PIZARRO VS.
CA, hereinafter called the Rescission Case) in the Court of First
G.R. No. L-31979, August 6, 1980
RULE 73. VENUE AND PROCESS; SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
Doctrine:
 Certiorari is ordinarily unavailable, that general rule
allows of exceptions, namely, when appeal is
inadequate and ineffectual or when the broader interest
of justice so requires.
 There is no judicial interference to speak of by one
Court in the actuations of another co-equal Court.
Facts:
 Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of
the late Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., while the other petitioners, all
surnamed Pizarro, as well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla
and Lydia P. Gudani, are their children.
 Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special Proceedings
No. 1421 entitled "In the Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners on
September 21, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch I. Listed among the properties of the estate were
parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gill, and Claro
M. Recto Streets, Davao City.
 On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, filed a Motion for
Authority to Sell the properties located at Agdao and Jose
Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle the debts of the
estate, including inheritance and estate taxes and the
Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the
sale "in the interest of the parties" and since majority of the
heirs were in favor of the sale "to avoid unnecessary
additional burden.
 On February 8, 1967, the Administrator moved for the
approval of the conditional sale of the Agdao property to
Alfonso L. Angliongto and a hearing was held on the Motion
for approval of the sale.
 The heirs maintained their objection on the grounds that 1)
the sale would be improvident and greatly prejudicial; 2)
there has been no determination of the debts or obligations
of the estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were very
prejudicial to them but the Court denied reconsideration.
 On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another
Motion for Authority to Sell the Claro M. Recto lot stating
that the proceeds from the sale of the Agdao lot were not
sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate and that the
sale of the property on J. Palma Gil Street was unanimously
opposed by the heirs. Authority was granted by the Court o
March 6, 1967.
 The heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed that
Administrator be asked to resign or be removed for having
abused his powers and duties is such and that, Letters of
Administration be granted instead to Filomena Pizarro.
They also terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador.
 On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and
Lydia P. Gudani, filed a "Motion for Cancellation or
Rescission of Conditional Contract of Sale" of the Agdao lot
reiterating that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their
interests, that the sale of the lot in Claro M. Recto Street
was more than sufficient to settle the obligations of the
estate, that it was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants,
not later than July 31, 1967, and that the vendee had failed
to pay the last four installments due despite repeated
demands.
 On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to
Approve Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses
Angliongtos. On the same date, the Court approved the
same. It appears that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
19342 was issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10,
1967.
 On October 5, 1967, the some of the heirs filed a verified
Complaint for "Cancellation of Authority to Sell and
Rescission and Annulment of Deed of Sale and Damages
with Preliminary Injunction" (Civil Case No. 5762,
Instance of Davao.
 All the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss predicated
mainly on plaintiffs' lack of legal capacity to sue and lack of
cause of action., presented their respective Answers. Then
the Angliongtos pleaded res judicata, the sale having been
approved by the Court and the final deed, and the
corresponding title issued.
 On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge
Manases G. Reyes presiding) dismissed the Rescission
Case (Civil Case No. 5762) on the ground that it could not
review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court
besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still
pending resolution before the Probate Court. Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal Order was
denied on October 10, 1968.
 On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to
the Court of Appeals on "Certiorari and mandamus with
Prohibition and Injunction," charging that respondent Judge
Manases G. Reyes gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the Rescission Case and prayed that he be
required to take cognizance thereof and that the
Angliongtos be enjoined from exercising rights of ownership
over the property. But this was dismissed by the CA.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the ruling of the Court of Appeals upholding
the opinion of the Trial Court that the latter was devoid of
authority to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of
the Court was correct?
2. The propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy of certiorari
despite the existence of the remedy of appeal proper?
3. Whether or not the Appellate Tribunal had correctly upheld
of the Order of dismissal of the trial Court?
Ruling:
1. YES. As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the
Probate Court had to be reviewed. There is no judicial
interference to speak of by one Court in the actuations of
another co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the sale was
issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court
gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in
favor of the vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, that sale had been consummated; the
Order approving the sale, final.
2. YES. In this case, appeal would not have afforded the heirs
an effective and speedy recourse. It would have entailed a
protracted litigation and in the interim, the heirs stood to suffer
as a consequence of the approval of the sale. The prompt
stoppage of that sale was vital to them. Thusly, appeal not
being speedy enough to bring about the desired objective and
to be of any utility to the heirs, their availment of certiorari
must be held to have been proper.
3. NO. Petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission
Case was to rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendees
to pay the full consideration thereof, which is a valid ground
for rescission. That cause of action was within the judicial
competence and authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a
Court of First Instance with exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil cases the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds
of the Probate Court (Branch IV) whose main province was
the settlement of the estate. As a matter of fact, the
Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself
had stated that petitioners' cause of action was not within its
authority to resolve but should be filed with the competent
Court. The cause of action in one is different from that
obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to
have taken cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission
Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the Court of
Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.
HEIRS OF YPON V. RICAFORTE 8, JULY 2013
Principle:
Determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be
made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession
Facts:
Petitioners together with some of their cousins filed a
complaint for cancellation of title and Reconveyance with
damages against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte
aka ‘ Gaudioso Ypon. They alleged in their complaint that
Magdaleno Ypon died intestate and childless on June 28,
1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by TCT. Claiming to be the sole heir of
Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent
transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to
the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral
relatives and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful
son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live
Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a
certified true copy of his passport.
But the RTC DISMISSED the complaint failed to
state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that
while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship
with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that
they could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground
that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was
proper.
Ruling
YES, the petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations
in the complaint.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were
among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled.
While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear
that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
SPS. BUTIONG vs. PLAZO
G.R. No. 187524
August 5, 2015
DOCTRINE:
It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the
complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto,
does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
GR- It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a
person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor
in his will or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules
of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court.
XP- An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a
decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate,
may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary
action or partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the decision
and resolution of CA affirming the judgment of RTC.
In 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma.
Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several
properties including a resort and a family home, both located
in Nasugbu, Batangas.
In 1993, in their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents
alleged that they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro’s
second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria
and Maria Butiong who are now deceased and substituted by
their son Dr. Ruel Villafria, without their knowledge and
consent.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the
same, showing respondents a document she believed
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however,
did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained
by Pedro and Benita from a bank. Such document is
evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan releasing their
indebtedness.
Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed
respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving
the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the
titles to the same. Respondents discovered taht 4 out of 8
cottages in the resort wasd demolished and were not able to
enter the premises as it was padlocked.
Subsequently, on July 1991. respondents learned that a
notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late
father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Then, they
caused the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject
properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed
their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all
documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners
and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the
complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and
good faith in acquiring the subject properties. The petitioner
contended that what they purchased was only the resort. An
Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and
Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that
respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses
Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a
Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for
₱650, 000.00.
Trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to
petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the
Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s as well as
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same.
Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a
notary public that was not duly commissioned as such on the
date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was Undated, the
date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the
Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of
the document Was not signed. Both the documents were
never presented to RD for registration and that the title was
named after the names of Perdo and second wife Benita.
RTC: Declaring nullity of the Extra-judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of rights and Sale;
executed by Benita in favor of spouses Francisco and Maria
Butiong; ordering forfeiture of any and all improvemnets by
defendants; ordering defendants to vacate the premises and
deliver the possession of the 4 parcels of land and all its
improvements to palintiffs; declaring plaintiff and the
defendants- heirs to be legitimate and order RD to issue
corresponding titles in proportion established by law.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s Judgment.
CA: Alfredo de Guzman was not commissioned as notary
public therefore the document is not a public document; date
of execution was not indicated; amount of consideration id
superimposed; not presented to RD for annotation.Thus,
settlement/ family home deed is not a public document (void).
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising the trial court’s lack
of jurisdiction alleging that when the complaint for Judicial
Partition was filed, there was no yet settlement of Pedro's
estate not determination of the number of legitimate
heirs.That, RTC ruled of the intestate estate in ordinary
jurisdiction when the action filed was judicial
partition.Considering that the instant action is really one for
settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely in
its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled
upon the issues of forgery and ownership.
On appeal, this Court denied on petitioner's Petition for
Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the
petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of
service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant's identities.
Then the resolution became final and executory.
This Court also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
in the absence of any compelling reason to warrant a
modification of the previous denial.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment and Order before the CA assailing
the decision and order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction, which the CA dismissed.
Unsatisified, they wrote a letter on March 2008 addressed to
CJ Reynato Puno praying that the decision be rendered
based on merits and not on formal requirements (as to
absence of verification agianst non-forum shopping). However
no action was given.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL
PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
PEDRO RIFIOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR
ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD
PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING
RULING: No. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of
respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left
behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the
nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an
action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading
of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature
of the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for,
the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of
title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age5 or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized
for the purpose, the parties may without
securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office
of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action
of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an
Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public
instrument or by stipulation in a pending action
for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates
the entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the
register of deeds, a bond with the said register
of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value
of the personal property involved as certified to
under oath by the parties concerned and
conditioned upon the payment of any just claim
that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two (2) years after the
death of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall
be Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of
real estate. - A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so
as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and
an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the
property.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the
allegations of respondents in their complaint are but
customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of
real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro
died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-
heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for
the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known
heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of
all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no
known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful
heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the partition of the
same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear,
therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the
case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged
causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent,
properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
GR- It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a
person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor
in his will or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules
of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court.
XP- An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a
decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate,
may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary
action or partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.
THUS, where the deceased dies without pending obligations,
there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator
to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real
owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled. HOWEVER, they are not precluded form instituting
administration procedings even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to
an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened
with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and
was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his
estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to
petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal
obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a
special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are,
in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extra-judicially.
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for
judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate as law expressly permits the same. When
the complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for
settlement of estate does not mean that there was a
prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to the
estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs,
their status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to
the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition
proceedings alone.A complete inventory of estate may
likewise be done during partition proceedings, especially
when estate has no debts.
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for
the annulment of title and recovery of possession does not
strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property
could very well be achieved in an action for partition, as can
be seen in cases where courts determine the parties' rights
arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of
estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of
ownership and possession of property.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the
settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination
as to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution
of an action for partition, as held in Municipality of Bifzan v.
Garcia.
1st phase: of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. END- with a declaration
that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a
co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited
or vice versa (where accounting for rents and profits realized
in the real estate).
2nd phase: when the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition as directed by the court. In that event, partition shall
be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners.
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence
or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Unless
and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of an estate.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial
court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of
settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single
proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is
precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable
law and jurisprudence.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),
amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Since the action herein was not merely for partition and
recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and
documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the
trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the
instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily
fail. Wherefore, petition is denied and the resolution is
affirmed.
FRANELA v BANAYAD
G.R. No. 169700 July 30, 2009
FACTS:
Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises
F. Banayad, petitioner, who was named as devisee in the will,
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on
June 3, 1991, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P for the allowance of the
November 18, 1985 holographic will of the decedent.
Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and
left to her the following properties, namely:
(1) a parcel of land situated in Pasay City and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9741;
(2) images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the
crown; and
(3) all personal belongings.
Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner filed his
opposition and counter-petitioned for the allowance of two
other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated September
27, 1989 and another dated September 28, 1989.
After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29,
1995, rendered its Decision Declaring the September 27,
1989 holographic will as having revoked the November 18,
1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
administrator of Moisess estate. shall exercise:

