The army faces shortcomings from
outdated command structures, quality of personnel, professionalism and corruption." In terms
of combat capabilities, China has problems with logistical weaknesses, insufficient strategic
airlift capabilities, limited numbers of special mission aircraft and deficiencies in fleet air
defense and anti-submarine warfare, said Jeffrey Engstrom, co-lead author of the report and a RAND senior project associate.
However, the Chinese are keenly aware of the military's many weaknesses and are working hard to correct them. The Chinese military trade press, as
well as expert foreign observers, note that many of the key weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces stem
from shortcomings in organizational structure and continuing concerns about insufficient
educational accomplishments and levels of technical proficiency among soldiers and officers.
Other personnel issues include problems with corruption, morale and professionalism , including
difficulties accepting military discipline and maintaining operational security. In terms of combat capabilities , many Chinese strategists
identify the inability to conduct integrated joint operations at the desired level of competence
as the central problem. There are persistent challenges in combat support and combat service
support maintenance capabilities. Recent investments in military hardware have made a difference, but the Chinese have struggled
to make sure their military service members are able to operate it, according to the study. While new surface combatants and submarines boast
impressive capabilities comparable with those of a modern, world-class navy ,
the Chinese navy still has problems with the
integration of increasingly complex modern weapons and equipment platforms. The Chinese
air force has made similar technological strides, but must cope with such challenges as a large force comprising multiple generations of
aircraft, a shortage of key special mission aircraft, unrealistic training and insufficient strategic
transport capability. The Chinese military also faces potential weaknesses in its ability to
protect Chinese interests in space and the electromagnetic spectrum , and to successfully operate in these
areas in support of military campaigns requiring information dominance. As China places more satellites into orbit, the military is becoming more
dependent on space capabilities for important functions such as intelligence, navigation and communications. Chinese military publications assess China
as being less dependent on space than the U.S. military, but appear to recognize that the growing Chinese
reliance on space also
makes them vulnerable. The Chinese also are concerned about their own cybersecurity
weaknesses, particularly due to a perceived inferiority in the key aspects of "network military
struggle." Chase said it will be important for U.S. analysts, planners and leaders to continue to
improve their understanding of Chinese military shortcomings as well as how the Chinese see these weaknesses
and vulnerabilities. If deterrence fails, that knowledge may help the United States and its allies prevent China from using force to achieve its policy
objectives.
China’s military is decades of years behind the US
Dibb ‘15
(Paul Dibb, 10-15-2015, Paul Dibb is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at The Australian
National University., Strategist, "Why the PLA is a paper tiger,"
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-pla-is-a-paper-tiger/)
It’s becoming commonplace to drum up the military threat from China and belittle America’s
military capabilities. Much of this commentary reminds me of statements in the mid-1980s
that the former Soviet Union was poised to outstrip the US in military power. This isn’t to
argue that China is in the final stages of disintegration like the USSR, but it is to assert that the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) demonstrates all the brittleness and paper-thin professionalism
of a military that has never fought a modern war and whose much-vaunted military
equipment has never been tested in combat. With a slowing economy, and with structural economic and social tensions
becoming worse rather than better, China is a large but fragile power ruled by a vulnerable party that can’t afford any economic or foreign policy
disasters, let alone war with the US. Its economy is fundamentally interdependent with that of free international trade and global supply chains. War
for China would be an economic and social disaster. Moreover, Beijing has very few powerful or influential friends in the
region and suffers from strategic isolation, which is growing worse the more it throws its weight around. Beijing has no experience
whatsoever of modern war. Its last experience of armed conflict was in 1979 when it
abysmally failed to teach Vietnam a so-called ‘lesson’. Border scuffles with India and the USSR in the 1960s and sending
peasant armies into the Korean War in the 1950s scarcely rate as modern combat. The PLA’s power depends crucially on keeping the Communist Party
in power, which is what its oath of allegiance declares, and not the defence of China as a country. PLA officers still waste inordinate amounts of time
learning irrelevant communist dogma, rather than giving priority to military training. Then there’s the issue of corruption at the highest levels of the PLA
and the buying of favours and promotions. It’s true that in the last couple of decades the PLA has made some impressive strides technologically. But
despite President Xi Jinping proclaiming that China must become a powerful maritime power, geography is against it. When was the last
time a large land power really made it as a naval power? Certainly not the USSR, France or Germany. Commentators
in Australia repeat a lot of breathless assertions about China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities. And there can be no doubt that operating in the
approaches to China is becoming more dangerous, particularly given the sort of military mass that China can accumulate close to home. But do we
actually think that the Americans are sitting on their hands doing nothing technologically in areas such as hypersonic vehicles, railguns, stealth, drones

