Comments of The Solicitor General On The Petition Against BOL

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
EN BANC
THE PROVINCE OF SULU,

duly represented by its
Governor, ABDUSAKUR A.
TAN II,
Petitioner,
-versus-
HONORABLE SALVADOR C. G.R. No. 242255

MEDIALDEA, in his capacity For Certiorari and
as Executive Secretary, Prohibition with Urgent
HONORABLE EDUARDO M. Prayer for Issuance of
AÑO, in his capacity as Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of
Officer-in-Charge of the
Preliminary Injunction
Department of Interior and
Local Government, THE
HONORABLE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE
HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS,
HONORABLE JESUS G.
DUREZA, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Office of
the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process,
BANGSAMORO
TRANSITION COMMISSION
and MORO ISLAMIC
LIBERATION FRONT,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
COMMENT
Province of Sulu v. Hon. Medialdea, et al.
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
COMMENT
[On the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent
Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated 11 October 2018]
The HONORABLE SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, in

his capacity as Executive Secretary, the HONORABLE
EDUARDO M. AÑO, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge
of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, the
HONORABLE JESUS G. DUREZA, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process and the BANGSAMORO TRANSITION
COMMISSION, through the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, respectfully state:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. In this present Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated 11 October 2018, the Province of Sulu, represented by
its Governor Abdusakur A. Tan II, asks this Honorable Court
to declare Republic Act No. 11054, 1 otherwise known as the
Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, for having been allegedly enacted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
2. Petitioner likewise asks for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Public Respondents from enforcing the
Bangsamoro Organic Law including, among others, the
1
An Act Providing For The Organic Law For The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao,
Repealing For The Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled “An Act Providing For An Organic Act For
The Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao,” As Amended By Republic Act No. 9054, Entitled “An
Act To Strengthen And Expand The Organic Act For The Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao”
2
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
conduct of the plebiscite for its ratification on 21 January

2019.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
3. A discussion of the constitutionality of the

Bangsamoro Organic Law will not be complete without
revisiting and understanding the history of the struggle of
the Bangsamoro people for self-determination, and retracing
the steps that the Philippine Government and the
Bangsamoro people took to achieve regional autonomy in
Muslim Mindanao.
The armed struggle for regional

autonomy and the signing of the
1976 Tripoli Agreement between
the Philippine Government and the
MNLF
4. The Moro people’s struggle for self-determination

dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the
Philippines.2 This struggle has been the longest national
liberation movement in the country covering almost 400
years of violent resistance against Spanish, American,
Japanese, and even Filipino rule. 3
5. In March 1967, about 180 Muslim trainees were

recruited as part of the government’s covert force named
Jabidah, allegedly formed to wrest away Sabah from
Malaysia.4 The following year, these trainees were
massacred when they reportedly protested their unbearable
training and demanded the return to their home.5
2
Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Dante Tiñga in Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16,
2008.
3
Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Samuel Martires in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4,
2017 citing Rommel Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah, Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, pp. 24-25
(3rd ed.).
4
Separate Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato Puno in Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008.
5
Ibid. citing T.J.S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics (1980) and Cesar
Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines (1985), cited in Thomas M. McKenna,
Muslim Rulers and Rebels, Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in Southern Philippines, p. 141
(1998).
3
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
6. Following the tragic Jabidah massacre, groups

calling for the creation of a separate Islamic state were
formed, one of which was the Muslim Independence
Movement (MIM), founded by the then Governor of
Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam.6
7. On 21 September 1972, President Ferdinand E.

Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under martial law. Among his reasons for
proclaiming martial law was “the equally serious disorder in
Mindanao and Sulu resulting from the unsettled conflict
between certain elements of the Christian and Muslim
population of Mindanao and Sulu, between the Christian
‘Ilagas’ and the Muslim ‘Barracudas,’ and between our
government troops, and certain lawless organizations such
as the Mindanao Independence Movement.”
8. In 1973, the Moro National Liberation Front,

headed by Nur Misuari, was founded in response to
President Marcos’ martial law proclamation.7 Armed struggle
between the Philippine Government and the MNLF ensued in
the following years.
9. In 1974, the Organization of Islamic Conference

(OIC) officially recognized the MNLF and strongly urged “the
Philippine Government to find a political and peaceful
solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders,
particularly with representatives of the MNLF in order to
arrive at a just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims
within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Philippines.”8
10. On 23 December 1976, the Philippine Government

and the MNLF, with the participation of the Quadripartite
Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference
and Secretary General of the OIC, signed the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement in Tripoli, Libya.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
4
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
11. To put an end to the armed struggle in Southern

Philippines and to attain peace in the region, the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement laid down the “[t]he establishment of Autonomy
in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines” and set forth general principles as to how the
autonomy shall be given flesh. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement
contained provisions (a) enumerating thirteen areas of
autonomy in Southern Philippines, and (b) guaranteeing the
establishment of a regional government, its structure and
powers, to wit:
First: The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern

Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Second: The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the

Southern Philippines shall comprise the following:
1.Basilan
2. Sulu
3. Tawi-tawi
4. Zamboanga del Sur
5. Zamboanga del Norte
6. North Cotabato
7. Maguindanao
8. Sultan Kudarat
9. Lanao del Norte
10. Lanao del Sur
11. Davao del Sur
12. South Cotabato
13. Palawan
Third:
1. Foreign Policy shall be of the competence of the Central

Government of the Philippines.
2. The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the

Central Authority provided that the arrangements for
the joining of the forces of the Moro National Liberation
Front with the Philippine Armed Forces be discussed
later.
3. In the areas of the autonomy, the Muslims shall have

the right to setup their own Courts which implement the
Islamic Shari’ah laws. The Muslims shall be represented
in all Courts including the Supreme Court. The
representation of the Muslims in the Supreme Court
5
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
shall be upon the recommendation from the authorities

of the Autonomy and the Supreme Court. Decrees will
be issued by the President of the Republic of their
appointments taking into consideration all necessary
qualifications of the candidates.
4. Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the

Philippines shall have the right to set up schools,
colleges and universities, provided that matters
pertaining to the relationship between these educational
and scientific organs and the general education system
in the state shall be subject of discussion later on.
5. The Muslims shall have their own administrative

system in compliance with the objectives of the
autonomy and its institutions. The relationship
between this administrative system and the Central
administrative system to be discussed later.
6. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of

the Philippines shall have their own economic and
financial system. The relationship between this
system and the Central economic and financial system
of the State shall be discussed later.
7. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the

Philippines shall enjoy the right of representation and
participation in the Central Government and in all other
organs of the State. The number of representatives and
ways of participation shall be fixed later.
8. Special Regional Security Forces are to be setup in the

area of the Autonomy for the Muslims in the South of
the Philippines. The relationship between these forces
and the Central security forces shall be fixed later.
9. A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council

shall be formed in the areas of the Autonomy for
the Muslims. The setting up of the Legislative
Assembly shall be constituted through a direct
election, and the formation of the Executive
Council shall take place through appointments by
the Legislative Assembly. A decree for their
formation shall be enacted by the President of the
Republic respectively. The number of members of each
assembly shall be determined later on.
10. Mines and mineral resources fall within the competence

of the Central Government, and a reasonable
percentage deriving from the revenues of the mines
and minerals be fixed for the benefit of the areas of the
6
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
autonomy.
11. A Mixed Committee shall be composed of

representatives of the Central Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the representatives of
the Moro National Liberation Front. The Mixed
Committee shall meet in Tripoli during the period from
the Fifth of February to a date not later than the Third
of March 1977. The task of said Committee shall be
charged to study in detail the points left for discussion
in order to reach a solution thereof in conformity with
the provisions of this agreement.
12. Cease-fire shall be declared immediately after the

signature of this agreement, provided that its coming
into effect should not exceed the 20th January 1977. A
Joint Committee shall be composed of the two parties
with the help of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial
Commission to supervise the implementation of the
cease-fire.9
12. On 14 February 1977, Presidential Decree No.

1092 was promulgated calling for a referendum-plebiscite on
17 April 1977 in the thirteen provinces of Southern
Philippines enumerated in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.10
Among the questions during the plebiscite was Question No.
10, that is, “the proposal of the Batasang Bayan in its
Resolution No. 11 to create a Sangguniang Pampook and a
Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook (Regional Executive
Council).”11
13. Negotiations between the Philippine Government

and the MNLF were held from 9 February 1977 to 3 March
1977, also in Tripoli, Libya. The parties, however, were
unable to agree on certain vital aspects of the autonomy to
be established in Southern Philippines.12
9
Emphasis supplied.
10
P.D. No. 1092 was later amended by P.D. No. 1111 entitled "Further Amending Presidential Decree No.
1092, As Amended By Presidential Decree No. 1104, Providing For The Holding Of A Referendum
Through The Remark Sheets On The Occasion Of And In Connection With The April 17, 1977 Regional
Plebiscite In Southwestern Philippines, Prescribing Certain Questions For Voters' Remarks, And For Other
Purposes” (issued March 30, 1977); P.D. No. 1104 entitled "Authorizing The Use Of Remarks Sheets In
The March 1977 Regional Plebiscite, Further Amending For The Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1092, As
Amended" (issued March 3, 1977); and P.D. No. 1098 entitled "Resetting The Date Of The Regional
Plebiscite In Regions IX And XII And In The Provinces Of Palawan, Davao Del Sur And South Cotabato"
(issued February 25, 1977). See P.D. No. 1618, First Whereas Clause.
11
P.D. No. 1618, Fourth Whereas Clause.
12
President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1628, March 25, 1977, Second Whereas Clause.
7
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
14. From 12 to 22 March 1977, the Government

discussed the impasse in the negotiations with then Colonel
Muammar Al Ghaddafi, leader of the great First of
September Revolution of the People’s Socialist Libyan Arab
Jemeheriya.13
15. Colonel Ghaddafi “proposed to break the impasse

in the aforementioned negotiations with the declaration by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos of autonomy for the thirteen
provinces mentioned in the Tripoli agreement of December
23, 1976 within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, the organization
of a provisional government for such areas of autonomy, in
which provisional government the concerned parties of the
Moro National Liberation Front and the inhabitants of the
areas of autonomy shall take part and the holding of a
referendum by the provisional government concerning the
manner in which the inhabitants within the areas of
autonomy may wish to organize themselves administratively
in accordance with the Constitution of the Philippines.”14
16. On 25 March 1977, President Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 1628 declaring autonomy in Southern
Philippines to be composed of the provinces of Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur in
Region IX, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat in Region XII, Palawan in
Region IV-A, and Davao del Sur and South Cotabato in
Region XI. Proclamation No. 1628 likewise provided that the
results of the referendum of April 17, 1977 shall determine
the manner in which the inhabitants of the areas of
autonomy may wish to organize themselves administratively
in accordance with the Constitution of the Philippines and
the formula proposed by Col. Muammar Al Ghaddafi.
17. During the referendum on 17 April 1977, only the

provinces under Regions IX and XII voted for autonomy.
13
Ibid. at Third Whereas Clause.
14
Ibid. at Fourth Whereas Clause.
8
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
18. Furthermore, Question No. 10 was overwhelmingly

approved by the qualified voters of the thirteen provinces in
Southern Philippines with 2,499,375 affirmative votes.15 This
paved the way for the establishment of a Sangguniang
Pampook and a Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook in Regions
IX and XII which voted in favor of autonomy.
19. In April 1977, the peace talks between the

Government of the Republic of the Philippines and MNLF
Talks collapsed. Schism split the MNLF leadership. The
irreconcilable differences between Nur Misuari and Hashim
Salamat led to the formation of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, headed by the latter. Thus, the Maguindanao-led
MILF, parted ways with the Tausug-led MNLF.16 The MILF
was established on the ground, among others, of what
Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away
from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.17
20. Armed struggle in Southern Philippines continued,

this time with both the MNLF and the MILF fighting for
dominance in the region. Meanwhile, the MNLF’s prominence
at the international level increased even more when it was
accorded the status of an observer in Tripoli, Libya during
the 8th ICFM. In the 15th ICFM at Sana'a, Yemen, in 1984,
the MNLF's status was further elevated from a mere
legitimate representative to sole legitimate representative of
the Bangsamoro people.18
21. On 23 March 1979, the Interim Batasang

Pambansa enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 providing for the
organization of the Sangguniang Pampook in each of
Regions IX and XII.
15
P.D. No. 1618, Fifth Whereas Clause.
16
17
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14,
2008 (Decision) citing Eric Gutierrez and Abdulwahab Guialal, The Unfinished Jihad: The Moro Islamic
Liberation Front and Peace in Mindanao in Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism
and the War in Southern Philippines 275 (1999).
18
Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008 citing MNLF files, Nur Misuari,
Chairperson of the MNLF, Address delivered before the Plenary Session of the 19 th ICFM, held in Cairo,
Egypt, July 31 to August 5, 1990, "The Tragedy of the Peace Process and What the 19 th ICFM Can Do to
Help," cited in Abraham Iribani, in "Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement" jointly published by the
Department of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Muslim Affairs, Manila, November 27, 1984, p. 36,
cited in Abraham Iribani, Give Peace a Chance, The Story of the GRP-MNLF peace Talks, p. 15 (2006), at
p. 39.
9
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
22. On 25 July 1979, former President Marcos issued

Presidential Decree No. 1618 defining the functions, powers
and responsibilities of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook
and Sangguniang Pampook as the executive and legislative
arms, respectively, of each of the Autonomous Governments
in Regions IX and XII.
23. However, P.D. No. 1618 contained provisions

contrary to the conditions stated under the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement that the Muslims shall have their own
administrative system in compliance with the objectives of
the autonomy and its institutions, and that the setting up of
the Legislative Assembly shall be constituted through a
direct election, and the formation of the Executive Council
shall take place through appointments by the Legislative
Assembly.
24. P.D. No. 1618 instead provided, among others,

that:
Section 14. Composition of the Lupong

Tagapagpaganap ng Pook. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook shall be composed of a Chairman and four
members who shall be appointed by the President on
recommendation of the Sangguniang Pampook and who
may or may not be members thereof. Any elective official
who is appointed Lupon Chairman or member of the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook shall vacate his elective
position, except his being a member of the Sangguniang
Pampook.
Section 35. Relationship with the National

Government.
(b) The President shall have the power of general

supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions.
10
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
25. The Autonomous Regions in Regions IX and XII

functioned as provided in the decrees and proclamations of
President Marcos.
26. On 25 February 1986, the People Power

Revolution unseated Marcos. Corazon C. Aquino became the
President of the Philippines and she ordered the resumption
of peace talks with the MNLF.
The 1986 Constitutional

Commission and the recognition of
the need to establish an
autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao
27. Immediately upon holding office, President

Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation Nos. 3 and 9 on 25
March and 23 April 1986, respectively, ordering the creation
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The 1986
Constitutional Commission was tasked to draft the
fundamental law of the Philippines.
28. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, the Members of the Commission debated
heavily on whether there was a need to constitutionally
mandate the establishment of autonomous regions, and if
so, which territorial and political areas should be accorded
autonomy, the structure of government for these regions,
and the extent of powers that these regional governments
may exercise.
29. Commissioner Jose N. Nolledo, along with other

Members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission Committee
on Local Governments, described the existing autonomy in
Regions IX and XII as cosmetic, and not genuine autonomy.
To address this, the Committee on Local Governments
proposed the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao.
30. After much discussion, the members of the 1986

Constitutional Commission agreed that there shall be an
11
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. They provided in

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that:
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act

for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be

effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
31. On 2 February 1987, the 1987 Constitution was

ratified by the Filipino people.
The enactment of Republic Act No.

6734 creating the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao and the
favorable vote for inclusion of
Petitioner Province of Sulu
32. President Corazon Aquino’s incumbency cultivated

a culture of peace negotiations with both the MNLF and the
MILF.19 On 5 September 1986, she met with Misuari in Jolo,
Sulu, where they executed an Interim Ceasefire Agreement.
In January 1987, the Philippine Government entered into the
Jeddah Accord with the MNLF, where the MNLF demanded
autonomy for all of Mindanao’s twenty-three provinces,
including the thirteen areas originally covered by the 1976
Tripoli Agreement.20
19
Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008 citing Marites Danguilan Vitug and
Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao, p. 141 (2000).
20
Mikio Oishi (2015). Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Towards a New ASEAN Way of Conflict
Management. Springer Publishing. p. 50.
12
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
33. In the meantime, the first Congress under the

ambit of the 1987 Constitution enacted R.A. No. 6734,
otherwise known as An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM Law).
Section 1 of the said law provides that:
Section 1. (1) There is hereby created the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed
of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite
called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution.
(2) The plebiscite shall be conducted in the provinces

of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte,
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte,
and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato,
Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi,
Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga.
34. Section 1 of the ARMM Law included the thirteen

areas originally included in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement
between the Government and the MNLF for which autonomy
shall be granted. The law, however, did not cover the other
provinces demanded to be included by the MNLF during the
talks that led to the signing of the Jeddah Accord.
35. On 17 November 1989, a plebiscite was conducted

in the proposed areas of the ARMM. The MNLF urged
Muslims to boycott the plebiscite.21 Only four provinces
chose to join the ARMM, with the inclusion of the
Province of Sulu, herein Petitioner, along with Tawi-
Tawi, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur.
36. These four provinces initially constituted the

current ARMM, and through the Regional Government, have
exercised the powers provided under the ARMM Law.
The 1996 Final Peace Agreement

between the Philippine Government
and the MNLF
21
Ibid.
13
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
37. On 1 September 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos

issued Executive Order No. 19 constituting the National
Unification Commission (NUC). The NUC was an advisory
body to the President tasked under E.O. No. 19 to formulate
and recommend a viable general amnesty program and
peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and
lasting peace in the country.22
38. The NUC thereafter submitted its

recommendations to President Ramos who, on 15
September 1993, issued E.O. No. 125 which created the
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process.
39. Several peace talks were held during the Ramos

administration.23 These negotiations came to fruition when,
on 2 September 1996, the Final Peace Agreement, also
known as the Jakarta Accord, was executed by and between
the Philippine Government and the MNLF.
40. The 1996 Final Peace Agreement consisted of two

phases: (1) Phase I is a three-year transitional period which
committed the Philippine Government to a socio-economic
development program for the region encompassed in the
Zone of Peace and Development; and (2) Phase II which
provided for the expansion of the ARMM beyond the four
provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and Lanao del
Sur.
41. The 1996 Final Peace Agreement is a key

document that reaped peace between the Government and
the MNLF from 1996 to 2000. Unfortunately, this did not
prevent other armed groups like the MILF, the New People’s
22
E.O. No. 19, Section 2(a).
23
See Kroc Institute For International Peace Studies, University Of Notre Dame, Peace Accords Matrix,
available at Peace Accords Matrix, https://Peaceaccords.Nd.Edu/Provision/Cease-Fire-Mindanao-Final-
Agreement (last accessed December 17, 2018). A Statement of Understanding, as well as a Memorandum
of Agreement, was signed in the 1st Round of Formal Peace Talks held in Jakarta, Indonesia from 25
October 25-November 7, 1993. An Interim Agreement was signed in the 2nd Round of Formal Peace Talks
held in Jakarta on September 1-5, 1994, and Interim Agreement was signed in the 3rd Round of Formal
Peace Talks held in Jakarta on November 27-December 1, 1995, an Interim Agreement was signed in the
4th Round of Formal Peace Talks held in Jakarta on August 29, 1996, and nine (9) other meetings were
held in various places and dates in the Philippines and Indonesia.
14
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
Army, and the Abu Sayyaf Group from perpetrating attacks

in Southern Philippines.24
Expansion of the territorial

jurisdiction of ARMM through
Republic Act No. 9054
42. On 31 March 2001, or five years after signing of

the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Government
and the MNLF in 1996, R.A. No. 9054 (Expanded ARMM
Law) was enacted, the purpose of which was to strengthen
and expand the ARMM. Section 1 of the law provided for the
Expanded Autonomous Region and the manner of conducting
the plebiscite therefor, to wit:
Section 1. Expanded Autonomous Region. –
(1) The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao which,

under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6734, the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, is composed of the four provinces of
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, is
hereby expanded to include the provinces and cities,
enumerated hereunder, which vote favorably to be
included in the expanded area of the autonomous
region and for other purposes, in a plebiscite called
for that purpose in accordance with Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution.
The new area of autonomy shall then be determined

by the provinces and cities that will vote/choose to
join the said autonomy. It is understood that
Congress may by law which shall be consistent with
the Constitution and in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, provide that clusters of
contiguous-Muslim-dominated municipalities voting
in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into
a new province(s) which shall become part of the
new Autonomous Region.
(2) Plebiscite Coverage. The plebiscite shall be

conducted in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato,
Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Palawan, Sarangani, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
24
Ibid.
15
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
Norte, Zamboanga del Sur and the newly created