On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005

Decision, modified the decision of the trial court and ruled that
the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the (1) Exclusive original
November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary jurisdiction over civil
disposition of Moisess real property was concerned. actions and probate
proceedings, testate and
ISSUE: W/N The RTC of Pasay had jurisdiction over the intestate, including the
proceeding grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases,
HELD: where the demand does
not exceed twenty
The Court notes that the trial court focused all of its thousand pesos exclusive
of interest and costs but
attention on the merits of the case without first determining inclusive of damages of
whether it could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and whatever kind, the
amount of which must be
decide Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P. On appeal, the appellate court specifically alleged:
also overlooked the issue on the jurisdictional competence of Provided, That where
there are several claims
the trial court over the said case. This Court, after a or causes of action
between the same or
meticulous review of the records, finds that the RTC of Pasay
different parties,
City had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Sp. Proc. embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of
No. 3664-P.
the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a the causes of action
case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the irrespective of whether
the causes of action
institution of the action unless such statute provides for a arose out of the same or
retroactive application thereof. Jurisdiction is moreover different transactions;
and
determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint

or petition.
xxxx
In this case, at the time the petition for the allowance
of Moisess holographic will was instituted, the then Sections

19 and 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 were in force, The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on
the RTC or the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on
thus the gross value of the estate, which value must be alleged in
the complaint or petition to be filed.
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: gross value of Moisess estate. Thus, from a reading of the
original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.
xxxx
The RTC therefore committed gross error when it
had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the
initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of
(4) In all matters its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed
of probate, both testate the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal
and intestate, where the on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the
gross value of the estate courts.
exceeds twenty thousand
Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed
pesos (P20,000.00);
the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the
issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or
may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the
xxxx proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.