and cyber-attack?In key areas of military technology China is still a good 20 years behind the US. Its
antisubmarine warfare capability is marginal and many of its submarines are noisy. China lacks the necessary quieting and
propulsion technologies to build anything remotely comparable to an US or Russian nuclear
submarine. Even the newest Chinese Jin-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines are louder than the 1970s era Soviet Delta III SSBN. And the
forthcoming type 95 nuclear submarine will be louder than the late-1980s Soviet titanium-hulled Akula, according to US sources. China’s air defence
capabilities have gaping deficiencies against any technologically advanced enemy. Moreover,
China still relies heavily on
Russia for military reverse engineering and supply of high-performance military jet engines,
which it has failed to master for 30 years. Beijing has made important strides with ballistic missile technologies, but the DF-21
has never destroyed a naval target moving at battle speed. Moreover, it relies crucially on intelligence satellites and long-range over-the-horizon radar
for target acquisition. Those are soft targets and vulnerable to pre-emptive US military strikes. It isn’t clear in any case, according to the Pentagon,
whether China has the capability to collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch platforms in time for successful strikes against distant
targets at sea. As for China’s ICBM capabilities, such as the DF-5B with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), this is hardly a
breakthrough nuclear technology. In 1974, as Head of the National Assessments Staff, I was briefed by the CIA about MIRVs on the Soviet Union’s SS-18
ICBM. That was remarkable technological advance 40 years ago. There
are some Chinese military officers and
academics who are starting to brag about China’s nuclear war-fighting capabilities. While China has a
reasonably secure second-strike capability, it’s one of the most vulnerable large powers to all-out nuclear war because of its population density and its
distribution along the eastern seaboard. Just because China has a population 1.4 billion people doesn’t mean that it would survive a massive nuclear
attack. That’s a strong argument, in my view, for the US to keep a large nuclear attack force, both operational and in active reserve, of several thousand
strategic warheads.
All this is to argue that we need to put China’s emerging military capabilities into
some sensible comparative analysis with those of the US and in historical context. We need to
remember that the US is the most innovative country in the world and isn’t standing still in the
face of Chinese military advancements, many of which are seriously deficient.
China War
 China War Likely
Large risk of US-China nuclear war – structural mistrust makes escalation likely;
modernization guarantees nuclear use
Kulacki 16
Gary, May 2016, UCS China Project Manager, The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous,
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens
across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. “The Risk of Nuclear War with
China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf
The possibility that the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
could become involved in a nuclear war is increasing . Both governments must acknowledge
the danger if they hope to avoid it. Several factors contribute to the risk of a nuclear war
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China: • The United States and China
have a contentious history. Mutual mistrust sustains an entrenched and deepening
antagonism despite sincere and occasionally successful efforts to cooperate on shared
concerns such as climate change and nuclear terrorism. • Both governments are preparing for
war, including improving their nuclear arsenals. U.S. and PRC decision makers believe they
need a demonstrable readiness to use military force— including nuclear weapons—to ensure
the other nation will yield in a military confrontation. • U.S. and PRC leaders try to avoid
conflict, but their discussions of contentious issues are inadequate . The extensive military
exchanges the governments have conducted have produced memoranda of understanding on
the conduct of naval vessels and aircraft, but strategic dialogues on their nuclear forces, missile
defenses, and anti-satellite weapons are perfunctory. • U.S. and PRC officials see the risk
differently. U.S. officials are concerned that if a military conflict starts, they may need to use
nuclear weapons to stop it. PRC officials assume that no nation would ever invite nuclear
retaliation by using nuclear weapons first. Their concern is to assure the PRC maintains a
credible ability to retaliate after a U.S. nuclear attack. Can this peace that is not peace be
maintained indefinitely? Diplomacy has not slowed steadily accelerating preparations for war,
nor has it resolved U.S.-PRC disputes over the status of Taiwan, North Korean threats, or the
freedom of military navigation in East Asian waters. Keeping the peace depends on the skill and
patience of political leaders who seek to avoid conflict even as they keep a nervous eye on the
balance of rapidly evolving military technologies they are not trained to assess. Former U.S.
secretary of defense Robert McNamara closed a lifetime of watching that balance by warning,
“The indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations”
(Morris 2003). It is a warning the leaders of the United States and the People’s Republic of China
should take to heart.

China & US are preparing for nuclear war – modernization and more aggressive
nuclear policies make escalation likely
Kulacki 16
Gary, May 2016, UCS China Project Manager, The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous,
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens
across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. “The Risk of Nuclear War with
China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf
Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Military Science, a research center under the Central
Military Commission, which is the highest PRC military authority, believe the United States
seeks an “absolute military superiority” that it can use to limit China’s development and
compromise its autonomy (CAMS 2013). A PRC Ministry of Defense white paper identified three
new U.S. threats to PRC national security: “hegemonism, power politics, and neo
interventionism.” It announced the PRC would counter those threats with continued
investments in military space capabilities, missile defenses, strategic early warning systems,
and long-range precision strike weapons (SCIO 2015). The People’s Republic of China does not
release information about the size, composition, or cost of its nuclear forces. U.S. estimates
describe a relatively small nuclear arsenal: several hundred warheads and 75-100 long-range
ballistic missiles that can reach the United States (OSD 2016). The PRC also has a few score
intermediate range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that can be armed with nuclear
warheads (NASIC 2013). PRC military publications have discussed plans to improve the quality
and increase the quantity of nuclear-armed delivery vehicles, but they have characterized these
improvements as limited measures intended to hedge against continuing U.S. investments in a
global missile defense network and the U.S. development of longrange precision strike
capabilities. PRC leaders are not planning a major build-up in numbers, which they believe would
be counterproductive (CAMS 2013). According to experts within China, the PRC eschews fighting
a nuclear war and has no plans to produce nuclear weapons for that purpose (Sun 2013). The
PRC may attempt to use its nuclear forces to send a signal to the United States if it launches
large-scale conventional military attacks against sensitive targets like the Three Gorges Dam,
major population centers, or nuclear power plants (Yu 2004). The PRC is also considering
raising the alert level of its nuclear forces so it can launch them on warning of an incoming
attack (CAMS 2013).

Tensions in the SCS are high – both countries are preparing for war
Kulacki 16
Gary, May 2016, UCS China Project Manager, The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous,
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens
across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. “The Risk of Nuclear War with
China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf
U.S. and PRC interactions in East Asian waters increasingly emphasize the use of military
force . In 2009, the Obama administration broke with past policy by indicating it would use
military force to police long-simmering disputes between China and its Asian neighbors
over competing sovereignty claims (Chang 2010). The change responded to PRC statements
describing its sovereignty claims as a “core interest” (DOS 2010). The United States backed up
its new policy with new military bases, deployments, and exercises in the region . It sailed U.S.
Navy task forces into PRC-claimed waters that the United States does not normally patrol. The
stated objective has been to compel a compromise of PRC sovereignty claims (OSD 2012). The
PRC responded by accelerating ongoing island-building activities, excluding foreign fishing
vessels from disputed waters, and constructing new military facilities in the region.

