Title: Lolita Bas Capablanca vs. Heirs of Pedro Bas, et al G.R. No.
224144 On December 16, 1996, a notarized Partition Agreement of Real Property,
Doctrine: This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary
in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.
(Yet this doctrine does not apply here since, what the plaintiff asserts is her right of
ownership from the validity of the sale from Pedro to Faustina not as an heir.)
Facts:
The subject matter of this case is Lot 2535 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Land's
Estate located in "Biasong, Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu"5 with an area of 6,120 square
meters.
Andres Bas (Andres) and Pedro Bas (Pedro) acquired Lot 2535, "and Patent No.
1724 was issued in their names on May 12, 1937. Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal
(Faustina, sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale dated November 28,
1939. Lot 2535 consisting of "1,000 square meters, more or less," was later
conveyed to one (1) of their heirs, Alejandra Balorio (Alejandra).
Alejandra sold the land through a Deed of Absolute Sale to Edith N. Deen, who in
turn sold it to Atty. Eddy A. Deen (Atty. Deen). Upon Atty. Deen's death an extra-
judicial settlement of estate, which did not include Lot 2535, was executed by his
heirs. Later, they executed an Additional Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute
Deed of Sale, which sold the land for ₱l0,000.00 to Norberto B. Bas (Norberto),
who took possession of and built a house on it.
On December 15, 1995, Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by his
niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita).
Subsequently, Lolita learned that a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-96676
dated June 6, 1996 was issued in the names of Andres and Pedro on the basis of a
reconstituted Deed of Conveyance No. 96-00004.
In October 1996, Josefina Bas Espinosa (Josefina) represented the Heirs of Pedro
Bas to file a complaint for Clarification of Ownership of Lot 2535 against Lolita
before the Lupon where the parties did not resolve the dispute and resulted to the
issuance of a Certification to file Action.
Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights was executed between the heirs of Andres and
Lolita, representing Norberto, whereby they partitioned Lot 2535 among
themselves.
Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu, citing the need for a court order. Lolita then learned that TCT No.
T-96676 had been partially cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183,
and T-100185 had been issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented
by Josefina, on May 29, 1997.
Lolita filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the
cancellation of the titles with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses.
In their Answer, the Heirs of Pedro Bas claimed that "the sale between Pedro Bas
and Faustina Manreal [was] fake, spurious and invalid because [Pedro] who [was]
an illiterate never learned how to write his name so that the signature appearing
thereon could not have been made by Pedro Bas." They further claimed that the
cancellation of TCT No. T-96676 was made pursuant to a final judgment in Civil
Case No. 840 22 for Partition, Damages, and Attorney's Fees.
Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City rendered a Decision on December 26,
2007, in favor of Lolita. Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court
Decision and dismissed the complaint.
Hence, Lolita filed this Petition .
This Court grants the petition.
This Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in
order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of titles of the property.
The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the
validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina, from which
followed a series of transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the
property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property in 1939, it follows that
there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been
transmitted to his heirs.
Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her predecessor-in-
interest and not on any filiation with the original owner. What petitioner is
pursuing is Norberto's right of ownership over the property which was passed to
her upon the latter's death.46
This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order
that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased
Here, respondents never raised their objection to petitioner's capacity to sue
either as an affirmative defense or in a motion to dismiss.53 Rule 9, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court states, "[ d]efenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Thus, it was erroneous
for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no
prior judicial declaration of petitioner's heirship to Norberto..
Here, as stated, the main issue is the annulment of title to property, which
ultimately hinges on the validity of the sale from Pedro to Faustina. Petitioner does
not claim any filiation with Pedro or seek to establish her right as his heir as
against the respondents. Rather, petitioner seeks to enforce her right over the
property which has been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of respondents.
Furthermore, as found by the Regional Trial Court:
The plaintiff [Lolita] has sufficient interest to protect in the subject portion of Lot
2535. She had been there for around thirty (30) years, and had been in possession
thereof under a claim of ownership as an alleged heir of Norberto Bas after the
latter's death on December 15, 1993, that is: long before the issuance of TCT Nos.
T-100181, T-100182, T-100183[,] and T-100185 in 1997, and even TCT No. T-96676
in 1996. Moreover, it is annotated on TCT No. T-96676 (Exhibit "G") that she,
together with the heirs of Osmundo Bas, executed a declaration of heirs with
partition, quitclaim, etc., dated December 16, 1996, registered on March 3, 1997
... wherein they adjudicated unto themselves and partitioned Lot No. 2535 .. . She
also executed on June 14, 1997 an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir, declaring
herself as the sole heir of Norberto Bas and adjudicated unto herself the subject
portion pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The existence of the questioned certificates of title, and other related documents,
constitute clouds on said interest. There seems, therefore, to be no necessity that
the plaintiff should have been declared first as an heir of Norberto Bas as a
prerequisite to this action. Her possession of the subject lot under a claim of
ownership is a sufficient interest to entitle her to bring this suit.
This case has gone a long way since the complaint was filed in 1997. A full-blown
trial had taken place and judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court
where it thoroughly discussed, evaluated, and weighed all the pieces of
documentary evidence and testimonies of the witnesses of both parties. At this
point, to dismiss the case and require petitioner to institute a special proceeding
to determine her status as heir of the late Norberto would hamper, instead of
serve, justice.