Province of Zamboanga Sibugay, and (b) in the cities
of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos,
Iligan, Kidapawan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto
Princesa, Digos, Koronadal, Tacurong and
Zamboanga.
(a) PLEBISCITE QUESTION FOR VOTERS OF THE

FOUR ORIGINAL PROVINCES OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGION. For the voters of the
provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu
and Tawi-Tawi which are already members of
the autonomous region under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the
question to be asked in the plebiscite of the
voters therein shall be as follows: Do you vote
in favor of the amendments to Republic Act No.
6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as proposed under
this Organic Act, which includes, among other
things, the expansion of the area of the
autonomous region?
(b) PLEBISCITE QUESTION FOR THE VOTERS OF

THE PROVINCES AND CITIES PROPOSED FOR
INCLUSION IN THE EXPANDED AUTONOMOUS
REGION. For the voters of the provinces of
Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, Palawan, Sarangani, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga del Norte,
Zamboanga del Sur, and the newly created
Province of Zamboanga Sibugay, and the cities
of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, Digos,
Koronadal, Tacurong, General Santos, Iligan,
Kidapawan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa,
and Zamboanga, which compose the provinces
and cities that are proposed for inclusion in the
expanded area of the autonomous region, the
question to be asked in the plebiscite of the
voters therein shall be as follows: Do you vote
in favor of the inclusion of your province or city
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao?
43. A plebiscite was thereafter held to determine if the

four original provinces of ARMM were in favor of the
amendments to R.A. No. 6734. A plebiscite was also held in
the eleven provinces and fourteen cities identified in the
16
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
Expanded ARMM Law to determine if the residents therein

wanted to be included in the expanded ARMM.
44. A majority of votes cast in the original four

provinces were in favor of the amendments. Outside of
these four provinces, only the City of Marawi and the
Province of Basilan, with the exclusion of Isabela City,
satisfied the voting requirement under the Expanded ARMM
Law.
45. The municipalities of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan,

Pantar, Tagoloan, and Tangkal in the Province of Lanao del
Norte also voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao during the 2001 plebiscite. Further, thirty-
nine barangays25 in the municipalities of Aleosan, Carmen,
Kabacan, Midsayap, Pigkawayan, and Pikit in the Province of
North Cotabato voted for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao during the plebiscite. The
Congress under the Expanded ARMM Law, however, did not
empower these municipalities and barangays, even if they
voted favorably for inclusion in the expanded ARMM
territory, to join the expanded ARMM territory independent
from their mother provinces and municipalities.
46. Thus, only the City of Marawi and the Province of

Basilan, with the exclusion of Isabela City, were included in
the territory of the expanded ARMM, in addition to the four
original provinces of the ARMM.
Peace negotiations and agreements

with the MILF during the Ramos,
Estrada and Arroyo administrations
47. Between 1996 and 1997, the Ramos

administration began formal peace talks with the MILF. On
25
Dunguan, Lower Mingading, and Tapodoc in the Municipality of Aleosan ; Manarapan and Nasapian in
the Municipality of Carmen; Nanga-an, Simbuhay, and Sanggadong in the Municipality of Kabacan;
Damatulan, Kadigasan, Kadingilan, Kapinpilan, Kudarangan, Central Labas, Malingao, Mudseng,
Nabalawag, Olandang, Sambulawan, and Tugal in the Municipality of Midsayap; Lower Baguer,
Balacayon, Buricain, Datu Binasing, Kadingilan, Matilac, Patot, and Lower Pangangkalan in the
Municipality of Pigkawayan; and Bagoinged, Balatican, S. Balong, S. Balongis, Batulawan, Buliok,
Gokotan, Kabasalan, Lagunde, Macabual, and Macasendeg in the Municipality of Pikit. See Article III,
Section 2(c) of the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
17
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
18 July 1997, the Agreement for General Cessation of

Hostilities was signed in Cagayan de Oro in July 1997,
ending the hostilities between the Government and the MILF
in Buldon, Maguindanao.
48. President Joseph Estrada continued the peace

talks with the MILF. But in 2000, acts of violence and the
threats to the lives and security of civilians in Southern
Mindanao escalated at the hands of the MILF. 26 This led
President Estrada to declare an all-out war against the
MILF.27
49. On 20 January 2001, Estrada resigned from the

presidency, and he was succeeded by Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
50. On 28 February 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo

issued E.O. No. 3, which amended Ramos’ E.O. No. 125, and
established a Government Peace Negotiating Panel (GPNP)
which held negotiations with the MILF.
51. A month later, or on 24 March 2001, a General

Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the
Government and the MILF was signed whereby the Parties
agreed to resume the stalled peace negotiations immediately
after the signing of this Agreement, and to continue the
same from where it had stopped before 27 April 2000 until
they shall have reached a negotiated political settlement of
the Bangsamoro problem.
52. On 22 June 2001, the Philippine Government and

the MILF entered into an Agreement of Peace which
recognized, among others, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement
between the Government and the MNLF. The Agreement of
Peace stated that on the aspect of ancestral domain, the
Parties, in order to address the humanitarian and economic
needs of the Bangsamoro people and preserve their social
and cultural heritage and inherent rights over their ancestral
26
27
Ibid. citing Memorandum of the Respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
on the Ancestral Domain, September 26, 2008, p. 10.
18
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
domain, agree that the same be discussed further by the

Parties in their next meeting.
53. On 2 April 2003, Davao was twice bombed leading

to the cancellation of the peace talks and the resumption of
the fighting with the MILF.
54. Three months later, or on 19 July 2003, the

Philippine Government and the MILF agreed on a mutual
cessation of hostilities. The parties continued the discussion
of the problem of ancestral domain, divided into four
strands: concept, territory, resources, and governance. 28
55. On 7 February 2006, the 10th round of Exploratory

Talks between the Government and the MILF ended. The
parties issued a joint statement of the consensus points of
the Ancestral Domain aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of June 22, 2001. 29
56. The negotiations eventually led to the preparation

of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) on 27 July 2008. However, on 14 October 2008,
this Honorable Court declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional
in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic
of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain.30
The 2012 FAB and the 2014 CAB

during the Aquino administration
57. The administration of President Benigno S. Aquino

III resumed peace negotiations with the MILF. Prior to his
appointment to this Honorable Court, the eminent Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen headed the GPNP and became the
government’s chief peace negotiator with the MILF.
58. On 12 October 2012, the Government and the

MILF signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
(2012 FAB). The first paragraph of the 2012 FAB states that
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
G.R. No. 183591.
19
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
the Parties agree that the status quo is unacceptable and

that the Bangsamoro shall be established to replace the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
59. The 2012 FAB contains several provisions relating

to the establishment of the Bangsamoro, the enactment of a
Basic Law, the powers of the Bangsamoro Government,
Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing, Territory, Basic
Rights, Transition and Implementation, and Normalization.
Among the provisions pertinent to the present case are the
following:
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANGSAMORO
1. The Parties agree that the status quo is

unacceptable and that the Bangsamoro shall be
established to replace the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Bangsamoro is
the new autonomous political entity (NPE)
referred to in the Decision Points of
Principles as of April 2012.
2. The government of the Bangsamoro shall

have a ministerial form. The Parties agree to
entrench an electoral system suitable to a
ministerial form of government. The electoral
system shall allow democratic participation,
ensure accountability of public officers primarily to
their constituents and encourage formation of
genuinely principled political parties. The electoral
system shall be contained in the Bangsamoro
Basic Law to be implemented through legislation
enacted by the Bangsamoro Government and
correlated with national laws.
3. The provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays

and geographic areas within its territory shall be
the constituent units of the Bangsamoro. The
authority to regulate on its own responsibility the
affairs of the constituent units is guaranteed
within the limit of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The
privileges already enjoyed by the local
government units under existing laws shall not be
diminished unless otherwise altered, modified or
reformed for good governance pursuant to the
provisions of the Bangsamoro local government
code.
20
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
4. The relationship of the Central Government with

the Bangsamoro Government shall be
asymmetric.
5. The Parties recognize Bangsamoro identity. Those

who at the time of conquest and colonization were
considered natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its
adjacent islands including Palawan, and their
descendants whether of mixed or of full blood
shall have the right to identify themselves as
Bangsamoro by ascription or selfascription.
Spouses and their descendants are classified as

Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of other
Indigenous peoples shall be respected.
II. BASIC LAW
1. The Bangsamoro shall be governed by a

Basic Law.
2. The provisions of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

shall be consistent with all agreements of
the Parties.
3. The Basic Law shall reflect the Bangsamoro

system of life and meet internationally accepted
standards of governance.
4. It shall be formulated by the Bangsamoro people

and ratified by the qualified voters within its
territory.
V. TERRITORY
1. The core territory of the Bangsamoro shall be

composed of: (a) the present geographical area
of the ARMM; (b) the Municipalities of Baloi,
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal
in the province of Lanao del Norte and all other
barangays in the Municipalities of Kabacan,
Carmen, Aleosan, Pigkawayan, Pikit, and
Midsayap that voted for inclusion in the ARMM
during the 2001 plebiscite; (c) the cities of
Cotabato and Isabela; and (d) all other
contiguous areas where there is a resolution of
the local government unit or a petition of at least
ten percent (10%) of the qualified voters in the
area asking for their inclusion at least two months
21
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
prior to the conduct of the ratification of the

Bangsamoro Basic Law and the process of
delimitation of the Bangsamoro as mentioned in
the next paragraph.
2. The Parties shall work together in order to ensure

the widest acceptability of the Bangsamoro Basic
Law as drafted by the Transitory Commission and
the core areas mentioned in the previous
paragraph, through a process of popular
ratification among all the Bangsamoro within the
areas for their adoption. An international third
party monitoring team shall be present to ensure
that the process is free, fair, credible, legitimate
and in conformity with international standards.
3. Areas which are contiguous and outside the core

territory where there are substantial populations
of the Bangsamoro may opt anytime to be part of
the territory upon petition of at least ten percent
(10%) of the residents and approved by a
majority of qualified voters in a plebiscite.
4. The disposition of internal and territorial waters

shall be referred to in the Annexes on Wealth and
Power Sharing.
5. Territory refers to the land mass as well as the

maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
and the aerial domain and the atmospheric space
above it. Governance shall be as agreed upon by
the parties in this agreement and in the sections
on wealth and power sharing.
6. The Bangsamoro Basic Law shall recognize the

collective democratic rights of the constituents in
the Bangsamoro.
VII. TRANSITION AND IMPLEMENTATION
1. The Parties agree to the need for a transition

period and the institution of transitional
mechanisms.
2. The Parties agree to adopt and incorporate an

Annex on Transitional Arrangements and
Modalities, which forms a part of this Framework
Agreement.
22
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
3. There shall be created a Transition Commission

through an Executive Order and supported by
Congressional Resolutions.
4. The functions of the Transition Commission are as

follows:
a. To work on the drafting of the Bangsamoro

Basic Law with provisions consistent with all
agreements entered and that may be entered
into by the Parties;
b. To work on proposals to amend the Philippine

Constitution for the purpose of
accommodating and entrenching in the
constitution the agreements of the Parties
whenever necessary without derogating from
any prior peace agreements;
c. To coordinate whenever necessary

development programs in Bangsamoro
communities in conjunction with the MILF
Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), the
Bangsamoro Leadership and Management
Institute (BLMI) and other agencies.
5. The Transition Commission shall be composed of

fifteen (15) members all of whom are
Bangsamoro. Seven (7) members shall be
selected by the GPH and eight (8) members,
including the Chairman, shall be selected by the
MILF.
6. The Transition Commission will be independent

from the ARMM and other government agencies.
The GPH shall allocate funds and provide other
resources for its effective operation. All other
agencies of government shall support the
Transition Commission in the performance of its
tasks and responsibilities until it becomes functus
oficio and cease to exist.
7. The draft Bangsamoro Basic Law submitted by

the Transition Commission shall be certified as an
urgent bill by the President.
8. Upon promulgation and ratification of the

Basic Law, which provides for the creation of
the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA),
the ARMM is deemed abolished.
23
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
9. All devolved authorities shall be vested in the

Bangsamoro Transition Authority during the
interim period. The ministerial form and Cabinet
system of government shall commence once the
Bangsamoro Transition Authority is in place. The
Bangsamoro Transition Authority may reorganize
the bureaucracy into institutions of governance
appropriate thereto.
10. The Bangsamoro Transition Authority

shall ensure that the continued functioning
of government in the area of autonomy is
exercised pursuant to its mandate under the
Basic Law. The Bangsamoro Transition
Authority will be immediately replaced in
2016 upon the election and assumption of
the members of the Bangsamoro legislative
assembly and the formation of the
Bangsamoro government.
11. There will be created a third party monitoring

team to be composed of international bodies, as
well as domestic groups to monitor the
implementation of all agreements.
12. At the end of the transition period, the GPH

and MILF Peace Negotiating Panels, together with
the Malaysian Facilitator and the Third Party
Monitoring Team, shall convene a meeting to
review, assess or evaluate the implementation of
all agreements and the progress of the transition.
An ‘Exit Document’ officially terminating the
peace negotiation may be crafted and signed by
both Parties if and only when all agreements have
been fully implemented.
13. The Negotiating Panel of both Parties shall

continue the negotiations until all issues are
resolved and all agreements implemented.
60. On 17 December 2012, President Benigno S.

Aquino III issued E.O. 120, and in implementation of the
2012 FAB, constituted the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission (BTC), Respondent herein. The BTC was tasked,
among others, to: (a) draft the proposed Bangsamoro Basic
Law with provisions consistent with the 2012 FAB, and (b)
recommend to Congress or the people proposed
amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
24
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
61. After further negotiations, five Annexes and

Addendum to the FAB were also signed in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, as follows: (a) Annex on Transitional
Arrangements and Modalities; (b) Annex on Revenue
Generation and Wealth Sharing; (c) Annex on Power
Sharing; (d) Annex on Normalization; and (e) On the
Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Cooperation
Addendum to the Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth
Sharing and the Annex on Power Sharing.
62. More specifically, the Annex on Transitional

Arrangements and Modalities, signed on 27 February 2013,
established the transitional process for the establishment of
the Bangsamoro and detailed the creation of the BTC, the
Bangsamoro Basic Law and the Bangsamoro Transition
Authority. On the other hand, the Annex on Power Sharing,
signed on 8 December 2013, discussed intergovernmental
relations of the central government, the Bangsamoro
government, and the constituent units under the
Bangsamoro.
63. On 27 March 2014, the Government, represented

by GPNP Chairperson Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, signed the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014 CAB).
This served as an integration of the 2012 FAB, its Annexes,
and the other agreements previously executed between the
Philippine Government and the MILF. Among the principles
of implementation of the 2014 CAB is that:
The mechanisms and modalities for the actual

implementation of this Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro, including the ratification of the Bangsamoro
Organic Law pursuant to Article V, Territory of the
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, are spelled out
herein. The Parties shall mutually take such steps for
its full implementation leading to the establishment
of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority and the
regular Bangsamoro Government, the gradual
normalization of the previously conflict-affected areas and
their transformation into peaceful and progressive
communities.31
31
2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, p. 4, emphasis supplied.
25
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
64. On 10 September 2014, a draft of the

Bangsamoro Basic Law, referred to as House Bill No.
4994, was presented by President Benigno S. Aquino III to
the House of Representatives of the 16th Congress. In the
Senate, a revised version of the Bangsamoro Basic Law,
known as the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region or Senate Bill No. 2894, was presented.
Unfortunately, the 16th Congress adjourned on 6 June 2016
without passing the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.
65. Several petitions were filed before this Honorable

Court assailing the constitutionality of the CAB, including the
FAB, and its Annexes. This Honorable Court dismissed all
petitions in Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine
Government.32
Enactment of the Bangsamoro

Organic Law under the Duterte
administration
66. On 7 November 2016, President Rodrigo Roa

Duterte issued E.O. No. 08 amending President Benigno S.
Aquino III’s E.O. No. 120. President Duterte’s E.O. 08
expanded the membership and functions of Respondent
BTC, increasing its number of members from fifteen to
twenty-one, all of whom were appointed by the President. 33
E.O. No. 08 likewise provided that out of this total
membership, eleven members, including the Chairperson,
shall be selected from nominees of the MILF.
67. Section 3 of E.O. No. 120, as amended by E.O.

No. 08, retained the primary function of Respondent BTC,
which is to draft proposals for a Bangsamoro Basic Law, to
be submitted to the Office of the President for submission to
Congress, and to convene an inclusive Bangsamoro
Assembly as a consultative body to discuss the proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law.
32
G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016.
33
E.O. No. 08, Section 2.
26
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
68. On 10 February 2017, President Duterte signed

the appointment papers of the twenty-one members of
Respondent BTC, three of whom are MNLF members,
namely: Omar Sema, Firdausi Ismail Abbas, and Hatimil
Hassan.
69. In July 2017, Respondent BTC submitted its

proposed draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law to President
Duterte. The draft was then transmitted to Congress the
following month.
70. On 26 September 2017, H.B. No. 6475 was filed

before the House of Representatives, while S.B. No. 1717
was filed before the Senate on 28 February 2018. Both bills
were entitled “An Act Providing For The Basic Law For The
Bangsamoro And Abolishing The Autonomous Region In
Muslim Mindanao, Repealing For The Purpose Republic Act
No. 9054, Entitled An Act To Strengthen And Expand The
Organic Act For The Autonomous Region In Muslim
Mindanao, and Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act
Providing For An Organic Act For The Autonomous Region In
Muslim Mindanao, And For Other Purposes.”
71. On 30 May 2018, the House of Representatives

approved H.B. No. 6475 on third reading with 227 yeas, 11
nays, and 2 abstentions. On even date, the Senate approved
S.B. No. 1717 on third reading with 21 votes, no nay votes,
and no abstentions. The House Bill was transmitted to the
Senate on the same day and both chambers agreed to form
a conference committee.
72. The Senate designated Senators Juan Miguel F.

Zubiri, Sonny M. Angara, Aquilino Pimentel III, Sherwin
Gatchalian, Joel Villanueva, Francis G. Escudero, Franklin M.
Drilon, Risa Hontiveros, Loren B. Legarda and Francis
Pangilinan as its conferees to the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the conflicting provisions of S.B. No. 1717
and H.B. No. 6475.
73. For its part, the House of Representatives

designated Representatives Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Pedro B.
Acharon, Jr., Mauyag Jun B. Papandayan, Jr., Ruby M.
27
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
Sahali, Bai Sandra Sinsuat A. Sema, Juan Pablo Rimpy P.