Despite the pendency of this case for around 18

SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial years, the exception laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People cannot be applied.
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
 First, because, as a general rule, the principle of
estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government. No
injustice to the parties or to any third person will be wrought
by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
instituted probate proceedings.
Second and most important, because in Tijam, the
delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has been made
during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a
court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized that estoppel by
laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the
factual milieu in Tijam.
Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction
has only been raised during the execution stage, specifically
when the matter of the trial courts denial of the suretys motion
to quash the writ of execution has been brought to the
appellate court for review. Here, the trial courts assumption of
unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has
been discovered by the Court during the appeal stage of the
main case, not during the execution stage of a final and
executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down
in Tijam cannot apply.
Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all
the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are
null and void.
CAPABLANCA VS BAS
UY VS LEE
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO
SINGSON, oppositor-appellee
[G.R. No. L-14003. August 5, 1960.]
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered
on 15 January 1958 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City in its Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the
determination of the quantity of evidence required for the
probate of a holographic will.
Facts:
That on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died
at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last residence of
said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for
probate of the holographic will, submitted the said holographic
will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as
against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson; that
witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographic
will one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix,
as the same was handed to him and his wife; that the witness
testified also that he recognized all the signatures appearing
in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix and to
reinforce said statement, witness presented the mortgage, the
special power of attorney, and the general power of attorney,
besides the deeds of sale including an affidavit, and that there
were further exhibited in court two residence certificates to
show the signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes;
that said witness, Azaola, testified that the penmanship
appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the
handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures
appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix; that said
witness, in answer to a question of his counsel admitted that
the holographic will was handed to him by the testatrix.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811
of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses
who could declare that the will and the signature are in the
writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and
because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did not
prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the
handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound
to produce more than one witness because the will's
authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811
does not mandatorily require the production of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a
holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by
the adverse party.
Issue:
WON the proponent must present three witnesses who could
declare that the holographic will and the signature are in the
writing of the testatrix.
Held:
No. The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil
Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to
the following effect:
"ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it
shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If
the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to
in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
(691a)"
The Court agreed with the appellant that since the authenticity
of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce
more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, Article 811 of our present
Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of
the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a
holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new
Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of
witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they
must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature
of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course,
even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be
no available witness acquainted with the testator's hand; or
even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give
a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of
Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
The decision appealed from is set aside, and the records
ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to
hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence
already on record shall not be retaken.
CODOY VS CALUGAY
312 SCRA 333
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and
Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic
will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a
petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde
Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind
when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there
was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the
person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedents property, including all
real and personal property was about P400,000.00, at the
time of her death.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel
Ramonal filed an opposition[5] to the petition for probate,
alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the
same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a third
hand of an interested party other than the true hand of Matilde
Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or
appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the
ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will,
and was not forced, the dates and the signature should
appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done
and not after every disposition.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various
documentary evidence. The first witness was the clerk of court
of the probate court who produced and identified the records
of the case bearing the signature of the deceased. The
second witness was election registrar who was made to
produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the
same was already destroyed and no longer available. The
third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired
familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as
she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her
various tenants of commercial buildings and
the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified
that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated
and signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was a
former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of
her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was
similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The sixth was an employee of the DENR who testified that
she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which
appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The
fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had
lived with the deceased since birth where she had become
familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the
will was genuine.
Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a
demurrer[6] to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to
establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by
the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court
of Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that
at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in
a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator is
mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently established the
authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s holographic
will.
HELD:
1. In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the
provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or
mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the
probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three
witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a
holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least
three of such witnesses shall be required.”
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article
811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word shall connotes a
mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is
mandatory.[11]
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide
against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at
bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ
means to defeat the wishes of the testator. So, we believe that
the paramount consideration in the present petition is to
determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and
objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to
establish the true intent of the testator.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will
was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that
the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of
the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce
the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer
available. The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts
and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw
the deceased sign a document or write a note. Evangeline
Calugay never declared that she saw the deceased write a
note or sign a document. As it appears in the foregoing, the
three-witness requirement was not complied with.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to
the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. The
will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased
but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the
death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she
revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985,
or five years before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the
signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other
documents signed and executed by her during her
lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-
examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners
asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which
contained the signature of the deceased with that of the
holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the
former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that
the strokes are different when compared with other
documents written by the testator. The signature of the
testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were
uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing
the signature in the holographic will dated August 30,
1978,[33] and the signatures in several documents such as the
application letter for pasture permit dated December 30,
1980,[34] and a letter dated June 16, 1978,[35] the strokes are
different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the
strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike
that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain
that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the
deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET
ASIDE.
PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS
REPUBLIC V. MARCOS, 4 AUGUST 2009;
Facts:
The RTC of Pasig issued an order granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos
II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the
last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner
LiwaywayVinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. Later
on, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration to the Order granting letters testamentary to
respondents. On the other hand, Imelda Marcos filed her own
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost
and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.
Subsequently, Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating
that he already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as
directed by the RTC and filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters
of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner
Vinzons-Chato. The Motion for reconsideration of Republic
and Imelda was both denied.
Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning
the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary
to respondents. The Court issued a Resolution referring the
petition to the CA which was denied later on. Hence, a motion
for reconsideration was filed to SC.
Issue:
WON petition for certiorari was proper.
Held:
No. Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was
then in effect provides that, except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua,
judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the
Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Supreme Court
shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on certiorarias the law or rules of
court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as provided in the pertinent portions of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948. A reading of Supreme Court
Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition,
that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to
respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the
subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus
correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do not
fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of
the instant case."
“Failure to file income tax return is not an offense involving
moral turpitude which would make a person incompetent to
serve as executor or administrator. Moreover the conviction
was not yet final as Bongbong Marcos had appealed
therefrom”
“From the probate court’s order allowing the will of Ferdinand
Marcos and issuing letters testamentary to Imelda and
Bongbong Marcos, the Republic should have appealed to the
CA under S1(a) R109 instead of filing a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court.”
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA
CARLA E. OCAMPO, AND LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR.,
VS. RENATO M. OCAMPO AND ERLINDA M. OCAMPO,
G.R. No. 187879 : July 05, 2010
“Unlike that of a special administrator, the appointment of a
regular administrator cannot be procured by a mere motion. A
petition must be filed pursuant to S2 R79.”
Facts: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E.
Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and
Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving
wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who
died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings,
respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M.
Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of
the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate
on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively.
Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in
Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts.
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of
Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate
proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the
Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado
Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the RTC, Branch 24,
Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089. The
petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima,
respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled,
managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under
such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share
consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated
from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo
died, respondents took possession, control and management
of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition
prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima
and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the
appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and
award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the
decedents.
After long side by side filing of motions, petitions and
oppositions, Renato and Erlinda were appointed as special
administrators but refused to give an inventory of properties
as petitioned by herein petitioners until after the court ruled in
their petition for exemption in posting a bond. Meanwhile,
petitioners subsequently learned that respondents has
disposed of real properties for P2,700,000.00 saying it was
only for P1,500,000.00 then move the court through a petition
in removing the respondents as administrators and proceed to
partitioning the estate. The RTC ruled in the affirmative and
appointed Melinda as regular administrator conditioned with
the posting of P200,000.00 as bond which the later complied.
The respondents appealed in the CA and they received a
favorable decision reversing and setting aside the decision of
the RTC.
Issue: Whether the court should have acted with grave abuse
of discretion in revoking and terminating the appointment of
Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account
of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting
of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
responsibilities as special administrators and in appointing
Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the trial court did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of the
respondents as special administrators and otherwise in
appointing Melinda as regular administrator opining and
ordering that she should instead be appointed as special
administration as according to the rules.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who
is subject to its supervision and control, expected to work for
the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth
administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or
she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the
parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
While the RTC considered that respondents were
the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a
mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been
settled that the selection or removal of special administrators
is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators. The probate court may
appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion,
such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of
fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in
the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as
the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based
on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by
higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal of
special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures
the performance of the duties and obligations of an
administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the
debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within
one (1) year and at any other time when required by the
probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3)
months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the
bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the
administration of the decedents estate requiring the special
administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account
for such as received by him when required by the court; and
(3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or
regular administrator, or to such other person as may be
authorized to receive them.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the
creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator,
whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in,
and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object
and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent,
and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of
the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not
being included among the acts constituting the care,
management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the
ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the
office of administration.
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON.
JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region,
Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, as
Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua,
respondents.
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
“Only an interested person may oppose the petition for
issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is
one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his
interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect
or contingent.”
FACTS:
Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock
with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981.
The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson
Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28, 1992. Vallejo
filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for
declaration of guardianship of the two child and their
properties worth P5,000,000.00.
Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion
alleging that she was the true wife of Roberto. However,
according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the
latter but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never
contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto
Chua.
HELD:
The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status
as wife of the decedent. She could not produce the original
copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate.
Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was
presented that no such marriage contract between petitioner
and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by
Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have
solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not solemnized
such alleged marriage.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the
motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor
does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or
otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration — Any
interested person, may by filing a written opposition, contest
the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for
whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the
ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and
may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent
person or persons named in the opposition..
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for
issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is
one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his
interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect
or contingent.
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving
wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man
and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed
to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the
photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she
presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule,
together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial
court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates,
passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage
especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification
from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged
marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge
alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. . . .
Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of
her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent.
The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she
failed to produce.
MARGARITO R. JAMERO, vs. THE HONORABLE
ACHILLES L. MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 4, ATTY. ALBERTO BAUTISTA, in his capacity as
the appointed SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, and ERNESTO
R. JAMERO,
G.R. No. 140929. May 26, 2005;
“The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory
and discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable.
(S1[e] R109). However, it can be subject to certiorari if it can