In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require
it would be superfluous considering that petitioner had already presented
evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto, which respondents
never disputed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
Title: Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Absolute Management
Corporation, G.R. No. 170498 January 9, 2013
Doctrine: A claim against an estate based on quasi-contract and a contingent claim
both belong to the category of claims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Comi and, as such, should have been so filed in Special Proceedings.
Facts:
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint
for sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC).
SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the
purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of
₱12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Checks. These checks were all crossed,
and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General
Manager, in 1998.
Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
commenced before the RTC of Pasay City, pending at the time AMC filed its
answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.
SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items
worth ₱8,331,700.00. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua
received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth ₱31,807,500.00. These were all
payable to AMC and were crossed or "for payee’s account only.
In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint, AMC averred that it
had no knowledge of Chua’s transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any
money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the
subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.
According to Metrobank, AMC’s claim against it is the same claim that it raised
against Chua’s estate in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023 before the RTC of Pasay
City, Branch 112. The RTC subsequently denied this motion.
answer23
In its dated December 1, 2003, Metrobank admitted that it deposited the
checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole
proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly done with
the knowledge and consent of AMC. Metrobank also raised the defense of
estoppel because AMC had knowledge of its arrangements with Chua for several
years. Despite this arrangement, AMC did not object to nor did it call the attention
of Metrobank about Chua’s alleged lack of authority to deposit the checks in Ayala
Lumber and Hardware’s account. At this point, AMC is already estopped from
questioning Chua’s authority to deposit these checks in Ayala Lumber and
Hardware’s account.
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party
complaint24 against Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s estate should reimburse
Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against
it by AMC.
RTC denied Metrobank’s motion. It likewise denied Metrobank’s motion for
reconsideration in an order26 dated July 7, 2004.
CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint should have
been filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.29 According to the CA, the relief
that Metrobank prayed for was based on a quasi-contract and was a money claim
categorized as an implied contract that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court.
In its present petition for review on certiorari,30 Metrobank asserts that it should
be allowed to file a fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate in the
proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-party complaint was filed merely to enforce
its right to be reimbursed by Chua’s estate in case Metrobank is held liable to
AMC. Hence, Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply.
Issue:
1. Is Metrobank’s claim against the Estate of Jose Chua based on a quasi-contract?
2.. Are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling:
1. Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is
based on quasi-contract. Both the RTC and the CA described Metrobank’s claim
against Chua’s estate as one based on quasi-contract. The Court notes, however,
that its description of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint as a claim closely
analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the validity of the lower courts’
orders denying it. It is not an adjudication determining the liability of Chua’s estate
against Metrobank. The appropriate trial court should still determine whether
Metrobank has a lawful claim against Chua’s estate based on quasi-contract.
2. Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within the
claims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent
nature – the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged
liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic
unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in
the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. – All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment
for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice.
Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over general
provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.
Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply
because it impleaded Chua’s estate for reimbursement in the same transaction
upon which it has been sued by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the
conclusion of the CA, to wit:
Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6
applies to ordinary civil actions while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to
money claims against the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x x x
must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.48
We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle of lex
specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions
of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily
governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary
claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 ofthe Rules of Court, merely apply
suppletorily.49
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the
resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution.
Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on
quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both
belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be filed
under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Comi and, as such, should have been so
filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit.
Title: Ma. Hazelina A. Tujamilitante in Behalf of the minor Criselda M. Cada
G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
Doctrine: The writ of Habeas corpus is made enforceable within a judicial region,
petitions for the issuance of the writ, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be
filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement
thereof is sought. Service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas
corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
Facts:
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the R TC-
Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, docketed as Special Civil
Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate
issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to
produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M.
Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child.
RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child
to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts,
however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of
the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the Sheriff
left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as witnessed
by respondent’s counsel and barangay officials.3 Nevertheless, petitioner failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the
RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among
others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for
kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor – Quezon City against
petitioner and her counsel.
On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion and dismissed
the guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas corpuspetition before
RTC-Caloocan.4
Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of
habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court. In
compliance, the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011 Order as well as the
Alias Writ during the preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case.
Petitioner, moved for the quashal of the claiming, among others, that she was not
personally served with summons. Thus, as argued by petitioner, jurisdiction over
her and Criselda’s person was not acquired by the RTCCaloocan.
The Trial Court - Dismissed the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Ma. Hazelina
Tujan-Militante for lack of merit.She is hereby directed to appear and bring
Criselda Martinez Cada before the Court. Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to
the CA, assailed the issued Order.
Court of Appeals- dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
petition filed by respondent and
2. Assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner and the person of Criselda.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
1. The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding.
Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case, petitioner relies
on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus
petition should have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over
her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be
found.18 As to respondent, she asserts, among others, that the applicable rule is
not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court.20 As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The
writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the
presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall
refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where
there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
with any of its members and, if so granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any
regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The
appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy
of the decision.
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may
therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where
enforcement thereof is sought.21
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. Said provision, which
contains the enumeration of judicial regions in the country.:
Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies
to petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where
the minormay be found.
2. As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served,
suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a
habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.22
In view of the foregoing, We need not belabor the other issues raised.

In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities
enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the
National Capital Judicial Region, as here.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of
Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same
judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in
view of the above rule.