People v.

Marti

Facts: Andre Marti and his common-law wife sent 4 gift wrapped packages via Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. When
Anita Reyes asked if she can examine the packages, Marti refused and assured her that it only contains books and cigars.
Before delivery to Bureau of Customs it is SOP to open the boxes for inspection and found dried leaves with peculiar odor
from the said box. They asked NBI to test the dried leaves. The NBI made inventory and took charge of the box. Dried leaves
are found to be marijuana. When Marti was claiming his mail at post office he has invited for questioning by the NBI. Marti
contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.

Issue: Whether or not Marti’s right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated?

Decision: Judgment affirmed. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. The search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.

Waterhouse Drug v NLRC

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to
Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed
that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that
the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten
bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to
Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open
envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held: Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as
said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was
insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided
by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
Zulueta v CA

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without
the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance
operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her
right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed
to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information,
and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order
for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal
cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
[T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when
the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

PART III
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 7
WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s
organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall contain the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent or if the name and personal circumstances are unknown and
uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the act or omission complained of, and the
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
 (d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence, scientific or other expert
studies, and if possible, object evidence;

(e) The certification of petitioner under oath that: (1) petitioner has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and no such other action or claim is pending therein; (2) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of its present status; (3) if petitioner should learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, petitioner shall report to the court that fact within five (5) days therefrom; and

(f) The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO.

Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals.

Section 4. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of docket

fees.

Section 5. Issuance of the writ. - Within three (3) days from the date of filing of the petition, if the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, the court shall give an order: (a) issuing the writ; and (b) requiring the respondent to file a verified return as provided in Section
8 of this Rule. The clerk of court shall forthwith issue the writ under the seal of the court including the issuance of a cease and desist order
and other temporary reliefs effective until further order.

Section 6. How the writ is served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a court officer or any person deputized by the court,
who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally, the rule on substituted service
shall apply.

Section 7. Penalty for refusing to issue or serve the writ. - A clerk of court who unduly delays or refuses to issue the writ after its allowance
or a court officer or deputized person who unduly delays or refuses to serve the same shall be punished by the court for contempt without
prejudice to other civil, criminal or administrative actions.

Section 8. Return of respondent; contents. - Within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days after service of the writ, the respondent shall
file a verified return which shall contain all defenses to show that respondent did not violate or threaten to violate, or allow the violation of
any environmental law, rule or regulation or commit any act resulting to environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

All defenses not raised in the return shall be deemed waived.

The return shall include affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence, scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence, in
support of the defense of the respondent.

A general denial of allegations in the petition shall be considered as an admission thereof.

Section 9. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss;

(b) Motion for extension of time to file return;

(c) Motion for postponement;

(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;

(f) Third-party complaint;

(g) Reply; and

(h) Motion to declare respondent in default.

Section 10. Effect of failure to file return. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
Section 11. Hearing. - Upon receipt of the return of the respondent, the court may call a preliminary conference to simplify the issues,
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions from the parties, and set the petition for hearing.

The hearing including the preliminary conference shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days and shall be given the same priority as petitions
for the writs of habeas corpus, amparo and habeas data.

Section 12. Discovery Measures. - A party may file a verified motion for the following reliefs:

(a) Ocular Inspection; order — The motion must show that an ocular inspection order is necessary to establish the magnitude of
the violation or the threat as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It shall state in
detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses having personal knowledge of the
violation or threatened violation of environmental law.

After hearing, the court may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property to permit entry for the
purpose of inspecting or

photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making
the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties.

(b) Production or inspection of documents or things; order – The motion must show that a production order is necessary to
establish the magnitude of the violation or the threat as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces.

After hearing, the court may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of
the movant.

The production order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the production and the date, time, place and manner of
making the inspection or production and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties.

Section 13. Contempt. - The court may after hearing punish the respondent who refuses or unduly delays the filing of a return, or who
makes a false return, or any person who disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.

Section 14. Submission of case for decision; filing of memoranda. - After hearing, the court shall issue an order submitting the case for
decision. The court may require the filing of memoranda and if possible, in its electronic form, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30)
days from the date the petition is submitted for decision.

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting
or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation
of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;

(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore
the environment;

(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the
decision and orders of the court;

(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on the
execution of the final judgment; and

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation,
rehabilitation or restoration of the

environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.

Section 16. Appeal. - Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration, any
party may appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise questions of fact.

Section 17. Institution of separate actions. - The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of
separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.

Oposa v Factoran

FACTS:
Forty-four children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR Secretary stop issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking
their right to a healthful environment (Secs. 16, 15 Article II, 1987 Constitution). The petitioners further asserted that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." They further claimed that the Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements to cover more areas for logging than what is available.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action to file the case.

RULING:
Yes. the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the rights enumerated in the latter: “[it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions”. The right is linked to the
constitutional right to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It
imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding
generations as “the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance
of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.”

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia,
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges
is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.
The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is
to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing
the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing
permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the
government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water
quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove
and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred
in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when
a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
“has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general
application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of the
MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the
Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for
environmental cases.

20 days – Temporary restraining order

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)

Syllabus

Prior to September 3, 1945, petitioner was the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese
Army in the Philippine Islands. On that day, he surrendered to the United States Army and became a prisoner of war.
Respondent was the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, whose command embraced
the Philippine Islands. Respondent appointed a military commission to try the petitioner on a charge of violation of the law
of war. The gist of the charge was that petitioner had failed in his duty as an army commander to control the operations of
his troops, "permitting them to commit" specified atrocities against the civilian population and prisoners of war. Petitioner
was found guilty, and sentenced to death.