be shown that the appointment was made with grave abuse of
discretion.”
Facts:
Petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. 1618 for the
Administration and Settlement of the Estate of his deceased
mother Consuelo Jamero with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 4, Tagbilaran City. Private respondent Ernesto R.
Jamero, a brother of petitioner, opposed the latters petition for
appointment as regular administrator of the estate.
Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and over the
objections of petitioner, the respondent court, in its Order
dated December 4, 1998,[2] appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista
as special administrator pending the appointment of a regular
administrator. Petitioner received said Order on December 11,
1998 and filed a motion for reconsideration on December 28,
1998, the last day of the 15-day reglementary period, that is,
December 26, 1998, falling on a Saturday during which,
according to petitioner, the Bureau of Post Office held no
office. The court a quodenied petitioners motion
reconsideration in its Order dated February 26, 1999 which
petitioner received on March 4, 1999.[3]
Issues:
(1) whether or not the CA erred in dismissing CA-G.R.
SP No. 53020 for having been filed out of time;
(2) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the
appointment of special administrator is discretionary to the
appointing court and that being an interlocutory order, the
same is not appealable nor subject to certiorari; and
(3) whether or not the appointment of a special
administrator is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
As to the first issue, the Court finds merit to the claim of
petitioner that A.M. Circular No. 00-2-03-SC as herein quoted
earlier, further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, should be given retroactive effect. The Court held
in Republic vs. Court of Appeals:[11]
The amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is
procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new or
remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled
that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception
of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive
operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure.[12]
Thus, applying the same to CA-G.R. SP No. 53020, the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA should now
be considered as having been filed within the reglementary
period provided under said circular. Petitioner would have had
sixty days from March 4, 1999 or until May 3, 1999 within
which to file his petition in the CA. The petition
for certiorari was filed on April 21, 1999.
However, far from rendering the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 53020 moot and academic, as claimed by petitioner, the
third issue will have to be passed upon by the CA in the
petition for certiorari filed with it.
As to the second issue, suffice it to be stated that
indeed, the appointment of a special administrator is
interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-
appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be
shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. As the Court held
in Pefianco vs. Moral,[13] even as the trial courts order may
merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the
proper remedy to annul the same when it is rendered with
grave abuse of discretion.[14]
for
It is for this reason that the third issue, as already stated,
will have to be considered and passed upon by the CA.
RUFINA LUY LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al, G.R. No.
124715, January 24, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late
Pastor Y. Lim, who died intestate and whose estate is the
subject of probate proceedings. Private respondents Auto
Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company
are corporations formed, organized and existing under
Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered
under the Torrens system.
Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented
by her nephew George Luy filed a joint petition5 for the
administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the RTC
of Quezon City. Rufina alleged that the assets of these
corporations were owned wholly by Pastor; that these
corporations themselves are owned by Pastor and they are
mere dummies of Pastor.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were
included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then
filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for
exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
decedent. They presented proof (Torrens Titles) showing that
the assets of the corporations are in their respective names
and titles. The RTC granted the twin motions of the private
respondents but were later on reinstated upon petitioner’s
motion. However, the CA favoured the private respondents.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the corporations and/or their assets should be
included in the inventory of the estate.
HELD:
No. As regards the corporations, to include them in the
inventory is tantamount to the piercing of the veil of corporate
fiction because the probate court effectively adopted the
theory of Rufina. This cannot be done. Firstly, the probate
court is sitting in a limited capacity. Secondly, Rufina was not
able to present sufficient evidence that indeed the
corporations are mere conduits of Pastor. Mere ownership by
a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly
all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a
sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities. The veil can’t be pierced without any
showing that indeed the corporation is being used merely as a
dummy. To disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly
established. It cannot be presumed.
As regards the assets, the corporations were able to present
their respective Torrens Titles over the disputed assets. It is
true that a probate court may pass upon the question
ownership albeit in a provisional manner but still, a Torrens
Title cannot be attacked collaterally in a probate proceeding, it
must be attacked directly in a separate proceeding.
MAYOR VS TIU
HILADO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 164108,
8 MAY 2009
RULE 82. REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH,
RESIGNATION, AND REMOVAL OF EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS
Doctrine:
Facts:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died
intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife,
private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one
of the plaintiffs therein. The second was then pending with the
RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of
the plaintiffs therein.
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court. the Manila RTC issued an order
appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in
her favor. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties,
and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the
List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two
pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City
courts.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they
be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. petitioners filed an
omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline
for the submission by private respondent of the required
inventory of the decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on
the part of private respondent in her administration of the
estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted
thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. CA likewise
dismissed the petition.
Issue/s:
1. WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim
have the right to participate in the settlement proceeding by
way of intervention under Rule 19
2. Won petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate
estate of the deceased person, are entitled to copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
Ruling:
1. Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
should they fail to submit the compromise within the given
period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be
categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent
that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules.
And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties
cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only
strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a
compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable
settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is
premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the
law and rules.
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required
under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive
the death of the decedent and may be commenced against
the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.
2. In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings
do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the
estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed
to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and
there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently
preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be
duly satisfied.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special
Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties"
the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such
notice. The instances when notice has to be given to
interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the
account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule
89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90
regarding the hearing for the application for an order for
distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory,
the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
SIGUION REYNA V. CHIONGLO-SIA
Facts:
Petitioner Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako Law
Offices (SRMO) acted as counsel for Remedios N.
Rodriguez when she commenced an action for the intestate
settlement of the estate of her deceased husband Susano J.
Rodriguez before RTC of Lucena City.
During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Remedios
asked for the payment of widow's allowance. RTC denied but
the CA reversed the order of RTC and granted Remedios a
MONTHLY allowance of P3,000. February 29 1988, while the
case was pending before the CA, Remedios executed a Deed
of Sale of Inheritance (Deed of Sale) wherein she agreed to
sell all her rights, interests and participation in the estate of
Susano J. Rodriguez to a certain Remigio M. Gerardo
(Gerardo) in consideration of P200,000.00. Remedios
executed a special power of attorney in favor of Gerardo..
Gerardo later executed a document titled as “Substitutionof
Attorney in fact where SRMO as a substitute councel,
After the CA's decision regarding the widow's allowance
became final and executory, SRMO,on April 24 1991 ,
accordingly filed a motion with the RTC for the payment of the
allowance then amounting to a total of P315,000.00. A few
months after, the Estate of Deceased Susano J. Rodriguez
(Estate) remitted to SRMO three (3) checks totaling this
amount.
A Partial Project of Partition of the Estate dated was approved
by the RTC. Remedios questioned the RTC's Order approving
the partition and denied the execution of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Gerardo. RTC,order SRMO to reimburse the Estate
the amount of P315,000.00 representing the widow's
allowance it received in 1991.
SRMO moved to be excused from reimbursing the Estate, but
was denied by RTC.
SRMO elevated the case to the CA through a petition
for certiorari. CA denied SRMO's petition on the ground that
the latter was not a party in the case before the lower court
and therefore had no standing to question the assailed order.
Issue:
1. WON the RTC erred in ordering SRMO to reimburse
the widow's allowance? YES.
2. Won Remedios is no longer entitled to any widows
allowance when it sold her Estate to Gerardo on
February 29, 1988 from that point on? NO.
Ruling:
1. Yes, we find that the RTC was unjustified in ordering
SRMO, in its own capacity, to return the money to
the Estate. It appears that the RTC's primary
justification for ordering SRMO to return the money
from its own pocket is due to the latter's failure to
formally report the transfer of interest from Remedios
to Gerardo. While it certainly would have been
prudent for SRMO to notify the RTC, the Rules of
Court do not require counsels of parties to report any
transfer of interest. The Rules do not even mandate
the substitution of parties in case of a transfer of
interest.
Given the foregoing, we find that the RTC
was unjustified in ordering SRMO, in its own
capacity, to return the money to the Estate despite
the fact, as certified to by Gerardo's heirs, that
SRMO had already accounted for all monies or funds
it had received on its client's behalf to Gerardo. If the
RTC was convinced that the Estate had a right to
reimbursement, it should have ordered the party who
ultimately benefited from any unwarranted
payment—not his lawyer—to return the money.
2. No, Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court provides
for the allowance granted to the widow and family of
the deceased person during the settlement of the
estate. This allowance is rooted on the right and duty
to support under the Civil Code. The right to support
is a purely personal right essential to the life of the
recipient, so that it cannot be subject to attachment
or execution. Neither can it be renounced or
transmitted to a third person. Being intransmissible,
support cannot be the object of contracts.
Nonetheless, it has also been held that support in
arrears is a different thing altogether. It may be
compensated, renounced and transmitted by
onerous or gratuitous title.
 The Estate contends that since Remedios already
sold her Estate to Gerardo on February 29, 1988,
she was no longer entitled to any widow's allowance
from that point on. SRMO, on the other hand,
maintains that the right of Remedios to receive
widow's allowance remains from 1988 up to 1991
because she remained a nominal party in the
case, and that this formed part of the interests
sold to Gerardo.
AGUAS v. LLEMOS
GR No. L-18107
August 30, 1962
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court has held that contractual
money claims under S5 R86 (87) refers to all money claims
arising out of contract (express or implied), quasi-contract, or
law but do not refer to those arising from crime or quasidelict.
FACTS: March 1960, Francisco Salinas and the spouses
Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed before the CFI of
Catbalogan, Samar an action for damages against
Hermogenes Llemos and averred that:
1. Llemos had served them by registered mail with a
copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice
that the same would be submitted to the said CFIon
February 23, 1960 at 8:00am;
2.In view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs went
all the way from Manila to Samar accompanied by their
lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been
filed; and
3.Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, rendering
plaintiff's expenses and trouble all in vain, causing them
mental anguish and undue embarrassment.
April of the same year, Llemos died before he could answer
the complaint. Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended their
complaint to include Llemos' heirs.
July 1960, the heirs filed a motion to dismiss, which was
granted on the following grounds:
1.The legal representative, not the heirs, should have
been made the party defendant; and
2.The action being for recovery of money,
testate/intestate proceedings should be initiated and the
claim filed therein.
The MR was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: comaprison of Rule 87, Section 5 and Rule 88,
Section 1; Was the action filed by plaintiff-appellants one that
is abated by the death of the defendant?
RULING: No. Plaintiffs argue that when a comparison is made
between those provisions of the Rules of Court concerning
claims that are barred if not filed in the estate settlement
proceedings (Rule 86 (then Rule 87), Sec. 5) and those
defining actions that survive and may be prosecuted against
the executor or administrator (Rule 88, Sec. 1), actions for
damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant (as in the
case at bar) survive the death of the latter. So, the plaintiff is
correct.
Under Rule 87, Sec. 5, it provides that the actions that are
abated by death are:
1.Claims for funeral expenses and those for the last
sickness of the decedent;
2.Judgments for money; and
3.All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract express or implied.
Thus, none of which include that of the plaintiffs, for it is not
enough that the claim against the deceased party be for
money, but it must arise from "contract express or
implied", i.e. all purely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict or tort. (Leung Ben vs.
O'Brien)
Rule 88, Sec. 1, it enumerates actions that survive against a
decedent's executors or administrators:
1.Actions to recover real and personal property from the
estate;
2.Actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
3.Actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property.
In this case being under the third kind of action enumerated
above, it having been held that "injury to property" is not
limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other
wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished.
To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses,
as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's
property.
However, the parties have arrived at an amicable
settlement of their differences, and that they have agreed
to dismiss the appeal, rendering the case moot.
APPEAL DISMISSED and without special pronouncement as
to costs.
MACLAN v GARCIA
G.R. No. L-7622. May 27, 1955.
FACTS:
On July 3, 1945, Andres Mariano executed an
instrument, purporting to be a deed of conveyance, in favor of
Gabriel Maclan, of two (2) parcels of land, containing
fishponds, located in the municipality of Polo, and covered by
Certificates of Title Nos. 20410 and 20411 of the office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, which, accordingly, were
cancelled and then substituted by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 27813 and 27814, of the same office, in the name of
Gabriel Maclan.
About a year later, or on or about August 2, 1946,
Andres Mariano instituted Civil Case No. 106 in the Court of
First Instance of said province, against Gabriel Maclan, for the
annulment of said instrument, upon the ground of fraud, and
the recovery of the aforementioned property. In due course,
said court rendered judgment, on or about May 19, 1949
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on December 18,
1950 (CA G. R. No. 3350-R) the dispositve part of which
reads as follows:
"Wherefore, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff Andres Mariano as follows: That the deed of extra-
judicial adjudication and sale (Exhibit A) in favor of the
defendant Gabriel Maclan is null and void; and that the
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 27813 and 27814 issued in
the name of the defendant Gabriel Maclan by the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan be cancelled, thus restoring in its entirety
the former Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 20410 and 20411
issued in the name of Basilio Mariano, the expenses of which
to be borne by the defendant Tiburcio Ramirez alone, with
costs against the defendants." (Record on Appeal, p. 47.)
On June 25, 1952, Gabriel Maclan filed the complaint
in the case at bar. Ruben Garcia, who acquired the property in
dispute in case No. 106, by inheritance from Andres Mariano
(who had died in the meanwhile), as his grandson and sole
heir, is the defendant in the present case.
The purpose thereof is to recover the sum of P5,200,
as necessary expenses allegedly incurred in the preservation
of said property prior to the commencement of said case No.
106.
In his answer to the complaint in case No. 1752,
Garcia set up, among other things, the defense that plaintiff's
cause of action is barred by the final judgment rendered in
case No. 106 and by his failure to file his claim in Special
Proceedings No. 917 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
which the estate of the deceased Andres Mariano was settled
which has already been closed.
After due hearing on this plea, which was considered
as being in the nature of a motion to dismiss, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in an order dated September 25, 1952,
found Garcia's pretense to be well taken, and, accordingly
dismissed plaintiff's complaint, without special pronouncement
as to costs. Hence, this appeal by Maclan.
ISSUE: whether the claim for repairs should have been filed in
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased
HELD:
Plaintiff’s contention that claim for repairs should not
have been filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent since only money claims arising from
contracts expenses or implied are enforceable in said
proceedings is untenable because said obligation arises from
Law. Plaintiff’s argument seemingly, stems from
misconception of the nature of "implied contracts" as the term
is used in the provision of Section 5 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court. Obligations arising ex lege are in the common law
system merged into the category of obligations imposed by
law and all are denominated implied contracts.
METROBANK VS ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP.
IN RE: ESTATE OF REYES, 17 PHIL 188
MANUEL H. BARREDO, ET AL., vs. CA
The present appeal by the heirs of the late Fausto Barredo
involves a tardy claim to collect the fare value of a promissory
note for P20, 000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from 21
December 1949, the date of its maturity, plus attorney's fees
and costs in the sum of P2, 000.00, from the intestate estate
of the late Charles A. McDonough.
Facts:
There was a promissory note secured by a mortgage
executed on 31 December 1940 in favor of Fausto Barredo
over the leasehold rights of McDonough. Upon Fausto
Barredo's death on 8 October 1942, his heirs, in a deed of
extrajudicial partition, adjudicated unto themselves the
secured credit of the deceased, and had the same recorded
on the aforesaid certificate of title.
Charles McDonough died on 15 March 1945; thereupon,
Special Proceedings No. 70173 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, captioned "In re: Intestate Estate of Charles A.
McDonough", was instituted; and pursuant to a court order of
17 August 1945, the administrator caused to be published in
the "Philippine Progress" for three consecutive weeks, on 23
and 30 August 1945 and 6 September 1945, a notice to
creditors requiring them to file their claims with the clerk of
court within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first
publication and expiring on 23 February 1946.
On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their
belated claim against the estate of McDonough. This claim
was opposed by the administrator. After hearing, the lower
court allowed the claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
order of allowance hence this present appeal.
The respondent administrator, relying on the case of the
Estate of Howard J. Edmands, 87 Phil. 405, argues that the
one-month period for filing late claims mentioned in Section 2,
Rule 87, of the Rules of Court should be counted from the
expiration of the regular six- month period.
Issue:
WON the belated claim of the heirs of Fausto Barredo should
be granted against the estate of McDonough.
Held:
No. The belated claim should be denied and the decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing the order of allowance granted
by the lower court should be upheld.
The Court argued that the pronouncement anchored from the
case of the Estate of Howard J. Edmands was but an obiter
dictum that did not resolve the issue involved in said case.
The true ruling appears in the case of Paulin vs. Aquino, L-
11267, March 20, 1958, wherein the controverted one month
period was clarified as follows:
"The one-month period specified in this section is the
time granted claimants, and the same is to begin
from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It
does not mean that the extension of one month
starts from the expiration of the original period fixed
by the court for the presentation of claims."
Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court reads:
"SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In
the notice provided in section 1, the court shall state
the time for the filing of claims against the estate,
which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six
months after the date of the first publication of the
notice. However, at any time before an order of
 distribution is entered, on application of a creditor
who has failed to file his claim within the time
previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim
to be filed within a time not exceeding one month."
The probate court previously fixed the period for filing claims