Bondoc, Arthur R. Defensor, Jr.; Johnny Ty Pimentel, Eugene
Michael B. De Vera, Rodolfo T. Albano III, Amihilda J.
Sangcopan, Wilter Sharky Wee Palma II, Celso L. Lobregat,
Mohamad Khalid Q. Dimaporo, Abdullah D. Dimaporo,
Romeo M. Acop, Seth Frederick P. Jalosjos and Shernee
Abubakar Tan as its conferees to the Bicameral Conference
Committee.
74. On 23 and 24 July 2018, the Senate and House of

Representatives approved the Conference Committee Report
on the conflicting provisions of S.B. No. 1717 and H.B. No.
6475.
75. The bill was presented to President Duterte who

signed it into law on 27 July 2018 as R.A. No. 11054, the
Bangsamoro Organic Law.
Actions of the COMELEC pursuant to

the Bangsamoro Organic Law
76. On 29 August 2018, the Commission on Elections

resolved to set the date of the plebiscite on 21 January
2019, pursuant to the period provided in Section 2, Article
XV of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, that is, ninety days
from 9 September 2018 (date of effectivity of the law) until
6 February 2019 (the 150th day from the effectivity of the
law).34
77. On 26 September 2018, the COMELEC

35
promulgated Resolution No. 10425 establishing the Rules
and Regulations governing the conduct of the plebiscite to
ratify the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
78. On 4 October 2018, the COMELEC promulgated

Resolution No. 1043236 prescribing the calendar of activities
34
See COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 18-0720 attached to the Petition as Annex “B”.
35
A certified true copy of COMELEC Resolution No. 10425 is attached hereto as Annex “1” and is made
an integral part hereof.
36
28
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the

plebiscite to ratify the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
79. On 28 November 2018, the COMELEC resolved:37

(1) to push through with the conduct of the plebiscite in
ARMM, Isabela City, and Cotabato City on 21 January 2019;
and (2) to approve the re-scheduling of the conduct of the
plebiscite in Lanao del Norte and six municipalities, North
Cotabato, including those areas with Petitions for Inclusion,
to 6 February 2019.
80. On 13 December 2018, the COMELEC promulgated

Resolution No. 1046438 establishing the Rules on voting,
counting and canvassing of votes in connection with
plebiscite to ratify the Bangsamoro Organic Law. On even
date, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1046639
supplementing the calendar of activities and periods of
certain prohibited acts in relation to the 6 February 2019
plebiscite.
The present Petition for Certiorari

and Prohibition
81. On 17 October 2018, the Province of Sulu

instituted the present Petition invoking this Honorable
Court’s expanded power of judicial review under the second
paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
82. In a Resolution dated 6 November 2018, this

Honorable Court, without giving due course to the Petition,
required Respondents to file a Comment thereon within ten
days from notice of said Resolution.
83. Public Respondents, through the OSG, received

said Resolution on 23 November 2018. Thus, Public
37
A certified true copy of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 18-1162 is attached hereto as Annex “3” and
is made an integral part hereof.
38
39
A certified copy of COMELEC Resolution No. 10466 is attached hereto as Annex “5” and is made an
integral part hereof.
29
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
Respondents had until 3 December 2018 within which to file

their Comment.
84. On 3 December 2018, the OSG filed an Entry of

Appearance with Motion for Additional Time of even date
asking that this Honorable Court: (1) note its entry of
appearance as counsel for Public Respondents, and (2) grant
Public Respondents an additional period of thirty (30) days
from 3 December 2018, or until 2 January 2019, within
which to file its Comment on the Petition.
85. The President40 and the Supreme Court, however,

suspended government and court work for 2 January 2019.
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, 41
Public Respondents have until today, 3 January 2019, within
which to file their Comment.
86. Hence, this Comment is being filed asking for the

denial of the present Petition and its prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL AND

DENIAL OF THE PETITION AND THE APPLICATION
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I.
THIS HONORABLE COURT’S POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW DOES NOT INCLUDE
PURELY POLITICAL QUESTIONS. IN ANY
CASE, NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION, MUCH
LESS GRAVE, CAN BE ASCRIBED AGAINST
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS FOR ENACTING
AND IMPLEMENTING THE BANGSAMORO
ORGANIC LAW. THE WRITS OF CERTIORARI
AND PROHIBITION, THEREFORE, DO NOT LIE
AGAINST THEM.
40
See Memorandum Circular No. 54.
41
RULES OF COURT , Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the
act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
30
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
II.
CONGRESS RETAINS THE PLENARY POWER
TO AMEND AND REPEAL THE ORGANIC ACT
THAT CREATED THE AUTONOMOUS REGION
IN MUSLIM MINDANAO. THE POWER TO
AMEND AND REPEAL LAWS IS INCLUDED IN
THE GENERAL AND EXPRESS GRANT OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER UNDER SECTION 1,
ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III.
THE AUTOMATIC INCLUSION OF THE
PROVINCE OF SULU AND OTHER
CONSTITUENT POLITICIAL UNITS OF THE
CURRENT ARMM IN THE PROPOSED
BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION DOES
NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 CONSITUTION.
IV.
UNDER THE PLENARY POWER OF CONGRESS
TO DETERMINE THE TERRITORY OF THE
PROPOSED BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS
REGION, THE INCLUSION OF THE CURRENT
CONSTITUENT UNITS OF THE ARMM IN THE
REGION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE IDENTITY
AND THE RIGHTS OF THE NON-MORO
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. FURTHER, THE
BANGSAMORO ORGANIC LAW CLEARLY
PROVIDES FOR THE PROTECTION AND
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS OF THE NON-MORO
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF MINDANAO.
V.
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION
COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
31
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
A.
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES ONLY THAT THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS CONSIST OF AN
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND A
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, BOTH OF WHICH
ARE PRESENT IN THE PROPOSED
BANGSAMORO GOVERNMENT. THE 1987
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE
CONGRESS TO ADOPT A STRUCTURE AKIN TO
A PRESIDENTIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT
FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGIONS, AND
THUS, HAS THE DISCRETION OF ADOPTING A
PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
INSTEAD.
B.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BANGSAMORO
GOVERNMENT IS COMPLIANT WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 18,
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
VI.
THE CONSTITUTION ALLOWS CONGRESS TO
CONSTITUTE A BODY THAT WILL IMPLEMENT
THE BANGSAMORO ORGANIC LAW DURING
THE TRANSITION PERIOD. FURTHERMORE,
THE SELECTION OF THE MILF AS THE
LEADING ENTITY OF THE BANGSAMORO
TRANSITION AUTHORITY DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
VII.
THE FORMATION OF AN AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO IS MADE
MANDATORY BY NO LESS THAN THE
CONSTITUTION. NO INFRINGEMENT OF THE
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE MAY BE
IMPUTED AGAINST THE STATE FOR
FULFILLING THIS MANDATE.
32
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
VIII.
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
A.
PETITIONER HAS NO CLEAR AND
UNMISTAKABLE RIGHT TO THE INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF PRAYED FOR. ITS ALLEGATIONS ARE
SPECULATIVE, MAKING ITS APPLICATION
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PREMATURE.
B.
PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT IT WILL
SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NOT ISSUED.
C.
THE PUBLIC WILL SUFFER GRAVE AND
IRREPARABLE INJURY IF INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF IS ISSUED.
DISCUSSION
I.
THIS HONORABLE COURT’S POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW DOES NOT INCLUDE
PURELY POLITICAL QUESTIONS. IN ANY
CASE, NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION, MUCH
LESS GRAVE, CAN BE ASCRIBED AGAINST
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS FOR ENACTING
AND IMPLEMENTING THE BANGSAMORO
ORGANIC LAW. THE WRITS OF CERTIORARI
AND PROHIBITION, THEREFORE, DO NOT LIE
AGAINST THEM.
87. Petitioner argues, on the basis of Araullo v.

Aquino,42 that “petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
42
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
33
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
executive officials.” Allegedly, the Bangsamoro Organic Law

suffers from constitutional infirmities and that the writs of
certiorari and prohibition should issue against the Public
Respondents for enacting and from implementing the law.43
88. At the outset, the sole province of this Honorable

Court’s judicial power, even in the expanded concept, is to
set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.44 The 1987 Constitution
has not completely done away with the concept of non-
justiciable issues which fall beyond the ambit of judicial
review.
89. On several occasions, this Honorable Court has

refused to exercise the power of judicial review as the issues
raised in the petition are non-justiciable and purely political.
90. In Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, 45 citing

Francisco v. House of Representatives,46 this Honorable
Court held that the issue of whether acts alleged in an
impeachment complaint constitutes grounds for
impeachment “require[s] the Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. … Clearly, the issue calls
upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question
which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.]”47
91. More recently, this Honorable Court held in

Lagman v. Medialdea48 that the power of judicial review
does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set
of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an
43
Petition, pp. 3 – 4.
44
Ibid.
45
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
46
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
47
Ibid. emphasis supplied.
48
G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.
34
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,

lies with the President.
92. The issues raised in the present Petition are purely

political questions that this Honorable Court is not permitted
by the 1987 Constitution to examine.
93. As will be exhaustively discussed below, the 1987

Constitution lodged absolute discretion in Congress to
determine all the issues raised in the Petition. The text of
the 1987 Constitution and the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission support the conclusion that all
matters that Petitioner alleges to be unconstitutional fall
within the power of Congress to ascertain.
94. In any case, no abuse of discretion, much less of a

grave character, may be imputed against Public
Respondents. Grave abuse of discretion carries a precise
meaning in law, that demands Petitioner to prove that Public
Respondents acted in an arbitrary, whimsical and baseless
manner.49 The Bangsamoro Organic Law, as the following
discussion will prove, faithfully complies with the clear text
of the relevant provisions of the 1987 Constitution and
mirrors the intent of the framers of the fundamental law.
II.
CONGRESS RETAINS THE PLENARY POWER
TO AMEND AND REPEAL THE ORGANIC ACT
THAT CREATED THE AUTONOMOUS REGION
IN MUSLIM MINDANAO. THE POWER TO
AMEND AND REPEAL LAWS IS INCLUDED IN
THE GENERAL AND EXPRESS GRANT OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER UNDER SECTION 1 ,
ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
95. The 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to

create the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.50 More
specifically, the mandate to create the autonomous region
49
See for e.g., Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. COA, G.R. No. 195105, November 21,
2017 and Yu v. Hon. Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011.
50
1987 PHIL. CONST ., Article X, Sections 1 and 15.
35
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
fell on the first Congress elected under the 1987 Constitution

to create an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, to wit:
Article X, Section 19. The first Congress elected

under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from
the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic
acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. 51
96. That the fundamental law mandated the first

Congress elected under the 1987 Constitution to create the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao does not, however,
prevent succeeding Congresses, like the 17 th Congress, from
revising the organic act.
97. Legislative power is defined as the authority,

under the constitution, to make laws and to alter and
repeal them.52 This power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines.53 The grant of legislative power to the Congress
is broad, general and comprehensive. 54 The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. 55 Except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest. 56
98. The creation of an autonomous region in Muslim

Mindanao is through an organic law, categorized as a statute
passed by Congress. 57 As a statute, the organic law may be
amended or repealed by Congress pursuant to its general
legislative power.
51
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
52
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927 citing Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 126-131, 157-162 (7th ed.), emphasis supplied.
53
1987 PHIL. CONST ., Article VI, Section 1.
54
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group, et al. vs. The Executive Secretary, The Hon. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007.
55
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998.
56
Review Center Association of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R.
No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
57
Disomangcop v. Secretary of DPWH, G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004.
36
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
99. Differently put, the power of Congress to create

the autonomous regions carries with it the power to modify
it whenever such course may seem necessary, expedient, or
conducive to the public good. Every legislative body may
modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its
predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the
same session at which the original act was passed; and even
while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. 58
100. To eschew any doubt that Congress has the power

to alter the provisions of the organic act, this Honorable
Court in Disomangcop v. Secretary of DPWH59 had already
upheld the power of Congress to amend the organic act
creating the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, for as
long as these amendments are subject to ratification in a
plebiscite.60 The Supreme Court held in Disomangcop61 that:
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the

regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified as
statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes
because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the
provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary
statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory
law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
We quote excerpts of the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the reason I am

bringing this up. This thing involves
some rather far-reaching
consequences also in relation to the
issue raised by Commissioner
Romulo with respect to federalism.
Are we, in effect, creating new
categories of laws? Generally, we
have statutes and constitutional
provisions. Is this organic act
equivalent to a constitutional
provision? If it is going to be
equivalent to a constitutional
provision, it would seem to me that
the formulation of the provisions of
58
Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al., vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.
59
60
Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al., v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.
61
37
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
the organic act will have to be done

by the legislature, acting as a
constituent assembly, and
therefore, subject to the provisions
of the Article on Amendments. That
is the point that I am trying to
bring up. In effect, if we opt for
federalism, it would really involve
an act of the National Assembly or
Congress acting as a constituent
assembly and present amendments
to this Constitution, and the end
product itself would be a
constitutional provision which would
only be amendable according to the
processes indicated in the
Constitution.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I express

my personal opinion in this respect.
I think to require Congress to act as

a constituent body before enacting
an organic act would be to raise an
autonomous region to the same
level as the sovereign people of the
whole country. And I think the
powers of the Congress should be
quite sufficient in enacting a law,
even if it is now exalted to the level
of an organic act for the purpose of
providing a basic law for an
autonomous region without having
to transform itself into a constituent
assembly. We are dealing still with
one subordinate subdivision of the
State even if it is now vested with
certain autonomous powers on
which its own legislature can pass
laws.
FR. BERNAS. So the questions I have raised so

far with respect to this organic act
are: What segment of the
population will participate in the
plebiscite? In what capacity would
the legislature be acting when it
passes this? Will it be a constituent
assembly or merely a legislative
body? What is the nature,
therefore, of this organic act in
relation to ordinary statutes and
38
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
the Constitution? Finally, if we are

going to amend this organic act,
what process will be followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the

light of what is now appearing in
our report.
First, only the people who are

residing in the units composing the
regions should be allowed to
participate in the plebiscite.
Second, the organic act has the
character of a charter passed by
the Congress, not as a constituent
assembly, but as an ordinary
legislature and, therefore, the
organic act will still be subject to
amendments in the ordinary
legislative process as now
constituted, unless the Gentlemen
has another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again.
MR. NOLLEDO. Those who will participate in the

plebiscite are those who are directly
affected, the inhabitants of the
62
units constitutive of the region.
101. Accordingly, in Abas Kida v. Senate63 this

Honorable Court held that Congress cannot pass a law that
imposes a supermajority vote to amend the organic act that
established the ARMM, thereby recognizing that the ARMM
Law and the Expanded ARMM Law may indeed be amended
or repealed by Congress through a statute. This Honorable
Court even went on to say that Congress cannot pass
irrepealable laws.64
102. In the City of Davao v. Regional Trial Court,

Branch XII, Davao City,65 this Honorable Court was emphatic
that it is a basic precept that among the implied substantive
62
Ibid. citing JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONST IT UT ION OF T HE REPUBLIC OF T HE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENT ARY, p. 1103 (2003 ed.) and III RECORD OF T HE 1986 CONST IT UT IONAL COMMISSION, pp. 182 –
183.
63
Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al., v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, Octo ber 18, 2011.
64
Ibid., emphasis supplied.
65
G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005.
39
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition

against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws
deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best
senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the
operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy
stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic
democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times.
Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno put it best when he said
that, “[n]o law, no Constitution can chain the people to an
undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no irrepealable
laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change
is the predicate of progress and we should not fear
change.”66
103. The ARMM was established under R.A. No. 6734,

which was later amended by R.A. No. 9054, both of which
are statutes. For Petitioner to argue that these statutes
cannot be amended or repealed will run afoul of the
Constitution and will deprive the 17th Congress and
subsequent Congresses their constitutionally-granted power
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.
104. The contention that the Bangsamoro Organic Law

will automatically result in the dissolution of the current
ARMM67 is, at any rate, unfounded. The mere passage of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law, by itself, will not automatically
result in the replacement, much less the abolition, of the
current ARMM organized under the ARMM Law, as amended
by the Expanded ARMM Law. The creation of the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region and the determination of
its territorial jurisdiction are still subject to the results of the
plebiscite as provided in Section 3, Article XV of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law. It is only upon ratification in the
plebiscite that the law will officially serve as the organic act
to replace the ARMM Law, as amended. Stated otherwise, if
the current ARMM votes against the approval of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law, the current ARMM will remain as
such, and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region is rejected.
The solution to Petitioner’s dilemma is obvious. The recourse
available to Petitioner in order to prevent the establishment
66
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Reynato Puno in Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 127325, March 19, 1997.
67
Petition, p. 16.
40
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region is political, and not

judicial. Petitioner Province of Sulu must be able to convince
the rest of the ARMM that the establishment of the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region will not contribute to the
resolution of the decades-long conflict in Southern
Philippines, and that the Bangsamoro Organic Law will not
promote genuine autonomy and lasting peace for the region.
III.
THE AUTOMATIC INCLUSION OF THE
PROVINCE OF SULU AND OTHER
CONSTITUENT POLITICIAL UNITS OF THE
CURRENT ARMM IN THE PROPOSED
BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION DOES
NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 CONSITUTION.
105. Petitioner argues that the “automatic inclusion of

the present geographical area known as the ARMM in the
newly-created [Bangsamoro Autonomous Region] and the
provision that the provinces and cities of the ARMM shall
vote as one are likewise [unconstitutional].”68 Petitioner’s
contention is premised on the supposition that it has “the
right to exclude itself from being part of an autonomous
region.”69 Petitioner’s position lacks merit.
In insisting that Congress should

have allowed each of the provinces
and cities forming part of the
existing ARMM to vote favorably as
separate units for the expansion of
the territory of the region, the
Province of Sulu asserts that its
right to separate from the region
has been violated. The 1987
Constitution, however, makes it
purely discretionary on the part of
Congress whether to retain or
remove a province, city or
68
Petition, p. 23.
69
Ibid. at p. 31.
41
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
geographical area from the already

existing autonomous region.
106. As part of its legislative powers, the Congress may

alter the organic act of the existing autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao. The determination of whether to amend a
law is exclusively lodged in Congress, and cannot be the
subject of review, much less be compelled, even by the
Supreme Court, a co-equal branch of government. The
removal of a province, city, or geographical area from the
existing autonomous region affects the territory of the
autonomous region and therefore entails an amendment of
the ARMM Law and the Expanded ARMM Law in accordance
with the Congress’ power to amend laws.
107. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission confirm that the legislature is given the
authority and wide leeway to determine the territory of the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao:
MR. RODRIGO. This section mentions autonomous

region of Mindanao. Does that refer
to the whole of Mindanao?
MR. OPLE. It refers to the so-called Muslim

Mindanao in the context of the Moro
homeland mentioned in the Tripoli
Agreement; but in saying this, I do
not want it understood that we are
limiting the power of Congress to
determine the autonomous areas.
MR. RODRIGO. The Tripoli Agreement, if I

remember right, comprises not only
Mindanao but Palawan and Sulu,
am I right?
MR. OPLE. Yes, Madam President. The original

Moro homeland consists of 13
provinces which, however, in the
late 1970s had been reduced to
about 10 with Davao, Cotabato and
Palawan being taken out of the
original area.
MR. RODRIGO. But under Section 1 6 the

legislature has the power to
42
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
determine which areas will

comprise this region. It might
specify only a few provinces in
the Island of Mindanao plus a
few cities, is that right?
MR. OPLE. Yes, Madam President. By these

provisions, we do not want to
limit the power of Congress in
determining the areas of the
autonomous regions.
MR. RODRIGO. After enacting the organic acts for