Squo space policy leads to war – bilateral coop insufficient to stop space
warfare
Kulacki 16
Gary, May 2016, UCS China Project Manager, The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous,
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens
across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. “The Risk of Nuclear War with
China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf
China and the United States are also ramping up plans to use military force in outer space. In
2007, the PRC tested a destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptor against one of its own
satellites. Subsequent PRC research, development, and testing of ASAT weapons, particularly a
high-altitude ASAT test in May 2013, caused the Obama administration to shift away from
diplomacy and toward military countermeasures to address the Chinese threat to U.S.
satellites (Hitchens 2016). These demonstrations of the capability and the will to use military
force on the high seas and in outer space mirror attempts by both governments to develop the
capability for cyber attacks. The PRC military has hacked U.S. government and corporate
websites and stolen the personnel files of millions of security clearance holders (Nakashima
2015). U.S. intelligence agencies collaborated with U.S. telecommunication firms that provided
the equipment used in China’s computer networks. The PRC is replacing the equipment with
domestically designed and manufactured replacements and now prohibits U.S. firms from selling
to large sections of the Chinese IT market (Griffiths 2015). In this way, both governments are
implementing policies that prioritize hedging against threats over the benefits of scientific,
technological, and commercial collaboration. The time, effort, and resources they devote to
preparing for a potential war far outweigh their support for confidence building and
cooperation . In some areas, like space science and technology, hedging now makes bilateral
cooperation extremely difficult .