at six (6) months reckoned from the date of first publication,
and the said notice to creditors was first published on 23
August 1945. The present claim was filed on 22 October
1947. There is no doubt, therefore, that the claim was filed
outside of the period previously fixed. But a tardy claim may
be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of
cause for failure to present said claim on time.
However, the probate court's discretion in allowing a claim
after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of an
order of distribution presupposes not only a claim of apparent
merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in
filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their
tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto
Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now
deceased. This ground is insufficient, due to the availability,
and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the
back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the
instant claim.
The order of the trial court allowing the late claim is without
justification, because under Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of
Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for
no cause or for an insufficient cause.
DE RAMA VS PALILEO
IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF BEATRIZ C. DE RAMA,
deceased.
FACTS:
In connection with the proceeding for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the deceased Beatriz Cosio de Rama, and
pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
before which the proceeding is pending, a notice to all
persons with money claims against the deceased to file their
said claims within six months, was duly published, the first
notice appearing in the August 13, 1958 issue of the Manila
Chronicle. On January 27, 1959, the administrator filed an
inventory of the estate, showing assets amounting to
P139.596.77 and liabilities in the sum of P33,012.95.
The period provided in the published notice having expired
without anybody filing any claim against the deceased, the
administrator, upon order of the court, submitted a final
account of the estate and a project of partition, which were
approved on May 12, 1960.
Under date of June 7, 1961, however, Cherie Palileo
petitioned the court for permission to file a claim in the
proceeding, alleging that on the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 2256-R, promulgated on May 6,
1961, she obtained a money judgment against the deceased
Beatriz C de Rama.
The administrator opposed this petition on the ground that the
claim was filed beyond the period provided in the notice to
creditors.
By order of August 8, 1961, the lower court sustained the
claimant and allowed her to file her claim within one month
from receipt of said order, it appearing that no final decree of
distribution has as yet been entered in the case. The
administrator filed this appeal from the aforesaid order.
ISSUE:
When should the money claims against a deceased person be
filed?
HELD:
Section 2 of Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 86)
provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In
the notice provided in section 1, the court shall state the time
for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be
more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of
the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before
an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor
who has failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as
are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not
exceeding one month.
It is clear from the foregoing that the period prescribed in the
notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against
the estate may be allowed any time before an order of
distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court, for cause
and upon such terms as are equitable. 1 This extension of the
period shall not exceed one month, from the issuance of the
order authorizing such extension.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the order
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
SHEKER VS ESTATE OF SHEKER
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO,
G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
Facts:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita
Toledo.6 Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March
1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Answer7 in which she alleged, among others, that
her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is
already dead.8 The death certificate9 of Manuel states "13 July
1995" as the date of death. As a result, petitioner filed a
motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to
disclose the heirs of Manuel.10 In compliance with the verbal
order of the court during the 11 October 1999 hearing of the
case, respondent submitted the required names and
addresses of the heirs.11 Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying that Manuel be
substituted by his children as party-defendants. It appears that
this motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9
October 2000.13
Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001, the trial court
issued its pre-trial order containing, among others, the dates
of hearing of the case.14
The trial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, as
plaintiff, presented its evidence and its exhibits were
thereafter admitted.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein
respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On
24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given
a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to
evidence.15 However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as
grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to implead an
indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the case
must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2)
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court erred in ordering the
substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that
the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004, denied
the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing
Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states
that: "Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
may be made x x x."17 Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise denied on
the ground that "defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this
Court is now barred by estoppel by laches" since respondent
failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so. 18
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred
and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion to
dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of
evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal of the
case.19
The Court of Appeals granted the petition with the following
grounds:
xxxx
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have
been granted by public respondent judge as the same was in
order. Considering that the obligation of Manuel S. Toledo is
solidary with another debtor, x x x, the claim x x x should be
filed against the estate of Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with
the provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, x x
x.20
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the estate of Manuel Toledo is an
indispensable party
Held: No.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. –
Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter of a case that a final
adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a party who has
not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy,
but "an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be
made without affecting that interest or leaving the controversy
in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also
been considered that an indispensable party is a person in
whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
parties already before the court which is effective, complete or
equitable." Further, an indispensable party is one who must
be included in an action before it may properly proceed. 44
On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if
his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable
from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree
which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is
not an indispensable party if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him or her and those already
parties to the action, or if he or she has no interest in the
subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient reason to
declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because
his or her presence will avoid multiple litigations.45
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it
is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party
to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation
of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and
respondent and respondent’s husband, on the other, states:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in
solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES,
INC. x x x the sum of PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED (₱1,400,000.00)] x x x.47
The provisions and stipulations of the contract were then
followed by the respective signatures of respondent as
"MAKER" and her husband as "CO-MAKER."48 Thus,
pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, petitioner may
collect the entire amount of the obligation from respondent
only. The aforementioned provision states: "The creditor may
proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all
of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the
debt has not been fully collected."
In other words, the collection case can proceed and the
demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only,
even without impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently,
the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to
petitioner’s complaint for sum of money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the contention
of respondent, held that the claim of petitioner should have
been filed against the estate of Manuel in accordance with
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The
aforementioned provisions provide:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise,
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator
may bring against the claimants. x x x.
SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. Where the obligation
of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall
be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor,
without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover
contribution from the other debtor. x x x.
The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the above-
quoted provisions.
In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the
precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which latter provision has been retained in the present Rules
of Court without any revisions, the Supreme Court, in the case
of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama, et.
al.,49 held:50
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from
whence [Section 6, Rule 87] was taken, this Court held that
where two persons are bound in solidum for the same debt
and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved
against the estate of the latter, the decedent’s liability being
absolute and primary; x x x. It is evident from the foregoing
that Section 6 of Rule 87 provides the procedure should the
creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is
certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with
such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary
action against the surviving solidary debtors, should the
creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be
entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same
would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the
Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against
any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing improper in the
creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary
debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his
claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later
case of Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion 51where the
Supreme Court pronounced:
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said
provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection
in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the
estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set
forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option
whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the
solidary debtor. x x x
xxxx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the
applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the
creditor the right to "proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." The choice is
undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against
whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of
the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without
necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased
debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case
dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For
to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it
a condition precedent for any collection action against the
surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his
substantive rightsprovided by Article 1216 of the New Civil
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of
the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under
the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed
against the estate of [the deceased debtor] only. Obviously,
this provision diminishes the [creditor’s] right under the New
Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the
solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by
principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a
substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New
Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the
latter, substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party and the case can proceed as against
respondent only. That petitioner opted to collect from
respondent and not from the estate of Manuel is evidenced by
its opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss asserting that
the case, as against her, should be dismissed so that
petitioner can proceed against the estate of Manuel.
Republic of the Philippines
Vs
MA. IMELDA IMEE R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND
BONGBONG R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA
III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN,
YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO
G. R. No. 171701 February 8,2012
“Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable
parties as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be
no final determination of an action. They are those parties
who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts
cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are
indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of
the other parties.”
FACTS:
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President
Corazon C. Aquino created the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) that was primarily tasked to
investigate and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed
by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and associates.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic
with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution,
Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who
was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R.
Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene
Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and
Gregorio Araneta III.
Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive
participation and collaboration of another persons, viz.
Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious
Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda
Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime
Holdings, in the alleged illegal activities and undertakings of
the Marcoses in relation to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten
wealth allegation.
Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against
herein respondents. However, the latter objected on the
ground that the documents were unauthenticated and mere
photocopies.
On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION
ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits formally offered by
the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to
the determination of the Court.
Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and
Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio
Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung
Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their respective
Demurrers to Evidence.
On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all
the demurrers to evidence except the one filed by Imelda R.
Marcos. The sequestration orders on the properties in the
name of Gregorio Maria AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.
With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos,
Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court noted
that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never
established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint
their involvement therein. The court held that all presented
evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that
the originals were not presented in court, nor were they
authenticated by the persons who executed them.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to
provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in
court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of
Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2
and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired
illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting through De
Soleil Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses used the
Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus
company PANTRANCO.
Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court
found the allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed
to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for
dollar salting; or to show that they were dummies of the
Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary
evidence relevant to this allegation was INADMISSIBLE for
being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been
presented as witnesses.
ISSUE:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE
DEMURRERS TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS
MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND
(BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR.; RESPONDENT-SPOUSES
GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA
AND RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN
FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO
RULING:
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations; the operative
act on how and in what manner must be clearly shown
through preponderance of evidence.
The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are
the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative;
therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove
petitioner’s allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents are
in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the
evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore,
petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason
why the originals were not presented, or any compelling
ground why the court such documents as secondary evidence
absent the affiant’s testimony.
The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is
not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office,’ the original thereof need not be presented.
However, all except one of the exhibits are not necessarily
public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)
of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a
public document but what the plaintiff presented was a mere
photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified
copy and was not even signed by the stenographer who
supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide
that when the original document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued
by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its contents.
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there
must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of
the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such
originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the
search for or attempt to produce the original. None of the
abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff.
Exhibits ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’,
and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before
the Court. Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter, which is clearly a private
document. It is emphasized, even if originals of these
affidavits were presented, they would still be considered
hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify
them.
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule
rendered the offered documentary evidence futile and
worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar
as the specific allegations herein were concerned.Hence,
Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents
respective Demurers to evidence.
It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional
circumstances, given the nature and the extent of the
properties involved in the case pending with the
Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis that the Complaint is one
for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and the
accounting of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of
damages. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the
court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties
in the Marcos estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten
wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3) issuing the
appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the
payment of these properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the
award of damages is proper.
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives
the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore
that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this
rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party
to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death.
The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to
be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed
legal representative of his estate. On that note, we take
judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of
Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos
II,we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.
and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will
and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are
ready to waive in favor of the state their right to defend or
protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in
their possession, control or ownership, then they may not be
dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable
parties as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be
no final determination of an action. They are those parties
who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts
cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are
indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of
the other parties.
In order to reach a final determination of the matters
concerning the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos that is, the
accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth the present
case must be maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein
respondent Ferdinand Bongbong R. Marcos, Jr., as executors
of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court. According to this provision, actions may be
commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal
property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon;
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the case and thereby ordered the RTC to reinstate the
executors.
respondents’ complaint, which was to declare the sale of the
In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, said property null and void, and to proceed with the trial of the
because (1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan is
same. Petitioner, asserting that the Court of Appeals (CA) had
one that survives death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate
must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or erred in its decision, filed this petition for review by certiorari.
own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement in
accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been
Issues:
proven.