Mindanao and the Cordillera, the
legislature may then enact other
organic acts for different regions in
the Philippines. I heard
Commissioner Nolledo mention a
possible autonomous region in
Ilocos and Bicol. 70
108. Under this premise, the ultimate determination

lies with Congress whether to include in and, by implication,
to exclude provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas from the autonomous region. As a consequence, too,
the Petitioner cannot, on the basis of a nebulous claim that it
possesses “the right to exclude itself from being part of an
autonomous region,”71 demand that it be given the right to
vote in the plebiscite as a separate political unit.
109. Even assuming that Petitioner, as a separate

province, does have the demandable right to be excluded
from the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, it is well
to note that Petitioner already waived that right when it
voted in favor of joining the ARMM during the ratification of
the ARMM Law and the Expanded ARMM Law, respectively.
110. By voting in favor of the ARMM Law and the

Expanded ARMM Law, Petitioner agreed to be bound by all
the provisions of the organic act and its amendment. One of
these provisions of the ARMM Law is that in amending or
revising the same, it is sufficient that the amendment or
revision shall become effective “when approved by a
70
III RECORD OF T HE 1986 CONST IT UT IONAL COMMISSION, p. 185, emphasis supplied.
71
Petition, p. 31.
43
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the

purpose.”72
111. The provision does not give the provinces and

cities constituting the current ARMM the right to vote as
separate constituent units in case of amendments or
revisions. Having voted in favor of the ARMM Law in the first
place, the Province of Sulu cannot now complain that
Congress has deprived it of the opportunity to vote
separately as a constituent unit on whether to accept the
112. Petitioner likewise claims that Congress “cannot

simply consider the current provinces and cities composing
the ARMM as left without a choice but to accept being part of
the [Bangsamoro Autonomous Region].” 73 This argument
fails to impress.
113. As previously stated, the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region, if its creation is approved in the
plebiscite, merely replaces the current ARMM. No separate
region, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, is created.
Differently put, the establishment of the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region will not make the Province of Sulu a
member of the autonomous region of which it is not already
a member. The Province of Sulu became a member of the
autonomous region when it voted in favor of autonomy
during the plebiscite on 17 November 1989. The enactment
of the Bangsamoro Organic Law only aims to further this
regional autonomy and expand its territorial scope.
114. Hence, Congress acted within its right and duty to

require the conduct of a plebiscite for (1) the current ARMM
as one unit, and (2) the individual municipalities, cities and
barangays proposed to be included in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region.
The requirement under Section 18,

Article X of the 1987 Constitution
72
R.A. No. 6734, Article XVII, Section 3 and R.A. No. 9054, Article XVIII, Section 4.
73
Petition, p. 31.
44
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
that the majority of the constituents

in each province, city or
geographical area must vote
favorably to be included in the
autonomous region applies only for
the creation of the autonomous
region. However, when Congress
decides to expand the territory of
the autonomous region, the
requirement does not apply to the
subsisting provinces, cities or
geographical areas of the
autonomous region, but only to
those provinces, cities or
geographical areas proposed by
Congress to be added therein. A
majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together is
sufficient for those provinces, cities
or geographical areas already part
of the autonomous region.
115. Petitioner’s insistence that the provinces and cities

of the current ARMM should vote as separate units for the
expansion of the autonomous region pursuant to Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution has no leg to stand on.
The voting requirement provided in Section 18, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution applies only to the creation of an
autonomous region, not to the amendment of the law, nor to
the expansion of its territorial jurisdiction.
116. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

provides:
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act

for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the Presi dent
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
45
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent

with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be

effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
117. One of the primary and basic rules in statutory

construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. 74
118. A plain reading of the second paragraph of Article

X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution readily reveals that
the requirement of majority of votes cast by the provinces,
cities, and geographical areas as constituent units is
applicable only to the creation of the autonomous region.
True, this Honorable Court held in Abbas v. COMELEC75 that
what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent
units. Taken in its proper context, however, Abbas76
resolved the issue of how a plebiscite should be conducted
for the purpose of creating the autonomous region as what
was involved there was the ratification of the ARMM Law.
119. In its generic sense, the term “creation” means

“[t]he action or process of bringing something into
existence,”77 or “the act of making, inventing, or
producing.”78 When the ARMM Law was ratified on 17
November 1989, the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao
came to be; it was brought into existence on that day. From
then on, the ARMM, as a region, became one local
government unit—a geographical area in itself.
74
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
75
G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989.
76
Ibid.
77
Oxford University Press, “creation,” available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/creation
(last accessed December 21, 2018).
78
Merriam-Webster, “Creation,” available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/creation (last
accessed December 21, 2018).
46
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
120. The question, therefore, remains: How should the

plebiscite be conducted when, as in this case, Congress
proposes to change the structure of the existing autonomous
region and expand its territorial scope?
121. While Section 18, Article X of the 1987

Constitution lays down the requirements for the creation of
the autonomous region, it did not provide for the voting
requirements in case of its revision or expansion. This
Honorable Court, with all due respect, cannot supply the
omission. As the Court itself explained in Chavez v. Judicial
and Bar Council:79
[I]n the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of

the Constitution, cannot read into the law something that
is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as
correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would
otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment
to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement. In
other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative
omission. According to the rule of casus omissus, a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted. The principle
proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. Pursuant to this, the Court cannot under its
power of interpretation supply the omission even though
the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or
because the case in question was not foreseen or
contemplated. The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been
called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation.
122. Inasmuch as Article X, Section 18 of the 1987

Constitution is silent as to the voting requirements in case of
the expansion of the autonomous region, it is within the
power of the Congress to decide that in the expansion of the
autonomous region, the majority of votes in all constituent
units put together is sufficient for those provinces, cities, or
geographical areas already part of the autonomous region.
The wisdom in such determination by the Congress is a
purely political question and is, thus, outside of this
Honorable Court’s ambit of judicial review.
79
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013.
47
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
123. As already discussed, when the ARMM Law and

the Expanded ARMM Law were ratified in 1989 and 2001,
respectively, the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao
consisting of herein Petitioner Province of Sulu, Province of
Tawi-Tawi, Province of Maguindanao, Province of Lanao del
Sur, the Province of Basilan (with the exclusion of Isabela
City), and the City of Marawi constituted one unit. The
ARMM, in fact, is by law a corporate entity with jurisdiction
over all matters devolved to it by the Constitution and this
Organic Act.80
124. For this purpose, Congress provided in the

Bangsamoro Organic Law the mechanism for the ratification
of the amendments to the ARMM Law and the Expanded
ARMM Law. Article XV of the Bangsamoro Organic Law on
plebiscite provides:
SEC. 1. Establishment of the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region. – The establishment of the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region and the determination
of its territorial jurisdiction shall take effect upon
ratification of this Organic Law by majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the following:
(a) The present geographical area known as the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created
under Republic Act No. 6734, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9054, which shall subsist as such
until this Organic Law is ratified through a plebiscite;
xxx
SEC. 3. Results of the Plebiscite. –
(a) The Bangsamoro of Autonomous Region shall be

established and all the provinces and cities of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created
under Republic Act No. 67334, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9054, shall form part of the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region is the majority of
the votes cast in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao shall be in favor of the approval of this
Organic Law; Provided, That the provinces and cities
80
R.A. No. 9054, Article IV, Section 2.
48
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
of the present Autonomous Region in Mindanao shall

vote as one geographical area.
125. Since the ARMM is a juridical entity with an

existence separate and distinct from its five component
provinces and one city, Congress did not abuse its
discretion, much less gravely, in treating the ARMM as one
unit, a geographical area of its own. Consequently, Congress
acted within its jurisdiction in requiring the current ARMM,
being in itself a corporate entity, to vote as one unit in the
plebiscite to be conducted for purposes of ratifying the
126. The Record of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, as well as jurisprudence, likewise lends
credence to the plebiscite mechanism chosen by Congress
for the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, to wit:
MR. DAVIDE. May a portion or a component unit

of an autonomous region secede
from the mother unit? For instance,
we have an autonomous region in
Central Visayas, can Cebu secede
from the autonomous region?
MR. NOLLEDO. Section 3 can apply to it. Section 3

of Committee Report No. 21
provides:
No autonomous region, province,

city, municipality, or barrio may be
created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in
accordance with criteria established
by law.
It seems to me it is subject to the

plebiscite as I already mentioned
and that the questions should fall
under this section. 81
81
III RECORD OF T HE 1986 CONST IT UT IONAL COMMISSION, p. 190.
49
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
127. Section 3 of the Committee Report No. 21 referred

to by Commissioner Nolledo eventually became Article X,
Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution. The provision reads:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or

barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.82
128. Jurisprudence is teeming with cases where this

Honorable Court construed Article X, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution, the most relevant of which is Padilla v.
COMELEC.83
129. In said case, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7155

creating the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of
Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-
Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the
Municipality of Labo, same province. Pursuant to R.A. No
7155 and Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2312 on 13 November
1991, the dispositive portion of which directed that:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission

hereby resolves to promulgated (sic) the following
guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in

the areas or units affected, namely the barangays
comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte (Tan v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).
…84
82
Emphasis supplied.
83
G.R. No. 103328, October 19, 1992.
84
Ibid., emphasis and underscoring supplied.
50
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
130. The results of the plebiscite for the ratification of

R.A. No. 7155 were as follows:
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991

throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes
favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the
creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the
Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa by a majority of voters.85
131. For his part, Roy Padilla contended that the

plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results
obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as
mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have
been conducted only in the political unit or units affected,
i.e., the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio,
Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-asa,
Maot, and Calabasa. Padilla stressed that the plebiscite
should not have included the remaining area of the mother
unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.86
132. Disagreeing with Padilla, this Honorable Court held

that what is contemplated by the phrase ‘political units
directly affected,’ is the plurality of political units which
would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as
well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte.87
133. This Honorable Court, in effect, upheld the

conduct of the plebiscite throughout the Municipality of
Labo,88 requiring only a plurality of the votes cast therein,
and not a plurality for each of the twelve (12) barangays
voting separately, on top of the plurality of the votes cast
throughout the entire Municipality of Lawbo.
85
86
87
88
51
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
134. In view of Section 10, Article X of the 1987

Constitution, Congress was correct to treat the ARMM as one
unit, as indeed, it is the political unit to be directly affected
by its conversion into the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
and the proposed expansion of its territorial jurisdiction.
135. All told, Section 18, Article X of the 1987

Constitution makes the creation of the autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao dependent on the will of the majority in
each of the constituent units desiring to be included in the
autonomous region. For purposes of revising the provisions
of the organic act to change the structure of government of
the autonomous region and to expand its territory, however,
the 1987 Constitution does not require that each of the
constituent units vote favorably in the plebiscite for them to
remain in the autonomous region. A majority of the votes in
all constituent units put together is sufficient.
IV.
UNDER THE PLENARY POWER OF CONGRESS
TO DETERMINE THE TERRITORY OF THE
REGION, THE INCLUSION OF THE CURRENT
CONSTITUENT UNITS OF THE ARMM IN THE
REGION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE IDENTITY
AND THE RIGHTS OF THE NON-MORO
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. FURTHER, THE
BANGSAMORO ORGANIC LAW CLEARLY
PROVIDES FOR THE PROTECTION AND
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS OF THE NON-MORO
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF MINDANAO.
136. Petitioner posits that in automatically including the

Province of Sulu in the proposed Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region, even it if it votes for its exclusion in the plebiscite,
the Congress has suddenly erased the identity of the
indigenous cultural minorities in the said province not only
without their knowledge and consent, but also against their
will and in violation of their rights. 89 This argument has no
merit.
89
Petition, p. 32.
52
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
137. At the outset, Petitioner’s thesis is premised on

the assumption that the indigenous cultural minorities in the
Province of Sulu will not ratify the Bangsamoro Organic Law
and will not support the establishment of the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in the forthcoming plebiscite.90 Indeed,
it is too presumptuous for Petitioner to conclude that
indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) and the indigenous
peoples (IPs) in the Province of Sulu would even vote to
reject the Bangsamoro Organic Law. On this point, it is a
rudimentary rule that this Honorable Court cannot pass upon
a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must
be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 91
138. Corollarily, it must be pointed out that the rights

of the ICCs and IPs under Section 22, Article II of the 1987
Constitution are peculiar and personal to them as
individuals, or at most, as a particular class. Petitioner
cannot invoke such right on behalf of the ICCs and IPs
absent any showing that the Province of Sulu has been
authorized to seek judicial enforcement of such rights on
their behalf.
139. In addition, during the drafting of the 1987

Constitution, the framers of the fundamental law were
cognizant of the existence of the IPs in Muslim Mindanao
other than the Muslim Filipinos. This is evident from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you, Madam President.
I have a minor observation on

Section 1, page 3, lines 10 and 11,
which reads: “There shall be
created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao. . .” Upon first
reading, it will appear that the
whole Mindanao is composed of
Muslims because “Muslim” is used
and I would rather change it FOR
THE MUSLIMS of MINDANAO
90
Ibid.
91
Pagcor vs. Thunderbird, G.R. No. 197942-43, 199528, March 26, 2014.
53
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
instead of “MUSLIM OF MINDANAO

and the Cordillera. . .”
MR. DE CASTRO. As I said, when one reads the

provision, it will appear that the
whole Mindanao is occupied by
Muslims when it is not true. Surigao
is not occupied by Muslims; there is
no Muslim in Misamis Oriental, in
Bukidnon, in Misamis Occidental.
So, it may not appear right when
we say “Muslim Mindanao” so I am
changing it FOR THE MUSLIMS OF
MINDANAO.
MR. ABUBAKAR. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Abubakar is

recognized.
MR. ABUBAKAR. I think there is a different

conception and descriptive idea of
the word “Muslim Mindanao.” The
whole Mindanao is not
inhabited predominantly by the
Muslim. But when we say
“Muslim Mindanao,” this refers
to the part of Mindanao
predominantly occupied by the
Muslims. That is why to be more
colorful [or] descriptive, when we
say “Muslim Mindanao,” that means
that part of Mindanao
predominantly occupied by the
Muslims.
Not only is this in the Philippines

but also in other countries such as
Sri Lanka. We call a part of Ceylon
as Ceylonese Ceylon and that is
occupied by the Ceylonese,
different from the Tamils’. So when
we say “Muslim Mindanao,” it
means an area predominantly
occupied by the Muslims.
54
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Alonto is recognized.
MR. ALONTO. Madam President, the amendment

being proposed does not really alter
what is really the meaning of
“Muslim Mindanao” because when
we read the section in relation to
the other sections, it will definitely
show that only those areas whose
population or inhabitants that have
a common historical, cultural,
linguistic, ethnic, communal,
economic or other characteristics
will vote for the autonomous
region.
So, whatever area is not

predominantly occupied by
inhabitants of the same common
historical, cultural, linguistic, ethnic,
communal, economic or other
characteristics will not vote.
MR. DE CASTRO. There really is.92
140. These proceedings relevant to the creation of the

autonomous region for Muslim Mindanao evince that the
phrase “Muslim Mindanao” occasioned some dispute as it
could be construed to mean that all of Mindanao was
Muslim. Nonetheless, Muslim Commissioners Abubakar and
Alonto answered that the phrase meant only those areas
which are predominantly Muslim.93 The term “Bangsamoro”,
therefore, can hardly be considered as elevating the status
of the Moro people to a level higher than the non-Moro, as
well as the ICCs and IPs in Muslim Mindanao, nor does it
diminish the latter’s rights. The use of the term is but a
recognition of the predominant Muslim population in the
region owing to their historical ties therein.
141. Besides, in the creation of the autonomous region

in Muslim Mindanao, the framers were fully aware that other
than the Muslim Filipinos, there are non-Moro people, as well
92
III RECORD OF T HE 1986 CONST IT UT IONAL COMMISSION, pp. 492 – 495; emphasis supplied.
93
Bernas, J., SJ. “The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary”, 2009 Ed ., p.
1139.
55
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
as indigenous peoples and communities residing in the

region. Still, the framers decided to give Congress free rein
to determine the territory of the autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao with the limitation that the “provinces,
cities and geographical areas” forming part of the
autonomous region must share “common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics.” 94 This leads
to the inevitable conclusion that the establishment of a
Bangsamoro in Muslim Mindanao, by legal fiction, does not,
by itself, violate the rights of IPs and ICCs.
Sections 1 to 5, Article III of the

Bangsamoro Organic Law do not
violate Section 22, Article II, and
Section 5, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Contrary to
Petitioner’s assertion, the
Bangsamoro Organic Law clearly
provides for the protection and
preferential rights of the Non-Moro
indigenous peoples of Mindanao.
142. Petitioner asserts that the Bangsamoro Organic

Law is patently unconstitutional for transgressing the rights
of indigenous cultural minorities. 95 Specifically, Petitioner
cites Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution, viz.:
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this

Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.96
143. This averment is unfounded. Contrary to

Petitioner’s mistaken position, it is patent from the express
words of the Bangsamoro Organic Law itself that the rights
of the indigenous cultural minorities are protected and are
even given preferential status.
94
1987 PHIL. CONST ., Article X, Section 15.
95
Petition, pp. 34 – 35.
96
1987 PHIL. CONST ., Article II, Section 22.
56
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
144. The Preamble of the Bangsamoro Organic Law,

while not a source of law, affords recognition to all the
inhabitants of Muslim Mindanao, whether Bangsamoro or
not, to wit:
Imploring the aid of Almighty God, in recognition of

the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people and other
inhabitants in the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao
to establish an enduring peace on the basis of justice,
balanced society and asserting their right to conserve and
develop their patrimony, reflective of their system of life as
prescribed by their faith, in harmony with their
customary laws, cultures and traditions, within the
framework of the Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines, and the accepted principles of human rights,
liberty, justice, democracy, and the norms and standards
of international law, and affirming their distinct
historical identity and birthright to their ancestral
homeland and their right to chart their political future
through a democratic process that will secure their identity
and posterity, and allow genuine and meaningful self-
governance, the Filipino people, by the act of the Congress
of the Philippines, do hereby ordain and promulgate this
Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.97
145. More importantly, the Bangsamoro Organic Law is

also replete with provisions recognizing the identity and
preferential rights of the indigenous peoples and
communities living in the proposed Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region, viz.:
ARTICLE II. Bangsamoro Identity
SEC. 1. Bangsamoro People. – Those who, at the

advent of the Spanish colonization, were considered
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the
Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands, whether of
mixed or of full blood, shall have the right to identify
themselves, their spouses and descendants, as
Bangsamoro.98
ARTICLE IV. General Principles and Policies
97
Emphasis supplied.
98
Emphasis supplied.
57
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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SEC. 9. Rights of Non-Moro Indigenous Peoples. –

The Bangsamoro Government shall recognize and
promote the rights of non-Moro indigenous peoples
within the framework of the Constitution and national
laws.99
SEC. 10. Freedom of Choice. – The freedom of choice

of all peoples within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
shall be respected. Indigenous peoples shall have the
freedom to retain their distinct indigenous and
ethnic identity in addition to their Bangsamoro
political identity. There shall be no discrimination on the
basis of identity, religion, and ethnicity.100
146. In light of the foregoing premises, there is nothing

in the law which diminishes the identities of the indigenous
cultural minorities. Even as the law recognizes the identity of
the Bangsamoro as a people, it does not deprive IPs and
ICCs the right to similarly retain and enjoy their distinct
indigenous and ethnic identities.
147. Notably, with regard to the government structure

and participation in governance, the law gives importance to
the non-Moro and IPs as it ensures their rightful
representation in the Bangsamoro Parliament, to wit:
ARTICLE VII. Bangsamoro Government
SEC. 7. Classification and Allocation of Seats. – The

seats in the Parliament shall be classified and allocated as
follows:
xxx
(c) Reserved Seats and Sectoral Representatives. –