Tensions Rising – US intervention both in water and in air causing problems for
China – Causing extreme Chinese Aggression, war talks a reality
Broder 16 - Jonathan Broder is an author of Foreign Policy and Defense at Newsweek, he has
been covering foreign policy for 2 decades and is a frequent commentator on foreign affairs for
NPR. 6/22/16. News Week. THE ‘INEVITABLE WAR’ BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA.
http://www.newsweek.com/south-china-sea-war-nuclear-submarines-china-united-states-
barack-obama-xi-473428
Updated Roughly 15 years ago, a Chinese fighter jet pilot was killed when he collided with an
American spy plane over the South China Sea. The episode marked the start of tensions
between Beijing and Washington over China’s claim to the strategic waterway. So in May,
when two Chinese warplanes nearly crashed into an American spy plane over the same area,
many in China felt a familiar sense of nationalist outrage. “Most Chinese people hope China’s
fighter jets will shoot down the next spy plane,” wrote the Global Times, China’s official nationalist mouthpiece. Though
little talked about in the West, many Chinese officials have long felt that war between Washington and
Beijing is inevitable. A rising power, the thinking goes, will always challenge a dominant one. Of
course, some analysts dismiss this idea; the costs of such a conflict would be too high, and the U.S., which is far stronger militarily,
would almost certainly win. Yet history is riddled with wars that appeared to make no sense . Today, the
maritime dispute between the U.S. and China has become the most contentious issue in their
complex relationship, and conditions seem ripe for a military clash between the two countries :
This summer, an international court will rule on a Philippine challenge to China's claim to the disputed waterway, and for the first time, Beijing
appears poised to send nuclear-armed submarines into the S outh China Sea. On one level, the dispute is
about territory. Beijing insists that nearly the entire sea—from its islands, reefs and submerged rocks to its fish and underwater energy reserves—
historically belongs to China. The U.S., however, regards the South China Sea as international waters—at least until rival claims by several neighboring
countries can be resolved. Until then, Washington contends, only the U.S Navy can be trusted to ensure freedom of navigation in those waters, which
include some of the world’s most important shipping lanes. The larger conflict, however, revolves around China’s emergence as a major regional power
and America’s insistence on policing the Pacific.
It also involves the system of international rules and institutions
that Washington and its allies crafted after World War II. Chinese President Xi Jinping has
repeatedly complained this system favors America and prevents Beijing from taking its rightful
place as the dominant power in Asia. And at a time when China’s economy is slowing, Xi is under increased pressure at home to
find other ways to demonstrate China’s advances under his leadership. A clear reassertion of Beijing’s control over the South China Sea after more than
a century of foreign domination would do just that. Failure to do so, however, analysts say, could threaten Xi’s grip on power. China says its claim to the
South China Sea dates back thousands of years. But historians date the modern dispute back to about 130 years ago, when various European countries
took over the waterway. Over the next century, the sea formed part of French Indochina, then Japan’s Pacific empire, and after World War II, the U.S.
Navy acted as its caretaker. But in the 1970s, oil and gas deposits were discovered under the sea bed, prompting the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Brunei and Taiwan to stake their own claims to the region. Those countries have since seized 45 islands. Since 2012, China has occupied seven shoals
and, through land reclamation operations, turned them into man-made islands with landing strips and missile defenses. “History matters,” says Fu Ying,
a former ambassador to Britain and now spokeswoman for the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament. In recounting China’s litany of foreign
invasions, beginning in the 1840s with Britain’s seizure of Hong Kong and ending with Japan’s brutal occupation of China before and during World War II,
she notes that the Chinese remain acutely aware of the country’s past humiliation. “ The
people won’t tolerate it if we lose territory yet
again,” says Fu. “We’ve lost enough.” Wary of an armed conflict, U.S. President Barack Obama has
responded by quietly permitting Beijing to operate in the South China Sea while building up
military and economic relations with China’s neighbors in hopes of weakening its influence. And
despite the administration’s repeated vows to sail continuously through the disputed waters, it has mostly avoided them. “We’ve done a lot sailing in
the South China Sea but in areas that aren’t claimed by anybody,” says Bryan Clark, a retired Navy veteran who last served as a special assistant to the
chief of naval operations.
 China War Unlikely
US and China are too close and rely too much on each other to go to war. No
matter how fiercely they compete they will never go to War.
Keck 13 - Zachary Keck is the former managing leader for The Diplomat, and is currently
researching at the Belfer Center in Harvard for International Relations. He also has interned at
the US Congress working on defense issues. 7/12/2013. The Diplomat: Why China and the US
(Probably) Won’t Go to War. http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-
wont-go-to-war/
As I noted earlier in the week, the diplomatic summits between China and the U.S. over the past month has
renewed conversation on whether Beijing and Washington, as rising and established power,
can defy history by not going to war. Xinhua was the latest to weigh in on this question ahead of the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue this week, in an article titled, “China, U.S. Can Avoid ‘Thucydides Trap.’” Like many others, Xinhua’s argument that a U.S.-China war
can be avoided is based largely on their strong economic relationship. This logic is deeply
flawed both historically and logically. Strong economic partners have gone to war in the past,
most notably in WWI, when Britain and Germany fought on opposite sides despite being each
other’s largest trading partners. More generally, the notion of a “capitalist peace” is problematic at best. Close trading ties can raise
the cost of war for each side, but any great power conflict is so costly already that the addition of a
temporarily loss of trade with one’s leading partner is a small consideration at best . And while trade
can create powerful stakeholders in each society who oppose war, just as often trading ties can be an important source of friction. Indeed, the fact that
Japan relied on the U.S. and British colonies for its oil supplies was actually the reason it opted for war against them. Even today, China’s
allegedly unfair trade policies have created resentment among large political constituencies in
the United States. But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, a U.S.-China war is
virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons and geography. The fact
that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious reasons why they
won’t clash, even if they remain fiercely competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means,
and nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics . Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which
cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states. This is not only because of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas
Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that wars
between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in
nomadic “societies.” What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While
extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary
because of any number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war. With
nuclear
weapons, countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to
destroy an entire country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear
attack, every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in
short-order in the event of a total conflict. Since no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the
only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the
U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about redlines are discussed.
 China Cyber War Likely
China Still is a Cyber Threat in US Attacks
Michael Hill 21 Jun 2016 http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/china-still-major-
cyber-threat/. China still poses major cyber Threat Despite Drop in US attacks. Infosecurity
Magazine.
Michael Hill Michael Hill Deputy Editor , Infosecurity Magazine
Over the last year China-based threat actors have lessened their activity against US
organizations, according to new findings from cybersecurity specialists FireEye . FireEye’s observations
are based on 262 intrusions that occurred in 26 countries – including the US, UK, Canada, and Japan – including insights into 72
China-based threat actors. The firm says the shifts in operations are reflective of ongoing military
reforms, widespread exposure of Chinese cyber operations, and actions taken by the US
government. However, despite this decline, FireEye predicts that China will almost certainly
remain an aggressive cyber espionage actor going forward . Since mid-2015 they have observed at least 13
China-based threat groups target a range of industries in the US, Europe, and Japan. That’s despite the agreement
between President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping that neither government would
“conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property”, set out back in
September 2015. China-based groups have been particularly synonymous for targeting governments and firms around Asia for
the past decade, commonly keen on regional security issues in the South China Sea and political movements in Taiwan and Hong
Kong. "Chinaremains a serious cyber threat to the US and countries around the world,” Nick
Rossman, senior strategic threat intelligence manager at FireEye, told Infosecurity. “China is likely
in the process of a multi-year maturation of their cyber program with better organization,
communication and execution. We anticipate an evolution in their organization, tools and tactics .
As we discuss in the report, some China-based groups are improving their capabilities. In addition, as we cover in the report, 13 of
these groups have conducted network compromises in the US, Japan, and Europe since mid-2015, demonstrating that China-based
groups remain active,” he added.