1. Whether or not the Waiver of

Hereditary shares and/or Rights executed
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Sandiganbayan by Eleanor Valle Siapno is valid and that it
Resolution dated 6 December 2005 is AFFIRMED with
was properly made;
MODIFICATION. For the reasons stated herein, respondents
Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. shall be maintained as defendants in
2. Whether or not Eleanor Valle
Civil Case No. 0002 pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Siapnos interests in the assets of the Estate
of her late father, Victorio Valle, as an heir
DAMIANA INTO is merely inchoate and therefore may not be
- versus - PUNO, Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, levied upon and sold;
CALLEJO, SR., MARIO VALLE, OCTAVIO TINGA, and
VALLE, ALBERTO VALLE, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. OLIVER 3. Whether or not the granting of
VALLE, BRENDA VALLE, and LUISA VDA. DE VALLE, the appeal and ordering the RTC of Tagum
by the Court of Appeals to reinstate the
Respondents complaint and to proceed with
“Instances when the heirs may sue for the recovery of estate
the trial of the same [is] tantamount to
property during the pendency of probate proceedings: 1. If the
allowing the RTC, Branch 2 of Tagum (now
executor/administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit. 2.
Tagum City), Province of Davao del Norte,
When the executor/administrator is alleged to have
to interfere with the levy on attachment and
participated in the act complained of and he is made a party-
levy on execution of the interests of Eleanor
defendant. 3. When letters testamentary or of administration
Valle Siapno in the assets of the estate of
have not yet been issued.”
her late father of the Deputy Sheriff of the
Facts: RTC Branch 14 of the City of Davao, which
is a coordinate court.[15]
Victorio Valle, married to Luisa vda. De Valle, owned an
estate consisting of six parcels of land. The two had six (6)
Held:
children, one of which was Eleanor who is married to a certain
The first and second issues go into the merits of the complaint
Oscar Siapno. On the 19th of August 1990, Eleanor and her
for Declaration of Nullity of Sheriffs Sale and/or Recovery of
husband were ordered by Branch 14 of the Regional Trial
Hereditary Shares, Damages and Attorneys fees. It is
Court (RTC) of Davao City to pay Damiana Into the amount of
gathered from the pleadings filed by the parties that the issues
P283,000.00 plus interests for a debt which was the subject of
involve the determination of the following questions, although
Civil Case No. 19-896-89. The court’s decision was final and
not exclusive: (1) Was SP Proc. No. 63 already instituted
executory. On the 6th of August 1992, Sheriff Alberto C.
when the decision in Civil Case No. 19-896-89 was issued on
Esguerra and Diosdado A. Cajes sold the six parcels of land
August 13, 1990?; (2) If in the affirmative, was there a duly
by Victorio Valle, of which Eleanor was an heir and which was
constituted administrator in SP Proc. No. 63 at that time?; (3)
now held by Luisa vda. De Valle as administratrix following
Did the Sheriffs in executing the final decision in Civil Case
the death of her husband. As a result of the sale, respondents
No. 19-896-89 notify the administratrix and the RTC (Branch
in this case filed a complaint with Branch 1 of the RTC of
2), Tagum, Davao City in SP Proc. No. 63 of the final decision
Tagum, Davao City seeking to nullify the sale of the property
in Civil Case No. 19-896-89 in favor of petitioner and against
on the grounds that (1) Eleanor had already waived her rights
Eleanor?; (4) Were the Sheriffs properly notified of the Waiver
as heir on the said property, a fact which the sheriff had
executed by Eleanor?; (5) Did the writ of attachment issued by
verbally been made aware of this before the sale and (2) that
RTC, Branch 14, Davao City, validly attach the properties
Eleanor had no rights yet to the property sold. The case was
pursuant to the Rules of Court?; (6) Was Eleanor duly notified
transferred to Branch 2 where SP Proc. No. 63 was pending;
of the decision against her in Civil Case No. 19-896-89?; (7)
the subject of the said special proceeding (SP) was the
Was Eleanor in good faith when she executed the Waiver in
hereditary rights of the respondents to the estate of Victorio
favor of the other heirs of the late Victorio Valle?; (8) Was the
Valle. The case was dismissed by the RTC of Tagum.
Waiver submitted to the RTC in SP Proc. No. 63? If in the
Respondents appealed to the CA which found merit in their
affirmative, when?; (9) Was there a proper and valid levy on
the properties?; (10) Under the Sheriffs Provisional Certificate
of Sale, what was actually sold at public auction by the
sheriffs the rights, interests, title, claims and participation pro-
indiviso of Eleanor over the real properties subject of SP Proc.
No. 63, as stated in the early portion of the Sheriffs
Provisional Certificate of Sale, or, the six parcels of land
enumerated and described in said document, as stated in the
latter portion of the said certificate of sale?; (11) Were
Eleanors interests in the assets of the Estate of Victorio Valle
already defined by the court in SP Proc. No. 63 on the date of
execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 19-896-89?
Evidently, these matters cannot be resolved by this Court at
the first instance. It is not a trier of facts.[16] Such questions
may be determined by the RTC only after a full- blown trial of
the case
Thus, the Court will resolve only the third
issue, i.e., whether or not the CA erred in ordering the RTC,
Branch 2, Tagum, Davao City to reinstate the complaint of
respondents and to proceed with the trial. Corollary to this is
the question whether respondents have a valid cause of
action against petitioner.
In her Memorandum, petitioner argues that the CA
erred in ordering the RTC of Tagum to reinstate the complaint
of respondents and to proceed with the trial of the same as it
is tantamount to allowing the RTC, Branch 2, Tagum to
interfere with the levy on attachment and levy on execution of
the interests of Eleanor in the assets of the estate of her late
father by the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC, Branch 14, Davao
City which is a coordinate court.[17]
In their Memorandum, respondents contend that if
ever the complaint is reinstated, it will not necessarily be in
disagreement with the final judgment of RTC, Branch 14,
Davao City in Civil Case No. 19-896-89, considering that the
issue to be resolved by the RTC, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao
City is limited in the determination of the validity or nullity of
the Sheriffs Sale.[18]
The petition lacks merit. The CA did not err in
ordering the RTC to reinstate the complaint and to proceed
with the trial of the same. Respondents have a valid cause of
action against petitioner.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides that
a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. In De Guzman, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals,[19] this Court held:
A cause of action is the fact or
combination of facts which affords a party a
right to judicial interference in his behalf.
An action means an ordinary suit in a court
of justice, by which one party prosecutes
another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prosecution or redress of a
wrong.
The cause of action must always
consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiffs
primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, whatever may
be the subject to which they relate person,
character, property or contract; and (2) the
delict or wrongful act or omission of the
defendant, by which the primary right and
duty have been violated. The cause of
action is determined not by the prayer of the
complaint but by the facts alleged.
A cause of action exists if the following elements are
present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.[20]
In the present case, it is alleged in the complaint that
herein respondents are the children and the wife of the late
Victorio Valle whose real and personal properties are subject
of SP Proc. No. 63. In a gist, respondents claim that without
having legal custody of the share or properties of Eleanor
Valle Siapno by inscribing, annotating or indicating the
attachment and levy in the certificate of titles of the properties
mentioned in paragraph IV of this complaint, defendants
Sheriff proceeded to sell the properties at public auction
inspite of the prior verbal notice to them that the shares of
Eleanor Valle Siapno has been conveyed, waived and ceded
to the herein plaintiffs.[21] It is clear, therefore, that
respondents seek to protect their rights over the subject real
properties as heirs of the deceased Victorio which the Sheriffs
have allegedly violated by selling said properties or interests
therein at public auction. The complaint satisfies the elements
of a valid cause of action.
The complaint was filed on November 23, 1992. Prior
to the 1997 amendment of the Rules of Court, an executor or
administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is presented or defended. Section 3,
Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 3. Representative Parties.- A
trustee of an express trust, a guardian,
executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by statute, may sue or be sued
 without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is presented or defended; but the
court may, at any stage of the proceedings,
order such beneficiary to be made a party.
An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue
or be sued without joining the principal
except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
Accordingly, in Ramos vs. Ramos,[22] the Court held that the
heirs of a decedent have no standing in court with respect to
actions over a property of the estate, if the latter is
represented by an executor or administrator.
Considering that plaintiff-respondent Luisa vda. de Valle is
admittedly the administratrix of the Estate of her late husband
Victorio Valle, and considering further that the subject
properties belong to the Estate, the complaint against the
Sheriffs who sold the same at public auction constitutes a
valid cause of action. The fact that the children of the
decedent are co-plaintiffs is not a ground to dismiss the
complaint.
Pursuant to the present Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which took effect on July 1, 1997, to wit:
SEC. 3. Representatives as
parties.- Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative
or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity,
the beneficiary shall be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the
real party in interest. A representative may
be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian,
an executor or administrator, or a party
authorized by law or these Rules. An agent
acting in his own name and for the benefit
of an undisclosed principal may sue or be
sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging
to the principal.
and for orderly administration of justice, the administratrix
should be allowed by the RTC to implead the Estate of the
deceased Victorio Valle. However, this holds true only if, at
this time, the Estate has not been finally settled in that debts
have been paid and the heirs given their respective shares. In
the event that the Estate has been settled, then the Heirs to
whom the real properties or portions thereof, subject of the
auction sale, had been adjudged by the probate court would
have the legal personality to be included as plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 2671.
JUANA PIMENTEL v. ENGRACIO PALANCA, G.R. No. L-
2108 December 18, 1905
FACTS:
Margarita Jose, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands,
died in China, on the 4th of February, 1902. Her last will was
duly proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on the 15th day of April, 1902, and on the same day
Engracio Palanca was duly appointed administrator of the
estate of the deceased. He entered upon the discharge of his
duties as such administrator, and is still engaged therein.
By her said will Margarita Jose left all her property to her two
children, Vicente Barreto and Benito Carlos. On the 8th day of
July, 1902, Juana Pimentel, the mother of said Margarita
Jose, commenced this, an ordinary action, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, alleging that the two children of Margarita
Jose were illegitimate, and that she was the heir at law and
entitled to the whole estate. The prayer of the original
complaint was that the plaintiff be declared the lawful heir and
entitled to all the property of her daughter, Margarita Jose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ordinary action at law be maintained under
these circumstances by a person claiming to be an heir of the
deceased against other persons, also claiming to be such
heirs, for the purpose of having their rights in the estate
determined?
RULING:
No. By Section 641 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when a
will is proved it is obligatory upon the court to appoint an
executor or administrator. By virtue of other provisions of the
code this executor or administrator has, under the direction of
the court, the full administration and control of the deceased's
property, real and personal, until a final decree is made in
accordance with section 753.
For the purpose of such administration and distribution there
is only one proceeding in the Court of First Instance. That
proceeding is not an action of law, but fall under Part II of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and is a special proceeding.
It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the
estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a
special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in
that court, or in any other court, by a person claiming to be the
heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to
be heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the plaintiff in
the estate determined. The very purpose of the trial or hearing
provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those
questions, and until they are settled and determined in that
proceeding and under that section no action such as the
present one can be maintained.
NGO THE HUA VS CCHUNG KIAT HUA
IMPERIAL V. MUNOZ, 58 SCRA 678 [1974]
RULE 90. DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE
ESTATE; PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION
Doctrine:
Facts:
-On 1957, Luis Santos surviving spouse of the deceased
Fermina Bello Santos, who died intestate filed Special
Proceeding No. 1049, entitled "Intestate Estate of Fermina
Bello Santos", in CFI Bulacan
-Luis was appointed regular Administrator on 1958, as there
was no opposition filed by the only other heir, herein petitioner
Purificacion Santos Imperial
-Later on petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial entered her
appearance in the abovementioned intestate proceedings as
Oppositor, and filed a motion to require the regular
administrator to render an accounting
-This resulted in the approval by the Court a quo on 1967 of
the project of partition with the following awards:
1. To Dr. Luis U. Santos, citizen of the Philippines, of age,
married to Socorro Manankil and resident of Malolos,
Bulacan, is hereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided
FIVE-EIGHTH(5/8) share in each of the above-described
properties; and
2. To Purificacion Santos-Imperial, citizen of the Philippines,
of age, married to Eloy Imperial and resident of Malolos,
Bulacan, is hereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided
THREE-EIGHTH (3/8) share in each of the properties
described above;
Santos filed a Motion for Correction of both the Amended
Project of Partition of 1966, approved by the Court on June 6,