Reserved seats and sectoral representatives
shall constitute at least ten percent (10%) of the
members of the Parliament, which shall include
two (2) reserved seats each for non-Moro
indigenous peoples and settler communities.
Women, youth, traditional leaders, and the
Ulama shall have one sectoral seat each:
Provided, That the reserved seats and sectoral
representatives shall in no case be less than
eight (8) seats.
99
Emphasis supplied.
100
Emphasis supplied.
58
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
SEC. 8. Election for Reserved Seats for Non-Moro

Indigenous Peoples. – Notwithstanding the immediately
preceding sections, reserved seats for non-Moro
indigenous peoples, such as Teduray, Lambangian,
Dulangan Manobo, B’laan, and Higaonon, shall
adhere to their customary laws and indigenous
processes based on the following: …101
148. Significantly, notwithstanding the plenary power of

Congress to determine the territory of the autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao, and consistent with Section 22,
Article II, and Section 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress canalized the powers of the Bangsamoro
Government with regard to matters relating to the IPs
through several affirmative guarantees embodied in the
Bangsamoro Organic Law. The following provisions of
Bangsamoro Organic Law exhaustively reflect this fact.
149. While Section 2(ff), Article V of the Bangsamoro

Organic Law grants the Bangsamoro Government authority
over indigenous people’s rights, Article IX is clear that the
law shall not in any manner diminish the rights and benefits
of the non-Moro indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region under the Constitution, national laws,
particularly R.A. No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), viz.:
ARTICLE IX. Basic Rights
SEC. 1. Transitional Justice. – The Bangsamoro

Parliament, taking into account the report of the
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission, shall
enact a transitional justice mechanism to address the
legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people and
the indigenous peoples, such as historical injustices,
human rights violations, and marginalization through
unjust dispossession of territorial and proprietary rights
and customary land tenure.
SEC. 3. Indigenous Peoples’ Rights. – The

Bangsamoro Government recognizes the rights of the
indigenous peoples and shall adopt measures for the
101
Emphasis supplied.
59
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
promotion and protection of the following rights: (a) Native

titles or fusaka inged; (b) Indigenous customs and
traditions; (c) Justice systems and indigenous political
structures; (d) Equitable share in revenues from the
utilization of resources in their ancestral lands; (e) Free,
prior and informed consent; (f) Political participation in the
Bangsamoro Government including reserved seats for the
non-Moro indigenous peoples in the Parliament; (g) Basic
services; and (h) Freedom of choice as to their identity.
The Bangsamoro Government shall create a ministry for
indigenous peoples and shall have the primary
responsibility to formulate and implement policies, plans,
and programs to promote the well-being of all indigenous
peoples in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights
thereto. Any measure enacted by the Parliament shall in
no way diminish the rights and privileges granted to
indigenous peoples by virtue of the United Nations
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, and other
laws pertaining to indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region. This Organic Law shall not in any
manner diminish the rights and benefits of the non
Moro indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region under the Constitution, national
laws, particularly Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the “Indigenous Peoples’ 2 Rights Act of
1997.”
SEC. 4. Customary Rights and Traditions. – The

customs, beliefs, and traditions of the Bangsamoro people
are hereby recognized, protected, and guaranteed. The
Parliament shall adopt measures to ensure mutual
respect and protection of the distinct beliefs,
customs, and traditions of the Bangsamoro people
and the other inhabitants in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region. No person in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region shall be subjected to any form of
discrimination on account of creed, religion, ethnic origin,
parentage, or gender.
SEC. 24. Preservation of the Cultural Heritage of the

Bangsamoro People. – The Bangsamoro Government shall
preserve the history, culture, arts, traditions, and the rich
cultural heritage of the Bangsamoro people and their
Sultanates, such as those of Sulu, Maguindanao,
Kabuntalan, Buayan, the Royal Houses of Ranao and of the
Iranun, and the non Moro indigenous peoples of the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. For this purpose, it shall
create the Bangsamoro Commission for the Preservation of
60
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
Cultural Heritage in coordination with the appropriate and

relevant national government agencies. 102
150. The Bangsamoro Organic Law even goes beyond

the 1987 Constitution and national laws by stating in the
same provision that any measure enacted by the Parliament
shall in no way diminish rights and privileges granted to
indigenous peoples under international instruments.
ARTICLE XII. Fiscal Autonomy
SEC. 36. Share of Indigenous Communities. –

Indigenous peoples and communities shall have an
equitable share of the revenues generated from the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources that are found within the territories covered by a
native, traditional, or customary title in their favor, which
shall be provided by a law to be passed by the Parliament
detailing the sharing mechanism and percentages:
Provided, That the rights and privileges granted to
indigenous peoples by Republic Act No. 8371 and
other laws pertaining to indigenous peoples shall not
be diminished.
ARTICLE XIII. Regional Economy and Patrimony
SEC. 8. Natural Resources, Nature Reserves, and

Protected Areas. – Subject to the provisions of the
Constitution, the Bangsamoro Government shall have the
power, authority, and right to explore, develop, and utilize
the natural resources, including surface and subsurface
rights, inland waters, coastal waters, and renewable and
nonrenewable resources in the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region. The protection, conservation, rehabilitation, and
development of forests, coastal, and marine resources,
including the adoption of programs and projects, to ensure
the maintenance of ecological balance and biodiversity
shall be given priority. The Bangsamoro Government shall
also have the power to declare nature reserves and aquatic
parks, forests, watershed reservations, and other
protected areas in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.
The Parliament shall pass a law to establish protected
areas, the procedure for the declaration and the
management thereof, and the role of the Bangsamoro
Government and other stakeholders in the process:
Provided, that protected areas to be declared within
the ancestral domains shall be subject to the free,
102
Emphasis supplied.
61
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
prior and informed consent of the non-Moro

indigenous peoples. Pending the enactment of such law,
the declaration and management of protected areas shall
be governed by existing laws, rules and regulations.
Existing nature reserves and protected areas shall remain
as such. These, including those to be declared, shall be
managed in accordance with sustainable development and
biodiversity conservation policies and principles as
contained in international conventions and treaties to
which the Philippines is a party.
SEC. 12. Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Natural

Resources. – The Parliament shall enact a law recognizing
the rights of indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in relation to natural resources within
the areas covered by a native title, including their share in
revenues as provided in this Organic Law, and priority
rights in the exploration, development, and utilization of
such natural resources within their area. The right of
indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed
consent in relation to development initiatives and
the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources within ancestral domains covered
by Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title shall be
respected.
151. These provisions all guarantee that IPs and ICCs

are given a share in the revenues generated in the region.
This is a breakthrough in terms of recognition of the IPs and
ICCs, well beyond what has been provided for under the
IPRA and in the Constitution. As to their ancestral domains,
nothing in the law violates their constitutional and property
rights as they shall be respected on their claims of
ownership of lands on account of their occupation and
possession of the same since time immemorial.
152. In sum, the Bangsamoro Organic Law is a

manifestation of the legislative intent to enlarge, and not
diminish, the rights of indigenous peoples in Muslim
Mindanao, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions.
V.
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION
COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
CONSTITUTION.
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COMMENT
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153. Petitioner contends that the governmental

structure of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region is
constitutionally infirm. Petitioner argues that Congress acted
with grave abuse of discretion in instituting a parliamentary
system of government for the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region,103 and that the governmental setup provided in the
Bangsamoro Organic Law fails to comply with Article X,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. 104 Petitioner’s
assertions are bereft of merit.
A.
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES ONLY THAT THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS CONSIST OF AN
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND A
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, BOTH OF WHICH
ARE PRESENT IN THE PROPOSED
BANGSAMORO GOVERNMENT. THE 1987
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE
CONGRESS TO ADOPT A STRUCTURE AKIN TO
A PRESIDENTIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT
FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGIONS, AND
THUS, HAS THE DISCRETION OF ADOPTING A
PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT
INSTEAD.
The 1987 Constitution does not

require Congress, whether
expressly or impliedly, to adopt any
particular system of government for
the autonomous regions.
154. There is nothing under Section 18, Article X, or

elsewhere in the 1987 Constitution, that imposes upon
Congress a positive obligation to adopt any particular
system of government for the autonomous regions. Instead,
the text of Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
prescribes only that the basic structure of government for
the autonomous regions consist of an executive department
103
Petition, p. 20.
104
Ibid. at p. 21.
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COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
and a legislative assembly. The Constitution, however, failed

to specify the scope, extent, and relationship of the powers
of and between the executive and legislative branches of the
autonomous regions. An express distribution of powers could
have served as the textual basis from which it may be
inferred that the framers of the Constitution had really
intended that these departments be independent of and
separate from one another, like the separation of powers
enjoyed by the executive and the legislative branches of the
National Government.
155. The lack of any such judicially discoverable and

manageable standard105 makes the adoption of the system
of government for the autonomous regions a purely political
question on the part of Congress, outside the ambit of this
Honorable Court’s power of judicial review. Put differently, it
is up to Congress to determine which system of government
to adopt for the autonomous regions—be it presidential,
parliamentary, or a hybrid system of government—and this
Honorable Court, with all due respect, has no power to
question the wisdom of Congress on this matter.
156. Yet, this Honorable Court need not limit itself to

the text of the fundamental law to be convinced that
Congress enjoys absolute discretion as to the distribution of
powers between the executive department and the
legislative assembly of the autonomous regions. The
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission likewise
support this analysis.
The 1986 Constitutional

Commission intended for Congress
to have absolute discretion as to the
distribution of powers between the
executive department and the
legislative assembly of the
autonomous regions.
157. The exchange between Commissioners Nolledo

and Teodulo C. Natividad during the deliberations on the
105
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 citing Tañada v.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957 and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
64
COMMENT
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provisions on Local Government of the 1987 Constitution is

enlightening:
MR. NATIVIDAD. What is the Committee’s idea on

how the autonomous regions are
supposed to be governed? Will
there be a governor? Section 10, of
course, says that the organic act
shall define the basic structure of
government but as a matter of
inquiry, what is the plan of the
Committee on this?
MR. RAMA. Madam President, I ask that

Commissioner Natividad be
recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. I thank the Gentleman for that

question because in the original
draft, a regional executive council,
contemplating a collegial body, was
put there but our Committee
changed that to a regional
executive department, believing
that it would be better that the
executive head, as much as
possible, be alone, perhaps assisted
by some sort of ministers. The
executive head of the region will be
called a regional governor.
With respect to the legislative

assembly, it says here that the
regional executive department will
be headed by the regional governor
and the regional legislative
assembly shall be elective and
representative of the constituent
political units. We are making this
a little bit broader in the sense
that we are giving Congress the
discretion to determine the
details of the basic structure of
government within the
106
autonomous region.
106
III RECORD OF T HE 1986 CONST IT UT IONAL COMMISSION, pp. 216 – 217, emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
65
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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158. From this exchange, it becomes evident that the

constitutional framers deliberately formulated the language
of the present-day Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution in a manner broad enough to give Congress
wide leeway to determine the details of the governmental
structure of the autonomous regions—omitting any
particular reference to the composition of, or powers that
each department may exercise.
159. Consistent with this proposition from

Commissioner Nolledo, another Member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Vicente B. Foz,
likewise explained that the distinction between presidential
and parliamentary systems of government finds no
relevance in local government units, to wit:
MR. FOZ. I think it is settled in some

jurisprudence that the
presidential form of
government and the
parliamentary system are not
applicable to local government
systems. As a matter of fact, in
the existing local government
setup, there is a mixture as it is.
The provincial governor sits in the
provincial board which is the
legislative department of the
provincial government, and this
example is extended to some other
forms of local government where
the mayor sits as chairman or
presiding officer of the city or
municipal council. So, the
question of whether this is
parliamentary or presidential
does not apply, does not come
into play at all. So, the form of
government as used in the
provision involves the question of
whether it is a mayor-council type
of government or a manager type
of government as far as local
government is concerned. So the
parliamentary and presidential
systems are not at all involved. 107
107
Ibid. at pp. 400 – 401, emphasis supplied.
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COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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160. Indeed, the present-day setup of local government

units is defined by power structures characteristic of
parliamentary systems of government. The provincial vice-
governors, city and municipal vice-mayors, and the punong
barangay all preside the legislative bodies of the province,
city, municipality and barangay, 108 respectively—despite
being part of the executive department of their respective
local governing bodies. This fusion of legislative and
executive powers is through statutory fiat under the Local
Government Code of 1991, yet no constitutional objection
can be lodged against such governmental framework. This
Honorable Court has, in several occasions, upheld the
validity of local ordinances with nary a quibble about the
constitutionality of the composition of the legislative bodies
that enacted them.
161. Autonomous regions are, of course, also

considered as local government units. This is by express
provision of Article X, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
and as recently declared by this Honorable Court in
Mandanas v. Ochoa.109 According to this Honorable Court,
there are two groups of local government units: (1) the
regional units which enjoy decentralization of power, and (2)
the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays which
enjoy the decentralization of administration. 110 No plausible
reason exists why Congress may adopt a system of
government other than one that is akin to a presidential kind
for the second group, but not for first group.
162. Add to that, former Supreme Court Associate

Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna was categorical during the public
hearings for the enactment of the Bangsamoro Organic Law
that the framers intentionally fashioned Article X of the 1987
Constitution to be flexible enough for Congress to adopt a
parliamentary system of government for the autonomous
regions, viz.:
MR. AZCUNA. … The other thing that I did not see

in the present objections but was
108
Local Government Code, Section 49.
109
G.R. Nos. 199802 & 208488, July 3, 2018.
110
Ibid. at p. 11.
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COMMENT
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raised also before was that you

cannot merge the executive with
the legislative because our setup
under the present form of
government is separation of
powers. So if you have separation
of powers in our national
government, you should also have
separation of powers in the
Bangsamoro and in the
Autonomous Region. That does not
follow. We do not require that in
Article X, we fashion Article X to
be as flexible as possible
precisely because it is supposed
to meet the idiosyncrasies of
these regions which are not the
same as the rest of the nation.
They have their own peculiar
customs and traditions and
ways of doings things. So what
we only require is that there should
be democratic government that is
elected and representative.
Besides, we have been practicing
merging executive and legislative in
our local governments. Our
provincial boards are mixture of
legislative and executive. The
governor, the vice governor, they
sit in the legislative body of the
provincial government but they are
the executive. So this is not
something strange to us. It is
something familiar to our local
government. So there is nothing
anathema to it. A parliamentary
system as long as it is democratic,
it is elected, it represents the
constituent units, to my mind,
would fulfill the requirements of this
Article X of the Constitution. So, to
me, that is the basic—the heart of
the question. …111
163. Similarly, Dr. Florangel Rosario Braid stated that,

she shared the sentiments of her fellow framers of the 1987
Constitution which is that “the present revised version of
111
January 30, 2018 Public Hearings of the Subcommittee on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, pp. 18 – 19,
emphasis and underscoring supplied.
68
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
the [Bangsamoro Basic Law] is constitutional.”112 The

eminent former Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., on the other
hand, asked the Senate to approve the Bangsamoro Organic
Law with dispatch,113 even as he was cognizant that the bill
then proposed that the powers of the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Government be exercised by a Bangsamoro
Parliament.114
164. It bears noting that Dr. Braid, former Supreme

Court Associate Justice Azcuna, and former Chief Justice
Davide, Jr. were all part of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Not only that, but they actively participated in
the deliberations of the provisions that eventually became
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
165. If it were true, as Petitioner contends, that the

1987 Constitution prohibits the institution of a parliamentary
form of government for the autonomous regions, the
framers themselves could have objected to such a proposal,
but they did not. Instead, more than thirty years after the
ratification of the present Constitution, these framers
maintain that they actually intended to vest Congress with
the discretion to choose which kind of governmental system
to adopt for the autonomous regions and that a
parliamentary form of government is allowed for these
autonomous regions.
The intent of the framers in

requiring the establishment of an
executive department and a
legislative assembly in the
autonomous regions is only to
ensure their autonomy from the
National Government in the
enactment and enforcement of
laws.
112
February 5, 2018 Public Hearings of the Subcommittee on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, p. 13, emphasis
supplied.
113
See February 5, 2018 Public Hearings of the Subcommittee on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, p. 32.
114
See February 5, 2018 Public Hearings of the Subcommittee on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, p. 28, where
former Chief Justice Davide said: “Further, I suggest that the item, “The Bangsamoro Parliament” under
that article enumerating certain powers should be transferred to the Article on the Bangsamoro Parliament.
I think that is its proper situs.”
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COMMENT
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166. This Honorable Court in Civil Liberties Union v.