Cyber vulnerabilities high – squo measures insufficient

BY DUSTIN VOLZ AND MARK HOSENBALL .Feb 10, 2016
Concerned by cyber threat, Obama seeks big increase in funding WASHINGTON.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-budget-cyber-idUSKCN0VI0R1
Dustin Volz is a journalist for Reuters covering cybersecurity, and surveillance policy. He also
appears in the Washinton Post. He graduated from Arizona State University. Mark Hosenball is a
writer for Reuters. Before working there he covered for Newsweek, Washington Post, and the
Wall Street Journal. He graduated from University of Pennsylvania.
President Barack Obama on Tuesday sought a surge in funding to counter cyber security threats,
as his top intelligence official warned Congress that computer attacks were among the most
imminent security challenges facing the United States. In his fiscal 2017 budget proposal, Obama
asked for $19 billion for cyber security across the U.S. government, an increase of $5 billion over
this year While the White House's overall fiscal plan faces tough going in the Republican-controlled Congress, increased cyber
security funding has won bipartisan support of lawmakers in the past. The request comes as the Obama
administration has struggled to address the growing risk posed by criminals and nation states in
the digital world. In Congress, Obama's director of national intelligence, James Clapper, warned
that cyber threats "could lead to widespread vulnerabilities in civilian infrastructures and U.S.
government systems." The Obama initiative calls for a more than one-third increase from the
$14 billion appropriated this year and would include $3.1 billion for technology modernization at
various federal agencies. Cyber threats are "among the most urgent dangers to America’s
economic and national security," Obama said in a Wall Street Journal op-ed published on
Tuesday. The request for a cash infusion is the latest signal that the White House intends to make cyber security a priority in the
last year of Obama’s presidency. It follows a series of high-profile hacks against the government and companies like Sony Pictures
(6758.T) and Target (TGT.N) that were largely met with legislative inaction and administrative uncertainty on how best to address
evolving cyber threats. Those difficulties played out publicly last year when the Office of Personnel Management announced it had
fallen victim to a hack that lifted sensitive information on roughly 22 million individuals from its databases. The
White House
issued an executive order setting up a presidential commission on cyber security, which would
make recommendations for strengthening defenses over the next decade. A new position of
federal chief information security officer also would be established . A government watchdog report last
month concluded the government’s cyber defense system, known as Einstein, is ineffective at combating hackers. Obama also
signed another executive order creating a permanent Federal Privacy Council, which aims to
connect privacy officials across the government to develop comprehensive guidelines for how
personal data is collected and stored. The president’s budget proposal also called for $62 million
to expand efforts to attract and retain qualified cyber professionals working for the government.
 China Cyber War Unlikely
Chinese cyber-espionage down 90% in U.S
BY JOSEPH MENN AND JIM FINKLE June 21, 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cyber-spying-china-idUSKCN0Z700D . Reuters.com Chinese economic cyber-espionage
plummets in U.S
Jim Finn works in Reuters Boston Bureau covering cyber security, hacking and technology issues. He also previously
covered for Bloomberg News. Joseph Menn is the technology projects reporter for Reuters in San Francisico. He wrote
the book The Hunt for the New Crime Lords who are bringing down the Internet.
The Chinese government appears to be abiding by its September pledge to stop supporting the
hacking of American trade secrets to help companies there compete, private U.S. security executives and government
advisors said on Monday. FireEye Inc, the U.S. network security company best known for fighting sophisticated Chinese
hacking, said in a report released late Monday that breaches attributed to China-based groups had
plunged by 90 percent in the past two years. The most dramatic drop came during last summer's
run-up to the bilateral agreement, it added. FireEye's Mandiant unit in 2013 famously blamed a specific unit of
China's Peoples Liberation Army for a major campaign of economic espionage. Kevin Mandia, the Mandiant founder who took over
last week as FireEye chief executive, said in an interview that several factors seemed to be behind the shift. He cited embarrassment
from Mandiant's 2013 report and the following year's indictment of five PLA officers from the same unit Mandiant uncovered.
Prosecutors said the victims included U.S. Steel, Alcoa Inc and Westinghouse Electric. Mandia also cited the threat just before the
agreement that the United States could impose sanctions on Chinese officials and companies. "They all contributed to a positive
result," Mandia said. A senior Obama administration official said the government was not yet ready to proclaim that China was fully
complying with the agreement but said the new report would factor into its monitoring. "We are still doing an assessment," said the
official, speaking on condition he not be named. The official added that a just-concluded second round of talks with China on the
finer points of the agreement had gone well. He noted that China had sent senior leaders even after the U.S. Secretary of Homeland
Security pulled out because of the Orlando shootings. China's Foreign Ministry, the only government department to regularly answer
questions from foreign reporters on the hacking issue, said China
aimed to maintain dialogue on preventing and
combating cyber-spying. "We've expressed our principled position on many occasions," ministry spokeswoman Hua
Chunying told a daily news briefing on Tuesday. "We oppose and crack down on commercial
cyber-espionage activities in all forms." FireEye said that Chinese intrusions into some U.S. firms have continued, with
at least two hacked in 2016. But while the hackers installed "back doors" to enable future spying, FireEye said it had seen no
evidence that data was stolen. Both hacked companies had government contracts, said FireEye analyst Laura Galante, noting that it
was plausible that the intrusions were stepping stones toward gathering information on government or military people or projects,
which remain fair game under the September accord. FireEye
and other security companies said that as the
Chinese government-backed hackers dropped wholesale theft of U.S. intellectual property , they
increased spying on political and military targets in other countries and regions, including Russia, the Middle East, Japan and South
Korea. Another security firm, CrowdStrike, has observed more Chinese state-supported hackers spying outside of the United States
over the past year, company Vice President Adam Meyers said in an interview. Targets include Russian and Ukrainian military targets,
Indian political groups and the Mongolian mining industry, Meyers said. FireEye and CrowdStrike said they were confident that the
attacks are being carried out either directly by the Chinese government or on its behalf by hired contractors. Since late last year there
has been a flurry of new espionage activity against Russian government agencies and technology firms, as well as other targets in
India, Japan and South Korea, said Kurt Baumgartner, a researcher with Russian security software maker Kaspersky Lab. He said those
groups use tools and infrastructure that depend on Chinese-language characters. One of those groups, known as Mirage or APT 15,
appears to have ended a spree of attacks on the U.S. energy sector and is now focusing on government and diplomatic targets in
Russia and former Soviet republics, Baumgartner said. (Reporting by Joseph Menn in San Francisco and Jim Finkle in Boston;
Additional reporting by; Megha Rajagopalan in Beijing; Editing by Jonathan Weber and Richard Chang)