1967, and the Final Partial Project of Partition of March 22,
1968, likewise approved by the same court on April 26, 1968,
claiming that the partition submitted to the Court was
erroneous, as the same did not conform with the ruling laid
down in the case of Santillon vs. Miranda
-Luis contended that he should get the properties partitioned
while oppositor-petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial, the
only child (adopted), should get only the remaining of the
estate.
Issue/s:
(1) WON an order of a probate court in testate or intestate
proceedings approving a project of partition which clearly fixed
the distributive share to which each heir is entitled is merely
interlocutory in nature so that the probate court can correct
and set aside the same anytime; or is final and, therefore,
appealable within the 30 day period for appeal; and
(2) WON a court can order the correction of an erroneous final
decision after it had become final and executory.
Ruling:
(1)
-The contention of petitioner to the effect that the orders of the
court a quo dated 1967 as well as that of 1968, are final as
the same have determined the distributive shares of the
known forced heirs, finds support in the very same case cited
by the respondents as their authority.
-This Court citing the case of Santillon held that in deciding
the issue as to whether the order of the lower court is final and
appealable, went on to say:
It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,
therefore, appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, section 1, a person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance
where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled."
The two (2) questioned orders, being final in character, should
have been appealed by the party adversely affected within the
30-day reglementary period provided for appeal. This was not
done.
(2)
-The contention of petitioner that an order which has already
become final and therefore executory is not subject to
correction, finds support in Chereau vs. Fuentebella, where it
was held that an erroneous decree or judgment although
granted without legal authority and contrary to the express
provision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was
taken, the decree must be conceded to have full force and
effect. An erroneous decree is not a void decree.
-The questioned orders having become final and, therefore,
executory because of the failure of the herein respondent Luis
U. Santos to appeal on time by allowing the period for appeal
to lapse before filing his motion for correction on June 18,
1968, he has to suffer the misfortune brought about by his
own negligence and fatal inadvertence
IGNACIO VS ELCHICO
Intestate estate of the deceased Baldomero Cosme,
ROSARIO COSME DE MENDOZA (administratrix-appellee)
vs. JANUARIO PACHECO and RAYMUNDO CORDERO
G.R. No. 43351
February 26, 1937
DOCTRINE: -It is clear that a Court of First Instance,
exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the
filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof,
and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's
duty. With an all-embracing power over the administrator's
bond and over administration proceedings, a Court of First
Instance in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal
authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the
very purpose for which it was filed.
- It is the duty of courts of probate jurisdiction to guard
jealously the estates of the deceased person by intervening in
the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any
injury that may be done thereto
FACTS: Manuel Soriano (former administrator of the estate of
Baldomero Cosme). He filed a bond amounting to P5,000 with
with Juanario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero as sureties for
faithful complaince/ performance of his duties as
administartor.
Soriano's account,upon approval, indebted to P 23, 603.21.
Being unable to return the amount to the estate upon
denmand by Rosario Cosme (new administratrix) the court
ordered execution of bond on November 4, 1932, after notice
duly served to the parties.
Later, the court approved settlement betwee the old and new
administartor, whereby SOriano ceded certain real properties
to the estate reducing account of his indebtedness to estate to
P5,000. Subsequently, the adminitratrix had the public sale to
collect the amoutn of P5,000.
Separate motions to be discharged from bond were filed by
Pacheco and Cordero. However, both were denied.
Cordero then filed a motion for reconsideration but was then
denied. Appeal was then brought to this court.
CA: On Nov. 4, 1932, MR was filed but denied and no appeal
was made. Thus, the decision is final. The decision was
affirmed with costs against appellants.
Case was remanded to lower court and the sureties filed a
motion challenging for the 1st time the jurisdiction of the trial
court to issue order executing the bond. However, it was
denied, The case was elevated for 2nd time on appeal.
ISSUE: WON the court acting as probate court has jurisdiction
to order execution of the administrator's bond.
RULING: Yes. It is within the discretion of the court to select
administrator of the estate of the deceased person. It is clear
that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction,
is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond,
to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any
breach of the administrator's duty.
Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the
execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of
administration are issued, the person to whom they are issued
is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court
directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon
the faithful performance of his trust and is accountable on his
bond with the sureties for such performance.
It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate
jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the
administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it
accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty. With
an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and
over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a
probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to
execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose
for which it was filed.
In this connection, it should be observed that section 683 of
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the
settlement of the account of an executor or administrator,
trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety in respect to
such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to
such accounting, and may have the right to appeal as
hereinafter provided."
Thus, a person who may be held liable as surety in respect to
an administrator's account the right, upon application, to be
admitted as a party to their accounting, from which we may
not unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the
case before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond
during the process of accounting, that is, within the
recognized confines of probate proceedings, and not in an
action apart and distinct from such proceedings.
In the appellant's brief, it mentioned related jurisprudence in
this case where the execution of an administrator's bond,
clearly stands upon a different footing, and is as necessary a
part and incident of the administration proceeding as the filing
of such bond or the fixing of its amount. Particularly is this true
in the present case where Soriano's indebtedness to the sate
in the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to
P5,000, is conceded on all sides, and all that the trial court
had to do was to see that said amount was turned over to the
estate.
It is the duty of courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously
the estates of the deceased person by intervening in the
administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury
that may be done thereto.
"Probate and like courts have a special jurisdiction only, and
their powers as to ancillary or incidental questions must of
necessity to exercise within certain limitations; but such
powers include the right to try questions which arise
incidentally in a cause over which such courts have
jurisdiction and the determination of which are necessary to a
lawful exercise of the powers expressly conferred in arriving at
a decision. Generally, in the absence of express and specific
restrictions to the contrary, to uphold the exercise by these
court of such incidental powers as are, within the purview of
their grant of authority, reasonably necessary to enable them
to accomplish the objects for which they were invested with
jurisdiction and to perfect the same. And it has been held that
statutes conferring jurisdiction on such courts, being remedial
and for the advancement of justice, should receive a favorable
construction, such as will give them the force and efficiency
intended by the legislature."
We refer to the dispatch and economy with which
administration of the estates of deceased persons should be
terminated and settled. It will be recalled that the appellants
could have raised the question of jurisdiction now pressed
upon us in civil case and on appeal. They failed to appeal
from the order complained thereof.
The court cannot encourage a practice that trenches violently
upon the settled jurisprudence of this court that the policy and
purpose of administration proceedings is ". . . to close up, and
not to continue an estate . . ."the State fails wretchedly in its
duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the
division and distribution of the property of a decedent is so
cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a considerable
portion of the sate is absorbed in the process of such division.
Order appealed from is affirmed.
MAMBA VS BUENO
EDITA T. BURGOS vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Facts
On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision
in the consolidated petitions for the Issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her
son Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, who was forcibly taken and
abducted by a group of four men and by a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the
ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City, on April 28, 2007. This CA decision dismissed
the petitioner's petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus; denied the petitioner's motion to declare the
respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.
Held:
No. The Court of Appeal’s decision was upheld.
Considering the findings of the CA and the Court’s review of
the records of the present case, it conclude that the PNP and
the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the
performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires. Because of these investigative
shortcomings, the Court cannot rule on the case until a more
meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is
undertaken. The Court affirmed the CA’s decision that the
evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her
claimed direct connection between the abductors of Jonas
and the military.
The Court directed the Commission on Human Rights to
conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field
investigations — acting as the Court's directly commissioned
agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The Court affirmed CA’s decision that the petitions for habeas
corpus and contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo must be dropped since she enjoys the privilege of
immunity from suit. The CA ruled that the President's
immunity from suit is a settled doctrine citing David v. Arroyo.
SEC OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS MANALO
FACTS:
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both
questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled
"Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by
military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that
they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on
August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to
stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case
was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a
manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the
privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to
furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the
present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the
Manalo brothers while under military custody.
In this present case, the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a continuing violation of
respondents' right to security after they have
escaped.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of respondents'
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government
HELD:
1. YES. The possibility of respondents being executed
stared them in the eye while they were in detention.
With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is
apparent. Understandably, since their escape,
respondents have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to
their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their
free will as they are forced to limit their movements
or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are
being shielded from the perpetrators of their
abduction, they cannot be expected to show
evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face
intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and
security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents' abduction, detention, torture and
escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is
an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These
constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
2. YES. Apart from the failure of military elements to
provide protection to respondents by themselves
perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture,
they also miserably failed in conducting an effective
investigation of respondents' abduction.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National
Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive
dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP
should adopt rules of action in the event the writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against
any members of the AFP, which should essentially
include verification of the identity of the aggrieved
party; recovery and preservation of relevant
evidence; identification of witnesses and securing
statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of
the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected
offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner
AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit
attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that
acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be
issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the
purpose of establishing the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance
of the respondents, and undertook to provide results
of the investigations to respondents.151
To this day, however, almost a year after the policy
directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of
National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents
have not been furnished the results of the
investigation which they now seek through the
instant petition for a writ of Amparo. Under these
circumstances, there is substantial evidence to
warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents' right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government. In sum, we conclude
that respondents' right to security as "freedom from
threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life,
liberty and security of person. Their right to security
as a guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and
protection on the part of the military.

The petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SAN ROQUE VS REPUBLIC
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact,
EVELYN M. OGA,
G.R. No. 186027; December 8, 2010
“Hence any petition which seeks to change the name
recorded in the civil registry is a petition for change of name
governed by R103. However mere correction of typographical
or clerical errors in the entry of the name which are obvious to
the understanding are governed by R108. If what a petitioner
seeks to do is simply to correct a typographical or clerical
error in the entry of her name, then the procedure to be
followed is Rule 108 and not Rule 103. On the other hand,
Rule 103 is based on change of name which is not simply a
correction of a typographical or clerical error, as where the
name is dishonorable or is indicative of former alienage. Here
the correction of a patently misspelled name (Marilyn to
Merlyn) is proper under Rule 108. The RTC did not allow
Mercadera to change her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she has been
using ever since she could remember.”
Facts: On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera),
represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-
Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given
name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from
Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9048.
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general is now authorized to effect the change of first
name or nickname and the correction of clerical or
typographical errors in civil registry entries. The Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to
effect the correction unless a court order was obtained
"because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a
permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions
for corrections filed before their office as mandated by R.A.
No. 9048."
Mercadera then filed a Petition For Correction of Some
Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule
108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC).
Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC
issued an order, dated June 10, 2005, for the hearing of said
petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized
the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case. Without
any objection from the City Prosecutor, the testimony of Oga
and several photocopies of documents were formally offered
and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used
the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private
transactions.
In its September 28, 2005 Decision, the RTC granted the
petition and ruled that the documentary evidence presented
by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances
alleged in her petition. Considering that she had used
"Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she
discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the
RTC was convinced that the correction was justified.
The OSG timely appealed praying for the reversal and setting
aside of the RTC decision. For the OSG, the correction in the
spelling of Mercadera’s given name "is in truth a material
correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights",
which would have been proper had she filed a petition under
Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.
The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008
Decision, the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC
order.
On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On
behalf of Mercadera, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed
its Comment on July 3, 2009.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON
A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN
RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 103.
HELD:
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change
of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of
the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an
independent special proceeding in court to establish the
status of a person involving his relations with others, that is,
his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. Essentially, a change of name does not define or
effect a change of one’s existing family relations or in the
rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status.
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings
for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry
pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil
register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in Article 408
of the same law.
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from
"MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous
error but a material correction tantamount to a change of
name which entails a modification or increase in substantive
rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires
compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule
108.
A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only
on grounds provided by law, there must be a proper and
compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. In
petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised.
Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also
includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not
all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule
103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under
Rule 108.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly
falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a
misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or
set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change
means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the
allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the
lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered
given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same
to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." The CA did
not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did
allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which
she had been using ever since she could remember.
Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial
proceeding before the lower court. The publication and
posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil
Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding.
Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the
motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective.
Wherefore, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LORENA OMAPAS
SALI
G.R. No. 206023, April 03, 2017
“...not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under
Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108”
Facts:
Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition for Correction of
Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC.
Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and
Almarina A. Albay who was born on April 24, 1968 in Baybay,
Leyte. Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the
personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, thru
inadvertence and mistake, erroneously entered in the records
the following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as
“DOROTHY” instead of “LORENA” and Secondly, the date of
birth of the petitioner as “June 24, 1968” instead of “April 24,
1968.” The petitioner alleged that she has been using the
name “Lorena A. Omapas” and her date of birth as “April 24,
1968” for as long as she could remember and is known to the
community in general as such.
To sustain petitioner’s claim that the entries in her Certificate
of Live Birth pertaining to her first name and date of birth
should be corrected so that it will now read as “LORENA A.
OMAPAS” and “April 24, 1968”. RTC granted the Petition.
However, appealed the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of RTC because the title of the petition and the
order setting the petition for hearing did not contain Sali’s
aliases. The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records
are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a name other
than “Lorena,” hence, it would be absurd to compel her to
indicate any other alias that she does not have; (2) Sali not
only complied with the mandatory requirements for an
appropriate adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 of the
Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity to timely
contest the purported defective petition; and (3) the change in
the first name of Sali will certainly avoid further confusion as
to her identity and there is no showing that it was sought for a
fraudulent purpose or that it would prejudice public interest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the present Petition is for change of
name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules
and not for correction of entries under Rule 108;
2. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
petition
Ruling
Sali’s petition is not for a change of name as contemplated
under Rule 103 of the Rules but for correction of entries under
Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors
which were committed in the recording of her name and birth
date. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in
one’s name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections
for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. The
evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has
been using the name “Lorena.” Thus, it is apparent that she
never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks
is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first
name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name she
grew up with.
Nevertheless, at the time Sali’s petition was filed, R.A. No.
9048 was already in effect.
Section 1 of the law states:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among
other grounds, if the new first name has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been
publicly known by that first name in the community.8 The local
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the
primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when
such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to
the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with
the proper court.
We stressed in Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines:
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It
likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
Recently, the Court again said in Onde v. Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Las Pinas City.
In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and
effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic
v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the
correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical
errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy
for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of
Sali’s first name, was not within the RTC’s primary jurisdiction.
It was improper because the remedy should have been
administrative, e., filing of the petition with the local civil
registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to
correct Sali’s first name. On the other hand, anent Sali’s
petition to correct her birth date from “June 24, 1968” to “April
24, 1968,”
R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012
that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending R.A. No.
9048.14 As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and
month in the date of birth and sex of a person, thus:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or
sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a
clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 10815 is
the appropriate remedy in seeking to correct her date of birth
in the civil registry. Under the Rules, the following must be
observed:
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The February 11, 2013 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442, which
affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Petition for
Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A.
Omapas with respect to her first name is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with the local civil registrar
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF
ANTONINA B. OSHITA.
ANTONINA B. OSHITA,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. L-21180 March 31, 1967
“The above grounds are not exclusive. The matter of whether
to grant a petition for change of name is left to the sound
discretion of the court. The petition should be granted where
there is proper and reasonable cause and where there is no
showing that the petition was motivated by fraudulent intent or
that the change of surname will prejudice public interest.”
Facts:
On February 15, 1962, Antonina B. Oshita filed with the Court
of First Instance of Davao a petition to have her name
changed from "Antonina B. Oshita" to "Antonina Bartolome".
The petition was signed by the petitioner herself and was
"subscribed and sworn to" by her before the Deputy Clerk of
Court. The requirements for the publication of the hearing of
the petition were duly complied with. Asst. City Attorney
Roque M. Barnes, acting in behalf of the Solicitor General,
filed a motion to dismiss the petition upon the grounds (1) of
lack of jurisdiction, in that although the petition was
subscribed and sworn to by petitioner, it was not verified in
accordance with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) that the petition does not state a cause
of action. The petitioner-appellee filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion to
dismiss and set the case for hearing.
Issue:
(1) that the lower court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case because the petition was not verified as required
by Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
(2) that no sufficient reason had been shown to justify the
change of the surname of the appellee.
Held:
This appeal has no merit. It is admitted that the petition is not
verified in the manner as prescribed in Section 6 of Rule 15 of
the old Rules of Court (now Section 6 of Rule 7 of the new
Rules of Court), because what appears is a simple jurat by the
Deputy Clerk of Court that the petitioner had subscribed and
sworn to, the petition, before him. While it is true that under
Section 2, Rule 103, it is required that the petition for change
of name be verified, nevertheless, no provision exists in the
rules which declares that such a requirement regarding
verification is jurisdictional. The requirement regarding
verification of a pleading is simply intended to secure an
assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply a
condition affecting the form of pleading,1the non-compliance
of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order the correction of the pleading if
the verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is
not verified if the attending circumstances are such that the
strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice or the law may thereby be served. This
view finds support in the ruling laid down by this Court in
several decisions.
In the case of The Philippine Bank of Commerce vs.
Macadaeg, et al., L-14174, October 31, 1960, the petition for
certiorari was attacked as fatally defective because it was not
verified as required by the provision of Section 1 of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court (now Section 1, Rule 65 of the new Rules
of Court). In resolving this question, this Court held:
First, respondents claim that the petition, not being
verified, is fatally defective. We do not think so. It is
true that Rule 67, sec. 1, of the Rules of Court,
require that the petition for certiorari be verified, the
apparent object thereof being to insure good faith in
the averments of the petition. Where, however, the
material facts alleged are a matter of record in the
court below, consisting in pleadings filed
proceedings taken therein, and the questions raised
are mainly of law, a verification as to the truth of said
facts is not an absolute necessity and may be waived
(42 Am. Jur., sec. 42, p. 177), as this Court has done
in this case when we gave due course to the present
petition. In fact, many authorities consider the
absence of verification a mere formal,
jurisdictional, defect, the absence of which does not
of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act in
the case (71 C.J.S., 744-745). (Emphasis supplied).
Likewise, in the case of Tavera vs. El Hogar Filipino, Inc., et
al., 98 Phil. 481, this Court held that "lack of verification of a
petition filed in a probate court for the sale of real property
belonging to the estate of a minor is not a jurisdictional
defect."2In a land registration case, notwithstanding the
provision of Section 34, Act 496, which requires that
opposition to an application for registration of land should be
sworn to by oppositor, this Court held that an "unverified
opposition is sufficient to confer standing in court to
3
oppositors."
In the light of the rulings laid down by this Court in the
decisions afore-cited, it is clear that verification is not a
jurisdictional, but a formal, requisite. While the petition now
before Us was not verified, it was, however, subscribed and
sworn to by the petitioner, and We believe that the lower court
did not commit a reversible error when it denied the motion to
dismiss the petition upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the court was not affected by the absence
of the proper verification of the petition. It may be stated here,
though, that the lower court should have required appellee to
have her petition verified before setting the case for hearing,
in order to have the petition conform with the rule.1äwphï1.ñët
The appellant also contends that no sufficient reasons had
been shown to justify the grant by the lower court of the
petition for a change of name. The appellant urges that under
Article 364 of the Civil Code legitimate children shall
principally use the surname of the father. This provision,
however, is not absolute because under Article 264 of the
same Code, it is provided that legitimate children have the
right to bear the surname of the father and of the mother.
Hence, if there is sufficient reason, the change of a child's
surname from that of the father, to that of the mother, may be
authorized by the court.
In the instant case, it has been shown that the petitioner-
appellee is the legitimate daughter of Buena Bartolome and
Hishimatsu Oshita; that upon reaching the age of majority she
elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance;
that being already a Filipino citizen she desires to adopt a
Filipino surname; that her older brother and sister who had
also elected Philippine citizenship have been using the
surname "Bartolome"; and that she desires to have the
or surname "Bartolome" instead of "Oshita", because she felt
embarrassed when introduced as one bearing Japanese
surname. The lower court further observed that "It cannot be
denied that there had been ill feeling among the Filipinos
against the Japanese due to the last Pacific war. Although
normal relations between the Philippines and Japan have
been established the ill feelings still persist among some
not Filipinos especially among the less educated who had
unpleasant experience during the war." There is no showing
that the appellee was motivated by any fraudulent purpose, or
that the change of her surname will prejudice public interest.
We believe that the lower court acted correctly when it
considered these circumstances as reasons sufficient to
justify the change of name as prayed for by the petitioner-
appellee.
Moreover, the matter of whether to grant or deny a petition for
a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court.
The following, ruling of this Court is relevant:
In granting or denying petitions for change of name,
the question of "proper and reasonable cause" is left
to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the Court and
not all the best evidence available.
In the present case the trial court found to its
satisfaction that petitioner was in earnest in his
desire to do away with all traces of his former
Chinese nationality and henceforth to be recognized
as a Filipino. Such desire is in line with the policy of
our naturalization law that applicants for
naturalization should fully embrace Filipino customs
and traditions and socially mingle with Filipinos.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also
known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected
as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly
represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG v. CEBU
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
FACTS:
Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet
married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will
study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna
Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court
seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered
name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of
name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated
against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle
name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.
Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will
cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing
or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance
and integration in the Singaporean community.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason
given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law.
Issue:
whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is
contrary to Article 1747 of the Family Code
RULING:
Yes. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the
name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a
minor. When he reaches majority age he could then decide
whether to change his name by dropping his middle name,
added the RTC.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals
and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of
name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person
can be authorized to change his name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify
such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show
not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for
the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how
such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the
nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name
is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be
left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand
and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his
rights under our laws.
REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
REPUBLIC V. COSETENG- MAGPAYO,
G.R. NO. 189476, 2 FEBRUARY 2011
R.A. NO. 9048 (ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME AND CORRECTION
OF
CLERICAL/TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS)
Doctrine:
Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio
M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng
who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted
marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his
parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July
22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a
Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-
0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-
LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification
from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna
Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of
Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic records
from elementary up to college showing that he carried the
surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child
where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001
and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as
Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name
"JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent
amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the
3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of
the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing
on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper
Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008,
November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a
copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of
general default was entered by the trial court which then
allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte
By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted
respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar ofMakati
City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein
respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last
Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle
Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space
for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and
underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of
July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present
petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name involving
change of civil status should be made through appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
2. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it directed the deletion of the name of respondent’s
father from his birth certificate.
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic)
1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103
(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds
including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
*** Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v.
Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the
therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had
been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon
did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to
use the surname of her mother which she had been using
since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she
was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that
the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow
her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies
his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far
as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks
to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then
would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes
which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate .
. . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only
be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."
******** Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It
reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns
one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which
the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of
Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be
made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed
not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in
Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition
filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made
parties thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108
concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are separate and distinct.
Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil
registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in
the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of
entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the
civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim
to have any interest that would be affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different
"potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the
"persons named in the petition" and the second (which is
through publication) is that given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets
of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is
validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted,
which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential
oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from
notice or from the last date of publication).
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the
whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The
sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were
inadvertently left out
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City
Principle:
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry),
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiation.
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Sicad
Braza, Jr., also known as Pablito Sicad Braza, were married
on January 4, 1978..Pablo died in a vehicular accident in
Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. During the wake following
the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent
Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza as her and Pablo's son.
well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as
well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.
CORPUZ VS STO TOMAS

Ma. Cristina file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional

ONDE VS LCR
Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a
petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in
the Local Civil Register. Contending that Patrick could not
have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account
of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and
Pablo, petitioners prayed for
(1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with
respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza";
2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular,
as guardians of the minor Patrick to submit Parick to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and
3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as
stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as
bigamous.

Patricks filed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction it

holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family
Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage
of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and
order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial
action.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?

Ruling:

No, the petition fails.

In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108

(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry),
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule
on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil
Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil
registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties
are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial

court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous
and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they ask
the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. It is