Executive Secretary115 held that a foolproof yardstick in
constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. According to this Honorable
Court:
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a

Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant
to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.116
167. As such, it is crucial in the resolution of whether

Congress has the power to establish a parliamentary system
of government for the autonomous regions that this
Honorable Court sift through the history behind the
requirement that these autonomous regions consist of an
executive department and legislative assembly.
168. As stated earlier, the Bangsamoro People have

long asserted their right to self-determination, and the
framers of the 1987 Constitution were mindful of the rich
legal and political history of this struggle. Commissioner
Nolledo, chairman of the Committee on Local Governments
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, staunchly defended
the establishment of an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao, and coined the term “cosmetic autonomy” to
describe the structural infirmities and insufficiencies of P.D.
No. 1618 in granting genuine autonomy in Muslim Mindanao.
The Public Respondents quote at length the pertinent
portions of the Record of the Constitutional Commission, to
wit:
MR. PADILLA. Thank you.
115
G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991.
116
70
COMMENT
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x---------------------------x
I have heard in previous

discussions that some people have
been blaming the unitary system
even as it existed during colonial
Spain and so forth. Does the
criticism on unitary system mean
that we do not want a strong
centralized government?
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, because we believe that

political power must be shared
with the autonomous regions. It
is a sort of shared responsibility.
That is why in the handouts given
to us only this afternoon, it is
stated that decentralization
heightens the access of the people
to decision or policy-making
process.
We will notice that even our

government has decided to
regionalize all its agencies and
offices. The Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports, the Central
Bank, and even the Ministry of
Trade and Industry are all
regionalized. They have what is
known as the regional development
council at several levels of the local
government. And so, the national
government believes that
political power must be
dispersed in order to attain
economic and social
development. I believe that the
unitary system — I repeat it as
many times as I could — has been
a failure in the Republic of the
Philippines.
MR. PADILLA. There are regional offices of the

national departments or ministries.
But it does not mean that we must
have a weak central government
consistent with local autonomy. We
may increase local autonomy
but it should not diminish the
strength of the central
government, especially if we
stress the unity of the entire
country. For example, we have a
71
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
national economic development

program. That must encompass the
whole nation and all our people. We
cannot be stressing one region as
having a preference over other
regions. Does not the
Commissioner believe that what we
need is more local government
autonomy but within a strong,
united central government?
MR. NOLLEDO. I have to qualify, if the Vice

President does not mind, that we
have to strengthen the local
governments within the framework
of national sovereignty without
necessarily weakening the
supervisory power of the President
over local governments because
ultimately, if all these regions
succeed, the President's powers will
be fully respected but within the
framework also of authority to set
up autonomous regions. We will
notice that in Section 12, the
second part of our report,
autonomous regions have
authority over the following:
regional, economic, social and
cultural development subject,
as to economic development, to
policies laid down by the
National Economic and
Development Authority.
In other words, certain standards

set forth by the national
government may constitute the
guidelines to economic, social and
cultural development programs of
regional governments.
MR. PADILLA. When we say regional, we really

mean the political units of barrios,
municipalities, cities and provinces.
But Section I of Committee Report
No. 21 makes reference to
provinces, cities, municipalities,
barrios and then they added ''and
the autonomous regions." But we
cannot have an autonomous region
as yet in accordance with the
72
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
committee report unless there be:

First, a well-defined territory; and
second, a plebiscite by all the
people comprising that supposed
region to petition and approve an
autonomous region.
Why are we taking for granted and

assuming that we will have all
these autonomous regions? The
danger, as already explained by
various Commissioners, is that we
may have too many autonomous
regions beginning with the Ilocano
region. And this may impair the
unity and solidarity of the nation
under one central government by
stressing too much autonomous
regions.
We agree to grant autonomy to

local governments. The 1935
Constitution had no provision on
local governments while the 1973
Constitution provided that the
National Assembly shall enact a
Local Government Code, and that
was realized through Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337. Why do we
not just say that Congress will
strengthen this Local
Government Code to grant
additional powers within the
concept of local autonomy?
MR. NOLLEDO. I am very sorry but our

Committee has decided to set
up autonomous regions. When
we defined the political units
constituting local governments,
we included autonomous
regions as one of them in
anticipation of the fulfillment of
the mandate that there should
be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras. I am very sorry, but I
beg to disagree with the
Commissioner. That is why we are
going to submit this question to the
body for consideration. I do not
believe that there will be disunity if
73
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
we set up autonomous regions. The

examples of Switzerland, Malaysia
and other countries, including the
United States where there is a
federal system, show that
autonomy does not sow disunity.
MR. PADILLA. The Commissioner mentioned

Malaysia. My understanding of
Malaysia is that there are five or six
sultanates there with their
respective chieftains who are called
sultans, datus or chiefs. The sultans
rotate among themselves within
five years or so the rank or
category of king or perhaps
ceremonial president, but the
power in Malaysia does not rest on
those sultans. The power is vested
in a national assembly and on a
prime minister. I do not think the
parity between the conditions of the
Philippines and Malaysia is
obtainable or present equally.
Sometimes others talk of Spain but
it is well known that the people of
the southern part of Spain, the
Vascos, are separatists, and they
have been accused of many plots
against the government of Madrid.
We should be avoiding autonomous
regions here and there based on
incidental differences, for other
regions may also demand their
autonomy and the result may be
sacrificing the unity and solidarity
of the entire nation.
MR. NOLLEDO. Before Commissioner Ople answers

the Vice-President. I would like to
mention here that there are state
legislatures in Malaysia's 13 states.
Each state has its own constitution,
legislative assembly and an
executive council headed by a chief
minister responsible to the
legislative assembly. There are
some states with hereditary rulers.
That is what my note says.
Mr. Presiding Officer, I request that

Commissioner Ople be recognized.
74
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
MR. OPLE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
The particular relevance of Malaysia

to the issue at hand has to do with
Sabah and Sarawak. Malaysia is a
federal state. In 1963. Sabah and
Sarawak joined the New Federation
of Malaysia. But what is distinctive
about Sabah and Sarawak relative
to the preexisting states of the
Malaysian Federation is the fact
that both of them reserved their
sovereignty on labor, immigration
and education. So, with respect to
these spheres, the federal
government has theoretically no
involvement in Sabah and Sarawak,
and I think in this respect we might
say that although they are regularly
constituted as states of the
Malaysian Federation, Sabah and
Sarawak are more autonomous
states than the other states which
were earlier associated with that
federation.
I think in the case of China, this is

more illuminating. It has a unitary
state unlike Malaysia which is
federal, but it has vested
autonomous status in Chingkiang
and Tibet. And in most ways,
Hongkong is the latest of these
autonomous regions when the
treaty with the United Kingdom
over Hongkong takes effect in
1997, under the motto "One
country, two systems," because
China is communist and Hongkong
is capitalist. Both do not disturb the
autonomy of Hongkong with respect
to the choice of an economic and
social system until 50 years from
1997, in accordance with that
treaty itself.
In the case of Spain, there is a

good warning to the Filipino people.
The chronic unrest in the Basque
region is a consequence of the
denial of autonomy to the Basque
75
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
nation which is, in most ways,

really different from the Castilian
Spanish. So I thought I would
contribute this input on behalf of
the Committee.
MR. PADILLA. The Vascos in Spain who are in the

southern part have a racial
community with some portions of
northern France. They are given
autonomy, but the problem there is
that they consider themselves as
entitled to be a separate state. In
other words, they are in a way
separatists, together with some
Basques in Northern Europe. So we
should not consider that situation
because in the Philippines. we are
all for one united nation. one flag,
one people, without many
distinctions as to temporary or
incidental differences in the
different islands or regions of the
country.
Section 4 (2) of Article XI of the

1973 Constitution, which is
reproduced in Section 5 of this
Article on Local Governments,
reads:
Local government units may group

themselves, or consolidate or
coordinate their efforts. services,
and resources for purposes
commonly beneficial to them.
Does not the Committee believe

that the different political units
beginning with provinces and cities
can avail of this provision in the
1973 Constitution and repeated in
the committee report for a
combination, we might say, among
different provinces in the same part
of the country, which may amount
to what we now call or commonly
consider autonomous regions? For
example, Commissioner
Abubakar says that autonomy in
Region IX is working well under
the Tripoli Agreement. There is
76
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
a legislative council and an

executive council in Zamboanga
City. But these really are only
aggrupations of a few provinces.
The fact is that in every province
we have a governor and a
provincial board or a sangguniang
panlalawigan. If the legislative
council will just be a combination of
provincial boards or the governors
thereof will become members of the
executive council, that could be
accomplished within the purview of
the Local Government Code and
this provision of the Constitution. In
the same way, the legislative
assembly may just be a larger
assembly over the municipal and
provincial legislative bodies. Does
not the Commissioner believe that
this coud be well implemented
within the purview of Section 5?
MR. NOLLEDO. That is possible. I call that a

"cosmetic autonomy." And
besides, Section 5 of the first part
of our committee report
contemplates only a temporary
aggrupation and the situation
covers only essential services. So
the function there is merely for
purposes of coordination. The
situation is essentially different and
apart from the autonomous region.
MR. PADILLA. Its efforts, services and resources

are for purposes commonly
beneficial to them. So that can
cover the concept of an expanded
autonomy but within the local units,
particularly the provinces.
MR. NOLLEDO. Commissioner Alonto would like to

answer some more.
MR. ALONTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.

Presiding Officer.
I would like to make a little

comment on the remarks of the
distinguished Vice-President of the
Constitutional Commission.
77
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
In the first place, let us take

into account that this
appearance of autonomous
regions in the report of the
Committee is merely a
restatement of something that
was accomplished by this
country through the Tripoli
Agreement which was entered
into by and between the regime
of President Marcos and the
Moro National Liberation Front.
This was ill response to the
oppression and tyranny that the
Muslims in this country had
experienced, forcing them to go to
the mountains to oppose that
regime of President Marcos during
martial law years. In order to
eliminate that particular problem
the deposed President Marcos,
through the help of the government
of Libya, tried to negotiate with the
Moro National Liberation Front
which, at that time, was mistaken
for being a secessionist group. This
negotiation resulted in the
establishment of autonomous
regions in Mindanao, a
unilateral decision which did
not undergo the consideration
of the finer details of that
negotiation. Therefore, as far as
the existence of these
autonomous regions is
concerned, they are existing de
facto. So the term "autonomous
regions" as embodied in this
committee report is merely a
recognition of a de facto existence
of autonomous regions in this
country. But as the Chairman of
the Committee has said, this is
merely a "cosmetic autonomy"
because the deposed President
Marcos never really intended to
put up here a real and genuine
autonomous region. His
purpose was to deceive the
whole Filipino people,
particularly the Muslims.
78
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
In this case, the establishment of

autonomous regions is not for the
purpose of destroying unity among
the Filipino people but to
strengthen that unity as one people
having one country, one
government and one flag.
MR. PADILLA. I am glad to hear that. But does not

the Commissioner believe that the
efforts should be more towards
representation of, say, our Muslim
brothers, especially in national
offices so that they can be heard
and represented, with the ultimate
goal of faster integration? And
probably, through more educational
facilities and interrelations, say,
mixed marriages, there will be
more representation and more
integration.
Would that not be a solution to

whatever alleged discrimination or
other sins may be against some
sectors which are attributed to the
system? Why do we not go into this
unified central government, with
local autonomy, and with some
representation, say, from our
Muslim brothers or our Cordillera
brothers, so that their voices can be
heard and their interest protected
and promoted not only within their
local communities and their
"autonomous regions," but also in
the higher levels of national
authority?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that question?
History has proven that the

intention to integrate these
members of the indigenous
communities within the stream
of national life has miserably
failed. (Applause)
Is it impossible for us to integrate

the Muslims?
79
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
The move to integrate the Muslims

began during the Spanish regime.
THE PRESIDING
OFFICER
(Mr. Rodrigo). Just a minute, please, the audience
is requested not to make any show
of approval or disapproval.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. PADILLA. Let us not talk anymore of the

Spanish regime. That was centuries
ago. We are now considering a new
Republic which has toppled 20
years of dictatorial regime.
MR. NOLLEDO. The question of assimilation began

during the Spanish regime; then it
continued during the American
regime. There was an attempt by
Quezon to assimilate the Muslims;
it was attempted by many past
Presidents, and yet these minorities
resisted. I do not consider
assimilation a possibility at all. We
have to respect our Constitution of
1973: it contains a provision that
we have to respect the customs
and traditions of the indigenous
communities. Likewise, several
provisions now appear in the 1986
Constitution to the same effect.
This nation will ever be divided
and secession movements may
continue if we do not recognize
the right of indigenous
communities to maintain their
customs and traditions. It is
high time that we get ourselves
out of that maverick shell of
conservatism and obsolescence.
I am sorry to say that, but it
really comes from my heart.
(Applause)
THE PRESIDING
OFFICER
(Mr. Rodrigo). The Chair would like-to call the
attention of the audience to please
refrain from any demonstration of
approval or disapproval.
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COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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MR. PADILLA. One last question. Will the

Commissioner agree to delete
under Section 14 the phrase "may
establish its own special forces"?
MR. NOLLEDO. I will submit it to the floor. The

Committee will insist on its
recommendation. I am sorry
because we have met objections
thereto by setting forth several
limitations on the establishment of
special forces.
MR. PADILLA. Thank you.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING
OFFICER
(Mr. Rodrigo). The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. I ask that Commissioner Bacani be

recognized.
THE PRESIDING
OFFICER
(Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Bacani is recognized.
BISHOP BACANI. Will the Chairman of the Committee

yield to my questions?
MR. NOLLEDO. Gladly.
BISHOP BACANI. Commissioner Alonto pointed out

that the autonomous government is
already existing de facto by reason
of the Tripoli Agreement. I would
ask how the provinces in these
autonomous regions have de facto
fared economically, politically and
socially since that time. Has there
been a marked improvement to
justify optimism about the results in
the future?
MR. ALONTO. With the permission of the

Chairman, I will answer that very
good question. The Commissioner
must have noticed in my remark in
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COMMENT
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response to the Vice-President that

this present status or composition
of these autonomous regions was
never presented to the different
provinces that constitute these
autonomous regions. In other
words, they were established by
President Marcos in the exercise of
his dictatorial power. As far as the
economic, political and social
conditions of these existing
autonomous regions are concerned,
the conditions are almost the same
as those in other parts of the
country; that is, instead of
improving, they have deteriorated
as other local units have
experienced during the time of
martial law. Hence, these
existing de facto autonomous
regions in Mindanao, instead of
becoming a solution to the
problem of strongly uniting the
Filipino people, has worked the
other way around because, as
the Chairman of the Committee
has said, their autonomy is only
in words but not really in
practice, considering that even
the legislative assemblies are
not empowered to legislate at
all.
BISHOP BACANI. So, in fact, de facto means it does

not exist?
MR. ALONTO. De facto means it is existing. As a

matter of fact, even this regime has
continued appointing officials in
these autonomous regions.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. In other words, we really have

no experience yet even in the so-
called autonomous regions.
MR. ALONTO. In truth and in fact, we have

not exercised any autonomous
authority.
MR. NOLLEDO. In other words, the former

President retained his appointing
powers. I just want to cite one
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provision to show that it was really

a ''cosmetic autonomy." Section 32
of P.D. No. [1618] states:
The collection, custody, use,

disbursement and accounting of
public funds in the autonomous
region shall be governed by laws
and regulations which cover similar
local and national financial
transactions.
It was really deceiving. And so,

quoting Mr. Michael Mastura:
"These autonomous regions
were mere monitoring agencies
for the President." The
President was fooling Muslim
Mindanao.117
169. Even without looking into the deliberations of the

1986 Constitutional Commission, this Honorable Court will
not find it difficult to see why P.D. No. 1618 failed in fulfilling
the promise of autonomy for Muslim Mindanao.
170. Section 35(b) of P.D. No. 1618 vested the

President not only the power of general supervision,118 but
also the power of control over the Autonomous Regions.
Supervision and control have marked distinctions in legal
parlance:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing

of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor
or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or
re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He
117
III RECORD OF T HE 1986 CONST IT UT IONAL COMMISSION, pp. 225 – 228, emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
118
P.D. No. 1618, Section 35(b) states that, “The President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over the Autonomous Regions. In this connection, the President may call upon the Ministry of
Local Government and Community Development to assist him in the exercise of his supervision over the
Autonomous Regions, particularly in matters relating to the administration of the regions and their
relationships with the local government units therein.”
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COMMENT
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may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act.
He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed. 119
171. The evident intent of the framers in requiring the

establishment of an executive department and a legislative
assembly in the autonomous regions is only to ensure their
autonomy from the National Government in both the
enactment and enforcement of laws. Otherwise stated,
Congress cannot enact a law for the autonomous regions
with only a legislative assembly, and no executive
department, or vice versa. Nonetheless, the framers of the
Constitution saw it fit to leave it entirely within the province
of Congress to define the distribution and interplay of
powers between these two bodies.
The adoption of a parliamentary

system for the Bangsamoro
Government rests on sound basis.
Congress did not act arbitrarily in
establishing a Bangsamoro
Parliament from which the Chief
Minister is to be elected.
172. Perhaps the most persuasive argument for the

establishment of a parliamentary system of government for
the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is the famous
adage that “insanity is doing the same thing over and over
again, but expecting different results.” While it is true that
Congress can choose the kind of governmental system for
the autonomous regions, Petitioner cannot reasonably
expect Congress to retain the same structure of government
of the ARMM for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region when,
almost thirty years after its creation, the structure of the
ARMM Government has been inadequate to resolve the
decades-long conflict in the region.
173. That the adoption of a parliamentary system of

government for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region rests
on rational basis is shown in the public hearings that led to
the enactment of the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
119
Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994.
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COMMENT
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174. Commissioner Abbas, a member of Respondent

BTC which formulated the initial draft of the Bangsamoro
Organic Law, stated that the purpose of adopting a
parliamentary system of government is to enable greater
debate and discussion among the constituencies in a way
similar to Islamic practices, to wit:
MR. ABBAS. None of the Moro sultanates have

what you call a parliament. The
sultanate of Sulu, for instance,
and the sultan of Maguindanao
on Rajah Buayan and
Kabuntalan, they have the ruma
bichara but this is composed of
the elders and they are not
elected. They sit there on the basis
of their blood or by choice of the
sultan. But the sultans, they have
the last say. And they have the last
decision, they have the authority to
decide because it is an autocratic
form and autocratic system. So it is
very different.
The word parliamentary

actually stems from the practice
in the past. Centuries ago, when
the ruler started to call in some
members of his constituency
and discuss matters with them,
and this evolve into councils
until it became a parliament as
it is known now. So a
parliament actually is a place
where matters are debated and
discussed which actually is
taken from its old concept. And
that is precisely the parliament
which is envisioned by the
Bangsamoro government.
SEN.
HONTIVEROS. Thank you, Sultan Abbas.
So is this ruma bichara, the elders,

but an autocratic form of
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COMMENT
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governance, is it somehow reflected

partially in the BTC proposal on the
role of the wali although in a
democratic setup? A
parliamentary setup which has
evolved, as you said earlier, and
which should describe now
coming from this earlier
parliamentary forms of calling
in constituents consulting them.
Can we understand the proposal
also for the wali at least
partially in the context?
MR. ABBAS. The wali is ceremonial. He does not

perform any substantive duty.
Actually, there is no function of the
wali which require a judgment and
discretion. What he has are mere
ministerial functions which are
delegated to him by the chief
minister. So he is there only for
ceremonial purposes.
Now, does this have any

similarity in the old traditional
political setup of the sultans?
Well, the sultans generally has
his spiritual adviser. And the
spiritual adviser in a way
advises him on matters which
do not only pertain to religion
but also pertains to the other
organs of governance. Because
Islam is not only a religion, it is
also an ideology. That is the
only similarity. The word wali
was used before in the middle-
eastern countries and it is a
title of governor. In marriage, in
nikah, the wali is one who gives
away the bride. So these are the
meanings which are attached to the
word wali.120
175. Commissioner Hassan, also a member of

Respondent BTC, remarked that a parliamentary system of
government was the original plan under the 1976 Tripoli
120
Emphasis supplied.
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COMMENT
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Agreement signed between the Philippine Government and

the MNLF, viz.:
MR. HASSAN. And besides, the mother

agreement of all the
agreements signed by the Moro
National Liberation Front and
the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front was the Tripoli Agreement
of 1976. 1976 Tripoli Agreement
was signed when the Philippines
was in parliamentary form of
government. That was during
martial law operated under the
1973 Constitution. That’s why if
you read the Tripoli Agreement,
the form of government that
should be established is a
parliamentary form of
government. And how is that? The
Bangsamoro Basic Law that we are
proposing is the form of
government that we are envisioned
to establish in the Bangsamoro.
176. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the

Government of the Philippines and the MNLF is explicit that:
9. A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council

shall be formed in the areas of the Autonomy for the
Muslims. The setting up of the Legislative Assembly
shall be constituted through a direct election, and
the formation of the Executive Council shall take
place through appointments by the Legislative
Assembly. A decree for their formation shall be enacted
by the President of the Republic respectively. The number
of members of each assembly shall be determined later on.
177. Aside from the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between

the Philippine Government and the MNLF, the 2012 FAB
between the Philippine Government and the MILF states
that:
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANGSAMORO
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COMMENT
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2. The government of the Bangsamoro shall have

a ministerial form. The Parties agree to
entrench an electoral system suitable to a
ministerial form of government. The electoral
system shall allow democratic participation, ensure
accountability of public officers primarily to their
constituents and encourage formation of genuinely
principled political parties. The electoral system shall
be contained in the Bangsamoro Basic Law to be
implemented through legislation enacted by the
Bangsamoro Government and correlated with
national laws.
178. On this point, Article II, Section 2 of the 2012 FAB

is categorical that the provisions of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law shall be consistent with all agreements of
the Parties. The Philippine Government will not renege on
its obligations towards the MILF under the 2012 FAB and the
2014 CAB at the risk of fomenting hostilities in Southern
Philippines. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Final
Peace Agreement with the MNLF likewise remain intact. The
enactment of the Bangsamoro Organic Law is but a
fulfillment of the Philippine Government’s commitments in
the many agreements it has signed with the Bangsamoro
people.
179. When Congress opted to establish a parliamentary

system of government for the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region, it can hardly be said that it acted in a whimsical,
arbitrary and despotic manner as Petitioner claims. Congress
purposely selected a parliamentary system of government as
it was chosen by the Bangsamoro people themselves and is
a governmental system that they believe will best realize
their aspirations.
B.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BANGSAMORO
GOVERNMENT IS COMPLIANT WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 18,
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
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COMMENT
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180. Petitioner posits that the parliamentary system

adopted in Section 7, Article VII of the Bangsamoro Organic
Law likewise violates the requirement imposed by Section
18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution that the executive
department and legislative assembly shall both be elective
and representative of the constituent political units. 121 This
argument is bereft of merit.
When Section 18, Article X of the