China and U.S. cooperating to solve cyber attacks now

GERRY SHIH, ASSOCIATED PRESS BEIJING — Jun 14, 2016,
China, US Hold Talks to Bridge Cybersecurity Differences.
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/china-us-hold-talks-bridge-cybersecurity-
differences-39835869. Garry shih is a corresponded in San Francisco covering Internet
companies and social media.
Chinese and American officials said Tuesday they're committed to bridging their differences on
cybersecurity and moving to implement recent agreements , as they held talks amid complaints over China-
based hacking operations that the U.S. says may have already cost U.S. companies tens of billions of dollars. Repeated
meetings between the sides on cybersecurity indicate the seriousness with which the Obama
administration regards the issue, the U.S. ambassador to China, Max Baucus, said at the start of the two-day talks in
western Beijing. U.S. officials have been particularly eager to build on an agreement forged during
Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the White House in September that says neither
government will support commercial cyber-theft. The deal was viewed by Washington as a diplomatic
breakthrough, although U.S. officials have not conclusively determined that it has led to a decline in hacks against U.S. companies.
"We're here today to ensure implementation of agreements made by the two presidents,
commitments that illustrate that we can work through areas of differences to reach areas of
cooperation," Baucus said, referring to the agreement, which he called a "major advancement ."
Cyber issues are "an important element in our bilateral relationship, " the ambassador said. "Each step that
we take enables us to have greater trust. We're prepared to work hard with you to narrow our differences." Chinese Minister
of Public Security Guo Shengkun said China wants to "bring the discussions from policies on
paper to actual implementation." "Both sides will continue to cooperate on cyber cases," Guo
said. "I believe the leadership on both sides places emphasis on the issue and values participation. Xi Jinping has personally been
involved." U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and Attorney General Loretta Lynch were scheduled to attend the
meetings, but withdrew following the mass shooting in Orlando, Florida. In a meeting with Suzanne Spaulding, an undersecretary at
the Department of Homeland Security, Meng Jianzhu, secretary of the Communist Party's Central Political and Legal Affairs
Commission, said China wants to make progress on talks in the final half year of the Obama administration. "We hope that both sides
can work to enrich our cooperation in the remaining six months and leave more of a political legacy for President Obama, and lay a
strong foundation for our cooperation for the next administration," said Meng, who as China's de facto security chief has been
closely involved in cybersecurity discussions. Although China denies sponsoring or permitting hacking attacks, a U.S. congressional
advisory body said last year that China's increasing use of cyber espionage has already cost U.S. companies tens of billions of dollars
in lost sales and expenses in repairing the damage from hacking. It said that in many cases, stolen trade secrets had been turned over
to Chinese government-owned companies. That body, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, is typically very
critical of Beijing, and said the U.S. response to the threat has been "inadequate." It said China has also infiltrated a wide swath of
U.S. government computer networks. Among the most serious breaches in which China is suspected was one last year against the
Office of Personnel Management. Hackers gained access to the personal information of more than 22 million U.S. federal employees,
retirees, contractors and others. China describes itself as a victim of hacking and says it is combating cybercrimes. Along with
cybersecurity, the two days of talks are also expected to deal with global supply chain security, combating transnational crime, illegal
immigration, counterterrorism and maritime law enforcement.
 China Miscalc Probable
Ambiguity in US nuclear policy makes nuclear miscalc likely – US ability to
negate Chinese second strike causes use it or lose it approach
Kulacki 16
Gary, May 2016, UCS China Project Manager, The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous,
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens
across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. “The Risk of Nuclear War with
China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf
The PRC solution to avoiding a nuclear exchange begins with a commitment to no first use of
nuclear weapons. PRC participants in the dialogues claim their policies around procuring,
deploying, alerting, and using nuclear weapons are consistent with that commitment (Roberts
2016). Official U.S. assessments affirm that the PRC maintains a small nuclear force, kept off
alert and to be used for retaliation from a nuclear attack (OSD 2016), but they remain skeptical
that China would not use nuclear weapons first in some situations. PRC participants in the
talks argue that a comparable no-first-use commitment from the United States would be the
best way to ensure that a conventional military conflict between the two nations does not
escalate to the nuclear level. The Obama administration considered this option but concluded
there is “a narrow range of contingencies” where the United States may need to resort to the
first use of nuclear weapons to counter conventional attacks against the United States, its
allies, or non-allied “partners” (DOD 2010). Statements by a former Pentagon official who
participated in these deliberations indicated that one of those contingencies is a conventional
attack by the PRC on U.S. military bases in Asia (Roberts 2016). Because the Obama
administration considered and rejected the possibility of committing the United States to a no-
first-use policy, most of the U.S. participants in the dialogues view continued PRC requests for
this commitment as an obstacle to progress. PRC participants have responded by suggesting an
alternative: an assurance from the United States that it would not seek to negate China’s
ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons if struck first. Some U.S. officials, such as former
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, appear
willing to grant the PRC this assurance; in their view, it is “not a policy choice to be embraced or
rejected, but rather a strategic fact to be managed with priority on strategic stability” (CFR
2009). However, some experts express concern that, while true, acknowledging this fact could
undermine extended deterrence guarantees the United States has made to China’s neighbors.
Other U.S. officials worry that the PRC’s communist leaders would interpret acquiescence on
this point as a sign of appeasement , increasing the probability of PRC military aggression
(Roberts 2016).

Conventional war escalates to nuclear exchange – destroying or disabling

military tech makes miscalculation likely
Kulacki 15
Gary, March UCS China Project Manager, The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous,
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens
across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. “The Chinese Military Updates
China’s Nuclear Strategy” http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/chinese-
nuclear-strategy-full-report.pdf
Despite efforts by both sides to develop a strategic dialog, strategic trust between the PLA and
the U.S. military remains well out of reach (Lieberthal and Wang 2012). Mutually acceptable
strategic adjustments, however, are both possible and urgently needed. Both militaries seek to
avoid war, in part because if war should break out it will be difficult to restrain. PLA strategists
believe that modern military technologies, especially space and cyber technologies, can
disable or destroy the info rmation systems needed to make decisions and control military
activity, while at the same time requiring decision makers to act quickly in a crisis .
Escalation will be rapid and could end in a nuclear exchange .