Held:

1. The military commission appointed to try the petitioner was lawfully created. P. 327 U. S. 9.

(a) Nature of the authority to create military commissions for the trial of enemy combatants for offenses against the law of
war, and principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by such commissions, considered. Citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1,
and other cases. Pp. 327 U. S. 7-9.

(b) A military commission may be appointed by any field commander, or by any commander competent to appoint a general
court-martial, as was respondent by order of the President. P. 327 U. S. 10.

(c) The order creating the military commission was in conformity with the Act of Congress (10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593) sanctioning

Page 327 U. S. 2

the creation of such tribunals for the trial of offenses against the law of war committed by enemy combatants. P. 327 U. S.
11.

2. Trial of the petitioner by the military commission was lawful, although hostilities had ceased. P. 327 U. S. 12.

(a) A violation of the law of war, committed before the cessation of hostilities, may lawfully be tried by a military commission
after hostilities have ceased -- at least until peace has been officially recognized by treaty or proclamation by the political
branch of the Government. P. 327 U. S. 12.

(b) Trial of the petitioner by the military commission was authorized by the political branch of the Government, by military
command, by international law and usage, and by the terms of the surrender of the Japanese government. P. 327 U. S. 13.

3. The charge preferred against the petitioner was of a violation of the law of war. P. 327 U. S. 13.
(a) The law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to
control the troops under his command for the prevention of acts which are violations of the law of war and which are likely
to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and he may be charged with personal responsibility
for his failure to take such measures when violations result. Pp. 327 U. S. 14, 327 U. S. 16.

(b) What measures, if any, petitioner took to prevent the alleged violations of the law of war, and whether such measures as
he may have taken were appropriate and sufficient to discharge the duty imposed upon him, were questions within the
peculiar competence of the military officers composing the commission, and were for it to decide. P. 327 U. S. 16.

(c) Charges of violations of the law of war triable before a military tribunal need not be stated with the precision of a common
law indictment. P. 327 U. S. 17.

(d) The allegations of the charge here, tested by any reasonable standard, sufficiently set forth a violation of the law of war,
and the military commission had authority to try and to decide the issue which it raised. P.327 U. S. 17.

4. In admitting on behalf of the prosecution a deposition and hearsay and opinion evidence, the military commission did not
violate any Act of Congress, treaty, or military command defining the commission's authority. Pp. 327 U. S. 18, 327 U. S. 23.

(a) The Articles of War, including Articles 25 and 38, are not applicable to the trial of an enemy combatant by a military
commission

Page 327 U. S. 3

for violations of the law of war, and imposed no restrictions upon the procedure to be followed in such trial. Pp. 327 U. S. 19-
20.

(b) Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, which provides that

"Sentence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in
the case of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power,"

does not require that Articles 25 and 38 of the Articles of War be applied in the trial of the petitioner. Article 63 refers to
sentence "pronounced against a prisoner of war" for an offense committed while a prisoner of war, and not for a violation of
the law of war committed while a combatant. P. 327 U. S. 20.

(c) The Court expresses no opinion on the question of the wisdom of considering such evidence as was received in this
proceeding, nor on the question whether the action of a military tribunal in admitting evidence which Congress or controlling
military command has directed to be excluded may be drawn in question by petition for habeas corpus or prohibition. P. 327
U. S. 23.

5. On an application for habeas corpus, the Court is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. P. 327 U. S.
8.

6. By sanctioning trials of enemy aliens by military commission for offenses against the law of war, Congress recognized the
right of the accused to make a defense, and did not foreclose their right to contend that the Constitution or laws of the United
States withhold authority to proceed with the trial. P. 327 U. S. 9.

7. The Court does not appraise the evidence on which the petitioner here was convicted. P. 327 U. S. 17.

8. The military commission's rulings on evidence and on the mode of conducting the proceedings against the petitioner are
not reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing military authorities. From this viewpoint, it is unnecessary to consider
what, in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might require. Pp.327 U. S. 8, 327 U. S. 23.

9. Article 60 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, which provides that,

"At the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, the detaining Power shall advise the representative
of the protecting Power thereof as soon as possible, and always before the date set for the opening of the trial,"

applies only to persons who are subjected to judicial proceedings for offenses committed while prisoners of war. P. 327 U. S.
23.

10. The detention of the petitioner for trial, and his detention upon his conviction, subject to the prescribed review by the
military authorities, were lawful. P. 327 U. S. 25.

Leave and petition denied.

Page 328 U. S. 4

No. 61, Misc. Application for leave to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition in this Court challenging the
jurisdiction and legal authority of a military commission which convicted applicant of a violation of the law of war and
sentenced him to be hanged. Denied.

No. 672. Petition for certiorari to review an order of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, 42 Off.Gaz.
664, denying an application for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition likewise challenging the jurisdiction and legal authority
of the military commission which tried and convicted petitioner. Denied.

David v Arroyo

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists
to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies
and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated
anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the
same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back
in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and
GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared
by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-
Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights.
The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and
take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case
at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional.
The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute
such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and
do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech
cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that
it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected
conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power
as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise
of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated
legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC
ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without
any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out
power of the president by the president.