1987 Constitution speaks of an
elective executive department, it
does not require direct election. The
purpose of the provision is only to
prevent the appointment by the
President of the officers of the
autonomous regions with the end in
view of attaining genuine autonomy
from the national government.
181. Petitioner contends that “[t]he Chief Minister, who

heads the executive department, is merely chosen by
members of the parliament among themselves. As a result,
the right of the people to elect the head of the executive
branch of the Bangsamoro Government.” 122
182. The first rule in constitutional construction is verba

legis. If possible, the words in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning, save where technical terms
are employed.123 In its generic sense, the term “elective”
means “dependent upon choice; bestowed or passing by
election. Also pertaining or relating to elections; conferring
the right or power to vote at elections.”124
183. Guided by this standard, the question is whether

the Chief Minister who shall head the Bangsamoro
Government125 is an elective official. The answer is yes.
121
Petition, p. 21.
122
Ibid. at p. 22.
123
Funa v. Chairman Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012.
124
Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 609 (Rev. 4th ed., 1968).
125
R.A. No. 11054, Article VII, Section 32.
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COMMENT
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184. Section 30, Article VII of the Bangsamoro Organic

Law provides for the qualifications of the Chief Minister, to
wit:
SEC. 30. Qualifications of the Chief Minister. – No

person shall be elected as Chief Minister unless a
member of Parliament, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election. 126
185. In turn, the Members of the Bangsamoro

Parliament are all elected by the people pursuant to the
classification and allocation of seats as stated in Article VII,
Section 7 of the Bangsamoro Organic Law. The Bangsamoro
Parliament, by a majority vote of all its members, will then
elect who the Chief Minister shall be among themselves
pursuant to Section 4, Article VII of the law.
186. On this score alone, there is absolutely no merit to

Petitioner’s contention that the post of Chief Minister is not
elective in nature, and that it fails to comply with Section
18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Despite being selected
by the Bangsamoro Parliament, the Chief Minister remains to
be an official who won his seat in the Parliament by way of
election, that is, through popular vote, and not by way of
appointment.
187. What is more, this Honorable Court will note that,

aside from the Chief Minister, Section 4, Article VII of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law prescribes that majority of the
members of Cabinet shall come from the Parliament. On the
other hand, the executive department of the current ARMM
is headed by the Regional Governor who, under Section 2,
Article VII of the Expanded ARMM Law, is empowered to
appoint all the members of her/his Cabinet, none of whom
were elected by the people, whether through direct or
indirect election. Yet, time and again, this Honorable Court
has upheld the constitutionality of the Expanded ARMM Law
without issue as to the prevailing setup of the ARMM
Government.
126
Emphasis supplied.
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COMMENT
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188. Besides, it has already been established that both

the text and the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution grant
Congress the discretion to adopt the system of government
for the autonomous regions, and that a parliamentary
system may be instituted for this purpose. Characteristic of
many parliamentary systems of government around the
world is the fact that the head of the parliament, oftentimes
called the prime minister, is elected from among the
members of parliament, thereby giving rise to the
expression that the prime minister is primus inter pares, or
first among equals.
189. Thus, when the 1987 Constitution was being

drafted, it cannot be gainsaid that its framers were
cognizant that allowing Congress to establish a
parliamentary system of government for the autonomous
regions meant as well that the head of the autonomous
region need not be directly elected by the people of the
autonomous region. Instead, the prime minister may be
indirectly elected for that position, through the election of
the parliament, as in the case of the Chief Minister of the
Bangsamoro Government.
190. The 1987 Constitution does not distinguish

between direct election and indirect election of the executive
department and the legislative assembly of the autonomous
regions. In constitutional, as in statutory, construction, the
oft-repeated maxim is that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the Court. Absent any
specification as to the manner of election of the officers of
these two bodies, Petitioner’s assertion that the Chief
Minister must be directly elected by the people falls flat on
its face.
191. If only to further emphasize why the Chief Minister

need not be directly elected by the people, the term
“elective” under Section 18, Article X of the 1987
Constitution must be understood in its proper legislative
context.
192. Prior to the drafting and ratification of the 1987

Constitution, the President had the power to appoint the
91
COMMENT
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Chairman and members of the executive department of the

then existing autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, i.e.,
the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook. Section 14 of P.D. No.
1618 provides that:
Section 14. Composition of the Lupong

Tagapagpaganap ng Pook. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook shall be composed of a Chairman and four
members who shall be appointed by the President on
recommendation of the Sangguniang Pampook and who
may or may not be members thereof. Any elective official
who is appointed Lupon Chairman or member of the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook shall vacate his elective
position, except his being a member of the Sangguniang
Pampook.
193. The President’s appointment of the Chairman and

four members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook is
anathema to the objective of granting autonomy from the
National Government. Thus, when Section 18, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution removed from the President the power
to appoint the officers of the executive department and
legislative assembly of the autonomous regions, the evident
intent is simply to give effect to the autonomy aspired by
the peoples of these regions. The indirect election of the
Chief Minister, a Member of the Bangsamoro Parliament,
adequately breathes life to this policy.
The classification and allocation of

seats for the Bangsamoro
Parliament comply with Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
194. The Bangsamoro Parliament shall be composed of

eighty members, unless otherwise increased by the
Congress of the Philippines. 127 In turn, Section 7, Article VII
of the Bangsamoro Organic Law classifies the seats into: (a)
Party Representatives, (b) Parliamentary District Seats, and
(c) Reserved Seats and Sectoral Representatives.
195. The Party Representatives consist of half of the

Bangsamoro Parliament, that is, forty seats which shall be
127
R.A. No. 11054, Article VII, Section 6.
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COMMENT
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allocated to representatives of political parties who are

elected through a system of proportional representation
based on the Bangsamoro territorial jurisdiction. 128 A
registered political party shall submit to the Bangsamoro
Electoral Office a list of nominees, ranked from one to forty,
from which party representatives shall be chosen in case
they obtain the required number of votes. 129 The number of
seats allocated for each political party shall be based
proportionately on the percentage of votes obtained by each
political party as against the total votes cast in the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region for the election of party
representatives.130
196. Moreover, a maximum of thirty-two seats shall be

elected from single member parliamentary districts
apportioned for the areas and in the manner provided for by
the Parliament.131 These district representatives shall be
elected through direct plurality vote by the registered voters
in the parliamentary districts. 132
197. Reserved Seats and Sectoral Representatives shall

occupy not less than eight seats in the Bangsamoro
Parliament which shall include two reserved seats each for
non-Moro indigenous peoples and settler communities.
Women, youth, traditional leaders, and the Ulama shall have
one sectoral seat each.133
198. Petitioner nonetheless challenges the composition

of the Bangsamoro Parliament, claiming that it is not
representative of the constituent political units, and that
sectoral representation is not permitted for the autonomous
regions.134 The argument is flawed.
199. By the unambiguous text of the Bangsamoro

Organic Law, the Party Representatives, elected through a
system of proportional representation based on the
128
Ibid. at Section 7(a).
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid. at Section 7(b).
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid. at Section 7(c).
134
Ibid. at pp. 22 – 23.
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COMMENT
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Bangsamoro territorial jurisdiction,135 and the

Parliamentary District Representatives, elected through
direct plurality vote by the registered voters in the
parliamentary districts,136 are without a doubt,
representative of the constituent political units of the current
ARMM and those that will vote in favor joining the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. The election of these two
classes of representatives is based on the territory of the
Bangsamoro territorial jurisdiction, in addition to the
requirement that no person shall be a member of the
Parliament unless she or he is a registered voter in the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. 137
200. Ergo, the Bangsamoro Parliament is

representative of the constituent political units of the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, as mandated by Section
18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
201. Besides, this Honorable Court will likewise note

that only regional political parties duly accredited by the
Bangsamoro Electoral Office, as approved by the COMELEC,
shall participate in the parliamentary elections in the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. 138 Add to that, the
COMELEC, under Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the 1987
Constitution, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of all elective regional officials. The COMELEC, therefore,
serves as the gatekeeper in ensuring that the parties
intending to participate in the election for seats in the
Bangsamoro Parliament, and must be allowed to exercise
this original jurisdiction at the proper time. It is too early in
the day for Petitioner to even claim that the composition of
the Bangsamoro Parliament is unconstitutional.
202. As regards the provision for Reserved Seats and

Sectoral Representatives, Petitioner is of the belief that
“unlike legislative bodies of local government units where
sectoral representation is recognized and sanctioned by the
Constitution, no counterpart provision of the same can be
135
Ibid. at Section 7(a).
136
Ibid. at Section 7(b).
137
Ibid. at Section 12.
138
Ibid. at Section 9.
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COMMENT
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found in Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the

Constitution.”139 This is a myopic reading of the Constitution.
203. Another basic rule of constitutional construction is

ut magis valeat quam pereat, that is, the Court must choose
the interpretation which gives effect to the whole of the
Constitution—its every word.140 As already discussed above,
autonomous regional governments are likewise classified as
local government units as understood under Article X,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, and as recently declared
by this Honorable Court in Mandanas v. Ochoa.141 In fact,
Autonomous Regions fall under Article X of the 1987
Constitution, with the epigraph “Local Governments.” Unless
otherwise specifically provided or clearly intended by the
Constitution, the General Provisions under Article X of the
1987 Constitution are likewise applicable to Autonomous
Regions.
204. For instance, one of the General Provisions under

Article X of the 1987 Constitution states that local
government units shall have a just share, as determined by
law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them.142 No counterpart provision exists under
the sub-heading “Autonomous Regions,” yet this Honorable
Court in Mandanas v. Ochoa143 held that the remaining 50%
of the collections of value-added taxes and 70% of the
collections of the other national taxes in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao shall be the exclusive share of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to
Section 9 and Section 15 of the Expanded ARMM Law.
205. Section 9, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,

found under General Provisions, which states that
“[l]egislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral
representation as may be prescribed by law” must be read
as similarly applicable to the autonomous regions, absent
any indication to the contrary. Congress consequently acted
within its power and jurisdiction in providing that reserved
139
Petition, p. 23.
140
See Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
141
G.R. Nos. 199802 & 208488, July 3, 2018.
142
1987 PHIL. CONST ., Article X, Section 6.
143
G.R. Nos. 199802 & 208488, July 3, 2018.
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COMMENT
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seats and sectoral representatives shall constitute at least

10% of the members of the Bangsamoro Parliament under
Section 7(c), Article VII of the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
206. The classification and allocation of seats for the

Bangsamoro Parliament into Party Representatives,
Parliamentary District Seats, and Reserved Seats and
Sectoral Representatives are therefore in faithful compliance
with Sections 9 and 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
VI.
THE CONSTITUTION ALLOWS CONGRESS TO
CONSTITUTE A BODY THAT WILL IMPLEMENT
THE BANGSAMORO ORGANIC LAW DURING
THE TRANSITION PERIOD. FURTHERMORE,
THE SELECTION OF THE MILF AS THE
LEADING ENTITY OF THE BANGSAMORO
TRANSITION AUTHORITY DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
207. Section 2, Article XVI of R.A. No. 11054 provides

for the creation of a Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA),
which shall serve as the interim government in the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region during the transition period
from the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law up to
the qualification of the elected Chief Minister. 144 The said
provision, as well as other related provisions in the
Bangsamoro Organic Law, states:
SEC. 1. Transition Period. – The transition period

for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region shall commence upon ratification of this Organic
Law.
This Organic Law shall be deemed ratified when

approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite as
proclaimed by the Commission on Elections or its duly
authorized officers.
The transition period shall end upon the dissolution

of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority as provided in this
Organic Law.
144
See R.A. 11054, Article XVI, Sections 1 and 12.
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COMMENT
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The transition period shall be without prejudice to

the initiation or continuation of other measures that may
be required by post-conflict transition and normalization
even beyond the term of the Bangsamoro Transition
Authority.
SEC. 2. Bangsamoro Transition Authority. –

There is hereby created a Bangsamoro Transition Authority
which shall be the interim government in the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region during the transition period. The Moro
Islamic Liberation Front shall lead the Bangsamoro
Transition Authority, without prejudice to the participation
of the Moro National Liberation Front in its membership.
The compensation of the members of the

Bangsamoro Transition Authority shall be subject to
existing rules and regulations of the National Government.
The Bangsamoro Transition Authority shall be

composed of eighty 1 (80) members, who shall be
appointed by the President: Provided, That, in addition, the
elected officials of the Autonomous Regional Government
in Muslim Mindanao shall automatically become members
of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority and shall serve
until noon of the 30th of June 2019: Provided, Further,
That non-Moro indigenous communities, youth, women,
settler communities, traditional leaders, and other sectors
shall have representatives in the Bangsamoro Transition
Authority.
SEC. 12. Dissolution of the Bangsamoro

Transition Authority. – Immediately upon the election
and qualification of the Chief Minister under the first
Parliament, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority shall be
deemed dissolved. Within sixty (60) days from the
assumption into office of all members of the
first Parliament, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority shall
submit its final report and recommendations on the status
of government during the transition period to the
Parliament, as well as to the House of Representatives, the
Senate of the Philippines, and the Office of the President.
208. Petitioner questions the very creation and purpose

of the BTA.145 It posits that because the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region is a new autonomous region separate
145
Petition, p. 41.
97
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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and distinct from the ARMM, then there is no need for a

transitory authority similar to the ARMM Law.146 Petitioner
also claims that the designation of the MILF to lead the BTA
violates the equal protection clause under the
147
Constitution. Hence, Petitioner concludes that the BTA is
merely a tool for placing the MILF in a separate class of its
own to the detriment and prejudice of other Muslims and
non-Muslims who are not members of the MILF. 148
Petitioner’s contentions are unmeritorious.
209. Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, it has been

repeatedly stated that no separate region is created. The
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region will merely replace the
current ARMM.
210. Consequently, there is a need for a body that will

ensure the successful transition to the new Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region, given that the existing legal framework
of the ARMM is incompatible with the structure of the
proposed Bangsamoro Government. For example, the
proposed system is parliamentary in form composed of
elected representatives, which means that there will no
longer be any regional governor and vice governor. 149 Thus,
the Congress recognized the need for a new body that will
implement the provisions of the Bangsamoro Organic Law
during the transition period, and exercised its legislative
prerogative in creating the BTA.150 This intent is underscored
in the enumerated functions and priorities of the BTA under
Section 4, wherein it is tasked to enact priority legislations,
determine parliamentary districts for the first regular
elections, and organize the bureaucracy of the Bangsamoro
government among others.151
The power to create a public office

is a legislative power.
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid. pp. 35 – 42.
148
Ibid. pp. 41 – 42.
149
See R.A. No. 11054, Article XVI, Section 10.
150
See Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1717 and House
Bill No. 6475 (Bangsamoro Basic Law), July 11, 2018, p. 82; July 12, 2018, pp. 232-233; AND July 18,
2018, pp. 119-120, 255-256, and 248. See also Committee On Local Government (Subcommittee on the
Bangsamoro Basic Law) Joint With The Committees On Constitutional Amendments And Revision Of
Codes; Ways And Means; And Finance, February 5, 2018, pp. 129-132.
151
See R.A. No. 11054, Article XVI, Section 4.
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211. Moreover, Congress has the prerogative to create

a public office that shall implement that laws it enacts. 152
According to this Honorable Court in Atitiw v. Zamora:153
Except for such offices as are created by the

Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily
a legislative function. Insofar as the legislative power in
this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it
is supreme; the legislature may decide for itself
what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When
in the exigencies of government, it is
necessary to create and define duties the legislative branch
has the discretion to determine whether
additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties
shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of
existing offices. An office created by the legislature is
wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe
the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of
the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office. 154
212. It is also important to note that this Honorable

Court had already upheld the power of Congress to vest the
President with the power to appoint officers-in-charge of the
autonomous regions provided that the power to appoint is
only an interim and temporary measure. According to this
Honorable Court in Abas Kida v. Senate:155
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the

interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to
adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization
unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and
based on the above considerations, given the plain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and
the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for
lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power
to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an
interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
152
See Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001.
153
G.R. No. 143374, September 30, 2005.
154
Citation omitted.
155
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.
99
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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Admittedly, the grant of the power to the

President under other situations or where the power of
appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period
for synchronization would be to foster a government that is
not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right
to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to
be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally
breach the elective and representative governance
requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very

limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153
where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms
of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be
touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously
been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the
Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary
measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization

will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice
of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that
interim measures have been adopted and used in the
creation of local government units and the adjustments of
sub-provinces to the status of provinces. These measures,
too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the
synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the
regional interests involved). The adoption of these
measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise
by Congress of the inherent police power of the State,
where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of
the interim measure taken in light of the given
circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the

chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the
appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the elective
aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In
this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address
concerns arising from the appointments by providing,
under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete
terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and
Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No.