US-China miscalc likely -- China misjudges the situation

Ryall 15
Ryall, Julian, the Japan Correspondent for the Daily Telegraph "US-China War 'inevitable' Unless
Washington Drops Demands over South China Sea." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 26
May 2015. Web. 22 June 2016.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11630185/US-China-war-inevitable-
unless-Washington-drops-demands-over-South-China-Sea.html>.
Analysts say neither Washington nor Beijing appear to be in the mood to back down and that there
is a serious risk of a minor incident in airspace around the islands escalating rapidly. “I think the
concern has to be that China misjudges the situation ”, said Robert Dujarric, director of the Institute of
Contemporary Asian Studies at the Japan campus of Temple University. “ Neither party wants a war if it can be
avoided, but there are red lines for both sides ”, he said. “I worry whether Beijing considers the US
to be a declining power and assumes that Washington will back down if it shoots down a US
observation aircraft”.Washington chose to “de-escalate” a major crisis that blew up after a
Chinese fighter collided with a US Navy intelligence-gathering aircraft off Hainan Island in April 2001.
However, Prof. Dujarric said there would be a different response if a similar incident were to occur in what Washington insists is
international air space over the South China Sea
 China Miscalc Improbable
Military to Military exercises prevent miscalc
Kulacki 16
Gary, May 2016, UCS China Project Manager, The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous,
independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens
across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative,
practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. “The Risk of Nuclear War with
China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf
The two militaries have agreed to regular exchanges intended to keep political disagreements
and diplomatic maneuvering from escalating into armed conflict . These exchanges include
meetings between senior defense officials, academic conferences, and ship visits. The U.S.
Department of Defense claims the exchanges have “sustained positive momentum and
achieved notable accomplishments,” especially two memoranda of understanding on
c onfidence b uilding m easure s to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and accidents ( OSD
2016). General Fang Fenghui, the chief of the Joint Staff Department under the Central Military
Commission, told former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the Chinese military was
fully committed to implementing these memoranda, as well as to build ing a “healthy and
stable military-to-military relationship that was beneficial to increasing strategic trust
between the PRC and the United States” (MOD 2016).

Recent disputes prove that the US will use caution and protocols to avert war
Blanchard and Shalal 15
Blanchard, Ben, a General News and Politics Reporter for Reuters and Andrea Shalal, a Journalist
for Reuters "China Naval Chief Says Minor Incident Could Spark War in South China Sea."
Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 30 Oct. 2015. Web. 22 June 2016.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-china-navy-idUSKCN0SO05320151030>.
China's naval commander told his U.S. counterpart that a minor incident could spark war in
the South China Sea if the United States did not stop its "provocative acts" in the disputed
waterway, the Chinese navy said on Friday. Admiral Wu Shengli made the. comments to U.S. chief of naval
operations Admiral John Richardson during a video teleconference on Thursday, according to a Chinese naval statement
The two officers held talks after a U.S. warship sailed within 12 nautical miles of one of Beijing's
man-made islands in the contested Spratly archipelago on Tuesday. China has rebuked Washington over the
patrol, the most significant U.S. challenge yet to territorial limits China effectively claims around its seven artificial islands in one of
the world's busiest sea lanes. "If
the United States continues with these kinds of dangerous, provocative acts,
there could well be a seriously pressing situation between frontline forces from both sides on
the sea and in the air, or even a minor incident that sparks war," the statement paraphrased Wu as saying.
"(I) hope the U.S. side cherishes the good situation between the Chinese and U.S. navies that has not come easily and avoids these
kinds of incidents from happening again," Wu said. Speaking earlier, a U.S. official said the naval chiefs agreed to maintain dialogue
and follow protocols to avoid clashes. Scheduled port visits by U.S. and Chinese ships and planned visits to China by senior U.S. Navy
officers remained on track, the official said. "None of that is in jeopardy. Nothing has been canceled," said the official. UNPLANNED
ENCOUNTERS Both officers agreed on the need to stick to protocols established under the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). "They agreed that it's very important that both sides
continue to use the protocols under the CUES agreement when they're operating close to keep
the chances for misunderstanding and any kind of provocation from occurring," the U.S. official said.
Indeed, Wu said he believed the Chinese and U.S. navies had plenty of scope for cooperation and should both "play a positive role in
maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea". A U.S. Navy spokesman stressed Washington's position that U.S. freedom of
navigation operations were meant to "protect the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations
under international law". Chinese warships followed the USS Lassen, a guided-missile destroyer, as it moved through the Spratlys on
Tuesday. The U.S. Navy is operating in a maritime domain bristling with Chinese ships. While the U.S. Navy is expected to keep its
technological edge in Asia for decades, China's potential trump card is sheer weight of numbers, with dozens of naval and coastguard
vessels routinely deployed in the South China Sea, security experts say.