10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not
100
COMMENT
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violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy

provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the
circumstances.
213. In the instant case, Section 13, Article XVI of the

Bangsamoro Organic Law provides that the first regular
election for the Bangsamoro Government under this Organic
Law shall be held and synchronized with the 2022 national
elections. Thus, aside from the inherent incompatibility
between the provisions of the Expanded ARMM Law and the
Bangsamoro Organic Law, the intended synchronization of
elections in 2022 is a legal ground, following the
pronouncement in Abas Kida,156 for Congress to empower
the President to appoint officials that will exercise transitory
authority until such time that the officials of the Bangsamoro
Government shall have been elected.
There is no violation of the equal

protection clause.
214. Petitioner’s argument that the designation of the

MILF as the leading entity of the BTA to the exclusion of
other inhabitants of the ARMM who are not Muslims nor MILF
members infringes the equal protection clause.157 This is
premature and deserves scant consideration.
215. The issue is not yet ripe for judicial adjudication

because the Bangsamoro Organic Law has yet to be ratified
and the members of the BTA are yet to be appointed. The
Honorable Court has ruled that for a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then
been accomplished or performed by either branch of
government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
Petitioner must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of.158 Similarly, in this case, Petitioner’s
perceived injury, if at all, is mere speculation not subject to
judicial review.
156
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011.
157
Petition, pp. 40-41.
158
PHILCONSA v. GPH, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016.
101
COMMENT
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216. Equal protection simply requires that all persons

or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 159 In Garcia
v. Drilon,160 the Honorable Court held that “[t]he mere fact
that the legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid.” Thus, the Court has ruled that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or di stinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.161
217. In this case, there is a rational basis for the

designation of the MILF in leading the BTA given that the
Bangsamoro Organic Law is a product of years of peace
negotiations between the government and, primarily, the
MILF. In fact, it was with the MILF that the Philippine
Government forged the 2012 FAB and the 2014 CAB which
eventually led to the drafting of the Bangsamoro Organic
Law. Given the undeniable contributions of the MILF in
turning the Bangsamoro dream into a reality, it is only
reasonable for Congress to allow them to lead the BTA with
their institutional knowledge. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the
Congress’ intent of ensuring a successful transition to the
new Bangsamoro Government.
218. Furthermore, Petitioner’s baseless claim that the

BTA will primarily be composed of MILF members 162 must
also be brushed aside because the assailed provision clearly
allows other non-MILF members to participate. As provided
in the third paragraph of the same provision, which
petitioner conveniently omits, 163 the BTA “shall be composed
of eighty (80) members, who shall be appointed by the
President: Provided, That, in addition, the elected officials
of the Autonomous Regional Government in Muslim
159
Garcia v. Hon. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.
160
G.R. No. 179367, June 25, 2013.
161
Ibid.
162
163
102
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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Mindanao shall automatically become members of the

[BTA …]: Provided, Further, That non-Moro indigenous
communities, youth, women, settler communities,
traditional leaders, and other sectors shall have
representatives in the [BTA].”164 The provision further
explicitly recognizes that the MNLF may become members of
the BTA contrary to Petitioner’s assertion.165
VII.
THE FORMATION OF AN AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO IS MADE
MANDATORY BY NO LESS THAN THE
CONSTITUTION. NO INFRINGEMENT OF THE
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE MAY BE
IMPUTED AGAINST THE STATE FOR
FULFILLING THIS MANDATE.
219. Petitioner claims that the enactment of the

Bangsamoro Organic Law violates the non-establishment
clause enshrined in the constitution.166 Particularly,
Petitioner maintains that government funds are being, and
will further be, spent by the State just to “accommodate”
and satisfy Respondent Islam-believing MILF’s thirst for
power.167 Petitioner also posits that the ARMM, as well as the
other local government units and geographical areas ought
to be part of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, has
essentially been converted into a Muslim Religion
permanently appropriated for the exclusive use, enjoyment,
and even abuse of its faithful.168 Hence, Petitioner concludes
that the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the establishment of
the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region will prejudice not only
the other religions but the entire Filipino nation as well. 169
Petitioner’s claims are bereft of merit.
The Constitution mandates the

creation of an autonomous region in
“Muslim Mindanao.”
164
R.A. No. 11054, Article XVI, Section 2; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
165
Id.
166
Petition, p, 42.
167
Id., p. 44
168
Id., p. 45.
169
Id.
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COMMENT
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220. No less than the Constitution authorizes the

creation of an autonomous region in “Muslim Mindanao.”
Section 15, Article X thereof provides:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous

regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
Philippines.
221. As can be gleaned from the provision, the term

“Muslim Mindanao”170 is used in the Constitution not to
establish a particular religion but to describe the
autonomous region. In fact, the framers voted against
changing the term “Muslim Mindanao” to “predominantly
Muslim areas of Mindanao.” 171 As explained by
Commissioner Ponciano L. Bennagen, the term is meant to
be as descriptive as when the rest of the country is referred
to as “Christian majority”:172
MR. BENNAGEN. I think we use “Muslim Mindanao”

here in the sense that we also use
“Christian Philippines” to refer to
our country in relation to the Asian
context. When we use “Christian
Philippines,” we do not deny the
existence of other religious groups.
So, I think we should take the term
in that context.
Also, we should recognize the fact

that there are areas in Muslim
Mindanao where several groups of
ethnic origins, of ethnic religious
language and characteristics
harmoniously coexist. We should
encourage that kind of social
harmony in the region.
170
The term is also used in Article X, Sections 1 and 19 of the Constitution.
171
172
Report of the Peace Council on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, p. 14, available at
http://www.bantaybayanihan.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/263331469-Full-report-Peace-Council-on-
the-BBL.pdf (last accessed December 13, 2018). See also III RECORD OF T HE 1986 CONST IT UT IONAL
COMMISSION, pp. 183, 185, 224, and 375; emphasis supplied.
104
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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Thank you, Madam President. 173
222. Thus, considering that no less than the

Constitution itself uses the term, the same cannot be
interpreted as a preference of one particular religion over
the others.
223. Finally, Section 1, Article II of the Bangsamoro

Organic Law defines “Bangsamoro People” as “[t]hose who,
at the advent of the Spanish colonization, were considered
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago and its adjacent islands, whether of mixed or full
blood, shall have the right to identify themselves, their
spouses and descendants, as Bangsamoro.” An objective
examination of this provision readily shows that the term
“Muslim Mindanao” is actually further secularized by using
“Bangsamoro,” giving more emphasis on the historical
character, rather than a religious one.174
There is no infringement of the non-

establishment clause.
224. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the

Bangsamoro Organic Law does not violate the non-
establishment clause, which is provided in Section 5,175
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This Honorable Court in
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding Of Religious
Rituals at the Hall Of Justice Building in Quezon City,176
citing noted constitutionalist Father Joaquin Bernas,
explained what the non-establishment clause entails, viz.:
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of

separation between Church and State. It simply means
that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over
another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a
173
174
Id.
175
1987 PHIL. CONST ., Article III, Section 5 states that: “No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference shall forever be ed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.”
176
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
105
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot

punish a person for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activity or institution
whatever they may be called or whatever form they may
adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot
openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is
that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official
religion.
In the same breath that the establishment clause

restricts what the government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establish a state religion.
Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as

follows:
‘In effect, what non-establishment calls for is

government neutrality in religious matters. Such
government neutrality may be summarized in four
general propositions: (1) Government must not
prefer one religion over another or religion over
irreligion because such preference would violate
voluntarism and breed dissension; (2) Government
funds must not be applied to religious purposes
because this too would violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension; (3) Government action must
not aid religion because this too can violate
voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; [and]
(4) Government action must not result in excessive
entanglement with religion because this too can
violate voluntarism and breed interfaith
dissension.’177
225. The Bangsamoro Organic Law does not violate the

separation of church and state. Its enactment would neither
result in a preference or establishment of one religion over
the others, nor in an excessive entanglement with any
religion. In addition, no government funds will be
appropriated for the exclusive use of one particular religion ,
177
JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONST IT UT ION OF T HE PHILIPPINES, p. 346 (2009 ed.).
106
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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whether directly or indirectly, as the State does not aim to

aid any particular one.
226. Petitioner is mistaken in arguing that the law

infringes the non-establishment clause enshrined in the
1987 Constitution. In fact, the law guarantees the freedom
of religion of non-Muslims. Section 10, Article IV, and
Section 5, Article IX of the Bangsamoro Organic Law state:
Article IV, SEC 10. Freedom of Choice.– The Freedom

of choice of all peoples within the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region shall be respected. Indigenous peoples shall have
the freedom to retain their distinct indigenous and ethnic
identity in addition to their Bangsamoro political identity.
There shall be no discrimination on the basis of identity,
religion, and ethnicity.
Article IX, SEC. 5. Religious Freedom. - The

Bangsamoro Government shall guarantee religious freedom
and the free exercise thereof pursuant to the Constitution,
national laws, and principles of international law. The
Bangsamoro Government shall protect all persons from
harassment or any undue pressure, coercion, and violence
on account of religion. Any establishment and institution
shall be free to implement policies and undertake activities
pursuant to their respective religious beliefs and values.
227. Pursuant to the foregoing premises, all persons

within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall have the
right to choose their religion and they cannot be
discriminated against on the basis of such choice. Contrary
to Petitioner’s contention, therefore, they are not necessarily
converted into a Muslim religion.
VIII.
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
228. Public Respondents replead the foregoing and

oppose Petitioner’s application for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
107
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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229. The requisites for the issuance of an injunctive

writ are the following:
(a) the applicant must have a clear and

unmistakable right, that is a right in esse;
(b) there is a material and substantial invasion of
such right;
(c) there is an urgent need for the writ to
prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;
and
(d) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate
remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.178
230. In applications for injunctive relief, the burden is

on the applicant to show that there is meritorious ground for
the issuance of a TRO in its favor. 179 The very nature of a
writ of injunction requires that the allegations in support of
the applicant must be strictly construed against the
applicant.180
A.
PETITIONER HAS NO CLEAR AND
UNMISTAKABLE RIGHT TO THE INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF PRAYED FOR. ITS ALLEGATIONS ARE
SPECULATIVE, MAKING ITS APPLICATION
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PREMATURE.
231. Petitioner claims that unless a TRO and Writ of

Preliminary Injunction is issued by this Honorable Court, the
people of the Province of Sulu “will be coerced and
compelled to be part of an autonomous region even if the
votes cast in the plebiscite called for that purpose resulted in
its peoples’ desire for exclusion.”181 This is highly speculative
and should be given scant consideration.
178
Marquez v. The Presiding Judge Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez, et al., G.R. No. 141849, February 13, 2007,
515 SCRA 577, 594.
179
Cayabyab, et al. v. Dimson, et al., G.R. No. 223862, July 10, 2017, citing Australian Professional
Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, G.R. No. 183367, March 14, 2012.
180
Buayan Cattle Company, Inc. v. Quintillan, et al., G.R. No. L-26970, March, 19 1984, 128 SCRA 276,
286, emphasis supplied.
181
Petition, p. 45.
108
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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232. This Honorable Court has defined a right in esse

as a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, one
clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law.182 Thus, an injunction will not issue to protect
a right not in esse and which may never arise, nor will the
writ be granted to restrain an act which does not give rise to
a cause of action.183 Moreover, a TRO is of the same nature
as an injunction, it is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights; the possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of actual existing right is not a ground
for the issuance thereof.184
233. The creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous

Region and determination of its territorial jurisdiction are
contingent on the results of the plebiscite as provided
in Section 3, Article XV of the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
Thus, if majority of the electorate votes against the approval
of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the ARMM will remain
intact, and the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region will be rejected.
234. There exists no clear legal right upon which

Petitioner anchors its application for preliminary injunctive
relief. As succinctly put by this Honorable Court, ‘clear legal
right,’ within the meaning of Rule 58 contemplates a right
‘clearly founded in or granted by law.’ Any hint of doubt or
dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of
preliminary injunctive relief. 185
235. Petitioner Province of Sulu is not being forced to

be a member of an autonomous region, as the people of
Sulu freely made that choice when they voted in favor of
regional autonomy on 17 November 1989 during the
ratification of the ARMM Law.
236. In other words, Petitioner failed to cite any

provision in law to support its claim that it has the
182
Eugine Lim v. BPI Agricultural Development Bank, G.R. No. 1179230, March 9, 2010.
183
Cereno v. Dictado, G.R. No. L-81550, April 15, 1988.
184
Brizuela v. Dingle and Legaspi, G.R. No. 175371, April 30, 2008, citing Heirs of Asuncion v. Gervacio,
Jr., et al., G.R. No. 115741, March 9, 1999; emphasis supplied.
185
Executive Secretary, et al. v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324, January 7, 2013,
citing Boncodin v. NECU, G.R. No. 162716, September 27, 2006, and Sps. Arcega v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-20869, August 28, 1975.
109
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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demandable right to be excluded from the autonomous

region of which it voluntarily decided to be a part of. In
truth, no such right exists. It is entirely up to Congress to
decide a priori which provinces, cities, and geographical
areas it deems should or should not be part of the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
B.
PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT IT WILL
SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NOT ISSUED.
237. Jurisprudence provides when an injury is

considered irreparable, to wit:
Respecting the element of irreparable injury, the landmark

case of Social Security Commission v. Bayona teaches:
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of

the rule relative to the issuance of injunction
where there is no standard by which their
amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy (Crouc v. Central Labor Council, 83 ALR,
193). “An irreparable injury which a court of
equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong
of a repeated and continuing kind which
produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that
can be estimated only by conjecture, and not
by any accurate standard of measurement”
(Phipps v. Rogue River Valley Canal Co., 7 ALR,
741). An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction
consists of “a serious charge of, or is destructive to,
the property it affects, either physically or in the
character in which it has been held and enjoined, or
when the property has some peculiar quality or use,
so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense
the owner of the loss thereof” (Dunker v. Field and
Tub Club, 92 P., 502). (emphasis supplied) 186
238. In Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. De

los Angeles,187 the Supreme Court explained that injury is
irreparable if:
186
Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-Delorino, G.R. No. 177130, June 7, 2011, citing Social Security Commission v.
Bayona, G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962; emphasis in the original.
187
G.R. No. L-27829, August 19, 1988.
110
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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[I]t is of such constant and frequent recurrence

that no fair or reasonable redress can be had
therefor in a court of law or where there is no standard
by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical
computation.188
239. Irreparable injury must be such that is frequent,

recurring, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and one which
leaves the aggrieved party without other adequate modes of
redress.
240. Petitioner claims that, aside from the Province of

Sulu, the entire country as well will suffer grave and
irreparable damage and injury resulting in manifest
injustice.189 However, it failed to point to any specific serious
and irreparable damage to the Province of Sulu, more so to
the entire country, which would call for the issuance of the
provisional remedies prayed for.
241. Based on Petitioner’s allegations, the damage

contemplated to the Province of Sulu is highly speculative.
To reiterate, the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law
will only be determined after the conduct of a plebiscite.
242. If any damage at all will be suffered by Petitioner,

the damage contemplated is not irreparable and is capable
of reasonable redress by the courts of law. The effects of the
enforcement of the Bangsamoro Organic Law pertaining to
the plebiscite are not permanent, but reversible. Nothing
bars this Honorable Court from ordering the exclusion of the
Province of Sulu or any of the constituent units of the ARMM
from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region after the conduct
of the plebiscite.
243. In fact, the votes cast by each province, city and

geographical area in the plebiscite may be segregated from
the rest of the ARMM because the COMELEC, through its
canvassing process, is capable of determining the total
number of votes cast by each province of the current ARMM.
188
Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.
189
Petition, p. 6.
111
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
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The pertinent provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 10464

prove this point, viz.:
ARTICLE VII
CANVASSING OF VOTES BY THE PLEBISCITE BOARD OF
CANVASSERS
SEC. 40. Plebiscite board of canvassers are hereby

constituted:
b) Provincial Plebiscite Board of Canvassers

(PPBOC) each for the provinces of Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Lanao
del Norte, to be composed of the: i) Provincial Election
Supervisor (PES) of the province or a lawyer of the
Commission, as Chairperson; ii) Provincial Prosecutor, as
Vice-Chairperson; and iii) District School Superintendent of
the province, as Member-Secretary;
SEC. 61. Canvassing procedures for the PPBOCs in

the provinces of AMRR. – The PPBOCs in the ARMM shall
follow the applicable canvass procedures used by the
MPBOC/CPBOC in the canvass of the Certificates of Votes
submitted to it by the MPBOC/CPBOC.
Upon completion of the canvass, the PPBOCs in

the ARMM shall prepare a Certificate of Canvass of
Votes By Provincial Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
(CEF 26-1), in four (4) copies, for distribution to the
following:
a) Regional Plebiscite Board of Canvassers

(RPBOC);
b) Election Records and Statistic Department
(ERSD), Commission on Elections;
c) Chairperson of the PPBOC; and
d) Citizens’ Arm of the Commission
…190
244. Before the votes are canvassed at the regional

level, that is, before the total number of votes in the region
are tallied for purposes of determining whether the
Bangsamoro Organic Law has been ratified by the ARMM as
190
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
112
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
one entity, the COMELEC would be able to determine as well

the canvass of votes for each of the five component
provinces, including Sulu, and the City of Marawi
constituting the current ARMM.
245. Petitioner thus failed to allege, much less

substantiate, that it is sustaining, or is likely to sustain,
irreparable injury as would warrant the issuance of a TRO
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
C.
THE PUBLIC WILL SUFFER GRAVE AND
IRREPARABLE INJURY IF THE INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF IS ISSUED.
246. The purpose of the Bangsamoro Organic Law is to

establish a political entity, and to provide for its basic
structure of government in recognition of the justness and
legitimacy of the cause of the Bangsamoro people and the
aspirations of Muslim Filipinos and all ICCs in the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.191
247. The Bangsamoro Organic Law is the embodiment

of years of hard work towards peace between the Philippine
Government and the Muslim Filipinos. Through its
enactment, the Bangsamoro people and all other inhabitants
in the proposed Bangsamoro Autonomous Region are finally
given an opportunity to secure their identity and posterity,
and to attain meaningful self-governance within the
framework of the Constitution and the national sovereignty
Philippines.192
248. If this Honorable Court were to grant the

injunctive relief being prayed for by Petitioner, it would
deprive the Bangsamoro people the chance to vote for their
self-determination and self-reliance. Inevitably, an injunctive
writ would only further stall years of peace talks and
191
R.A. No. 11054, Section 3.
192
Ibid.
113
COMMENT
G.R. No. 242255
x---------------------------x
negotiations between the Government and the Muslim

Filipinos.
249. Beyond cavil, it is the Bangsamoro people and all

ICCs in Muslim Mindanao, and ultimately the Filipino people
as a whole, that will suffer grave and irreparable injury if the
injunctive relief prayed for by Petitioner is issued.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Public Respondents, through the Office

of the Solicitor General, respectfully pray that this Honorable
Court:
a. DENY the Petitioner’s application for the issuance

of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction;
b. DENY the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

dated 11 October 2018 for utter lack of merit; and
c. AFFIRM the CONSTITUTIONALITY of Republic

Act No. 11054, otherwise known as the Organic
Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao.
Public Respondents likewise request such further or

other relief that may be deemed just and equitable under
the premises.
Makati City for the City of Manila, 3 January 2019.
114

Comments of The Solicitor General On The Petition Against BOL

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Comments of The Solicitor General On The Petition Against BOL

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

THE PROVINCE OF SULU,

HONORABLE SALVADOR C. G.R. No. 242255

The HONORABLE SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, in

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. In this present Petition for Certiorari and

2. Petitioner likewise asks for the issuance of a

conduct of the plebiscite for its ratification on 21 January

3. A discussion of the constitutionality of the

The armed struggle for regional

4. The Moro people’s struggle for self-determination

5. In March 1967, about 180 Muslim trainees were

6. Following the tragic Jabidah massacre, groups

7. On 21 September 1972, President Ferdinand E.

8. In 1973, the Moro National Liberation Front,

9. In 1974, the Organization of Islamic Conference

10. On 23 December 1976, the Philippine Government

11. To put an end to the armed struggle in Southern

First: The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern

Second: The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the

1. Foreign Policy shall be of the competence of the Central

2. The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the

3. In the areas of the autonomy, the Muslims shall have

shall be upon the recommendation from the authorities

4. Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the

5. The Muslims shall have their own administrative

6. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of

7. The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the

8. Special Regional Security Forces are to be setup in the

9. A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council

10. Mines and mineral resources fall within the competence

11. A Mixed Committee shall be composed of

12. Cease-fire shall be declared immediately after the

12. On 14 February 1977, Presidential Decree No.

13. Negotiations between the Philippine Government

14. From 12 to 22 March 1977, the Government

15. Colonel Ghaddafi “proposed to break the impasse

16. On 25 March 1977, President Marcos issued

17. During the referendum on 17 April 1977, only the

18. Furthermore, Question No. 10 was overwhelmingly

19. In April 1977, the peace talks between the

20. Armed struggle in Southern Philippines continued,

21. On 23 March 1979, the Interim Batasang

22. On 25 July 1979, former President Marcos issued

23. However, P.D. No. 1618 contained provisions

24. P.D. No. 1618 instead provided, among others,

Section 14. Composition of the Lupong

Section 35. Relationship with the National

(b) The President shall have the power of general

25. The Autonomous Regions in Regions IX and XII

26. On 25 February 1986, the People Power

The 1986 Constitutional

27. Immediately upon holding office, President

28. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional

29. Commissioner Jose N. Nolledo, along with other

30. After much discussion, the members of the 1986

autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. They provided in

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act

The creation of the autonomous region shall be

31. On 2 February 1987, the 1987 Constitution was

The enactment of Republic Act No.

32. President Corazon Aquino’s incumbency cultivated

33. In the meantime, the first Congress under the