The Risk of Unintentional Incidents in the South China Sea are “Pretty Low” –
they are professional navies who prepare for interactions regularly
Dougherty 16
Dougherty, Carter, the Senior International Economics Writer at International Business Times
"Top U.S. Naval Official Says Chances Of Accidental Incident In South China Sea Are 'Pretty Low'"
International Business Times. International Business Times, 06 May 2016. Web. 22 June 2016.
<http://www.ibtimes.com/top-us-naval-official-says-chances-accidental-incident-south-china-
sea-are-pretty-low-2365041>.
A top U.S. naval officer for the Pacific Rim said the chances of an unintentional incident in the
disputed waters of the South China Sea are “pretty low,” despite heightened tensions over
Beijing’s reclamation of land in a string of disputed islands. “ These are professional navies,” Rear
Admiral Mark Montgomery, the director for operations of the U.S. Pacific Command, told a group of journalists
Thursday. “The highest risk is associated with non-military vessels.” U.S. and Chinese naval forces regularly drill for
unplanned maritime encounters on the high seas, following a set of international procedures
worked out by militaries in the Pacific, Montgomery said. Beyond that, the two countries have “a
significant amount of interaction” every month , whether ship visits or informal conversations,
that help guard against unintentional incidents.
 Cyber High
Cyberattacks remain high – the US has a state of emergency, bilateral talks are
slow and may collapse, both countries are increasing capabilities
Gady 6/16
Franz-Stefan Gady. June 16, 2016. China-US Relations in Cyberspace: A Half-Year Assessment. Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor
with The Diplomat. He also is a Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute where he edits the Policy Innovation
Blog.http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/china-us-relations-in-cyberspace-a-half-year-assessment/
Nevertheless, major stumbling blocks remain. First, while there may be a slowdown in Chinese state-
sponsored attacks on the private sector, U.S. President Barack Obama extended a national state of
emergency due to continued cyberattacks against U.S. critical information infrastructure in April
2015. “Significant malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in
whole or in substantial part, outside the United States continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States,” Obama wrote in a
letter justifying the state of emergency extension this March. As a result, the United States can still impose
economic sanctions and travel restrictions on foreign nationals thought to be behind
cyberattacks—hardly a vote of confidence for the Chinese government. Second, progress during
recent talks has been slow, leaving both the U.S. private sector and the U.S. military (along
with U.S. intelligence agencies) dissatisfied with the Obama administration’s approach to
reducing Chinese state-sponsored attacks. Time and again, U.S. defense officials, along with private sector
representatives, have leaked to the media the possibility of cyber counterattacks against Chinese
critical information infrastructure. Neither, the Pentagon nor private sector is happy with the current U.S. cyber
deterrence strategy. In particular, the U.S. State Department’s concepts of “deterrence by denial” as well as “voluntary norms
of responsible state behavior in cyberspace” are seen as too weak in the face of persistent
Chinese attacks. As a result, there is a chance that bilateral talks might collapse given the apparent
disunity among stakeholders in the United States. Third, fundamental differences between China and the
United States remain when it comes to Internet governance issues , China’s new anti-terror law, and
military-to-military relations in cyberspace, among other things. Both the China and the United States continue
building up their cyber weapons arsenals and probing each other’s networks . In a number of speeches
Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to improve China’s cyberwarfare capabilities and
strengthen“cyber defense and deterrence capabilities.” As I noted previously, the U.S. Department of Defense
published a new Law of War Manual, in which the pre-emplacement of “logic bombs” in an adversary country’s networks and
information systems is advocated, which can further fuel competition and bred mistrust .
Neither side accepts
limitations in the development neither of cyber weapons nor to the overall militarization of
cyberspace. However, analysts of China-U.S. relations in cyberspace have to take into account the ultimate objective of talks.
That is, it is important to understand that the end goal of Sino-U.S. deliberations will not be an end to state-
sponsored hacking and any other form of cyberattacks including cyber espionage , but to put a
framework in place that will not only help prevent disagreements in cyberspace from spilling over into other parts of the bilateral
relationship, but also help both sides to get closer to an understanding of what constitutes strategic stability, i.e., peace, in
cyberspace. On that front, we may expect some progress in the months ahead.
 Cyber Low
Cyberattacks from China low now – no state sponsored attacks, agreements are
effective, and new agreements have been made to limit new attacks
Gady 6/16
Franz-Stefan Gady. June 16, 2016. China-US Relations in Cyberspace: A Half-Year Assessment. Franz-Stefan Gady is an Associate Editor
with The Diplomat. He also is a Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute where he edits the Policy Innovation
Blog.http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/china-us-relations-in-cyberspace-a-half-year-assessment/
With the second round of the China-U.S. High-Level Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues held on June 14 in Beijing finished, as
well as the eighth China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) concluded, it might be time for a tentative mid-year
assessment of China-U.S. relations in cyberspace. Overall, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic
about the relationship for three reasons . First, we have not seen the disclosure of a likely
Chinese state-sponsored cyber operation akin to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management data breach revealed in
June 2015. This in no way means that these sorts of attacks are not occurring at the moment. However, the fact that neither
country has chosen to publicize any large-scale attacks in 2016 indicates a willingness by both sides
to at least attempt to find a modus operandi in cyberspace that will not have spillover effects
into other parts of the bilateral relationship. Second, the September 2015 Sino-U.S. agreement to
refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting commercial cyber-espionage appears to have
had some impact (in combination with the threat of economic sanctions). While difficult to verify independently, the U.S.
private sector has seen a reduction in Chinese state-sponsored hacking over the last few months,
according to a number of key U.S. security experts. This could indicate that “the days of
widespread Chinese smash-and-grab activity, get in, get out, don’t care if you’re caught, seem to be over,”
a former U.S. National Security Council official told the Financial Times . Chinese hackers have
been more careful in covering their tracks, which paradoxically will help depoliticize cyber
issues during bilateral discussions, even when attacks continue.(Chinese President Xi Jinping’s push for
reforms within the Chinese intelligence and military apparatus is also having a huge impact in
the reduction of activities by rogue cyber actors in those institutions.) Third, official talks between China and
the United States are continuing with a real chance to slowly institutionalize cooperation on
cybercrime and norms of state behavior in cyberspace. In May, the first Sino-U.S. Senior Experts Group
convened to discuss international norms and other security-related topics. The U.S. State Department called the dialogue “fruitful.”
The recently concluded eight S&ED reaffirmed that both China and the United States “refrain
from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property,
including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive
advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” The recent High-Level Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues expanded on
guidelines and mechanisms for cooperation outlined during the last meeting in December 2015. China and the United States also
held a tabletop exercise concerning cybercrime and network protection in April 2016.